National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Cisco Systems, Inc.
170 West Tasman Drive,
San Jose, CA 95134-1706
Cisco Catalyst 2K/3K Wired Access Switches
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-10687-2015
Dated: March 11, 2016
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Paul Bicknell
Lisa Mitchell
Chris Thorpe
MITRE Corporation
Bedford, MA
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Tammy Compton
Chris Keenan
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Catonsville, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 2
3 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 3
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms ................................................................................... 4
3.2 TOE Configuration ............................................................................................. 4
3.3 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................ 4
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 4
4.1 Security audit ...................................................................................................... 5
4.2 Cryptographic support ........................................................................................ 5
4.3 Identification and authentication......................................................................... 5
4.4 Security management.......................................................................................... 6
4.5 Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................... 6
4.6 TOE access.......................................................................................................... 6
4.7 Trusted path/channels ......................................................................................... 6
5 Assumptions................................................................................................................ 7
6 Documentation............................................................................................................ 7
7 IT Product Testing ...................................................................................................... 7
7.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................... 7
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................... 7
8 Evaluated Configuration ............................................................................................. 7
9 Results of the Evaluation ............................................................................................ 8
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)............................................................ 8
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV).............................................................. 8
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ................................................. 8
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC) ..................................... 9
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ................. 9
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)......................................................... 9
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results.......................................................................... 9
9.8 Clarifications of Scope........................................................................................ 9
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................. 10
11 Annexes..................................................................................................................... 10
12 Security Target.......................................................................................................... 10
13 Glossary .................................................................................................................... 10
14 Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 11
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of the Catalyst 2K/3K Wired Access Switches
solution provided by Cisco Systems, Inc. It presents the evaluation results, their
justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report is not an endorsement
of the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is
either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Catonsville, MD, United States of America, and
was completed in March 2016. The information in this report is largely derived from the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer
Security Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria
Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements of the
collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices (NDcPP), version 1.0, February 27,
2015.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Cisco Catalyst 2K/3K Wired Access Switches
family of products. The TOE is a purpose-built, switching and routing platform with OSI
Layer2 and Layer3 traffic filtering capabilities.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4) for conformance to the Common Criteria for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4). This Validation Report applies only to the
specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in
accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in
the Security Target (ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing
laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results
are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Cisco Catalyst
2K/3K Wired Access Switches Security Target and analysis performed by the Validation
Team.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations. Under this
program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories called
Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common Evaluation
Methodology (CEM) for Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 1 through 4 in accordance
with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation.
Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated
Products List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as
evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE: Cisco Catalyst 2K/3K Wired Access Switches
Protection Profile
(Specific models identified in Section 3.1)
collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices (NDcPP), version 1.0,
February 27, 2015 (including the optional SSH and IPsec requirements)
ST: Cisco Catalyst 2K/3K Wired Access Switches Security Target, Version 1.0,
March 11, 2016
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Cisco Catalyst 2K/3K Wired Access Switches,
Version 1.2, March 11, 2016
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 4
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor Cisco Systems, Inc.
Developer Cisco Systems, Inc.
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Item Identifier
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
CCEVS Validators Paul Bicknell
Lisa Mitchell
Chris Thorpe
MITRE Corporation
3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The TOE is comprised of both software and hardware. The hardware is comprised of the
following: 2960CX, 2960X, 2960XR, 3560CX, 3560X and 3750X. The software is
comprised of the Universal Cisco Internet Operating System (IOS) software image Release
IOS 15.2(4)E.
The Cisco Catalyst 2K/3K Wired Access Switches (WAS) that comprises the TOE has
common hardware characteristics. These characteristics affect only non-TSF relevant
functions of the switches (such as throughput and amount of storage) and therefore support
security equivalency of the switches in terms of hardware.
The Cisco Catalyst 2K/3K Wired Access Switches primary features include the following:
 Central processor that supports all system operations;
 Dynamic memory, used by the central processor for all system operation.
 Flash memory (EEPROM), used to store the Cisco IOS image (binary program).
 USB port (v2.0) (note, none of the USB devices are included in the TOE).
o Type A for Storage, all Cisco supported USB flash drives.
o Type mini-B as console port in the front.
 Non-volatile read-only memory (ROM) is used to store the bootstrap program and
power-on diagnostic programs.
 Non-volatile random-access memory (NVRAM) is used to store switch
configuration parameters that are used to initialize the system at start-up.
 Physical network interfaces (minimally two) (e.g. RJ45 serial and standard
10/100/1000 Ethernet ports). Some models have a fixed number and/or type of
interfaces; some models have slots that accept additional network interfaces.
Cisco IOS is a Cisco-developed highly configurable proprietary operating system that
provides for efficient and effective routing and switching
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3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms
The evaluated configuration consists of the Cisco Catalyst 2K/3K Wired Access Switches,
including the following models: 2960CX, 2960X, 2960XR, 3560CX, 3560X and 3750X.
The models are running the IOS software Release IOS 15.2(4)E.
3.2 TOE Configuration
The TOE consists of one or more physical devices as specified in section 3.1 and includes
the Cisco IOS software. The TOE has two or more network interfaces and is connected to
at least one internal and one external network. The Cisco IOS configuration determines
how packets are handled to and from the TOE’s network interfaces. The switch
configuration will determine how traffic flows received on an interface will be handled.
Typically, packet flows are passed through the internetworking device and forwarded to
their configured destination.
The TOE can optionally connect to an NTP server on its internal network for time services.
Also, if the Cisco Catalyst 2K/3K Wired Access Switches is to be remotely administered,
then the management station must be connected to an internal network, SSHv2 must be
used to connect to the switch. A syslog server is also used to store audit records. If these
servers are used, they must be attached to the internal (trusted) network. The internal
(trusted) network is meant to be separated effectively from unauthorized individuals and
user traffic; one that is in a controlled environment where implementation of security
policies can be enforced.
3.3 Physical Boundaries
The TOE is a hardware and software solution that makes up the switch models as follows:
2960CX, 2960X, 2960XR, 3560CX, 3560X and 3750X running Cisco IOS 15.2(4)E. The
network, on which they reside, is considered part of the environment. The TOE guidance
documentation that is considered to be part of the TOE can be found listed in the Cisco
Catalyst 2K/3K Wired Access Switches Common Criteria Operational User Guidance and
Preparative Procedures document and are downloadable from the http://cisco.com web site
4 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Security audit
2. Cryptographic support
3. Identification and authentication
4. Security Management
5. Protection of the TSF
6. TOE access
7. Trusted path/channels
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4.1 Security audit
The Cisco Catalyst 2K/3K Wired Access Switches provides extensive auditing capabilities.
The TOE generates a comprehensive set of audit logs that identify specific TOE operations.
For each event, the TOE records the date and time of each event, the type of event, the
subject identity, and the outcome of the event. The TOE is configured to transmit its audit
messages to an external syslog server. Communication with the syslog server is protected
using IPsec and the TOE can determine when communication with the syslog server fails.
If that should occur, the TOE can be configured to block new permit actions. The logs can
be viewed on the TOE using the appropriate IOS commands. The records include the
date/time the event occurred, the event/type of event, the user associated with the event,
and additional information of the event and its success and/or failure. The TOE does not
have an interface to modify audit records, though there is an interface available for the
authorized administrator to clear audit data stored locally on the TOE.
4.2 Cryptographic support
The TOE provides cryptography in support of other Cisco Cat2K/3K WAS security
functionality. This IOS software calls the IOS Common Cryptographic Module (IC2M)
Rel5 (Firmware Version: Rel 5) has been validated for conformance to the requirements of
FIPS 140-2 Level 2 certificate #2388.
4.3 Identification and authentication
The TOE performs two types of authentication: device-level authentication of the remote
device (VPN peers) and user authentication for the Authorized Administrator of the TOE.
Device-level authentication allows the TOE to establish a secure channel with a trusted
peer. The secure channel is established only after each device authenticates the other.
Device-level authentication is performed via IKE/IPsec mutual authentication. The IKE
phase authentication for the IPsec communication channel between the TOE and
authentication server and between the TOE and syslog server is considered part of the
Identification and Authentication security functionality of the TOE.
The TOE provides authentication services for administrative users to connect to the TOEs
secure CLI administrator interface. The TOE requires Authorized Administrators to
authenticate prior to being granted access to any of the management functionality. The
TOE can be configured to require a minimum password length of 15 characters as well as
mandatory password complexity rules. The TOE provides administrator authentication
against a local user database. Password-based authentication can be performed on the
serial console or SSH over IPsec interfaces. The TOE supports use of a RADIUS AAA
server (part of the IT Environment) for authentication of administrative users attempting to
connect to the TOE’s CLI.
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4.4 Security management
The TOE provides secure administrative services for management of general TOE
configuration and the security functionality provided by the TOE. All TOE administration
occurs either through a secure SSHv2 over IPsec session or via a local console connection.
The TOE provides the ability to securely manage all aspects of the security requirements.
The TOE supports two separate administrator roles: non-privileged administrator and
privileged administrator. Only the privileged administrator can perform the above security
relevant management functions.
4.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE protects against interference and tampering by untrusted subjects by
implementing identification, authentication, and access controls to limit configuration to
Authorized Administrators. The TOE prevents reading of cryptographic keys and
passwords. Additionally Cisco IOS is not a general-purpose operating system and access
to Cisco IOS memory space is restricted to only Cisco IOS functions.
The TOE internally maintains the date and time. This date and time is used as the
timestamp that is applied to audit records generated by the TOE. Administrators can
update the TOE’s clock manually, or can configure the TOE to use NTP to synchronize the
TOE’s clock with an external time source. Finally, the TOE performs testing to verify
correct operation of the switch itself and that of the cryptographic module.
The TOE is able to verify any software updates prior to the software updates being installed
on the TOE to avoid the installation of Authorized Administrator software.
4.6 TOE access
The TOE can terminate inactive sessions after an Authorized Administrator configurable
time-period. Once a session has been terminated the TOE requires the user to re-
authenticate to establish a new session. The TOE can also display an Authorized
Administrator specified banner on the CLI management interface prior to allowing any
administrative access to the TOE.
4.7 Trusted path/channels
The TOE allows trusted paths to be established to itself from remote administrators over
SSHv2 over IPsec, and initiates outbound IPsec tunnels to transmit audit messages to
remote syslog servers. In addition, IPsec is used to secure the session between the TOE
and the authentication servers. The TOE can also establish trusted paths of peer-to-peer
IPsec sessions. The peer-to-peer IPsec sessions can be used for securing the
communications between the TOE and authentication server/syslog server.
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5 Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the
collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices (NDcPP), version 1.0, February 27,
2015. That information has not been reproduced here and the NDcPP should be consulted if
there is interest in that material.
6 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
 Cisco Catalyst 2K/3K Wired Access Switches Common Criteria Operational User
Guidance and Preparative Procedures, Version 1.0, March 4, 2016
7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the Evaluation Team Test Report for the Cisco
Catalyst 2K/3K Wired Access Switches, Version 0.5, March 11, 2015.
7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according the Cisco Catalyst 2K/3K Wired
Access Switches Common Criteria Operational User Guidance and Preparative Procedures,
Version 1.0, March 4, 2016 document and ran the tests specified in the NDcPP including
the optional SSH and IPsec tests.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration consists of the Cisco Catalyst 2K/3K Wired Access Switches,
including the following models: 2960CX, 2960X, 2960XR, 3560CX, 3560X and 3750X.
The models are running the IOS software Release IOS 15.2(4)E.
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as
specified in the Cisco Catalyst 2K/3K Wired Access Switches Common Criteria
Operational User Guidance and Preparative Procedures, Version 1.0, March 4, 2016.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
EAL1 work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to
the corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon
CC version 3.1 rev 4 and CEM version 3.1 rev 4. The evaluation determined the Product
Name TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the Part 3 Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL
1).
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
of security requirements claimed to be met by the Cisco Catalyst 2K/3K Wired Access
Switches that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function
descriptions that support the requirements.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV_FSP.1 CEM work unit. The evaluation team
assessed the design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the
TSF provides the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional
specification contained in the Security target and Guidance documents. Additionally the
evaluator performed the assurance activities specified in the NDcPP related to the
examination of the information contained in the TSS.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team
ensured the adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE.
Additionally, the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in
describing how to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the
design and testing phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
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conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC_OPE.1 and ALC_CMS.1 CEM work unit. The
evaluation team found that the TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE_IND.1 CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran
the set of tests specified by the assurance activities in the NDcPP and recorded the results
in a Test Report, summarized in the Assurance Activities Report.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA_VAN.1 CEM work unit. The evaluation team
performed a public search for vulnerabilities and did not discover any public issues with
the TOE.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims
in the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
9.8 Clarifications of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarifying. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications
of this evaluation. Note that:
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1. As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made, with a certain level of assurance (the assurance
activities specified in the claimed PPs and performed by the evaluation team).
2. This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software version
identified in this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in
process.
3. The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the
functionality specified in the NDcPP. Any additional security related functional
capabilities of the product were not covered by this evaluation.
4. This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validators have no further comments about the evaluation results.
11 Annexes
Not applicable
12 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as Cisco Catalyst 2K/3K Wired Access Switches Security
Target, Version 1.0, March 11, 2016.
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims
made are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common
Criteria using the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is
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complete, consistent, technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of
requirements for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor
or developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or
an IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the
issue of a Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2102.
[4] collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices (NDcPP), version 1.0,
February 27, 2015.