THD88--EAL4A-ST-V1.1
THD88/M2064 Secure Microcontroller
with Crypto Library
Security Target Lite
Version 1.1
Beijing Tongfang Microelectronics Co.,Ltd.
2015 - 11
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Revision History
Modification By
Create Xingchen Li
Ying Pan
Modify Editorial changes Xingchen Li
Ying Pan
Update for the formal evaluation Xingchen Li
Ying Pan
Release for final version Xingchen Li
Ying Pan
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Contents
1. ST Introduction .................................................................................................................. 5
1.1. ST and TOE reference.................................................................................................. 5
1.2. TOE overview .............................................................................................................. 5
1.3. TOE description ........................................................................................................... 6
1.3.1. Physical architecture ............................................................................................. 6
1.3.2 Logical scope......................................................................................................... 7
1.3.3 TOE components................................................................................................... 7
1.4 Life cycle and delivery................................................................................................. 8
2. Conformance claim ............................................................................................................ 9
2.1. CC Conformance.......................................................................................................... 9
2.2. PP Claim....................................................................................................................... 9
2.3. Package claim............................................................................................................... 9
2.4. Conformance claim rationale ....................................................................................... 9
3. Security problem definition.............................................................................................. 10
3.1. Description of Assets ................................................................................................. 10
3.2. Threats........................................................................................................................ 10
3.3. Organisational security policies ................................................................................. 10
3.4. Assumptions............................................................................................................... 10
4. Security objectives ........................................................................................................... 12
4.1. Security objectives for the TOE................................................................................. 12
4.2. Security objectives for the security IC embedded software....................................... 12
4.3. Security objectives for the operational environment.................................................. 13
4.4. Security objectives rationale ...................................................................................... 13
5. Extended Components Definitions................................................................................... 15
6. Security requirements....................................................................................................... 16
6.1. Definitions.................................................................................................................. 16
6.2. Security Functional Requirements (SFR) .................................................................. 16
6.2.1. SFRs derived from the Security IC Platform Protection Profile......................... 16
6.2.2. SFRs regarding cryptographic functionality ....................................................... 18
6.3. Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) .................................................................. 19
6.4. Security requirements rationale.................................................................................. 20
6.4.1. Security Functional Requirements (SFR) ........................................................... 20
6.4.2. Dependencies of the SFRs................................................................................... 22
6.4.3. Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) ........................................................... 23
7. TOE summary specification............................................................................................. 24
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7.1. Malfunction ................................................................................................................ 24
7.2. Leakage ...................................................................................................................... 24
7.3. Physical manipulation and probing............................................................................ 24
7.4. Abuse of functionality and Identification................................................................... 25
7.5. Random numbers........................................................................................................ 25
7.6. Cryptographic functionality ....................................................................................... 25
8. References ........................................................................................................................ 25
1. ST Introduction
This Security Target (ST) is built upon the Security IC Platform Protection Profile with
Augmentation Packages [1], registered and Certified by BundesamtfürSicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI) under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014.
This chapter presents the ST reference, the reference for the Target of Evaluation (TOE), a
TOE overview description and a description of the logical and physical scope of the TOE.
1.1. ST and TOE reference
Table 1 Description of ST reference and TOE reference
ST reference: THD88/M2064Secure Microcontroller with Crypto Library Security
Target, version 1.1, November 2015
TOE reference: THD88/M2064Secure Microcontroller with Crypto Library
1.2. TOE overview
The TOE is a secure microcontroller with crypto library suitable for instance to support ID
cards, Banking cards, ePassport applications, etc.
The TOE consists of hardware and IC dedicated software. The hardware is based on a 32-bit
CPU with ROM(Non-Volatile Read-Only Memory), EEPROM (Non-volatile Programmable
Memory) and RAM(Volatile Memory). The hardware of the TOE also incorporates
communication peripherals and cryptographic coprocessors for execution and acceleration of
symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic algorithms. The IC dedicated software consists of
boot code and a library of cryptographic services.
The TOEsupports the following communication interfaces:
 ISO/IEC 7816 contact interface
 ISO/IEC 14443 contactless interface
The TOE is delivered to a composite product manufacturer. The security IC embedded
software is developed by the composite product manufacturer. The security IC embedded
software is sent to TMC(Beijing Tongfang Microelectronics Co., Ltd.)to be implemented in
ROM and delivered back to the composite product manufacturer together with the TOE. The
security IC embedded software is not part of the TOE.
The TOE has been designed to provide a platform for Security IC Embedded Software which
ensures that the critical user data of the Composite TOE are stored and processed in a secure
way. To this end the TOE has the following security features:
 Hardwarecoprocessor for DES/TDES
 True Random Number Generator
 Hardware for RSA support
 Protectionagainst power analysis
 Protectionagainstphysical attacks
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 Protectionagainstperturbation attacks
 Software library with cryptographic services for DES/TDES and RSA
1.3. TOE description
This section presents the physical and logical scope of the TOE.
1.3.1. Physical architecture
The main functional blocks of the TOE hardware is depicted below.
ROM Sensors
ARM
SC000
CPU
AHBMMU
RAM
Interfaces/IO
Clock Circuitry
Reset
Circuitry
EEPROM
TRNG
DES/
TDES
System
control
circuitry Security
Circuitry
Power
Management
Unit
Crytp Co-
Processor
Test
circuitry
Timers
Chinese
domestic
crypto Co-
processor
CRC
DRNG
Figure 1 The block diagram of the TOE hardware
The hardware of the TOE has the following components:
 ARMSC000 CPU
 80kB EEPROM
 320kB ROM
 14.25kB RAM
 AHBMMU
 Interfaces I/O
o ISO/IEC 14443 contactless interface
o ISO/IEC 7816 contact interface
 True Random Number Generator
 Deterministic Random Number Generator
 DES/TDES Co-Processor
 Hardware Crypto Co-Processor for RSA support
 CRC Co-Processor
 Chinese domestic crypto Co-Processor
 System control circuitry
 Test circuitry
 Timers
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 Security Circuitry
 Sensors
 Power Management Circuitry
 Clock circuitry
 Resetcircuitry
The AHBMMU is a bus component which also provides user controllablebus masking.
The ARM CPU in the TOE contains a Memory Management Unit (MMU) to facilitate applet
isolation in an operating system. However the security of this MMU is not claimed in the
TOE.
The TOE contains crypto support for Chinese domestic algorithms. The security of these
algorithms is not claimed in the TOE.
The TOE contains Deterministic Random Number Generator. However the security
functionality of this Deterministic Random Number Generator is not claimed in the TOE.
1.3.2 Logical scope
The TOE provides the following cryptographic services to the Security IC embedded
software:
 DES/TDES
 RSA
The TOE provides high entropy random numbers to the Security IC embedded software from
a true physical random number generator.
The TOE crypto library also includes functionality for SHA1 and Chinese domestic crypto
algorithms. The security of these is not claimed by the TOE.
1.3.3 TOE components
The TOE consists of the following components that are delivered to the composite product
manufacturer:
Table 2 List of TOE components
Type Name Version Package
Hardware THD88 0.1 Module
Software Crypto Library 1.2 Software library in ROM
Boot code 1.0 Boot code in ROM
Document Operational
guidance[6]
0.8 document
Preparatory
guidance[7]
0.4 document
Security
guidelines[12]
0.7 document
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1.4 Life cycle and delivery
The end-consumer environment of the TOE is phase 7 of the Security IC product life-cycle as
defined in the PP [1]. In this phase the TOE is in usage by the end-consumer. Its method of
use now depends on the Security IC Embedded Software. Examples of use cases are ID cards
or Bank cards.
The scope of the assurance components referring to the TOE’s life cycle is limited to phases
2, 3 and 4. These phases are under the control of the TOE manufacturer. At the end of phase 4
the TOE components described in 1.3.3 are delivered to the Composite Manufacturer.
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2. Conformance claim
This chapter presents conformance claim and the conformance claim rationale.
2.1. CC Conformance
This Security Target and the TOE claim to be conformant to the Common Criteria version
3.1:
• Part 1 revision 4 [2]
• Part 2 revision 4 [3]
• Part 3 revision 4 [4]
For the evaluation, it will be used the methodology in Common Criteria Evaluation
Methodology version 3.1 CEM revision 4 [5].
This Security Target and the TOE claim to be CC Part 2 extended and CC Part 3 conformant.
2.2. PP Claim
This Security Target claims strictconformance to the Security IC Platform Protection Profile,
[1].
The TOE also provides additional functionality, which is not covered in [1].
2.3. Package claim
This Security Target claims conformance to the assurance package EAL4 augmented with
AVA_VAN.5, ATE_DPT.2 and ALC_DVS.2. This assurance level is in line with the Security
IC Platform Protection Profile [1].
2.4. Conformance claim rationale
This TOE is equivalent to the conformance claim stated in a Security IC Platform Protection
Profile [1].
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3. Security problem definition
This chapter presents the threats, organisational security policies and assumptions for the
TOE.
The Assets, Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies are completely taken
from the Security IC Platform Protection Profile [1].
3.1. Description of Assets
Since this Security Target claims conformance to the Security IC Platform Protection Profile
[1], the assets defined in section 3.1 of the Protection Profile are applied.
3.2. Threats
This Security Target claims conformance to the Security IC Platform Protection Profile [1].
The Threats that apply to this Security Target are defined in section 3.2 of the Protection
Profile. The following table lists the threats of the Protection Profile.
Table 3 Threats defined in the Protection Profile
Threat Title
T.Leak-Inherent Inherent Information Leakage
T.Phys-Probing Physical Probing
T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
T.Phys-
Manipulation
Physical Manipulation
T.Leak-Forced Forced Information Leakage
T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality
T.RND Deficiency of Random Numbers
3.3. Organisational security policies
This Security Target claims conformance to the Security IC Platform Protection Profile [1].
The Organisational Security Policies that apply to this Security Target are defined in section
3.3 of the Protection Profile, they are:
P.Process-TOE Protection during TOE Development and Production
The following Organisational Security Policy is also taken from the PP [1] to facilitate the
TOE crypto services:
P.Crypto-Service Cryptographic services of the TOE
3.4. Assumptions
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This Security Target claims conformance to the Security IC Platform Protection Profile [1].
The assumptions claimed in this Security Target defined in section 3.4 of the Protection
Profile.They are specified below.
Table 4 Assumptions defined in the Protection Profile
Assumption Title
A.Process-Sec-IC Protection during Packaging, Finishing and
Personalisation
A.Resp-Appl Treatment of User Data
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4. Security objectives
This chapter provides the statement of security objectives and the security objective rationale.
For this chapter the Security IC Platform Protection Profile [1] can be applied completely.
Only a short overview is given in the following.
4.1. Security objectives for the TOE
All objectives described in the section 4.1 of the Security IC Platform Protection Profile [1]
are claimed for the TOE, these are:
Table 5 Security objectives for the TOE defined in the Protection Profile
Security Objective Title
O.Phys-
Manipulation
Protection against Physical Manipulation
O.Phys-Probing Protection against Physical Probing
O.Malfunction Protection against Malfunctions
O.Leak-Inherent Protection against Inherent Information Leakage
O.Leak-Forced Protection against Forced Information Leakage
O.Abuse-Func Protection against Abuse of Functionality
O.Identification TOE Identification
O.RND Random Numbers
The following additional security objectives are taken from the PP [1]for the provision of
hardware based Cryptographic services:
Table 6Security objectives for the Cryptographic services
Security Objective Title
O.TDES Cryptographic service Triple-DES
In addition the TOE defines the following objectives:
O.RSA RSA functionality
The TOE shall provide secure cryptographic services implementing the RSA
cryptographic algorithm for encryption and decryption.
4.2. Security objectives for the security IC embedded software
The security IC Embedded Software defines the operational use of the TOE. This section
describes the security objective for the Security IC Embedded Software, which is taken from
section 4.2 of the Security IC Platform Protection Profile [1].
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Table 7 Security Objectives for the security IC embedded software environment defined in the Protection Profile
Security Objective Title
OE.Resp-Appl Treatment of User Data of the composite TOE
4.3. Security objectives for the operational environment
This section describes the security objective for the operational environment, which is taken
from section 4.3 of the Security IC Platform Protection Profile [1].
Table 8 Security Objectives for the operational environment defined in the Protection Profile
Security Objective Title
OE.Process-Sec-IC Protection during composite product
manufacturing
4.4. Security objectives rationale
Section 4.4 in the Protection Profile provides a rationale how the assumptions, threats and
organisational security policies are addressed by the objectives. The table below shows this
relationship.
Table 9 Addressing of assumptions, threats and organisational security policies to objectives
Assumption, Threat or
Organisational Security Policy
Security Objective
A.Resp-Appl OE.Resp-Appl
P.Process-TOE O.Identification
A.Process-Sec-IC OE.Process-Sec-IC
T.Leak-Inherent O.Leak-Inherent
T.Phys-Probing O.Phys-Probing
T.Malfunction O.Malfunction
T.Phys-Manipulation O.Phys-Manipulation
T.Leak-Forced O.Leak-Forced
T.Abuse-Func O.Abuse-Func
T.RND O.RND
For the justification of the above mapping please refer to the Protection Profile.
The table below shows how the additional organisational security policies are addressed by
objectives for the TOE.
Table 10 Addressing of assumptions, threats and organisational security policies to additional objectives
Assumption, Threat or
Organisational Security Policy
Security Objective
P.Crypto-Service O.TDES
O.RSA
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Note that O.TDES has been taken from the PP [1]. The others have been added.
The objective O.RSA implements specific crypto services as required by P.Crypto-Service.
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5. Extended Components Definitions
This Security Target uses the extended security functional requirements defined in chapter 5
of the Security IC Platform Protection Profile [1].
This Security Target does not define extended components in addition to the Protection
Profile.
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6. Security requirements
This chapter presents the statement of security requirements for the TOE and the security
requirements rationale. This chapter applies the Security IC Platform Protection Profile [1].
6.1. Definitions
In the next sections the following notation is used:
 The iteration operation is used when a component is claimed with varying operations,
it is denoted by adding “[XXX]” to the component name.
 Refinement, selection or assignment operations are used to add details or assign
specific values to components, they are indicated by italic text and explained in
footnotes.
6.2. Security Functional Requirements (SFR)
To support a better understanding of the combination Security IC Platform Protection Profile
vs. Security Target, the TOE Security Functional Requirements are presented in the following
several different sections.
6.2.1. SFRs derived from the Security IC Platform Protection Profile
The table below lists the Security Functional Requirements that are directly taken from the
Security IC Platform Protection Profile.
Table 11 List of Security Functional Requirements on the security IC platform Protection Profile
Security functional
requirement
Title
FRU_FLT.2 “Limited fault tolerance”
FPT_FLS.1 “Failure with preservation of secure state”
FMT_LIM.1 “Limited capabilities”
FMT_LIM.2 “Limited availability”
FAU_SAS.1 “Audit storage”
FPT_PHP.3 “Resistance to physical attack”
FDP_ITT.1 “Basic internal transfer protection”
FDP_IFC.1 “Subset information flow control”
FPT_ITT.1 “Basic internal TSF data transfer protection”
FDP_SDC.1 “Stored data confidentiality”
FDP_SDI.2 “Stored data integrity monitoring and action”
FCS_RNG.1 “Quality metric for random numbers”
Except for FAU_SAS.1, FDP_SDC.1, FDP_SDI.2 and FCS_RNG.1 all assignment and
selection operations are defined in the Protection Profile.
 In FAU_SAS.1 the left open assignment is the type of persistent memory;
 In FDP_SDC.1 the left open assignment is the memory area;
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 In FDP_SDI.2 the left open assignments are the user data attributes and the action to
be taken;
 In FCS_RNG.1 the left open definition is the quality metric for the random numbers.
The following statements define these completed SFRs.
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide the test process before TOE Delivery1
with the
capability to store Initialisation Data2
in theOTP3
.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_SDC.1 Stored data confidentiality
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_SDC.1.1 The TSF shall ensure the confidentiality of the information of the user
data while it is stored in the EEPROM, ROM and RAM4
.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action
Hierarchical to: FDP_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring
FDP_SDI.2.1 The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the
TSF for integrity errors 5
on all objects, based on the following
attributes:redundancy bits6
.
FDP_SDI.2.2 Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall reset7
.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_RNG.1 [PTG.2]Random number generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_RNG.1.1[PTG.2]The TSF shall provide a physical random number generator that
implements:
 A total failure test detects a total failure of entropy source
immediately when the RNG has started. When a total failure is
detected, no random numbers will be output.
 If a total failure of the entropy source occurs while the RNG is
being operated, the RNG prevents the output of any internal
random number that depends on some raw random numbers that
have been generated after the total failure of the entropy source8
.
1
[assignment: list of subjects]
2
[assignment: list of audit information]
3
[assignment: type of persistent memory]
4
[assignment: memory area]
5
[assignment: integrity errors]
6
[assignment: user data attributes]
7
[assignment: action to be taken]
8
[selection: prevents the output of any internal random number that depends on some raw random numbers that
have been generated after the total failure of the entropy source, generates the internal random numbers with a
post-processing algorithm of class DRG.2 as long as its internal state entropy guarantees the claimed output
entropy].
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 The online test shall detect non-tolerable statistical defects of the
raw random number sequence (i) immediately when the RNG has
started. and (ii) while the RNG is being operated. The TSF must not
output any random numbers before the power-up online test has
finished successfully or when a defect has been detected.
 The online test procedure shall be effective to detect non-tolerable
weakness of the random numbers soon.
 The online test procedure checks the quality of the raw random
number sequence. It is triggered upon specified internal events9
.
The online test is suitable for detecting non-tolerable statistical
defects of the statistical properties of the raw random numbers
within an acceptable period of time.
FCS_RNG.1.2[PTG.2]TheTSF shall provide 32 bit random number words10
that meet:
 Test procedure A and no other test suites11
does not distinguish the
internal random numbers from output sequences of an ideal RNG.
 The average Shannon entropy per internal random bit exceeds
0.997.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types offailures
occur: exposure to operating conditions which may not be tolerated
according to the requirement Limited fault tolerance (FRU_FLT.2) and
where therefore a malfunction could occur12
.
Application note:The occurred failures will cause the alarm signals to be triggered, which will
result in a reset(secure state).
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing13
to the TSF14
by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.
Application note: If a physical manipulation or physical probing attack is detected,an
alarm will be automatically triggered by the hardware, which will cause
the chip to be reset.
6.2.2. SFRs regarding cryptographic functionality
9
[selection: externally, at regular intervals, continuously, applied upon specified internal events].
10
[selection: bits, octets of bits, numbers [assignment: format of the numbers]]
11
[assignment: additional standard test suites]
12
[assignment: list of types of failures in the TSF]
13
[assignment: physical tampering scenarios]
14
[assignment: list of TSF devices/elements]
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FCS_COP.1 [TDES]Cryptographic operation - TDES
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1 [TDES] The TSF shall perform encryption and decryption15
in accordance
with aspecified cryptographic algorithm TDESinECBmode 16
and
cryptographic key sizes of112 bit 17
that meet the following:NIST
SP800-67[8] and NIST SP800-38A18
[9].
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes,
or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Application note: The TOE also supports single DES. However the security of the single
DES algorithm is not resistant against attackswith a high attack
potential. Therefore the application of single DES shall not be used in
parts of the Security Embedded Software that require high security.
FCS_COP.1 [RSA] Cryptographic operation – RSA
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1[RSA] The TSF shall perform encryption and decryption 19
operation in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithmRSA 20
and
cryptographic key sizes of256 bits to 2048 bits 21
that meet the
following: RSA standard [11]22
.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes,
or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Application note: The security IC embedded software shall make a choice regarding the
RSA key length based on the required security strength.
6.3. Security Assurance Requirements (SAR)
The Security Assurance Requirements claimed for the TOE are the SARs claimed in section
6.2 of the Security IC Protection Profile [1].
This Security Target will be evaluated according to Security Target evaluation (Class ASE)
15
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
16
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
17
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
18
[assignment: list of standards]
19
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
20
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
21
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
22
[assignment: list of standards]
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The Security Assurance Requirements for the evaluation of the TOE are the components in
Assurance Evaluation level EAL4 augmented by the components ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2
and AVA_VAN.5. The table below shows the details of these assurance requirements.
Table 12 TOE assurance requirements
Security assurance
requirements
Titles
Class ADV: Development
ADV_ARC.1 Architectural design
ADV_FSP.4 Functional specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation
ADV_TDS.3 TOE design
Class AGD: Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative user guidance
Class ALC: Life-cycle support
ALC_CMC.4 CM capabilities
ALC_CMS.4 CM scope
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery
ALC_DVS.2 Development security
ALC_LCD.1 Life-cycle definition
ALC_TAT.1 Tools and techniques
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
Class ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.2 Coverage
ATE_DPT.2 Depth
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing
Class AVA: Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Vulnerability analysis
6.4. Security requirements rationale
6.4.1. Security Functional Requirements (SFR)
The table below provides an overview of how the security functional requirements are
combined to meet the security objectives.
Table 13 Mapping of security functional requirements to security objectives
Security Security Functional Fulfilment of mapping
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Objectives for the
TOE
Requirements
O.Leak-Inherent FDP_ITT.1
FDP_IFC.1
FPT_ITT.1
See PP
O.Phys-Probing FDP_SDI.2
FPT_PHP.3
See PP
O.Malfunction FRU_FLT.2
FPT_FLS.1
See PP
O.Phys-
Manipulation
FDP_SDI.2
FPT_PHP.3
See PP
O.Leak-Forced FDP_ITT.1
FDP_IFC.1
FPT_ITT.1
FRU_FLT.2
FPT_FLS.1
FPT_PHP.3
See PP
O.Abuse-Func FMT_LIM.1
FMT_LIM.2
FDP_ITT.1
FPT_ITT.1
FDP_IFC.1
FPT_PHP.3
FRU_FLT.2
FPT_FLS.1
See PP
O.Identification FAU_SAS.1 See PP
O.RND FCS_RNG.1
FDP_ITT.1
FPT_ITT.1
FDP_IFC.1
FPT_PHP.3
FRU_FLT.2
FPT_FLS.1
See PP
O.TDES FCS_COP.1
[TDES]
O.TDES requires the TOE to support DES
encryption and decryption with its
specified key lengths. The claim for
FCS_COP.1 [TDES] is suitable to meet the
objective O.TDES.
O.RSA FCS_COP.1 [RSA] O.RSA requires the TOE to support RSA
CRT encryption and decryption with its
specified key lengths. The claim for
FCS_COP.1 [RSA] is suitable to meet the
objective O. RSA.
OE.Process-Sec-IC
OE.Plat-Appl
OE.Resp-Appl
Security
Objectives for the
Dependencies Fulfilment of dependencies, see next
paragraph
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TOE
6.4.2. Dependencies of the SFRs
The dependencies for the SFRs claimed according to the Protection Profile are all satisfied in
the set of SFRs claimed in the Protection Profile.
In the following table the dependencies of the SFRs claimed in addition to Protection Profile
is indicated.
Table 14 Dependencies of SFRs in addition to PP
Security functional
requirement
Dependencies Fulfilled by security requirements in this
Security Target
FCS_COP.1[TDES] FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1,
FCS_CKM.4
See explanation below this table
FCS_COP.1[RSA] FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1,
FCS_CKM.4
See explanation below this table
The developer of the Security IC Embedded Software must ensure that the implemented
additional security functional requirements FCS_COP.1[TDES] and FCS_COP.1[RSA] and
FCS_RNG.1are used as specified and that the User Data processed by the related security
functionality is protected as defined for the application context.
The dependent requirements for FCS_COP.1[TDES] and FCS_COP.1[RSA] address the
appropriate management of cryptographic keys used by the specified cryptographic function.
All requirements concerning these management functions shall be fulfilled by the
environment (Security IC Embedded Software).
The functional requirements [FDP_ITC.1, or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1] and FCS_CKM.4
are not included in this Security Target since the TOE only provides a pure engine for
encryption and decryption without additional features for the handling of cryptographic keys.
Therefore the Security IC Embedded Software must fulfil these requirements related to the
needs of the realised application.
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6.4.3. Security Assurance Requirements (SAR)
The SARs as defined in section 6.3 are in line with the SARs in the Security IC Platform
Protection Profile. The context of this ST is equivalent to the context described in the
Protection Profile and therefore these SARs are also applicable for this ST.
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7. TOE summary specification
This chapter provides general information to potential users of the TOE on how the TOE
implements the Security Functional Requirements in terms of “Security Functionality”.
7.1. Malfunction
Malfunctioning relates to the security functional requirements FRU_FLT.2 and FPT_FLS.1.
The TOE meets these SFRs by a group of security measures that guarantee correct operation
of the TOE.
The TOE ensures its correct operation and prevents any malfunction while the security IC
embedded software is executed by implementation of the following security features:
• Environmental sensors
monitor if environmental conditions are within the specified range
• Abnormality check for TRNG
verifies the quality of generated random data
7.2. Leakage
Leakages relates to the security functional requirements FDP_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1 and
FPT_ITT.1. The TOE meets these SFRs by implementing several measures that provide
logical protection against leakage:
• Memory encryption and bus masking
• No plain text on the bus and memory
7.3. Physical manipulation and probing
Physical manipulation and probing relates to the security functional requirements
FPT_PHP.3, FDP_SDC.1 and FDP_SDI.1. The TOE meets this SFR by implementing
security measures that provides physical protection against physical probing and
manipulation.
The security measures protect the TOE against manipulation of
(i) The hardware.
(ii) The security IC embedded software in the ROM.
(iii) The application data in the EEPROM including the configuration data.
It also protects User Data or TSF data against disclosure by physical probing when stored or
while being processed by the TOE.
The protection of the TOE comprises different features within the design and construction,
which make reverse-engineering and tamper attacks more difficult. These features comprise
of
• Active shielding
Dedicated shielding techniques for different components
• Data integrity checking
verifies the integrity of the data in memory during reading and writing
• Memory and bus encryption
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No plain text on the bus and memory
7.4. Abuse of functionality and Identification
Abuse of functionality and Identification relates to the security functional requirements
FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2 and FAU_SAS.1. The TOE meets these SFRs by implementation
of a test mode access control mechanism that prevents abuse of test functionality delivered as
part of the TOE.
The test functionality is not available to the user delivery of the TOE to the Composite
Manufacturer. The TOE has implemented a combination of a hardware fuse in combination
with software access control to prevent using this functionality after TOE delivery.
7.5. Random numbers
Random numbers relate to the security requirement FCS_RNG.1. The TOE meets this SFR by
providing a random number generator.
The random number generator is composed of entropy sources, self-test circuit and post-
processing circuit. The random number also fulfils the AIS20/31 PTG.2level.
7.6. Cryptographic functionality
The TOE provides the single and Triple-DES algorithm according to the NIST SP800-67[8],
NIST SP800-38A23
[9] Standard to meet the security requirement FCS_COP.1[TDES]. The
TOE implements the Triple-DES algorithm by means of a hardware co-processor and the
software crypto library. It supports the DES algorithm with a single 56 bit key supporting
ECB mode. It supports the Triple-DES algorithm with two 56 bit keys for 2-key Triple DES
supporting ECB mode.The keys for the DES algorithms shall be provided by the security IC
embedded software.
The TOE provides the RSA CRT algorithm according to the paper [11] to meet the security
requirement FCS_COP.1[RSA]. The TSF implement the RSA CRT algorithm with the
cryptographic key sizes is 256 bits to 2048 bits.
8. References
Ref Title Version Date
[1] Security IC Platform Protection Profile, BSI-CC-PP-
0084-2014
Version 1.0 13.01.2014
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation,
Part 1: Introduction and General Model
CCMB-2012-09-001
Version 3.1
Revision 4
September
2012
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Version 3.1 September
23
[assignment: list of standards]
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Security Evaluation,
Part 2: Security Functional Requirements
CCMB-2012-09-002
Revision 4 2012
[4] Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation,
Part 3: Security Assurance Requirements
CCMB-2012-09-003
Version 3.1
Revision 4
September
2012
[5] Common Methodology for Information Technology
Security Evaluation (CEM), Evaluation
Methodology
CCMB-2012-09-004
Version 3.1
Revision 4
September
2012
[6] AGD EAL4+ for Tong Fang v0.8
OperationalGuidance
Version 0.8 October, 2015
[7] THD88/M2064 Preparative Guidance v0.4 Version 0.4 October 2015
[8] NIST SP 800-67, Recommendation for the Triple
Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher,
revised January 2012, National Institute of
Standards and Technology
Revision 1 January
2012
[9] NIST SP 800-38A Recommendation for Block
Cipher Modes of Operation, 2001, with Addendum
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Three Variants of Ciphertext Stealing for
CBC Mode, October 2010
2001 ED October
2010
[10] SC000 Detailed Description Revision:
r0p0-01re10
2011
[11] PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Standard, RSA
Laboratories
Version 2.2 2012
[12] THD88/M2064 Secure Microcontroller
Securityguideline_v0.7
Version 0.7 October, 2015