Security Target Junos OS 19.1R2 for EX2300, EX2300-C and EX3400 Juniper Networks
Version 1.3 Page 1 of 49
Security Target Junos OS 19.1R2 for EX2300, EX2300-C and
EX3400
Juniper Networks
Version 1.5
April 17, 2020
Prepared for:
Juniper Networks, Inc.
1133 Innovation Way
Sunnyvale, CA 94089
www.juniper.net
Security Target Junos OS 19.1R2 for EX2300, EX2300-C and EX3400 Juniper Networks
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Abstract
This document provides the basis for an evaluation of a specific Target of Evaluation (TOE), Junos OS
19.1R2 EX2300, EX2300-C, EX3400. This Security Target (ST) is conformant to the requirements of
Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices v2.1 ([NDcPP2.1]).
References
[CC1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction
and General Model, CCMB-2017-04-001, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CC2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security
Functional Components, CCMB-2017-04-002, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[CC3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security
Assurance Components, CCMB-2017-04-003, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation
Methodology, CCMB-2017-04-004, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[CC_Add] CC and CEM Addenda, Exact Conformance, Selection-Based SFRs, Optional SFRs, CCDB-
2017-05-xxx, Version 0.5, May 2017
[NDcPP2.1] Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices (NDcPP), Version 2.1, 24-
September-2018
[SD] Supporting Document, Evaluation Activities for Network Device cPP, September-2018,
version 2.1
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................5
1.1 EX ST reference .......................................................................................................................5
1.2 TOE Reference.........................................................................................................................5
1.3 About this document ..............................................................................................................5
1.4 Document Conventions ..........................................................................................................5
1.5 TOE Overview..........................................................................................................................6
1.6 TOE Description.......................................................................................................................6
1.6.1 Overview .........................................................................................................................6
1.6.2 Physical boundary...........................................................................................................7
1.6.3 Logical Scope of the TOE.................................................................................................8
1.6.4 Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware .......................................................................10
1.6.5 Summary of out scope items ........................................................................................10
2 Conformance Claim.......................................................................................................................11
2.1 CC Conformance Claim .........................................................................................................11
2.2 PP Conformance claim..........................................................................................................11
2.3 Conformance Rationale ........................................................................................................11
2.4 Technical Decisions...............................................................................................................11
3 Security Problem Definition..........................................................................................................14
3.1 Threats ..................................................................................................................................14
3.2 Assumptions..........................................................................................................................16
3.3 Organizational Security Policies............................................................................................17
4 Security Objectives........................................................................................................................18
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE ............................................................................................18
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment..........................................................18
4.3 Security Objectives rationale ................................................................................................19
5 Security Functional Requirements................................................................................................20
5.1 Security Audit (FAU)..............................................................................................................20
5.1.1 Security Audit Data generation (FAU_GEN)..................................................................20
5.1.2 Security audit event storage (Extended – FAU_STG_EXT)............................................22
5.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS).................................................................................................22
5.2.1 Cryptographic Key Management (FCS_CKM)................................................................22
5.2.2 Cryptographic Operation (FCS_COP) ............................................................................23
5.2.3 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation......................................................................24
5.2.4 Cryptographic Protocols (Extended – FCS_SSHS_EXT SSH Protocol)............................24
5.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA) ................................................................................25
5.3.1 Authentication Failure Management (FIA_AFL) ...........................................................25
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5.3.2 Password Management (Extended – FIA_PMG_EXT)...................................................25
5.3.3 User Identification and Authentication (Extended – FIA_UIA_EXT) .............................25
5.3.4 User authentication (FIA_UAU) (Extended – FIA_UAU_EXT)........................................26
5.4 Security Management (FMT) ................................................................................................26
5.4.1 Management of functions in TSF (FMT_MOF)..............................................................26
5.4.2 Management of TSF Data (FMT_MTD) .........................................................................26
5.4.3 Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF)...................................................27
5.4.4 Security management roles (FMT_SMR) ......................................................................27
5.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT) ...................................................................................................27
5.5.1 Protection of TSF Data (Extended – FPT_SKP_EXT) ......................................................27
5.5.2 Protection of Administrator Passwords (Extended – FPT_APW_EXT)..........................28
5.5.3 TSF testing (Extended – FPT_TST_EXT).........................................................................28
5.5.4 Trusted Update (FPT_TUD_EXT) ...................................................................................28
5.5.5 Time stamps (Extended – FPT_STM_EXT)) ...................................................................28
5.6 TOE Access (FTA)...................................................................................................................28
5.6.1 TSF-initiated Session Locking (Extended – FTA_SSL_EXT) ............................................28
5.6.2 Session locking and termination (FTA_SSL) ..................................................................29
5.6.3 TOE access banners (FTA_TAB).....................................................................................29
5.7 Trusted path/channels (FTP).................................................................................................29
5.7.1 Trusted Channel (FTP_ITC)............................................................................................29
5.7.2 Trusted Path (FTP_TRP).................................................................................................29
6 Security Assurance Requirements ................................................................................................31
7 TOE Summary Specification..........................................................................................................32
7.1 Protected communications...................................................................................................32
7.1.1 Algorithms and zeroization...........................................................................................32
7.1.2 Random Bit Generation ................................................................................................35
7.1.3 SSH ................................................................................................................................36
7.2 Administrator Authentication...............................................................................................39
7.3 Correct Operation.................................................................................................................41
7.4 Trusted Update .....................................................................................................................42
7.5 Audit......................................................................................................................................42
7.6 Management.........................................................................................................................44
8 Rationales......................................................................................................................................46
8.1 SFR dependency analysis ......................................................................................................46
9 Glossary.........................................................................................................................................48
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1 Introduction
1. This section identifies the Security Target (ST), Target of Evaluation (TOE), Security Target
organization, document conventions, and terminology. It also includes an overview of the
evaluated products.
1.1 EX ST reference
ST Title Security Target Junos OS 19.1R2 for EX2300, EX2300-C and EX3400
ST Revision 1.5
ST Draft Date April 17, 2020
Author Juniper Networks, Inc.
cPP/EP Conformance [NDcPP2.1] Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices (NDcPP),
Version 2.1, 24-September-2018
1.2 TOE Reference
TOE Title Junos OS 19.1R2 EX2300, EX2300-C, EX3400
TOE Firmware Junos OS 19.1R2
1.3 About this document
2. This Security Target follows the following format:
Section Title Description
1 Introduction Provides an overview of the TOE and defines the hardware and
firmware that make up the TOE as well as the physical and logical
boundaries of the TOE
2 Conformance Claims Lists evaluation conformance to Common Criteria versions,
Protection Profiles, or Packages where applicable
3 Security Problem Definition Specifies the threats, assumptions and organizational security
policies that affect the TOE
4 Security Objectives Defines the security objectives for the TOE/operational
environment and provides a rationale to demonstrate that the
security objectives satisfy the threats
5 Security Functional
Requirements
Contains the functional requirements for this TOE
6 Security Assurance
Requirements
Contains the assurance requirements for this TOE
7 TOE Summary Specification Identifies the IT security functions provided by the TOE and also
identifies the assurance measures targeted to meet the
assurance requirements
Table 1 Document Organization
1.4 Document Conventions
3. This document follows the same conventions as those applied in [NDcPP2.1] in the completion
of operations on Security Functional Requirements, namely:
• Unaltered SFRs are stated in the form used in [CC2] or their extended component definition
(ECD);
• Refinement made in the ST: the refinement text is indicated with bold text and
strikethroughs;
• Selection completed in the ST: the selection values are indicated with underlined text
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e.g. “[selection: disclosure, modification, loss of use]” in [CC2] or an ECD might
become “disclosure” (completion;
• Assignment completed in the ST: indicated with italicized text;
• Assignment completed within a selection in the ST: the completed assignment text is
indicated with italicized and underlined text
e.g. “[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other
operations]]” in [CC2] or an ECD might become “change_default, select_tag”
(completion of both selection and assignment);
• Iteration: indicated by adding a string starting with “/” (e.g. “FCS_COP.1/Hash”).
1.5 TOE Overview
4. The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Juniper Networks, Inc. Junos OS 19.1R2 executing on EX2300,
EX2300-C and EX3400 Ethernet Switch.
5. Juniper Networks EX Series Ethernet Switches provide scalable connectivity for the enterprise
market, including branch offices, campus locations, and data centers. The switches run the
Juniper Networks Junos operating system (Junos OS), which provides Layer 2 and Layer 3
switching, routing, and security services.
6. The EX switches are secure network devices that protect themselves largely by offering only a
minimal logical interface to the network and attached nodes. Each of the EX switches includes an
ASIC-based Packet Forwarding Engine (PFE) with an integrated CPU to consistently deliver wire-
rate forwarding.
7. The EX2300, EX2300-C and EX3400 each occupy a single rack unit, delivering a compact solution.
8. The EX Switches primarily support the definition of, and enforce, information flow policies
among network nodes. All information flow from one network node to another passes through
an instance of the TOE. Information flow is controlled on the basis of network node addresses
and protocol. In support of the information flow security functions, the TOE ensures that
security-relevant activity is audited, and provides the security tools to manage all of the security
functions.
1.6 TOE Description
1.6.1 Overview
9. The appliances are physically self-contained, housing the firmware and hardware necessary to
perform all switching and routing functions. The architecture components of the appliances are:
• Switch fabric – the switch fabric boards/modules provide a highly scalable, non-blocking,
centralized switch fabric matrix through which all network data passes.
• Routing Engine (Control Board) – the RE runs the Junos firmware and provides Layer 3
routing services and Layer 2 switching services. The RE also provides network management
for all operations necessary for the configuration and operation of the TOE and controls the
flow of information through the TOE, including support for appliance interface control and
control plane functions such as chassis component, system management and user access to
the appliance.
• Layer 2 switching services, Layer 3 switching/routing services and network management for
all operations necessary for the configuration and operation of the TOE and controls the
flow of information through the TOE.
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• The Packet Forwarding Engine (PFE) – provides all operations necessary for transit packet
forwarding:
o The EX2300 switch has four 10-Gigabit Ethernet ports and up to 48 10/100/1000
BASE-T Gigabit Ethernet connectors with or without PoE/PoE+.
o The EX2300-C switch has two 10-Gigabit Ethernet ports and 12 10/100/1000 BASE-T
Gigabit Ethernet connectors with or without PoE/PoE+.
o The EX3400 switch has four dual-mode (GbE/10GbE) small form-factor pluggable
transceiver (SFP/SFP+) uplink ports and two 40GbE QSFP+ ports, and up to 48
10/100/1000 BASE-T Gigabit Ethernet connectors with or without PoE/PoE+.
• Power – power supply bays to provide complete flexibility for provisioning and redundancy.
The power supplies connect to the midplane, which distributes the different output voltages
produced by the power supplies to the appliance components, depending on their voltage
requirements.
10. The Routing Engine and Packet Forwarding Engine perform their primary tasks independently,
while constantly communicating through a high-speed internal link. This arrangement provides
streamlined forwarding and routing control and the capability to run Internet-scale networks at
high speeds.
11. The functions of the appliances can all be managed through the Junos firmware, either from a
connected terminal console or via a network connection. Network management is secured using
the SSH protocol. All management, whether from a user connecting to a terminal or from the
network, requires successful authentication. In the evaluated deployment the TOE is managed
and configured via Command Line Interface, either via a directly connected console or over the
network secured using the SSH protocol.
1.6.2 Physical boundary
12. The TOE is the Junos OS 19.1R2 firmware running on the appliance chasses listed in Table 2.
Hence, the physical boundary of the TOE is the entire chassis of the appliance, as shown in
Figure 1 and defined in Table 2 below.
Figure 1 TOE Boundary
13. The TOE interfaces are comprised of the following:
i. Network interfaces which pass traffic
ii. Management interface through which handle administrative actions.
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Chassis
Model
Processor Hardware Version Network Ports Firmware
(Operating
System)
EX2300 1.25Ghz
ARM
Cortex A9
EX2300-48P/48T 48 x 10/100/1000 BASE-T Gigabit
Ethernet connectors with/out
PoE/PoE+
4 x 10-Gigabit Ethernet connectors
(SFP/SFP+)
Junos OS
19.1R2
EX2300-C-12T/12T 12 x 10/100/1000 BASE-T Gigabit
Ethernet connectors with/out
PoE/PoE+
2 x 10-Gigabit Ethernet connectors
EX3400 Dual Core
1Ghz ARM
Cortex A9
EX3400-24P/24T Up to 48 x 10/100/1000 BASE-T
Gigabit Ethernet connectors
with/out PoE/PoE+
4 x SFP/SFP+
2 x QSFP/QSFP+
EX3400-48P/48T
Table 2 TOE Chassis Details
14. The details of the appliances, including interface options supported for the EX2300, EX2300-C
and EX3400 appliances are described in the following reference documents:
• EX2300 Switch Hardware Guide
• EX3400 Switch Hardware Guide
15. The same jinstall image is used for each of the above listed Ethernet switch chassis, namely:
• junos-arm-32-19.1R2.5.tgz
16. The firmware version reflects the detail reported for the components of the Junos OS when the
“show version” command is executed on the appliance.
17. The guidance documents included as part of the TOE are:
[ECG] Junos OS Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide for EX2300 and EX3400
Devices, Release 19.1R2
1.6.3 Logical Scope of the TOE
18. The logical boundary of the TOE includes the following security functionality:
Security Functionality Description
Security Audit Junos auditable events are stored in the syslog files on the
appliance and can be sent to an external log server (via
Netconf over SSH). Auditable events include start-up and
shutdown of the audit functions, authentication events, as
well as the events listed in Table 9. Audit records include
the date and time, event category, event type, username,
and the outcome of the event (success or failure). Local
syslog storage limits are configurable and are monitored. In
the event of storage limits being reached the oldest logs
will be overwritten.
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Security Functionality Description
Cryptographic Support The TOE provides an SSH server to support protected
communications for administrators to establish secure
sessions and to connect to external syslog servers.
The TOE requires that applications exchanging information
with it are successfully authenticated prior to any exchange
(i.e. applications connecting over SSH).
The TOE includes cryptographic modules that provide the
underlying cryptographic services, including key
management and protection of stored keys, algorithms,
random bit generation and crypto-administration. The
cryptographic modules provide confidentiality and integrity
services for authentication and for protecting
communications with connecting applications.
Identification and
Authentication
The TOE supports Role Based Access Control. All users
must be authenticated to the TOE prior to carrying out any
management actions. The TOE supports password-based
authentication and public key-based authentication. Based
on the assigned role, a user is granted a set of privileges to
access the system.
Administrative users must provide unique identification
and authentication data before any administrative access
to the system is granted. Authentication data entered and
stored on the TOE is protected. The TOE can be configured
to terminate interactive user sessions and to present an
access banner with warning messages prior to
authentication.
Security Management The TOE provides a Security Administrator role that is
responsible for:
• the configuration and maintenance of
cryptographic elements related to the establishment of
secure connections to and from the evaluated product
• the regular review of all audit data;
• initiation of trusted update function;
• all administrative tasks (e.g., creating the security
policy).
The devices are managed through a Command Line
Interface (CLI). The CLI is accessible through local (serial)
console connection or remote administrative (SSH) session.
Protection of the TSF The TOE protects all passwords, pre-shared keys,
symmetric keys and private keys from unauthorized
disclosure. Passwords are stored using sha256 or sha512.
The TOE executes self-tests during initial start-up to ensure
correct operation and enforcement of its security
functions. An administrator can install software updates to
the TOE. The TOE internally maintains the date and time.
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Security Functionality Description
TOE Access Prior to establishing an administration session with the
TOE, a banner is displayed to the user. The banner
messaging is customizable. The TOE will terminate an
interactive session after a period of inactivity. A user can
terminate their local CLI session and remote CLI session by
entering exit at the prompt.
Trusted Path/Trusted
Channel
The TOE supports SSH v2 for secure communication to
Syslog server. The TOE supports SSH v2 (remote CLI) for
secure remote administration.
Table 3 Logical Scope of TOE
1.6.4 Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware
19. The TOE relies on the provision of the following items in the network environment:
• Syslog server supporting SSHv2 connections to send audit logs;
• SSHv2 client for remote administration;
• Serial connection client for local administration.
1.6.5 Summary of out scope items
• Use of telnet, since it violates the Trusted Path requirement set (see Section 5.7.2)
• Use of FTP, since it violates the Trusted Path requirement set (see Section 5.7.2)
• Use of SNMP, since it violates the Trusted Path requirement set (see Section 5.7.2)
• Use of SSL, including management via J-Web, JUNOScript and JUNOScope, since it violates
the Trusted Path requirement set (see Section 5.7.2).
• Use of digital signatures to verify updates
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2 Conformance Claim
2.1 CC Conformance Claim
20. The TOE and ST are compliant with the Common Criteria (CC) Version 3.1, Revision 5, dated:
April 2017.
This TOE is conformant to:
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluations Part 1, Version 3.1,
Revision 5, April 2017
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluations Part 2, Version 3.1,
Revision 5, April 2017: Part 2 extended
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluations Part 2, Version 3.1,
Revision 5, April 2017: Part 3 conformant
2.2 PP Conformance claim
21. This TOE is conformant to:
• [NDcPP2.1] Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices (NDcPP), Version 2.1, 24-
September-2018
2.3 Conformance Rationale
22. This Security Target provides exact conformance to Version 2.1 of the Collaborative Protection
Profile for Network Devices. The security problem definition, security objectives and security
requirements in this Security Target are all taken from the Protection Profile performing only
operations defined there.
2.4 Technical Decisions
23. In line with Labgram #105, this section identifies all NIAP Technical Decisions that are applicable
to this TOE:
NIAP Technical Decisions (TDs)
Technical Decisions applicable to NDcPP v2.1
Technical Decisions Applicable Exclusion Rationale (if
applicable)
TD0395: NIT Technical Decision for
Different Handling of TLS1.1 and TLS1.2
No No TLS claims made in the ST
TD0396: NIT Technical Decision for
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1, Test 2
No No TLS claims made in the ST
TD0397: NIT Technical Decision for
Fixing AES-CTR Mode Tests
Yes
TD0398: NIT Technical Decision for
FCS_SSH*EXT.1.1 RFCs for AES-CTR
Yes
TD0399: NIT Technical Decision for
Manual installation of CRL
(FIA_X509_EXT.2)
Yes
TD0400: NIT Technical Decision for
FCS_CKM.2 and elliptic curve-based key
establishment
Yes
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TD0401: NIT Technical Decision for
Reliance on external servers to meet
SFRs
Yes (However, the TOE itself meets
all FIA requirements)
TD0402: NIT Technical Decision for RSA-
based FCS_CKM.2 Selection
Yes (However, NIST SP800-56B is
not claimed)
TD0407 – NIT Technical Decision for
handling Certification of Cloud
Deployments
No Not a cloud deployment
TD0408 – NIT Technical Decision for
local vs. remote administrator accounts
Yes
TD0409 – NIT decision for Applicability
of FIA_AFL.1 to key-based SSH
authentication
Yes
TD0410 – NIT technical decision for
Redundant assurance activities
associated with FAU_GEN.1
Yes
TD0411 - NIT Technical Decision for
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.5, Test 1 - Server and
client side seem to be confused
No No SSH client claims made in
ST
TD0412 – NIT Technical Decision for
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.5 SFR and AA
discrepancy
Yes
TD0423 – NIT Technical Decision for
Clarification about application of
RfI#201726rev2
No No TLS or X.509 claims made
in ST
TD0424 – NIT Technical Decision for
NDcPP v2.1 Clarification -
FCS_SSHC/S_EXT1.5
Yes
TD0425 – NIT Technical Decision for
Cut-and-paste Error for Guidance AA
Yes
TD0447 - NIT Technical Decision for
Using 'diffie-hellman-group-
exchange-sha256' in
FCS_SSHC/S_EXT.1.7
Yes
TD0450 - NIT Technical Decision for
RSA-based ciphers and the Server
Key Exchange message
No No TLS claims made in ST
TD0451 - NIT Technical Decision for
ITT Comm UUID Reference Identifier
No No TLS claims made in ST
TD0453 - NIT Technical Decision for
Clarify authentication methods SSH
clients can use to authenticate SSH
se
No SSHC is not claimed in ST
TD0475 – NIT Technical Decision for
Separate traffic consideration for SSH
rekey
Yes
TD0477 - NIT Technical Decision for
Clarifying FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted
Update
Yes
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TD0478 - NIT Technical Decision for
Application Notes for
FIA_X509_EXT.1 iterations
No X.509 is not claimed in ST
TD0480 - NIT Technical Decision for
Granularity of audit events
Yes
TD0481 - NIT Technical Decision for
FCS_(D)TLSC_EXT.X.2 IP addresses in
reference identifiers
No TLS is not claimed in ST
TD0482 - NIT Technical Decision for
Identification of usage of
cryptographic schemes
Yes
TD0483 – NIT Technical Decision for
Applicability of FPT_APW_EXT.1
Yes
TD0484 – NIT Technical Decision for
Interactive Sessions in FTA_SSL_EXT.1 &
FTA_SSL.3
Yes
Table 4 Technical Decisions
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3 Security Problem Definition
24. The security problem definition has been taken from [NDcPP2.1] and is reproduced here for the
convenience of the reader.
25. The threats for the Network Device are grouped according to functional areas of the device in
the sections below.
3.1 Threats
Threat Threat Definition
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ADMINISTRATOR_ACCESS Threat agents may attempt to gain Administrator
access to the network device by nefarious means
such as masquerading as an Administrator to the
device, masquerading as the device to an
Administrator, replaying an administrative
session (in its entirety, or selected portions), or
performing man-in-the-middle attacks, which
would provide access to the administrative
session, or sessions between network devices.
Successfully gaining Administrator access allows
malicious actions that compromise the security
functionality of the device and the network on
which it resides.
T.WEAK_CRYPTOGRAPHY Threat agents may exploit weak cryptographic
algorithms or perform a cryptographic exhaust
against the key space. Poorly chosen encryption
algorithms, modes, and key sizes will allow
attackers to compromise the algorithms, or brute
force exhaust the key space and give them
unauthorized access allowing them to read,
manipulate and/or control the traffic with
minimal effort.
T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS Threat agents may attempt to target network
devices that do not use standardized secure
tunneling protocols to protect the critical
network traffic. Attackers may take advantage of
poorly designed protocols or poor key
management to successfully perform man-in-the-
middle attacks, replay attacks, etc. Successful
attacks will result in loss of confidentiality and
integrity of the critical network traffic, and
potentially could lead to a compromise of the
network device itself.
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Threat Threat Definition
T.WEAK_AUTHENTICATION_ENDPOINTS Threat agents may take advantage of secure
protocols that use weak methods to authenticate
the endpoints – e.g., shared password that is
guessable or transported as plaintext. The
consequences are the same as a poorly designed
protocol, the attacker could masquerade as the
Administrator or another device, and the attacker
could insert themselves into the network stream
and perform a man-in-the-middle attack. The
result is the critical network traffic is exposed and
there could be a loss of confidentiality and
integrity, and potentially the network device
itself could be compromised.
T.UPDATE_COMPROMISE Threat agents may attempt to provide a
compromised update of the software or firmware
which undermines the security functionality of
the device. Non-validated updates or updates
validated using non-secure or weak cryptography
leave the update firmware vulnerable to
surreptitious alteration.
T.UNDETECTED_ACTIVITY Threat agents may attempt to access, change,
and/or modify the security functionality of the
network device without Administrator
awareness. This could result in the attacker
finding an avenue (e.g., misconfiguration, flaw in
the product) to compromise the device and the
Administrator would have no knowledge that the
device has been compromised.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_COMPROMISE Threat agents may compromise credentials and
device data enabling continued access to the
network device and its critical data. The
compromise of credentials include replacing
existing credentials with an attacker’s credentials,
modifying existing credentials, or obtaining the
administrator or device credentials for use by the
attacker.
T.PASSWORD_CRACKING Threat agents may be able to take advantage of
weak administrative passwords to gain privileged
access to the device. Having privileged access to
the device provides the attacker unfettered
access to the network traffic, and may allow
them to take advantage of any trust relationships
with other network devices.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_FAILURE An external, unauthorized entity could make use
of failed or compromised security functionality
and might therefore subsequently use or abuse
security functions without prior authentication to
access, change or modify device data, critical
network traffic or security functionality of the
device.
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Table 5 Threats
3.2 Assumptions
26. This section describes the assumptions made in identification of the threats and security
requirements for network devices. The network device is not expected to provide assurance in
any of these areas, and as a result, requirements are not included to mitigate the threats
associated.
Assumption Assumption Definition
A.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION The network device is assumed to be physically protected in
its operational environment and not subject to physical
attacks that compromise the security and/or interfere with
the device’s physical interconnections and correct
operation. This protection is assumed to be sufficient to
protect the device and the data it contains. As a result, the
cPP will not include any requirements on physical tamper
protection or other physical attack mitigations. The cPP will
not expect the product to defend against physical access to
the device that allows unauthorized entities to extract data,
bypass other controls, or otherwise manipulate the device.
A.LIMITED_FUNCTIONALITY The device is assumed to provide networking functionality
as its core function and not provide functionality/services
that could be deemed as general purpose computing. For
example the device should not provide computing platform
for general purpose applications (unrelated to networking
functionality).
A.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION A standard/generic network device does not provide any
assurance regarding the protection of traffic that traverses
it. The intent is for the network device to protect data that
originates on or is destined to the device itself, to include
administrative data and audit data. Traffic that is traversing
the network device, destined for another network entity, is
not covered by the ND cPP. It is assumed that this
protection will be covered by cPPs and PP-Modules for
particular types of network devices (e.g., firewall).
A.TRUSTED_ADMINISTRATOR The Security Administrator(s) for the network device are
assumed to be trusted and to act in the best interest of
security for the organization. This includes being
appropriately trained, following policy, and adhering to
guidance documentation. Administrators are trusted to
ensure passwords/credentials have sufficient strength and
entropy and to lack malicious intent when administering the
device. The network device is not expected to be capable
of defending against a malicious Administrator that actively
works to bypass or compromise the security of the device.
For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based
authentication, the Security Administrator(s) are expected
to fully validate (e.g. offline verification) any CA certificate
(root CA certificate or intermediate CA certificate) loaded
into the TOE’s trust store (aka 'root store', ' trusted CA Key
Store', or similar) as a trust anchor prior to use (e.g. offline
verification).
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Assumption Assumption Definition
A.REGULAR_UPDATES The network device firmware and software is assumed to
be updated by an Administrator on a regular basis in
response to the release of product updates due to known
vulnerabilities.
A.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE The administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access
the network device are protected by the platform on which
they reside.
A.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION The Administrator must ensure that there is no
unauthorized access possible for sensitive residual
information (e.g. cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs,
passwords etc.) on networking equipment when the
equipment is discarded or removed from its operational
environment.
Table 6 Assumptions
3.3 Organizational Security Policies
27. An organizational security policy is a set of rules, practices, and procedures imposed by an
organization to address its security needs. For the purposes of this cPP a single policy is
described in the section below.
Policy Name Policy Definition
P.ACCESS_BANNER The TOE shall display an initial banner describing restrictions of use, legal
agreements, or any other appropriate information to which users consent by
accessing the TOE.
Table 7 Organizational Security Policies
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4 Security Objectives
28. The security objectives have been taken from [NDcPP2.1] and are reproduced here for the
convenience of the reader.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
29. The security objectives for the TOE are trivially determined through the inverse of the statement
of threats presented in [NDcPP2.1] Section 4.1.
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
30. The security objectives have been taken from [NDcPP2.1] and are reproduced here for the
convenience of the reader. The following section describe objectives for the Operational
Environment:
Environment Security Objective IT Environment Security Objective Definition
OE.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the
TOE and the data it contains, is provided by the
environment.
OE.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE There are no general-purpose computing capabilities
(e.g., compilers or user applications) available on the TOE,
other than those services necessary for the operation,
administration and support of the TOE.
OE.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION The TOE does not provide any protection of traffic that
traverses it. It is assumed that protection of this traffic will
be covered by other security and assurance measures in
the operational environment.
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN Security Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all
administrator guidance in a trusted manner.
For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based
authentication, the Security Administrator(s) are assumed
to monitor the revocation status of all certificates in the
TOE's trust store and to remove any certificate from the
TOE’s trust store in case such certificate can no longer be
trusted.
OE.UPDATES The TOE firmware and software is updated by an
Administrator on a regular basis in response to the
release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
OE.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE The Administrator’s credentials (private key) used to
access the TOE must be protected on any other platform
on which they reside.
OE.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION The Security Administrator ensures that there is no
unauthorized access possible for sensitive residual
information (e.g. cryptographic keys, keying material,
PINs, passwords etc.) on networking equipment when the
equipment is discarded or removed from its operational
environment.
Table 8 Security Objectives for Operational Environment
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4.3 Security Objectives rationale
31. As these objectives for the TOE and operational environment are the same as those specified in
[NDcPP2.1],the rationales provided in the prose of the following are wholly applicable to this
security target as the statements of threats, assumptions, OSPs and security objectives provided
in this security target are the same as those defined in the collaborative Protection Profile to
which this ST claims conformance:
• [NDcPP2.1] section 4
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5 Security Functional Requirements
32. All security functional requirements are taken from the [NDcPP2.1]. The Security Functional
requirements are primarily structured according to [NDcPP2.1]. The SFRs are presented in
accordance with the conventions described in [NDcPP2.1] Section 6.1, and section 1.4 of this
document.
33. Note: as this TOE is not distributed, none of the security functional requirements relating to
distributed TOEs are specified for this TOE.
5.1 Security Audit (FAU)
5.1.1 Security Audit Data generation (FAU_GEN)
5.1.1.1 FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
a) Start-up and shut-down of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and
c) All administrative actions comprising:
• Administrative login and logout (name of user account shall be logged if individual user
accounts are required for Administrators).
• Changes to TSF data related to configuration changes (in addition to the information
that a change occurred it shall be logged what has been changed).
• Generating/import of, changing, or deleting of cryptographic keys (in addition to the
action itself a unique key name or key reference shall be logged).
• Resetting passwords (name of related user account shall be logged).
• [starting and stopping services, changes to configuration of audit behavior, changes to
thresholds for SSH re-keying1
];
d) Specifically defined auditable events listed in Table 9.
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the outcome (success or
failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional
components included in the cPP/ST, information specified in column three of Table 9.
Requirement Auditable Events Additional Audit Record
Contents
FAU_GEN.1 None. None.
FAU_GEN.2 None. None.
FAU_STG_EXT.1 None. None.
FAU_STG.1 None. None.
FCS_CKM.1 None. None.
FCS_CKM.2 None. None.
FCS_CKM.4 None. None.
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption None. None.
1
FMT_SMF.1 also includes management functions for management of cryptographic keys and set the time
used for time stamp. However, audit of these activities these actions is addressed in the 3rd
bullet of item c in
FAU_GEN.1.1 and in the FPT_STM_EXT.1 entry in Table 9, respectively.
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FCS_COP.1/SigGen None. None.
FCS_COP.1/Hash None. None.
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash None. None.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 None. None.
FIA_AFL.1 Unsuccessful login attempts
limit is met or exceeded.
Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP
address).
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 None. None.
FIA_UIA_EXT.1 All use of identification and
authentication mechanism.
Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP
address)
FIA_UAU_EXT.2 All use of identification and
authentication mechanism.
Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP
address)
FIA_UAU.7 None. None.
FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate Any attempt to initiate a
manual update
None.
FMT_MTD.1/CoreData None. None.
FMT_SMF.1 All management activities of
TSF data
None.
FMT_SMR.2 None. None.
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 None. None.
FPT_APW_EXT.1 None. None.
FPT_TST_EXT.1 None. None.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Initiation of update; result of
the update attempt (success
or failure)
None.
FPT_STM_EXT.1 Discontinuous changes to
time - either Administrator
actuated or changed via an
automated process. (Note
that no continuous changes
to time need to be logged.
See also application note on
FPT_STM_EXT.1)
For discontinuous changes to
time: The old and new values
for the time. Origin of the
attempt to change time for
success and failure (e.g., IP
address).
FTA_SSL_EXT.1 (if “terminate
the session is selected)
The termination of a local
interactive session by the
session locking mechanism.
None.
FTA_SSL.3 The termination of a remote
session by the session locking
mechanism.
None.
FTA_SSL.4 The termination of an
interactive session.
None.
FTA_TAB.1 None. None.
FTP_ITC.1 Initiation of the trusted
channel.
Termination of the trusted
channel.
Failure of the trusted channel
functions.
Identification of the initiator
and target of failed trusted
channels establishment
attempt.
FTP_TRP.1/Admin Initiation of the trusted path.
Termination of the trusted
path.
None.
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Failure of the trusted path
functions.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 Failure to establish an SSH
session
Reason for failure
FMT_MOF.1/Functions None. None.
FMT_MOF.1/Services None. None
FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys None. None.
Table 9 FAU_GEN.1 Security Functional Requirements and Auditable Events
5.1.1.2 FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to
associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.
5.1.2 Security audit event storage (Extended – FAU_STG_EXT)
5.1.2.1 FAU_ STG_EXT.1 Protected Audit Event Storage
FAU_STG_EXT.1 Protected Audit Event Storage
FAU_STG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to transmit the generated audit data to an external IT entity
using a trusted channel according to FTP_ITC.1.
ST Application Note
Transfer of the audit data to the external server is performed automatically (without further Security
Administrator intervention) in the evaluated deployment.
FAU_STG_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall be able to store generated audit data on the TOE itself.
[TOE shall consist of a single standalone component that stores audit data locally].
FAU_STG_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall [overwrite previous audit records according to the following rule:
[oldest log is overwritten]] when the local storage space for audit data is full.
5.1.2.2 FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage (Optional)
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG.1.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorised
deletion.
FAU_STG.1.2 The TSF shall be able to prevent unauthorised modifications to the stored audit
records in the audit trail.
5.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)
5.2.1 Cryptographic Key Management (FCS_CKM)
5.2.1.1 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation (Refinement)
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm: [
• RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet the
following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.3;
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• ECC schemes using “NIST curves” [P-256, P-384, P-521] that meet the following: FIPS PUB
186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.4
• FFC Schemes using Diffie-Hellman group 14 that meet the following: RFC 3526, Section 3
] and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the
following: [assignment: list of standards].
5.2.1.2 FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment (Refinement)
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment
FCS_CKM.2.1 The TSF shall perform cryptographic key establishment in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key establishment method: [
• Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: NIST Special
Publication 800-56A Revision 2, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment
Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”;
• Key establishment scheme using Diffie-Hellman group 14 that meets the following: RFC
3526, Section 3;
] that meets the following: [assignment: list of standards].
5.2.1.3 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key destruction method
• For plaintext keys in volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by a [destruction
of reference to the key directly followed by a request for garbage collection];
• For plaintext keys in non-volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by the
invocation of an interface provided by a part of the TSF that [
o logically addresses the storage location of the key and performs a [single
overwrite consisting of [zeroes]]
that meets the following: No Standard.
5.2.2 Cryptographic Operation (FCS_COP)
5.2.2.1 FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)
FCS_COP.1.1/DataEncryption The TSF shall perform encryption/decryption in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm AES used in [CBC, CTR] mode and cryptographic key sizes [128 bits,
256 bits] that meet the following: AES as specified in ISO 18033-3, [CBC as specified in ISO 10116, CTR
as specified in ISO 10116].
FCS_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and Verification)
FCS_COP.1.1/SigGen The TSF shall perform cryptographic signature services (generation and
verification) in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [
• RSA Digital Signature Algorithm and cryptographic key sizes (modulus) [2048 bits, 4096
bits],
• Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm and cryptographic key sizes [P-256, P-384, P-
521 bits]
] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
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that meet the following: [
• For RSA schemes: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 5.5, using
PKCS #1 v2.1 Signature Schemes RSASSA-PSS and/or RSASSA-PKCS1v1_5; ISO/IEC 9796-2,
Digital signature scheme 2 or Digital Signature scheme 3,
• For ECDSA schemes: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 6 and
Appendix D, Implementing “NIST curves” [P-256, P-384, P-521]; ISO/IEC 14888-3, Section
6.4
].
FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)
FCS_COP.1.1/Hash The TSF shall perform cryptographic hashing services in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512] and cryptographic key sizes
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes] and message digest sizes [160, 256, 384, 512] bits that meet
the following: ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004.
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)
FCS_COP.1.1/KeyedHash The TSF shall perform keyed-hash message authentication in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm [HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-512] and
cryptographic key sizes [160, 256 and 512 bits] and message digest sizes [160, 256, 512] bits that
meet the following: ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 “MAC Algorithm 2”.
5.2.3 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in
accordance with ISO/IEC 18031:2011 using [HMAC_DRBG (any)].
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2 The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source that
accumulates entropy from [[3] software-based noise source, [1] hardware-based noise source] with a
minimum of [256 bits] of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength, according to
ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 “Security Strength Table for Hash Functions”, of the keys and hashes
that it will generate.
5.2.4 Cryptographic Protocols (Extended – FCS_SSHS_EXT SSH Protocol)
5.2.4.1 FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Server Protocol
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Server Protocol
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the SSH protocol that complies with RFC(s) [4251, 4252,
4253, 4254, 4344, 5656, 6668].
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports the
following authentication methods as described in RFC 4252: public key-based, [password-based].
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall ensure that, as described in RFC 4253, packets greater than [256K]
bytes in an SSH transport connection are dropped.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses the following
encryption algorithms and rejects all other encryption algorithms: [aes128-cbc, aes256-cbc, aes128-
ctr, aes256-ctr].
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH public-key based authentication
implementation uses [ssh-rsa, rsa-sha2-256, rsa-sha2-512, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, ecdsa-sha2-
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nistp384, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521] as its public key algorithm(s) and rejects all other public key
algorithms.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses [hmac-sha1,
hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-512] as its MAC algorithm(s) and rejects all other MAC algorithm(s).
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall ensure that [diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, ecdh-sha2-nistp256] and
[ecdh-sha2-nistp384, ecdh-sha2-nistp521] are the only allowed key exchange methods used for the
SSH protocol.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.8 The TSF shall ensure that within SSH connections, the same session keys are used
for a threshold of no longer than one hour, and each encryption key is used to protect no more than
one gigabyte of data. After any of the thresholds are reached a rekey needs to be performed.
ST Application Note
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 was updated based on TD0408 and TD0424.
5.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA)
5.3.1 Authentication Failure Management (FIA_AFL)
5.3.1.1 FIA_AFL.1 Authentication Failure Management (Refinement)
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication Failure Management
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when an Administrator configurable positive integer within [2 to
10] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to Administrators attempting to authenticate
remotely using a password.
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met, the
TSF shall [
• prevent the offending remote Administrator from successfully establishing remote
session using any authentication method that involves a password until an Administrator
defined time period has elapsed].
FIA_AFL.1 has been updated according to TD0408.
5.3.2 Password Management (Extended – FIA_PMG_EXT)
5.3.2.1 FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Password Management
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Password Management
FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities for
administrative passwords:
a) Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters,
numbers, and the following special characters: [“!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(“, “)”,
[and all other standard ASCII, extended ASCII and Unicode characters]];
b) Minimum password length shall be configurable to between [10] and [20] characters.
5.3.3 User Identification and Authentication (Extended – FIA_UIA_EXT)
5.3.3.1 FIA_UIA_EXT.1 User Identification and Authentication
FIA_UIA_EXT.1 User Identification and Authentication
FIA_UIA_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall allow the following actions prior to requiring the non-TOE entity to
initiate the identification and authentication process:
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• Display the warning banner in accordance with FTA_TAB.1;
• [[ICMP echo]].
FIA_UIA_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall require each administrative user to be successfully identified and
authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that administrative user.
5.3.4 User authentication (FIA_UAU) (Extended – FIA_UAU_EXT)
5.3.4.1 FIA_UAU_EXT.2 Password-based Authentication Mechanism
FIA_UAU_EXT.2 Password-based Authentication Mechanism
FIA_UAU_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall provide a local [password-based] authentication mechanism to
perform local administrative user authentication.
ST Application Note
FIA_UAU_EXT.2 has been updated according to TD0408
5.3.4.2 FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback
FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback
FIA_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only obscured feedback to the administrative user while the
authentication is in progress at the local console.
5.4 Security Management (FMT)
5.4.1 Management of functions in TSF (FMT_MOF)
5.4.1.1 FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MOF.1.1/ManualUpdate The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable the functions to perform
manual updates to Security Administrators.
5.4.1.2 FMT_MOF.1/Services Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MOF.1/Services Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MOF.1.1/Services The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable and disable start and stop the
functions services to Security Administrators.
5.4.1.3 FMT_MOF.1/Functions Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MOF.1/Functions Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MOF.1.1/Functions The TSF shall restrict the ability to [modify the behaviour of] the functions
[transmission of audit data to an external IT entity, handling of audit data] to Security
Administrators.
5.4.2 Management of TSF Data (FMT_MTD)
5.4.2.1 FMT_MTD.1/CoreData Management of TSF Data
FMT_MTD.1/CoreData Management of TSF Data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CoreData The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the TSF data to Security
Administrators.
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5.4.2.2 FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CryptoKeys The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the cryptographic keys to
Security Administrators.
5.4.3 Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF)
5.4.3.1 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
• Ability to administer the TOE locally and remotely;
• Ability to configure the access banner;
• Ability to configure the session inactivity time before session termination or locking;
• Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using [hash comparison] capability
prior to installing those updates;
• Ability to configure the authentication failure parameters for FIA_AFL.1;
[
o Ability to start and stop services;
o Ability to configure audit behavior;
o Ability to manage cryptographic keys;
o Ability to configure thresholds for SSH rekeying;
o Ability to set the time which is used for time-stamps].
5.4.4 Security management roles (FMT_SMR)
5.4.4.1 FMT_SMR.2 Restrictions on security roles
FMT_SMR.2 Restrictions on Security Roles
FMT_SMR.2.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles:
• Security Administrator.
FMT_SMR.2.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
FMT_SMR.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that the conditions
• The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE locally;
• The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE remotely
are satisfied.
5.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
5.5.1 Protection of TSF Data (Extended – FPT_SKP_EXT)
5.5.1.1 FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all pre-shared, symmetric
and private keys)
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all pre-shared, symmetric and private keys)
FPT_SKP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private
keys.
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5.5.2 Protection of Administrator Passwords (Extended – FPT_APW_EXT)
5.5.2.1 FPT_APW_EXT.1 Protection of Administrator Passwords
FPT_APW_EXT.1 Protection of Administrator Passwords
FPT_APW_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall store administrative passwords in non-plaintext form.
FPT_APW_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall prevent the reading of plaintext administrative passwords.
5.5.3 TSF testing (Extended – FPT_TST_EXT)
5.5.3.1 FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF Testing (Extended)
FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF testing
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of the following self-tests [during initial start-up (on
power on)] to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF: [
• Power on test,
• File integrity test,
• Crypto integrity test,
• Authentication test,
• Algorithm known answer tests].
5.5.4 Trusted Update (FPT_TUD_EXT)
5.5.4.1 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted update
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide Security Administrators the ability to query the currently
executing version of the TOE firmware/software and [no other TOE firmware/software version].
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall provide Security Administrators the ability to manually initiate
updates to TOE firmware/software and [no other update mechanism].
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall provide means to authenticate firmware/software updates to the
TOE using a [published hash] prior to installing those updates.
5.5.5 Time stamps (Extended – FPT_STM_EXT))
5.5.5.1 FPT_STM_EXT.1 Reliable Time Stamps
FPT_STM_EXT.1 Reliable Time Stamps
FPT_STM_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use.
FPT_STM_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall [allow the Security Administrator to set the time].
5.6 TOE Access (FTA)
5.6.1 TSF-initiated Session Locking (Extended – FTA_SSL_EXT)
5.6.1.1 FTA_SSL_EXT.1 TSF-initiated Session Locking
FTA_SSL_EXT.1 TSF-initiated Session Locking
FTA_SSL_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall, for local interactive sessions, [
• terminate the session]
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after a Security Administrator-specified time period of inactivity.
5.6.2 Session locking and termination (FTA_SSL)
5.6.2.1 FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated Termination (Refinement)
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated Termination
FTA_SSL.3.1: The TSF shall terminate a remote interactive session after a Security Administrator
configurable time interval of session inactivity.
5.6.2.2 FTA_SSL.4 User-initiated Termination (Refinement)
FTA_SSL.4 User-initiated Termination
FTA_SSL.4.1: The TSF shall allow Administrator-initiated termination of the Administrator’s own
interactive session.
5.6.3 TOE access banners (FTA_TAB)
5.6.3.1 FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE Access Banners (Refinement)
FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE Access Banners
FTA_TAB.1.1: Before establishing an administrative user session the TSF shall display a Security
Administrator-specified advisory notice and consent warning message regarding use of the TOE.
5.7 Trusted path/channels (FTP)
5.7.1 Trusted Channel (FTP_ITC)
5.7.1.1 FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel (Refinement)
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of using [SSH] to provide a trusted communication channel
between itself and authorized IT entities supporting the following capabilities: audit server, [no
other capabilities] that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured
identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from disclosure and detection of
modification of the channel data.
FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit the TSF or the authorized IT entities to initiate communication via
the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [no communication].
5.7.2 Trusted Path (FTP_TRP)
5.7.2.1 FTP_TRP.1/Admin Trusted Path (Refinement)
FTP_TRP.1/Admin Trusted Path
FTP_TRP.1.1/Admin The TSF shall be capable of using [SSH] to provide a communication path
between itself and authorized remote Administrators that is logically distinct from other
communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the
communicated data from disclosure and provides detection of modification of the channel data.
FTP_TRP.1.2/Admin The TSF shall permit remote Administrators to initiate communication via the
trusted path.
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FTP_TRP.1.3/Admin The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for initial Administrator
authentication and all remote administration actions.
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6 Security Assurance Requirements
34. The TOE security assurance requirements are taken from [NDcPP2.1] , together with the
refinements documented in [NDcPP2.1] Section 7, as listed in Table 10 below.
Assurance Class Assurance Component
Security Target (ASE) Conformance claims (ASE_CCL.1)
Extended components definition (ASE_ECD.1)
ST introduction (ASE_INT.1)
Security objectives for the operational environment (ASE_OBJ.1)
Stated security requirements (ASE_REQ.1)
Security Problem Definition (ASE_SPD.1)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS.1)
Development (ADV) Basic functional specification (ADV_FSP.1)
Guidance documents (AGD) Operational user guidance (AGD_OPE.1)
Preparative procedures (AGD_PRE.1)
Life cycle support (ALC) Labelling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1)
TOE CM coverage (ALC_CMS.1)
Tests (ATE) Independent testing – conformance (ATE_IND.1)
Vulnerability assessment (AVA) Vulnerability survey (AVA_VAN.1)
Table 10 Security Assurance Requirements
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7 TOE Summary Specification
7.1 Protected communications
35. Local console access is gained by connecting an RJ-45 cable between the console port on the
appliance and a workstation with a serial connection client.
7.1.1 Algorithms and zeroization
36. All FIPS-approved cryptographic functions implemented by the TOE are implemented in the
following libraries:
• OpenSSL - EX2300/EX3400, version Junos OS 19.1R2
• LibMD - EX2300/EX3400, version Junos OS 19.1R2
• Kernel - EX2300/EX3400, version Junos OS 19.1R2
37. All random number generation by the TOE is performed in accordance with NIST Special
Publication 800-90 using HMAC_DRBG implemented in the OpenSSL library and kernel library
(FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1). Additionally, SHA (256,512) used for password hashing by Junos’ MGD
daemon is implemented in the LibMD library which isderived from Junos 19.1R2 OpenSSL.
38. The appliance does not have to be operated with FIPS mode enabled, providing the following
configuration knobs are applied:
• set system services ssh ciphers [ aes128-cbc aes256-cbc aes128-ctr aes256-ctr]
• set system services ssh hostkey-algorithm ssh-rsa
• set system services ssh hostkey-algorithm ssh-ecdsa
• set system services ssh hostkey-algorithm no-ssh-ed25519
• set system services ssh hostkey-algorithm no-ssh-dss
• set system services macs [ hmac-sha1 hmac-sha2-256 hmac-sha2-512]
• set system services key-exchange [ ecdh-sha2-nistp256 ecdh-sha2-nistp384 ecdh-
sha2-nistp521 ]
• set system services rekey time-limit 60
• set system services rekey data-limit 1000000000
39. The TOE evaluation provides a CAVP validation certificate for all FIPS-approved cryptographic
functions implemented by the TOE. CAVP certificate details are provided in Table 11.
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Library SFRs Supported Function, Usage, Algorithm, Mode, Key Size CAVP Cert#
JUNOS 19.1R2
OpenSSL
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1
FCS_COP.1/DataEncry
ption
FCS_COP.1/Hash
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash
FCS_COP.1/SigGen
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.2
SSH AES Data Encryption/Decryption:
AES-CBC with key sizes 128 bit and 256 bit
AES-CTR with key sizes 128 bit and 256 bit
SSH Hashing:
SHA1, SHA2-256, SHA2-512
SSH Keyed-hashing:
HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-
SHA-512
SSH signature generation and verification
using ECDSA:
P-256 w/SHA-256, P-384 w/SHA-384, P-
521 w/SHA-512
SSH Key generation for ECDH
P-256, P-384, P-521
SSH EC Key Agreement including keypair
generation using:
EC (P-256, SHA-256), ED (P-384, SHA-384),
EE (P-521, SHA-512)
C1376
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1
FCS_COP.1/SigGen
FCS_CKM.1
RSA KeyGen (generation mode B.3.3) for SSH
host keys:
Modulo 2048
Modulo3072
RSA SigGen (signature type: PKCS 1.5) for SSH:
Modulo 2048, Hash Algorithm SHA2-256,
SHA2-512
Modulo 3072, Hash Algorithm SHA2-256,
SHA2-512
Modulo 4096, Hash Algorithm SHA2-256,
SHA2-512
RSA SigVer (signature type: PKCS 1.5) for SSH:
Modulo 2048, Hash Algorithm SHA2-256,
SHA2-512
Modulo 3072, Hash Algorithm SHA2-256,
SHA2-512
C1376
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Library SFRs Supported Function, Usage, Algorithm, Mode, Key Size CAVP Cert#
JUNOS 19.1R2
LibMD
FCS_COP.1/Hash
FPT_APW_EXT.1
FPT_TST_EXT.1
Used by veriexec for cryptographic hashing
for password conditioning, password hashing
sha256, sha512
Used by manifest process for self-testing
(verifying integrity of system files):
sha1, sha256, sha512
C1375
JUNOS 19.1R2
Kernel
FCS_RBG_EXT.1
FCS_COP.1/Hash
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash
Random bit generation with HMAC-DRBG
HMAC-SHA2-256
C1374
Table 11 CAVP certificates for cryptographic services
40. The FIPS approved algorithms are applied when the configuration as described in [ECG] is
applied2
. The relevant configuration of algorithms is specified in [ECG].
(FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption, FCS_COP.1/SigGen, FCS_COP.1/Hash, FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash,
FCS_RBG_EXT.1, FCS_CKM.1, FMT_SMF.1)
41. Asymmetric keys are also generated in accordance with FIPS PUB 186-4 Appendix B.3 for RSA
Schemes and Appendix B.4 for ECC Schemes for SSH communications. The TOE implements
Diffie-Hellman group 14, using the modulus and generator specified by Section 3 of RFC3526.
(FCS_CKM.2, FCS_CKM.1).
42. The following table relates cryptographic algorithms to the protocols by the TOE. The TOE acts
only as the server for SSH in the supported protocols listed in Table 12:
Protocol Key Exchange Authentication Encryption
Algorithms
Data Integrity
Algorithms
SSHv2
ecdh-sha2-nistp256
ecdh-sha2-nistp384
ecdh-sha2-nistp521
Diffie-Hellman group 14
(modp 2048)
ssh-rsa
rsa-sha2-256,
rsa-sha2-512,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384
ecdsa-sah2-nistp521
AES CTR 128
AES CTR 256
AES CBC 128
AES CBC 256
HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA-256
HMAC-SHA-512
Table 12 Supported Protocols
43. Regardless of the module, the HMAC algorithms in Table 12 use the values specified in Table 13:
HMAC-SHA-1 HMAC-SHA-256 HMAC-SHA-512
Key Length 160 bits 256 bits 512 bits
Hash function SHA-1 SHA-256 SHA-512
Block Size 512 bits 512 bits 1024 bits
Output MAC 160 bits 256 bits 512 bits
Table 13 HMAC Values
44. Junos OS handles zeroization for all CSP, plaintext secret and private cryptographic keys
according to Table 14 below. (FCS_CKM.4).
2
The knob “set system fips level 1” will enforce strict compliance to FIPS and enable restrictions on algorithms
and keys sizes as required by FIPS requirements. FIPS-mode may be applied, but is not mandated to comply
with operation of the TOE in accordance with [ECG].
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CSP Description Method
of
storage
Storage
location
Zeroization Method
SSH
Private
Host Key
The first time SSH is
configured, the key is
generated. Used to identify the
host.
Plaintext File format
on SDD)
When the appliance is
recommissioned, the config
files (including CSP files such as
SSH keys) are removed using
the “request system zeroize”
option.
Loaded into memory to
complete session
establishment
Plaintext Memory Memory free() operation is
performed by Junos upon
session termination
SSH
Session
Key
Session keys used with SSH,
AES 128, 256, hmac-sha-1,
hmac-sha2-256 or hmac-sha2-
512 key (160, 256 or 512), DH
Private Key (2048 or elliptic
curve 256/384/521-bits)
Plaintext Memory Memory free() operation is
performed by Junos upon
session termination
User
Password
Plaintext value as entered by
user
Plaintext
as entered
Processed
in Memory
Memory free() operation is
performed by Junos upon
completion of authentication
Hashed
when
stored
Stored on
disk
When the appliance is
recommissioned, the config
files (including the obfuscated
password) are removed using
the “request system zeroize”
option.
RNG State Internal state and seed key of
RNG
Plaintext Memory Handled by kernel, overwritten
with zero’s at reboot.
Table 14 CSP Storage and Zeroization
45. Junos OS does not provide a CLI interface to permit the viewing of keys. Cryptographic keys are
protected through the enforcement of kernel-level file access rights, limiting access to the
contents of cryptographic key containers to processes with cryptographic rights or shell users
with root permission3
. (FPT_SKP_EXT.1)
7.1.2 Random Bit Generation
46. Junos OS performs random bit generation in accordance with NIST Special Publication 800-90
using HMAC_DRBG, SHA-256. The RBG is seeded from a single hardware source and three
software sources4
:
• RANDOM_NET_ETHER: This software source of entropy is associated with network activity.
Timings (CPU counter values at the time of the event) together with internal representation
of network packets are used to harvest entropy from this source and is further fed into the
HMAC DRBG
• RANDOM_FS_ATIME: This software source of entropy is associated with the time slices
during access of the temporary file storage such as a tmpfs in the system. Continuous
3
Security Administrators do not have root permission in shell.
4
The calculated min-entropy was between 5.84 and 5.79 bits per byte for hardware sources and between 1.17
and 4.43 for software sources after startup.
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process of creation, access and destruction of files in the temporary space in a running
system provides randomness.
• RANDOM_ATTACH: This software source of entropy is associated with the elapsed cycle
count for each device-driver as it attaches to the associated devices in the system and
provide entropy during boot-up only.
• RANDOM_PURE: This hardware source of entropy is provided by Broadcom chips working in
conjunction with the ARM processors, feeding one bit at a time into a 512-bit capture FIFO.
The value from the random number generator is post-processed using FIPS186-2 by the ARM
Cortex-A9.
7.1.3 SSH
47. Junos OS supports and enforces Trusted Channels that protect the communications between the
TOE and a remote audit server from unauthorized disclosure or modification. It also supports
Trusted Paths between itself and remote administrators so that the contents of administrative
sessions are protected against unauthorized disclosure or modification. (FTP_ITC.1,
FTP_TRP.1/Admin)
48. Junos OS provides an SSH server to support Trusted Channels using SSHv2 protocol which
ensures the confidentiality and integrity of communication with the remote audit server. Export
of audit information to a secure, remote server is achieved by setting up an event trace monitor
that sends event log messages by using NETCONF over SSH to the remote system event logging
server. The remote audit server initiates the connection. The SSHv2 protocol ensures that the
data transmitted over a SSH session cannot be disclosed or altered by using the encryption and
integrity mechanisms of the protocol with the FIPS cryptographic module. (FTP_ITC.1,
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1)
49. The Junos OS SSH Server also supports Trusted Paths using SSHv2 protocol which ensures the
confidentiality and integrity of user sessions. The encrypted communication path between Junos
OS SSH Server and a remote administrator is provided by the use of an SSH session. Remote
administrators of Junos OS initiate communication to the Junos CLI through the SSH tunnel
created by the SSH session. Assured identification of Junos OS is guaranteed by using public key
based authentication for SSH. The SSHv2 protocol ensures that the data transmitted over a SSH
session cannot be disclosed or altered by using the encryption and integrity mechanisms of the
protocol with the FIPS cryptographic module. (FTP_TRP.1/Admin, FCS_SSHS_EXT.1)
50. The Junos OS SSH server is implemented in accordance with RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, 4344,
5656 and 6668. Junos OS provides assured identification of the Junos OS appliance though
public key authentication and supports password-based authentication by administrative users
(Security Administrator) for SSH connections. The following table identifies conformance to the
SSH related RFCs:
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RFC Summary TOE implementation of Security
RFC 4251 The Secure Shell
(SSH) Protocol
Architecture
Host Keys: The TOE uses an ECDSA Host Key for SSH v2, with a
key size of 256 bits or greater, which is generated on initial
setup of the TOE. It can be de-configured via the CLI and the key
will be deleted and thus unavailable during connection
establishment. This key is randomly generated to be unique to
each TOE instance. The TOE presents the client with its public
key and the client matches this key against its known_hosts list
of keys. When a client connects to the TOE, the client will be
able to determine if the same host key was used in previous
connections, or if the key is different (per the SSHv2 protocol).
Junos OS also supports RSA-based key establishment schemes
with a key size of 2048 bits.
Policy Issues: The TOE implements all mandatory algorithms and
methods. The TOE can be configured to accept public-key based
authentication and/or password-based authentication. The TOE
does not require multiple authentication mechanisms for users.
The TOE allows port forwarding and sessions to clients. The TOE
has no X11 libraries or applications and X11 forwarding is
prohibited.
Confidentiality: The TOE does not accept the “none” cipher.
Supports AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256, AES-CTR-128, AES-CTR-256
encryption algorithms for protection of data over SSH and uses
keys generated in accordance with “ssh-rsa”, “rsa-sha2-256”,
“rsa-sha2-512”, “ecdsa-sha2-nistp256”, “ecdsa-sha2-nistp384”
or “ecdsa-sha2-nistp521” to perform public-key based device
authentication. For ciphers whose blocksize >= 16, the TOE
rekeys every (2^32-1) bytes. The client may explicitly request a
rekeying event as a valid SSHv2message at any time and the TOE
will honor this request. Re-keying of SSH session keys can be
configured using the sshd_config knob. The data-limit must be
between 51200 and 4294967295 (2^32-1) bytes and the time-
limit must be between 1 and 1440 minutes. In the evaluated
deployment the time-limit must be set within 1 and 60 minutes.
Denial of Service: When the SSH connection is brought down,
the TOE does not attempt to re-establish it.
Ordering of Key Exchange Methods: Key exchange is performed
only using one of the supported key exchange algorithms, which
are ordered as follows: ecdh-sha2-nistp256, ecdh-sha2-nistp384,
ecdh-sha2-nistp521 (all specified in RFC 5656), diffie-hellman-
group14-sha1 (specified in RFC 4253).
Debug Messages: The TOE sshd server does not support debug
messages via the CLI.
End Point Security: The TOE permits port forwarding.
Proxy Forwarding: The TOE permits proxy forwarding.
X11 Forwarding: The TOE does not support X11 forwarding.
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RFC Summary TOE implementation of Security
RFC 4252 The Secure Shell
(SSH) Authentication
Protocol
Authentication Protocol: The TOE does not accept the “none”
authentication method. The TOE implements a timeout period
of 30seconds for authentication of the SSHv2 protocol and
provides a limit of three failed authentication attempts before
sending a disconnect to the client.
Authentication Requests: The TOE does not accept
authentication if the requested service does not exist. The TOE
does not allow authentication requests for a non-existent
username to succeed – it sends back a disconnect message as it
would for failed authentications and hence does not allow
enumeration of valid usernames. The TOE denies “none”
authentication method and replies with a list of permitted
authentication methods.
Public Key Authentication Method: The TOE supports public key
authentication for SSHv2 session authentication. Authentication
succeeds if the correct private key is used. The TOE does not
require multiple authentications (public key and password) for
users.
Password Authentication Method: The TOE supports password
authentication. Expired passwords are not supported and
cannot be used for authentication.
Host-Based Authentication: The TOE does not support the
configuration of host-based authentication methods.
RFC 4253 The Secure Shell
(SSH) Transport
Layer Protocol
Encryption: The TOE offers the following for encryption of SSH
sessions: aes128-cbc and aes256-cbc, aes128-ctr, aes256-ctr.
The TOE permits negotiation of encryption algorithms in each
direction. The TOE does not allow the “none” algorithm for
encryption.
Maximum Packet length: Packets greater than 256Kbytes in an
SSH transport connection are dropped and the connection is
terminated by Junos OS.
Data Integrity: The TOE permits negotiation of HMAC-SHA1 in
each direction for SSH transport.
Key Exchange: The TOE supports diffie-hellman-group14-sha1.
Key Re-Exchange: The TOE performs a re-exchange when
SSH_MSG_KEXINIT is received.
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RFC Summary TOE implementation of Security
RFC 4254 Secure Shell (SSH)
Connection Protocol
Multiple channels: The TOE assigns each channel a number (as
detailed in RFC 4251, see above).
Data transfers: The TOE supports a maximum window size of
256K bytes for data transfer.
Interactive sessions: The TOE only supports interactive sessions
that do NOT involve X11 forwarding.
Forwarded X11 connections: This is not supported in the TOE.
Environment variable passing: The TOE only sets variables once
the server process has dropped privileges.
Starting shells/commands: The TOE supports starting one of
shell, application program or command (only one request per
channel). These will be run in the context of a channel, and will
not halt the execution of the protocol stack.
Window dimension change notices: The TOE will accept
notifications of changes to the terminal size (dimensions) from
the client.
Port forwarding: This is fully supported by the TOE.
RFC4344 Secure Shell (SSH)
Transport Layer
Encryption Modes
Encryption Modes: The TOE implements the recommended
modes aes128-ctr and aes256-ctr (it does not implement the
recommended modes aes192-ctr or 3des-ctr, nor does it
implement any of the optional modes).
RFC5656 SSH ECC Algorithm
Integration
ECDH Key Exchange: The support key exchange methods
specified in this RFC are ecdh-sha2-nistp256, ecdh-sha2-
nistp384, or ecdh-sha2-nistp521. The client matches the key
against its known_hosts list of keys.
Hashing: Junos OS supports cryptographic hashing via the SHA-
256 and SHA-512 algorithms, provided it has a message digest
size of either 256 or 512 bits.
Required Curves: All required curves are implemented: ecdh-
sha2-nistp256, ecdh-sha2-nistp384, or ecdh-sha2-nistp521.
None of the Recommended Curves are supported as they are
not included in [NDcPP2.1].
RFC 6668 sha2-Transport Layer
Protocol
Data Integrity Algorithms: Both the recommended and optional
algorithms hmac-sha1, hmac-sha2-256 and hmac-sha2-512
(respectively) are implemented for SSH transport.
Table 15 SSH RFC conformance
7.2 Administrator Authentication
51. Junos OS enforces binding between human users and subjects. The Security Administrator5
is
responsible for provisioning user accounts, and only the Security Administrator can do so.
(FMT_SMR.2, FMT_MTD.1/CoreData)
52. Junos users are configured under “system login user” and are exported to the password
database ‘/var/etc/master.passwd’. A Junos user is therefore an entry in the password
database. Each entry in the password database has fields corresponding to the attributes of
“system login user”, including username, (obfuscated) password and login class.
53. The internal architecture supporting Authentication includes an active process, associated linked
libraries and supporting configuration data. The Authentication process and library are
5
The Security Administrator role is detailed in Section 7.7 below.
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• login()
• PAM Library module
54. Following TOE initialization, the login() process is listening for a connection at the local
console. This ‘login’ process can be accessed through either direct connection to the local
console or following successful establishment of a remote management connection over SSH,
when a login prompt is displayed.
55. This login process identifies and authenticates the user using PAM operations. The login process
does two things; it first establishes that the requesting user is whom they claim to be and second
provides them with an interactive Junos Command interactive command line interface (CLI).
56. The SSH daemon supports public key authentication by looking up a public key in an authorized
keys file located in the directory ‘.ssh’ in the user’s home directory (i.e. ‘~/.ssh/’) and this
authentication method will be attempted before any other if the client has a key available
(FIA_UIA_EXT.1). The SSH daemon will ignore the authorized keys file if it or the directory ‘.ssh’
or the user’s home directory are not owned by the user or are writeable by anyone else.
57. For password authentication, login() interacts with a user to request a username and
password to establish and verify the user’s identity. The username entered by the administrator
at the username prompt is reflected to the screen, but no feedback to screen is provided while
the entry made by the administrator at the password prompt until the Enter key is pressed
(FIA_UAU.7). login() uses PAM Library calls for the actual verification of this data. The
password is hashed and compared to the stored value, and success/failure is indicated to
login(), (FIA_UIA_EXT.1). PAM is used in the TOE support authentication management,
account management, session management and password management. Login primarily uses
the session management and password management functionality offered by PAM.
58. The retry-options can be configured to specify the action to be taken if the administrator fails to
enter valid username/password credentials for password authentication when attempting to
authenticate via remote access (FMT_MTD.1/CoreData). The retry-options are applied
following the first failed login attempt for a given username (FIA_AFL.1). The length of delay (5-
10 seconds) after each failed attempt is specified by the backoff-factor, and the increase of the
delay for each subsequent failed attempt is specified by the backoff-threshold (1-3). The tries-
before-disconnect sets the maximum number of times (2-10) the administrator is allowed to
enter a password to attempt to log in to the device through SSH before the connection is
disconnected. The lockout-period sets the amount of time in minutes before the administrator
can attempt to log in to the device after being locked out due to the number of failed login
attempts (1-43,200 minutes). Even when an account is locked for remote access to the TOE, an
administrator is always able to login locally through the serial console and the administrator can
attempt authentication via remote access after the maximum timeout period of 24 hours.
59. The TOE requires users to provide unique identification and authentication data
(passwords/public key) before any access to the system is granted. Prior to authentication, the
only Junos OS managed responses provided to the administrator are (FIA_UAU_EXT.2):
• Negotiation of SSH session
• Display of the access banner
• ICMP echo responses.
60. Authentication data for fixed password authentication is a case-sensitive, alphanumeric value.
The password has a minimum length of 10 characters and maximum length of 20 characters, and
must contain characters from at least three different character sets (upper, lower, numeric,
punctuation), and can be up to 20 ASCII characters in length (control characters are not
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recommended). Any standard ASCII, extended ASCII and Unicode characters can be selected
when choosing a password. (FIA_PMG_EXT.1)
61. Locally stored authentication credentials are protected (FPT_APW_EXT.1):
• The password is hashed when stored using sha256 or sha512.
• Authentication data for public key-based authentication methods are stored in a directory
owned by the user (and typically with the same name as the user). This directory contains
the files ‘.ssh/authorized_keys’ and ‘.ssh/authorized_keys2’ which are used for SSH public
key authentication.
• There is no CLI command provided to retrieve the content of the password file or display a
specific password value.
62. Junos enables Security Administrators to configure an access banner for local and remote SSH
connections provided with the authentication prompt. The banner can provide warnings against
unauthorized access to the secure switch as well as any other information that the Security
Administrator wishes to communicate. (FTA_TAB.1)
63. User sessions (local and remote) can be terminated by users (FTA_SSL.4). The administrative
user can logout of existing CLI and remote SSH sessions by typing logout to exit the session and
the Junos OS makes the current contents unreadable after the admin initiates the termination.
No user activity can take place until the user re-identifies and authenticates.
64. The Security Administrator can set the TOE so that a user session is terminated after a period of
inactivity. (FTA_SSL_EXT.1, FTA_SSL.3) For each user session Junos OS maintains a count of
clock cycles (provided by the system clock) since last activity. The count is reset each time there
is activity related to the user session. When the counter reaches the number of clock cycles
equating to the configured period of inactivity the user session is locked out.
65. Junos OS overwrites the display device and makes the current contents unreadable after the
local interactive session is terminated due to inactivity, thus disabling any further interaction
with the TOE. This mechanism is the inactivity timer for administrative sessions. The Security
Administrator can configure this inactivity timer on administrative sessions after which the
session will be logged out.
7.3 Correct Operation
66. Junos OS runs the following set of self-tests during power on to check the correct operation of
the Junos OS firmware (FPT_TST_EXT.1):
• Power on test – determines the boot-device responds, and performs a memory size check to
confirm the amount of available memory.
• File integrity test –verifies integrity of all mounted signed packages, to assert that system
files have not been tampered with. To test the integrity of the firmware, the fingerprints of
the executables and other immutable files are regenerated and validated against the
fingerprints (SHA-1, SHA256, SHA-512) contained in the manifest file.
• Crypto integrity test – checks integrity of major CSPs, such as SSH hostkeys.
• Authentication error – verifies that veriexec is enabled and operates as expected using
/opt/sbin/kats/cannot-exec.real.
• Kernel, libmd, OpenSSL– verifies correct output from known answer tests for appropriate
algorithms.
67. Juniper Networks devices run only binaries supplied by Juniper Networks. Within the package,
each Junos OS firmware image includes fingerprints of the executables and other immutable
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files. Junos firmware will not execute any binary without a validating registered fingerprint. This
feature protects the system against unauthorized firmware and activity that might compromise
the integrity of the device. These self-tests ensure that only authorized executables are allowed
to run thus ensuring the correct operation of the TOE.
68. In the event of a transiently corrupt state or failure condition, the system will panic; the event
will be logged and the system restarted, having ceased to process network traffic. When the
system restarts, the system boot process does not succeed without passing all applicable self-
tests. This automatic recovery and self-test behavior, is discussed in Chapter 11 of the [ECG].
69. When any self-test fails, the device halts in an error state. No command line input or traffic to
any interface is processed. The device must be power cycled to attempt to return to operation.
This self-test behavior is discussed in [ECG]. (FPT_TST_EXT.1,)
7.4 Trusted Update
70. Security Administrators are able to query the current version of the TOE firmware using the CLI
command “show version” (FPT_TUD_EXT.1) and, if a new version of the TOE firmware is
available, initiate an update of the TOE firmware. Junos OS does not provide partial updates for
the TOE, customers requiring updates must migrate to a subsequent release. Updates are
downloaded and applied manually (there is no automatic updating of the Junos OS).
(FPT_TUD_EXT.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate,)
71. The installable firmware package containing the Junos OS can be manually verified against a
published hash value when the Security Administrator attempts to install the package. When
installing the firmware packages, the Security Administrator must verify the published hash on
the update package before uploading it to the TOE. If the hash is found not to match the
published value, the update should be considered invalid.
7.5 Protection of Cryptographic Keys
72. Access to flash memory requires administrator credentials. Cryptographic keys are protected
through the enforcement of kernel-level file access rights, limiting access to the contents of
cryptographic key containers to processes with cryptographic rights. The TOE does not provide a
CLI interface to permit the viewing of keys.
73. (FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys)
7.6 Audit
74. Junos OS creates and stores audit records for the following events (the detail of content
recorded for each audit event is detailed in 10 (FAU_GEN.1). Auditing is implemented using
syslog.
• Start-up and shut-down of the audit functions
• Administrative login and logout
• Configuration is committed
• Configuration is changed (includes all management activities of TSF data)
• Generating/import of, changing, or deleting of cryptographic keys (see below for more
detail)
• Resetting passwords
• Starting and stopping services
• All use of the identification and authentication mechanisms
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• Unsuccessful login attempts limit is met or exceeded
• Any attempt to initiate a manual update
• Result of the update attempt (success or failure)
• The termination of a local/remote/interactive session by the session locking mechanism
• Initiation/termination/failure of the SSH trusted channel to syslog server
• Initiation/termination/failure of the SSH trusted path with Admin
75. In addition the following management activities of TSF data are recorded:
• configure the access banner;
• configure the session inactivity time before session termination;
• configure the authentication failure parameters for FIA_AFL.1;
• Ability to configure audit behaviour;
• configure the cryptographic functionality;
• configure thresholds for SSH rekeying;
• set the time which is used for time-stamps.
76. The detail of what events are to be recorded by syslog are determined by the logging level
specified the “level” argument of the “set system syslog” CLI command. To ensure
compliance with the requirements the audit knobs detailed in [ECG] must be configured.
77. As a minimum, Junos OS records the following with each log entry:
• date and time of the event and/or reaction
• type of event and/or reaction
• subject identity (where applicable)
• the outcome (success or failure) of the event (where applicable).
78. In order to identify the key being operated on, the following details are recorded for all
administrative actions relating to cryptographic keys (generating, importing, changing and
deleting keys):
• SSH key configured for SSH public key authentication –the hash of the public key that is
to be used for authentication is recorded in syslog
• SSH keys configured for outbound trusted channel to external syslog server –the hash
of the public key that is to be used for authentication is recorded in syslog
• adding, replacing or removing trust anchors in the TOE's trust store.
79. All events recorded by syslog are timestamped. The clock function of Junos OS provides a source
of date and time information for the appliance, used in audit timestamps, which is maintained
using the hardware Time Stamp Counter as the clock source. (FAU_GEN.2, FPT_STM_EXT.1)
80. Syslog can be configured to store the audit logs locally (FAU_STG_EXT.1), and optionally to send
them to one or more syslog log servers in real time via Netconf over SSH (FAU_STG.1,
FMT_MOF.1/Functions). Local audit log are stored in /var/log/ in the underlying filesystem. Only
a Security Administrator can read log files, or delete log and archive files through the CLI
interface or through direct access to the filesystem having first authenticated as a Security
Administrator. Modification of the audit logs is limited to those administrators with permission
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to access the filesystem directly, such as the Security Administrator. The syslogs are
automatically deleted locally according to configurable limits on storage volume. The default
maximum size is 1Gb. The default maximum size can be modified by the user, using the “size”
argument for the “set system syslog” CLI command.
81. The Junos OS defines an active log file and a number of “archive” files (10 by default, but
configurable from 1 to 1000). When the active log file reaches its maximum size, the logging
utility closes the file, compresses it, and names the compressed archive file ‘logfile.0.gz’. The
logging utility then opens and writes to a new active log file. When the new active log file
reaches the configured maximum size, ‘logfile.0.gz’ is renamed ‘logfile.1.gz’, and the active log
file is closed, compressed, and renamed ‘logfile.0.gz’. When the maximum number of archive
files is reached and when the size of the active file reaches the configured maximum size, the
contents of the oldest archived file are deleted so the current active file can be archived.
82. A 1Gb syslog file takes approximately 0.25Gb of storage when archived. Syslog files can acquire
complete storage allocated to /var filesystem, which is platform specific. However, when the
filesystem reaches 92% storage capacity an event is raised to the administrator but the eventd
process (being a privileged process) still can continue using the reserved storage blocks. This
allows the syslog to continue storing events while the administrator frees the storage. If the
administrator does not free the storage in time and the /var filesystem storage becomes
exhausted a final entry is recorded in the log reporting “No space left on device” and logging is
terminated. The appliance continues to operate in the event of exhaustion of audit log storage
space.
7.7 Management
83. Accounts assigned to the Security Administrator role are used to manage Junos OS in accordance
with [NDcPP2.1]. User accounts in the TOE have the following attributes: user identity (user
name), authentication data (password) and role (privilege). The Security Administrator is
associated with the defined login class “security-admin”, which has the necessary permission set
to permit the administrator to perform all tasks necessary to manage Junos OS in accordance
with the requirements of [NDcPP2.1].(FMT_SMR.2)
84. The TOE provides user access either through the system console or remotely over the Trusted
Path using the SSHv2 protocol. Users are required to provide unique identification and
authentication data before any access to the system is granted, as detailed in Section 7.2 above.
(FMT_SMR.2, FMT_SMF.1)
85. The Security Administrator has the capability to:
• Administer the TOE locally via the serial ports on the physical device or remotely over an SSH
connection.
• Initiate a manual update of TOE firmware (FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate):
o Query currently executing version of TOE firmware (FPT_TUD_EXT.1)
o Verify update using published hash (FPT_TUD_EXT.1)
• Manage Functions:
o Transmission of audit data to an external IT entity, including Start/stop and modify
the behaviour of the trusted communication channel to external syslog server
(netconf over SSH) and the trusted path for remote Administrative sessions (SSH)
(FMT_MOF.1/Functions, FMT_MOF.1/Services, FMT_SMF.1)
o Handling of audit data, including setting limits of log file size (FMT_MOF.1/Functions)
• Manage TSF data (FMT_MTD.1/CoreData)
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o Create, modify, delete administrator accounts, including configuration of
authentication failure parameters
o Reset administrator passwords
o Re-enable an Administrator account (FIA_AFL.1);
• Manage crypto keys (FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys):
o SSH key generation (ecdsa, ssh-rsa)
• Perform management functions (FMT_SMF.1):
o Configure the access banner (FTA_TAB.1)
o Configure the session inactivity time before session termination or locking, including
termination of session when serial console cable is disconnected (FTA_SSL_EXT.1,
FTA_SSL.3)
o Manage cryptographic functionality (FCS_SSHS_EXT.1), including:
▪ ssh ciphers
▪ hostkey algorithm
▪ key exchange algorithm
▪ hashed message authentication code
▪ thresholds for SSH rekeying
o Set the system time (FPT_STM_EXT.1)
86. Detailed topics on the secure management of Junos OS are discussed in [ECG].
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8 Rationales
8.1 SFR dependency analysis
The dependencies between SFRs implemented by the TOE are satisfied as demonstrated in
[NDcPP2.1] Appendix E.1.
Security Functional
Requirement
Dependency Rationale
FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 FPT_STM_EXT.1 included (which is
hierarchical to FPT_STM.1)
FAU_GEN.2 FAU_GEN.1
FIA_UID.1
FAU_GEN.1 Included
Satisfied by FIA_UIA_EXT.1, which
specifies the relevant Administrator
identification timing
FAU_STG_EXT.1 FAU_GEN.1
FTP_ITC.1
FAU_GEN.1 included
FTP_ITC.1 included
FAU_STG.1 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1 Included
FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.2 included
FCS_CKM.4 included
FCS_CKM.2 FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1 included (also FTP_ITC.1 as
a secure channel that could be used for
import)
FCS_CKM.4 included
FCS_CKM.4 FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.1 included (also FTP_ITC.1 as
a secure channel that could be used for
import)
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1 included (also FTP_ITC.1 as
a secure channel that could be used for
import)
FCS_CKM.4 included
FCS_COP.1/SigGen FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1 included (also FTP_ITC.1 as
a secure channel that could be used for
import)
FCS_CKM.4 included
FCS_COP.1/Hash FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1 included (also FTP_ITC.1 as
a secure channel that could be used for
import)
FCS_CKM.4 included
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1 included (also FTP_ITC.1 as
a secure channel that could be used for
import)
FCS_CKM.4 included
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 None n/a
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.2
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption
FCS_COP.1/SigGen
FCS_COP.1/Hash
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash
FCS_RBG_EXT.1
FCS_CKM.1 included
FCS_CKM.2 included
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption included
FCS_COP.1/SigGen included
FCS_COP.1/Hash included
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash included
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 included
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Security Functional
Requirement
Dependency Rationale
FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1 Satisfied by FIA_UIA_EXT.1, which
specifies the relevant Administrator
authentication
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 None n/a
FIA_UIA_EXT.1 FTA_TAB.1 FTA_TAB.1 included
FIA_UAU_EXT.2 None n/a
FIA_UAU.7 FIA_UAU.1 Satisfied by FIA_UIA_EXT.1, which
specifies the relevant Administrator
authentication
FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.2 included
FMT_SMF.1 included
FMT_MOF.1/Services FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.2 included
FMT_SMF.1 included
FMT_MOF.1/Functions FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.2 included
FMT_SMF.1 included
FMT_MTD.1/CoreData FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.2 included
FMT_SMF.1 included
FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.2 included
FMT_SMF.1 included
FMT_SMF.1 None n/a
FMT_SMR.2 FIA_UID.1 Satisfied by FIA_UIA_EXT.1, which
specifies the relevant Administrator
authentication
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 None n/a
FPT_APW_EXT.1 None n/a
FPT_TST_EXT.1 None n/a
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 FCS_COP.1/SigGen or
FCS_COP.1/Hash
FCS_COP.1/Hash
FPT_STM_EXT.1 None n/a
FTA_SSL_EXT.1 FIA_UID.1 Satisfied by FIA_UIA_EXT.1, which
specifies the relevant Administrator
authentication
FTA_SSL.3 None n/a
FTA_SSL.4 None n/a
FTA_TAB.1 None n/a
FTP_ITC.1 None n/a
FTP_TRP.1/Admin None n/a
Table 16 SFR Dependency Analysis
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9 Glossary
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
ANSI American National Standards Institute
API Application Program Interface
cPP collaborative Protection Profile
CCM Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code
CFP C Form-factor Pluggable
CSP Critical security parameter
DH Diffie Hellman
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EP Extended Package, defined in [CC1]
ESP Encapsulating Security Payload
FFC Finite Field Cryptography
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
HMAC Keyed-Hash Authentication Code
I&A Identification and Authentication
ID Identification
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force
IP Internet Protocol
IPv6 Internet Protocol Version 6
ISO International Organization for Standardization
IT Information Technology
Junos Juniper Operating System
MIC Modular Interface Cards
MPC Modular Port Concentrator
MS-MPC MultiServices Modular Port Concentrator
NAT Network Address Translation
NDcPP Network Device collaborative Protection Profile
NTP Network Time Protocol
OSI Open Systems Interconnect
OSP Organizational Security Policy
PAM Pluggable Authentication Module
PFE Packet Forwarding Engine
PIC/PIM Physical Interface Card/Module
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
POE Power over Ethernet
PP Protection Profile
PRNG Pseudo Random Number Generator
RE Routing Engine
RFC Request for Comment
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Adelman
SA Security Association
SFP Small Form-factor Pluggable
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SSH Secure Shell
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SSL Secure Sockets Layer
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSFI TSF interfaces
UDP User Datagram Protocol