BSI-DSZ-CC-0864-2012
for
Crypto Library V2.7 NXP Smart Card Controller
P5CD081V1D and its major configurations
from
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V4.71
BSI-DSZ-CC-0864-2012
Crypto Library V2.7 NXP Smart Card Controller P5CD081V1D and its
major configurations
from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version
1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification
Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance
to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 19 December 2012
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
for components up
to EAL 4
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0864-2012
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0864-2012 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0864-2012
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................10
1 Executive Summary......................................................................................................11
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................12
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................15
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................15
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................16
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................18
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................18
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................20
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................20
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................22
11 Security Target............................................................................................................23
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................23
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................25
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................27
CC Part1:........................................................................................................................27
CC Part 3:.......................................................................................................................28
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................37
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0864-2012 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp. E3 (basic). In Addition, certificates issued
for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0864-2012
As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom.Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found
at https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of September 2011 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved
certification schemes can be seen on the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
This evaluation contains the components ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 that are not
mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual
recognition the EAL4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Crypto Library V2.7 NXP Smart Card Controller P5CD081V1D and its major
configurations has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification
based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0633-2010. Specific results from the evaluation process
BSI-DSZ-CC-0633-2010 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Crypto Library V2.7 NXP Smart Card Controller
P5CD081V1D and its major configurations was conducted by Brightsight BV. The
evaluation was completed on 14 December 2012. The Brightsight BV is an evaluation
facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: NXP Semiconductors
Germany GmbH.
The product was developed by: NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0864-2012 Certification Report
4 Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product Crypto Library V2.7 NXP Smart Card Controller P5CD081V1D and its major
configurations has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published
regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be
obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Stresemannallee 101
22529 Hamburg
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0864-2012
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0864-2012 Certification Report
1 Executive Summary
The evaluated TOE is “NXP Crypto Library V2.7 on SmartMX
P5Cx081/CD041/CD021/CD016 V1D”. This TOE is a composite TOE, consisting of:
The TOE is a composite TOE, consisting of:
• the hardware “NXP SmartMX P5Cx081/ CD041/ CD021/ CD016 V1D Secure Smart
Card Controller” which is used as evaluated platform, and all its Major
Configurations(see [15] for details):
• P5CD081V1D
• P5CN081V1D
• P5CD041V1D
• P5CD021V1D
• P5CD016V1D
and
• The “Crypto Library V2.7”, which is built upon this platforms.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007,
BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [7].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 4. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and
some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security Functions Addressed issue
F.AES The TOE uses the AES hardware coprocessor to provide a AES encryption
and decryption facility.
F.DES The TOE uses the DES hardware coprocessor to provide a DES encryption
and decryption facility.
F.RSA_encrypt The TOE provides functions that implement the RSA algorithm for data
encryption and decryption.
F.RSA_sign The TOE provides functions that implement the RSA algorithm and the
RSA-CRT algorithm for signature generation and verification.
F.RSA_public The TOE provides functions that implement computation of an RSA public
key from a private key.
F.ECC_GF_p_ECDSA The TOE provide functions to perform ECC Signature Generation and
Signature Verification according to ISO/IEC 14888-3.
F.ECC_GF_p_ DH_KeyExch The TOE provides functions to perform Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
according to ISO 11770-3 section 8.4.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0864-2012
TOE Security Functions Addressed issue
F.RSA_KeyGen The TOE provides functions to generate RSA key pairs as described in
„Regulierungsbehörde für Telekommunikation und Post: Bekanntmachung
zur elektronischen Signatur nach dem Signaturgesetz und der
Signaturverordnung (Übersicht über geeignete Algorithmen), German
"Bundesanzeiger Nr. 59", p. 4695-4696, March 30th, 2005“.
F.ECC_GF_p_KeyGen The TOE provides functions to perform ECC over GF(p) Key Generation
according to ISO/IEC 15946-1 section 6.1.
F.SHA The TOE implements functions to compute the Secure Hash Algorithms
SHA-1, SHA-224 and SHA- 256 according to the standard FIPS 180-2.
F.RNG_Access The TOE contains both a hardware Random Number Generator (RNG) and
a software RNG.
F.Object_Reuse The TOE provides internal security measures which clear memory areas
used by the Crypto Library after usage.
F.COPY The function F.COPY implements functionality to copy memory content in a
manner protected against side channel attacks.
F.LOG The IT Security Functionality SF.LOG – Logical Protection defined in the
Hardware Security Target [15] is extended in this Security Target to include
software countermeasures against side channel attacks.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 5.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [8],
chapter 2.1 . Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [8], chapter 2.3 and 2.4.
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
The evaluated TOE is “Crypto Library V2.7 NXP Smart Card Controller P5CD081V1D and
its major configurations„. There are no additional version or other identification and
configuration characteristics.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Crypto Library V2.7 NXP Smart Card Controller P5CD081V1D and its major
configurations
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0864-2012 Certification Report
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW
NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers
P5CD016V1D / P5CD021V1D /
P5CD041V1D / P5Cx081V1D with DESFire
EV1
V1D
Wafer, modules and packages
(dice include reference T046D)
2 SW Boot-ROM Software 1.3
Test-ROM on the chip,
TestRom_042_107.hex
3 SW DESFire EV1 Software 1.3
Test-ROM on the chip,
TestRom_042_107.hex
4 SW Test-ROM Software 1.3
Test-ROM on the chip,
TestRom_042_107.hex
5 DOC
Product data sheet P5CD016/021/041/051
and P5Cx081 family; Secure dual interface
and contact PKI smart card controller
3.6 Electronic document
6 DOC Instruction Set, SmartMX-Family 1.1 Electronic document
7 DOC
Guidance, Delivery and Operation Manual
NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers
P5CD016V1D/P5CD021V1D/P5CD041V
1D/P5Cx081V1D
3.0 Electronic document
8 SW Crypto Library 2.7 Electronic file
9 DOC
Secured Crypto Library on the
P5CD016/021/041 and P5Cx081
Revision 1.2 Electronic document
10 DOC
Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX –
Pseudo Random Number Generator &
Chi-Squared Test Library
Revision 5.0 Electronic document
11 DOC
Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX –
Secured AES Library
Revision 1.2 Electronic document
12 DOC
Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX –
Secured DES Library
Revision 3.0 Electronic document
13 DOC
Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX –
SHA Library
Revision 4.1 Electronic document
14 DOC
Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX –
Secured RSA Library
Revision 4.5 Electronic document
15 DOC
Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX –
Secured RSA Key Generation Library
Revision 4.3 Electronic document
16 DOC
Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX –
Secured ECC Library
Revision 1.4 Electronic document
17 DOC Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX –
Utility Library
Revision 1.0 Electronic document
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The hardware part of the TOE is delivered by NXP either as wafers or in packaged form.
The hardware part of the TOE will be delivered with the IC Dedicated Support Software.
The Crypto Library is delivered in Phase 1 (for a definition of the Phases refer to section
‘1.2.3 TOE life cycle’ of the Protection Profile [7]) as a software package (a set of binary
files) to the developers of Smartcard Embedded Software. The Smartcard Embedded
Software may comprise in this case an operating system and/or other smart card software
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0864-2012
(applications). The Software developer can incorporate the Crypto Library into their
product.
As explained in the user guidance, as part of the delivery procedure, the customer shall
verify the correctness of the delivered files by calculating the SHA-256 hash value of the
delivered files and comparing them to reference values provided in the user guidance, and
reproduced in the following Table:
Component Rev. SHA-256 Value
PhSmxCIAes.lib 1.1 1891a109ad652a61cfa34de34409cb6423a3987cfe4bf82d94ea62d6ca292cfa
phSmxClAes.h 1.1 14babe9b889dfaf365c626fd456dfa8c8472a4fd19338c41e7e3bf792633ac8a
phSmxClDes.lib 2.1 53d0008fa1e5e5a6c6137649337bf46bb399a2974b6784c56502066fb8c8d009
phSmxClDes.h 2.1 3ac882e7589a3174d4cb0ba8e5c54d505b25009ce70edbc81ee64c8b17b26337
phSmxClRsa.lib 3.2 2d4c71b2ce754571f7449841e66c91b740a3a7359e3cf8ad673d6da8c64d0e97
phSmxClRsa_Oaep.lib 3.2 902c94caa2df961f2accf705f5aa8a2289cdfcf13a2af852f99ceb0ae70b8de5
phSmxClRsa_Pss.lib 3.2 15a0a171c8515cc5b61f8443f7bbd4700bc90f2972a7cac056d4d991f5ee58cb
phSmxClRsa_Inverse.lib 3.2 d75c75aef409066c7ef575c01f691cd839602e1bc10a673ab85f9e1a9e740122
phSmxClRsa.h 3.2 a9f41716664f41e916cfaf7e988910867c93c3f8f913798b42b4f53197915a74
phSmxClRsa_Oaep.h 3.2 4900c940de1aa6cf9a18b4479ca52d6de282b61081e7bf676d8d1a42ae0d2f90
phSmxClRsa_Pss.h 3.2 06d8538772b052047a156a620d04271611e53b8605eea4b1af64c50be15b8da8
phSmxClRsaKg.lib 3.1 c8c0ef3813a2b171a9a4635fd33c9614be2e408f38f22765d0cf27ccb9996ff2
phSmxClRsaKg.h 3.1 d9222fe19a40e652ce721b60c48e729621ca04c512fa25596a4e23f559b30f9b
phSmxClECC_GFp.lib 2.2 31c09e8592e8e0e933a7e8fc0ad4e7174c1ac1d7f69c1c1bb60f18d249152486
phSmxClECC_GFp.h 2.2 cadd2f8eabaa2160a89bf8662245a636399c15d70835cf7e023c67f7ef2ada2b
phSmxClSha.lib 3.0 57a86da6e0b6910a26d4bb629a918bbd7336a8a11c775f28ef146414975b5c6b
phSmxClSha.h 3.0 e75f12fd7148e1bff8316a8f177d921416e3a1b32361df036612e0782d647877
phSmxClRng.lib 3.0 2e952c81f040746998a05ca8d88a8041d6b1806e63735f0028099e389cef783e
phSmxClRng.h 3.0 5b7247e2e8ce8472e6f6dd33d295190740e0f2b50981e283319d1eb86c1c3b4b
phSmxClUtility.lib 1.0 011590478b8cbd78ea1fa2b72789c93a931a05fbf0b8c9dee2e7295114d20589
phSmxClUtility.h 1.0 551832b86b658294b02a84e6f00a6aba1785885d3f99ed79e24e4c40d35e9611
phSmxClTypes.h 1.1 67ae8997413e6c3ed0554fced701f97ab162ecf2755fefd922463449e3bd96e9
The subsequent use of the Crypto Library by Smartcard Embedded Software Developers
is out of the control of the developer NXP Semiconductors, Business Unit Identification;
the integration of the Crypto Library into Smartcard Embedded Software is not part of this
evaluation.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0864-2012 Certification Report
The reference of the software part of the TOE is checked by using the SHA-256 hash
values. The values are provided in the user guidance manual [12].
The reference of the hardware part of the TOE is checked by visual inspection. The
surface of the TOE consists of the label “T046D”. The chip is manufactured by SSMC in
Singapore.
Device coding byte values, according to the data sheet, for the hardware configurations
are as follows:
device DC(0 DC(1) DC(2)
P5CD081V1D 0x21 0x07 0x53
P5CN081V1D 0x61 0x07 0x54
P5CD041V1D 0x21 0x07 0x52
P5CD021V1D 0x21 0x07 0x51
P5CD016V1D 0x21 0x07 0x50
3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues: The security policy of the TOE is
to provide basic Security Functions to be used by the smart card operating system and the
smart card application thus providing an overall smart card system security. Therefore, the
TOE will implement algorithms to ensure the confidentiality of plain text data by encryption
and to support secure authentication protocols and it will provide a random number
generator.
The TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to provide
protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of cryptographic
keys during cryptographic functions performed by the TOE), against physical probing,
against malfunctions, against physical manipulations and against abuse of functionality.
Hence the TOE shall
• maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the
TOE and
• maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of Security
Features provided by the TOE.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
Name Title
OE.Plat-Appl Usage of Hardware Platform
OE.Resp-Appl Treatment of User Data
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0864-2012
OE.Process-Sec-IC Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalization
OE.Check-Init Check of initialization data by the Smart Card Embedded Software.
OE.RSA-Key-Gen
In case that resistance of the fast, but insecure mode of the RSA Key Generation
against side channel attacks is needed, the operational environment shall ensure that
side-channel attacks cannot be performed.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 3.2.
5 Architectural Information
This chapter provides a high-level description of the IT product and its major components
based on the evaluation evidence described in the Common Criteria assurance family
entitled “TOE design (ADV_TDS)”. The intent of this chapter is to characterise the degree
of architectural separation of the major components and to show dependencies between
the TOE and products using the TOE in a composition (e.g. dependencies between HW
and SW).
TOE definition
The TOE is the “NXP Crypto Library V2.7 on SmartMX P5Cx081/CD041/CD021/CD016
V1D”. The TOE consists of a hardware part and a software part:
• The hardware part consists of the NXP SmartMX P5CD081V1D / P5CN081V1D /
P5CD041V1D / P5CD021V1D / P5CD016V1D Secure Smart Card Controller with
IC Dedicated Software stored in the Test-ROM that is not accessible in the System
Mode or the User Mode after Phase 3. The hardware part of the TOE includes
dedicated guidance documentation. All configurations as defined in [15] are covered
by this evaluation. These configurations are:
• P5CD081V1D
• P5CN081V1D
• P5CD041V1D
• P5CD021V1D
• P5CD016V1D
• The software part consists of the IC Dedicated Support Software “NXP Crypto
Library V2.7 on SmartMX P5Cx081/CD041/CD021/CD016 V1D” which consists of a
software library and associated documentation. The Crypto Library is an additional
part that provides cryptographic functions that can be operated on the hardware
platform
The NXP SmartMX hardware is described in Section 1.4.2.1 “Hardware Description” of the
Hardware Security Target [15].
A Smartcard embedded Software developer may create Smartcard embedded Software to
execute on the NXP SmartMX hardware. This software is stored in the User ROM of the
NXP SmartMX hardware and is not part of the TOE, with one exception: the Smartcard
embedded Software may contain the “Crypto Library on SmartMX“ (or parts thereof) and
this Crypto Library (or parts thereof) is part of the TOE. The crypto functions are supplied
as a library rather than as a monolithic program, and hence a user of the library may
include only those functions that are actually required. However, some dependencies exist;
details are described in the User Guidance [12].
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The TOE provides AES, DES, Triple-DES (3DES), RSA, RSA key generation, RSA public
key computation, ECC over GF(p), ECC over GF(p) key generation, ECC Diffie-Hellman
key-exchange, SHA-1, SHA-224 and SHA-256 algorithms.
In addition, the Crypto Library implements a software (pseudo) random number generator,
which is initialised (seeded) by the hardware random number generator of the SmartMX.
Finally, the TOE provides a secure copy routine and includes internal security measures
for residual information protection.
Logical Architecture
The Crypto Library is implemented as a set of subsystems. The division into subsystems is
chosen according to the cryptographic algorithms provided and, as such, corresponds
directly with most of the TSF.
The Crypto Library subsystems are:
• RSA Key Generation
• RSA
• SHA
• AES
• DES
• ECC over GF(p)
• Random Numbers
• Utility
The library relies on the underlying hardware for some functionality. The figure below,
taken from Chapter 15 of the TOE design specification shows the relations between the
subsystems and the functionality provided by the underlying hardware.
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6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
Test subset selection for independent testing
The evaluator judges that tests, supplementing the developer’s tests, should be defined
based on how much assurance is provided by the developer's tests on how well the TOE
security functionalities are implemented, rather than on how well the different standards
are met.
Based on how rigorous the TOE's behaviour is tested by the developer, and their test
results, the evaluator has selected the following items to be tested:
• Correctness of operation during RSA key generation under different clock settings,
when primes p and q are generated such that they have equal length;
• Establish most promising approach for side-channel testing (Worst-Case Testing)
• Possibility to identify RSA operations in side-channel traces;
• The effect of basis and exponent blinding on side-channel traces;
• Correctness and timing of ECDSA signature generation;
• Possibility to identify ECC operations in side-channel traces;
• The effect of randomising of modular parameters (ECC) on side-channel traces;
• The effect of randomising of projective coordinates (ECC) on side-channel traces;
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• ECC side-channel analysis:
• point leakage
• ephemeral key leakage
• leakage of differences between additions
• Verification of the developer's PRNG test results;
• Sensitivity to fault injection by performing optical fault injection on the FameXE
coprocessor operations.
Developer test selection for validation testing
The crypto library has been evaluated before (version 2.1, certification ID:
BSI-DSZ-CC-0417). During the work performed for the previous evaluation, the evaluator
has selected the entire set of the developer’s automated tests for the subset. ATE_COV
and ATE_DPT have shown that these scripts cover all SFRs and all functions, so, in that
procedure, the evaluator has tested all functions.
The version of the crypto library evaluated in procedure BSI-DSZ-CC-0417 has been
re-evaluated as major maintenance in procedure BSI-DSZ-0608, and that version (2.2)
has been certified, and therefore ATE is considered covered for that version. Since the
evaluation of version 2.2 (BSI-DSZ-CC-0608), the crypto library has undergone no
changes that influence the functionality of the interfaces. Therefore the evaluator judges
that the developer's tests need not be repeated in order to confirm their validity.
Testing results and verdict
The testing results show that the TOE exhibits the expected behaviour. No deviations were
found.
Independent testing conclusion
The overall judgement of the evaluators is that the evaluator and the independent testing
showed the TSF to operate correctly. The hardware test results are extendable to
composite evaluations on this hardware TOE, provided that TOE is operated according to
its guidance and the composite evaluation requirements are met.
Penetration testing
The penetration tests are devised after performing the Evaluator Vulnerability Analysis.
This analysis has followed the following steps: The reference for attack techniques against
which smart card-based devices controllers such as the Crypto Library on SmartMX must
be protected against is the document "Attack methods for smart cards". Additional
guidance for testing was provided by the certification body in the form of a number of
questions regarding the TOE. The vulnerability of the Crypto Library for these attacks has
been analysed in a white box investigation conforming to AVA_VAN.5.
Results
All test results were as expected.
The overall conclusion is that the Crypto Library is protected against attackers possessing
a high attack potential, provided the user guidance of both the Crypto Library and the
underlying hardware are followed, and the recommendations from the ETR of the
underlying hardware are followed.
The user of the Crypto Library must implement the advices of the hardware user guidance.
Important to mention are
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• Section 4.3.2 limit the use of a single key for AES operations under certain
circumstances (A) or implement a mechanism with dummy AES operations (B); It
should be stressed that the ETR for composition of the underlying hardware
mandates testing of the AES implementation if mechanism (B) is implemented in a
composite TOE
• Section 4.4: appropriate handling of sensor resets and exceptions;
• Section 5.1: error counter mechanism.
If a composite TOE uses RSA exponents with low Hamming Weight, additional testing for
leakage of the exponent value during the exponent blinding operation is required.
Furthermore, for proper functioning of the countermeasures, the user must ensure that the
RNG is properly seeded, as described in the user guidance manual, section 6.13.
Finally, in all circumstances, user guidance must be followed and be carefully considered
when certain interfaces are used, in particular
• phSmxClRsa_DecryptSF(),
• phSmxClRsa_DecryptCRT(),
• phSmxClRsa_SignSF(),
• phSmxClRsa_SignCRT(),
• phSmxClRsa_OaepDec(),
• phSmxClECC_GFp_KeyGen() and
• phSmxClECC_GFp_DHKeyExch().
As was the case for the evaluator’s penetration testing, the developer test results also
indicate that the TOE is sufficiently resistant to achieve the required VAN.5 rating.
8 Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE: The evaluated TOE is
“Crypto Library V2.7 NXP Smart Card Controller P5CD081V1D and its major
configurations”. There are no additional version or other identification and configuration
characteristics.
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of deterministic random number
generators
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(ii) Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices (see AIS 36).
According to this concept the relevant guidance documents of the underlying
platform and the documents ETR for Composition from the platform evaluations
have been applied in the TOE evaluation.
(iii) The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
(iv) Application of Attack Potential to Smart Cards
(v) Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of physical random number
generators
(see [4], AIS 20, AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 31, AIS 36).
To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite
evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this
platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on
top.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a
re-evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0633-2010, re-use of specific
evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on ECC and RSA.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June
2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [7]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). This holds for:
– the TOE Security functionality F.AES (128, 192 or 256 bit),
– the TOE Security functionality F.DES (two-key and three-key),
– the TOE Security functionality F.RSA_encrypt (256 bits to 5024 bits),
– the TOE Security functionality F.RSA_sign (256 bits to 5024 bits),
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– the TOE Security functionality F.RSA_public (1024 bits to 2048 bits (Straight Forward)
or from 1024 to 4096 bits (CRT)),
– the TOE Security functionality F.ECC_GF_p_ECDSA (128 bits to 544 bits),
– the TOE Security functionality F.SHA (SHA-1, SHA-224 and SHA-256) and
– for other usage of encryption and decryption within the TOE.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with
a security level of 80 bits or lower can no longer be regarded as secure against attacks
with high attack potential without considering the application context. Therefore for this
functionalites it shall be checked whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for
the intended system. Some further hints and guidelines can be derived from the
'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102' (https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The Cryptographic Functionalities 2-key Triple DES (2TDES), RSA 1024, ECC 160 and
SHA1 used as collision-resistent hash function provided by the TOE achieve a security
level of maximum 80 Bits (in general context).
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process.
Some security measures are partly implemented in the hardware and require additional
configuration or control or measures to be implemented by the IC Dedicated Support
Software or Embedded Software.
For this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains
guidelines for the developer of the IC Dedicated Support Software and Embedded
Software on how to securely use the microcontroller chip and which measures have to be
implemented in the software in order to fulfil the security requirements of the Security
Target of the TOE.
In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or system it must be examined if
the required measures have been correctly and effectively implemented by the software.
Additionally, the evaluation of the composite product or system must also consider the
evaluation results as outlined in the document ETR for composite evaluation [10].
In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:
The user of the Crypto Library must implement the advices of the hardware user guidance.
Furthermore, for proper functioning of the countermeasures, the user must ensure that the
RNG is properly seeded, as described in the user guidance manual, section 6.13.
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11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [8] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on
well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon
which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
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Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 3, July 2009
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 3, July 2009
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6] Security Target “Crypto Library V2.7 on SmartMX P5Cx081 / CD041/ CD021/
CD016 V1D”, Rev 1.1, 6 Nov 2012 (confidential document)
[7] Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007,
BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007
[8] Security Target Lite “Crypto Library V2.7 on SmartMX P5Cx081 / CD041/ CD021/
CD016 V1D”, Rev 1.1, 6 Nov 2012
[9] Evaluation Technical Report, V4.0, NXP Crypto Library V2.7 on SmartMX
P5Cx081/CD041/CD021/CD016 V1D, Brightsight, 13 December 2012 (confidential
document)
[10] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36, V3.0, NXP Crypto Library V2.7
on SmartMX P5Cx081/CD041/CD021/CD016 V1D, Brightsight, 12 December 2012
(confidential document)
[11] List of Configuration Items, Version 1.0, 15 September 2010 (confidential document)
[12] User Guidance Manual “Secured Crypto Library on the P5CD016/021/041/081 and
P5CC081” – Overview – Rev. 1.2, 21 January 2011, and also
8
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 2, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 25, Version 7, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 8,Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 2, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 2.0, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 3, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 38, Version 2.9, Reuse of evaluation results
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• AES Library User Guidance Manual “Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX”,
Rev. 1.2 – August 19th, 2010
• DES Library User Guidance Manual “Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX”,
Rev. 3.0 – 24 August 2007
• ECC over GF(p) User Guidance Manual “Secured Crypto Library on the
SmartMX”, Rev. 1.4 – 30 March 2010
• Random Number Generator User Guidance Manual “Secured Crypto Library on
the SmartMX”, Rev. 5.0 – 24 August 2007
• RSA Library User Guidance Manual “Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX”,
Rev. 4.5, April 15th, 2010
• RSA Key Generation User Guidance Manual “Secured Crypto Library on the
SmartMX”, Rev. 4.3 – 30 March 2010
• SHA Library User Guidance Manual “Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX”,
Rev. 4.1 – 12 June 2008
• Utility Library User Guidance Manual “Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX”,
Rev. 1.0 – 24 August 2007
[13] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0707-2012 “NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers
P5CD016V1D /P5CD021V1D / P5CD041V1D / P5Cx081V1D withDESFire EV1”,
BSI, 13 August 2012
[14] P5CD081V1D ETR for composition, BSI-DSZ-CC-0707, version 1.2, June 8th, 2012
[15] Security Target Lite P5Cx081V1D/P5CD016V1D/P5CD021V1D/P5CD041V1D NXP
Secure Smart Card Controllers, Revision 1.1, NXP Semiconductors, Business Unit
Identification, October 24th, 2011 (sanitised public document)
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance Claim
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal
high-level design presentation
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0864-2012
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Crypto Library V2.7 NXP Smart Card Controller P5CD081V1D and its
major configurations (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved
evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM),
Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5
and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the Common
Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 19 December 2012, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4,
ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1) are fulfilled for the development and
production sites of the TOE listed below:
1. NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH, Business Unit Identification,
Stresemannallee 101, D-225292 Hamburg (Development and Customer Support).
2. NXP Semiconductors (Thailand), Assembly Plant Bangkok, Thailand (APB), 303
Moo Chaengwattana Rd., Laksi, Bangkok 10210 Thailand (Test center, module
assembly and delivery).
3. NXP Semiconductors GmbH, Business Unit Identification, Document Control, Office
Mikron-Weg 1, A-8101 Gratkorn (Document control).
4. Systems on Silicon Manufacturing Co. Pte. Ltd. (SSMC), 70 Pasir Ris Drive, 1
Singapore 519527 (Wafer fab).
5. Toppan Photomasks Korea Ltd., 345-1, Sooha-Ri ShinDoon-Myon, 467-840 Ichon,
South Korea (Mask Shop).
6. Chipbond Technology Corporation, No. 3, Li-Hsin Rd. V, Science Based Industrial
Park, Hsin-Chu City, Taiwan R.O.C. (Bumping).
7. NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH, IC Manufacturing Operations – Test Center
Hamburg (IMO TeCH), Stresemannallee 101, D-22529 Hamburg (Delivery, Test and
Assembly).
8. NedCard B.V., Bijsterhuizen 25-29, 6604 LM Wijchen, The Netherlands (Module
Assembly), Site Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0003
9. NXP Semiconductors Taiwan Ltd., Assembly Plant Kaohsiung (APK), #10, Jing 5th
Road, N.E.P.Z Kaohsiung 81170, Taiwan R.O.C. (Test center and module assembly)
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [8]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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