Americas Headquarters:
Cisco Systems, Inc., 170 West Tasman Drive, San Jose, CA 95134-1706 USA
© 2021 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. This document is Cisco Public.
Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3x00 Rugged
Series (IE3200, IE3300, IE3400, IE3400H) Switches
running IOS-XE 17.3
Common Criteria Security Target
Version 1.0
3 August 2021
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Table of Contents
Table of Contents.......................................................................................................................................2
List of Tables ..............................................................................................................................................4
List of Figures .............................................................................................................................................4
1 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION........................................................................................9
1.1 ST and TOE Reference ..........................................................................................................9
1.2 TOE Overview....................................................................................................................... 10
1.2.1 TOE Product Type........................................................................................................ 10
1.2.2 Supported non-TOE Hardware/ Software/ Firmware........................................... 10
1.3 TOE DESCRIPTION ............................................................................................................. 11
1.4 TOE Evaluated Configuration ............................................................................................ 13
1.5 Physical Scope of the TOE................................................................................................. 14
1.6 Logical Scope of the TOE................................................................................................... 16
1.6.1 Security Audit ............................................................................................................... 16
1.6.2 Cryptographic Support ................................................................................................ 17
1.6.3 Identification and authentication.............................................................................. 19
1.6.4 Security Management ................................................................................................. 20
1.6.5 Protection of the TSF.................................................................................................. 21
1.6.6 TOE Access................................................................................................................... 21
1.6.7 Trusted path/Channels............................................................................................... 21
1.7 Excluded Functionality........................................................................................................ 22
2 Conformance Claims...................................................................................................................23
2.1 Common Criteria Conformance Claim ............................................................................. 23
2.2 Protection Profile Conformance........................................................................................ 23
2.3 Protection Profile Conformance Claim Rationale .......................................................... 23
2.3.1 TOE Appropriateness .................................................................................................. 23
2.3.2 TOE Security Problem Definition Consistency ....................................................... 23
2.3.3 Statement of Security Requirements Consistency ................................................ 24
3 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION..........................................................................................25
3.1 Assumptions ......................................................................................................................... 25
3.2 Threats................................................................................................................................... 27
3.3 Organizational Security Policies........................................................................................ 29
4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES.............................................................................................................30
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4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE........................................................................................ 30
4.2 Security Objectives for the Environment......................................................................... 30
5 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS .....................................................................................................32
5.1 Conventions .......................................................................................................................... 32
5.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements........................................................................... 33
5.2.1 Security audit (FAU).................................................................................................... 35
5.2.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)..................................................................................... 38
5.2.3 Identification and authentication (FIA).................................................................... 43
5.2.4 Security management (FMT)..................................................................................... 46
5.2.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT) ...................................................................................... 47
5.2.6 TOE Access (FTA)........................................................................................................ 49
5.2.7 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)................................................................................... 49
5.3 TOE SFR Dependencies Rationale for SFRs Found in NDcPPv2.2e .......................... 50
5.4 Security Assurance Requirements.................................................................................... 50
5.4.1 SAR Requirements....................................................................................................... 50
5.4.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale.......................................................... 51
5.5 Assurance Measures........................................................................................................... 51
6 TOE Summary Specification ......................................................................................................53
6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirement Measures.......................................................... 53
7 Annex A: Key Zeroization............................................................................................................71
7.1 Key Zeroization .................................................................................................................... 71
8 Annex B: NIAP Technical Decisions.........................................................................................74
9 Annex C: References...................................................................................................................78
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List of Tables
TABLE 1 ACRONYMS ...........................................................................................................................................................................................5
TABLE 2 TERMINOLOGY .....................................................................................................................................................................................7
TABLE 3 ST AND TOE IDENTIFICATION..........................................................................................................................................................9
TABLE 4 IT ENVIRONMENT COMPONENTS....................................................................................................................................................10
TABLE 5 HARDWARE MODELS AND SPECIFICATIONS .................................................................................................................................15
TABLE 6 CAVP REFERENCES...........................................................................................................................................................................18
TABLE 7 TOE PROVIDED CRYPTOGRAPHY ...................................................................................................................................................19
TABLE 8 EXCLUDED FUNCTIONALITY .............................................................................................................................................................22
TABLE 9 PROTECTION PROFILES.....................................................................................................................................................................23
TABLE 10 TOE ASSUMPTIONS ........................................................................................................................................................................25
TABLE 11 THREATS ..........................................................................................................................................................................................27
TABLE 12 ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES.......................................................................................................................................29
TABLE 13 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE ENVIRONMENT........................................................................................................................30
TABLE 14 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ...................................................................................................................................34
TABLE 15 AUDITABLE EVENTS.......................................................................................................................................................................35
TABLE 16: ASSURANCE MEASURES ................................................................................................................................................................51
TABLE 17 ASSURANCE MEASURES..................................................................................................................................................................52
TABLE 18 HOW TOE SFRS MEASURES.........................................................................................................................................................53
TABLE 19: TOE KEY ZEROIZATION................................................................................................................................................................71
TABLE 20 NIAP TECHNICAL DECISIONS (TD).............................................................................................................................................74
TABLE 21: REFERENCES ...................................................................................................................................................................................78
List of Figures
FIGURE 1 TOE EXAMPLE DEPLOYMENT .......................................................................................................................................................12
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Acronyms
The following acronyms and abbreviations are common and may be used in this Security
Target.
Table 1 Acronyms
Acronyms /
Abbreviations
Definition
AAA Administration, Authorization, and Accounting
ACL Access Control Lists
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
BRI Basic Rate Interface
CAK Secure Connectivity Association Key
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security
CKN Secure Connectivity Association Key Name
CM Configuration Management
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol
EAP-TLS EAP Transport Layer Security
EAPOL EAP over LANs
EHWIC Ethernet High-Speed WIC
ESP Encapsulating Security Payload
GCM Galois Counter Mode
GE Gigabit Ethernet port
ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IGMP Internet Group Management Protocol
IOS-XE The proprietary operating system developed by Cisco Systems
IP Internet Protocol
IPsec IP Security
ISDN Integrated Services Digital Network
IT Information Technology
MAC Media Access Control
MSK Master Session Key
NDcPP collaborative Network Device Protection Profile
NVRAM Non-volatile random access memory, specifically the memory in the switch where the
configuration parameters are stored
OS Operating System
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Acronyms /
Abbreviations
Definition
Packet A block of data sent over the network transmitting the identities of the sending and
receiving stations, error-control information, and message
PBKDF2 Password-Based Key Derivation Function version 2
PoE Power over Ethernet
PP Protection Profile
PRNG Pseudo Random Number Generator
RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial In User Service
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (algorithm for public-key cryptography)
SA Security Association
SAK Secure Association Key
SC Secure Channel
SCI Secure Channel Identifier
SecTAG MAC Security TAG
SecY MAC Security Entity
SCI Secure Channel Identifier
SecTAG MAC Security TAG
SecY MAC Security Entity
SFP Small–form-factor pluggable port
SHS Secure Hash Standard
SM Service Module
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SSHv2 Secure Shell (version 2)
ST Security Target
TCP Transport Control Protocol
TCP/IP Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Function
TSP TOE Security Policy
UDP User datagram protocol
WAN Wide Area Network
WIC WAN Interface Card
Terminology
The following terms are common and may be used in this Security Target.
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Table 2 Terminology
Term Definition
Authorized
Administrator
Any user that has been assigned to a privilege level that is permitted to perform all
TSF-related functions.
Peer Another switch on the network that the TOE interfaces.
Remote VPN
Gateway/Peer
A remote VPN Gateway/Peer is another network device that the TOE sets up a VPN
connection with. This could be a VPN client or another switch.
Security
Administrator
Synonymous with Authorized Administrator for the purposes of this evaluation.
User Any entity (human user or external IT entity) outside the TOE that interacts with the
TOE.
vty vty is a term used by Cisco to describe a single terminal (whereas Terminal is more
of a verb or general action term).
Firmware (per NIST
for FIPS validated
cryptographic
modules)
The programs and data components of a cryptographic module that are stored in
hardware (e.g., ROM, PROM, EPROM, EEPROM or FLASH) within the cryptographic
boundary and cannot be dynamically written or modified during execution.
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DOCUMENT INTRODUCTION
Prepared By:
Cisco Systems, Inc.
170 West Tasman Dr.
San Jose, CA 95134
This document provides the basis for an evaluation of a specific Target of Evaluation (TOE),
Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3x00 Rugged Series (IE3200, IE3300, IE3400, IE3400H)
Switches running IOS-XE 17.3 . This Security Target (ST) defines a set of assumptions about
the aspects of the environment, a list of threats that the product intends to counter, a set of
security objectives, a set of security requirements and the IT security functions provided by
the TOE which meet the set of requirements.
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1 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION
The Security Target contains the following sections:
• Security Target Introduction [Section 1]
• Conformance Claims [Section 2]
• Security Problem Definition [Section 3]
• Security Objectives [Section 4]
• IT Security Requirements [Section 5]
• TOE Summary Specification [Section 6]
• Key Zeroization [Annex A]
• NIAP Technical Decisions [Annex B]
• References [Annex C]
The structure and content of this ST comply with the requirements specified in the Common
Criteria (CC), Part 1, Annex A, and Part 2.
1.1 ST and TOE Reference
This section provides information needed to identify and control this ST and its TOE.
Table 3 ST and TOE Identification
Name Description
ST Title Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3x00 Rugged Series (IE3200, IE3300, IE3400,
IE3400H) Switches running IOS-XE 17.3 Common Criteria Security Target
ST Version 1.0
Publication Date 3 August 2021
Vendor and ST
Author
Cisco Systems, Inc.
TOE Reference Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet IE3x00 Rugged Series (IE3200, IE3300,
IE3400, IE3400H) Switches
TOE Hardware
Models
IE3200, IE3300, IE3400 and IE3400H Rugged Series
TOE Software
Version
IOS-XE 17.3
Keywords Audit, Authentication, Encryption, Network Device, Secure Administration
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1.2 TOE Overview
The Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet IE3x00 Rugged Series (IE3200, IE3300, IE3400,
IE3400H) Switches (here after referred to as Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet IE3x00 Rugged
Series Switches), all running IOS-XE 17.3. The TOE is a purpose-built, switching and routing
platform with OSI Layer2 and Layer3 traffic filtering capabilities. The TOE includes the
hardware models as defined in Table 3 in Section 1.1.
1.2.1 TOE Product Type
The Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet IE3x00 Rugged Series Switches are switching and
routing platforms that provide connectivity and security services. These switches offer
broadband speeds and simplified management to small businesses, and enterprise small
branch and teleworkers.
The Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet IE3x00 Rugged Series Switches is a single-device
security and switching solutions for protecting the network.
1.2.2 Supported non-TOE Hardware/ Software/ Firmware
The TOE supports the following hardware, software, and firmware components in its
operational environment. Each component is identified as being required or not based on the
claims made in this Security Target. All the following environment components are supported
by all TOE evaluated configurations.
Table 4 IT Environment Components
Component Required Usage/Purpose Description for TOE performance
Audit (syslog)
Server
Yes This includes any syslog server to which the TOE transmits syslog
messages over a secure IPsec trusted channel either directly or connected
to a TOE Peer that also supports a secure IPsec trusted channel.
Local Console Yes This includes any IT Environment Console that is directly connected to the
TOE via the Serial Console Port and is used by the TOE administrator to
support TOE administration.
Management
Workstation with
SSHv2 client
Yes This includes any IT Environment Management workstation that is used by
the TOE administrator to support TOE administration using SSHv2
protected channels. Any SSH client that supports SSHv2 may be used.
Certification
Authority (CA)
Yes This includes any IT Environment Certification Authority (CA) on the TOE
network. The CA can be used to provide the TOE with a valid certificate
during certificate enrollment as well as validating a certificate.
TOE Peer Conditional The TOE Peer is required if the remote syslog server is attached for the
TOE’s use. If the remote syslog server is directly connected to the TOE for
the TOE’s use, then the TOE Peer is not required.
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1.3 TOE DESCRIPTION
This section provides an overview of the Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet IE3x00 Rugged
Series Switches Target of Evaluation (TOE). The TOE is comprised of both software and
hardware. The hardware is comprised of the following hardware models as described in 1.5
Physical Scope of the TOE. The software is comprised of the Universal Cisco Internet
Operating System (IOS) XE software image Release IOS-XE 17.3 .
The Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet IE3x00 Rugged Series Switches that comprises the
TOE has common hardware characteristics as described in Table 5 Hardware Models and
Specifications. These characteristics affect only non-TSF relevant functions of the switches
(such as throughput and amount of storage) and therefore support security equivalency of
the switches in terms of hardware.
The Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet IE3x00 Rugged Series Switches primary features
include the following:
• Central processor that supports all system operations;
• Dynamic memory, used by the central processor for all system operation;
• x86 CPU complex with minimum, based on model of 2 GB memory, 1.5 GB of flash and
external USB 4GB SD pluggable storage slot (optional);
• Flash memory (EEPROM), used to store the Cisco IOS-XE image (binary program);
• Non-volatile read-only memory (ROM) is used to store the bootstrap program and
power-on diagnostic programs and
• Non-volatile random-access memory (NVRAM) is used to store switch configuration
parameters that are used to initialize the system at start-up.
• Physical network interfaces (minimally two) (e.g. RJ45 serial and standard
10/100/1000 Ethernet ports). Some models have a fixed number and/or type of
interfaces; some models have slots that accept additional network interfaces;
• Dedicated management port on the switch, RJ-45 console port and a USB mini-Type
B console connection and
• Built for harsh environments and temperature ranges, fanless, convection-cooled with
no moving parts for extended durability and hardened for vibration, shock and surge,
and electrical noise immunity.
Cisco IOS-XE is a Cisco-developed highly configurable proprietary operating system that
provides for efficient and effective routing and switching. Although IOS-XE performs many
networking functions, this TOE only addresses the functions that provide for the security of
the TOE itself as described in Section 1.6 Logical Scope of the TOE below.
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The following figure provides a visual depiction of an example TOE deployment.
Figure 1 TOE Example Deployment
Syslog
Server
(Mandatory)
Management
Workstation
(Mandatory)
TOE Boundary
CA
(Mandatory)
Local
Console
(Mandatory)
TOE Peer
(Conditional)
Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet IE3x00
Series Switches
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The previous figure includes the following devices, noting the TOE is only the Cisco Catalyst
Industrial Ethernet IE3x00 Rugged Series Switches and only one TOE device is required for
the deployment of the TOE in the evaluated configuration.
• Identifies the TOE Models
o Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet IE3x00 Rugged Series (IE3200, IE3300,
IE3400, IE3400H) Switches running Cisco IOS-XE 17.3
• Identifies the following IT entities that are considered to be in the IT Environment:
o Syslog (audit) Server with a secure connection using IPsec
o Local Console to support local Administration (direct connection)
o Management Workstation to support remote Administration with a secure
connection using SSHv2 Client
o Certificate Authority (CA) for X509 certificate validation with a secure
connection using IPsec
o TOE Peer (Conditional) with a secure connection using IPsec
1.4 TOE Evaluated Configuration
The TOE consists of one or more physical devices as specified in section 1.5 below and
includes the Cisco IOS-XE 17.3 software. The TOE has two or more network interfaces and
is connected to at least one internal and one external network. The Cisco IOS-XE
configuration determines how packets are handled to and from the TOE’s network interfaces.
The switch configuration will determine how traffic flows received on an interface will be
handled. Typically, packet flows are passed through the internet working device and
forwarded to their configured destination.
In addition, if the Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet IE3x00 Rugged Series Switches are to be
remotely administered, then the management workstation must be connected to an internal
network. SSHv2 is used to securely connect to the switch. An external syslog server is used
to store audit records, where IPsec is used to secure the transmission of the records. If these
servers are used, they must be attached to the internal (trusted) network. The internal
(trusted) network is meant to be separated effectively from unauthorized individuals and user
traffic, one that is in a controlled environment where implementation of security policies can
be enforced.
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1.5 Physical Scope of the TOE
The TOE is a hardware and software solution that makes up the Cisco Catalyst Industrial
Ethernet IE3x00 Rugged Series Switch models as follows: IE3200, IE3300, IE3400 and
IE3400H running Cisco IOS-XE 17.3 . The network, on which they reside is considered part
of the operational environment. The TOE deployment and operational guidance
documentation that is considered to be part of the TOE can be found in the Cisco Catalyst
Industrial Ethernet IE3x00 Rugged Series Switches Common Criteria Operational User
Guidance and Preparative Procedures document and is downloadable from the
http://cisco.com web site. The TOE is comprised of the following physical specifications as
described in Table 5 below. The hardware, size and the interfaces are based on the number
of ports.
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Table 5 Hardware Models and Specifications
Hardware Processor Software Picture Size Power Interfaces
Cisco Catalyst
Industrial
Ethernet
Series IE3200
Switch
Xilinx ZU3EG
(ARM Cortex-
A53)
Cisco IOS-
XE 17.3
6 in. X
3.6 in. X
5.3 in.
3.8lbs
Supports up to 8
PoE/PoE+ ports
[Power budget -
240W]
8 -10/100/1000 RJ45
Copper ports,
2 - 100/1000 SFP
Ports,
1 RS-232 (via RJ-45),
1 USB Mini Type B
Cisco Catalyst
Industrial
Ethernet
Series IE3300
Switch
Xilinx ZU3EG
(ARM Cortex-
A53)
Cisco IOS-
XE 17.3
6 in. X
3.6 in. X
5.3 in.
3.8 lbs
up to 24x
PoE/PoE+ ports
or 4x 802.3bt
type 4 ports (with
2.5G expansion
module) with the
all GE PoE
enabled base
[Power budget -
360W]
OR
up to 24x
PoE/PoE+ ports
or 4x 802.3bt
type 3 ports (on
PoE base
system) or 4x
802.3bt type 4
ports (with 2.5G
expansion
module) with the
10G PoE enabled
base
8 -10/100/1000 RJ45
Copper ports,
2 - 100/1000 SFP
Ports,
4 1GE/2.5G RJ45
Copper ports
2 1GE/10G SFP+
ports
1 RS-232 (via RJ-45),
1 USB Mini Type B
Cisco Catalyst
Industrial
Ethernet
IE3400 Series
Switch
Xilinx ZU3EG
(ARM Cortex-
A53)
Cisco IOS-
XE 17.3
6 in. X
3.6 in. X
5.3 in.
3.8 lbs
to
6 in. X
4.4 in. X
5.3 in.
5.0 lbs
Supports up to 24
PoE/PoE+ ports
or up to 8
PoE/PoE+ Ports
and 4 “802.3bt
type 4” Ports
with the 2.5G
expansion
module 2
[System Power
budget - 480W]
8 up to
1610/100/1000 RJ45
Copper ports,
2 up t0 8 100/1000
SFP Ports,
4 1GE/2.5G RJ45
Copper Ports
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Hardware Processor Software Picture Size Power Interfaces
Cisco Catalyst
Industrial
Ethernet
IE3400H
Series Switch
Xilinx ZU3EG
(ARM Cortex-
A53)
Cisco IOS-
XE 17.3
9.58 x
7.90 x
3.15 in.
8.45 lbs
to
9.58 x
10.90 x
3.15 in.
IP67-rated PoE
DC-DC power
supply,
Input:18V-60V
Output: 54V, 3.1A
max 160W
OR
IP67-rated PoE
AC-DC power
supply, input 85-
264VAC/88-
300VDC, Output
54V, 3.1A max,
180Watts
8 up to 24 - 10/100
Fast Ethernet ports,
8 up to 24 -
10/100/1000 Gigabit
Ethernet ports
1.6 Logical Scope of the TOE
The TOE is comprised of several security features. Each of the security features identified
above consists of several security functionalities, as identified below.
• Security Audit
• Cryptographic Support
• Identification and Authentication
• Security Management
• Protection of the TSF
• TOE Access
• Trusted Path/Channels
These features are described in more detail in the subsections below. In addition, the TOE
implements all RFCs of the NDcPP v2.2e as necessary to satisfy testing/assurance measures
prescribed therein.
1.6.1 Security Audit
The Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet IE3x00 Rugged Series Switches provide extensive
auditing capabilities. The TOE generates a comprehensive set of audit logs that identify
specific TOE operations. For each event, the TOE records the date and time of each event,
the type of event, the subject identity, and the outcome of the event.
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Auditable events include:
• failure on invoking cryptographic functionality such as establishment, termination and
failure of cryptographic session establishments and connections;
• creation and update of Secure Association Key
• modifications to the group of users that are part of the Authorized Administrator roles;
• all use of the user identification mechanism;
• any use of the authentication mechanism;
• Administrator lockout due to excessive authentication failures;
• any change in the configuration of the TOE;
• changes to time;
• initiation of TOE update;
• indication of completion of TSF self-test;
• maximum sessions being exceeded;
• termination of a remote session;
• attempts to unlock a termination session and
• initiation and termination of a trusted channel
The TOE is configured to transmit its audit messages to an external syslog server.
Communication with the syslog server is protected using IPsec and the TOE can determine
when communication with the syslog server fails. If that should occur, the TOE will store all
audit records locally and when the connection to the remote syslog server is restored, all
stored audit records will be transmitted to the remote syslog server.
The audit logs can be viewed on the TOE using the appropriate IOS-XE commands. The
records include the date/time the event occurred, the event/type of event, the user associated
with the event, and additional information of the event and its success and/or failure. The
TOE does not have an interface to modify audit records, though there is an interface available
for the Authorized Administrator to clear audit data stored locally on the TOE.
1.6.2 Cryptographic Support
The TOE provides cryptography in support of other TOE security functionality. All the
algorithms claimed have CAVP certificates (Operation Environment – Xilinx ZU3EG
processors).
The TOE leverages the IOS Common Cryptographic Module (IC2M) Rel5 as identified in the
table below. The IOS software calls the IOS Common Cryptographic Module (IC2M) Rel5
(Firmware Version: Rel 5) that has been validated for conformance to the requirements of
FIPS 140-2 Level 1.
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Refer to Table 6 for algorithm certificate references.
Table 6 CAVP References
Algorithm Description Supported
Mode
CAVP
Cert. #
Module SFR
AES Used for symmetric
encryption/decryption,
keyed hashing
CBC and GCM
(128 and 256
bits)
A1462 IC2M FCS_COP.1/
DataEncryption
SHS (SHA-1,
SHA-256)
Cryptographic hashing
services
Byte Oriented A1462 IC2M FCS_COP.1/Hash
HMAC
(HMAC-
SHA-1,
HMAC-SHA-
256 and
HMAC-SHA-
512)
Keyed hashing
services and software
integrity test
Byte Oriented A1462 IC2M FCS_COP.1/KeydHash
DRBG Deterministic random
bit generation services
in accordance with
ISO/IEC 18031:2011
CTR_DRBG
(AES 256)
A1462 IC2M FCS_RBG_EXT.1
RSA Signature Verification
and key transport
FIPS PUB 186-4
Key Generation
PKCS #1 v2.1
2048 bit key
C1411 IC2M FCS_CKM.1
FCS_COP.1/SigGen
CVL-KAS-
ECC
Key Agreement NIST Special
Publication 800-
56A
A1462 IC2M FCS_CKM.2
ECDSA Cryptographic
Signature services
FIPS 186-4,
Digital Signature
Standard (DSS)
A1462 IC2M FCS_CKM.1
The TOE provides cryptography in support of secure connections that includes remote
administrative management via SSHv2 and IPsec to secure the transmission of audit records
to the remote syslog server. In addition, IPsec is used to secure the session between the
TOE.
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The cryptographic services provided by the TOE are described in Table 7 below.
Table 7 TOE Provided Cryptography
Cryptographic Method Use within the TOE
AES Used to encrypt IPsec session traffic
Used to encrypt SSH session traffic
HMAC Used for keyed hash, integrity services in IPsec and SSH
session establishment
FFC DH Used as the Key exchange method for IPsec and SSH
Internet Key Exchange Used to establish initial IPsec session
RSA Signature Services Used in IPsec session establishment
Used in SSH session establishment
X.509 certificate signing.
RSA Used in IKE protocols peer authentication
Used to provide cryptographic signature services
Used in Cryptographic Key Generation and Key Establishment
Secure Shell Establishment Used to establish initial SSH session.
SHS Used to provide IPsec traffic integrity verification
Used to provide SSH traffic integrity verification
Used for keyed-hash message authentication
SP 800-90 RBG Used for random number generation, key generation and seeds
to asymmetric key generation
Used in IPsec session establishment
Used in SSH session establishment
ECDSA Used to provide cryptographic signature services
ECC DH Used as the Key exchange method for IPsec
The IE 3000 Series Switches platforms contain the following processors as listed in Table 5
Hardware Models and Specifications.
1.6.3 Identification and authentication
The TOE performs two types of authentication: device-level authentication of the remote
device (TOE peers) and user authentication for the Authorized Administrator of the TOE.
Device-level authentication allows the TOE to establish a secure channel with a trusted peer.
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The secure channel is established only after each device authenticates the other. Device-
level authentication is performed via IKE/IPsec mutual authentication. The IKE phase
authentication for the IPsec communication channel between the TOE and syslog server is
considered part of the Identification and Authentication security functionality of the TOE.
The TOE provides authentication services for administrative users to connect to the TOE’s
secure CLI administrator interface. The TOE requires Authorized Administrators to
authenticate prior to being granted access to any of the management functionality. The TOE
can be configured to require a minimum password length of 15 characters as well as
mandatory password complexity rules. The TOE provides administrator authentication
against a local user database. Password-based authentication can be performed on the local
serial console or SSHv2 interfaces. The SSHv2 interface also supports authentication using
SSH keys.
The TOE also provides an automatic lockout when a user attempts to authenticate and enters
invalid information. When the threshold for a defined number of failed authentication
attempts has exceeded the configured allowable attempts, the user is locked out until an
Authorized Administrator can reenable the user account.
The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for IPsec
connections.
1.6.4 Security Management
The TOE provides secure administrative services for management of general TOE
configuration and the security functionality provided by the TOE. All TOE administration
occurs either through a secure SSHv2 session or via a local serial console connection. The
TOE provides the ability to securely manage:
• Administration of the TOE locally and remotely;
• Configuration of warning and consent access banners;
• Configuration of session inactivity thresholds;
• Updates of the TOE software;
• Configuration of authentication failures;
• Configuration of the audit functions of the TOE;
• Configuration of the TOE provided services;
• Configuration of the cryptographic functionality of the TOE.
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The TOE supports two separate administrator roles: non-privileged administrator and
privileged administrator. Only the privileged administrator can perform the above security
relevant management functions. The privileged administrator is the Authorized Administrator
of the TOE and has the ability to enable, disable, determine and modify the behavior of all of
the security functions of the TOE as described in this document.
1.6.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE protects against interference and tampering by untrusted subjects by implementing
identification, authentication, and access controls to limit configuration to Authorized
Administrators. The TOE prevents reading of cryptographic keys and passwords.
Additionally, Cisco IOS-XE is not a general-purpose operating system and access to Cisco
IOS-XE memory space is restricted to only Cisco IOS-XE functions.
The TOE is able to verify any software updates prior to the software updates being installed
on the TOE to avoid the installation of unauthorized software.
The TOE internally maintains the date and time. This date and time are used as the
timestamp that is applied to audit records generated by the TOE. The TOE provides the
Authorized Administrators the capability to update the TOE’s clock manually to maintain a
reliable timestamp.
Finally, the TOE performs testing to verify correct operation of the TOE itself and that of the
cryptographic module.
1.6.6 TOE Access
The TOE can terminate inactive sessions after an Authorized Administrator configurable time-
period. Once a session has been terminated the TOE requires the Authorized Administrator
to re-authenticate to establish a new session. Sessions can also be terminated if an
Authorized Administrator enters the “exit” command.
The TOE can also display an Authorized Administrator specified banner on the CLI
management interface prior to allowing any administrative access to the TOE.
1.6.7 Trusted path/Channels
The TOE allows trusted path to be established to itself from remote administrators over
SSHv2 and initiates outbound IPsec trusted channels to transmit audit messages to remote
syslog servers. In addition, IPsec is used as a trusted channel to protect the communications
with the CA server.
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1.7 Excluded Functionality
The following functionality is excluded from the evaluation.
Table 8 Excluded Functionality
Excluded Functionality Exclusion Rationale
Non-FIPS 140-2 mode of
operation
This mode of operation includes non-FIPS allowed operations.
SNMP:The Simple Network
Management Protocol is an
application layer protocol,
facilitates the exchange of
management information
among network devices
SNMP is not associated with Security Functional Requirements
claimed in [NDcPP].
Telnet Telnet sends authentication data in plain text. This feature must
remain disabled in the evaluated configuration. SSHv2 must be
used to secure the trusted path for remote administration for all
SSHv2 sessions.
TLS Transport layer Security TLS is not associated with Security Functional Requirements
claimed in [NDcPP] IPsec is used instead.
SSL Secure Socket Layer SSL is not associated with Security Functional Requirements
claimed in [NDcPP] IPsec is used instead.
HTTP Hypertext Transfer
Protocol
Hypertext Transfer Protocol is not associated with Security
Functional Requirements claimed in [NDcPP] Use tunnelling
through IPSEC.
HHTPS Hypertext Transfer
Protocol Secure
Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure is not associated with Security
Functional Requirements claimed in [NDcPP] Use tunnelling
through IPSEC.
AH Authentication Header
(part of IPsec)
Encapsulating Security Payload (part of IPsec) must be used in all
IPsec connections.
These services can be disabled by configuration settings as described in the Guidance
documents (AGD). The (AGD) Table 14 provides a list of the services and protocols allowed
in the evaluated configuration.
The exclusion of this functionality does not affect the compliance to the collaborative
Protection Profile for Network Devices Version 2.2e.
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2 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS
2.1 Common Criteria Conformance Claim
The TOE and ST are compliant with the Common Criteria (CC) Version 3.1, Revision 5, dated:
April 2017. For a listing of Assurance Requirements claimed, see section 5.4.
The TOE and ST are CC Part 2 extended and CC Part 3 conformant.
2.2 Protection Profile Conformance
The TOE and ST are conformant with the Protection Profiles as listed in Table 9 Protection
Profiles below. This ST applies the NIAP Technical Decisions as described in Table 20 in Annex B.
Each posted TD was reviewed and considered based on the TOE product type, the PP claims
and the security functional requirements claimed in this document.
Table 9 Protection Profiles
Protection Profile Version Date
collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices (NDcPP) 2.2e 23 March 2020
2.3 Protection Profile Conformance Claim Rationale
2.3.1 TOE Appropriateness
The TOE provides all the functionality at a level of security commensurate with that identified
in the:
• collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e
2.3.2 TOE Security Problem Definition Consistency
The Assumptions, Threats, and Organization Security Policies included in the Security Target
represent the Assumptions, Threats, and Organization Security Policies specified in the
collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e for which conformance is
claimed verbatim. All concepts covered in the Protection Profile and Extended Package
Security Problem Definition is included in the Security Target Statement of Security
Objectives Consistency.
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The Security Objectives included in the Security Target represent the Security Objectives
specified in the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e for which
conformance is claimed verbatim. All concepts covered in the Protection Profile and Extended
Package Statement of Security Objectives is included in the Security Target.
2.3.3 Statement of Security Requirements Consistency
The Security Functional Requirements included in the Security Target represent the Security
Functional Requirements specified in the collaborative Protection Profile for Network
Devices, Version 2.2e for which conformance is claimed verbatim. All concepts covered in
the Protection Profile and Extended Package Statement of Security Requirements is included
in this Security Target. Additionally, the Security Assurance Requirements included in this
Security Target are identical to the Security Assurance Requirements included in the
collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e.
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3 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION
This section identifies the following:
• Significant assumptions about the TOE’s operational environment.
• IT related threats to the organization countered by the TOE.
• Environmental threats requiring controls to provide sufficient protection.
• Organizational security policies for the TOE as appropriate.
This document identifies assumptions as A.assumption with “assumption” specifying a
unique name. Threats are identified as T.threat with “threat” specifying a unique name.
Organizational Security Policies (OSPs) are identified as P.osp with “osp” specifying a unique
name.
3.1 Assumptions
The specific conditions listed in the following subsections are assumed to exist in the TOE’s
environment. These assumptions include both practical realities in the development of the
TOE security requirements and the essential environmental conditions on the use of the TOE.
Note, the assumption, A.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION is strike-through since the TOE
does provide protection against the traffic that does traverse the TOE, which is countered by
the TOE objectives defined in 4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE.
Table 10 TOE Assumptions
Assumption Assumption Definition
A.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION The Network Device is assumed to be physically protected in its
operational environment and not subject to physical attacks that
compromise the security and/or interfere with the device’s physical
interconnections and correct operation. This protection is assumed
to be sufficient to protect the device and the data it contains. As a
result, the cPP will not include any requirements on physical tamper
protection or other physical attack mitigations. The cPP will not
expect the product to defend against physical access to the device
that allows unauthorized entities to extract data, bypass other
controls, or otherwise manipulate the device. For vNDs, this
assumption applies to the physical platform on which the VM runs.
A.LIMITED_FUNCTIONALITY The device is assumed to provide networking functionality as its
core function and not provide functionality/ services that could be
deemed as general purpose computing. For example, the device
should not provide a computing platform for general purpose
applications (unrelated to networking functionality).
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Assumption Assumption Definition
If a virtual TOE evaluated as a pND, following Case 2 vNDs as
specified in Section 1.2, the VS is considered part of the TOE with
only one vND instance for each physical hardware platform.
The exception being where components of a distributed TOE run
inside more than one virtual machine (VM) on a single VS. In Case
2 vND, no non-TOE guest VMs are allowed on the platform..
A.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION A standard/generic network device does not provide any assurance
regarding the protection of traffic that traverses it. The intent is for
the network device to protect data that originates on or is destined
to the device itself, to include administrative data and audit data.
Traffic that is traversing the network device, destined for another
network entity, is not covered by the ND cPP. It is assumed that this
protection will be covered by cPPs and PP Modules for particular
types of Network Devices (e.g, firewall).
A.TRUSTED_ADMINISTRATOR The Security Administrator(s) for the Network Device are assumed
to be trusted and to act in the best interest of security for the
organization. This includes being appropriately trained, following
policy, and adhering to guidance documentation. Administrators
are trusted to ensure passwords/credentials have sufficient
strength and entropy and to lack malicious intent when
administering the device. The Network Device is not expected to
be capable of defending against a malicious administrator that
actively works to bypass or compromise the security of the device.
For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based authentication, the
Security Administrator(s ) are expected to fully validate (e.g. offline
verification) any CA certificate (root CA certificate or intermediate
CA certificate) loaded into the TOE’s trust store (aka 'root store',
'trusted CA Key Store', or similar) as a trust anchor prior to use (e.g.
offline verification).
A.REGULAR_UPDATES The Network Device firmware and software is assumed to be
updated by an administrator on a regular basis in response to the
release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
A.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE The administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access the
Network Device are protected by the platform on which they reside.
A.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION The Administrator must ensure that there is no unauthorized
access possible for sensitive residual information (e.g.
cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on
networking equipment when the equipment is discarded or
removed from its operational environment.
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3.2 Threats
The following table lists the threats addressed by the TOE and the IT Environment. The
assumed level of expertise of the attacker for all the threats identified below is Enhanced-
Basic.
Table 11 Threats
Threat Threat Definition
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ADMINISTRATOR_ACCESS Threat agents may attempt to gain administrator access to
the Network Device by nefarious means such as
masquerading as an administrator to the device,
masquerading as the device to an administrator, replaying
an administrative session (in its entirety, or selected
portions), or performing man-in-the-middle attacks, which
would provide access to the administrative session, or
sessions between Network Devices. Successfully gaining
administrator access allows malicious actions that
compromise the security functionality of the device and the
network on which it resides.
T.WEAK_CRYPTOGRAPHY Threat agents may exploit weak cryptographic algorithms or
perform a cryptographic exhaust against the key space.
Poorly chosen encryption algorithms, modes, and key sizes
will allow attackers to compromise the algorithms, or brute
force exhaust the key space and give them unauthorized
access allowing them to read, manipulate and/or control the
traffic with minimal effort.
T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS Threat agents may attempt to target Network Devices that
do not use standardized secure tunneling protocols to
protect the critical network traffic. Attackers may take
advantage of poorly designed protocols or poor key
management to successfully perform man-in-the-middle
attacks, replay attacks, etc. Successful attacks will result in
loss of confidentiality and integrity of the critical network
traffic, and potentially could lead to a compromise of the
Network Device itself.
An attacker may acquire sensitive TOE or user data that is
transmitted to or from the TOE because an untrusted
communication channel causes a disclosure of data in
transit.
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Threat Threat Definition
T.WEAK_AUTHENTICATION_ENDPOINTS Threat agents may take advantage of secure protocols that
use weak methods to authenticate the endpoints – e.g.,
shared password that is guessable or transported as
plaintext. The consequences are the same as a poorly
designed protocol, the attacker could masquerade as the
administrator or another device, and the attacker could
insert themselves into the network stream and perform a
man-in-the-middle attack. The result is the critical network
traffic is exposed and there could be a loss of confidentiality
and integrity, and potentially the network device itself could
be compromised.
T.UPDATE_COMPROMISE Threat agents may attempt to provide a compromised
update of the software or firmware which undermines the
security functionality of the device. Non-validated updates
or updates validated using non-secure or weak
cryptography leave the update firmware vulnerable to
surreptitious alteration.
T.UNDETECTED_ACTIVITY Threat agents may attempt to access, change, and/or
modify the security functionality of the network device
without administrator awareness. This could result in the
attacker finding an avenue (e.g., misconfiguration, flaw in
the product) to compromise the device and the
administrator would have no knowledge that the device has
been compromised.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_COMPROMISE Threat agents may compromise credentials and device data
enabling continued access to the Network Device and its
critical data. The compromise of credentials includes
replacing existing credentials with an attacker’s credentials,
modifying existing credentials, or obtaining the
administrator or device credentials for use by the attacker.
T.PASSWORD_CRACKING Threat agents may be able to take advantage of weak
administrative passwords to gain privileged access to the
device. Having privileged access to the device provides the
attacker unfettered access to the network traffic and may
allow them to take advantage of any trust relationships with
other Network Devices.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_FAILURE An external, unauthorized entity could make use of failed or
compromised security functionality and might therefore
subsequently use or abuse security functions without prior
authentication to access, change or modify device data,
critical network traffic or security functionality of the device.
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3.3 Organizational Security Policies
The following table lists the Organizational Security Policies imposed by an organization to
address its security needs.
Table 12 Organizational Security Policies
Policy Name Policy Definition
P.ACCESS_BANNER The TOE shall display an initial banner describing restrictions of use, legal agreements,
or any other appropriate information to which users consent by accessing the TOE.
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4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES
This section identifies the security objectives of the TOE and the IT Environment. The security
objectives identify the responsibilities of the TOE and the TOE’s IT environment in meeting
the security needs.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
The collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices v2.2e does not define any security
objectives for the TOE.
4.2 Security Objectives for the Environment
All the assumptions stated in section 3.1 are considered to be security objectives for the
environment. The following are the Protection Profile non-IT security objectives, which, in
addition to those assumptions, are to be satisfied without imposing technical requirements
on the TOE. That is, they will not require the implementation of functions in the TOE hardware
and/or software. Thus, they will be satisfied largely through application of procedural or
administrative measures. Note, the environment security objective,
OE.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION is strike-through since the TOE does provide
protection against the traffic that does traverse the TOE, which is countered by the TOE
objectives defined in 4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE.
Table 13 Security Objectives for the Environment
Environment Security Objective IT Environment Security Objective Definition
OE.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and
the data it contains, is provided by the environment.
OE.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE There are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g.,
compilers or user applications) available on the TOE, other than
those services necessary for the operation, administration and
support of the TOE. Note: For vNDs the TOE includes only the
contents of the its own VM, and does not include other VMs or
the VS
OE.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION The TOE does not provide any protection of traffic that traverses
it. It is assumed that protection of this traffic will be covered by
other security and assurance measures in the operational
environment.
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN Security Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all
guidance documentation in a trusted manner. For vNDs, this
includes the VS Administrator responsible for configuring the
VMs that implement ND functionality.
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Environment Security Objective IT Environment Security Objective Definition
For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based authentication,
the Security Administrator(s) are assumed to monitor the
revocation status of all certificates in the TOE's trust store and
to remove any certificate from the TOE’s trust store in case such
certificate can no longer be trusted.
OE.UPDATES The TOE firmware and software is updated by an administrator
on a regular basis in response to the release of product updates
due to known vulnerabilities.
OE.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE The administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access the
TOE must be protected on any other platform on which they
reside.
OE.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION The Security Administrator ensures that there is no unauthorized
access possible for sensitive residual information (e.g.
cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on
networking equipment when the equipment is discarded or
removed from its operational environment. For vNDs, this
applies when the physical platform on which the VM runs is
removed from its operational environment.
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5 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
This section identifies the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE. The Security
Functional Requirements included in this section are derived from Part 2 of the Common
Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5, dated: April
2017 and all international interpretations.
5.1 Conventions
The CC defines operations on Security Functional Requirements: assignments, selections,
assignments within selections and refinements. This document uses the following font
conventions to identify the operations defined by the CC and claimed PP/EP:
• Unaltered SFRs are stated in the form used in [CC2] or their extended component
definition (ECD);
• Refinement made by PP author: Indicated with bold text and strikethroughs;
• Selection wholly or partially completed in the PP: the selection values (i.e. the
selection values adopted in the PP or the remaining selection values available for the
ST) are indicated with underlined text
o e.g. “[selection: disclosure, modification, loss of use]” in [CC2] or an ECD might
become “disclosure” (completion) or “[selection: disclosure, modification]”
(partial completion) in the PP;
• Assignment wholly or partially completed in the PP: indicated with italicized text
• Assignment completed within a selection in the PP: the completed assignment text is
indicated with italicized and underlined text
o e.g. “[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other
operations]]” in [CC2] or an ECD might become “change_default, select_tag”
(completion of both selection and assignment) or “[selection: change_default,
select_tag, select_value]” (partial completion of selection, and completion of
assignment) in the PP;
• Iteration: indicated by adding a string starting with “/” (e.g. “FCS_COP.1/Hash”).
• Extended SFRs are identified by having a label “EXT” at the end of the SFR name.
Formatting conventions outside of operations and iterations matches the formatting specified
within the NDcPPv2.2e.
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5.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements
This section identifies the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE. The TOE Security
Functional Requirements that appear in the following table are described in more detail in
the following subsections.
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Table 14 Security Functional Requirements
Class Name Component Identification Component Name
FAU: Security audit FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_GEN.2 User Identity Association
FAU_STG_EXT.1 Protected Audit Event Storage
FCS: Cryptographic
support
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys)
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/
Decryption)
FCS_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and
Verification)
FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 IPsec Protocol
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Server Protocol
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation
FIA: Identification
and authentication
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication Failure Handling
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Password Management
FIA_UIA_EXT.1 User Identification and Authentication
FIA_UAU_EXT.2 Password-based Authentication Mechanism
FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev X.509 Certificate Validation
FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication
FMT: Security
management
FMT_MOF.1/Services Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MTD.1/CoreData Management of TSF Data
FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys Management of TSF Data
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.2 Restrictions on Security Roles
FPT: Protection of
the TSF
FPT_APW_EXT.1 Protection of Administrator Passwords
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all pre-
shared, symmetric and private keys)
FPT_STM.1 Reliable Time Stamps
FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF Testing
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update
FTA: TOE Access FTA_SSL_EXT.1 TSF-initiated Session Locking
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated Termination
FTA_SSL.4 User-initiated Termination
FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE Access Banners
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
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Class Name Component Identification Component Name
FTP: Trusted
path/channels
FTP_TRP.1/Admin Trusted Path
5.2.1 Security audit (FAU)
5.2.1.1 FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable
events:
a) Start-up and shut-down of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and
c) All administrative actions comprising:
• Administrative login and logout (name of user account shall be logged if individual
user accounts are required for administrators).
• Changes to TSF data related to configuration changes (in addition to the
information that a change occurred it shall be logged what has been changed).
• Generating/import of, changing, or deleting of cryptographic keys (in addition to
the action itself a unique key name or key reference shall be logged).
• Resetting passwords (name of related user account shall be logged).
• [Starting and stopping services];
d) Specifically defined auditable events listed in Table 16.
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following
information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the outcome (success
or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional
components included in the PP/ST, information specified in column three of Table 15.
Table 15 Auditable Events
SFR Auditable Event Additional Audit Record
Contents
FAU_GEN.1 None. None.
FAU_GEN.2 None. None.
FAU_STG_EXT.1 None. None.
FCS_CKM.1 None. None.
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SFR Auditable Event Additional Audit Record
Contents
FCS_CKM.2 None. None.
FCS_CKM.4 None. None.
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption None. None.
FCS_COP.1/SigGen None. None.
FCS_COP.1/Hash None. None.
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash None. None.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 Failure to establish an IPsec SA. Reason for failure.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 Failure to establish an SSH
session
Reason for failure.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 None. None.
FIA_AFL.1 Unsuccessful login attempts
limit is met or exceeded.
Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP
address).
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 None. None.
FIA_UIA_EXT.1 All use of the identification and
authentication mechanism.
Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP
address).
FIA_UAU_EXT.2 All use of the identification and
authentication mechanism.
Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP
address).
FIA_UAU.7 None. None.
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev Unsuccessful attempt to validate
a certificate Any addition,
replacement or removal of trust
anchors in the TOE's trust store.
Reason for failure of certificate
validation Identification of
certificates added, replaced or
removed as trust anchor in the
TOE's trust store.
FIA_X509_EXT.2 None. None.
FIA_X509_EXT.3 None. None.
FMT_MOF.1/Services None None.
FMT_MOF.1/ ManualUpdate Any attempt to initiate a manual
update
None.
FMT_MTD.1/CoreData None. None.
FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys None. None
FMT_SMF.1 All management activities of TSF
data.
None.
FMT_SMR.2 None. None.
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 None. None.
FPT_APW_EXT.1 None. None.
FPT_STM_EXT.1 Discontinuous changes to time –
either Administrator actuated or
changed via an automated
process. (Note that no
continuous changes to time need
For discontinuous changes to
time: The old and new values
for the time. Origin of the
attempt to change time for
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SFR Auditable Event Additional Audit Record
Contents
to be logged. See also
application note on
FPT_STM_EXT.1)
success and failure (e.g., IP
address).
FPT_TST_EXT.1 None. None.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Initiation of update; result of the
update attempt (success and
failure)
None.
FTA_SSL_EXT.1 The termination of a local
session by the session locking
mechanism.
None.
FTA_SSL.3 The termination of a remote
session by the session locking
mechanism.
None.
FTA_SSL.4 The termination of an interactive
session.
None.
FTA_TAB.1 None. None.
FTP_ITC.1 Initiation of the trusted channel.
Termination of the trusted
channel.
Failure of the trusted channel
functions.
Identification of the initiator
and target of failed trusted
channels establishment
attempt
FTP_TRP.1/Admin Initiation of the trusted path.
Termination of the trusted path.
Failures of the trusted path
functions.
None.
5.2.1.2 FAU_GEN.2 User Identity Association
FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be
able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.
5.2.1.3 FAU_STG_EXT.1 Protected Audit Event Storage
FAU_STG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to transmit the generated audit data to an external
IT entity using a trusted channel according to FTP_ITC.1.
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FAU_STG_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall be able to store generated audit data on the TOE itself
[TOE shall consist of a single standalone component that stores audit data locally].
FAU_STG_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall [overwrite previous audit records according to the following
rule: [when allotted space has reached its threshold]] when the local storage space for audit
data is full.
5.2.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)
5.2.2.1 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation
FCS_CKM.1.1: The TSF shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm: [
• RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet the
following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.3;
• ECC schemes using “NIST curves” [P-256, P-384] that meet the following: FIPS
PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.4;
• FFC Schemes using ’safe-prime’ groups that meet the following: “NIST Special
Publication 800-56A Revision 3, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography” and [RFC 3526]
] and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the
following: [assignment: list of standards].
5.2.2.2 FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment
FCS_CKM.2.1 The TSF shall perform cryptographic key establishment in accordance with
a specified cryptographic key establishment method: [
• RSA-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: RSAES-PKCS1-
v1_5 as specified in Section 7.2 of RFC 8017, “Public-Key Cryptography Standards
(PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1;
• Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes that meets the following: NIST
Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”;
• FFC Schemes using ‘safe-prime’ groups that meet the following: NIST Special
Publication 800-56A Revision 3, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
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Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography” and [groups
listed in RFC 3526];
] that meets the following: [assignment: list of standards].
5.2.2.3 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method [
• For plaintext keys in volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by a [single
overwrite consisting of [zeroes]];
• For plaintext keys in non-volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by the
invocation of an interface provided by a part of the TSF that [
o logically addresses the storage location of the key and performs a [single]
overwrite consisting of [zeroes]];
that meets the following: No Standard.
5.2.2.4 FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption Cryptographic Operation (AES Data
Encryption/Decryption)
FCS_COP.1.1/DataEncryption The TSF shall perform encryption/decryption in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES used in [CBC] mode and cryptographic key sizes
[128 bits, 256 bits] that meet the following: AES as specified in ISO 18033-3, [CBC as
specified in ISO 10116].
5.2.2.5 FCS_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation
and Verification)
FCS_COP.1.1/SigGen The TSF shall perform cryptographic signature services (generation
and verification) in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
[
• RSA Digital Signature Algorithm and cryptographic key sizes (modulus) [2048 bits or
greater],
]
that meet the following: [
• For RSA schemes: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 5.5,
using PKCS #1 v2.1 Signature Schemes RSASSA-PSS and/or RSASSA-PKCS1v1_5;
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ISO/IEC 9796-2, Digital signature scheme 2 or Digital Signature scheme 3,
].
5.2.2.6 FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)
FCS_COP.1.1/Hash The TSF shall perform cryptographic hashing services in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm [SHA-1, SHA-256] and cryptographic key sizes
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes] and message digest sizes [160, 256] bits that meet
the following: ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004.
5.2.2.7 FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash
Algorithm)
FCS_COP.1.1/KeyedHash The TSF shall perform keyed-hash message authentication in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256,
HMAC-SHA-512] and cryptographic key sizes [160-bit, 256-bit, 512-bit used in HMAC] and
message digest sizes [160, 256, 512] bits that meet the following: ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011,
Section 7 “MAC Algorithm 2”.
5.2.2.8 FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 IPsec Protocol
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the IPsec architecture as specified in RFC
4301.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall have a nominal, final entry in the SPD that matches
anything that is otherwise unmatched and discards it.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall implement [tunnel mode, transport mode].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall implement the IPsec protocol ESP as defined by RFC
4303 using the cryptographic algorithms [AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256 (specified by RFC
3602)] together with a Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-based HMAC [HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-
SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-512].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall implement the protocol: [
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• IKEv2 as defined in RFCs 5996 and [with no support for NAT traversal], and [RFC 4868
for hash functions]
].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall ensure the encrypted payload in the [IKEv2] protocol
uses the cryptographic algorithms [AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256 (as specified in RFC 3602)].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall ensure that [
• IKEv2 SA lifetimes can be configured by a Security Administrator based on
[
o length of time, where the time values can be configured within [1-24] hours;
]
].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.8 The TSF shall ensure that [
• IKEv2 Child SA lifetimes can be configured by a Security Administrator based on
[
o number of bytes
o length of time, where the time values can be configured within [1-8] hours;
]
].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.9 The TSF shall generate the secret value x used in the IKE Diffie-
Hellman key exchange (“x” in gx
mod p) using the random bit generator specified in
FCS_RBG_EXT.1, and having a length of at least [112 (for DH Group 14)] bits.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.10 The TSF shall generate nonces used in [IKEv2] exchanges of length
• [according to the security strength associated with the negotiated Diffie-Hellman
group
• at least 128 bits in size and at least half the output size of the negotiated
pseudorandom function (PRF) hash
].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.11 The TSF shall ensure that IKE protocols implement DH Group(s) [14
(2048-bit MODP)].
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FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.12 The TSF shall be able to ensure by default that the strength of the
symmetric algorithm (in terms of the number of bits in the key) negotiated to protect the
[IKEv2 IKE_SA] connection is greater than or equal to the strength of the symmetric algorithm
(in terms of the number of bits in the key) negotiated to protect the [IKEv2 CHILD_SA]
connection.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.13 The TSF shall ensure that all IKE protocols perform peer
authentication using [RSA] that use X.509v3 certificates that conform to RFC 4945 and [Pre-
shared Keys].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.14 The TSF shall only establish a trusted channel if the presented
identifier in the received certificate matches the configured reference identifier, where the
presented and reference identifiers are of the following fields and types: [SAN: Fully Qualified
Domain Name (FQDN)] and [no other reference identifier type]].
5.2.2.9 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in
accordance with ISO/IEC 18031:2011 using [CTR_DRBG (AES)].
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2 The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source
that accumulates entropy from [[1] hardware based] with a minimum of [256 bits] of entropy
at least equal to the greatest security strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1
“Security Strength Table for Hash Functions”, of the keys and hashes that it will generate.
5.2.2.10FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Server Protocol
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the SSH protocol that complies with RFCs
[4251, 4252, 4253, 4254].
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports
the following authentication methods as described in RFC 4252: public key-based, [password
based].
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FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall ensure that, as described in RFC 4253, packets greater
than [65,535] bytes in an SSH transport connection are dropped.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses the
following encryption algorithms and rejects all other encryption algorithms: [aes128-cbc,
aes256-cbc].
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH public-key based authentication
implementation uses [ssh-rsa, rsa-sha2-256, rsa-sha2-512] as its public key algorithm(s) and
rejects all other public key algorithms.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses
[hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-512] as its MAC algorithm(s) and rejects all other MAC
algorithm(s).
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall ensure that [diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, ecdh-sha2-
nistp256] and [ecdh-sha2-nistp384, ecdh-sha2-nistp384] are the only allowed key exchange
methods used for the SSH protocol.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.8 The TSF shall ensure that within SSH connections, the same session
keys are used for a threshold of no longer than one hour, and each encryption key is used to
protect no more than one gigabyte of data. After any of the thresholds are reached, a rekey
needs to be performed.
5.2.3 Identification and authentication (FIA)
5.2.3.1 FIA_AFL.1 Authentication Failure Handling
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when an Administrator configurable positive integer within
[1-3] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to Administrators attempting to
authenticate remotely using a password.
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been
met, the TSF shall [prevent the offending Administrator from successfully establishing a
remote session using any authentication method that involves a password until [an
Authorized Administrator unlocks the locked user account] is taken by a local Administrator].
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5.2.3.2 FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Password Management
FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities
for administrative passwords:
a) Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of upper and lower case
letters, numbers, and the following special characters: [“!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”,
“*”, “(“,”)”]
b) Minimum password length shall be configurable to between [minimum 1] and
[maximum 127] characters.
5.2.3.3 FIA_UIA_EXT.1 User Identification and Authentication
FIA_UIA_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall allow the following actions prior to requiring the non-TOE
entity to initiate the identification and authentication process:
• Display the warning banner in accordance with FTA_TAB.1;
• [no other actions].
FIA_UIA_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall require each administrative user to be successfully
identified and authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated action on behalf of that
administrative user.
5.2.3.4 FIA_UAU_EXT.2 Password-based Authentication Mechanism
FIA_UAU_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall provide a local [password-based, SSH public key-based [no
other]] authentication mechanism to perform local administrative user authentication.
5.2.3.5 FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback
FIA_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only obscured feedback to the administrative user while
the authentication is in progress at the local console.
5.2.3.6 FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev X.509 Certificate Validation
FIA_X509_EXT.1.1/Rev The TSF shall validate certificates in accordance with the following
rules:
• RFC 5280 certificate validation and certification path validation supporting a
minimum path length of three certificates.
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• The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate designated as a trust
anchor.
• The TSF shall validate a certification path by ensuring that all CA certificates in the
certification path contain the basicConstraints extension with the CA flag set to TRUE.
• The TSF shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [Certificate
Revocation List (CRL) as specified in RFC 5759 Section 5].
• The TSF shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules:
o Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification
shall have the Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the
extendedKeyUsage field.
o Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose
(id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose
(id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
FIA_X509_EXT.1.2/Rev The TSF shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the
basicConstraints extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.
Application Note
NIAP TD0527 has been applied to FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev, though it impacts only the tests, not the
text of the SFR
5.2.3.7 FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support
authentication for [IPsec], and [no additional uses].
FIA_X509_EXT.2.2 When the TSF cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of
a certificate, the TSF shall [not accept the certificate].
Application Note
NIAP TD0537 has been applied to FIA_X509_EXT.2.
5.2.3.8 FIA_X509_EXT.3 X.509 Certificate Requests
FIA_X509_EXT.3.1 The TSF shall generate a Certificate Request as specified by RFC 2986
and be able to provide the following information in the request: public key and [Common
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Name, Organization, Organizational Unit, Country].
FIA_X509_EXT.3.2 The TSF shall validate the chain of certificates from the Root CA upon
receiving the CA Certificate Response.
5.2.4 Security management (FMT)
5.2.4.1 FMT_MOF.1/Services Management of security functions behavior
FMT_MOF.1.1/Services The TSF shall restrict the ability to start and stop services to
Security Administrators.
5.2.4.2 FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate Management of security functions
behaviour
FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable the functions to
perform manual update to Security Administrators.
5.2.4.3 FMT_MTD.1/CoreData Management of TSF Data
FMT_MTD.1/CoreData The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the TSF data to Security
Administrators.
5.2.4.4 FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CryptoKeys The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the cryptographic
keys to Security Administrators.
5.2.4.5 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
• Ability to administer the TOE locally and remotely;
• Ability to configure the access banner;
• Ability to configure the session inactivity time before session termination or locking;
• Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using [hash comparison] capability
prior to installing those updates;
• Ability to configure the authentication failure parameters for FIA_AFL.1;
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• [
o Manually unlock a locked administrator account,
o Ability to start and stop services;
o Ability to configure audit behaviour;
o Ability to configure the cryptographic functionality;
o Ability to configure thresholds for SSH rekeying;
o Ability to configure the lifetime for IPsec SAs;
o Ability to re-enable an Administrator account;
o Ability to set the time which is used for time-stamps;
o Ability to configure the reference identifier for the peer;
]
].
5.2.4.6 FMT_SMR.2 Restrictions on Security Roles
FMT_SMR.2.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles:
• Security Administrator.
FMT_SMR.2.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
FMT_SMR.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that the conditions
• The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE locally;
• The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE remotely
are satisfied.
5.2.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
5.2.5.1 FPT_APW_EXT.1: Protection of Administrator Passwords
FPT_APW_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall store administrative passwords in non-plaintext form.
FPT_APW_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall prevent the reading of plaintext administrative passwords.
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5.2.5.2 FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all pre-
shared, symmetric and private keys)
FPT_SKP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and
private keys.
5.2.5.3 FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
FPT_STM_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use.
FPT_STM_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall [allow the Security Administrator to set the time].
5.2.5.4 FPT_TST_EXT.1: TSF Testing
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of the following self-tests [during initial start-
up (on power on), periodically during normal operation] to demonstrate the correct operation
of the TSF: [
• AES Known Answer Test
• HMAC Known Answer Test
• RNG/DRBG Known Answer Test
• SHA-1/256/512 Known Answer Test
• RSA Signature Known Answer Test (both signature/verification)
• Software Integrity Test
].
5.2.5.5 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide Security Administrators the ability to query the
currently executing version of the TOE firmware/software and [no other TOE
firmware/software version].
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall provide Security Administrators the ability to manually
initiate updates to TOE firmware/software and [no other update mechanism].
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall provide means to authenticate firmware/software updates
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to the TOE using a [published hash] prior to installing those updates.
5.2.6 TOE Access (FTA)
5.2.6.1 FTA_SSL_EXT.1 TSF-initiated Session Locking
FTA_SSL_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall, for local interactive sessions, [
• terminate the session]
after a Security Administrator-specified time period of inactivity.
5.2.6.2 FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated Termination
FTA_SSL.3.1: The TSF shall terminate a remote interactive session after a Security
Administrator-configurable time interval of session inactivity.
5.2.6.3 FTA_SSL.4 User-initiated Termination
FTA_SSL.4.1 The TSF shall allow Administrator-initiated termination of the Administrator’s
own interactive session.
5.2.6.4 FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE Access Banners
FTA_TAB.1.1 Before establishing an administrative user session the TSF shall display a
Security Administrator-specified advisory notice and consent warning message regarding
use of the TOE.
5.2.7 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)
5.2.7.1 FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of using [IPsec] to provide a trusted communication
channel between itself and authorized IT entities supporting the following capabilities:
audit server, [no other capabilities] that is logically distinct from other communication
channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel
data from disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data.
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FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit the TSF or the authorized IT entities to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [
• external audit server using IPsec
].
5.2.7.2 FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path/Admin Trusted Path (Refinement)
FTP_TRP.1.1/Admin: The TSF shall be capable of using [SSH] to provide a communication
path between itself and authorized remote Administrators that is logically distinct from other
communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of
the communicated data from disclosure and provides detection of modification of the
channel data.
FTP_TRP.1.2/Admin The TSF shall permit remote Administrators to initiate communication
via the trusted path.
FTP_TRP.1.3/Admin The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for initial
Administrator authentication and all remote administration actions.
5.3 TOE SFR Dependencies Rationale for SFRs Found in NDcPPv2.2e
The Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) in this Security Target represent the SFRs
identified in the NDcPPv2.2e. As such, the NDcPPv2.2e SFR dependency rationale is deemed
acceptable since the PP itself has been validated.
5.4 Security Assurance Requirements
5.4.1 SAR Requirements
The TOE assurance requirements for this ST are taken directly from the NDcPPv2.2e which
are derived from Common Criteria Version 3.1, Revision 5, dated April 2017. The assurance
requirements are summarized in the table below.
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Table 16: Assurance Measures
Assurance Class Components Components Description
Security Target (ASE) ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security Problem Definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
Development (ADV) ADV_FSP.1 Basic Functional Specification
Guidance Documents (AGD) AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative User guidance
Life Cycle Support (ALC) ALC_CMC.1 Labeling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
Tests (ATE) ATE_IND.1 Independent testing - conformance
Vulnerability Assessment (AVA) AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability analysis
5.4.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
The Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) in this Security Target represent the SARs
identified in the NDcPPv2.2e. As such, the NDcPPv2.2e SAR rationale is deemed acceptable
since the PP itself has been validated.
5.5 Assurance Measures
The TOE satisfies the identified assurance requirements. This section identifies the
Assurance Measures applied by Cisco to satisfy the assurance requirements. The table below
lists the details.
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Table 17 Assurance Measures
Component How requirement will be met
Security Target
(ASE) /
ASE_CCL.1 /
ASE_ECD.1 /
ASE_INT.1 /
ASE_OBJ.1 /
ASE_REQ.1 /
ASE_SPD.1 /
ASE_TSS.1
Section 2 of this ST includes the TOE and ST conformance claim to CC Version 3.1, Revision
5, dated: April 2017, CC Part 2 extended and CC Part 3 conformant, NDcPPv2.2e and the
rationale of how TOE provides all of the functionality at a level of security commensurate
with that identified in NDcPPv2.2e. Section 2 also includes the consistency rationale for the
TOE Security Problem Definition and the Security Requirements to include the extended
components definition.
ADV_FSP.1 The functional specification describes the external interfaces of the TOE; such as the means
for a user to invoke a service and the corresponding response of those services. The
description includes the interface(s) that enforces a security functional requirement, the
interface(s) that supports the enforcement of a security functional requirement, and the
interface(s) that does not enforce any security functional requirements.
The interfaces are described in terms of their:
• purpose (general goal of the interface);
• method of use (how the interface is to be used);
• parameters (explicit inputs to and outputs from an interface that control the
behaviour of that interface);
• parameter descriptions (tells what the parameter is in some meaningful way); and
• error messages (identifies the condition that generated it, what the message is, and
the meaning of any error codes).
The development evidence also contains a tracing of the interfaces to the SFRs described in
this ST.
AGD_OPE.1 The Administrative Guide provides the descriptions of the processes and procedures of how
the administrative users of the TOE can securely administer the TOE using the interfaces
that provide the features and functions detailed in the ST.
AGD_PRE.1 The Installation Guide describes the installation, generation and startup procedures so that
the users of the TOE can setup the components of the TOE in the evaluated configuration.
ALC_CMC.1 The Configuration Management (CM) document(s) describes how the consumer (end-user)
of the TOE can identify the evaluated TOE (Target of Evaluation).
The CM document(s) identifies the configuration items, how those configuration items are
uniquely identified, and the adequacy of the procedures that are used to control and track
changes that are made to the TOE. This includes details on what changes are tracked, how
potential changes are incorporated, and the degree to which automation is used to reduce
the scope for error.
ALC_CMS.1
ATE_IND.1 Cisco will provide the TOE for testing.
AVA_VAN.1 Cisco will provide the TOE for testing.
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6 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION
6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirement Measures
This section identifies and describes how the Security Functional Requirements identified
above are met by the TOE.
Table 18 How TOE SFRs Measures
TOE SFRs How the SFR is Met
FAU_GEN.1 The TOE generates an audit record whenever an audited event occurs. The types of events
that cause audit records to be generated include cryptography related events such as,
generating keys (e.g. RSA), and deletion of cryptographic keys, importing of X509 certificates,
and management of the cryptographic algorithms is provided through the CLI with auditing of
those commands. Audit records are also generated for identification and authentication
related events and administrative events (the specific events and the contents of each audit
record are listed in the table within the FAU_GEN.1 SFR, “Auditable Events Table”).
Each of the events specified in the audit record is in enough detail to identify the user for which
the event is associated (e.g. user identity, MAC address, IP address), when the event occurred,
where the event occurred, the outcome of the event, and the type of event that occurred such
as generating keys, including the type of key. Additionally, the startup and shutdown of the
audit functionality is audited.
The audit trail consists of the individual audit records; one audit record for each event that
occurred. The audit record can contain up to 80 characters and a percent sign (%), which
follows the time-stamp information. As noted above, the information includes [at least] all of
the required information. Additional information can be configured and included if desired.
Following is the audit record format:
seq no:timestamp: %facility-severity-MNEMONIC:description (hostname-n)
Following is an example of an audit record:
Dec 8 2020 10:59:19.394: \%PARSER-5-CFGLOG_LOGGEDCMD: User:lab logged
command:line console 0
Dec 8 2020 10:59:19.441: \%SYS-5-CONFIG_I: Configured from console by lab on
console
The logging buffer size can be configured from a range of 4096 (default) to 2147483647 bytes.
It is noted, not make the buffer size too large because the switch could run out of memory for
other tasks. Use the show memory privileged EXEC command to view the free processor
memory on the switch. However, this value is the maximum available, and the buffer size
should not be set to this amount. Refer to the Common Criteria Operational User Guidance
and Preparative Procedures for command description and usage information.
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TOE SFRs How the SFR is Met
The administrator can also configure a ‘configuration logger’ to keep track of configuration
changes made with the command-line interface (CLI). The administrator can configure the
size of the configuration log from 1 to 1000 entries (the default is 100). Refer to the Common
Criteria Operational User Guidance and Preparative Procedures for command description and
usage information.
The log buffer is circular, so newer messages overwrite older messages after the buffer is full.
Administrators are instructed to monitor the log buffer using the show logging privileged EXEC
command to view the audit records. The first message displayed is the oldest message in the
buffer. There are other associated commands to clear the buffer, to set the logging level, etc.;
all of which are described in the Guidance documents and IOS-XE CLI. Refer to the Common
Criteria Operational User Guidance and Preparative Procedures for command description and
usage information.
The logs can be saved to flash memory, so records are not lost in case of failures or restarts.
Refer to the Common Criteria Operational User Guidance and Preparative Procedures for
command description and usage information.
The administrator can set the level of the audit records to be displayed on the console or sent
to the syslog server. For instance, all emergency, alerts, critical, errors, and warning message
can be sent to the console alerting the administrator that some action needs to be taken as
these types of messages mean that the functionality of the switch is affected. All notifications
and information type message can be sent to the syslog server, whereas message is only for
information; switch functionality is not affected.
To configure the TOE to send audit records to a syslog server, the ‘set logging server’ command
is used. A maximum of three syslog servers can be configured. Refer to the Common Criteria
Operational User Guidance and Preparative Procedures for command description and usage
information. The audit records are transmitted using IPsec tunnel to the syslog server. If the
communications to the syslog server is lost, the TOE generates an audit record and will store
all audit records locally and when the connection to the remote syslog server is restored, all
stored audit records will be transmitted to the remote syslog server.
The FIPS crypto tests performed during startup, the messages are displayed only on the
console. Once the box is up and operational and the crypto self-test command is entered, then
the messages would be displayed on the console and will also be logged. For the TSF self-
test, successful completion of the self-test is indicated by reaching the log-on prompt. If there
are issues, the applicable audit record is generated and displayed on the console.
FAU_GEN.2 The TOE shall ensure that each auditable event is associated with the user that triggered the
event and as a result, they are traceable to a specific user. For example, a human user, user
identity or related session ID would be included in the audit record. For an IT entity or device,
the IP address, MAC address, host name, or other configured identification is presented. Refer
to the Common Criteria Operational User Guidance and Preparative Procedures for command
description and usage information.
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TOE SFRs How the SFR is Met
FAU_STG_EXT.1 The TOE is a standalone TOE that stored internally to the TOE the audit records are stored in
a circular log file where the TOE overwrites the oldest audit records when the audit trail
becomes full. The size of the logging files on the TOE is configurable by the administrator with
the minimum value being 4096 (default) to 2147483647 bytes of available disk space Refer to
the Common Criteria Operational User Guidance and Preparative Procedures for command
description and usage information.
Only Authorized Administrators are able to clear the local logs, and local audit records are
stored in a directory that does not allow administrators to modify the contents.
The TOE can optionally be configured to export syslog records to a specified, external syslog
server. Once the configuration is complete, the audit records are automatically sent to the
external syslog server at the same time as they are written to the logging buffer. The TOE
protects communications with an external syslog server via IPsec. If the IPsec connection fails,
the TOE will store audit records on the TOE when it discovers it can no longer communicate
with its configured syslog server. When the connection is restored, the TOE will transmit the
buffer contents when connectivity to the syslog server
FCS_CKM.1 The TOE implements Diffie-Hellman based key establishment schemes that meets RFC 3526,
Section 3. The TOE implements and uses the prime and generator specified in RFC 3526
Section 3 when generating parameters for the key exchange.
The TOE complies with section 5.6 and all subsections regarding asymmetric key pair
generation and key establishment in the NIST SP 800-56A and with section 6.
Asymmetric cryptographic keys used for IKE peer authentication are generated according to
FIPS PUB 186-4, Appendix B.3 for RSA schemes and Appendix B.4 for ECDSA schemes.
The TOE complies with section 5.6 and all subsections regarding asymmetric key pair
generation in the NIST SP 800-56A and with section 6 and all subsections regarding RSA key
pair generation. The TOE employs RSA-based key establishment, RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 used
in cryptographic operations as specified in Section 7.2 of RFC 8017.
The TOE can create an RSA public-private key pair using key sizes of 2048-bit or larger that
can be used to generate a Certificate Signing Request (CSR). Through use of Simple
Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP), the TOE can send the CSR to a Certificate Authority
(CA) for the CA to generate a certificate and receive its X509v3 certificate from the CA.
Integrity of the CSR and certificate during transit are assured through use of digitally signatures
(encrypting the hash of the TOE’s public key contained in the CSR and certificate).
The key pair generation portions of "The RSA Validation System" for FIPS 186-4 were used as
a guide in testing the FCS_CKM.1 during the FIPS validation.
The TOE employs RSA-based key establishment used in cryptographic operations. The TOE
also implements ECC key generation for SSH key exchanges.
FCS_CKM.2
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TOE SFRs How the SFR is Met
The TOE implements Diffie-Hellman (DH) group 14 (2048) bit key establishment schemes in
SSH and IPsec. The DH key generation meets RFC3526, Section 3.
The TOE acts as a receiver for SSH communications (remote administration) and as both a
sender and receiver for IPsec communications (transmit generated audit records to an external
IT entity (syslog server).
Scheme SFR Service
RSA
Key generation
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Remote Administration
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 Transmit generated audit data to
an external IT entity
FFC
Key generation
Key establishment
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Remote Administration
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 Transmit generated audit data to
an external IT entity
ECC
Key generation
Key establishment
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Remote Administration
Through use of Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP), the TOE can: send the CSR to
a Certificate Authority (CA) for the CA to generate a certificate; and receive its X.509v3
certificate from the CA. Integrity of the CSR and certificate during transit are assured through
use of digital signatures (encrypting the hash of the TOE’s public key contained in the CSR
and certificate). The TOE can store and distribute the certificate to external entities including
Registration Authorities (RA). The IOS-XE Software supports embedded PKI client functions
that provide secure mechanisms for distributing, managing, and revoking certificates. In
addition, the IOS-XE Software includes an embedded certificate server, allowing the router to
act as a certification authority on the network.
The TOE can also use the X.509v3 certificate for securing IPsec sessions. The TOE provides
cryptographic signature services using RSA that meets FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature
Standard”.
For details on each protocol, see the related SFR.
FCS_CKM.4 The TOE meets all requirements as specified by the cryptographic key destruction method of
the keys and the Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) when no longer required for use.
See Table 21: TOE Key Zeroization in Section 7.1 Key Zeroization. The information provided
in the table includes all of the secrets, keys and associated values, the description, and the
method used to zeroization when no longer required for use.
The information is provided in the reference section for ease and readability of all of the
secrets, keys and associated values, their description and zeroization methods.
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TOE SFRs How the SFR is Met
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption The TOE provides symmetric encryption and decryption capabilities using AES in CBC mode
(128, 256 bits) as described in ISO 10116.
AES is implemented in the following protocols: IPsec and SSH.
Through the implementation of the cryptographic module, the TOE also provides AES
encryption and decryption in support of SSH for secure communications.
The configuration and management of the cryptographic algorithms is provided through the
CLI, to include the auditing of configuring the options by the Authorized Administrator.
The relevant CAVP certificate numbers are listed in Table 6 FIPS References.
FCS_COP.1/SigGen The TOE provides cryptographic signature services using RSA Digital Signature Algorithm with
key size of 2048 and greater as specified in ISO/IEC 9796-2, Digital signature scheme 2 or
Digital Signature scheme 3. The TOE also supports RSA key size of 3072-bit, and it is
recommended to use the stronger key size.
Through the implementation of the cryptographic module, the TOE provides cryptographic
signatures in support IPsec for secure communications.
The configuration and management of the cryptographic algorithms is provided through the
CLI, to include the auditing of configuring the options by the Authorized Administrator.
The relevant CAVP certificate numbers are listed in Table 6 FIPS References.
FCS_COP.1/Hash
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash
The TOE provides cryptographic hashing services using SHA-1 and SHA-256 as specified in
ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004 (with key sizes and message digest sizes of 160 and 256, respectively).
The TOE provides keyed-hashing message authentication services using HMAC-SHA-1 and
HMAC-SHA-256 that operates on 512-bit blocks and HMAC-SHA-512 operating on 1024-bit
blocks of data, with key sizes and message digest sizes of 160-bits, 256 bits and 512 bits
respectively as specified in ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 “MAC Algorithm 2”.
For IKE (ISAKMP) hashing, administrators can select any of SHA-1 and/or SHA-256 (with
message digest sizes of 160 and 256 respectively) to be used with remote IPsec endpoints.
For IPsec SA authentication integrity options Authorized Administrators can select any of esp-
sha-hmac (HMAC-SHA-1), esp-sha256-hmac (HMAC-SHA-256), or esp-sha512-hmac
(HMAC_SHA-512) with message digest sizes of 160 and 256 and 512 bits respectively to be
part of the IPsec SA transform-set to be used with remote IPsec endpoints.
Through the implementation of the cryptographic module, the TOE provides SHS hashing and
HMAC message authentication in support of SSH and IPsec for secure communications.
The configuration steps, commands and algorithms for the supported keys, key sizes and
hashing are provided in the Operational User Guidance And Preparative Procedures.
The relevant CAVP certificate numbers are listed in Table 6 FIPS References.
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TOE SFRs How the SFR is Met
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 The TOE implements IPsec to provide authentication and encryption services to prevent
unauthorized viewing or modification of data as it travels over the external network.
The IPsec implementation provides VPN peer-to-peer capabilities. The VPN peer-to-peer
tunnel allows for example the TOE and another switch to establish an IPsec tunnel to secure
the passing of route tables (user data). Another configuration in the peer-to-peer configuration
is to have the TOE be set up with an IPsec tunnel with a VPN peer to secure the session
between the TOE and syslog server.
In addition to tunnel mode, which is the default IPsec mode, the TOE also supports transport
mode, allowing for only the payload of the packet to be encrypted. If tunnel mode is explicitly
specified, the switch will request tunnel mode and will accept only tunnel mode.
The TOE implements IPsec to provide both certificates and pre-shared key-based
authentication and encryption services to prevent unauthorized viewing or modification of data
as it travels over the external network. The TOE implementation of the IPsec standard (in
accordance with the RFCs noted in the SFR) uses the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)
protocol to provide authentication, encryption and anti-replay services. The IPsec protocol
ESP is implemented using the cryptographic algorithms AES-CBC-128 and AES-CBC-256
together with HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256 and HMAC-SHA-512.
Preshared keys can be configured using the 'crypto isakmp key' key command and may be
proposed by each of the peers negotiating the IKE establishment.
IPsec Internet Key Exchange, also called ISAKMP, is the negotiation protocol that lets two
peers agree on how to build an IPsec Security Association (SA). The IKE protocols implement
Peer Authentication using the RSA algorithm with X.509v3 certificates or preshared keys.
When certificates are used for authentication, the SAN: fully qualified domain name (FQDN)
is verified to ensure the certificate is valid and is from a valid entity. The attributes in the
certificate are compared with the expected SAN: FQDN.
IKE separates negotiation into two phases: phase 1 and phase 2. Phase 1 creates the first
tunnel, which protects later ISAKMP negotiation messages. The key negotiated in phase 1
enables IKE peers to communicate securely in phase 2. During Phase 2 IKE establishes the
IPsec SA. IKE maintains a trusted channel, referred to as a Security Association (SA), between
IPsec peers that is also used to manage IPsec connections, including:
• The negotiation of mutually acceptable IPsec options between peers (including peer
authentication parameters, either signature based, or pre-shared key based),
• The establishment of additional Security Associations to protect packets flows using
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), and
• The agreement of secure bulk data encryption AES keys for use with ESP.
After the two peers agree upon a policy, the security parameters of the policy are identified by
a SA established at each peer, and these IKE SAs apply to all subsequent IKE traffic during
the negotiation.
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TOE SFRs How the SFR is Met
The TOE can be configured to not allow "confidentiality only" ESP mode by ensuring the IKE
Policies configured include ESP-encryption.
The TOE supports configuration lifetimes of both Phase 1 SAs and Phase 2 SAs using "lifetime"
command. The default time value for Phase 1 SAs is 24 hours, though is configurable from 1
to 24 hours. The default time value for Phase 2 SAs is 1 hour, though is configurable up to 8
hours.
The TOE also supports configuring the maximum amount of traffic that is allowed to flow for a
given IPsec SA using the following command, 'crypto ipsec security-association lifetime'. The
default amount is 2560KB, which is the minimum configurable value. The maximum
configurable value is 4GB.
The TOE provides AES-CBC-128 and AES-CBC-256 for encrypting the IKEv2 payloads. The
Authorized Administrator is instructed in the AGD to ensure that the size of key used for ESP
must be greater than or equal to the key size used to protect the IKE payload.
The TOE supports Diffie-Hellman Group 14 (2048-bit keys), in support of IKE Key
Establishment. These keys are generated using the AES-CTR Deterministic Random Bit
Generator (DRBG), as specified in SP 800-90, and the following corresponding key sizes (in
bits) are used: 112 (for DH Group 14) bits. The DH group can be configured by issuing the
following command during the configuration of IPsec:
TOE-common-criteria (config-isakmp)# group 14
This selects DH Group 14 (2048-bit MODP) for IKE and this sets the DH group offered during
negotiations.
The TOE generates the secret value 'x' used in the IKEv2 Diffie-Hellman key exchange ('x' in
gx mod p) using the NIST approved AES-CTR Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG)
specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1 and having possible lengths of 112 bits. When a random number
is needed for a nonce, the probability that a specific nonce value will be repeated during the
life a specific IPsec SA is less than 1 in 2^128. The nonce is likewise generated using the AES-
CTR DRBG, is at least 128-bits and is at least half the output size of the negotiated
pseudorandom function.
IPsec provides secure tunnels between two peers, such as two switches. An Authorized
Administrator defines which packets are considered sensitive and should be sent through
these secure tunnels. When the IPsec peer recognizes a sensitive packet, the peer sets up the
appropriate secure tunnel and sends the packet through the tunnel to the remote peer. More
accurately, these tunnels are sets of security associations (SAs) that are established between
two IPsec peers. The SAs define the protocols and algorithms to be applied to sensitive
packets and specify the keying material to be used. SAs are unidirectional and are established
per security protocol (AH or ESP). In the evaluated configuration, only ESP will be configured
for use.
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TOE SFRs How the SFR is Met
A crypto map (the Security Policy Definition (SPD)) set can contain multiple entries, each with
a different access list. The crypto map entries are searched in a sequence - the switch
attempts to match the packet to the access list (acl) specified in that entry. Separate access
lists define blocking and permitting at the interface. For example:
Router# access-list 170 permit ip 192.168.3.0 0.0.0.255 10.3.2.0 0.0.0.255
When a packet matches a permit entry in a particular access list, the method of security in the
corresponding crypto map is applied. If the crypto map entry is tagged as ipsec-isakmp, IPsec
is triggered. For example:
Router# crypto map MAP_NAME 19 ipsec-isakmp
The match address 170 command means to use access list 101 in order to determine which
traffic is relevant. For example:
Router# (config-crypto-map)#match address 170
The traffic matching the permit acls would then flow through the IPsec tunnel and be classified
as "PROTECTED".
Traffic that does not match a permit crypto map acl and does not match a non-crypto permit
acl on the interface would be DISCARDED.
Traffic that does not match a permit acl in the crypto map, though does match a non-crypto
permit acl would be allowed to BYPASS the tunnel. For example, a non-crypto permit acl for
icmp would allow ping traffic to flow unencrypted if a permit crypto map was not configured
that matches the ping traffic.
If there is no SA that the IPsec can use to protect this traffic to the peer, IPsec uses IKE to
negotiate with the remote peer to set up the necessary IPsec SAs on behalf of the data flow.
The negotiation uses information specified in the crypto map entry as well as the data flow
information from the specific access list entry.
In IOS-XE the negotiations of the IKE SA adhere to configuration settings for IPsec applied by
the administrator. For example, in the first SA, the encryption, hash and DH group is identified,
for the Child SA the encryption and the hash are identified. The administrator configures the
first SA to be as strong as or stronger than the child SA; meaning if the first SA is set at AES
128, then the Child SA can only be AES128. If the first SA is AES256, then the Child SA could
be AES128 or AES256. During the negotiations, if a non-match is encountered, the process
stops, and an error message is received.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 The TOE implements a NIST-approved AES-CTR Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG),
as specified in ISO/IEC 18031:2011seeded by an entropy source that accumulates entropy
from a TSF-hardware based noise source.
The deterministic RBG is seeded with a minimum of 256 bits of entropy, which is at least equal
to the greatest security strength of the keys and hashes that it will generate.
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TOE SFRs How the SFR is Met
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 The TOE implementation of SSHv2 supports the following:
• Compliance with RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253, and 4254;
• Dropping packets greater than 65,535 bytes, as such packets would violate the IP
packet size limitations;
• Enforcement to only allow the encryption algorithms AES-CBC-128, and AES-CBC-
256 to ensure confidentiality of the session;
• Enforcement to only use of the SSH_RSA, RSA-SHA2-256, RSA-SHA2-512 public key
algorithms for authentication;
• Local password-based and public key authentication for administrative users
accessing the TOE through SSHv2; The TOE provides a command that allows a user
to upload a public key for SSHv2 public key authentication and to specify the user
identity associated that key.
• Enforcement to only allow the hashing algorithms hmac-sha2-256 and hmac-sha2-
512-96 to ensure the integrity of the session and
• The TOE's implementation of SSHv2 can be configured to only allow Diffie-Hellman
Group 14 (2048-bit keys), ECDH-SHA2-NISTP256, ECDH-SHA2-NISTP384 and
ECDH-SHA2-NISTP512 Key Establishment, as required by the cPP to which
conformance is claimed.
The TOE can also be configured to ensure that SSH re-key of no longer than one hour and no
more than one gigabyte of transmitted data for the session key. Re-key occurs on the limit that
is reached first.
FIA_AFL.1 The TOE provides the privileged administrator the ability to specify the maximum number of
unsuccessful authentication attempts before privileged administrator or non-privileged
administrator is locked out through the administrative CLI using a privileged CLI command.
While the TOE supports a range from 1-25, in the evaluated configuration, the maximum
number of failed attempts is recommended to be set to 3.
When a privileged administrator or non-privileged administrator attempting to log into the
administrative CLI reaches the administratively set maximum number of failed authentication
attempts, the user will not be granted access to the administrative functionality of the TOE
until a privileged administrator resets the user's number of failed login attempts through the
administrative CLI.
To ensure the privileged administrator account does not get locked out by the number of failed
attempts it is essential that an additional Administrator account be created to only be used in
an emergency at the local console to unlock the locked Administrator account. Although, it is
noted that the lockout is not applicable to the local console administrators.
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 The TOE supports the local definition of users with corresponding passwords. The passwords
can be composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and special
characters (that include: “!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(“, and “)”. Minimum password
length from 1 – 127 characters is settable by the Authorized Administrator and can be
configured for minimum password lengths of 15 characters.
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TOE SFRs How the SFR is Met
FIA_UIA_EXT.1
FIA_UAU_EXT.2
The TOE requires all users to be successfully identified and authenticated before allowing any
TSF mediated actions to be performed except for the login warning banner that is displayed
prior to user authentication and any network packets as configured by the Authorized
Administrator may flow through the switch.
Administrative access to the TOE is facilitated through the TOE’s CLI. The TOE mediates all
administrative actions through the CLI. Once a potential administrative user attempts to
access the CLI of the TOE through either a directly connected console or remotely through an
SSHv2 secured connection, the TOE prompts the user for a user name and password. Only
after the administrative user presents the correct authentication credentials will access to the
TOE administrative functionality be granted. No access is allowed to the administrative
functionality of the TOE until an administrator is successfully identified and authenticated.
The TOE provides a local password based authentication mechanism. The TOE also performs
remote authentication using SSH public key to login authorized administrative users.
The process for authentication is the same for administrative access whether administration
is occurring via a directly connected console or remotely via SSHv2 secured connection.
At initial login, the administrative user is prompted to provide a username. After the user
provides the username, the user is prompted to provide the administrative password
associated with the user account. The TOE then either grant administrative access (if the
combination of username and password is correct) or indicate that the login was unsuccessful.
The TOE does not provide a reason for failure in the cases of a login failure.
FIA_UAU.7 When a user enters their password at the local console, the TOE does not echo any characters
as they are entered.
For remote session authentication, the TOE does not echo any characters as they are entered.
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for IPsec
connections.
The Certificate Authority (CA) server in the IT Environment acts as a CRL distribution point.
The TOE supports the following methods to obtain a certificate from a CA:
• Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP)—A Cisco-developed enrollment
protocol that uses HTTP to communicate with the CA or registration authority (RA).
• Imports certificates in PKCS12 format from an external server.
• IOS-XE File System (IFS)—The switch uses any file system that is supported by Cisco
IOS-XE software (such as TFTP, FTP, flash, and NVRAM) to send a certificate request
and to receive the issued certificate.
• Manual cut-and-paste—The switch displays the certificate request on the console
terminal, allowing the administrator to enter the issued certificate on the console
terminal; manually cut-and-paste certificate requests and certificates when there is
no network connection between the switch and CA.
• Enrollment profiles—The switch sends HTTP-based enrollment requests directly to
the CA server instead of to the RA-mode certificate server (CS).
FIA_X509_EXT.2
FIA_X509_EXT.3
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• Self-signed certificate enrollment for a trust point.
When the CA issues a certificate, the CA can include in the certificate the CRL distribution
point (CDP) for that certificate. The TOE will use the CDPs to locate and load the correct CRL.
If a CDP is not specified in the certificate, the TOE will use the default Simple Certificate
Enrollment Protocol (SCEP) method to retrieve the CRL.
All the certificates include at least the following information: public key, Common Name,
Organization, Organizational Unit and Country.
Public key infrastructure (PKI) credentials, such as Rivest, Shamir, and Adelman (RSA) keys
and certificates can be stored in a specific location on the TOE. Certificates are stored to
NVRAM by default; however, some switches do not have the required amount of NVRAM to
successfully store certificates. All Cisco platforms support NVRAM and flash local storage.
Depending on the platform, an authorized administrator may have other supported local
storage options including bootflash, slot, disk or USB flash. The other supported storage
options were not tested in the evaluated configuration. During run time, an authorized
administrator can specify what active local storage device will be used to store certificates.
The certificates themselves provide protection in that they are digitally signed. If a certificate
were modified in any way, it would be invalidated. The digital signature verifications process
would show that the certificate had been tampered with when the hash value would be invalid.
The certificate chain establishes a sequence of trusted certificates, from a peer certificate to
the root CA certificate. Within the PKI hierarchy, all enrolled peers can validate the certificate
of one another if the peers share a trusted root CA certificate or a common subordinate CA.
Each CA corresponds to a trust point. When a certificate chain is received from a peer, the
default processing of a certificate chain path continues until the first trusted certificate, or
trust point, is reached. The administrator may configure the level to which a certificate chain
is processed on all certificates including subordinate CA certificates.
To verify, the authorized administrator could ‘show’ the pki certificates and the pki trust points.
The authorized administrator can also configure one or more certificate fields together with
their matching criteria to match. Such as:
• alt-subject-name
• expires-on
• issuer-name
• name
• serial-number
• subject-name
• unstructured-subject-name
• valid-start
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This allows for installing more than one certificate from one or more CAs on the TOE. For
example, one certificate from one CA could be used for one IPsec connection, while another
certificate from another CA could be used for a different IPsec connection. However, the
default configuration is a single certificate from one CA that is used for all authenticated
connections.
The physical security of the TOE (A.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION) protects the switch and the
certificates from being tampered with or deleted. Only authorized administrators with the
necessary privilege level can access the certificate storage and add/delete them. In addition,
the TOE identification and authentication security functions protect an unauthorized user from
gaining access to the TOE.
The use of CRL is configurable and may be used for certificate revocation. The authorized
administrator uses the revocation-check command to specify at least one method of revocation
checking; CRL is the default method. The authorized administer sets the trust point and its
name and the revocation-check method
• crl --Certificate checking is performed by a CRL. This is the default option.
Checking is also done for the basicConstraints extension and the CA flag to determine whether
they are present and set to TRUE. The local certificate that was imported must contain the
basic constraints extension with the CA flag set to true, the check also ensure that the key
usage extension is present, and the keyEncipherment bit or the keyAgreement bit or both are
set. If they are not, the certificate is not accepted.
If the connection to determine the certificate validity cannot be established, the connection is
rejected.
FMT_MOF.1/Services
FMT_MOF./ManualUpdate
FMT_MTD.1/CoreData
FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys
The TOE performs role-based authorization, using TOE platform authorization mechanisms, to
grant access to the privileged and semi-privileged levels. For the purposes of this evaluation,
the privileged level is equivalent to full administrative access to the CLI, which is the default
access for IOS-XE privilege level 15; and the semi-privileged level equates to any privilege level
that has a subset of the privileges assigned to level 15. Privilege levels 0 and 1 are defined by
default and are customizable, while levels 2-14 are undefined by default and are also
customizable.
The term “Authorized Administrator” is used in this ST to refer to any user which has been
assigned to a privilege level that is permitted to perform the relevant action; therefore, has the
appropriate privileges to perform the requested functions. Therefore, semi-privileged
administrators with only a subset of privileges may also manage and modify TOE data based
on the privileges assigned.
The TOE provides the ability for Security Administrators (a.k.a Authorized Administrators) to
access TOE data, such as audit data, configuration data, security attributes, session
thresholds, cryptographic keys and updates. Each of the predefined and administratively
configured privilege level has a set of permissions that will grant them access to the TOE data,
though with some privilege levels, the access is limited.
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The TOE does not provide automatic updates to the software version running on the TOE.
The Security Administrators (a.k.a Authorized Administrators) can query the software version
running on the TOE, and can initiate updates to (replacements of) software images. When
software updates are made available by Cisco, the Authorized Administrators can obtain, verify
the integrity of, and install those updates.
In addition, network packets are permitted to flow, as configured by the Authorized
Administrator, through the switch prior to the identification and authentication of an Authorized
Administrator. The warning and access banner may also be displayed prior to the identification
and authentication of an Authorized Administrator. No administrative functionality is available
prior to administrative login.
See FMT_SMF.1 for services the Security Administrator is able to start and stop. Management
functionality of the TOE is provided through the TOE CLI.
FMT_SMF.1 The TOE provides all the capabilities necessary to securely manage the TOE. The Security
Administrators (a.k.a Authorized Administrators) user can connect to the TOE using the CLI to
perform these functions via SSHv2 secured connection, a terminal server, or at the local
console.
The specific management capabilities available from the TOE include;
• Local and remote administration of the TOE and the services provided by the TOE via
the TOE CLI, as described above;
• The ability to manage the warning banner message and content which allows the
Authorized Administrator the ability to define warning banner that is displayed prior
to establishing a session (note this applies to the interactive (human) users; e.g.
administrative users;
• The ability to allow any network packets as configured by the Authorized
Administrator may flow through the switch prior to the identification and
authentication process;
• The ability to manage the time limits of session inactivity which allows the Authorized
Administrator the ability to set and modify the inactivity time threshold;
• The ability to configure the number of failed administrator logon attempts that will
cause the account to be locked until it is reset;
• The ability to update the IOS-XE software. The validity of the image is provided using
SHA-256 and/or digital signature prior to installing the update;
• The ability to manage audit behavior and the audit logs which allows the Authorized
Administrator to configure the audit logs, view the audit logs, and to clear the audit
logs;
• The ability to manage the cryptographic functionality which allows the Authorized
Administrator the ability to identify and configure the algorithms used to provide
protection of the data, such as generating the RSA keys to enable SSHv2;
• The ability to configure the IPsec functionality which supports the secure connections
to the audit server;
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• The ability to import the X.509v3 certificates and validate for use in authentication
and secure connections;
• The ability to configure and set the time clock.
• The ability to configure the reference identifiers for peers, which can be FQDN
identifier.
• The ability to manually unlock a locked administrator account.
FMT_SMR.2 The TOE maintains Authorizer Administrators that include privileged and semi-privileged
administrator roles to administer the TOE locally and remotely.
The TOE performs role-based authorization, using TOE platform authorization mechanisms, to
grant access to the privileged and semi-privileged roles. For the purposes of this evaluation,
the privileged role is equivalent to full administrative access to the CLI, which is the default
access for IOS privilege level 15; and the semi-privileged role equates to any privilege level
that has a subset of the privileges assigned to level 15. Privilege levels 0 and 1 are defined by
default and are customizable, while levels 2-14 are undefined by default and are also
customizable. Note: the levels are not theoretically hierarchical.
The term “Authorized Administrator” is used in this ST to refer to any user which has been
assigned to a privilege level that is permitted to perform the relevant action; therefore, has the
appropriate privileges to perform the requested functions.
The privilege level determines the functions the user can perform; hence the Authorized
Administrator with the appropriate privileges.
The TOE can and shall be configured to authenticate all access to the command line interface
using a username and password.
The TOE supports both local administration via a directly connected console cable and remote
administration via SSHv2 secure connection.
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 and
FPT_APW_EXT.1
The TOE includes CLI command features that can be used to configure the TOE to encrypt all
locally defined user passwords. In this manner, the TOE ensures that plaintext user passwords
will not be disclosed even to administrators. The command is the password encryption aes
command used in global configuration mode.
The command service password-encryption applies encryption to all passwords, including
username passwords, authentication key passwords, the privileged command password,
console and virtual terminal line access passwords.
During the setup and configuration of the TOE and the generation of keys, the TOE stores all
private keys in a secure directory that is not readily accessible to administrators; hence no
interface access. Additionally, all pre-shared and symmetric keys are stored in encrypted form
to prevent access.
Refer to the Common Criteria Operational User Guidance and Preparative Procedures for
command description and usage information.
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FPT_STM.1 The TOE provides a source of date and time information used in audit event timestamps.
The clock function is reliant on the system clock provided by the underlying hardware.
This date and time are used as the time stamp that is applied to TOE generated audit records
and used to track inactivity of administrative sessions.
This system clock is also used for cryptographic functions such as SA lifetimes that are
configured based on length of time values configured within 1-24 hours and for certificate
validity.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Authorized Administrator can query the software version running on the TOE and can initiate
updates to (replacements of) software images.
The software version information for the TOE specific image can be displayed using the
following commands. The administrator in privileged EXEC mode enters:
Switch# show version (this displays information about the Cisco IOS software version
running on the TOE the ROM Monitor and Bootflash software versions, and the
hardware configuration, including the amount of system memory
When updates are made available by Cisco, an Authorized Administrator can obtain and install
those updates. The Authorized Administrator can download the approved image file from
Cisco.com onto a trusted computer system for usage in the trusted update functionality.
Software images are available from Cisco.com at the following:
https://www.cisco.com/cisco/web/download/index.html.
Published hash mechanisms are used to verify software/firmware update files (to ensure they
have not been modified from the originals distributed by Cisco) before they are used to update
the TOE. Once the Authorized Administrator has verified the TOE image, the Authorized
Administrator can install the file on the TOE after they have logged in and have been
successfully identified and authenticated.
Once the image is loaded into bootflash, the Authorized Administrator can display information
related to software authenticity for a specific image file, using the verify command.
The image name and hash can be verified on the [TOE] download page on Cisco.com
(https://software.cisco.com/download/home/286314016/type/282046477/release/Gibraltar-
17.3 .1).
If the there is an issue with the verification of the SHA512 checksum, the software should not
be installed and contact Cisco for assistance.
Once the Authorized Administrator has verified the TOE image, the file can be installed.
For full details, refer to the (AGD) for assistance.
FPT_TST_EXT.1 During the system bootup process (power on or reboot), all the Power on Startup Test (POST)
components for all the cryptographic modules perform the POST for the corresponding
component (hardware or software). Also, during the initialization and self-tests, the module
inhibits all access to the cryptographic algorithms.
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Additionally, the power-on self-tests are performed after the cryptographic systems are
initialized but prior to the underlying OS initialization of external interfaces; this prevents the
security appliances from passing any data before completing self-tests and entering FIPS
mode. In the event of a power-on self-test failure, the cryptographic module will force the IOS
platform to reload and reinitialize the operating system and cryptographic module. This
operation ensures no cryptographic algorithms can be accessed unless all power on self-tests
are successful.
The tests include:
• AES Known Answer Test –
For the encrypt test, a known key is used to encrypt a known plain text value resulting in an
encrypted value. This encrypted value is compared to a known encrypted value to ensure that
the encrypt operation is working correctly. The decrypt test is just the opposite. In this test a
known key is used to decrypt a known encrypted value. The resulting plaintext value is
compared to a known plaintext value to ensure that the decrypt operation is working correctly.
• RSA Signature Known Answer Test (both signature/verification) –
This test takes a known plaintext value and Private/Public key pair and used the public key to
encrypt the data. This value is compared to a known encrypted value to verify that encrypt
operation is working properly. The encrypted data is then decrypted using the private key. This
value is compared to the original plaintext value to ensure the decrypt operation is working
properly.
• RNG/DRBG Known Answer Test –
For this test, known seed values are provided to the DRBG implementation. The DRBG uses
these values to generate random bits. These random bits are compared to known random bits
to ensure that the DRBG is operating correctly.
• HMAC Known Answer Test –
For each of the hash values listed, the HMAC implementation is fed known plaintext data and
a known key. These values are used to generate a MAC. This MAC is compared to a known
MAC to verify that the HMAC and hash operations are operating correctly.
• SHA-1/256/512 Known Answer Test –
For each of the values listed, the SHA implementation is fed known data and key. These values
are used to generate a hash. This hash is compared to a known value to verify they match and
the hash operations are operating correctly.
Prior to installing the image, the Authorized Administrator can verify the public hash to ensure
the files has not been tampered with prior to installing. In addition, the Software Integrity Test
is run automatically whenever the IOS system images is loaded and confirms that the image
file that’s about to be loaded has maintained its integrity.
If any self-tests fail, the TOE transitions into an error state. In the error state, all secure data
transmission is halted and the TOE outputs status information indicating the failure.
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If an error occurs during the self-test, a SELF_TEST_FAILURE system log is generated.
Following is an example:
Example Error Message _FIPS-2-SELF_TEST_IOS_FAILURE: "IOS crypto FIPS self
test failed at %s."
Explanation FIPS self test on IOS crypto routine failed.
These tests are sufficient to verify that the correct version of the TOE software is running as
well as that the cryptographic operations are all performing as expected because any deviation
in the TSF behaviour will be identified by the failure of a self-test.
FTA_SSL_EXT.1 and
FTA_SSL.3
An Authorized Administrator can configure maximum inactivity times individually for both local
and remote administrative sessions through the use of the “session-timeout” setting applied
to the console and virtual terminal (vty) lines.
The configuration of the vty lines sets the configuration for the remote console access.
The line console settings are not immediately activated for the current session. The current
line console session must be exited. When the user logs back in, the inactivity timer will be
activated for the new session. If a local user session is inactive for a configured period of time,
the session will be terminated and will require re-identification and authentication to login. If
a remote user session is inactive for a configured period of time, the session will be terminated
and will require re- identification and authentication to establish a new session.
Administratively configurable timeouts are also available for the EXEC level access (access
above level 1) through use of the “exec-timeout” setting.
The allowable inactivity timeout range is from 1 to 65535 seconds. A session (local or remote)
that is inactive (i.e., no commands issuing from the local or remote client) for the defined
timeout value will be terminated.
FTA_SSL.4 An Authorized Administrator is able to exit out of both local and remote administrative sessions
by issuing the ‘exit’ command.
FTA_TAB.1 Authorized administrators define a custom login banner that will be displayed at the CLI for
both local and remote access configurations prior to allowing Authorized Administrator access
through those interfaces.
A local console includes any IT Environment Console that is directly connected to the TOE via
the Serial Console Port and is used by the TOE administrator to support TOE administration.
Whereas a remote console is one that includes any IT Environment Management workstation
with a SSH client installed that is used by the TOE administrator to support TOE administration
through SSH protected channels. Any SSH client that supports SSHv2 may be used.
FTP_ITC.1 The TOE protects communications with authorized IT entities such as the remote audit server
with IPsec. This protects the data from disclosure by encryption and by checksums that verify
that data has not been modified.
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The TOE protects communications with peer or neighbour switches using keyed hash as
defined in FCS_COP.1.1/keyedhash and cryptographic hashing functions FCS_COP.1.1/hash.
This protects the data from modification of data by hashing that verify that data has not been
modified in transit. In addition, encryption of the data as defined in
FCS_COP.1.1/DataEncryption is provided to ensure the data is not disclosed in transit.
The TSF allows the TSF, or the authorized IT entities to initiate communication via the trusted
channel.
FTP_TRP.1/Admin All remote administrative communications take place over a secure encrypted SSHv2 session.
The SSHv2 session is encrypted using AES encryption. The remote users (Authorized
Administrators) are able to initiate SSHv2 communications with the TOE.
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7 ANNEX A: KEY ZEROIZATION
7.1 Key Zeroization
The following table describes the key zeroization referenced by FCS_CKM.4 provided by the
TOE. As described below in the table, the TOE zeroize all secrets, keys and associated values
when they are no longer required. The process in which the TOE zeroizes, meets FIPS 140
validation.
Table 19: TOE Key Zeroization
Name Description Zeroization
Diffie-Hellman
Shared Secret
The value is zeroized after it has been given back to the
consuming operation. The value is overwritten by 0’s. This key
is stored in DRAM.
Automatically after
completion of DH
exchange.
Overwritten with: 0x00
Diffie Hellman
private exponent
This is the private exponent used as part of the Diffie-Hellman
key exchange. This key is stored in DRAM.
Zeroized upon completion
of DH exchange.
Overwritten with: 0x00
skeyid This is an IKE intermittent value used to create skeyid_d. This
information is stored in DRAM.
Automatically after IKE
session terminated.
Overwritten with: 0x00
skeyid_d This is an IKE intermittent value used to derive keying data for
IPsec. This information is stored in DRAM.
Automatically after IKE
session terminated.
Overwritten with: 0x00
IKE session
encrypt key
This the key IPsec key used for encrypting the traffic in an IPsec
connection. This key is stored in DRAM.
Automatically after IKE
session terminated.
Overwritten with: 0x00
IKE session
authentication
key
This the key IPsec key used for authenticating the traffic in an
IPsec connection. This key is stored in DRAM.
Automatically after IKE
session terminated.
Overwritten with: 0x00
ISAKMP
preshared
This is the configured pre-shared key for ISAKMP negotiation.
This key is stored in NVRAM.
Zeroized using the
following command:
# no crypto isakmp key1
Overwritten with: 0x0d
1
Using this command will zeroized all isakmp keys.
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Name Description Zeroization
IKE RSA Private
Key
The RSA private-public key pair is created by the device itself
using the key generation CLI described below.
The device’s public key must be added into the device
certificate. The device’s certificate is created by creating a
trustpoint on the device. This trustpoint authenticates with the
CA server to get the CA certificate and to enrol with the CA
server to generate the device certificate.
In the IKE authentication step, the device’s certificate is first
sent to another device so that it can be authenticated. The
other device verifies the certificate is signed by CA’s signing
key, and then the device sends a random secret encrypted by
the device’s public key in the valid device certificate. Thus,
establishing the trusted connection since only the device with
the matching device private key can decrypt the message and
obtain the random secret.
This key is stored in NVRAM.
Zeroized using the
following command:
# crypto key zeroize rsa2
Overwritten with: 0x0d
IPsec encryption
key
This is the key used to encrypt IPsec sessions. This key is
stored in DRAM.
Automatically when IPsec
session terminated.
Overwritten with: 0x00
IPsec
authentication
key
This is the key used to authenticate IPsec sessions. This key is
stored in DRAM.
Automatically when IPsec
session terminated.
Overwritten with: 0x00
SSH Private Key Once the function has completed the operations requiring the
RSA key object, the module over writes the entire object (no
matter its contents). This key is stored in NVRAM
Zeroized using the
following command:
# crypto key zeroize rsa 3
Overwritten with: 0x00
SSH Session Key Once the function has completed the operations requiring the
RSA key object, the module over writes the entire object (no
matter its contents). This key is stored in DRAM.
Automatically when the
SSH session is terminated.
Overwritten with: 0x00
User Password This is a variable 15+ character password that is used to
authenticate local users. The password is stored in NVRAM.
Zeroized by overwriting
with new password
2
Using this command will zeroize all RSA keys.
3
Using this command will zeroized all RSA keys
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Name Description Zeroization
Enable Password
(if used)
This is a variable 15+ character password that is used to
authenticate local users at a higher privilege level. The
password is stored in NVRAM.
Zeroized by overwriting
with new password
RNG Seed This seed is for the RNG. The seed is stored in DRAM. Zeroized upon power cycle
the device
RNG Seed Key This is the seed key for the RNG. The seed key is stored in
DRAM.
Zeroized upon power cycle
the device
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8 ANNEX B: NIAP TECHNICAL DECISIONS
This ST applies the following NIAP Technical Decisions:
Table 20 NIAP Technical Decisions (TD)
TD
Identifier
TD Name Protection
Profiles
References Publication
Date
Applicable?
TD0592 NIT Technical
Decision for
Local Storage
of Audit
Records
CPP_ND_V2.2E FAU_STG 2021.05.21 Yes- TD has
been applied
TD0591 NIT Technical
Decision for
Virtual TOEs
and
hypervisors
CPP_ND_V2.2E A.LIMITED_FUNCTION
ALITY, ACRONYMS
2021.05.21 Yes- TD has
been applied
TD0581 The NIT has
issued a
technical
decision
for Elliptic
curve-based
key
establishment
and NIST SP
800-56Arev3.
CPP_ND_V2.2E FCS_CKM.2 2021.04.09 Yes- TD has
been applied
TD0580 The NIT has
issued a
technical
decision for
clarification
about use of
DH14 in
NDcPPv2.2e.
CPP_ND_V2.2E FCS_CKM.1.1,
FCS_CKM.2.1
2021.04.09 Yes- TD has
been applied
TD0572 NiT Technical
Decision for
Restricting
FTP_ITC.1 to
only IP
address
identifiers
CPP_ND_V2.1,
CPP_ND_V2.2E
FTP_ITC.1 2021.01.29 Yes- TD has
been applied
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TD
Identifier
TD Name Protection
Profiles
References Publication
Date
Applicable?
TD0571 NiT Technical
Decision for
Guidance on
how to handle
FIA_AFL.1
CPP_ND_V2.1,
CPP_ND_V2.2E
FIA_UAU.1,
FIA_PMG_EXT.1
2021.01.29 Yes- TD has
been applied
TD0570 NiT Technical
Decision for
Clarification
about
FIA_AFL.1
CPP_ND_V2.1,
CPP_ND_V2.2E
FIA_AFL.1 2021.01.29 Yes- TD has
been applied
TD0569 NIT Technical
Decision for
Session ID
Usage Conflict
in
FCS_DTLSS_E
XT.1.7
CPP_ND_V2.2E ND SD v2.2,
FCS_DTLSS_EXT.1.7,
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.4
2021.01.28 No, SFR not
claimed
TD0564 NiT Technical
Decision for
Vulnerability
Analysis
Search Criteria
CPP_ND_V2.2E NDSDv2.2, AVA_VAN.1 2021.01.28 Yes- TD has
been applied
TD0563 NiT Technical
Decision for
Clarification of
audit date
information
CPP_ND_V2.2E NDcPPv2.2e,
FAU_GEN.1.2
2021.01.28 Yes- TD has
been applied
TD0556 NIT Technical
Decision for
RFC 5077
question
CPP_ND_V2.2E NDSDv2.2,
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.4,
Test 3
2020.11.06 No, SFR not
claimed
TD0555 NIT Technical
Decision for
RFC
Reference
incorrect in
TLSS Test
CPP_ND_V2.2E NDSDv2.2,
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.4,
Test 3
2020.11.06 No, SFR not
claimed
TD0547 NIT Technical
Decision for
Clarification
on developer
CPP_ND_V2.1,
CPP_ND_V2.2E
ND SDv2.1, ND SDv2.2,
AVA_VAN.1
2020.10.15 Yes- TD has
been applied
Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3x00 Rugged Series (IE3200, IE3300, IE3400, IE3400H) Switches running IOS-XE 17.3 Security Target
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TD
Identifier
TD Name Protection
Profiles
References Publication
Date
Applicable?
disclosure of
AVA_VAN
TD0546 NIT Technical
Decision for
DTLS -
clarification of
Application
Note 63
CPP_ND_V2.2E FCS_DTLSC_EXT.1.1 2020.10.15 No, SFR not
claimed
TD0538 The NIT has
issued a
technical
decision for
Outdated link
to allowed-
with list
CPP_ND_V2.1,
CPP_ND_V2.2E
Section 2 2020.07.13 Yes- TD has
been applied
TD0537 The NIT has
issued a
technical
decision for
Incorrect
reference to
FCS_TLSC_EX
T.2.3
CPP_ND_V2.2E FIA_X509_EXT.2.2 2020.07.13 Yes- TD has
been applied
TD0536 The NIT has
issued a
technical
decision for
Update
Verification
Inconsistency
CPP_ND_V2.1,
CPP_ND_V2.2E
AGD_OPE.1, ND SDv2.1,
ND SDv2.2
2020.07.13 Yes - TD has
been applied
TD0528 The NIT has
issued a
technical
decision for
Missing EAs
for
FCS_NTP_EXT
.1.4
CPP_ND_V2.1,
CPP_ND_V2.2E
FCS_NTP_EXT.1.4, ND
SD v2.1, ND SD v2.2
2020.07.13 No, SFR not
claimed
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Page 77 of 78
TD
Identifier
TD Name Protection
Profiles
References Publication
Date
Applicable?
TD0527 Updates to
Certificate
Revocation
Testing
(FIA_X509_EX
T.1)
CPP_ND_V2.2E FIA_X509_EXT.1/REV,
FIA_X509_EXT.1/ITT
2020.07.01 Yes - TD has
been applied
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9 ANNEX C: REFERENCES
The following documentation was used to prepare this ST:
Table 21: References
Identifier Description
[CC_PART1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 1: Introduction and
general model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, dated: April 2017
[CC_PART2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, dated: April 2017
[CC_PART3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, dated: April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Evaluation
Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 5, dated: April 2017
[NDcPP] collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 23 March 2020
[800-56A] NIST Special Publication 800-56A, March 2007
[800-56B] NIST Special Publication 800-56B Recommendation for Pair-Wise, August 2009
[FIPS 140-2] FIPS PUB 140-2 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
[FIPS PUB 186-4] FIPS PUB 186-4 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication Digital Signature
Standard (DSS) October, 2015
[800-90] NIST Special Publication 800-90A Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using
Deterministic Random Bit Generators January 2012
[FIPS PUB 180-3] FIPS PUB 180-3 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication Secure Hash
Standard (SHS) October 2008