CyberArk
Privileged Access Manager – Digital Vault Server
v14.0
Security Target
Version 1.8
Jun 2024
Document prepared by
www.lightshipsec.com
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Document History
Version Date Author Description
0.1 08 Sept 2021 Marina Ibrishimova First draft.
0.2 09 Nov 2021 Marina Ibrishimova Updated ST to APP PP v1.4
0.3 19 Sep 2022 Marina Ibrishimova Added latest TDs.
0.4 09 Oct 2022 Marina Ibrishimova Addressed vendor’s comments.
0.5 01 Jan 2023 Marina Ibrishimova Addressed evaluator’s comments.
0.6 21 Feb 2023 Marina Ibrishimova Addressed evaluator’s comments.
0.7 16 Apr 2023 Marina Ibrishimova Addressed evaluator’s comments.
0.8 25 Apr 2023 Marina Ibrishimova Addressed ALC observations.
0.9 11 Oct 2023 Marina Ibrishimova Added latest TDs.
1.0 16 Oct 2023 Marina Ibrishimova Addressed vendor comments.
1.1 17 Dec 2023 Marina Ibrishimova Addressed ASE comments.
1.2 24 Jan 2024 Enav Coresh Addressed ASE comments.
1.3 30 Jan 2024 Enav Coresh Addressed ASE comments.
1.4 11 Feb 2024 Enav Coresh Updated product name
1.5 8 Apr 2024 Marina Ibrishimova Addressed ASE comments.
1.6 9 May 2024 Marina Ibrishimova Addressed ASE comments.
1.7 16 May 2024 Marina Ibrishimova Addressed ASE comments.
1.8 13 Jun 2024 Marina Ibrishimova Addressed ASE comments.
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Table of Contents
1 ST Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 4
1.1 ST and TOE References................................................................................................ 4
1.2 TOE Overview................................................................................................................ 4
1.3 TOE Description............................................................................................................. 6
1.4 Terminology.................................................................................................................... 8
2 Conformance Claims............................................................................................................ 9
3 Security Problem Definition............................................................................................... 11
3.1 Threats ......................................................................................................................... 11
3.2 Assumptions................................................................................................................. 11
3.3 Organizational Security Policies................................................................................... 11
4 Security Objectives............................................................................................................. 12
4.1 Objectives for the TOE................................................................................................. 12
4.2 Objectives for the Operational Environment ................................................................ 13
5 Security Requirements....................................................................................................... 14
5.1 Conventions ................................................................................................................. 14
5.2 Extended Components Definition................................................................................. 14
5.3 Functional Requirements ............................................................................................. 14
5.4 Assurance Requirements............................................................................................. 22
6 TOE Summary Specification.............................................................................................. 23
6.1 Timely Security Updates .............................................................................................. 23
6.2 SFR Fulfilment.............................................................................................................. 23
7 Rationale.............................................................................................................................. 31
7.1 Conformance Claim Rationale ..................................................................................... 31
7.2 Security Objectives Rationale ...................................................................................... 31
7.3 Security Requirements Rationale................................................................................. 32
8 Appendix A .......................................................................................................................... 33
9 Appendix B .......................................................................................................................... 66
List of Tables
Table 1: Evaluation identifiers...................................................................................................... 4
Table 2: Terminology .................................................................................................................... 8
Table 3: NIAP Technical Decisions.............................................................................................. 9
Table 4: Threats ........................................................................................................................... 11
Table 5: Assumptions ................................................................................................................. 11
Table 6: Security Objectives....................................................................................................... 12
Table 7: Operational environment objectives........................................................................... 13
Table 8: Summary of SFRs......................................................................................................... 14
Table 9: Assurance Requirements............................................................................................. 22
Table 10: SFR Fulfilment / TOE Summary Specification ......................................................... 23
Table 11: Cryptographic Algorithms ......................................................................................... 29
Table 12: HMAC ........................................................................................................................... 30
Table 13: Security Objectives Rationale ................................................................................... 31
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1 ST Introduction
1 This Security Target (ST) defines the CyberArk Privileged Access Manager – Digital
Vault Server Target of Evaluation (TOE) for the purposes of Common Criteria (CC)
evaluation.
2 The CyberArk Privileged Access Manager – Digital Vault Server is the Digital Vault
Server component of the CyberArk Privileged Access Manager (PAM) solution. PAM
enables organizations to secure, provision, control, and monitor all activities
associated with privileged identities used in enterprise systems and applications.
The TOE provides secure storage and access to privileged account files, and to the
administrator and session activity files.
3 The TOE operates in a Windows environment.
1.1 ST and TOE References
Table 1: Evaluation identifiers
ST Title CyberArk Software Ltd. Privileged Access Manager – Digital Vault
Server, v14.0
Security Target
ST version Version 1.8
ST Author Lightship Security
ST Publication Date Jun 13, 2024
TOE Reference CyberArk Privileged Access Manager – Digital Vault Server
v14.0.0.40
1.2 TOE Overview
1.2.1 Type
4 The TOE is an application that runs on the Windows Operating System (OS), and it
is compiled with OpenSSL FIPS Object Module v1.02 and MySQL v8.0.31 database.
1.2.2 Usage
5 The TOE securely manages, stores and controls access to privileged account files,
which are created by non-TOE components. The privileged account files, along with
each file’s unique file key, are encrypted by Privileged Access Manager (PAM)
components and sent to the TOE. For each privileged account file sent to the TOE,
the TOE encrypts the unique file key, and then stores the privileged account file with
its TOE-encrypted file key in a logical Safe. Each Safe has a unique key, which is
used to encrypt the file key of the privileged account file stored within the Safe. The
encrypted privileged account files, which are sent to and retrieved by the TOE, are
never decrypted by the TOE.
6 In the evaluated configuration, the TOE runs on a hardened Windows server. The
TOE’s network includes two additional servers for the other PAM components, LDAP
server and a Certificate Authority (CA) server.
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NOTE: The use of LDAP is optional. It is intended to be installed in the same
physical network with the TOE, as part of the same environment. The TOE does not
enforce any algorithms listed in the ST for the LDAP connection and is not
responsible for the validation of the TLS parameters with LDAP.
7 Communication between the TOE and non-TOE PAM components happens over
TLS as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Example TOE deployment
1.2.3 Security Functions
8 The TOE provides the following security functions:
a) Cryptographic Support. The TOE implements the OpenSSL FIPS Object
Module with the CyberArk libraries to provide the following cryptographic
services: encryption and decryption, hashing, digital signature generation and
verification, and key generation.
b) User Data Protection. The TOE encrypts all sensitive data stored in non-
volatile memory. The TOE limits its access to network connectivity when
accessing the platform’s hardware resources.
c) Identification and Authentication. The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates for
TLS communications. The certificates are presented by the by the TOE during
the TLS handshake is established. The vault certificates are authenticated by
the connecting client, i.e. the Windows server PAM components, and the
Linux server PAM components. The certificates can include (per generation) a
CRL distribution point (CDP) to enable the clients to use a certificate
revocation list (CRL) mechanisms to verify the certificate.
d) Security Management. The TOE provides a set of commands for
administrators to manage the security functions, configuration, and other
features of the TOE and OE components. A TOE administrator manages the
TOE from the Password Vault Web Access (PVWA) on the Windows server in
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the OE. There is no access to TOE functionality until passwords are created
for the built-in Administrator user.
e) Privacy. The TOE does not store or transmit any Personally Identifiable
Identification (PII).
f) Protection of the TSF. The TOE leverages anti-exploitation capabilities
provided by the OS. The TOE provides integrity for installation and software
updates.
g) Trusted Path. The TOE provides a trusted path between itself and the
Privileged Session Manager (PSM), Central Policy Manager (CPM), PVWA,
Privileged Session Manager SSH (Secure Shell), and Proxy (PSMP) PAM
components. All communications between the TOE and these components
are encrypted and authenticated over TLS v1.2 (port 443) sessions.
1.2.4 Non-TOE Components
9 The TOE operates with the following non-TOE components in the environment,
which are intended to be deployed in a physically secure environment:
a) PAM Windows components, OS Microsoft Windows Server 2019, is
composed of the PAM components:
i) The Privileged Session Manager (PSM) v14.0.0.9,
PSM is the part of PAM that enables organizations to secure, control,
and monitor privileged access to network devices over RDP
connections.
ii) Password Vault Web Access (PVWA) v14.0.0.32,
PVWA is the web interface of PAM that provides a single console for
requesting, accessing, and managing privileged passwords throughout
the environment.
iii) Central Policy Manager (CPM) v14.0.0.9,
CPM automatically enforces enterprise policies for password
management.
b) PAM Linux components which run on RHEL 8:
i) Privileged Session Manager SSH (Secure Shell) Proxy (PSMP)
v14.0.0.14
c) LDAP Server (optional), Windows Server 2019, a central authentication server
for organizations, build to provide access to internal servers for each
organization user.
d) CA Server, Windows Server 2019, provides the functionality of downloading
CRLs over HTTP.
e) Vault Windows Server 2019, the server on which the TOE runs.
1.3 TOE Description
1.3.1 Physical Scope
10 The physical scope of the TOE is the Privileged Access Manager – Digital Vault
Server Windows application. The TOE version is v14.0.0.40 and the TOE is
delivered through CyberArk’s online customer portal, which uses AWS Marketplace.
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The TOE delivery format is *.exe. The customer portal can be accessed after
customers register to the portal https://cyberark.my.site.com/s/login.
1.3.1.1 Guidance Parts
11 The TOE includes the following guidance documents, which are delivered to
customers through a download link that becomes available to them after they
purchase the TOE and sign in for the CyberArk Privileged Access Manager - Self-
Hosted customer portal:
a) Privileged Access Manager – Digital Vault Server Common Criteria Guide,
v1.6 (PDF), May 2024
b) PAM Self-Hosted v14.0, 25-Jan-2024, No.
A8474D5E4B6532ED3402D38B46F7DB15F650CA75EBD0372BB891F3ECD
C7089CE, as follow:
Download the PAM Self hosted document described above >go to Cyberark
Portal cyberark.my.site.com/mplace/s/#software > choose Privileged Access
Manager Self-Hosted > go to Components > choose Documentation >
download Production-PublicHelp-PAS - 14.0.zip and Extract > choose
OnlineHelp.htm > choose Install and Harden components
a) Install: Installation > install PAM Self-Hosted
b) Upgrade: Installation > Upgrade
c) Admin: Administrator > Components
1.3.1.2 Configuration List
12 The evaluation package consists of the following:
a) Privileged Access Manager – Digital Vault Server (TOE)
b) Privileged Access Manager – Digital Vault Server Security Target, v1.8
c) Privileged Access Manager – Digital Vault Server Common Criteria Guide,
v1.6
d) Privileged Access Manager – Digital Vault Server Entropy Description, v0.4
e) PAM Self-Hosted v14.0, 25-Jan-2024, No.
A8474D5E4B6532ED3402D38B46F7DB15F650CA75EBD0372BB891F3EC
DC7089CE.
1.3.1.3 Out-of-Scope Functionalities
13 The out-of-scope functionalities, which are disabled by default in the evaluated
configuration are as follows:
a) Disaster Recovery Vault
b) Distributed Vault
c) Cluster Vault
d) PAM on Cloud
e) Backup (Replicate)
f) ENE (SMTP Monitoring)
g) HSM
h) Remote Control Client (SNMP Monitoring)
i) PAKeyGen
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1.3.2 Logical Scope
14 The logical scope of the TOE comprises the security functions defined in section
Security Functions.
1.4 Terminology
Table 2: Terminology
Term Definition
CA Certificate Authority
CC Common Criteria
CPM CyberArk Central Policy Manager
CRL Certificate Revocation List
CDP CRL distribution point
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
IIS Internet information Services
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
NIAP National Information Assurance Partnership
PP Protection Profile
PAM CyberArk Privileged Access Manager
PSM CyberArk Privileged Session Manager
PSMP CyberArk Privileged Session Manager SSH (Secure Shell)
Proxy
PVWA CyberArk Password Vault Web Access
SRP Secure Remote Password
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
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2 Conformance Claims
15 The following conformance claims are made:
1) CC version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
2) CC Part 2 extended, CCMB-2017-04-002, April 2017
3) CC Part 3 extended, CCMB-2017-04-003, April 2017
4) NIAP Protection Profile for Application Software, v1.4 (PP_APP), 2021-10-07
5) NIAP Functional Package for Transport Layer Security, v1.1, 2019-03-01,
Conformant.
6) NIAP Technical Decisions per Table 3.
Table 3: NIAP Technical Decisions
TD
Type
TD # Name Rationale if N/A
PP_APP TD0628 Addition of Container Image to Package
Format
PP_APP TD0650 Conformance claim sections updated to
allow for MOD_VPNC_V2.3 and 2.4
PP_APP TD0664 Testing activity for FPT_TUD_EXT.2.2
PP_APP TD0717 Format changes for PP_APP_V1.4
PP_APP TD0719 ECD for PP APP V1.3 and 1.4
PP_APP TD0736 Number of elements for iterations of
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1
N/A. The TOE does not claim
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1/Server
PP_APP TD0743 FTP_DIT_EXT.1.1 Selection exclusivity
PP_APP TD0747 Configuration Storage Option for Android N/A. the TOE is not an Android
app
PP_APP TD0756 Update for platform-provided full disk
encryption
PP_APP TD0780 FIA_X509_EXT.1 Test 4 Clarification N/A. The TOE does not claim
FIA_X509_EXT.1
PP_APP TD0798 Static Memory Mapping Exceptions
PP_APP TD0815 Addition of Conditional TSS Activity for
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.5
PP_APP TD0822 Correction to Windows Manifest File for
FDP_DEC_EXT.1
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TD
Type
TD # Name Rationale if N/A
PP_APP TD0823 Update to Microsoft Windows Exploit
Protection link in FPT_AEX_EXT.1.3
PKG_TL
S_1.1
DT0779 Updated Session Resumption Support in
TLS package V1.1
PKG_TL
S_1.1
TD0770 TLSS.2 connection with no client cert NA, this SFR is not claimed
PKG_TL
S_1.1
TD0739 PKG_TLS_V1.1 has 2 different publication
dates
PKG_TL
S_1.1
TD0726 Corrections to (D)TLSS SFRs in TLS 1.1 FP
PKG_TL
S_1.1
TD0513 CA Certificate loading
PKG_TL
S_1.1
TD0499 Testing with pinned certificates
PKG_TL
S_1.1
TD0469 Modification of test activity for
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1 test 4.1
PKG_TL
S_1.1
TD0442 Updated TLS Ciphersuites for TLS Package
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3 Security Problem Definition
16 The security problem is described in terms of the threats that the TOE is expected to
address, assumptions about the operational environment, and any organizational
security policies that the TOE is expected to enforce.
3.1 Threats
Table 4: Threats
Identifier Description
T.NETWORK_ATTACK An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or
elsewhere on the network infrastructure. Attackers may engage
in communications with the application software or alter
communications between the application software and other
endpoints in order to compromise it.
T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP
An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or
elsewhere on the network infrastructure. Attackers may monitor
and gain access to data exchanged between the application and
other endpoints.
T.LOCAL_ATTACK An attacker can act through unprivileged software on the same
computing platform on which the application executes. Attackers
may provide maliciously formatted input to the application in the
form of files or other local communications.
T.PHYSICAL_ACCESS An attacker may try to access sensitive data at rest.
3.2 Assumptions
Table 5: Assumptions
Identifier Description
A.PLATFORM The TOE relies upon a trustworthy computing platform for its
execution. This includes the underlying platform and whatever
runtime environment it provides to the TOE.
A.PROPER_USER The user of the application software is not willfully negligent or
hostile, and uses the software in compliance with the applied
enterprise security policy.
A.PROPER_ADMIN The administrator of the application software is not careless,
willfully negligent or hostile, and administers the software within
compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.
3.3 Organizational Security Policies
17 There are no organizational security policies for the application.
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4 Security Objectives
4.1 Objectives for the TOE
Table 6: Security Objectives
Identifier Description
O.INTEGRITY Conformant TOEs ensure the integrity of their installation and
update packages, and also leverage execution environment-
based mitigations. Software is seldom, if ever, shipped without
errors. The ability to deploy patches and updates to fielded
software with integrity is critical to enterprise network security.
Processor manufacturers, compiler developers, execution
environment vendors, and operating system vendors have
developed execution environment-based mitigations that
increase the cost to attackers by adding complexity to the task
of compromising systems. Application software can often take
advantage of these mechanisms by using APIs provided by the
runtime environment or by enabling the mechanism through
compiler or linker options.
O.QUALITY To ensure quality of implementation, conformant TOEs leverage
services and APIs provided by the runtime environment rather
than implementing their own versions of these services and
APIs. This is especially important for cryptographic services and
other complex operations such as file and media parsing.
Leveraging this platform behaviour relies upon using only
documented and supported APIs.
O.MANAGEMENT To facilitate management by users and the enterprise,
conformant TOEs provide consistent and supported interfaces
for their security-relevant configuration and maintenance. This
includes the deployment of applications and application updates
through the use of platform-supported deployment mechanisms
and formats, as well as providing mechanisms for configuration.
This also includes providing control to the user regarding
disclosure of any PII.
O.PROTECTED_STORAGE To address the issue of loss of confidentiality of user data in the
event of loss of physical control of the storage medium,
conformant TOEs will use data-at-rest protection. This involves
encrypting data and keys stored by the TOE in order to prevent
unauthorized access to this data. This also includes
unnecessary network communications whose consequence
may be the loss of data.
O.PROTECTED_COMMS To address both passive (eavesdropping) and active (packet
modification) network attack threats, conformant TOEs use a
trusted channel for sensitive data. Sensitive data includes
cryptographic keys, passwords, and any other data specific to
the application that should not be exposed outside of the
application.
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4.2 Objectives for the Operational Environment
Table 7: Operational environment objectives
Identifier Description
OE.PLATFORM The TOE relies upon a trustworthy computing platform for its
execution. This includes the underlying operating system
and any discrete execution environment provided to the
TOE.
OE.PROPER_USER The user of the application software is not wilfully negligent
or hostile, and uses the software within compliance of the
applied enterprise security policy.
OE.PROPER_ADMIN The administrator of the application software is not careless,
wilfully negligent or hostile, and administers the software
within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.
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5 Security Requirements
5.1 Conventions
18 This document uses the following font conventions to identify the operations defined
by the CC:
a) Assignment. Indicated with italicized text in square brackets.
b) Refinement. Indicated with bold text and strikethroughs in square brackets.
c) Selection. Indicated with underlined text in square brackets.
d) Assignment within a selection. Indicated with italicized and underlined text
in square brackets.
e) Iteration. Indicated by adding a slash and a name, e.g., “FCS_COP.1/Hash”.
5.2 Extended Components Definition
19 All extended components (identified by EXT) are reproduced directly from the
claimed Protection Profile and therefore no further definition is provided in this
document.
5.3 Functional Requirements
Table 8: Summary of SFRs
Requirement Title Type
FCS_CKM.1/AK Cryptographic Asymmetric Key Generation Selection
FCS_CKM_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Generation Services Mandatory
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment Selection
FCS_COP.1/SKC Cryptographic Operation – Encryption/Decryption Selection
FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation – Hashing Selection
FCS_COP.1/Sig Cryptographic Operation – Signing Selection
FCS_COP.1/Keye
dHash
Cryptographic Operation – Keyed-Hash Message
Authentication
Selection
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services Mandatory
FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials Mandatory
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 TLS Protocol Mandatory
FCS_TLSS_EXT.
1
TLS Server Protocol Selection
FDP_DEC_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources Mandatory
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Requirement Title Type
FDP_NET_EXT.1 Network Communications Mandatory
FDP_DAR_EXT.1 Encryption Of Sensitive Application Data Mandatory
FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Supported Configuration Mechanism Mandatory
FMT_CFG_EXT.1 Secure by Default Configuration Mandatory
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions Mandatory
FPR_ANO_EXT.1 User Consent for Transmission of Personally
Identifiable Information
Mandatory
FPT_API_EXT.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs Mandatory
FPT_AEX_EXT.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities Mandatory
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Integrity for Installation and Update Mandatory
FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Integrity for Installation and Update Selection
FPT_LIB_EXT.1 Use of Third-Party Libraries Mandatory
FPT_IDV_EXT.1 Software Identification and Versions Mandatory
FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit Mandatory
5.3.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)
FCS_CKM.1/AK Cryptographic Asymmetric Key Generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/AK The application shall [implement functionality] to generate asymmetric
cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key
generation algorithm [
• [ECC schemes] using [“NIST curves” P-384 and [P-256] that meet
the following: [FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard
(DSS)”, Appendix B.4],
].
Application Note: This SFR was altered by TD0717.
FCS_CKM_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Generation Services
FCS_CKM_EXT.1.1 The application shall [implement asymmetric key generation].
Application Note: This SFR was altered by TD0717.
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FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment
FCS_CKM.2.1 The application shall [implement functionality] to perform cryptographic
key establishment in accordance with a specified cryptographic key
establishment method: [
• [Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes] that meets the
following: [NIST Special Publication 800-56A, “Recommendation for
Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm
Cryptography”],
• [FFC Schemes using “safe-prime” groups] that meet the following:
‘NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, “Recommendation for
Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm
Cryptography” and [RFC 7919]
].
FCS_COP.1/SKC Cryptographic Operation – Encryption/Decryption
FCS_COP.1.1/SKC The application shall perform [encryption/decryption] in accordance with
a specified cryptographic algorithm [
• AES-CBC (as defined in NIST SP 800-38A) mode,
• AES-GCM (as defined in NIST SP 800-38D) mode,
] and cryptographic key sizes [128-bit, 256-bit].
Application note: This SFR was altered by TD0717.
FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation – Hashing
FCS_COP.1.1/Hash The application shall perform [cryptographic hashing services] in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [
• SHA-256,
• SHA-384,
• SHA-512
] and message digest sizes [
• 256,
• 384,
• 512
] bits that meet the following: [FIPS Pub 180-4].
FCS_COP.1/Sig Cryptographic Operation – Signing
FCS_COP.1.1/Sig The application shall perform [cryptographic signature services
(generation and verification)] in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [
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• RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of [2048-bit or greater]
that meet the following: [FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature
Standard (DSS)”, Section 5],
].
Application note: This SFR was altered by TD0717.
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation – Keyed-Hash Message
Authentication
FCS_COP.1.1/KeyedHash The application shall perform [keyed-hash message
authentication] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [
• HMAC-SHA-256
• HMAC-SHA-384
• HMAC-SHA-512
] and [
• no other algorithms
] with key sizes [256, 384, 512] and message digest sizes [256, 384,
512] and [no other size] bits that meet the following: [FIPS Pub 198-1,
‘The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code’ and FIPS Pub 180-4
‘Secure Hash Standard’].
Application note: This SFR was altered by TD0717.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The application shall [invoke platform-provided DRBG functionality] for its
cryptographic operations.
FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials
FCS_STO_EXT.1.1 The application shall [ implement functionality to securely store [file keys,
safe keys, and password verifiers] according to [FCS_COP.1/SKC]]
] to non-volatile memory.
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 TLS Protocol
FCS_TLS_EXT.1.1 The product shall implement [
• TLS as a server
].
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 TLS Server Protocol
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1 The product shall implement TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246) and [no earlier TLS
versions] as a server that supports the cipher suites [
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• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in
RFC 5289
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in
RFC 5289
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC
5288
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC
5288
] and no other cipher suites, and also supports functionality for [
• none
].
Application Note: This SFR was altered by TD0779
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.2 The product shall deny connections from clients requesting SSL 2.0, SSL
3.0, TLS 1.0 and [TLS 1.1]
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.3 The product shall perform key establishment for TLS using [
• Diffie-Hellman parameters with size [3072 bits] and no other sizes,
• ECDHE parameters using elliptic curves [secp256r1, secp384r1] and
no other curves.
].
Application Note: This SFR was altered by TD0726.
5.3.2 User Data Protection (FDP)
FDP_DEC_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources
FDP_DEC_EXT.1.1 The application shall restrict its access to [
• network connectivity
].
FDP_DEC_EXT.1.2 The application shall restrict its access to [
• [the firewall, and event and system log repositories]
].
FDP_NET_EXT.1 Network Communications
FDP_NET_EXT.1.1 The application shall restrict network communication to [
• user-initiated communication for [the establishment of TLS sessions
with the PAM components and the following functions:
o CPM – authenticate to Password Vault Server, retrieve and
update privileged passwords and password policies
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o PSM – authenticate to Password Vault Server, retrieve
privileged accounts, upload privilege session recordings
o PVWA – authenticate to Password Vault Server, TOE
administration
o PSMP – authenticate to Password Vault Server, retrieve
privileged accounts, upload privileged session recordings],
] .
FDP_DAR_EXT.1 Encryption Of Sensitive Application Data
FDP_DAR_EXT.1.1 The application shall [
• leverage platform-provided functionality to encrypt sensitive data,
• protect sensitive data in accordance with FCS_STO_EXT.1,
] in non-volatile memory.
5.3.3 Security Management (FMT)
FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Supported Configuration Mechanism
FMT_MEC_EXT.1.1 The application shall [invoke the mechanisms recommended by the
platform vendor for storing and setting configuration options].
FMT_CFG_EXT.1 Secure by Default Configuration
FMT_CFG_EXT.1.1 The application shall provide only enough functionality to set new
credentials when configured with default credentials or no credentials.
FMT_CFG_EXT.1.2 The application shall be configured by default with file permissions which
protect the application binaries and data files from modification by normal
unprivileged users.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management
functions [
• [user management, configuration management, password
management, start/stop service]
].
5.3.4 Privacy (FPR)
FPR_ANO_EXT.1 User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable
Information
FPR_ANO_EXT.1.1 The application shall [
• not transmit PII over a network,
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].
5.3.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
FPT_API_EXT.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs
FPT_API_EXT.1.1 The application shall use only documented platform APIs.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.1 The application shall not request to map memory at an explicit address
except for [
• 0x0000000000000000
• 0x000000007FFF0000
• 0x000000007FFE0000
• 0x000000007FFE1000
• 0x000000007FFE3000
].
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.2 The application shall [not allocate any memory region with both write and
execute permissions].
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.3 The application shall be compatible with security features provided by
the platform vendor.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.4 The application shall not write user-modifiable files to directories that
contain executable files unless explicitly directed by the user to do so.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.5 The application shall be built with stack-based buffer overflow protection
enabled.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Integrity for Installation and Update
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 The application shall [leverage the platform] to check for updates and
patches to the application software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2 The application shall [provide the ability] to view the current version of
the application software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3 The application shall not download, modify, replace or update its own
binary code.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.4 Application updates shall be digitally signed such that the application
platform can cryptographically verify them prior to installation.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.5 The application is distributed [as an additional software package to the
platform OS].
FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Integrity for Installation and Update
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FPT_TUD_EXT.2.1 The application shall be distributed using the format of the platform-
supported package manager.
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.2 The application shall be packaged such that its removal results in the
deletion of all traces of the application, with the exception of
configuration settings, output files, and audit/log events.
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.3 The application installation package shall be digitally signed such that its
platform can cryptographically verify them prior to installation.
FPT_LIB_EXT.1 Use of Third Party Libraries
FPT_LIB_EXT.1.1 The application shall be packaged with only [the libraries listed in
Appendix B].
FPT_IDV_EXT.1 Software Identification and Versions
FPT_IDV_EXT.1.1 The application shall be versioned with [[version number]].
5.3.6 Trusted Path/Channel (FTP)
FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit
FTP_DIT_EXT.1.1 The application shall [
• encrypt all transmitted [sensitive data] with [TLS as a server as
defined in the Functional Package for TLS and also supports
functionality for [none],
] between itself and another trusted IT product.
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5.4 Assurance Requirements
20 The TOE security assurance requirements are summarized in Table 9.
Table 9: Assurance Requirements
Assurance Class Components Description
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance Claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended Components Definition
ASE_INT.1 ST Introduction
ASE_OBJ.1 Security Objectives for the operational environment
ASE_REQ.1 Stated Security Requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security Problem Definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE Summary Specification
Development ADV_FSP.1 Basic Functional Specification
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational User Guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative User Guidance
Life Cycle Support ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM Coverage
ALC_TSU_EXT.1 Timely Security Updates (as defined in PP_APP)
Tests ATE_IND.1 Independent Testing – conformance
Vulnerability
Assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability Analysis
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6 TOE Summary Specification
6.1 Timely Security Updates
21 CyberArk endeavors to remediate critical and high severity publicly disclosed
vulnerabilities in its TOEs, in accordance with their severity as implemented in the
TOE, and subject to patches made available by their respective vendors (if
applicable). The security updated can be provided as quickly as 4 weeks.
22 CyberArk will report a vulnerability to its customers when customers are required to
take action to apply the remediation. Reporting of vulnerability-related issues may be
via a security bulletin, release notes, knowledge base article, in-product notification
or any other appropriate notification method. For the protection of CyberArk’s
customers, reporting of a vulnerability (including disclosure to any individual
customer) will only be made once a remediation is made generally available by
CyberArk, unless otherwise required by applicable law or regulation. In addition, the
level of detail regarding a vulnerability in any reporting will be limited only to the
minimum necessary.
23 If a security bulletin is issued, notification is sent via email to our technical
subscribers (defined per customer upon request) and also published on the
CyberArk website - Product Security | CyberArk, leading to a password-protected
technical community - Login (site.com). First time users are asked to register prior to
login.
6.2 SFR Fulfilment
24 Table 10 describes how the TOE fulfils the SFRs.
Table 10: SFR Fulfilment / TOE Summary Specification
SFR Fulfilment
FCS_CKM.1/AK Table 11 below lists all the key sizes used for the ECC asymmetric key
generation scheme and its usage. Table 11 also lists the key
establishment and key exchange schemes used by the TOE.
The TOE uses ECDHE and DHE key establishment/exchange for TLS.
The use of asymmetric encryption is needed for the TLS protocol used
by the TOE.
The key generation methods follow the requirements within FIPS PUB
186-4. The key establishment methods follow the requirements within
NIST Special Publication 800-56A.
FCS_CKM_EXT.1
FCS_CKM.2
FCS_COP.1/SKC AES128-CBC, AES256-CBC, AES128-GCM, AES256-GCM is used for
the encryption/decryption of sensitive data stored in non-volatile
memory.
FCS_COP.1/Hash Table 12 lists all the key sizes used for SHA hashing and message
digests within the TOE. SHA is used in TLS and SRP. The SHA256,
SHA384, and SHA512 hash functions are used in HMAC for TLS
message integrity and authentication. The TOE’s implementation of
SHA follows the requirements within FIPS Pub 180-4.
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FCS_COP.1/Sig Table 11 lists all the key sizes used for signature generation and
verification for TLS and the key sizes used to verify TOE file signatures.
The TOE’s implementation of signature generation and verification
follow the requirements within FIPS PUB 186-4.
FCS_COP.1/KeyedH
ash
Table 12 lists all the key sizes used for SHA hashing and message
digests within the TOE. SHA is used in TLS and SRP. The SHA256,
SHA384, and SHA512 hash functions are used in HMAC for TLS
message integrity and authentication. The TOE’s implementation of
SHA follows the requirements within FIPS Pub 180-4
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 The TOE implements the Approved SP 800-90 Approved AES256-CTR
DRBG to generate random bits for key generation. When the TOE starts
up, the DRBG is seeded with 256 bits of entropy from the Windows
Entropy Pool by calling the OpenSSL RAND_seed function for the
CryptGenRandom function and for Crypto API (CAPI).
The platform system time and tick count noise sources are added to the
Windows OS Entropy Pool after initialization. On an ongoing basis the
TOE seeds the DRBG with 256 bits of entropy by calling the
RAND_seed function for the BCryptGenRandom function and for the
CNG (Crypto Next Generation) API. More information about the entropy
process is described in the proprietary Entropy Rationale document.
FCS_STO_EXT.1 The TOE secures sensitive data stored in non-volatile memory using its
algorithms for AES256-CBC encryption with a 256-bit key.
Sensitive data includes the file key sent with a file from a PAM
component, the Safe key used to encrypt the file key, and the verifier
associated with a CyberArk password (for CyberArk authentication).
• The privileged account file sent by a PAM client is encrypted by
the PAM client.
• The encrypted file is sent to the TOE and the file key is sent
along securely in encrypted form over TLS.
• The TOE decrypts the file key, then encrypts the file key with
the Safe’s unique AES 256-bit key using AES256-CBC
encryption.
• The Safe key is encrypted by the unique AES 256-bit Server
key and stored within the Safe. A Safe key is generated
automatically using the DRBG when a Safe is created.
An administrator creates the initial password for a CyberArk (local)
account. When the administrator creates the initial password, or a user
changes it, the password is concatenated and manipulated using hash
and exponential functions to derive a password verifier.
The password verifier is stored in the MySQL DB. In the MySQL DB, the
column containing the verifier is encrypted with the Server key using
AES256-CBC encryption.
Any time a local user authenticates, the password verifier is derived and
authenticated against the value stored in the DB.
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The Server key is unique to the TOE and is stored in volatile memory.
The Server key is used to encrypt the Safe keys and the sensitive data
stored within the DB. A Safe key is used to encrypt one or more files
within a Safe.
The Administrator user, and the PAM component users listed below,
authenticate to the TOE using CyberArk authentication:
• CPM – PasswordManager
• PVWA – PVWAAppUser, PVWAGWUser
• PSM – PSMAPPUSer, PSMGWUser
• PSMP – PSMPAppUser, PSMPGWUser
FCS_TLS_EXT.1
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1
The TOE is a server to the OE PAM component clients. The TOE uses
the https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Cryptographic-Algorithm-Validation-
Program/details?product=14798CyberArk Cryptographic Module v2.2.1
Module with the CyberArk libraries for the cryptographic services
required to support TLS communications with the PAM component
clients.
The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates for TLS communications. The
certificates are presented by the by the TOE during the TLS handshake
is established. The vault certificates are authenticated by the connecting
client, i.e. the Windows server PAM components, and the Linux server
PAM components. The certificates can include (per generation) a CRL
distribution point (CDP) to enable the clients to use a certificate
revocation list (CRL) mechanisms to verify the certificate.
The TOE supports:
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
Six TLS suites are suggested by the components during the TLS
handshake. These are:
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128-GCM-SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
From these, the Vault server does not support ECDSA certificates.
From the remaining four suites, the vault server will always select the
strongest one available -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384.
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Therefore, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 is the
only ciphersuite used.
The TOE does not accept any connection requests using SSL or a TLS
version other than TLSv1.2. The TOE checks that the presented
identifier matches the reference identifier, either the IP or DNS name,
and only establishes a trusted channel if the identifier is a match and if
the client’s certificate is validated. The TOE supports certificate pinning.
Key agreement parameters are provided in Table 11: Cryptographic
Algorithms.
FDP_DEC_EXT.1
The TOE limits its access to only network connectivity when accessing
the platform’s hardware resources. The TOE requires network access to
the CA server, the Windows server PAM components, and the RHEL
server PAM components.
The TOE limits access to only network connectivity between the PAM
component clients and the TOE over TLS on port 443. The TOE also
uses port 80 for HTTP connections to the CA server for certification
revocation checks.
The TOE limits access to the platform’s firewall services and audit
mechanism. The TOE hardening process closes all ports and removes
services not required by the TOE. The TOE accesses the platform’s
firewall to take control over the firewall services and change the firewall
information flow control rules. The TOE also accesses the platform’s
audit mechanism to write event and system logs.
FDP_NET_EXT.1
FDP_DAR_EXT.1 With the exception of cryptographic key destruction for keys stored in
volatile memory, the TOE does not depend on platform-provided
cryptographic functionality to provide its cryptographic services. The
cryptographic functionality is included with the CyberArk Crypto Library,
which provides all cryptographic services including
encryption/decryption of data stored in Safes and in the MySQL DB.
The TOE protects sensitive data by using AES256-CBC to encrypt the
data before storing it in non-volatile memory and restricting access to
the data. Sensitive data includes the file key used to encrypt a file sent
by a PAM client, the Safe key used to encrypt the file key, and the
password verifier used for SRP authentication to the TOE.
The file key is encrypted by the Safe key of the Safe where it is stored.
Both the client file and its encrypted file key are stored within the Safe.
All sensitive data stored within a Safe is protected by that Safe’s key.
The Safes are stored in non-volatile memory at c:\Private\Safes. The
Safe key is encrypted with the 256-bit Server key using AES256-CBC
encryption.
The Server key is stored in volatile memory. The Administrator user and
PAM components use SRP authentication. PAM client password
verifiers are encrypted with the Server key using AES256-CBC
encryption and stored in the MySQL DB. The sensitive data within a
Safe is protected by the combination of the Vault Access Control Policy,
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SFR Fulfilment
which is configured by the installation process, and the Safe Access
Control Policy.
Access to the Vault and Safes is enforced by user account
authorizations and permissions. The Vault Access Control Policy
controls user access to the Vault. The Vault Access Control Policy only
allows access to the Vault for those users that are defined in the
Vault.ini file. The Safe Access Control Policy controls Safe member
permissions to view or create Safes and their permissions on the files
within the Safes. An operator attempting to access the Vault or Safes
with the incorrect authorizations and permissions is denied access.
PSM and PSMP recordings may contain sensitive information if the user
chooses to connect to a remote target which may contain sensitive
information, therefore, we recommend the user to enable BitLocker.
FMT_MEC_EXT.1 The TOE uses OS functionality for storing and setting configuration
options. The storage location of configuration files is maintained in the
Windows Registry. The Server Windows Registry entries are located in
the following file: HKLM\Software\CyberArk\PrivateArk\Server\.
The TOE contains local configuration files that are created during
installation, but the information is read-only and never written to by the
TOE.
The Administrator user or users in the Administrators group have Full
control, Modify, Read & Execute, Read, and Write permissions for the
configuration files. The configuration files are located in the C:\Program
Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\conf folder.
The DBParm.ini configuration file contains the general parameters for
the Vault database. This file contains parameters for cryptographic
algorithms, key locations, certificate settings, groups and users, and the
TOE’s listening port. The Passparm.ini file contains the password
complexity settings.
FMT_CFG_EXT.1 Physical access is required for installation of the TOE. The TOE
provides only enough functionality to enter credentials for the
Administrator and Master users during installation. There are no default
credentials for these users and no other default credentials stored on
the TOE. Only an authorized administrator can install the TOE and set
the credentials.
During installation, the TOE is configured by default to protect the
application’s files from unauthorized access. The files are set with
permissions that do not allow the Users group to modify them.
FMT_SMF.1 The TOE provides the following management functions: user
management, configuration management, password management,
start/stop service. Any other management operations must be
performed by an authorized administrator using PVWA in the
environment.
FPR_ANO_EXT.1 The TOE does not transmit PII. Usernames were considered and
determined to not be PII as this information is owned and generated by
the company that implements the TOE. This means that a Security
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SFR Fulfilment
Policy must be enforced by the company that implements the TOE to
prevent users from choosing their own personal username that could
link to their personal identity.
FPT_API_EXT.1 The TOE uses only the standard platform APIs. Refer to Appendix A for
a list of all APIs used by the TOE.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1 The TOE provides anti-exploitation protections. By default, ASLR
protection is enabled on the Windows 2019 server. The TOE is
compiled using the /NXCOMPAT flag to enable Data Execution
Protection (DEP) and the /GS flag to enable stack-based buffer overflow
protection.
The TOE does not write user-modifiable files to directories that contain
executable files.
• Executable files are stored in ...\PrivateArk\Server\.
• User-modifiable files are written to ...\PrivateArk\Server\Conf
and ...\PrivateArk\Server\Logs.
The TOE hardening is part of the installation and results in disablement
of many operating system services. The hardening process also strips
the permissions from existing and built-in Windows users (except the
user that runs the installation). For more information about the
hardening process, refer to the CyberArk Installation Guide and the
script used to perform the hardening.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1/2
FPT_IDV_EXT.1
The TOE is delivered through CyberArk’s online customer portal, which
uses AWS Marketplace. The TOE installation and configuration files are
all packaged into a zip file that is digitally signed by CyberArk. To verify
the digital signature of a TOE package, users must do the following:
1. Download the TOE installation package from CyberArk.
2. Download and install the Java Development Kit (JDK) from
Oracle.
3. Download and install the JCE Unlimited Strength Jurisdiction
Policy Files.
4. Run the following command: JDK_Home%\jarsigner.exe -verify
-verbose -certs .zip.
More information about the jarsigner’s options can be found at
https://docs.oracle.com/javase/7/docs/technotes/tools/windows/j
arsigner.html#CCHFIDAB.
Individual TOE files are signed using the Windows OS package
manager MS21 Sign tool. To verify the integrity of the TOE installation
file, do the following:
1. Extract the files from the archive file.
2. Navigate to the setup.exe file.
3. Right-click the file, then click Properties > Digital Signatures.
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SFR Fulfilment
4. Select the CyberArk Software Ltd. signer. Click Details, and
then verify the signature details.
The authorized signing source is CyberArk.
The TOE relies on the platform’s package manager to make changes to
the binary code. Installation of the updates is performed by an
administrator while using the executable file (.exe) extracted from the
archive file (.zip).
You can remove the TOE software from the platform using the
platform’s Programs and Features manager. Uninstallation of the TOE
removes all traces of the application except for configuration settings,
output files, and audit/log events.
You can obtain the TOE version number by navigating to
C:\CyberArk\Server_rls.
Versioning naming convention: AA.B.C.DD (e.g: 14.0.0.32)
- AA – Major Version Number – 14
- B – Minor Version Number – 0
- C – Patch Number – 0
- DD – Build Number - 32
FPT_LIB_EXT.1 The TOE is packaged with third-party libraries required for its
functionality. For a full list, refer to Appendix B.
FTP_DIT_EXT.1 The TOE protects data in transit by providing trusted paths and
channels using the cryptographic functions within the TOE’s CyberArk
PAM Cryptographic libraries.
Communications between the TOE and Windows server’s CPM, PSM,
PVWA PAM components and between the TOE and RHEL server’s
PSMP PAM components are protected by TLS. The TOE acts as TLS
server to the CPM, PSM, PVWA Windows components and to the
PSMP PAM RHEL component. There is a single channel between the
components and the TOE using TCP port 443.
Table 11: Cryptographic Algorithms
Operation Usage Algorithm Key Size
Encryption/Dec
ryption
Secure Storage AES-CBC 256
TLS AES-GCM 128, 256
Key Generation Safe AES CTR-DRBG 256
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Operation Usage Algorithm Key Size
Signature
Generation
Signature
Verification
TLS RSA 2048, 3072, 4096
Key Exchange
/Establishment
TLS ECDHE,
DHE
256, 384
3072
Message
Digest
TLS SHA-256, SHA-384,
SHA-512
256, 384, 512
Message
Authentication
TLS HMAC-SHA-256,
HMAC-SHA-384,
HMAC-SHA-512
256, 384, 512
Random
Number
Generation
TOE DRBG CTR DRBG (AES) N/A
Table 12: HMAC
Hash Function Block Size Key Length Output Digest
SHA256 512 256 256
SHA384 1024 384 384
SHA512 1024 512 512
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7 Rationale
7.1 Conformance Claim Rationale
25 The following rationale is presented with regard to the PP conformance claims:
a) TOE type. As identified in section 1.2.1, the TOE is an application, consistent
with the PP.
b) Security problem definition. As shown in section 3, the threats, OSPs and
assumptions are reproduced in this ST.
c) Security objectives. As shown in section 4, the security objectives are
reproduced in this ST.
d) Security requirements. As shown in section 5, the security requirements are
reproduced from the PP. No additional requirements have been specified.
7.2 Security Objectives Rationale
26 All security objectives are drawn directly from the claimed PP.
Table 13: Security Objectives Rationale
Threat, Assumption,
or OSP
Security Objectives Rationale
T.NETWORK_ATTACK O.PROTECTED_COMMS,
O.INTEGRITY,
O.MANAGEMENT
The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is
countered by
O.PROTECTED_COMMS because
this provides for integrity of transmitted
data.
The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is
countered by O.INTEGRITY because
this provides for integrity of software
that is installed onto the system from
the network.
The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is
countered by O.MANAGEMENT
because this provides for the ability to
configure the application to defend
against network attack.
T.NETWORK_EAVES
DROP
O.PROTECTED_COMMS,
O.QUALITY,
O.MANAGEMENT
The threat
T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP is
countered by
O.PROTECTED_COMMS because
this provides for confidentiality of
transmitted data.
The objective O.QUALITY ensures use
of mechanisms that provide protection
against network-based attack.
The threat
T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP is
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Threat, Assumption,
or OSP
Security Objectives Rationale
countered by O.MANAGEMENT
because this provides for the ability to
configure the application to protect the
confidentiality of its transmitted data.
T.LOCAL_ATTACK O.QUALITY The objective O.QUALITY protects
against the use of mechanisms that
weaken the TOE with regard to attack
by other software on the platform.
T.PHYSICAL_ACCESS O.PROTECTED_STORAG
E
The objective
O.PROTECTED_STORAGE protects
against unauthorized attempts to
access physical storage used by the
TOE.
A.PLATFORM OE.PLATFORM The operational environment objective
OE.PLATFORM is realized through
A.PLATFORM.
A.PROPER_USER OE.PROPER_USER The operational environment objective
OE.PROPER_USER is realized
through A.PROPER_USER.
A.PROPER_ADMIN OE.PROPER_ADMIN The operational environment objective
OE.PROPER_ADMIN is realized
through A.PROPER_ADMIN.
7.3 Security Requirements Rationale
27 All security requirements are drawn directly from the claimed PP.
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8 Appendix A
Platform API for dbmain.exe version 14.0.0.40
Contents of this file
1) Platform modules used
2) Platform API used per module
*** 1) Platform modules used ***
ADVAPI32.DLL
API-MS-WIN-CRT-CONIO-L1-1-0.DLL
API-MS-WIN-CRT-CONVERT-L1-1-0.DLL
API-MS-WIN-CRT-ENVIRONMENT-L1-1-0.DLL
API-MS-WIN-CRT-FILESYSTEM-L1-1-0.DLL
API-MS-WIN-CRT-HEAP-L1-1-0.DLL
API-MS-WIN-CRT-LOCALE-L1-1-0.DLL
API-MS-WIN-CRT-MATH-L1-1-0.DLL
API-MS-WIN-CRT-RUNTIME-L1-1-0.DLL
API-MS-WIN-CRT-STDIO-L1-1-0.DLL
API-MS-WIN-CRT-STRING-L1-1-0.DLL
API-MS-WIN-CRT-TIME-L1-1-0.DLL
API-MS-WIN-CRT-UTILITY-L1-1-0.DLL
BCRYPT.DLL
CRYPT32.DLL
DNSAPI.DLL
KERNEL32.DLL
MSCOREE.DLL
MSVCP140.DLL
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NCRYPT.DLL
NTDSAPI.DLL
OLE32.DLL
OLEAUT32.DLL
RPCRT4.DLL
SECUR32.DLL
SHLWAPI.DLL
USER32.DLL
VCRUNTIME140.DLL
VCRUNTIME140_1.DLL
VERSION.DLL
WEBSERVICES.DLL
WS2_32.DLL
*** 2) Platform API used per module ***
ADVAPI32.DLL
CloseServiceHandle
ControlService
OpenSCManagerA
OpenServiceA
QueryServiceStatus
RegisterServiceCtrlHandlerA
SetServiceStatus
StartServiceCtrlDispatcherA
StartServiceA
AddAccessAllowedAce
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AddAccessDeniedAce
CreateWellKnownSid
InitializeAcl
InitializeSecurityDescriptor
SetSecurityDescriptorDacl
RegCloseKey
RegOpenKeyA
RegOpenKeyExA
RegQueryValueExA
GetUserNameA
OpenProcessToken
OpenThreadToken
GetTokenInformation
LookupAccountSidA
GetSidSubAuthority
GetSidSubAuthorityCount
DeregisterEventSource
RegisterEventSourceW
ReportEventW
RegisterEventSourceA
ReportEventA
ChangeServiceConfigA
QueryServiceConfigA
RegEnumKeyExA
GetLengthSid
ConvertStringSidToSidA
ConvertStringSidToSidA
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API-MS-WIN-CRT-CONIO-L1-1-0.DLL
_getch
API-MS-WIN-CRT-CONVERT-L1-1-0.DLL
atoi
_atoi64
atol
strtol
strtoul
_i64toa
_itoa
_i64toa_s
atof
_ultoa
strtod
_ltoa
wcstombs
_strtod_l
_atoi64
atoi
strtoul
API-MS-WIN-CRT-ENVIRONMENT-L1-1-0.DLL
getenv
getenv
API-MS-WIN-CRT-FILESYSTEM-L1-1-0.DLL
remove
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rename
_stat64i32
rename
API-MS-WIN-CRT-HEAP-L1-1-0.DLL
free
malloc
calloc
_get_heap_handle
realloc
_callnewh
_aligned_free
_aligned_malloc
free
free
free
malloc
_callnewh
API-MS-WIN-CRT-LOCALE-L1-1-0.DLL
setlocale
localeconv
_configthreadlocale
_create_locale
_free_locale
_configthreadlocale
API-MS-WIN-CRT-MATH-L1-1-0.DLL
CyberArk Security Target
Page 38 of 68
ceilf
log
_fdopen
__setusermatherr
fabs
fmod
pow
ceil
floor
asin
atan
atan2
cos
sin
sqrt
tan
ceilf
log
__setusermatherr
fabs
fmod
pow
asin
atan
atan2
cos
sin
sqrt
CyberArk Security Target
Page 39 of 68
tan
API-MS-WIN-CRT-RUNTIME-L1-1-0.DLL
signal
_invalid_parameter_noinfo_noreturn
_errno
raise
_invalid_parameter_noinfo
perror
exit
_beginthreadex
strerror
system
_exit
abort
_seh_filter_exe
_set_app_type
_configure_narrow_argv
_initialize_narrow_environment
_get_initial_narrow_environment
_initterm
_initterm_e
__p___argc
__p___argv
_cexit
_c_exit
_register_thread_local_exe_atexit_callback
_initialize_onexit_table
CyberArk Security Target
Page 40 of 68
_register_onexit_function
_crt_atexit
terminate
_getpid
_wassert
raise
exit
_exit
_seh_filter_exe
_set_app_type
_configure_narrow_argv
_initialize_narrow_environment
_get_initial_narrow_environment
_initterm
_initterm_e
__p___argc
__p___argv
_register_thread_local_exe_atexit_callback
_initialize_onexit_table
_register_onexit_function
_crt_atexit
API-MS-WIN-CRT-STDIO-L1-1-0.DLL
__acrt_iob_func
__stdio_common_vfprintf
__stdio_common_vsprintf
__stdio_common_vsscanf
fclose
CyberArk Security Target
Page 41 of 68
fgetpos
fopen
fsetpos
_get_osfhandle
_filelengthi64
feof
fflush
fgets
fputs
fseek
ftell
__stdio_common_vsnprintf_s
fwrite
setvbuf
fread
ferror
__stdio_common_vsprintf_s
_get_stream_buffer_pointers
fgetc
fputc
_fseeki64
ungetc
putc
_wfopen
_fileno
_setmode
_close
_lseek
CyberArk Security Target
Page 42 of 68
_read
_write
__stdio_common_vswprintf
_set_fmode
__p__commode
_wsopen_dispatch
_filelengthi64
__stdio_common_vsprintf
__stdio_common_vswprintf
_set_fmode
__p__commode
API-MS-WIN-CRT-STRING-L1-1-0.DLL
_strlwr
isdigit
isxdigit
tolower
strcspn
strncat
strncmp
strncpy
strtok_s
_stricmp
strnlen
strspn
strtok
strcpy_s
strcat_s
CyberArk Security Target
Page 43 of 68
_strdup
toupper
_strupr
_strnicmp
isalpha
strcmp
isspace
isalnum
iscntrl
_wcsnicmp
isupper
strlen
strcpy
wcslen
strcat
_wcsupr
strtok_s
strcmp
strlen
strcpy
strcat
API-MS-WIN-CRT-TIME-L1-1-0.DLL
_mktime64
_ftime64
_gmtime64
_localtime64
_time64
CyberArk Security Target
Page 44 of 68
_difftime64
_time32
__timezone
clock
strftime
__daylight
_localtime32
__dstbias
_gmtime64_s
__tzname
_tzset
_time64
API-MS-WIN-CRT-UTILITY-L1-1-0.DLL
qsort
bsearch
BCRYPT.DLL
BCryptGenRandom
BCryptGenRandom
CRYPT32.DLL
CertCreateCertificateContext
CertFreeCertificateContext
CertFreeCertificateChainEngine
CertGetCertificateChain
CertFreeCertificateChain
CertOpenStore
CyberArk Security Target
Page 45 of 68
CertCloseStore
CertEnumCertificatesInStore
CertGetCertificateContextProperty
CryptProtectData
CryptUnprotectData
CryptProtectData
CryptUnprotectData
DNSAPI.DLL
DnsFlushResolverCacheEntry_A
KERNEL32.DLL
SetProcessShutdownParameters
FreeLibrary
GetProcAddress
LoadLibraryExA
SetConsoleCtrlHandler
GetLastError
SetLastError
Sleep
CreateFileA
GetFileAttributesA
SetFileAttributesA
WriteFile
CloseHandle
SetCurrentDirectoryA
GetCurrentDirectoryA
CreateDirectoryA
CyberArk Security Target
Page 46 of 68
DeleteFileA
FindClose
FindFirstFileA
FindNextFileA
GetDiskFreeSpaceA
GetDriveTypeA
GetFileSizeEx
LockFile
ReadFile
RemoveDirectoryA
SetEndOfFile
SetFilePointerEx
SetFileTime
UnlockFile
QueryPerformanceCounter
GetCurrentProcessId
GetCurrentThreadId
GlobalMemoryStatusEx
GetSystemInfo
GetWindowsDirectoryA
GetModuleFileNameA
GetModuleHandleA
GetLogicalDriveStringsA
GetTempPathA
CopyFileA
MoveFileA
MoveFileExA
CompareFileTime
CyberArk Security Target
Page 47 of 68
QueryPerformanceFrequency
GetSystemTime
SystemTimeToFileTime
MultiByteToWideChar
WideCharToMultiByte
LocalAlloc
LocalFree
GetCurrentProcess
GetCurrentThread
ConnectNamedPipe
DisconnectNamedPipe
SetNamedPipeHandleState
CreateNamedPipeA
SetEvent
CreateEventA
OpenEventA
MapViewOfFile
UnmapViewOfFile
CreateFileMappingA
OpenFileMappingA
SetThreadPriority
CreateMutexA
RtlCaptureContext
GetEnvironmentVariableA
SuspendThread
ResumeThread
GetThreadContext
GetVersionExA
CyberArk Security Target
Page 48 of 68
ReadProcessMemory
GetProcessTimes
FileTimeToSystemTime
GetStdHandle
DuplicateHandle
InitializeCriticalSection
EnterCriticalSection
LeaveCriticalSection
TryEnterCriticalSection
DeleteCriticalSection
ResetEvent
ReleaseSemaphore
WaitForSingleObject
TerminateProcess
GetExitCodeProcess
TerminateThread
GetExitCodeThread
CreateProcessA
WaitForMultipleObjects
CreateSemaphoreA
GetEnvironmentStrings
FreeEnvironmentStringsA
HeapAlloc
HeapFree
GetProcessHeap
GetVersion
PostQueuedCompletionStatus
TlsAlloc
CyberArk Security Target
Page 49 of 68
FormatMessageA
FormatMessageW
DeviceIoControl
LoadLibraryA
GetOverlappedResult
CreateIoCompletionPort
GetQueuedCompletionStatus
TlsGetValue
TlsSetValue
CreateFileW
GetFileAttributesW
SetFileAttributesW
GetFileType
GetModuleHandleW
RtlVirtualUnwind
GetSystemTimeAsFileTime
GetTickCount
LoadLibraryW
GlobalMemoryStatus
FindFirstFileW
FindNextFileW
GetFileSize
FlushConsoleInputBuffer
SetHandleInformation
CreatePipe
RtlLookupFunctionEntry
UnhandledExceptionFilter
SetUnhandledExceptionFilter
CyberArk Security Target
Page 50 of 68
IsProcessorFeaturePresent
InitializeCriticalSectionAndSpinCount
WaitForSingleObjectEx
CreateEventW
IsDebuggerPresent
CreateDirectoryW
DeleteFileW
GetDiskFreeSpaceW
RemoveDirectoryW
GetWindowsDirectoryW
lstrcmpW
MoveFileW
MoveFileExW
GetACP
GetThreadLocale
GetLocaleInfoA
GetTimeZoneInformation
GetGeoInfoW
GetUserGeoID
GetLocaleInfoW
GetNumberFormatW
GetCurrencyFormatW
SystemTimeToTzSpecificLocalTime
GetDateFormatW
GetTimeFormatW
GetCurrentDirectoryW
GetFullPathNameW
GetFullPathNameA
CyberArk Security Target
Page 51 of 68
SetFilePointer
IsValidCodePage
IsDBCSLeadByteEx
RaiseException
InitializeCriticalSectionEx
VirtualProtect
VirtualQuery
OutputDebugStringW
Sleep
CopyFileA
CreateDirectoryA
CloseHandle
SetEndOfFile
FindClose
FindFirstFileA
FindNextFileA
GetCurrentDirectoryA
SetCurrentDirectoryA
CompareFileTime
GetSystemTime
SystemTimeToFileTime
WideCharToMultiByte
CreateNamedPipeA
DisconnectNamedPipe
ReadFile
WriteFile
InitializeCriticalSection
CreateEventA
CyberArk Security Target
Page 52 of 68
CreateSemaphoreA
DeleteCriticalSection
EnterCriticalSection
GetCurrentProcessId
GetCurrentThreadId
GetExitCodeThread
LeaveCriticalSection
ReleaseSemaphore
ResetEvent
SetEvent
TerminateThread
TryEnterCriticalSection
FreeEnvironmentStringsA
GetEnvironmentStrings
GetEnvironmentVariableA
LeaveCriticalSection
FreeLibrary
GetProcAddress
LoadLibraryA
GetLastError
GetTempPathA
LocalFree
InitializeCriticalSectionEx
MSCOREE.DLL
_CorExeMain
MSVCP140.DLL
CyberArk Security Target
Page 53 of 68
_Strcoll
_Strxfrm
_Xtime_get_ticks
_Mtx_init_in_situ
_Mtx_destroy_in_situ
_Mtx_lock
_Mtx_unlock
_Query_perf_counter
_Query_perf_frequency
_Strcoll
_Strxfrm
_Xtime_get_ticks
_Mtx_init_in_situ
_Mtx_destroy_in_situ
_Mtx_lock
_Mtx_unlock
_Query_perf_counter
_Query_perf_frequency
_Xlength_error
uncaught_exception
_Xbad_alloc
_Xout_of_range
_Xregex_error
_Throw_C_error
_Xbad_function_call
_Xinvalid_argument
_Fiopen
setw
CyberArk Security Target
Page 54 of 68
_Syserror_map
_Xbad_alloc
_Xregex_error
_Throw_C_error
_Xbad_function_call
_Xinvalid_argument
_Fiopen
setw
_Syserror_map
_Getcvt
_Locinfo
~_Locinfo
_Getfalse
_Gettrue
_Getcoll
_Getlconv
_Lockit
~_Lockit
operator=
~basic_ios<charCOMMABREAKstruct_std::char_traits<char>_>
setstate
widen
basic_ios<charCOMMABREAKstruct_std::char_traits<char>_>
clear
imbue
basic_iostream<charCOMMABREAKstruct_std::char_traits<char>_>
~basic_iostream<charCOMMABREAKstruct_std::char_traits<char>_>
basic_istream<charCOMMABREAKstruct_std::char_traits<char>_>
CyberArk Security Target
Page 55 of 68
~basic_istream<charCOMMABREAKstruct_std::char_traits<char>_>
_Ipfx
operator>>
operator>>
get
operator>>
seekg
tellg
read
basic_ostream<charCOMMABREAKstruct_std::char_traits<char>_>
~basic_ostream<charCOMMABREAKstruct_std::char_traits<char>_>
_Osfx
operator<<
operator<<
operator<<
put
flush
write
`vbase_destructor'
operator<<
operator<<
operator<<
operator<<
operator<<
basic_streambuf<charCOMMABREAKstruct_std::char_traits<char>_>
~basic_streambuf<charCOMMABREAKstruct_std::char_traits<char>_>
sbumpc
sgetc
CyberArk Security Target
Page 56 of 68
sputc
sputn
_Pninc
_Lock
_Unlock
imbue
setbuf
showmanyc
sync
uflow
xsgetn
xsputn
getloc
snextc
_Init
pbase
eback
gptr
pptr
egptr
epptr
_Lock
_Unlock
imbue
setbuf
showmanyc
sync
uflow
CyberArk Security Target
Page 57 of 68
xsgetn
xsputn
always_noconv
in
out
unshift
_Getcat
~codecvt<unsigned_shortCOMMABREAKcharCOMMABREAKstruct__Mbstatet>
codecvt<unsigned_shortCOMMABREAKcharCOMMABREAKstruct__Mbstatet>
out
toupper
_Getcat
tolower
tolower
widen
narrow
exceptions
getloc
classic
_Init
_Getgloballocale
classic
_Init
_Getgloballocale
_New_Locimp
_Addfac
facet
~facet
CyberArk Security Target
Page 58 of 68
_Decref
_Incref
_Decref
_Incref
operator_unsigned___int64
NCRYPT.DLL
NCryptOpenStorageProvider
NCryptOpenKey
NCryptGetProperty
NCryptExportKey
NCryptFreeObject
NCryptOpenStorageProvider
NCryptOpenKey
NCryptGetProperty
NCryptExportKey
NCryptFreeObject
NTDSAPI.DLL
DsFreePasswordCredentials
DsMakePasswordCredentialsW
OLE32.DLL
IIDFromString
CoUninitialize
CoInitializeEx
CoCreateInstance
CyberArk Security Target
Page 59 of 68
OLEAUT32.DLL
SysAllocStringLen
SysFreeString
VariantInit
VariantClear
VariantChangeType
VariantClear
RPCRT4.DLL
RpcStringFreeA
UuidCreate
UuidToStringA
RpcBindingSetOption
RpcBindingFromStringBindingW
RpcStringBindingComposeW
RpcBindingSetAuthInfoExW
RpcStringFreeW
RpcBindingFree
I_RpcBindingInqSecurityContext
NdrClientCall2
SECUR32.DLL
FreeContextBuffer
QueryContextAttributesW
SHLWAPI.DLL
PathFileExistsA
PathFindExtensionA
CyberArk Security Target
Page 60 of 68
PathFindFileNameA
PathIsDirectoryA
PathMatchSpecA
PathRemoveFileSpecA
PathStripToRootA
PathFileExistsW
PathIsDirectoryW
PathRemoveFileSpecW
UrlUnescapeW
StrCmpW
StrCmpIW
PathIsDirectoryA
PathFileExistsA
PathFindExtensionA
PathFindFileNameA
PathMatchSpecA
PathRemoveFileSpecA
PathStripToRootA
USER32.DLL
CharLowerA
CharUpperA
GetProcessWindowStation
GetUserObjectInformationW
MessageBoxW
GetDesktopWindow
VCRUNTIME140.DLL
CyberArk Security Target
Page 61 of 68
memset
longjmp
__std_exception_copy
__std_exception_destroy
_CxxThrowException
memcpy
memmove
strchr
strstr
_purecall
__C_specific_handler
__std_type_info_name
memchr
memcmp
strrchr
__std_type_info_compare
__std_type_info_hash
__RTDynamicCast
wcsstr
__intrinsic_setjmp
__current_exception
__current_exception_context
__RTtypeid
__FrameUnwindFilter
memset
longjmp
memcpy
strchr
CyberArk Security Target
Page 62 of 68
strstr
_purecall
__C_specific_handler
__std_type_info_name
memchr
memcmp
strrchr
__std_type_info_compare
__std_type_info_hash
wcsstr
__intrinsic_setjmp
__RTtypeid
VCRUNTIME140_1.DLL
__CxxFrameHandler4
__CxxFrameHandler4
VERSION.DLL
GetFileVersionInfoSizeA
GetFileVersionInfoA
VerQueryValueA
GetFileVersionInfoSizeA
GetFileVersionInfoA
VerQueryValueA
WEBSERVICES.DLL
WsCreateError
WsGetErrorString
CyberArk Security Target
Page 63 of 68
WsFreeError
WsCreateHeap
WsFreeHeap
WsOpenServiceProxy
WsCloseServiceProxy
WsFreeServiceProxy
WsCall
WsCreateServiceProxyFromTemplate
WsCreateError
WsGetErrorString
WsFreeError
WsCreateHeap
WsFreeHeap
WsOpenServiceProxy
WsCloseServiceProxy
WsFreeServiceProxy
WsCall
WsCreateServiceProxyFromTemplate
WS2_32.DLL
getaddrinfo
freeaddrinfo
inet_pton
inet_ntop
accept
bind
closesocket
connect
CyberArk Security Target
Page 64 of 68
getpeername
getsockname
getsockopt
htonl
htons
ioctlsocket
inet_addr
inet_ntoa
listen
ntohl
ntohs
recv
recvfrom
select
send
sendto
setsockopt
shutdown
socket
gethostbyname
gethostname
WSAGetLastError
WSASetLastError
WSAStartup
WSACleanup
__WSAFDIsSet
__WSAFDIsSet
inet_addr
CyberArk Security Target
Page 65 of 68
inet_ntop
CyberArk Security Target
Page 66 of 68
9 Appendix B
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\libcrypto-1_1-x64.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\libcurl.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\libeay32.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\libmysql.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\libprotobuf-lite.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\libprotobuf.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\libsasl.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\libssl-1_1-x64.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\PARENEAgent.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\PARNotificator.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\PARVaultAgent.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\RacControllerSDK.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\ssleay32.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\Xalan-C_1_12_x64.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\XalanMessages_1_12_x64.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\xerces-c_3_2_2_x64.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\Database\Bin\libcrypto-1_1-x64.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\Database\Bin\libcurl.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\Database\Bin\libprotobuf-lite.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\Database\Bin\libprotobuf.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\Database\Bin\libsasl.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\Database\Bin\libssl-1_1-x64.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\Database\MySQL Utilities\msvcp120.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\Database\MySQL Utilities\msvcr120.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\Database\MySQL Utilities\python27.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\Event Notification Engine\libeay32.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\Event Notification Engine\ssleay32.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\CyberArk.AppServices.Jwt.dll
c:\Program Files
(x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\CyberArk.AppServices.LogicContainer.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\CyberArk.Casos.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\CyberArk.Infra.Logger.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\CyberArk.Services.Exceptions.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\log4net.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\PowerCollections.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\BLDlls\Cyberark.DNA.Shared.Models.dll
CyberArk Security Target
Page 67 of 68
c:\Program Files
(x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\BLDlls\Cyberark.DNA.Shared.ModelsContract.dll
c:\Program Files
(x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\BLDlls\CyberArk.LogicContainer.Shared.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\BLDlls\FluentNHibernate.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\BLDlls\Iesi.Collections.dll
c:\Program Files
(x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\BLDlls\Microsoft.IdentityModel.Logging.dll
c:\Program Files
(x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\BLDlls\Microsoft.IdentityModel.Tokens.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\BLDlls\MySql.Data.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\BLDlls\Newtonsoft.Json.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\BLDlls\NHibernate.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\BLDlls\NHibernate.XmlSerializers.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\BLDlls\PIMSuiteBL.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\BLDlls\PIMSuiteData.dll
c:\Program Files
(x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\BLDlls\System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\BLDlls\WorkFlowManager.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\PlugIns\BouncyCastle.Crypto.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\PlugIns\Castle.Core.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\PlugIns\Castle.Windsor.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\PlugIns\CyberArk.Data.Entities.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\PlugIns\CyberArk.Data.Messaging.dll
c:\Program Files
(x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\PlugIns\CyberArk.Data.Messaging.Policies.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\PlugIns\CyberArk.Infra.Base.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\PlugIns\CyberArk.Infra.Common.dll
c:\Program Files
(x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\PlugIns\CyberArk.Infra.Engine.Contracts.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\PlugIns\CyberArk.Infra.Engine.dll
c:\Program Files
(x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\PlugIns\CyberArk.Server.Adapters.PIM.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\PlugIns\CyberArk.Server.Data.dll
c:\Program Files
(x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\PlugIns\CyberArk.Server.Engine.Contracts.Adapters.dll
c:\Program Files
(x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\PlugIns\CyberArk.Server.Engine.Contracts.App.dll
c:\Program Files
(x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\PlugIns\CyberArk.Server.Engine.Contracts.Packages.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\PlugIns\CyberArk.Server.Engine.dll
CyberArk Security Target
Page 68 of 68
c:\Program Files
(x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\PlugIns\CyberArk.Server.Packages.Accounts.dll
c:\Program Files
(x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\PlugIns\CyberArk.Server.Packages.Base.dll
c:\Program Files
(x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\PlugIns\CyberArk.Server.Packages.BulkOperations.dll
c:\Program Files
(x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\PlugIns\CyberArk.Server.Packages.Contracts.dll
c:\Program Files
(x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\PlugIns\CyberArk.Server.Packages.Data.dll
c:\Program Files
(x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\PlugIns\CyberArk.Server.Packages.Policies.dll
c:\Program Files
(x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\PlugIns\CyberArk.Server.Packages.Users.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\PlugIns\Dapper.StrongName.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\PlugIns\K4os.Compression.LZ4.dll
c:\Program Files
(x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\PlugIns\K4os.Compression.LZ4.Streams.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\PlugIns\K4os.Hash.xxHash.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\PlugIns\MySql.Data.dll
c:\Program Files (x86)\PrivateArk\Server\LogicContainer\PlugIns\System.Buffers.dll