

## Certification Report

### CyberArk Privileged Access Manager – Digital Vault Server v14.0.0.40

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# CONTENTS

<b>Foreword</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Recognition of the Certificate</b>	<b>4</b>
International recognition	4
European recognition	4
<b>1 Executive Summary</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>2 Certification Results</b>	<b>6</b>
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation	6
2.2 Security Policy	6
2.2.1 Cryptographic Support.	6
2.2.2 User Data Protection	6
2.2.3 Identification and Authentication	6
2.2.4 Security Management	6
2.2.5 Privacy	6
2.2.6 Protection of the TSF.	6
2.2.7 Trusted Path	6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope	7
2.3.1 Assumptions	7
2.3.2 Clarification of scope	7
2.4 Architectural Information	7
2.5 Documentation	8
2.6 IT Product Testing	8
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth	8
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing	8
2.6.3 Test configuration	8
2.6.4 Test results	9
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results	9
2.8 Evaluated Configuration	9
2.9 Evaluation Results	9
2.10 Comments/Recommendations	10
<b>3 Security Target</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>4 Definitions</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>5 Bibliography</b>	<b>12</b>

## Foreword

The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT) security products. Under this NSCIB, TrustCB B.V. has the task of issuing certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.

Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification Body, which is operated by TrustCB B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations.

An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TrustCB B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation of calibration and testing laboratories”.

By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TrustCB B.V. asserts that the product or site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.

The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the (site) security target.

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## Recognition of the Certificate

Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating nations.

### International recognition

The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance components up to and including EAL2+ALC\_FLR.

For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see <http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org>.

### European recognition

The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS MRA in December 2010.

For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see <https://www.sogis.eu>.

## 1 Executive Summary

This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the CyberArk Privileged Access Manager – Digital Vault Server v14.0.0.40. The developer of the CyberArk Privileged Access Manager – Digital Vault Server v14.0.0.40 is CyberArk Software Ltd. located in Petach-Tikva, Israel and they also act as the sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular requirements.

The TOE, CyberArk Privileged Access Manager – Digital Vault Server, is the Digital Vault Server component of the CyberArk Privileged Access Manager (PAM) solution. PAM enables organizations to secure, provision, control, and monitor all activities associated with privileged identities used in enterprise systems and applications. The TOE provides secure storage and access to privileged account files, and to the administrator and session activity files. The TOE is composed of the PAM components

The TOE has been evaluated by SGS Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands. The evaluation was completed on 03-07-2024 with the approval of the ETR. The certification procedure has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].

The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made during the evaluation, the intended environment for the CyberArk Privileged Access Manager – Digital Vault Server v14.0.0.40, the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the CyberArk Privileged Access Manager – Digital Vault Server v14.0.0.40 are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.

The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR]<sup>1</sup> for this product provide sufficient evidence that the TOE meets the assurance requirements listed in section 2.9 for the evaluated security functionality, and conforms to the [PP\_APP] and [PKG\_TLS].

The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).

TrustCB B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the specific version of the product as evaluated.

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<sup>1</sup> The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator, and is not available for public review.



## 2 Certification Results

### 2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the CyberArk Privileged Access Manager – Digital Vault Server v14.0.0.40 from CyberArk Software Ltd. located in Petach-Tikva, Israel.

The TOE is comprised of the following main components:

Delivery item type	Identifier	Version
Software	CyberArk Privileged Access Manager – Digital Vault Server	v14.0.0.40

To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the CyberArk Privileged Access Manager – Digital Vault Server v14.0.0.40. For details, see section 2.5 of this document.

### 2.2 Security Policy

The TOE provides the following security functions:

#### 2.2.1 Cryptographic Support.

The TOE implements the OpenSSL FIPS Object Module with the CyberArk libraries to provide the following cryptographic services: encryption and decryption, hashing, digital signature generation and verification, and key generation.

#### 2.2.2 User Data Protection

TOE encrypts all sensitive data stored in non-volatile memory. The TOE limits its access to network connectivity when accessing the platform’s hardware resources.

#### 2.2.3 Identification and Authentication

The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates for TLS communications. The certificates are presented by the by the TOE during the TLS handshake is established. The vault certificates are authenticated by the connecting client, i.e. the Windows server PAM components, and the Linux server PAM components. The certificates can include (per generation) a CRL distribution point (CDP) to enable the clients to use a certificate revocation list (CRL) mechanisms to verify the certificate.

#### 2.2.4 Security Management

The TOE provides a set of commands for administrators to manage the security functions, configuration, and other features of the TOE and OE components. A TOE administrator manages the TOE from the Password Vault Web Access (PVWA) on the Windows server in the OE. There is no access to TOE functionality until passwords are created for the built-in Administrator user.

#### 2.2.5 Privacy

The TOE does not store or transmit any Personally Identifiable Identification (PII).

#### 2.2.6 Protection of the TSF.

The TOE leverages anti-exploitation capabilities provided by the OS. The TOE provides integrity for installation and software updates.

#### 2.2.7 Trusted Path

The TOE provides a trusted path between itself and the Privileged Session Manager (PSM), Central Policy Manager (CPM), PVWA, Privileged Session Manager SSH (Secure Shell), and Proxy (PSMP)

PAM components. All communications between the TOE and these components are encrypted and authenticated over TLS v1.2 (port 443) sessions.

## 2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

### 2.3.1 Assumptions


The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 3.2 of the [ST].

### 2.3.2 Clarification of scope

The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security functions of the product

## 2.4 Architectural Information

Below is a logical diagram of the TOE in its operational environment:



The TOE securely manages, stores and controls access to privileged account files, which are created by non-TOE components. The privileged account files, along with each file's unique file key, are encrypted by Privileged Access Manager (PAM) components and sent to the TOE. For each privileged

account file sent to the TOE, the TOE encrypts the unique file key, and then stores the privileged account file with its TOE-encrypted file key in a logical Safe. Each Safe has a unique key, which is used to encrypt the file key of the privileged account file stored within the Safe. The encrypted privileged account files, which are sent to and retrieved by the TOE, are never decrypted by the TOE.

## 2.5 Documentation

The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:

Identifier	Version
Privileged Access Manager – Digital Vault Server Common Criteria Guide	V1.6, May 2024
PAM Self-Hosted v14.0	A8474D5E4B6532ED3402D38B46F7DB15F650CA75EBD0372BB891F3ECDC7089CE, 25-Jan-2024

## 2.6 IT Product Testing

Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the developer's testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities.

### 2.6.1 Testing approach and depth

Since the TOE conforms to *[PP\_APP]* which requires exact conformance, the evaluator tested CyberArk Privileged Access Manager – Digital Vault Server v14.0.0.40, hosted on a Windows machine, following the requirements mandated by *[PP\_APP]* and *[PKG\_TLS]*. The evaluator performed all the tests on the TOE's version.

Some special crypto tests are performed on a special crypto library build. It is verified the special crypto build and the crypto library used in the TOE software is equivalent.

### 2.6.2 Independent penetration testing

The vulnerability assessment is performed following the guideline provided in *[PP\_APP]*, based on the following hypotheses:

- Type 1: Public – Vulnerability based
- Type 2: Tool Generated
- Type 3: Virus scanner

The evaluator performed all the tests (independent and penetration tests) in the period 17th March 2024 until 26th March 2024, with about 1 man-week (40 man-hour) in total for testing and reporting. During test campaign, 100% of the total time was spent on software (logical) attacks.


Penetration tests were created based on the vulnerabilities that are applicable to an attacker possessing a Basic attack potential and according to *[PP\_APP]* work units of AVA\_VAN.

No exploitable vulnerabilities were found.

### 2.6.3 Test configuration

Tests were executed as shown in the figure, below. The Windows Components is used as a hosting machine of the CPM, PSM and PVWA, while Linux Components is used as a hosting machine of the PSMP. An external Kali Linux device is part of the test environment. Purpose of this machine is the management and testing device, used as TLS server and client to send over the unsupported cipher suites. Also used for penetration testing tools, such as: Metasploit.





## 2.6.4 Test results

The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.

The developer's tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.

No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.

## 2.7 Reused Evaluation Results

There is no reuse of evaluation results in this certification.

## 2.8 Evaluated Configuration

The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number CyberArk Privileged Access Manager – Digital Vault Server v14.0.0.40. Users must follow the guidance documents listed in section 2.5 of this document.

## 2.9 Evaluation Results

The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents.

The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is "Pass".

Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the CyberArk Privileged Access Manager – Digital Vault Server v14.0.0.40, to be **CC Part 2 extended**, **CC Part 3 extended**, and to meet the requirements of **ASE\_INT.1, ASE\_CCL.1, ASE\_SPD.1, ASE\_OBJ.1, ASE\_ECD.1, ASE.REQ.1, ASE.TSS.1, ADV\_FSP.1, AGD\_OPE.1, AGD\_PRE.1, ALC\_CMC.1, ALC\_CMS.1, ALC\_TSU\_EXT.1, ATE\_IND.1, and AVA\_VAN.1**. This implies that the product satisfies the security requirements specified in Security Target [ST].

The Security Target claims exact conformance to the Protection Profile [PP\_APP], and to the functional package [PKG\_TLS]. All applicable NIAP Technical Decisions issued before 2024-06-01 have been addressed.

## 2.10 Comments/Recommendations

The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 of this document contains necessary information about the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE's security functionality, in particular the countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant details concerning the resistance against certain attacks.

In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.

The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols and implementations: **none**, which are out of scope as there are no security claims relating to these.

### 3 Security Target

The CyberArk Software Privileged Access Manager –Digital Vault Server v14.0 Security Target, (no doc ID), v1.8, 2024-06-13, [ST], is included here by reference.

### 4 Definitions

This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:

CPM	Central Policy Manager
DVS	Digital Vault Server
IT	Information Technology
ITSEF	IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL	Joint Interpretation Library
NSCIB	Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security
PAM	Privileged Access Manager
PP	Protection Profile
PSM	Privileged Session Manager
PSMP	Privileged Session Manager Proxy
PVWA	Password Vault Web Access
SSH	Secure Shell
TOE	Target of Evaluation

## 5 Bibliography

This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this report.

[CC]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM]	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[ETR]	Evaluation Technical Report CyberArk Privileged Access Manager v14.0 – Digital Vault Server – NIAP PP_APP_v1.4, 24-RPT-355, v4.0, 2024-06-21
[NSCIB]	Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.6, 02 August 2022
[PKG_TLS]	NIAP Functional Package for Transport Layer Security, v1.1, 2019-03-01
[PP_APP]	NIAP Protection Profile for Application Software, v1.4 (PP_APP), 2021-10-07
[ST]	CyberArk Software Privileged Access Manager –Digital Vault Server v14.0 Security Target, (no doc ID), v1.8, 2024-06-13

(This is the end of this report.)