1
TnD v5.1 on JCOP
(BAC Configuration) –
Public Security Target
2
About IDEMIA
OT-Morpho is now IDEMIA, the global leader in trusted identities for an increasingly
digital world, with the ambition to empower citizens and consumers alike to interact, pay,
connect, travel and vote in ways that are now possible in a connected environment.
Securing our identity has become mission critical in the world we live in today. By
standing for Augmented Identity, we reinvent the way we think, produce, use and protect
this asset, whether for individuals or for objects. We ensure privacy and trust as well as
guarantee secure, authenticated and verifiable transactions for international clients from
Financial, Telecom, Identity, Security and IoT sectors.
With close to €3bn in revenues, IDEMIA is the result of the merger between OT
(Oberthur Technologies) and Safran Identity & Security (Morpho). This new company
counts 14,000 employees of more than 80 nationalities and serves clients in 180
countries.
| For more information, visit www.idemia.com / Follow @IdemiaGroup on Twitter
3
APPROVAL
COMPANY NAME FUNCTION
Established by: IDEMIA Prem KUMAR CERTIFICATION Project Manager
Authorized by: IDEMIA Sarra MESTIRI IDEMIA CERTIFICATION Manager
4
DOCUMENT EVOLUTION
Version/Edition Issue Date Purpose
Ed 1 19/03/2021 Sanitized version created for Public Issue.
5
Table of contents
1 ST INTRODUCTION............................................................................................... 9
1.1 ST IDENTIFICATION ........................................................................................................9
1.2 TOE REFERENCE ............................................................................................................9
2 TECHNICAL TERMS, ABBREVIATIONS AND ASSOCIATED REFERENCES............ 11
2.1 TECHNICAL TERMS........................................................................................................ 11
2.2 ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................................... 20
2.3 REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 21
3 TOE OVERVIEW................................................................................................... 23
3.1 TOE DESCRIPTION ....................................................................................................... 24
3.1.1 Physical scope.................................................................................................... 25
3.1.2 Logical Scope..................................................................................................... 27
3.2 NON-TOE HARDWARE/SOFTWARE/FIRMWARE REQUIRED BY THE TOE ......................................... 28
3.3 TOE USAGE AND SECURITY FEATURES FOR OPERATIONAL USE.................................................... 28
3.3.1 Security Features................................................................................................ 30
4 LIFE CYCLE ......................................................................................................... 32
4.1 DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENT .......................................................................................... 32
4.2 PRODUCTION ENVIRONMENT............................................................................................ 33
4.3 PREPARATION ENVIRONMENT ........................................................................................... 34
4.4 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT........................................................................................... 34
5 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS..................................................................................... 35
5.1 CC CONFORMANCE CLAIM............................................................................................... 35
5.2 PP CLAIM................................................................................................................... 35
5.3 PACKAGE CLAIM ........................................................................................................... 35
5.4 PP CONFORMANCE RATIONALE ......................................................................................... 35
5.4.1 Main aspects...................................................................................................... 35
5.4.2 Overview of differences between the PP and the ST .............................................. 36
6 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION ..................................................................... 37
6.1 ASSETS...................................................................................................................... 37
6.1.1 Logical MRTD data.............................................................................................. 37
6.1.2 Miscellaneous..................................................................................................... 38
6.2 USERS / SUBJECTS........................................................................................................ 38
6.3 THREATS.................................................................................................................... 40
6.4 ORGANISATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES................................................................................ 43
6.5 ASSUMPTIONS ............................................................................................................. 43
7 SECURITY OBJECTIVES ...................................................................................... 46
7.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE................................................................................. 46
7.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT................................................... 48
7.2.1 Issuing State or Organization .............................................................................. 48
7.2.2 Receiving State or Organization ........................................................................... 49
7.2.3 Additional Security Objectives for the Operational Environment .............................. 50
7.3 SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE .................................................................................... 51
7.3.1 Threats.............................................................................................................. 51
7.3.2 Organisational Security Policies............................................................................ 52
7.3.3 Assumptions ...................................................................................................... 53
7.3.4 SPD and Security Objectives................................................................................ 54
8 EXTENDED REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................... 57
8.1 EXTENDED FAMILIES...................................................................................................... 57
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8.1.1 Extended Family FAU_SAS - Audit data storage..................................................... 57
8.1.2 Extended Family FCS_RND - Generation of random numbers.................................. 57
8.1.3 Extended Family FMT_LIM - Limited capabilities.................................................... 58
8.1.4 Extended Family FPT_EMS - TOE Emanation......................................................... 59
8.1.5 Extended Family FIA_API - Authentication Proof of Identity.................................... 60
9 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ................................................................................ 61
9.1 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS .............................................................................. 61
9.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit.............................................................................. 61
9.1.2 Class FCS Cryptographic Support ................................................................ 61
9.1.3 Class FIA Identification and Authentication ......................................... 64
9.1.4 Class FDP User Data Protection .................................................................. 66
9.1.5 Class FMT Security Management.................................................................... 69
9.1.6 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions ................................... 71
9.2 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................... 72
9.2.1 ADV Development .............................................................................................. 72
9.2.2 AGD Guidance documents................................................................................... 77
9.2.3 ALC Life-cycle support......................................................................................... 79
9.2.4 ASE Security Target evaluation ............................................................................ 83
9.2.5 ATE Tests .......................................................................................................... 89
9.2.6 AVA Vulnerability assessment .............................................................................. 91
9.3 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE................................................................................ 92
9.3.1 Objectives.......................................................................................................... 92
9.3.2 Rationale tables of Security Objectives and SFRs................................................... 96
9.3.3 Dependencies .................................................................................................... 99
9.3.4 Rationale for the Security Assurance Requirements ............................................. 104
9.3.5 ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional error
information.................................................................................................................... 104
9.3.6 ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals .................................................................. 104
9.3.7 ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design ............................................................. 104
9.3.8 ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage....................................................... 104
9.3.9 ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures ....................................................... 104
9.3.10 ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards........................................ 105
9.3.11 ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design .................................................................. 105
10 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION....................................................................... 106
10.1 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION ...................................................................................... 106
10.2 SFRS AND TSS.......................................................................................................... 110
10.2.1 SFRs and TSS - Rationale.................................................................................. 110
10.2.2 Association tables of SFRs and TSS .................................................................... 112
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Table of figures
Figure 1 Physical Form............................................................................................................... 26
Figure 2 Logical Scope of the TOE .............................................................................................. 28
Figure 3 Life cycle Overview....................................................................................................... 32
8
Table of tables
Table 1 Configurations of the TnD application.............................................................................. 23
Table 2 TOE Configurations during Personalisation....................................................................... 24
Table 3 eMRTD and IDL Terminology.......................................................................................... 24
Table 4 Ports and Interfaces ...................................................................................................... 26
Table 5 TOE Guidance ............................................................................................................... 27
Table 6 BAC Configuration ......................................................................................................... 30
Table 7 CAP file of the applet and additional packages is loaded at IC manufacturer (Option 1) ....... 33
Table 8 CAP file of the applet and additional packages is loaded through the loader of the IC (Option
2)...................................................................................................................................... 34
Table 9 CAP file of the applet and additional packages is loaded through the loader of the IC (Option
3)...................................................................................................................................... 34
Table 10 Threats and Security Objectives - Coverage .................................................................. 54
Table 11 Security Objectives and Threats - Coverage .................................................................. 55
Table 12 OSPs and Security Objectives - Coverage...................................................................... 55
Table 13 Security Objectives and OSPs - Coverage...................................................................... 56
Table 14 Assumptions and Security Objectives for the Operational Environment - Coverage............ 56
Table 15 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment and Assumptions - Coverage............ 56
Table 16 Security Objectives and SFRs - Coverage ...................................................................... 97
Table 17 SFRs and Security Objectives....................................................................................... 98
Table 18 SFRs Dependencies................................................................................................... 101
Table 19 SARs Dependencies .................................................................................................. 103
Table 20 SFRs and TSS - Coverage .......................................................................................... 114
Table 21 TSS and SFRs - Coverage .......................................................................................... 115
9
1 ST Introduction
1.1 ST Identification
Title TnD v5.1 on JCOP (BAC Configuration) – Public Security Target
Reference FQR 550 0185 Ed 1
CC Version 3.1 Revision 5
Assurance Level
EAL4 augmented with ADV_FSP.5, ADV_INT.2, ADV_TDS.4, ALC_DVS.2,
ALC_CMS.5, ALC_TAT.2 and ATE_DPT.3
ITSEF Brightsight
Certification Body NSCIB
Protection Profiles
Common Criteria Protection Profile - Machine Readable Travel Document
with "ICAO Application", Basic Access Control, BSI-PP-0055, Version 1.10,
25th March. 2009 [BAC-PP]
1.2 TOE Reference
TOE name TnD v5.1 on COSMO J in BAC Configuration
Applet Code Version
(SAAAAR Code)
Please refer Table below
Platform Name JCOP 4 P71
Platform Certificate CC-21-180212
Platform identification
Platform configuration: JCOP 4 v4.7 R1.01.4
ROMID: 2E5AD88409C9BADB
Platform ID:
4A335233353130323336333130343030DCE5C19CFE6D0DCF
Patch ID: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01
IC Reference
NXP Smart Card Controller N7121 with IC Dedicated Software and Crypto
Library (R1/R2) certified by the German BSI certification body on 10-02-
2021, number BSI-DSZ-CC-1136-2021
IC Certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-1136-2021
Crypto Lib reference Crypto Library V 0.7.6 on N7121. Certified under the IC certificate.
10
The following table defines the configurations, which can exist in TOE as per the code compilation
options:
Configurations
Description of the
configurations
Content of the config (package/cap
files)
Config 1
TnD Applet without
support for PACE-CAM
and DBI
SAAAAR + Version + Config of TnD
Java Applet on JCOP {config 1}
203461FF 05010000
0101
SAAAAR + version + config of
Adapter Package config 1
417651FF 01000000
0101
SAAAAR + version + config of
Comon Package {JCOP build}
417641FF 01000000
0101
Config 2
TnD Applet with support
for PACE-CAM and DBI
SAAAAR + version + config of TnD
Java Applet on JCOP {config 2}
203461FF 05010000
0201
SAAAAR + version + config of
Adapter Package config 2
417651FF 01000000
0201
SAAAAR + version + config of
Comon Package {JCOP build}
417641FF 01000000
0101
Note: In above table, for each row, SAAAAR code is denoted by first 4 bytes, Version is denoted by
next 4 bytes and Config is denoted by next 2 bytes.
11
2 Technical Terms, Abbreviations and Associated
References
2.1 Technical Terms
Term Definition
Accurate Terminal
Certificate
A Terminal Certificate is accurate, if the issuing Document Verifier is trusted
by the travel document’s chip to produce Terminal Certificates with the correct
certificate effective date, see [TR-03110-1].
Advanced Inspection
Procedure (with
PACE)
A specific order of authentication steps between a travel document and a
terminal as required by [TR-03110-1], namely (i) PACE, (ii) Chip
Authentication v.1, (iii) Passive Authentication with SOD and (iv) Terminal
Authentication v.1. AIP can generally be used by EIS-AIP-PACE.
Agreement This term is used in the current ST in order to reflect an appropriate
relationship between the parties involved, but not as a legal notion.
Active Authentication Security mechanism defined in [ICAO-9303]. Option by which means the
MTRD’s chip proves and the inspection system verifies the identity and
authenticity of the MTRD’s chip as part of a genuine MRTD issued by a known
State of organization.
Application note Optional informative part of the PP containing sensitive supporting information
that is considered relevant or useful for the construction, evaluation, or use of
the TOE (cf. CC part 1, section B.2.7).
Audit records Write-only-once non-volatile memory area of the MRTDs chip to store the
Initialisation Data and Pre-personalization Data.
Authenticity Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s chip were
created by the issuing State or Organization
Basic Access Control Security mechanism defined in [ICAO-9303] by which means the MTRD’s chip
proves and the inspection system protect their communication by means of
secure messaging with Basic Access Keys (see there).
Basic Inspection
System (BIS)
A technical system being used by an inspecting authority and operated by a
governmental organisation (i.e. an Official Domestic or Foreign Document
Verifier) and verifying the travel document presenter as the travel document
holder (for ePassport: by comparing the real biometric data (face) of the
travel document presenter with the stored biometric data (DG2) of the travel
document holder).
The Basic Inspection System with PACE is a PACE Terminal additionally
supporting/applying the Passive Authentication protocol and is authorised by
the travel document Issuer through the Document Verifier of receiving state to
read a subset of data stored on the travel document.
Biographical data
(bio data).
The personalized details of the bearer of the document appearing as text in
the visual and machine readable zones on the biographical data page of a
passport book or on a travel card or visa.
Biometric reference
data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the MRTD’s
chip as (i) digital portrait and (ii) optional biometric reference data.
Card Access Number
(CAN)
Password derived from a short number printed on the front side of the data-
page.
Certificate chain A sequence defining a hierarchy certificates. The Inspection System Certificate
is the lowest level, Document Verifier Certificate in between, and Country
Verifying Certification Authority Certificates are on the highest level. A
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Term Definition
certificate of a lower level is signed with the private key corresponding to the
public key in the certificate of the next higher level.
Counterfeit An unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine security document made
by whatever means.
Country Signing CA
Certificate (CCSCA)
Self-signed certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key
(KPu CSCA) issued by CSCA stored in the inspection system.
Country Signing
Certification
Authority (CSCA)
An organisation enforcing the policy of the travel document Issuer with
respect to confirming correctness of user and TSF data stored in the travel
document. The CSCA represents the country specific root of the PKI for the
travel documents and creates the Document Signer Certificates within this
PKI.
The CSCA also issues the self-signed CSCA Certificate (CCSCA) having to be
distributed by strictly secure diplomatic means, see. [ICAO-9303], 5.5.1.
The Country Signing Certification Authority issuing certificates for Document
Signers (cf. [6]) and the domestic CVCA may be integrated into a single entity,
e.g. a Country Certification Authority. However, even in this case, separate
key pairs must be used for different roles, see [TR-03110-1].
Country Verifying
Certification
Authority (CVCA)
An organisation enforcing the privacy policy of the travel document Issuer
with respect to protection of user data stored in the travel document (at a trial
of a terminal to get an access to these data). The CVCA represents the
country specific root of the PKI for the terminals using it and creates the
Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI. Updates of the public key of the
CVCA are distributed in form of CVCA Link-Certificates, see [TR-03110-1].
Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does not imply any certificate-based
terminal authentication, the current TOE cannot recognise a CVCS as a
subject; hence, it merely represents an organizational entity within this ST.
The Country Signing Certification Authority (CSCA) issuing certificates for
Document Signers (cf. [ICAO-9303]) and the domestic CVCA may be
integrated into a single entity, e.g. a Country Certification Authority. However,
even in this case, separate key pairs must be used for different roles, see [TR-
03110-1].
Current date The maximum of the effective dates of valid CVCA, DV and domestic
Inspection System certificates known to the TOE. It is used the validate card
verifiable certificates.
CV Certificate Certificate of the new public key of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority signed with the old public key of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority where the certificate effective date for the new key is before the
certificate expiration date of the certificate for the old key.
CVCA link Certificate Certificate of the new public key of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority signed with the old public key of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority where the certificate effective date for the new key is before the
certificate expiration date of the certificate for the old key.
Document Basic
Access Key
Derivation Algorithm
The [ICAO-9303] describes the Document Basic Access Key Derivation
Algorithm on how terminals may derive the Document Basic Access Keys from
the second line of the printed MRZ data.
13
Term Definition
Document Details
Data
Data printed on and electronically stored in the travel document representing
the document details like document type, issuing state, document number,
date of issue, date of expiry, issuing authority. The document details data are
less-sensitive data.
Document Basic
Access Keys
Pair of symmetric Triple-DES keys used for secure messaging with encryption
(key KENC) and message authentication (key KMAC) of data transmitted
between the MRTD’s chip and the inspection system [ICAO-9303]. It is drawn
from the printed MRZ of the passport book to authenticate an entity able to
read the printed MRZ of the passport book.
Document Security
Object (SOD)
A RFC3369 CMS Signed Data Structure, signed by the Document Signer (DS).
Carries the hash values of the LDS Data Groups. It is stored in the MRTD’s
chip. It may carry the Document Signer Certificate (CDS). [ICAO-9303]
Document Signer
(DS)
An organisation enforcing the policy of the CSCA and signing the Document
Security Object stored on the travel document for passive authentication.
A Document Signer is authorised by the national CSCA issuing the Document
Signer Certificate (CDS), see [TR-03110-1] and [ICAO-9303].
This role is usually delegated to a Personalisation Agent.
Document Verifier
(DV)
An organisation enforcing the policies of the CVCA and of a Service Provider
(here: of a governmental organisation / inspection authority) and managing
terminals belonging together (e.g. terminals operated by a State’s border
police), by – inter alia – issuing Terminal Certificates. A Document Verifier is
therefore a Certification Authority, authorised by at least the national CVCA to
issue certificates for national terminals, see [TR-03110-1].
Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does not imply any certificate-based
terminal authentication, the current TOE cannot recognise a DV as a subject;
hence, it merely represents an organisational entity within this ST.
There can be Domestic and Foreign DV: A domestic DV is acting under the
policy of the domestic CVCA being run by the travel document Issuer; a
foreign DV is acting under a policy of the respective foreign CVCA (in this case
there shall be an appropriate agreement between the travel document Issuer
und a foreign CVCA ensuring enforcing the travel document Issuer’s privacy
policy) 1 2
Eavesdropper A threat agent with low attack potential reading the communication between
the MRTD’s chip and the inspection system to gain the data on the MRTD’s
chip.
Enrolment The process of collecting biometric samples from a person and the subsequent
preparation and storage of biometric reference templates representing that
person's identity. [ICAO-9303]
ePassport application [PP-SAC] definition
A part of the TOE containing the non-executable, related user data (incl.
biometric) as well as the data needed for authentication (incl. MRZ); this
application is intended to be used by authorities, amongst other as a machine
readable travel document (MRTD).
See [TR-03110-1].
1
The form of such an agreement may be of formal and informal nature; the term ‘agreement’ is used in the
current ST in order to reflect an appropriate relationship between the parties involved.
2
Existing of such an agreement may be technically reflected by means of issuing a CCVCA-F for the Public Key of
the foreign CVCA signed by the domestic CVCA.
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Term Definition
[PP-EAC] definition
Non-executable data defining the functionality of the operating system on the
IC as the travel document’s chip. It includes
the file structure implementing the LDS [ICAO-9303],
the definition of the User Data, but does not include the User Data itself (i.e.
content of EF.DG1 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16, EF.COM and EF.SOD) and
the TSF Data including the definition the authentication data but except the
authentication data itself.
Extended Access
Control
Security mechanism identified in [ICAO-9303] by which means the MTRD’s
chip (i) verifies the authentication of the inspection systems authorized to read
the optional biometric reference data, (ii) controls the access to the optional
biometric reference data and (iii) protects the confidentiality and integrity of
the optional biometric reference data during their transmission to the
inspection system by secure messaging. The Personalization Agent may use
the same mechanism to authenticate themselves with Personalization Agent
Authentication Private Key and to get write and read access to the logical
MRTD and TSF data.
Extended Inspection
System (EIS)
A role of a terminal as part of an inspection system which is in addition to
Basic Inspection System authorized by the issuing State or Organization to
read the optional biometric reference data and supports the terminals part of
the Extended Access Control Authentication Mechanism.
Forgery Fraudulent alteration of any part of the genuine document, e.g. changes to
the biographical data or the portrait.
Global
Interoperability
The capability of inspection systems (either manual or automated) in different
States throughout the world to exchange data, to process data received from
systems in other States, and to utilize that data in inspection operations in
their respective States. Global interoperability is a major objective of the
standardized specifications for placement of both eye-readable and machine
readable data in all MRTDs. [ICAO-9303]
IC Dedicated
Software
Software developed and injected into the chip hardware by the IC
manufacturer. Such software might support special functionality of the IC
hardware and be used, amongst other, for implementing delivery procedures
between different players. The usage of parts of the IC Dedicated Software
might be restricted to certain life phases.
IC Dedicated
Support Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which provides
functions after TOE Delivery. The usage of parts of the IC Dedicated Software
might be restricted to certain phases.
IC Dedicated Test
Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which is used to test
the TOE before TOE Delivery but which does not provide any functionality
thereafter.
IC Embedded
Software
Software embedded in an IC and not being designed by the IC developer. The
IC Embedded Software is designed in the design life phase and embedded
into the IC in the manufacturing life phase of the TOE.
IC Identification
Data
The IC manufacturer writes a unique IC identifier to the chip to control the IC
as travel document material during the IC manufacturing and the delivery
process to the travel document manufacturer.
Impostor A person who applies for and obtains a document by assuming a false name
and identity, or a person who alters his or her physical appearance to
represent himself or herself as another person for the purpose of using that
person’s document.
Improperly
documented person
A person who travels, or attempts to travel with: (a) an expired travel
document or an invalid visa; (b) a counterfeit, forged or altered travel
document or visa; (c) someone else’s travel document or visa; or (d) no travel
document or visa, if required. [ICAO-9303]
15
Term Definition
Initialisation Process of writing Initialisation Data (see below) to the TOE (TOE life-cycle,
Phase 2 Manufacturing, Step 3).
Initialisation Data Any data defined by the TOE Manufacturer and injected into the non-volatile
memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase 2). These data are for
instance used for traceability and for IC identification as MRTD’s material (IC
identification data).
Inspection The act of a State examining an MRTD presented to it by a traveler (the MRTD
holder) and verifying its authenticity. [ICAO-9303]
Inspection system
(IS)
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i)
examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity
and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder.
Integrated circuit
(IC)
Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or memory
functions. The MRTD’s chip is an integrated circuit.
Integrity Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s chip have
not been altered from that created by the issuing State or Organization
Issuing Organization Organization authorized to issue an official travel document (e.g. the United
Nations Organization, issuer of the Laissez-passer). [ICAO-9303]]
Issuing State The Country issuing the MRTD. [ICAO-9303]
Logical Data
Structure (LDS)
The collection of groupings of Data Elements stored in the optional capacity
expansion technology [ICAO-9303]. The capacity expansion technology used
is the MRTD’s chip.
Logical travel
document
Data of the travel document holder stored according to the Logical Data
Structure [ICAO-9303] as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated
circuit. It presents contactless readable data including (but not limited to)
personal data of the travel document holder
the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or
both and
the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16).
EF.COM and EF.SOD
Machine readable
travel document
(MRTD)
Official document issued by a State or Organization which is used by the
holder for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official document of
identity) and which contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a
separate mandatory data summary, intended for global use, reflecting
essential data elements capable of being machine read. [ICAO-9303]
Machine readable
zone (MRZ)
Fixed dimensional area located on the front of the MRTD or MRP Data Page
or, in the case of the TD1, the back of the MRTD, containing mandatory and
optional data for machine reading using OCR methods. [ICAO-9303]
The MRZ-Password is a restricted-revealable secret that is derived from the
machine readable zone and may be used for PACE.
Machine-verifiable
biometrics feature
A unique physical personal identification feature (e.g. an iris pattern,
fingerprint or facial characteristics) stored on a travel document in a form that
can be read and verified by machine. [ICAO-9303]
Manufacturer Generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing integrated circuit and the
travel document Manufacturer completing the IC to the travel document. The
Manufacturer is the default user of the TOE during the manufacturing life
phase. The TOE itself does not distinguish between the IC Manufacturer and
travel document Manufacturer using this role Manufacturer.
16
Term Definition
Metadata of a CV
Certificate
Data within the certificate body (excepting Public Key) as described in [TR-
03110-1].
The metadata of a CV certificate comprise the following elements:
- Certificate Profile Identifier,
- Certificate Authority Reference,
- Certificate Holder Reference,
- Certificate Holder Authorisation Template,
- Certificate Effective Date,
- Certificate Expiration Date.
Optional biometric
reference data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the MRTD’s
chip as (i) encoded finger image(s) (DG3) or (ii) encoded iris image(s) (DG4)
or (iii) both. Note that the European commission decided to use only finger
print and not to use iris images as optional biometric reference data.
Password
Authenticated
Connection
Establishment
(PACE)
A communication establishment protocol defined in [ICAO-9303] part 11. The
PACE Protocol is a password authenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement
protocol providing implicit password-based authentication of the
communication partners (e.g. smart card and the terminal connected): i.e.
PACE provides a verification, whether the communication partners share the
same value of a password π). Based on this authentication, PACE also
provides a secure communication, whereby confidentiality and authenticity of
data transferred within this communication channel are maintained.
PACE passwords Passwords used as input for PACE. This may either be the CAN or the SHA-1-
value of the concatenation of Serial Number, Date of Birth and Date of Expiry
as read from the MRZ, see [ICAO-9303] part 11
Passive
authentication
(i) verification of the digital signature of the Document Security Object and (ii)
comparing the hash values of the read LDS data fields with the hash values
contained in the Document Security Object.
Personalisation The process by which the Personalisation Data are stored in and
unambiguously, inseparably associated with the travel document. This may
also include the optional biometric data collected during the “Enrolment” (cf.
paragraph 1.7.4.3, TOE life-cycle, Phase 3, Step 6).
Personalisation
Agent
An organisation acting on behalf of the travel document Issuer to personalise
the travel document for the travel document holder by some or all of the
following activities:
establishing the identity of the travel document holder for the biographic data
in the travel document,
enrolling the biometric reference data of the travel document holder,
writing a subset of these data on the physical travel document (optical
personalisation) and storing them in the travel document (electronic
personalisation) for the travel document holder as defined in [TR-03110-1],
writing the document details data,
writing the initial TSF data,
signing the Document Security Object defined in
[ICAO-9303] (in the role of DS).
Please note that the role ‘Personalisation Agent’ may be distributed among
several institutions according to the operational policy of the travel document
Issuer.
Generating signature key pair(s) is not in the scope of the tasks of this role.
Personalisation Data A set of data incl.
individual-related data (biographic and biometric data) of the travel document
holder,
dedicated document details data and
dedicated initial TSF data (incl. the Document Security Object).
17
Term Definition
Personalisation data are gathered and then written into the non-volatile
memory of the TOE by the Personalisation Agent in the life-cycle phase card
issuing.
Personalization
Agent Authentication
Information
TSF data used for authentication proof and verification of the Personalisation
Agent.
Personalisation
Agent Key
Symmetric cryptographic key or key set (MAC, ENC) used
by the Personalisation Agent to prove his identity and get access to the logical
travel document and
by the MRTD’s chip to verify the authentication attempt of a terminal as
Personalization Agent according to the SFR
FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE.
Physical part of the
travel document
Travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip using secure printing to
present data including (but not limited to)
biographical data,
data of the machine-readable zone,
photographic image and
other data.
Pre-personalization Process of writing Pre-Personalisation Data (see below) to the TOE including
the creation of the travel document Application (TOE life-cycle, Phase 2, Step
5)
Pre-personalization
Data
Any data that is injected into the non-volatile memory of the TOE by the
MRTD Manufacturer (Phase 2) for traceability of non-personalized MRTD’s
and/or to secure shipment within or between life cycle phases 2 and 3. It
contains (but is not limited to) the Personalization Agent Key Pair and Chip
Life-Cycle Production data (CPLC data).
Pre-personalised
travel document’s
chip
Travel document’s chip equipped with a unique identifier.
Receiving State The Country to which the MRTD holder is applying for entry. [ICAO-9303]
Reference data Data enrolled for a known identity and used by the verifier to check the
verification data provided by an entity to prove this identity in an
authentication attempt.
RF-terminal A device being able to establish communication with an RF-chip according to
ISO/IEC 14443 [ISO14443].
Secondary image A repeat image of the holder’s portrait reproduced elsewhere in the document
by whatever means [ICAO-9303].
Secure messaging in
encrypted /combined
mode
Secure messaging using encryption and message authentication code
according to ISO/IEC 7816-4 [ISO7816]
Service Provider An official organisation (inspection authority) providing inspection service
which can be used by the travel document holder. Service Provider uses
terminals (BIS-PACE) managed by a DV.
Skimming Imitation of the inspection system to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via
the contactless or contact based communication channel of the TOE without
knowledge of the printed MRZ data.
Standard Inspection
Procedure
A specific order of authentication steps between an travel document and a
terminal as required by [ICAO- 9303] and [TR-03110-1], namely
PACE or BAC and
Passive Authentication with SOD.
18
Term Definition
SIP can generally be used by BIS-PACE and BIS-BAC.
Terminal A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE either through
the contact based or contactless interface. A technical system verifying
correspondence between the password stored in the travel document and the
related value presented to the terminal by the travel document presenter.
In this ST the role ‘Terminal’ corresponds to any terminal being authenticated
by the TOE.
Terminal may implement the terminal’s part of the PACE protocol and thus
authenticate itself to the travel document using a shared password (CAN or
MRZ).
Terminal
Authorization
Intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations of the Inspection System
Certificate, the Document Verifier Certificate and Country Verifier Certification
Authority which shall be valid for the Current Date.
Terminal
Authorisation Level
Intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorisations defined by the Terminal
Certificate, the Document Verifier Certificate and Country Verifying
Certification Authority which shall be all valid for the Current Date.
TOE tracing data Technical information about the current and previous locations of the travel
document gathered by inconspicuous (for the travel document holder)
recognising the travel document.
Travel document Official document issued by a state or organisation which is used by the holder
for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official document of identity) and
which contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a separate
mandatory data summary, intended for global use, reflecting essential data
elements capable of being machine read; see [ICAO-9303] (there “Machine
readable travel document”).
Travel document
(electronic)
The contact based or contactless smart card integrated into the plastic or
paper, optical readable cover and providing the following application:
ePassport.
Travel Document
Holder
The rightful holder of the travel document for whom the issuing State or
Organisation personalised the travel document.
Travel document’s
Chip
A contact based / contactless integrated circuit chip complying with ISO/IEC
14443 [15] and programmed according to the Logical Data Structure as
specified by ICAO, [ICAO-9303], sec III.
Traveler Person presenting the travel document to the inspection system and claiming
the identity of the travel document holder.
TSF data Data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the operation of the TOE
(CC part 1 [CC-1]).
Unpersonalised
travel document
The travel document that contains the travel document chip holding only
Initialisation Data and Pre-personalisation Data as delivered to the
Personalisation Agent from the Manufacturer.
User data All data (being not authentication data)
stored in the context of the ePassport application of the travel document as
defined in [5] and
being allowed to be read out solely by an authenticated terminal acting as
Basic Inspection System with PACE.
CC give the following generic definitions for user data:
Data created by and for the user that does not affect the operation of the TSF
(CC part 1 [CC-1]). Information stored in TOE resources that can be operated
19
Term Definition
upon by users in accordance with the SFRs and upon which the TSF places no
special meaning (CC part 2 [CC-2]).
Verification The process of comparing a submitted biometric sample against the biometric
reference template of a single enrollee whose identity is being claimed, to
determine whether it matches the enrollee’s template. [ICAO-9303]
Verification data Data provided by an entity in an authentication attempt to prove their identity
to the verifier. The verifier checks whether the verification data match the
reference data known for the claimed identity.
20
2.2 Abbreviations
Acronym Definition
CC Common Criteria
DBI Digital Blurring of Images
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
PP Protection Profile
PS Personalisation System
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
BIS Basic Inspection System
DES Data Encryption Standard
DF Dedicated File
DH Diffie Hellman
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EF Elementary File
EIS Extended Inspection System
FID File identifier
GP Global Platform
IC Integrated Chip
ICC Integrated Chip card
IFD Interface Device
MAC Message Authentication code
PIN Personal Identification Number
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
ROM Read Only Memory
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman
RSA CRT Rivest Shamir Adleman – Chinese Remainder Theorem
SCP Secure Channel Procotol
SHA Secure Hashing Algorithm
TOE Target Of Evaluation
21
2.3 References
Reference Description
[AGD_OPE] FQR 220 1496 Ed 5 - COSMO J TnD V5.1 – Operational User Guidance
(AGD_OPE)
[AGD_PRE] FQR 220 1495 Ed 10 - COSMO J TnD V5.1 – Preparative Procedures (AGD_PRE)
[ANSSI-
FRP256V1]
Avis relatif aux paramètres de courbes elliptiques définis par l'Etat français
NOR: PRMD1123151V (Le 18 avril 2012)- ANSSI
[BAC-PP] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with
"ICAO Application", Basic Access Control, BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009, Version 1.10,
25th March 2009
[EAC-PP] EAC- Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Extended
Access control – BSI-PP-0056 v1.10 25th march 2009
[CC-1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and general model. Version 3.1. Revision 5. April 2017. CCMB-
2017-04-001.
[CC-2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2:
Security functional requirements. Version 3.1. Revision 5. April 2017. CCMB-
2017-04-002.
[CC-3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3:
Security assurance requirements. Version 3.1. Revision 5. April 2017. CCMB-
2017-04-003.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Evaluation Methodology. Version 3.1. Revision 5. April 2017. CCMB-2017-04-
004.
[ICAO-9303] International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable
Travel Documents – 7th edition, 2015
[TR-03110-1] Technical Guideline TR-03110-1, Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine
Readable Travel Documents –Part 1 – eMRTDs with BAC/PACEv2 and EACv1,
Version 2.10, 20.03.2012 by BSI
[TR-03110-3] TR-03110-3 Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel
Documents – Part 3: Common Specifications, version 2.10, 2012-03-07 by BSI
[PCA-eMRTD] Polymorphic eMRTD Specification. V2.1. 03-04-2018. IDEMIA.
[ISO14443] ISO/IEC 14443 Identification cards -- Contactless integrated circuit cards --
Proximity cards, 2008-11
[ISO15946-2] ISO/IEC15946-2. Information technology – Security techniques –
Cryptographic techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 2: Digital signatures,
2002.
[ISO18013-3] ISO/IEC 18013-3: Information technology — Personal identification — ISO-
compliant driving licence. Part 3: Access control, authentication and integrity
validation, 2009-03-01
Including ISO/CEI 18013-3/AC1:2011, TECHNICAL CORRIGENDUM 1,
Published 2011-12-01
[ISO7816] ISO/IEC 7816: Identification cards — Integrated circuit cards, Version Second
Edition, 2008
[ISO9796-2] ISO/IEC 9796-2: 2002, Information Technology - Security Techniques - Digital
Signature Schemes giving message recovery - Part 2: Integer factorization
based mechanisms
[ISO9797] ISO/IEC 9797-1:1999, Information technology —Security techniques —
Message Authentication Codes (MACs) — Part 1: Mechanisms using a block
cipher.
[JCAPI] Java Card Platform, Application Programming Interface, Classic Edition,
Version 3.0.4, 2011. Published by ORACLE.
22
Reference Description
[PLTF-ST] JCOP 4 P71, Security Target for JCOP 4 P71 / SE050, Rev. 4.1, 2021-02-12.
[PLTF-UM] JCOP 4 P71, User manual for JCOP 4 P71, Rev. 3.7, DocNo 469537, 20190531,
NXP Semiconductors
[SIC-PP] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages Version
1.0, Registered and Certified by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI) under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014.
[NIST-180-4] NIST. FIPS 180-4, Secure Hash Standard, February 2011.
[NIST-186-3] NIST. Digital Signature Standard (DSS), FIPS 186-3, 2009
[NIST-197] NIST. Specification for the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), FIPS PUB
197, 2001
[RFC-5639] Lochter, Manfred; Merkle, Johannes. Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
Brainpool Standard Curves and Curve Generation, RFC 5639, 2010
[TR-02102] TR-02102 Technische Richtlinie Kryptographische Algorithmen und
Schlüssellängen, Version 2013.02, January 9th
2013 by BSI
23
3 TOE Overview
The TOE is applet named TnD v5.1 based on NXP JCOP 4 P71 Platform, which is used as an ICAO
eMRTD, as an official document of identity and may also be used as an ISO driving license, compliant
to ISO/IEC 18013 or ISO/IEC TR 19446.
The TOE is a bare microchip with its external interfaces for communication. The physical medium on
which the microchip is mounted is not part of the target of evaluation because it does not alter nor
modify any security functions of the TOE.
The TOE may be used on several form factors (like Chip module, Chip modules on a reel, Chip
modules embedded in ID3 passport booklets, Chip modules embedded in ID1 cards or ID3 holder
pages, Chip modules embedded in antenna inlays, Passport booklet).
The TOE supports verification using Basic Access Control, Chip Authentication and Active
Authentication.
This product is loaded on the NXP JCOP Platform, for details see [PLTF-ST].
The TOE consists of:
The MRTD’s chip circuitry and the IC dedicated software forming the Smart Card Platform (Hardware
Platform and Hardware Abstraction Layer);
The IC embedded software running on the Smart Card Platform consisting of
Java Card virtual machine, ensuring language-level security;
Java Card runtime environment, providing additional security features for Java card technology
enabled devices;
Java card API, providing access to card’s resources for the Applet;
Global Platform Card Manager, responsible for management of Applets on the card.
Crypto Library.
TnD v5.1 Applet along with Common package and Adapter package.
The TOE described in this security target is the BAC TOE of the product, conformant to Configuration
in Bold in next table.
Different configurations of the TOE are under evaluation. This ST considers only BAC, Chip
Authentication and Active Authentication:
Configuration PP Conformity Extensions
1 EAC PP0056v1 (EAC) AA
SM (DES + AES) on read DG3+DG4 after
EAC
2 ICAO/EAC with PACE
eMRTD, Polymorphic
LDS2 and Driver Licence
PP 0068 (PACE) AA
PACE-CAM
PACE-CAM/TA without CA
BAC de-activation
SM (DES + AES) on read
DG3+DG4 After EAC
LDS2
Polymorphism
PP0056v2 (EAC with
PACE)
3 BAC PP 0055 (BAC) AA + CA
Table 1 Configurations of the TnD application
24
The BAC TOE is instantiated during the application Pre-personalisation with the creation of the MF /
DF required for this configuration.’
Moreover, further configuration may also be done to each type of application to serve use cases other
than those behaviourally defined in the referenced normative documents.
In the rest of the document, the word “MRTD” may be understood either as a MRTD in the sense of
ICAO, or a driving license compliant to ISO/IEC 18013 or ISO/IEC TR 19446 depending on the
targeted usage envisioned by the issuer.
Depending on its configuration during pre-personalisation and personalisation, the TOE can be used
as:
ICAO/BAC eMRTD,
EU/ISO Driving Licence.
The BAC eMRTD and Driving Licence are installed as separate application instances of the applet
having their own dedicated application identifiers and personalisation. The following TOE
configurations are covered within the scope of this Security Target:
Configuration BAC eMRTD Driving licence
a present -
b - present
Table 2 TOE Configurations during Personalisation
When an Issuing state is using the product as an ISO compliant Driving licence, the following name
mapping of roles, definitions, data groups and protocol is applicable within the scope of this security
target:
MRTD ISO Driving License
MRTD IDL
ICAO ISO/IEC
ICAO 9303 ISO/IEC 18013 or ISO/IEC TR 19446
BAC BAP-1
DG3 DG7
DG4 DG8
DG15 DG13
MRZ MRZ or SAI (Scanning area identifier)
Traveler Holder
Table 3 eMRTD and IDL Terminology
3.1 TOE Description
The TOE scope encompasses the following features:
MRTD BAC with AA and CA in option
o Personalisation phase including:
 authentication protocol;
 access control;
 encryption mechanism involved in key loading;
 initialisation of the LDS;
 data loading;
 phase switching;
o Import and/or generation of CA keys in personalisation phase;
25
o Import and/or generation of AA keys in personalisation phase
Nevertheless, the TOE in the TnD application embeds other secure functionalities they are
not in the scope of this evaluation and are in the scope of other evaluations.
In the use phase of the product, and for interoperability purposes, the MRTD will most likely
support BAC, PACE and EAC.
• If the terminal reads the content of the MRTD by performing BAC then EAC,
the security of the MRTD will be covered by the security evaluation of the TOE
described by the ST claiming compliance [PLTF-ST] and the TOE described by the ST
claiming compliance to PP EAC assuming PACE is not supported (as not used for the
inspection procedure).
• If the terminal reads the content of the MRTD by performing PACE then EAC,
the security of the MRTD will be covered by the security evaluation of the TOE
described by the ST claiming compliance to PP with PACE assuming BAC is not
supported (as not used for the inspection procedure).
• If the terminal reads the content of the MRTD by performing BAC, the security
of the MRTD will be covered by the security evaluation of the TOE described by the
ST claiming compliance to PP BAC assuming EAC and PACE are not supported (as not
used for the inspection procedure).
3.1.1 Physical scope
The TOE is a bare microchip with its external interfaces for communication. The physical
medium on which the microchip is mounted is not part of the target of evaluation because it
does not alter nor modify any security functions of the TOE.
The TOE may be used on several form factors within an inlay, or eCover; in a plastic card.
The physical form of the module is depicted in figure below. The cryptographic boundary of
the module is the surface and edges of the die and associated bond pads, shown as circles in
the following figure.
26
Figure 1 Physical Form
The contactless ports of the module require connection to an antenna. The module relies on
[ISO7816] and [ISO14443] card readers and antenna connections as input/output devices.
Port Description Logical Interface Type
VCC, GND ISO 7816: Supply
voltage
Power (not available in contactless‐only configurations)
RST ISO 7816:Reset Control in (not available in contactless‐only
configurations)
CLK ISO 7816: Clock Control in (not available in
contactless‐only configurations)
I/O ISO 7816: Input/
Output
Control in, Data in, Data out, Status out (not available
in
contactless‐only configurations)
LA, LB ISO 14443: Antenna Power, Control in, Data in, Data out, Status out (Not
available in Contact‐only configurations)
Table 4 Ports and Interfaces
The following guidance documents will be provided for the TOE:
Description Audience Form Factor of Delivery
[AGD_PRE] Personalising Agent Electronic Version
27
[AGD_OPE] End user of the TOE
[PLTF-UM] Application Developer
Table 5 TOE Guidance
This ST Lite will also be provided as a guidance document along with above mentioned
documents.
All the above mentioned guidance documents will be delivered via mail in a .pgp encrypted
format.
Form factor and Delivery Preparation:
1.As per the Software Development Process of IDEMIA, upon completion of development
activities, particular applet will be uploaded into PS in CAP file format. Before
uploading, the applet will be verified through Oracle verifier and IDEMIA verifier.
2.During Release for Sample as project milestone, status of the applet in PS will be
changed into “Pilot version” to be used further for manufacturing samples.
3.During Software Delivery Review as the final R&D project milestone, status of the
applet in PS will be changed into “Industrial release” to be used further for mass
production.
Refer Life Cycle chapter of this ST for more details regarding TOE delivery as per different
options.
3.1.2 Logical Scope
The Target of Evaluation (TOE), addressed by the current security target, is an electronic
travel document representing a contactless/contact based smart card or passport
programmed according to Logical data structure (LDS). Electronic Passport is specified in
[ICAO-9303], additionally providing the Chip Authentication according to [TR-03110-1] and
Active Authentication according to [ICAO-9303]. The TOE may also be used as an ISO
driving license, compliant to ISO/IEC 18013 or ISO/IEC TR 19446.
The TOE is composed of
 the NXP JCOP 4 P71, composed of
o the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7121
including IC Dedicated Software) with hardware for the contact and
contactless interface;
o the Crypto Library on P71;
o the IC Embedded Software (operating system): NXP JCOP 4;
 The MRTD application TnD v5.1 loaded FLASH;
 The associated guidance documentation in [AGD_PRE] and [AGD_OPE];
 The Personalisation Agent Key set.
The TOE is a composition with the NXP JCOP 4 P71, which has been certified by the Dutch
NSCIB certification body.
28
The TOE comprises of 3 basic parts that work together to provide the functionality defined in
this Security Target. They are:
1.The TnD Applet
2.The Common Package
3.The Adapter Package
Figure 2 Logical Scope of the TOE
3.2 Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware required by the TOE
There is no explicit non-TOE hardware, software or firmware required by the TOE to perform
its claimed security features. The TOE is defined to comprise the chip, the complete
operating system and application. Note, the inlay holding the chip as well as the antenna and
the booklet (holding the printed MRZ) are needed to represent a complete travel document.
Nevertheless, these parts are not inevitable for the secure operation of the TOE.
In order to be powered up and to be able to communicate, the TOE needs a card reader.
3.3 TOE usage and security features for operational use
A State or Organization issues MRTDs to be used by the holder for international travel. The
traveler presents a MRTD to the inspection system to prove his or her identity. The MRTD in
context of this Security Target contains (i) visual (eye readable) biographical data and
portrait of the holder, (ii) a separate data summary (MRZ data) for visual and machine
reading using OCR methods in the Machine readable zone (MRZ) and (iii) data elements on
the MRTD’s chip according to LDS for contactless machine reading. The authentication of the
traveler is based on (i) the possession of a valid MRTD personalised for a holder with the
claimed identity as given on the biographical data page and (ii) optional biometrics using the
reference data stored in the MRTD. The issuing State or Organization ensures the
authenticity of the data of genuine MRTD’s. The receiving State trusts a genuine MRTD of an
issuing State or Organization.
The MRTD is viewed as unit of
29
a) the physical MRTD as travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip. It
presents visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the
MRTD holder
i) the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book,
ii) the printed data in the Machine-Readable Zone (MRZ) and
iii) the printed portrait.
b) the logical MRTD as data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data
Structure [ICAO_9303] as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated circuit. It
presents contactless readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the
MRTD holder
i) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
ii) the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
iii) the optional biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s)
(EF.DG4) or both
iv) the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16) and
v) the Document security object.
The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the MRTD to maintain the
authenticity and integrity of the MRTD and their data. The MRTD as the passport book and
the MRTD’s chip is uniquely identified by the Document Number.
The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper,
security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRTD’s chip) and organizational
security measures (e.g. control of materials, personalisation procedures) [ICAO_9303].
These security measures include the binding of the MRTD’s chip to the passport book.
The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by
the document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features of
the MRTD’s chip.
The ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the optional
advanced security methods Basic Access Control to the logical MRTD, Extended Access
Control to and the Data Encryption of additional sensitive biometrics as optional security
measure in the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [ICAO_9303]. The Passive Authentication Mechanism and
the Data Encryption are performed completely and independently on the TOE by the TOE
environment.
This security target addresses the protection of the logical travel document (i) in integrity by
write-only-once access control and by physical means, and (ii) in confidentiality by the Basic
Access Control Mechanism. Also it addresses the Active Authentication and Chip
Authentication Version 1 described in [TR_03110].
During the pre-personalisation and personalisation, the Personalisation Agent, once
authenticated, gets the rights (access control) for (1) reading and writing data,(2)
instantiating the application, and (4) writing of personalisation data. The Personalisation
Agent can so create the file structure (MF / ADF) required for this configuration.
Mutatis mutandis, the TOE may also be used as an ISO driving license, compliant to
ISO/IEC 18013 or ISO/IEC TR 19446 supporting BAP-1 (the same protocol as BAC but used
in the context of driving license), AA and CA, as both applications (MRTD and IDL) share the
same protocols and data structure organization. Therefore, in the rest of the document, the
word “MRTD” MAY be understood either as a MRTD in the sense of ICAO, or a driving license
30
compliant to ISO/IEC 18013 or ISO/IEC TR 19446 depending on the targeted usage
envisioned by the issuer.
3.3.1 Security Features
3.3.1.1 Active Authentication (AA)
Active Authentication is an authentication mechanism ensuring the chip is genuine. It uses a
challenge-response protocol between the IS and the chip.
Active Authentication is realized with the INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command. The
key and algorithms supported are the following:
RSA ISO/IEC 9796-2 with a key length of 1536, 1792, 2048, 2560, 3072, 3584 and 4096 bits
and hashing algorithm of SHA1 or SHA256.
ECDSA over prime field curves with hashing algorithm of SHA1 or SHA256 and the key sizes
192 to 521.
3.3.1.2 Basic Access Control (BAC)
The protocol for Basic Access Control is specified by [BAC-PP]. Basic Access Control checks that the
terminal has physical access to the MRTD’s data page. This is enforced by requiring the terminal to
derive an authentication key from the optically read MRZ of the MRTD. The protocol for Basic Access
Control is based on [ISO11770-2] key establishment mechanism 6. This protocol is also used to
generate session keys that are used to protect the confidentiality (and integrity) of the transmitted
data.
The Basic Access Control (BAC) is a security feature that is supported by the TOE. The inspection
system
Reads the printed data in the MRZ (for MRTD),
Authenticates itself as inspection system by means of keys derived from MRZ data. After successful
3DES based authentication, the TOE provides read access to data requiring BAC rights by means of a
private communication (secure messaging) with the inspection system.
The purpose of this mechanism is to ensure that the holder gives access to the IS to the logical MRTD
(data stored in the chip); It is achieved by a mutual authentication.
Once the mutual authentication is performed, a secure messaging is available to protect the
communication between the chip and the IS.
This table lists the supported configurations for BAC protocol:
Configuration Key Algo Key Length Hash Algo MAC Algo
BAC 3DES 2Key 16-bytes SHA-1 Retail MAC
Table 6 BAC Configuration
3.3.1.3 Chip Authentication
The Chip Authentication Protocol is an ephemeral-static Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol that
provides secure communication and unilateral authentication of the MRTD chip.
The protocol establishes Secure Messaging between an MRTD chip and a terminal based on a static
key pair stored on the MRTD chip. Chip Authentication is an alternative to the optional ICAO Active
Authentication, i.e. it enables the terminal to verify that the MRTD chip is genuine but has two
advantages over the original protocol:
Challenge Semantics are prevented because the transcripts produced by this protocol are
nontransferable.
Besides authentication of the MRTD chip this protocol also provides strong session keys.
31
The protocol in version 1 provides implicit authentication of both the MRTD chip itself and the stored
data by performing Secure Messaging using the new session keys.
32
4 Life Cycle
The TOE life cycle in the following figure distinguishes stages for development, production,
preparation and operational use in accordance with the standard smart card life cycle [PP_IC].
Figure 3 Life cycle Overview
4.1 Development Environment
In this environment, the following two phases take place:
 Phase 1: IC Embedded Software Development (Java Card Open Platform components and
TnD v5.1 applet)
 Phase 2: IC Development
The IC Embedded Software Developer is in charge of the specification, development and validation of
the software (Java Card Open Platform and TnD v5.1 applet).
The IC Developer designs the IC, develops the IC dedicated software and provides information,
software or tools to the IC embedded software developer.
Roles, actors, sites and coverage for this environment of the product life cycle are listed in the table
below:
33
Role Actor Site Covered by
TnD v5.1 Applet Developer IDEMIA MANILA,
JAKARTA,COURBEVOIE and
PESSAC R&D sites
ALC
Embedded Software Developer
(Java Card Open Platform)
NXP Platform Developer
Refer to [PLTF-ST]
ALC
Redaction and Review of
Documents
IDEMIA NOIDA and HAARLEM R&D
site
ALC
IC Developer NXP IC Manufacturer
Refer to [PLTF-ST]
ALC
4.2 Production Environment
In this environment, the following two phases take place:
 Phase 3: IC Manufacturing
 Phase 4: Smart Card Loading
The TnD v5.1 Applet run time code, Common Package and Adapter Package is integrated in FLASH of
the chip.
Depending on the intention:
(Option 1) the TnD v5.1 application with Common package and Adapter package is securely
delivered directly from the software developer (IDEMIA R&D Audited Site) to the IC manufacturer
(NXP Audited Site). The applet code will be integrated into FLASH by the IC manufacturer on top of
the platform already loaded by IC manufacturer (NXP), or
(Option 2) the TnD v5.1 application with Common package and Adapter package and the guidance
documentation are securely delivered directly from the software developer (IDEMIA R&D Audited Site)
to the travel document manufacturer (IDEMIA Audited Production Sites or IDEMIA Non-Audited Sites)
for production. The applet code will be integrated into FLASH by the IDEMIA audited production sites
or non-audited sites on top of the platform already loaded by IC manufacturer (NXP), or
(Option 3) the TnD v5.1 application with Common package and Adapter package and the guidance
documentation are securely delivered directly from the software developer (IDEMIA R&D Audited Site)
to external authorized agent (other external sites) for production. The applet code will be integrated
into FLASH by the external authorized agent in external sites on top of the platform already loaded by
IC manufacturer (NXP) using guidance documents of the applet.
Several life cycles are available, depending when the Flash Code is loaded. The following tables
present roles, actors, sites and coverage for this for this environment of the product life-cycle and
describe for each of them the TOE delivery point.
Role Package to be
loaded
Actor Site Covered
by
IC manufacturer CAP file of the applet
and additional
packages
Manufactur
er
IC manufacturer
production plants
[PLTF-ST]
ALC
Smart card loader - - - -
TOE Delivery Point
Table 7 CAP file of the applet and additional packages is loaded at IC manufacturer
(Option 1)
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Role Package to be
loaded
Actor Site Covered
by
IC manufacturer - - - -
TOE Delivery Point
Smart card loader
CAP file of the
applet and
additional packages
IDEMIA IDEMIA Audited
Production Sites
(Shenzhen, Haarlem,
Vitré, Noida, Ostrava)
and IDEMIA Non
Audited Sites
ALC or
AGD
Table 8 CAP file of the applet and additional packages is loaded through the loader of the
IC (Option 2)
Role Package to be
loaded
Actor Site Covered
by
IC manufacturer - - - -
TOE Delivery Point
Smart card loader
CAP file of the
applet and
additional packages
External
Authorized
Agent
External Sites AGD
Table 9 CAP file of the applet and additional packages is loaded through the loader of the
IC (Option 3)
4.3 Preparation Environment
In this environment, the following two phases take place:
 Phase 5: Pre-personalisation of the applet
 Phase 6: Personalisation
The preparation environment may not necessarily take place in a manufacturing site, but may be
performed anywhere. All along these two phases, the TOE is self-protected as it requires the
authentication of the pre-personalisation agent or personalisation agent prior to any operation.
The TnD v5.1 applet is pre-personalised and personalised according to [AGD_PRE].
At the end of phase 6, the TOE is constructed. These two phases are covered by [AGD_PRE] tasks of
the TOE and [PLTF-UM] tasks of [PLTF-ST].
4.4 Operational Environment
The TOE is used as a travel document's chip by the traveller and the inspection systems in the
“Operational Use” phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy of the issuing
State or Organisation and can be used according to the security policy of the issuing State but they
can never be modified for eMRTD application.
Note that applications can be loaded onto the JCOP platform during this phase.
During this phase, the TOE may be used as described in [AGD_OPE] of the TOE.
This phase is covered by [AGD_OPE] tasks of the TOE and [PLTF-UM] tasks of [PLTF-ST].
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5 Conformance Claims
5.1 CC Conformance Claim
This security target claims conformance to the Common Criteria version 3.1, revision 5 ([CC-1], [CC-2]
and [CC-3]).
The conformance to the Common Criteria is claimed as follows:
CC Conformance rationale
Part 2
Conformance with the extended3
part:
FAU_SAS.1 “Audit Storage”
FCS_RND.1 “Quality metric for random numbers”
FMT_LIM.1 “Limited capabilities”
FMT_LIM.2 “Limited availability”
FPT_EMS.1 “TOE Emanation”
FIA_API.1 “Authentication Proof of Identity”
Part 3 Conformance to Part 3.
Table 8: Conformance Rationale
The Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation [CEM] has been taken into
account.
Application note
Not all key sizes specified in this security target have sufficient cryptographic strength for satisfying
the AVA_VAN.5 “high attack potential”. In order to be protected against attackers with a "high attack
potential", sufficiently large cryptographic key sizes SHALL be configured for this TOE. References can
be found in national and international document standards. Further details have been specified in the
TOE’s guidance documentation [AGD_PRE].
5.2 PP Claim
This security target claims strict conformance to:
Common Criteria Protection Profile - Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application",
Basic Access Control, BSI-PP-0055, Version 1.10, 25th
March. 2009 [BAC-PP]
5.3 Package Claim
This ST is conforming to assurance package EAL4 augmented with ADV_FSP.5, ADV_INT.2,
ADV_TDS.4, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_TAT.2 and ATE_DPT.3 defined in CC part 3 [CC-3].
5.4 PP Conformance Rationale
This ST is claimed to be strictly conformant to the above mentioned PP [BAC-PP]. A detailed
justification is given in the following.
5.4.1 Main aspects
 All definitions of the security problem definition in [BAC-PP] have been taken exactly
from the PP in the same wording.
3
The rationale for SFR addition is described in the relative PP
36
 All security objectives have been taken exactly from [BAC-PP] in the same wording.
 The part of extended components definition has been taken originally from [BAC-PP],
except for FIA_API which has been taken from [EAC-PP]. Note that the ST does not
claim conformance to [EAC-PP].
 All SFRs for the TOE have been taken originally from the [BAC-PP] added by
according iterations, selections and assignments.
 The security assurance requirements (SARs) have been taken originally from the PP.
5.4.2 Overview of differences between the PP and the ST
Threats
The threat T.Counterfeit has been added to describe an unauthorized copy or reproduction
of a genuine MRTD’s chip.
Assumptions
Two assumption was added to cover Active Authentication and Chip Authentication during
personalization:
 A.Insp_Sys_Chip_Auth
 A.Insp_Sys_AA
Security Objectives for the TOE
The OT.Chip_Auth_Proof and OT.AA_Proof were added to cover Chip Authentication and
Active Authentication.
Security Objectives for the Environment
Additional OEs were added to cover Active Authentication and Chip
Authentication.
Security Functional Requirements
The Security Target enhances the following security functional requirements to support Chip
Authentication and Active Authentication.
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6 Security Problem Definition
6.1 Assets
6.1.1 Logical MRTD data
The following table presents the assets of the TOE and their corresponding phase(s)
according to section 1.2.3
Asset Phase 5 Phase 6 Phase 7
Personal Data No Yes Yes
Biometric Data No Yes Yes
EF.COM No Yes Yes
EF.SOD No Yes Yes
CA_PK No Yes Yes
CA_SK No Yes Yes
Perso_K No Yes No
BAC_K No Yes Yes
Session_K Yes Yes Yes
LCS Yes Yes Yes
Personal Data
The Personal Data are the logical MRTD standard User Data of the MRTD holder (EF.DG1,
EF.DG2, EF.DG5 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16).
Biometric Data
The Biometric Data are the sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3, EF.DG4).
EF.COM
The EF.COM is an elementary file containing the list of the existing elementary files (EF)
with the user data.
EF.SOD
The elementary file Document Security Object is used by the inspection system for
Passive Authentication of the logical MRTD.
Chip Authentication Public Key (CA_PK)
The Chip Authentication Public Key (contained in EF.DG14) is used by the inspection
system for the Chip Authentication.
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Chip Authentication Private Key (CA_SK)
The Chip Authentication Private Key is used by the application to process Chip
Authentication.
Personalization Agent keys (Perso_K)
This key set used for mutual authentication between the Personalization agent and the
chip, and secure communication establishment.
BAC keys (BAC_K)
This key set used for secure communication establishment between the Terminal and the
chip.
Secure Messaging session keys (Session_K)
Session keys are used to secure communication in confidentiality and authenticity.
TOE Life Cycle State (LCS)
This is the Life Cycle State related to the Prepersonalization, Personalisation and use
phase of the application.
6.1.2 Miscellaneous
Authenticity of the MRTD's chip
The authenticity of the MRTD’s chip personalized by the issuing State or Organization for
the MRTD holder is used by the traveler to prove his possession of a genuine MRTD.
6.2 Users / Subjects
The following table presents the assets of the TOE and their corresponding phase(s)
according to §1.3.6 TOE description
Subject Phase
3
Phase
4
Phase
5
Phase
6
Phase
7
IC manufacturer(Manufacturer role) Yes No No No No
MRTD packaging responsible(Manufacturer role) No Yes No No No
Embedded software loading
responsible(Manufacturer role)
No Yes No No No
Pre-personalization Agent(Manufacturer role) No No Yes No No
Personalization Agent No No No Yes No
Terminal No No Yes Yes Yes
Inspection System No No No No Yes
MRTD Holder No No No No Yes
Traveler No No No No Yes
Attacker Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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IC manufacturer
This additional subject is a refinement of the role Manufacturer as described in [PP_BAC].
It is the manufacturer of the IC.
If the IC Manufacturer loads the TOE at phase 3, this subject is responsible for the
embedded software downloading in the IC. This subject does not use Flash loader, even if
it is embedded in the IC.
MRTD packaging responsible
This additional subject is a refinement of the role Manufacturer as described in [PP_BAC].
This subject is responsible for the combination of the IC with hardware for the contactless
and/or contact interface.
Embedded software loading responsible
This additional subject is a refinement of the role Manufacturer as described in [PP_BAC].
This subject is responsible for the embedded software loading when the TOE is loaded by
the OS loader in phase 4 before TOE delivery point This subject does not exist if the TOE
is loaded by the IC Manufacturer. This subject used the Flash loader embedded in the IC.
Pre-personalization Agent
This additional subject is a refinement of the role Manufacturer as described in [PP_BAC].
This subject is responsible for the preparation of the card, i.e. creation of the MF and
MRTD ADF. He also sets Personalization Agent keys.
Personalization Agent
The agent is acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization to personalize the MRTD
for the holder by some or all of the following activities (i) establishing the identity the
holder for the biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of
the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris
image(s) (iii) writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for the holder as
defined for global, international and national interoperability, (iv) writing the initial TSF
data and (iv) signing the Document Security Object defined in [ICAO_9303].
Terminal
A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the contactless
interface.
Note: as the TOE may also be used in contact mode, the terminal may also communicate
using the contact interface
Inspection system (IS)
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining
an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the
traveler as MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection System (BIS) (i) contains a terminal for the
contactless communication with the MRTD’s chip, (ii) implements the terminals part of the
Basic Access Control Mechanism and (iii) gets the authorization to read the logical MRTD
under the Basic Access Control by optical reading the MRTD or other parts of the passport
book providing this information. The General Inspection System (GIS) is a Basic
Inspection System which implements additionally the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The
Extended Inspection System (EIS) in addition to the General Inspection System (i)
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implements the Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State
or Organization through the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive
biometric reference data. The security attributes of the EIS are defined of the Inspection
System Certificates.
MRTD Holder
The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization personalized
the MRTD.
Traveler
Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity of the
MRTD holder.
Attacker
A threat agent trying (i) to identify and to trace the movement of the MRTD’s chip
remotely (i.e. without knowing or optically reading the printed MRZ data), (ii) to read or
to manipulate the logical MRTD without authorization, or (iii) to forge a genuine MRTD.
6.3 Threats
T.Chip_ID
"Identification of MRTD’s chip"
Adverse action: An attacker trying to trace the movement of the MRTD by identifying
remotely the MRTD’s chip by establishing or listening to communications through the
contactless communication interface.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable
MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance
Asset: Anonymity of user
T.Skimming
"Skimming the logical MRTD"
Adverse action: An attacker imitates an inspection system trying to establish a
communication to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the contactless communication
channel of the TOE.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable
MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance.
Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD data.
T.Eavesdropping
"Eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and inspection system"
Adverse action: An attacker is listening to an existing communication between the MRTD’s
chip and an inspection system to gain the logical MRTD or parts of it. The inspection
system uses the MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page but the attacker does not
know these data in advance.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable
MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance.
41
Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD data.
T.Forgery
"Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip"
Adverse action: An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD or any
part of it including its security related data in order to deceive on an inspection system by
means of the changed MRTD holder’s identity or biometric reference data. This threat
comprises several attack scenarios of MRTD forgery. The attacker may alter the
biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book, in the printed MRZ
and in the digital MRZ to claim another identity of the traveler. The attacker may alter the
printed portrait and the digitized portrait to overcome the visual inspection of the
inspection officer and the automated biometric authentication mechanism by face
recognition. The attacker may alter the biometric reference data to defeat automated
biometric authentication mechanism of the inspection system. The attacker may combine
data groups of different logical MRTDs to create a new forged MRTD, e.g. the attacker
writes the digitized portrait and optional biometric reference finger data read from the
logical MRTD of a traveler into another MRTD’s chip leaving their digital MRZ unchanged
to claim the identity of the holder this MRTD. The attacker may also copy the complete
unchanged logical MRTD to another contactless chip.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of one or more
legitimate MRTDs.
Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data.
T.Abuse-Func
"Abuse of Functionality"
Adverse action: An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in the
phase “Operational Use” in order (i) to manipulate User Data, (ii) to manipulate (explore,
bypass, deactivate or change) security features or functions of the TOE or (iii) to disclose
or to manipulate TSF Data. This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the
initialization and the personalization in the operational state after delivery to MRTD
holder.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate
MRTD.
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF.
T.Information_Leakage
"Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip"
Adverse action: An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during
its usage in order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be
inherent in the normal operation or caused by the attacker. Leakage may occur through
emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by
changes in processing time requirements. This leakage may be interpreted as a covert
channel transmission but is more closely related to measurement of operating
parameters, which may be derived either from measurements of the contactless interface
(emanation) or direct measurements (by contact to the chip still available even for a
contactless chip) and can then be related to the specific operation being performed.
Examples are the Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and the Differential Power
Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce information leakage by
fault injection (e.g. Differential Fault Analysis).
42
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate
MRTD.
Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD and TSF data.
T.Phys-Tamper
"Physical Tampering"
Adverse action: An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD’s chip in order (i)
to disclose TSF Data or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software.
An attacker may physically modify the MRTD’s chip in order to (i) modify security features
or functions of the MRTD’s chip, (ii) modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip
Embedded Software, (iii) modify User Data or (iv) to modify TSF data. The physical
tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation of TOE User Data
(e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or TSF Data (e.g.
authentication key of the MRTD’s chip) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following
attack methods by modification of security features (e.g. to enable information leakage
through power analysis). Physical tampering requires direct interaction with the MRTD’s
chip internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse
engineering efforts may be used. Before that, the hardware security mechanisms and
layout characteristics need to be identified. Determination of software design including
treatment of User Data and TSF Data may also be a pre-requisite. The modification may
result in the deactivation of a security function. Changes of circuitry or data can be
permanent or temporary.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate
MRTD.
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF.
T.Malfunction
"Malfunction due to Environmental Stress"
Adverse action: An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD’s chip
Embedded Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify
security features or functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security
functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. This may be achieved e.g. by operating
the MRTD’s chip outside the normal operating conditions, exploiting errors in the MRTD’s
chip Embedded Software or misusing administration function. To exploit these
vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about the functional operation.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate
MRTD.
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF.
T.Counterfeit
"MRTD’s chip" Adverse action: An attacker with high attack potential produces an
unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine MRTD’s chip to be used as part of a
counterfeit MRTD. This violates the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip used for
authentication of a traveler by possession of a MRTD. The attacker may generate a new
data set or extract completely or partially the data from a genuine MRTD’s chip and copy
them on another appropriate chip to imitate this genuine MRTD’s chip.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate
MRTDs
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Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data
6.4 Organisational Security Policies
P.Manufact
"Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip"
The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The
MRTD Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data which contains at least the
Personalization Agent Key.
P.Personalization
"Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization only"
The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the
printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of
the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder. The personalization of the MRTD for
the holder is performed by an agent authorized by the issuing State or Organization only.
P.Personal_Data
"Personal data protection policy"
The biographical data and their summary printed in the MRZ and stored on the MRTD’s
chip (EF.DG1), the printed portrait and the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), the biometric
reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3), the biometric reference data of iris image(s)
(EF.DG4) and data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16) stored on the
MRTD’s chip are personal data of the MRTD holder. These data groups are intended to be
used only with agreement of the MRTD holder by inspection systems to which the MRTD
is presented. The MRTD’s chip shall provide the possibility for the Basic Access Control to
allow read access to these data only for terminals successfully authenticated based on
knowledge of the Document Basic Access Keys as defined in [ICAO_9303].
Application Note:
Note that EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 are only readable after successful EAC authentication, not
covered by this ST.
6.5 Assumptions
A.MRTD_Manufact
"MRTD manufacturing on phase 4 to 6"
It is assumed that appropriate functionality testing of the MRTD is used. It is assumed
that security procedures are used during all manufacturing and test operations to
maintain confidentiality and integrity of the MRTD and of its manufacturing and test data
(to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorized use).
A.MRTD_Delivery
"MRTD delivery during phase 4 to 6"
Procedures shall guarantee the control of the TOE delivery and storage process and
conformance to its objectives:
o Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery and
storage.
44
o Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper
operation in the delivery process and storage.
o Procedures shall ensure that people dealing with the procedure for delivery have
got the required skill.
A.Pers_Agent
"Personalization of the MRTD’s chip"
The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of (i) the logical MRTD with respect to
the MRTD holder, (ii) the Document Basic Access Keys, (iii) the Chip Authentication Public
Key (EF.DG14) if stored on the MRTD’s chip, and (iv) the Document Signer Public Key
Certificate (if stored on the MRTD’s chip). The Personalization Agent signs the Document
Security Object. The Personalization Agent bears the Personalization Agent Authentication
to authenticate himself to the TOE by symmetric cryptographic mechanisms.
A.Insp_Sys
"Inspection Systems for global interoperability"
The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i)
examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii)
verifying the traveler as MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection System for global
interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer
Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii) implements the terminal part of
the Basic Access Control [ICAO_9303]. The Basic Inspection System reads the logical
MRTD under Basic Access Control and performs the Passive Authentication to verify the
logical MRTD.
A.BAC-Keys
"Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys"
The Document Basic Access Control Keys being generated and imported by the issuing
State or Organization have to provide sufficient cryptographic strength. As a consequence
of the [ICAO_9303], the Document Basic Access Control Keys are derived from a defined
subset of the individual printed MRZ data. It has to be ensured that these data provide
sufficient entropy to withstand any attack based on the decision that the inspection
system has to derive Document Access Keys from the printed MRZ data with enhanced
basic attack potential.
A.Insp_Sys_Chip_Auth
"Inspection Systems for global interoperability on chip authenticity"
The Inspection System implements the following protocol to authenticate the MRTD’s
chip: Chip Authentication v1 as defined in [TR_03110].
The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i)
examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii)
verifying the traveler as MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection System for global
interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer
Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii) implements the terminal part of
the Basic Access Control [ICAO_9303]. The Basic Inspection System reads the logical
MRTD under Basic Access Control and performs the Passive Authentication to verify the
logical MRTD. The General Inspection System in addition to the Basic Inspection System
implements the Chip Authentication Mechanism v1. The General Inspection System reads
the logical travel document under BAC and performs the Chip Authentication v1 to verify
45
the logical travel document and establishes a new secure messaging that is different from
the BAC one.
A.Insp_Sys_AA
The Inspection System implements the Active Authentication Mechanism. The Inspection
System verifies the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip during inspection using the signature
returned by the TOE during Active Authentication.
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7 Security Objectives
7.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified
threats to be countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be met by the
TOE.
OT.AC_Pers
"Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD"
The TOE must ensure that the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document
security object according to LDS [ICAO_9303] and the TSF data can be written by
authorized Personalization Agents only. The logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and
the TSF data may be written only during and cannot be changed after its personalization.
The Document security object can be updated by authorized Personalization Agents if
data in the data groups EF.DG 3 to EF.DG16 are added.
OT.Data_Int
"Integrity of personal data"
The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against
physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure that the inspection
system is able to detect any modification of the transmitted logical MRTD data.
OT.Data_Conf
"Confidentiality of personal data"
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data groups EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16. Read access to EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 is granted to terminals successfully
authenticated as Personalization Agent. Read access to EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to
EF.DG16 is granted to terminals successfully authenticated as Basic Inspection System.
The Basic Inspection System shall authenticate itself by means of the Basic Access Control
based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Key. The TOE must ensure the
confidentiality of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the Basic Inspection
System.
OT.Identification
"Identification and Authentication of the TOE"
The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification and Pre-Personalization Data in its
non-volatile memory. The IC Identification Data must provide a unique identification of
the IC during Phase 2 “Manufacturing” and Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”. The
storage of the Pre-Personalization data includes writing of the Personalization Agent
Key(s). In Phase 4 “Operational Use” the TOE shall identify itself only to a successful
authenticated Basic Inspection System or Personalization Agent.
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
"Protection against Abuse of Functionality"
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After delivery of the TOE to the MRTD Holder, the TOE must prevent the abuse of test
and support functions that may be maliciously used to (i) disclose critical User Data, (ii)
manipulate critical User Data of the IC Embedded Software, (iii) manipulate Soft-coded IC
Embedded Software or (iv) bypass, deactivate, change or explore security features or
functions of the TOE.
Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the
Test Features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
"Protection against Information Leakage"
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored and/or
processed in the MRTD’s chip
o by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time
between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power
consumption, clock, or I/O lines and
o by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
o by a physical manipulation of the TOE
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
"Protection against Physical Tampering"
The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the
TSF Data, and the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against
attacks with enhanced-basic attack potential by means of
o measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips
surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage
and current) or
o measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction
between charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure
analysis)
o manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as
o controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data)
with a prior
o reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.
OT.Prot_Malfunction
"Protection against Malfunctions"
The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside
the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been
proven or tested. This is to prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include
external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency,
or temperature.
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
"Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity"
The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of
the MRTD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the
Chip Authentication as defined in [TR_03110] the chip is genuine and chip and data page
48
belong to each other as defined in [ICAO_9303].The authenticity proof provided by
MRTD’s chip shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.
OT.AA_Proof
The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of
MRTD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the
Active Authentication as defined in [ICAO_9303]. The authenticity proof through AA
provided by MRTD’s chip shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.
7.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
7.2.1 Issuing State or Organization
The issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE
environment.
OE.MRTD_Manufact
"Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing"
Appropriate functionality testing of the TOE shall be used in phase 4 to 6.
During all manufacturing and test operations, security procedures shall be used through
phases 4, 5 and 6 to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its
manufacturing and test data.
OE.MRTD_Delivery
"Protection of the MRTD delivery"
Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery including
the following objectives:
o non-disclosure of any security relevant information,
o identification of the element under delivery,
o meet confidentiality rules (confidentiality level, transmittal form, reception
acknowledgment),
o physical protection to prevent external damage,
o secure storage and handling procedures (including rejected TOE’s),
o traceability of TOE during delivery including the following parameters:
 origin and shipment details,
 reception, reception acknowledgement,
 location material/information.
Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in
the delivery process (including if applicable any non-conformance to the confidentiality
convention) and highlight all non-conformance to this process.
Procedures shall ensure that people (shipping department, carrier, reception department)
dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the required skill, training and knowledge
to meet the procedure requirements and be able to act fully in accordance with the above
expectations.
49
OE.Personalization
"Personalization of logical MRTD"
The issuing State or Organization must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting on
behalf of the issuing State or Organization (i) establish the correct identity of the holder
and create biographical data for the MRTD, (ii) enroll the biometric reference data of the
MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris
image(s) and (iii) personalize the MRTD for the holder together with the defined physical
and logical security measures to protect the confidentiality and integrity of these data.
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
"Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature"
The issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Country
Signing CA Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the Country Signing CA Private Key and
sign Document Signer Certificates in a secure operational environment, and (iii) distribute
the Certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key to receiving States and Organizations
maintaining its authenticity and integrity. The issuing State or Organization must (i)
generate a cryptographic secure Document Signer Key Pair and ensure the secrecy of the
Document Signer Private Keys, (ii) sign Document Security Objects of genuine MRTD in a
secure operational environment only and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the Document
Signer Public Key to receiving States and Organizations. The digital signature in the
Document Security Object relates all data in the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 if stored in
the LDS according to [ICAO_9303].
OE.BAC-Keys
"Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys"
The Document Basic Access Control Keys being generated and imported by the issuing
State or Organization have to provide sufficient cryptographic strength. As a consequence
of the [ICAO_9303] the Document Basic Access Control Keys are derived from a defined
subset of the individual printed MRZ data. It has to be ensured that these data provide
sufficient entropy to withstand any attack based on the decision that the inspection
system has to derive Document Basic Access Keys from the printed MRZ data with
enhanced basic attack potential.
OE.Auth_MRTD
"MRTD Authentication Key"
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure
in order to (i) generate the MRTD’s Chip Authentication Key Pair, (ii) sign and store the
Chip Authentication Public Key in the Chip Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG14 and
(iii) support inspection systems of receiving States or organizations to verify the
authenticity of the MRTD’s chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of the Chip
Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security Object.
7.2.2 Receiving State or Organization
The receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the
TOE environment.
OE.Exam_MRTD
"Examination of the MRTD passport book"
50
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization must examine the MRTD
presented by the traveler to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security
measures and to detect any manipulation of the physical MRTD. The Basic Inspection
System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing Public Key and the
Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii) implements the
terminal part of the Basic Access Control [ICAO_9303].
OE.Exam_Chip_Auth
"Examination of the chip authenticity"
Additionally to the OE.Exam_MRTD, inspection system performs the Chip Authentication
to verify the Authenticity of the presented MRTD’s chip.
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
"Verification by Passive Authentication" The border control officer of the receiving State
uses the inspection system to verify the traveler as MRTD holder. The inspection systems
must have successfully verified the signature of Document Security Objects and the
integrity data elements of the logical MRTD before they are used. The receiving States
and Organizations must manage the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer
Public Key maintaining their authenticity and availability in all inspection systems.
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
"Protection of data from the logical MRTD"
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization ensures the confidentiality
and integrity of the data read from the logical MRTD. The receiving State examining the
logical MRTD being under Basic Access Control will use inspection systems which
implement the terminal part of the Basic Access Control and use the secure messaging
with fresh generated keys for the protection of the transmitted data (i.e. Basic Inspection
Systems).
7.2.3 Additional Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
OE.Exam_MRTD_AA
Aditionally to the OE.Exam_MRTD, the inspection systems perform the Active
Authentication protocol to verify the Authenticity of the presented MRTD’s chip.
OE.Activ_Auth_Sign
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure
in order to (i) generate the MRTD’s Active Authentication Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy
of the MRTD’s Active Authentication Private Key, sign and store the Active Authentication
Public Key in the Active Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG15 and (iii) support
inspection systems of receiving States or organizations to verify the authenticity of the
MRTD’s chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of the Active Authentication Public
Key by means of the Document Security Object.
51
7.3 Security Objectives Rationale
7.3.1 Threats
T.Chip_ID The threat T.Chip_ID “Identification of MRTD’s chip” addresses the trace of the
MRTD movement by identifying remotely the MRTD’s chip through the contactless
communication interface. This threat is countered as described by the security objective
OT.Identification by Basic Access Control using sufficiently strong derived keys as required
by the security objective for the environment OE.BAC-Keys.
T.Skimming The threat T.Skimming “Skimming digital MRZ data or the digital portrait” and
T.Eavesdropping “Eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and inspection
system” address the reading of the logical MRTD trough the contactless interface or
listening the communication between the MRTD’s chip and a terminal. This threat is
countered by the security objective OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of personal data”
through Basic Access Control using sufficiently strong derived keys as required by the
security objective for the environment OE.BAC-Keys.
T.Eavesdropping The threat T.Eavesdropping “Eavesdropping to the communication
between TOE and inspection system” addresses listening to the communication between
the MRTD’s chip and a terminal. This threat is countered by the security objective
OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of personal data” through Basic Access Control using
sufficiently strong derived keys as required by the security objective for the environment
OE.BAC-Keys “Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys”.
T.Forgery The threat T.Forgery “Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip” addresses the fraudulent
alteration of the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it. The security objective
OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD” requires the TOE to limit
the write access for the logical MRTD to the trustworthy Personalization Agent (cf.
OE.Personalization). The TOE will protect the integrity of the stored logical MRTD
according the security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” and
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering”. The examination of the
presented MRTD passport book according to OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD
passport book” and OE.Exam_MRTD_AA shall ensure that passport book does not contain
a sensitive contactless chip which may present the complete unchanged logical MRTD.
The TOE environment will detect partly forged logical MRTD data by means of digital
signature which will be created according to OE.Pass_Auth_Sign “Authentication of logical
MRTD by Signature” and verified by the inspection system according to
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif “Verification by Passive Authentication”.
T.Abuse-Func The threat T.Abuse-Func “Abuse of Functionality” addresses attacks using
the MRTD’s chip as production material for the MRTD and misuse of the functions for
personalization in the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder to disclose or to
manipulate the logical MRTD. This threat is countered by OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection
against Abuse of Functionality”. Additionally this objective is supported by the security
objective for the TOE environment: OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD”
ensuring that the TOE security functions for the initialization and the personalization are
disabled and the security functions for the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder
are enabled according to the intended use of the TOE.
52
T.Information_Leakage The threats T.Information_Leakage "Information Leakage from
MRTD's chip" is typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with
high attack potential. The protection of the TOE against this threat is addressed by the
directly related security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak "Protection against Information
Leakage".
T.Phys-Tamper The threat T.Phys-Tamper "Physical Tampering" is typical for integrated
circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The protection of
the TOE against this threat is addressed by the directly related security objective
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper "Protection against Physical Tampering".
T.Malfunction The threat T.Malfunction "Malfunction due to Environmental Stress" is typical
for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The
protection of the TOE against this threat is addressed by the directly related security
objective OT.Prot_Malfunction "Protection against Malfunctions".
T.Counterfeit The threat T.Counterfeit "MRTD’s chip" addresses the attack of unauthorized
copy or reproduction of the genuine MRTD chip. This attack is thwarted by chip an
identification and authenticity proof required by OT.Chip_Auth_Proof "Proof of MRTD’s
chip authenticity" using a authentication key pair to be generated by the issuing State or
Organization. The Public Chip Authentication Key has to be written into EF.DG14 and
signed by means of Documents Security Objects as demanded by OE.Auth_MRTD "MRTD
Authentication Key". According to OE.Exam_Chip_Auth the inspection system has to
perform the Chip Authentication Protocol to verify the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip.
This attack is also thwarted by Active Authentication proving the authenticity of the chip
as required by OT.AA_Proof using a authentication key pair to be generated by the
issuing State or Organization. OE.Activ_Auth_Sign also covers this threat enabling the
possibility of performing an Active Authentication which reinforce the security associated
to the communication.
7.3.2 Organisational Security Policies
P.Manufact The OSP P.Manufact “Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip” requires a unique
identification of the IC by means of the Initialization Data and the writing of the Pre-
personalization Data as being fulfilled by OT.Identification
P.Personalization The OSP P.Personalization “Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State
or Organization only” addresses the (i) the enrolment of the logical MRTD by the
Personalization Agent as described in the security objective for the TOE environment
OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD”, and (ii) the access control for the
user data and TSF data as described by the security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control
for Personalization of logical MRTD”. Note the manufacturer equips the TOE with the
Personalization Agent Key(s) according to OT.Identification “Identification and
Authentication of the TOE”. The security objective OT.AC_Pers limits the management of
TSF data and management of TSF to the Personalization Agent.
P.Personal_Data The OSP P.Personal_Data “Personal data protection policy” requires the
TOE (i) to support the protection of the confidentiality of the logical MRTD by means of
the Basic Access Control and (ii) enforce the access control for reading as decided by the
issuing State or Organization. This policy is implemented by the security objectives
53
OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” describing the unconditional protection of the
integrity of the stored data and during transmission. The security objective OT.Data_Conf
“Confidentiality of personal data” describes the protection of the confidentiality.
7.3.3 Assumptions
A.MRTD_Manufact The assumption A.MRTD_Manufact “MRTD manufacturing on phase 4
to 6” is covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.MRTD_Manufact
“Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing” that requires to use security procedures during
all manufacturing steps.
A.MRTD_Delivery The assumption A.MRTD_Delivery “MRTD delivery during phase 4 to 6”
is covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.MRTD_Delivery
“Protection of the MRTD delivery” that requires to use security procedures during delivery
steps of the MRTD.
A.Pers_Agent The assumption A.Pers_Agent “Personalization of the MRTD’s chip” is
covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization
“Personalization of logical MRTD” including the enrolment, the protection with digital
signature and the storage of the MRTD holder personal data.
A.Insp_Sys The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption
A.Insp_Sys “Inspection Systems for global interoperability” is covered by the security
objectives for the TOE environment OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport
book”. The security objectives for the TOE environment OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
“Protection of data from the logical MRTD will require the Basic Inspection System to
implement the Basic Access Control and to protect the logical MRTD data during the
transmission and the internal handling.
A.BAC-Keys The assumption is directly covered by the security objective for the TOE
environment OE.BAC-Keys “Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys” ensuring
the sufficient key quality to be provided by the issuing State or Organization.
A.Insp_Sys_Chip_Auth The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the
assumption A.Insp_Sys_Chip_Auth “Inspection Systems for global interoperability” is
covered by the security objectives for the TOE environment OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination
of the MRTD passport book”. The security objectives for the TOE environment
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD “Protection of data from the logical MRTD will require the Basic
Inspection System to implement the Basic Access Control and to protect the logical MRTD
data during the transmission and the internal handling.
It is also covered by the security objectives for the TOE environment
OE.Exam_Chip_Auth.
54
A.Insp_Sys_AA The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption
A.Insp_Sys_AA "Inspection Systems for global interoperability" is covered by the security
objectives for the TOE environment OE.Exam_MRTD_AA "Examination of the MRTD
passport book".
7.3.4 SPD and Security Objectives
Threats Security Objectives Rationale
T.Chip_ID OT.Identification, OE.BAC-Keys Section 7.3.1
T.Skimming OT.Data_Conf, OE.BAC-Keys Section 7.3.1
T.Eavesdropping OT.Data_Conf, OE.BAC-Keys Section 7.3.1
T.Forgery OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper,
OE.Exam_MRTD, OE.Pass_Auth_Sign,
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif, OE.Personalization,
OE.Exam_MRTD_AA
Section 7.3.1
T.Abuse-Func OT.Prot_Abuse-Func, OE.Personalization Section 7.3.1
T.Information_Leakage OT.Prot_Inf_Leak Section 7.3.1
T.Phys-Tamper OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper Section 7.3.1
T.Malfunction OT.Prot_Malfunction Section 7.3.1
T.Counterfeit OT.Chip_Auth_Proof, OE.Exam_Chip_Auth,
OE.Auth_MRTD, OT.AA_Proof, OE.Activ_Auth_Sign
Section 7.3.1
Table 10 Threats and Security Objectives - Coverage
Security Objectives Threats
OT.AC_Pers T.Forgery
OT.Data_Int T.Forgery
OT.Data_Conf T.Skimming, T.Eavesdropping
OT.Identification T.Chip_ID
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func T.Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak T.Information_Leakage
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper T.Forgery, T.Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction T.Malfunction
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof T.Counterfeit
OT.AA_Proof T.Counterfeit
OE.MRTD_Manufact
OE.MRTD_Delivery
OE.Personalization T.Forgery, T.Abuse-Func
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign T.Forgery
OE.BAC-Keys T.Chip_ID, T.Skimming, T.Eavesdropping
55
OE.Auth_MRTD T.Counterfeit
OE.Exam_MRTD T.Forgery
OE.Exam_Chip_Auth T.Counterfeit
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif T.Forgery
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
OE.Exam_MRTD_AA T.Forgery
OE.Activ_Auth_Sign T.Counterfeit
Table 11 Security Objectives and Threats - Coverage
Organisational Security
Policies
Security Objectives Rationale
P.Manufact OT.Identification Section 7.3.2
P.Personalization OE.Personalization, OT.AC_Pers,
OT.Identification
Section 7.3.2
P.Personal_Data OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf Section 7.3.2
Table 12 OSPs and Security Objectives - Coverage
Security Objectives Organisational Security Policies
OT.AC_Pers P.Personalization
OT.Data_Int P.Personal_Data
OT.Data_Conf P.Personal_Data
OT.Identification P.Manufact, P.Personalization
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
OT.AA_Proof
OE.MRTD_Manufact
OE.MRTD_Delivery
OE.Personalization P.Personalization
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
OE.BAC-Keys
OE.Auth_MRTD
OE.Exam_MRTD
56
OE.Exam_Chip_Auth
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
OE.Exam_MRTD_AA
OE.Activ_Auth_Sign
Table 13 Security Objectives and OSPs - Coverage
Assumptions Security Objectives for the Operational Environment Rationale
A.MRTD_Manufact OE.MRTD_Manufact Section 7.3.3
A.MRTD_Delivery OE.MRTD_Delivery Section 7.3.3
A.Pers_Agent OE.Personalization Section 7.3.3
A.Insp_Sys OE.Exam_MRTD, OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD Section 7.3.3
A.BAC-Keys OE.BAC-Keys Section 7.3.3
A.Insp_Sys_Chip_Auth OE.Exam_Chip_Auth, OE.Exam_MRTD,
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
Section 7.3.3
A.Insp_Sys_AA OE.Exam_MRTD_AA Section 7.3.3
Table 14 Assumptions and Security Objectives for the Operational Environment -
Coverage
Security Objectives for the Operational
Environment
Assumptions
OE.MRTD_Manufact A.MRTD_Manufact
OE.MRTD_Delivery A.MRTD_Delivery
OE.Personalization A.Pers_Agent
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
OE.BAC-Keys A.BAC-Keys
OE.Auth_MRTD
OE.Exam_MRTD A.Insp_Sys,
A.Insp_Sys_Chip_Auth
OE.Exam_Chip_Auth A.Insp_Sys_Chip_Auth
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD A.Insp_Sys,
A.Insp_Sys_Chip_Auth
OE.Exam_MRTD_AA A.Insp_Sys_AA
OE.Activ_Auth_Sign
Table 15 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment and Assumptions -
Coverage
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8 Extended Requirements
8.1 Extended Families
8.1.1 Extended Family FAU_SAS - Audit data storage
8.1.1.1 Description
To define the security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FAU_SAS) of
the Class FAU (Security Audit) is defined here. This family describes the functional
requirements for the storage of audit data. It has a more general approach than FAU_GEN,
because it does not necessarily require the data to be generated by the TOE itself and
because it does not give specific details of the content of the audit records.
The family “Audit data storage (FAU_SAS)” is specified as follows.
8.1.1.2 Extended Components
Extended Component FAU_SAS.1
Description
Requires the TOE to the possibility to store audit data.
Definition
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorised users] with the capability to
store [assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
8.1.2 Extended Family FCS_RND - Generation of random numbers
8.1.2.1 Description
This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers intended to
be used for cryptographic purposes.
8.1.2.2 Extended Components
Extended Component FCS_RND.1
Description
Generation of random numbers requires that random numbers meet a defined quality metric.
58
Definition
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet
[assignment: a defined quality metric ].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
8.1.3 Extended Family FMT_LIM - Limited capabilities
8.1.3.1 Description
The family FMT_LIM describes the functional requirements for the Test Features of the TOE.
The new functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class addresses
the management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in
the TOE show that no other class is appropriate to address the specific issues of preventing
the abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of the functions and by limiting their
availability.
The family “Limited capabilities and availability (FMT_LIM)” is specified as follows.
8.1.3.2 Extended Components
Extended Component FMT_LIM.1
Description
Limited capabilities requires that the TSF is built to provide only the capabilities (perform
action, gather information) necessary for its genuine purpose.
Definition
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with ‘Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)’ the following policy is enforced
[assignment: Limited capability and availability policy]
Dependencies: (FMT_LIM.2)
Extended Component FMT_LIM.2
Description
Limited availability requires that the TSF restrict the use of functions (refer to Limited
capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)). This can be achieved, for instance, by removing or by disabling
functions in a specific phase of the TOE’s life-cycle).
59
Definition
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with ‘Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)’ the following policy is enforced
[assignment: Limited capability and availability policy]
Dependencies: (FMT_LIM.1)
8.1.4 Extended Family FPT_EMS - TOE Emanation
8.1.4.1 Description
The sensitive family FPT_EMS (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of the TSF) is
defined here to describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE. The TOE shall
prevent attacks against the TOE and other secret data where the attack is based on external
observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Examples of such attacks are evaluation of
TOE’s electromagnetic radiation, simple power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis
(DPA), timing attacks, etc. This family describes the functional requirements for the limitation
of intelligible emanations which are not directly addressed by any other component of
[CC_2].
The family “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMS)” is specified as follows.
8.1.4.2 Extended Components
Extended Component FPT_EMS.1
Description
This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation has two constituents:
 FPT_EMS.1.1 Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions enabling
access to TSF data or user data.
 FPT_EMS.1.2 Interface Emanation requires to not emit interface emanation enabling
access to TSF data or user data.
60
Definition
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of
[assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data]
and [assignment: list of types of user data].
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the
following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of
types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
8.1.5 Extended Family FIA_API - Authentication Proof of Identity
8.1.5.1 Description
To describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FIA_API)
of the Class FIA (Identification and authentication) is defined here. This family describes the
functional requirements for the proof of the claimed identity for the authentication
verification by an external entity where the other families of the class FIA address the
verification of the identity of an external entity.
Application note: The other families of the Class FIA describe only the authentication
verification of users' identity performed by the TOE and do not describe the functionality of
the user to prove their identity. The following paragraph defines the family FIA_API in the
style of the Common Criteria part 2 (cf. [CC-3], chapter 'Explicitly stated IT security
requirements (APE_SRE)') from a TOE point of view.
8.1.5.2 Extended Components
Extended Component FIA_API.1
Description
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
Management of authentication information used to prove the claimed identity.
Definition
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism ] to prove the
identity of the [assignment: authorized user or role ].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
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9 Security Requirements
9.1 Security Functional Requirements
9.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer with the capability to store the IC
Identification Data in the audit records.
9.1.2 Class FCS Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm Document Basic Access Key Derivation
Algorithm and specified cryptographic key sizes 112 bit that meet the following:
[ICAO_9303], normative appendix 5.
FCS_CKM.1/AA Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/AA The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [Cryptographic Key Generation Algorithm]
and specified cryptographic key sizes [Cryptographic Key Sizes] that meet the
following: [Standards]
Cryptographic Key Generation
Algorithm
Cryptographic Key Sizes Standards
ECKeyP 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512 and
521
[IEEE_1363]
RSA 1536, 1792, 2048, 2560, 3072,
3584 and 4096
[ANSI_X9.31]
.
FCS_CKM.1/CA Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/CA The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [Cryptographic Key Generation Algorithm]
62
and specified cryptographic key sizes [Cryptographic Key Sizes] that meet the
following: [Standards]
Cryptographic Key Generation Algorithm Cryptographic Key
Sizes
Standards
Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1[TR-
03110-1] based on the ECDH protocol
compliant to [TR-03111] in combination
with 112 bits 3DES or 128, 192 or 256 bits
AES
192, 224, 256, 320,
384, 512 and 521
bits
[TR-03111]
Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1[TR-
03110-1] based on the DH protocol
compliant to [TR-03110-1] in combination
with 112 bits 3DES or 128, 192 or 256 bits
AES
2048 bits [TR-03110-1]
and [RSA-
PKCS#3]
.
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method zeroisation that meets the following: none.
FCS_COP.1/SHA Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm SHA-1 and cryptographic key sizes none that meet the
following: [FIPS_180_3].
FCS_COP.1/ENC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/ENC The TSF shall perform secure messaging (BAC) – encryption and
decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Triple-DES in CBC
mode and cryptographic key sizes 112 bit that meet the following: [FIPS_46_3] and
[ICAO_9303]; normative appendix 5, A5.3 [ICAO_9303].
FCS_COP.1/AUTH Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/AUTH The TSF shall perform symmetric authentication – encryption
and decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Triple-DES and
cryptographic key sizes 112 bit that meet the following: [FIPS_46_3].
63
FCS_COP.1/MAC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/MAC The TSF shall perform secure messaging – message
authentication code in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Retail
MAC and cryptographic key sizes 112 bit that meet the following: [ISO_9797_1]
(MAC algorithm 3, block cipher DES, Sequence Message Counter, padding
mode 2).
FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SHA The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm SHA-1 and SHA-256 and cryptographic key sizes none that
meet the following: [FIPS_180_3].
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_ENC The TSF shall perform secure messaging – encryption and
decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [Algorithm] and
cryptographic key sizes [Key Size(s)] that meet the following: [Standard]
Algorithm Key Size(s) Standard
Triple-DES in CBC mode 112 bit [FIPS_46_3]
AES in CBC mode 128, 192 and 256 bit [FIPS_197]
.
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_MAC The TSF shall perform secure messaging – message
authentication code in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
[Algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [Key Size(s)] that meet the following:
[Standard]
Algorithm Key Size(s) Standard
Retail MAC 112 bit [ISO_9797_1]
AES CMAC 128, 192 and 256 bit [NIST_800_38B]
.
64
FCS_COP.1/AA Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/AA The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with
a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key
sizes [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [standard]
Cryptographic
Operation
Cryptographic
Algorithm
Cryptographic Key
Sizes(bits)
Standard
Digital Signature
Creation
ECDSA 192 to 521 over
prime field curves
[ISO_9796-2], [RSA-
PKCS#3],
[FIPS_180_2] and
[X.92]
Digital Signature
Creation
RSA signature 1536, 1792, 2048,
2560, 3072, 3584
and 4096
[ISO_9796-2]
.
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet
the deterministic random number generation specified by FCS_RNG.1 Quality
metric for random numbers of [PLTF-ST].
9.1.3 Class FIA Identification and Authentication
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow
o to read the Initialization Data in Stage 2 "Production",
o to read the random identifier in Stage 3 "Preparation",
o to read the random identifier in Stage 4 "Operational"
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow
o to read the Initialization Data in Stage 2 "Production",
o to read the random identifier in Stage 3 "Preparation",
o to read the random identifier in Stage 4 "Operational"
65
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.4.1 The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
o Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
o Authentication Mechanisms based on:
 Triple-DES.
FIA_UAU.5/BAC Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1/BAC The TSF shall provide
o Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
o Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2/BAC The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the
following rules:
o The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent by
one of the following mechanism(s) the Symmetric Authentication
Mechanism with the Personalization Agent Key,
o The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Basic Inspection System
only by means of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism
with the Document Basic Access Keys.
FIA_UAU.5/CA Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1/CA The TSF shall provide
o Secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode,
o Key agreement protocol DH and ECDH during Chip Authentication
Protocol v.1 according to [TR_03110]
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2/CA The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the
following rules:
o After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 the TOE accepts
only received commands with correct message authentication code sent
by means of secure messaging with key agreed with the terminal by
means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism v1.
66
FIA_UAU.6/BAC Re-authenticating
FIA_UAU.6.1/BAC The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each
command sent to the TOE during a BAC mechanism based communication
after successful authentication of the terminal with Basic Access Control
Authentication Mechanism.
FIA_UAU.6/CA Re-authenticating
FIA_UAU.6.1/CA The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each
command sent to the TOE after successful run of the Chip Authentication
Protocol shall be verified as being sent by the inspection system (GIS).
FIA_AFL.1/BAC Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL.1.1/BAC The TSF shall detect when an administrator configurable positive
integer within range of acceptable values 0 to 255 consecutive unsuccessful
authentication attempts occur related to BAC authentication protocol.
FIA_AFL.1.2/BAC When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has
been met and surpassed, the TSF shall wait for an increasing time during the
Mutual Authentication.
FIA_API.1/CA Authentication Proof of Identity
FIA_API.1.1/CA The TSF shall provide a Chip Authentication protocol according to
[TR_03110] to prove the identity of the TOE.
FIA_API.1/AA Authentication Proof of Identity
FIA_API.1.1/AA The TSF shall provide a Active Authentication to prove the identity of
the TOE.
9.1.4 Class FDP User Data Protection
67
FDP_ACC.1/BAC Subset access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/BAC The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP on terminals
gaining write, read and modification access to data in the EF.COM, EF.SOD,
EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
FDP_ACC.1/CA Subset access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/CA The TSF shall enforce the CA Access Control SFP on terminals
gaining read and modify access to data in the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
FDP_ACF.1/BAC Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1/BAC The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to objects based
on the following:
o Subjects:
 Personalization Agent,
 Basic Inspection System,
 Terminal,
o Objects:
 data EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
 data in EF.COM,
 data in EF.SOD,
o Security attributes:
 authentication status of terminals.
FDP_ACF.1.2/BAC The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
o the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write
and read the data of the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the
logical MRTD,
o the successfully authenticated Basic Inspection System is allowed to
read the data in EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
FDP_ACF.1.3/BAC The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on
the following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/BAC The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules:
o Any terminal is not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of
the logical MRTD,
68
o Any terminal is not allowed to read any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the
logical MRTD,
o The Basic Inspection System is not allowed to read the data in EF.DG3
and EF.DG4.
FDP_ACF.1/CA Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1/CA The TSF shall enforce the CA Control SFP to objects based on the
following:
o Subjects:
 General Inspection System,
 Terminal,
o Objects:
 data EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
 data in EF.COM,
 data in EF.SOD,
o Security attributes
 authentication status of terminals.
FDP_ACF.1.2/CA The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
o the successfully authenticated General Inspection System is allowed to
read the data in EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD..
FDP_ACF.1.3/CA The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on
the following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/CA The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules:
o Any terminal is not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of
the logical MRTD,
o Any terminal is not allowed to read any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the
logical MRTD,
o The General Inspection System is not allowed to read the data in
EF.DG3 and EF.DG4.
FDP_UCT.1/BAC Basic data exchange confidentiality
FDP_UCT.1.1/BAC The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to transmit
and receive user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.
69
FDP_UCT.1/CA Basic data exchange confidentiality
FDP_UCT.1.1/CA [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall enforce the CA Access Control
SFP to transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from unauthorised
disclosure after Chip Authentication.
FDP_UIT.1/BAC Data exchange integrity
FDP_UIT.1.1/BAC The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to transmit
and receive user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion
and replay errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2/BAC The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether
modification, deletion, insertion and replay has occurred.
FDP_UIT.1/CA Data exchange integrity
FDP_UIT.1.1/CA [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall enforce the CA Access Control
SFP to transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from modification,
deletion, insertion and replay errors after Chip Authentication protocol.
FDP_UIT.1.2/CA [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of
user data, whether modification, deletion, insertion and replay has occurred after
Chip Authentication protocol.
9.1.5 Class FMT Security Management
FMT_MOF.1/PROT Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MOF.1.1/PROT The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable the functions
o Chip Authentication,
to the Manufacturer.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
o Initialization
o Pre-personalization
o Personalization
o Chip Authentication protocol.
70
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles
o Manufacturer
o Personalization Agent
o Basic Inspection System
o General Inspection System.
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Application Note:
This SFR also applies to the refinement of the role Manufacturer.
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with ‘Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)’ the following policy is enforced
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
o User Data to be disclosed or manipulated,
o TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated,
o software to be reconstructed and,
o substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which
may enable other attacks
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with ‘Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)’ the following policy is enforced
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
o User Data to be disclosed or manipulated,
o TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated,
o software to be reconstructed and,
o substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which
may enable other attacks
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_ENA The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Initialization
Data and Pre-personalization Data to the Manufacturer.
71
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_DIS The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for
users to the Initialization Data to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Document
Basic Access Keys to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the Document Basic
Access Keys and Personalization Agent Keys to none.
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CAPK The TSF shall restrict the ability to load or generate the Chip
Authentication Keys to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/AAPK The TSF shall restrict the ability to load or generate the Active
Authentication Keys to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/AA_CA_KEY_READ Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/AA_CA_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the Active
Authentication and Chip Authentication Private Key to none.
9.1.6 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations and
electromagnetic radiations during command execution in excess of non useful
information enabling access to Personalization Agent Keys and
o Chip Authentication Private Key,
o Active Authentication: Private Key (AAK).
72
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure unauthorized users are unable to use the following
interface smart card circuit contacts to gain access to Personalization Agent Keys
and
o Chip Authentication Private Key,
o Active Authentication: Private Key (AAK).
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures
occur:
o Exposure to out-of-range operating conditions where therefore a
malfunction could occur,
o failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1.
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests at the conditions
o At reset
to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the
integrity of TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the
integrity of stored TSF executable code.
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing to the
TSF by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.
9.2 Security Assurance Requirements
The assurance components for the evaluation of the TOE and its development and operating
environment are those taken from the Evaluation Assurance Level 4 (EAL4) and augmented
by taking the following component: ADV_FSP.5, ADV_INT.2, ADV_TDS.4, ALC_CMS.5,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_TAT.2, and ATE_DPT.3.
9.2.1 ADV Development
9.2.1.1 ADV_ARC Security Architecture
73
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_ARC.1.1D The developer shall design and implement the TOE so that the security
features of the TSF cannot be bypassed.
ADV_ARC.1.2D The developer shall design and implement the TSF so that it is able to
protect itself from tampering by untrusted active entities.
ADV_ARC.1.3D The developer shall provide a security architecture description of the TSF.
ADV_ARC.1.1C The security architecture description shall be at a level of detail
commensurate with the description of the SFR-enforcing abstractions described in the
TOE design document.
ADV_ARC.1.2C The security architecture description shall describe the security domains
maintained by the TSF consistently with the SFRs.
ADV_ARC.1.3C The security architecture description shall describe how the TSF
initialisation process is secure.
ADV_ARC.1.4C The security architecture description shall demonstrate that the TSF
protects itself from tampering.
ADV_ARC.1.5C The security architecture description shall demonstrate that the TSF
prevents bypass of the SFR-enforcing functionality.
ADV_ARC.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.1.2 ADV_FSP Functional specification
74
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional error
information
ADV_FSP.5.1D The developer shall provide a functional specification.
ADV_FSP.5.2D The developer shall provide a tracing from the functional specification to
the SFRs.
ADV_FSP.5.1C The functional specification shall completely represent the TSF.
ADV_FSP.5.2C The functional specification shall describe the TSFI using a semi-formal
style.
ADV_FSP.5.3C The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of use
for all TSFI.
ADV_FSP.5.4C The functional specification shall identify and describe all parameters
associated with each TSFI.
ADV_FSP.5.5C The functional specification shall describe all actions associated with each
TSFI.
ADV_FSP.5.6C The functional specification shall describe all direct error messages that may
result from an invocation of each TSFI.
ADV_FSP.5.7C The functional specification shall describe all error messages that do not
result from an invocation of a TSFI.
ADV_FSP.5.8C The functional specification shall provide a rationale for each error message
contained in the TSF implementation yet does not result from an invocation of a TSFI.
ADV_FSP.5.9C The tracing shall demonstrate that the SFRs trace to TSFIs in the functional
specification.
ADV_FSP.5.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ADV_FSP.5.2E The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is an accurate
and complete instantiation of the SFRs.
9.2.1.3 ADV_IMP Implementation representation
75
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.1.1D The developer shall make available the implementation representation for
the entire TSF.
ADV_IMP.1.2D The developer shall provide a mapping between the TOE design description
and the sample of the implementation representation.
ADV_IMP.1.1C The implementation representation shall define the TSF to a level of detail
such that the TSF can be generated without further design decisions.
ADV_IMP.1.2C The implementation representation shall be in the form used by the
development personnel.
ADV_IMP.1.3C The mapping between the TOE design description and the sample of the
implementation representation shall demonstrate their correspondence.
ADV_IMP.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that, for the selected sample of the
implementation representation, the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.1.4 ADV_TDS TOE design
76
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.4.1D The developer shall provide the design of the TOE.
ADV_TDS.4.2D The developer shall provide a mapping from the TSFI of the functional
specification to the lowest level of decomposition available in the TOE design.
ADV_TDS.4.1C The design shall describe the structure of the TOE in terms of subsystems.
ADV_TDS.4.2C The design shall describe the TSF in terms of modules, designating each
module as SFR-enforcing, SFR-supporting, or SFR-non-interfering.
ADV_TDS.4.3C The design shall identify all subsystems of the TSF.
ADV_TDS.4.4C The design shall provide a semiformal description of each subsystem of the
TSF, supported by informal, explanatory text where appropriate.
ADV_TDS.4.5C The design shall provide a description of the interactions among all
subsystems of the TSF.
ADV_TDS.4.6C The design shall provide a mapping from the subsystems of the TSF to the
modules of the TSF.
ADV_TDS.4.7C The design shall describe each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting module
in terms of its purpose and relationship with other modules.
ADV_TDS.4.8C The design shall describe each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting module
in terms of its SFR-related interfaces, return values from those interfaces, interaction with
other modules and called SFR-related interfaces to other SFR-enforcing or SFR-supporting
modules.
ADV_TDS.4.9C The design shall describe each SFR-non-interfering module in terms of its
purpose and interaction with other modules.
ADV_TDS.4.10C The mapping shall demonstrate that all TSFIs trace to the behaviour
described in the TOE design that they invoke.
ADV_TDS.4.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ADV_TDS.4.2E The evaluator shall determine that the design is an accurate and complete
instantiation of all security functional requirements.
9.2.1.5 ADV_INT TSF internals
77
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.2.1D The developer shall design and implement the entire TSF such that it has
well-structured internals.
ADV_INT.2.2D The developer shall provide an internals description and justification.
ADV_INT.2.1C The justification shall describe the characteristics used to judge the
meaning of ``well-structured''.
ADV_INT.2.2C The TSF internals description shall demonstrate that the entire TSF is well-
structured.
ADV_INT.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ADV_INT.2.2E The evaluator shall perform an internals analysis on the TSF.
9.2.2 AGD Guidance documents
9.2.2.1 AGD_OPE Operational user guidance
78
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_OPE.1.1D The developer shall provide operational user guidance.
AGD_OPE.1.1C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the user-
accessible functions and privileges that should be controlled in a secure processing
environment, including appropriate warnings.
AGD_OPE.1.2C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, how to
use the available interfaces provided by the TOE in a secure manner.
AGD_OPE.1.3C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the
available functions and interfaces, in particular all security parameters under the control
of the user, indicating secure values as appropriate.
AGD_OPE.1.4C The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, clearly present
each type of security-relevant event relative to the user-accessible functions that need to
be performed, including changing the security characteristics of entities under the control
of the TSF.
AGD_OPE.1.5C The operational user guidance shall identify all possible modes of operation
of the TOE (including operation following failure or operational error), their consequences
and implications for maintaining secure operation.
AGD_OPE.1.6C The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, describe the
security measures to be followed in order to fulfil the security objectives for the
operational environment as described in the ST.
AGD_OPE.1.7C The operational user guidance shall be clear and reasonable.
AGD_OPE.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.2.2 AGD_PRE Preparative procedures
79
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
AGD_PRE.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE including its preparative procedures.
AGD_PRE.1.1C The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure
acceptance of the delivered TOE in accordance with the developer's delivery procedures.
AGD_PRE.1.2C The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure
installation of the TOE and for the secure preparation of the operational environment in
accordance with the security objectives for the operational environment as described in
the ST.
AGD_PRE.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
AGD_PRE.1.2E The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to confirm that the
TOE can be prepared securely for operation.
9.2.3 ALC Life-cycle support
9.2.3.1 ALC_CMC CM capabilities
80
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and automation
ALC_CMC.4.1D The developer shall provide the TOE and a reference for the TOE.
ALC_CMC.4.2D The developer shall provide the CM documentation.
ALC_CMC.4.3D The developer shall use a CM system.
ALC_CMC.4.1C The TOE shall be labelled with its unique reference.
ALC_CMC.4.2C The CM documentation shall describe the method used to uniquely identify
the configuration items.
ALC_CMC.4.3C The CM system shall uniquely identify all configuration items.
ALC_CMC.4.4C The CM system shall provide automated measures such that only
authorised changes are made to the configuration items.
ALC_CMC.4.5C The CM system shall support the production of the TOE by automated
means.
ALC_CMC.4.6C The CM documentation shall include a CM plan.
ALC_CMC.4.7C The CM plan shall describe how the CM system is used for the development
of the TOE.
ALC_CMC.4.8C The CM plan shall describe the procedures used to accept modified or
newly created configuration items as part of the TOE.
ALC_CMC.4.9C The evidence shall demonstrate that all configuration items are being
maintained under the CM system.
ALC_CMC.4.10C The evidence shall demonstrate that the CM system is being operated in
accordance with the CM plan.
ALC_CMC.4.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.3.2 ALC_CMS CM scope
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ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5.1D The developer shall provide a configuration list for the TOE.
ALC_CMS.5.1C The configuration list shall include the following: the TOE itself; the
evaluation evidence required by the SARs; the parts that comprise the TOE; the
implementation representation; security flaw reports and resolution status; and
development tools and related information.
ALC_CMS.5.2C The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.
ALC_CMS.5.3C For each TSF relevant configuration item, the configuration list shall
indicate the developer of the item.
ALC_CMS.5.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.3.3 ALC_DEL Delivery
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DEL.1.1D The developer shall document and provide procedures for delivery of the
TOE or parts of it to the consumer.
ALC_DEL.1.2D The developer shall use the delivery procedures.
ALC_DEL.1.1C The delivery documentation shall describe all procedures that are necessary
to maintain security when distributing versions of the TOE to the consumer.
ALC_DEL.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.3.4 ALC_DVS Development security
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ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_DVS.2.1D The developer shall produce and provide development security
documentation.
ALC_DVS.2.1C The development security documentation shall describe all the physical,
procedural, personnel, and other security measures that are necessary to protect the
confidentiality and integrity of the TOE design and implementation in its development
environment.
ALC_DVS.2.2C The development security documentation shall justify that the security
measures provide the necessary level of protection to maintain the confidentiality and
integrity of the TOE.
ALC_DVS.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ALC_DVS.2.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the security measures are being applied.
9.2.3.5 ALC_LCD Life-cycle definition
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.1.1D The developer shall establish a life-cycle model to be used in the
development and maintenance of the TOE.
ALC_LCD.1.2D The developer shall provide life-cycle definition documentation.
ALC_LCD.1.1C The life-cycle definition documentation shall describe the model used to
develop and maintain the TOE.
ALC_LCD.1.2C The life-cycle model shall provide for the necessary control over the
development and maintenance of the TOE.
ALC_LCD.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.3.6 ALC_TAT Tools and techniques
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ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.2.1D The developer shall provide the documentation identifying each
development tool being used for the TOE.
ALC_TAT.2.2D The developer shall document and provide the selected implementation-
dependent options of each development tool.
ALC_TAT.2.3D The developer shall describe and provide the implementation standards that
are being applied by the developer.
ALC_TAT.2.1C Each development tool used for implementation shall be well-defined.
ALC_TAT.2.2C The documentation of each development tool shall unambiguously define
the meaning of all statements as well as all conventions and directives used in the
implementation.
ALC_TAT.2.3C The documentation of each development tool shall unambiguously define
the meaning of all implementation-dependent options.
ALC_TAT.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ALC_TAT.2.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the implementation standards have been
applied.
9.2.4 ASE Security Target evaluation
9.2.4.1 ASE_CCL Conformance claims
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ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_CCL.1.1D The developer shall provide a conformance claim.
ASE_CCL.1.2D The developer shall provide a conformance claim rationale.
ASE_CCL.1.1C The conformance claim shall contain a CC conformance claim that identifies
the version of the CC to which the ST and the TOE claim conformance.
ASE_CCL.1.2C The CC conformance claim shall describe the conformance of the ST to CC
Part 2 as either CC Part 2 conformant or CC Part 2 extended.
ASE_CCL.1.3C The CC conformance claim shall describe the conformance of the ST to CC
Part 3 as either CC Part 3 conformant or CC Part 3 extended.
ASE_CCL.1.4C The CC conformance claim shall be consistent with the extended
components definition.
ASE_CCL.1.5C The conformance claim shall identify all PPs and security requirement
packages to which the ST claims conformance.
ASE_CCL.1.6C The conformance claim shall describe any conformance of the ST to a
package as either package-conformant or package-augmented.
ASE_CCL.1.7C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the TOE type is
consistent with the TOE type in the PPs for which conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.8C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of
the security problem definition is consistent with the statement of the security problem
definition in the PPs for which conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.9C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of
security objectives is consistent with the statement of security objectives in the PPs for
which conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.10C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of
security requirements is consistent with the statement of security requirements in the PPs
for which conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.4.2 ASE_ECD Extended components definition
85
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_ECD.1.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security requirements.
ASE_ECD.1.2D The developer shall provide an extended components definition.
ASE_ECD.1.1C The statement of security requirements shall identify all extended security
requirements.
ASE_ECD.1.2C The extended components definition shall define an extended component
for each extended security requirement.
ASE_ECD.1.3C The extended components definition shall describe how each extended
component is related to the existing CC components, families, and classes.
ASE_ECD.1.4C The extended components definition shall use the existing CC components,
families, classes, and methodology as a model for presentation.
ASE_ECD.1.5C The extended components shall consist of measurable and objective
elements such that conformance or nonconformance to these elements can be
demonstrated.
ASE_ECD.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_ECD.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that no extended component can be clearly
expressed using existing components.
9.2.4.3 ASE_INT ST introduction
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ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_INT.1.1D The developer shall provide an ST introduction.
ASE_INT.1.1C The ST introduction shall contain an ST reference, a TOE reference, a TOE
overview and a TOE description.
ASE_INT.1.2C The ST reference shall uniquely identify the ST.
ASE_INT.1.3C The TOE reference shall identify the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.4C The TOE overview shall summarise the usage and major security features of
the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.5C The TOE overview shall identify the TOE type.
ASE_INT.1.6C The TOE overview shall identify any non-TOE hardware/software/firmware
required by the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.7C The TOE description shall describe the physical scope of the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.8C The TOE description shall describe the logical scope of the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_INT.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE reference, the TOE overview, and
the TOE description are consistent with each other.
9.2.4.4 ASE_OBJ Security objectives
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ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_OBJ.2.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security objectives.
ASE_OBJ.2.2D The developer shall provide a security objectives rationale.
ASE_OBJ.2.1C The statement of security objectives shall describe the security objectives
for the TOE and the security objectives for the operational environment.
ASE_OBJ.2.2C The security objectives rationale shall trace each security objective for the
TOE back to threats countered by that security objective and OSPs enforced by that
security objective.
ASE_OBJ.2.3C The security objectives rationale shall trace each security objective for the
operational environment back to threats countered by that security objective, OSPs
enforced by that security objective, and assumptions upheld by that security objective.
ASE_OBJ.2.4C The security objectives rationale shall demonstrate that the security
objectives counter all threats.
ASE_OBJ.2.5C The security objectives rationale shall demonstrate that the security
objectives enforce all OSPs.
ASE_OBJ.2.6C The security objectives rationale shall demonstrate that the security
objectives for the operational environment uphold all assumptions.
ASE_OBJ.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.4.5 ASE_REQ Security requirements
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ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_REQ.2.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security requirements.
ASE_REQ.2.2D The developer shall provide a security requirements rationale.
ASE_REQ.2.1C The statement of security requirements shall describe the SFRs and the
SARs.
ASE_REQ.2.2C All subjects, objects, operations, security attributes, external entities and
other terms that are used in the SFRs and the SARs shall be defined.
ASE_REQ.2.3C The statement of security requirements shall identify all operations on the
security requirements.
ASE_REQ.2.4C All operations shall be performed correctly.
ASE_REQ.2.5C Each dependency of the security requirements shall either be satisfied, or
the security requirements rationale shall justify the dependency not being satisfied.
ASE_REQ.2.6C The security requirements rationale shall trace each SFR back to the
security objectives for the TOE.
ASE_REQ.2.7C The security requirements rationale shall demonstrate that the SFRs meet
all security objectives for the TOE.
ASE_REQ.2.8C The security requirements rationale shall explain why the SARs were
chosen.
ASE_REQ.2.9C The statement of security requirements shall be internally consistent.
ASE_REQ.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.4.6 ASE_SPD Security problem definition
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ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_APD.1.1D The developer shall provide a security problem definition.
ASE_SPD.1.1C The security problem definition shall describe the threats.
ASE_SPD.1.2C All threats shall be described in terms of a threat agent, an asset, and an
adverse action.
ASE_SPD.1.3C The security problem definition shall describe the OSPs.
ASE_SPD.1.4C The security problem definition shall describe the assumptions about the
operational environment of the TOE.
ASE_SPD.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.4.7 ASE_TSS TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.1.1D The developer shall provide a TOE summary specification.
ASE_TSS.1.1C The TOE summary specification shall describe how the TOE meets each
SFR.
ASE_TSS.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_TSS.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE summary specification is consistent
with the TOE overview and the TOE description.
9.2.5 ATE Tests
9.2.5.1 ATE_COV Coverage
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ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.2.1D The developer shall provide an analysis of the test coverage.
ATE_COV.2.1C The analysis of the test coverage shall demonstrate the correspondence
between the tests in the test documentation and the TSFIs in the functional specification.
ATE_COV.2.2C The analysis of the test coverage shall demonstrate that all TSFIs in the
functional specification have been tested.
ATE_COV.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.5.2 ATE_DPT Depth
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.3.1D The developer shall provide the analysis of the depth of testing.
ATE_DPT.3.1C The analysis of the depth of testing shall demonstrate the correspondence
between the tests in the test documentation and the TSF subsystems and modules in the
TOE design.
ATE_DPT.3.2C The analysis of the depth of testing shall demonstrate that all TSF
subsystems in the TOE design have been tested.
ATE_DPT.3.3C The analysis of the depth of testing shall demonstrate that all TSF modules
in the TOE design have been tested.
ATE_DPT.3.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.5.3 ATE_FUN Functional tests
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ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.1.1D The developer shall test the TSF and document the results.
ATE_FUN.1.2D The developer shall provide test documentation.
ATE_FUN.1.1C The test documentation shall consist of test plans, expected test results and
actual test results.
ATE_FUN.1.2C The test plans shall identify the tests to be performed and describe the
scenarios for performing each test. These scenarios shall include any ordering
dependencies on the results of other tests.
ATE_FUN.1.3C The expected test results shall show the anticipated outputs from a
successful execution of the tests.
ATE_FUN.1.4C The actual test results shall be consistent with the expected test results.
ATE_FUN.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
9.2.5.4 ATE_IND Independent testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
ATE_IND.2.1D The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
ATE_IND.2.1C The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
ATE_IND.2.2C The developer shall provide an equivalent set of resources to those that
were used in the developer's functional testing of the TSF.
ATE_IND.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ATE_IND.2.2E The evaluator shall execute a sample of tests in the test documentation to
verify the developer test results.
ATE_IND.2.3E The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm that the TSF
operates as specified.
9.2.6 AVA Vulnerability assessment
9.2.6.1 AVA_VAN Vulnerability analysis
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AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3.1D The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
AVA_VAN.3.1C The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
AVA_VAN.3.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
AVA_VAN.3.2E The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain sources to identify
potential vulnerabilities in the TOE.
AVA_VAN.3.3E The evaluator shall perform an independent, focused vulnerability analysis
of the TOE using the guidance documentation, functional specification, TOE design,
security architecture description and implementation representation to identify potential
vulnerabilities in the TOE.
AVA_VAN.3.4E The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, based on the identified
potential vulnerabilities, to determine that the TOE is resistant to attacks performed by an
attacker possessing Enhanced-Basic attack potential.
9.3 Security Requirements Rationale
9.3.1 Objectives
9.3.1.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
OT.AC_Pers The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical
MRTD” addresses the access control of the writing the logical MRTD. The write access to
the logical MRTD data are defined by the SFR FDP_ACC.1/BAC and FDP_ACF.1/BAC as
follows: only the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write the
data of the groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
The following paragraph is extracted from [PP_BAC] and has been refined according to
the technical characteristics of this TOE. The refinement is right after.
The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF
according to SFR FIA_UAU.4 and FIA_UAU.5. The Personalization Agent can be
authenticated either by using the BAC mechanism (FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1/SHA,
FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/ENC as well as FCS_COP.1/MAC) with
the personalization key or for reasons of interoperability with the [PP_EAC] by using the
symmetric authentication mechanism (FCS_COP.1/ AUTH)6.
In case of using the BAC mechanism the SFR FIA_UAU.6/BAC describes the re-
authentication and FDP_UCT.1/BAC and FDP_UIT.1/BAC the protection of the transmitted
data by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions
according to FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and
FCS_COP.1/ENC as well as FCS_COP.1/MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode.
Note: As BAC mechanism is not supported for the authentication of the terminal as
Personalization Agent, the following two paragraphs have been added to demonstrate
that symmetric authentication used in Personalization phase fulfills the OT.AC_Pers.
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The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent is performed by TSF according
to SFR FIA_UAU.4 and FIA_UAU.5/BAC. The Personalization Agent can be authenticated
by using the symmetric authentication mechanism (FCS_COP.1/AUTH) with the
personalization key.
The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent) and the SFR
FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including Personalization) setting the
Document Basic Access Keys according to the SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE as
authentication reference data. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents read access to
the secret key of the Personalization Agent Keys and ensure together with the SFR
FCS_CKM.4, FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_PHP.3 the confidentially of these keys.
The following parts are added to integrate the personalization of the different keys in the
OT.AC_Pers.
Only the Personalization Agent is allowed to set the Document Basic Access Keys
according to the SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents
read access to the Document Basic Access Keys and ensure together with the SFR
FCS_CKM.4, FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_PHP.3 the confidentially of these keys.
Only the Personalization Agent is allowed to set the Chip Authentication Private Key
according to the SFR FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and the Active Authentication Private Key
according to FMT_MTD.1/AAPK. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/AA_CA_KEY_READ prevents read
access to the Chip Authentication Private Key and Active Authentication Private Key and
ensure together with the SFR FCS_CKM.4, FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_PHP.3 the
confidentially of these keys.
OT.Data_Int The security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” requires the
TOE to protect the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against
physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The write access to the logical MRTD
data is defined by the SFRs (FDP_ACC.1/BAC, FDP_ACC.1/CA) and (FDP_ACF.1/BAC,
FDP_ACF.1/CA) in the same way: only the Personalization Agent is allowed to write the
data of the groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD (FDP_ACF.1.2/BAC, rule 1)
and terminals are not allowed to modify any of the data groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the
logical MRTD (cf. FDP_ACF.1.4/BAC). The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including
Personalization Agent) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions
(including Personalization). The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent
shall be performed by TSF according to SFR FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5/BAC and
FIA_UAU.6/BAC using FCS_COP.1/AUTH.
The security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” requires the TOE to
ensure that the inspection system is able to detect any modification of the transmitted
logical MRTD data by means of the BAC mechanism. The SFR FIA_UAU.6/BAC,
FDP_UCT.1/BAC and FDP_UIT.1/BAC requires the protection of the transmitted data by
means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/ENC and
FCS_COP.1/MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE requires the
Personalization Agent to establish the Document Basic Access Keys in a way that they
cannot be read by anyone in accordance to FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ.
The following part is added to integrate the Manufacturing and Personalization phases in
the OT_Data_Int.
The following part is added to integrate the Chip Authentication mechanism in the
coverage of the OT.Data_Int.
The inspection system is also able to detect any modification of the transmitted logical
MRTD data by means of the Chip Authentication mechanism. The SFR FIA_UAU.6/CA,
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FDP_UCT.1/CA and FDP_UIT.1/CA requires the protection of the transmitted data by
means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to
FCS_CKM.1/CA FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode. The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK requires the Personalization Agent to establish the Chip Authentication
Private Key in a way that it cannot be read by anyone in accordance to
FMT_MTD.1/AA_CA_KEY_READ. FCS_CKM.4 enforces the destruction of Secure
Messaging session keys.
OT.Data_Conf The security objective OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of personal data”
requires the TOE to ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data groups EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16. The SFR FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 allow only those actions before
identification respective authentication which do not violate OT.Data_Conf. In case of
failed authentication attempts FIA_AFL.1/BAC enforces additional waiting time prolonging
the necessary amount of time for facilitating a brute force attack. The read access to the
logical MRTD data is defined by the FDP_ACC.1/BAC and FDP_ACF.1/BAC along with
FDP_ACF.1/CA and FDP_ACC.1/CA: the successful authenticated Personalization Agent is
allowed to read the data of the logical MRTD (EF.DG1 to EF.DG16). The successful
authenticated Basic Inspection System is allowed to read the data of the logical MRTD
(EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16). The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including
Personalization Agent and Basic Inspection System) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF
management functions (including Personalization for the key management for the
Document Basic Access Keys).
The SFR FIA_UAU.4 prevents reuse of authentication data to strengthen the
authentication of the user. The SFR FIA_UAU.5/BAC enforces the TOE to accept the
authentication attempt as Basic Inspection System only by means of the Basic Access
Control Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access Keys. Moreover, the
SFR FIA_UAU.6/BAC requests secure messaging after successful authentication of the
terminal with Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism which includes the
protection of the transmitted data in ENC_MAC_Mode by means of the cryptographic
functions according to FCS_COP.1/ENC and FCS_COP.1/MAC (cf. the SFR FDP_UCT.1/BAC
and FDP_UIT.1/BAC). (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/ENC and FCS_COP.1/MAC for
the ENC_MAC_Mode. The SFR FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/SHA and FCS_RND.1
establish the key management for the secure messaging keys. The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE addresses the key management and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
prevents reading of the Document Basic Access Keys.
The following part is added to integrate the Manufacturing and Personalization phases in
the OT_Data_Conf.
The following parts are added to integrate the Chip Authentication mechanism and the
Symmetric Authentication mechanism used in Personalization phase in the coverage of
the OT.Data_Conf.
The SFR FIA_UAU.5/CA enforces the TOE to accept only received commands with correct
message authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with key agreed with
the terminal by means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism. Moreover, the SFR
FIA_UAU.6/CA requests secure messaging after successful authentication of the chip
which includes the protection of the transmitted data in ENC_MAC_Mode by means of the
cryptographic functions according to FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC (cf.
the SFR FDP_UCT.1/CA and FDP_UIT.1/CA). (for key generation), and
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode. The SFR
FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA and FCS_RND.1 establish the key
management for the secure messaging keys. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CAPK addresses the
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key management and FMT_MTD.1/AA_CA_KEY_READ prevents reading of the Chip
Authentication Private Key.
OT.Identification The security objective OT.Identification “Identification and
Authentication of the TOE” address the storage of the IC Identification Data uniquely
identifying the MRTD’s chip in its non-volatile memory. This will be ensured by TSF
according to SFR FAU_SAS.1.
Furthermore, the TOE shall identify itself only to a successful authenticated Basic
Inspection System in Phase 4 “Operational Use”. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA allows
only the Manufacturer to write Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data (including
the Personalization Agent key). The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS allows the Personalization
Agent to disable Initialization Data if their usage in the phase 4 “Operational Use” violates
the security objective OT.Identification. The SFR FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 do not allow
reading of any data uniquely identifying the MRTD’s chip before successful authentication
of the Basic Inspection Terminal and will stop communication after unsuccessful
authentication attempt. In case of failed authentication attempts FIA_AFL.1/BAC enforces
additional waiting time prolonging the necessary amount of time for facilitating a brute
force attack.
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func The security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against
Abuse of Functionality” is ensured by the SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 which prevent
misuse of test functionality of the TOE or other features which may not be used after TOE
Delivery.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak The security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against Information
Leakage” requires the TOE to protect confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the
MRTD’s chip against disclosure
o by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time
between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power
consumption, clock, or I/O lines, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_EMS.1,
o by forcing a malfunction of the TOE, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_FLS.1 and
FPT_TST.1, and/or
o by a physical manipulation of the TOE, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper The security objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against
Physical Tampering” is covered by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
OT.Prot_Malfunction The security objective OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against
Malfunctions” is covered by (i) the SFR FPT_TST.1 which requires self tests to
demonstrate the correct operation and tests of authorized users to verify the integrity of
TSF data and TSF code, and (ii) the SFR FPT_FLS.1 which requires a secure state in case
of detected failure or operating conditions possibly causing a malfunction.
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof The security objective OT.Chip_Auth_Proof “Proof of MRTD’s chip
authenticity” is ensured by the Chip Authentication Protocol activated by
FMT_MOF.1/PROT and provided by FIA_API.1/CA proving the genuineness of the TOE.
The Chip Authentication Protocol defined by FCS_CKM.1/CA is performed using a TOE
internally stored confidential private key. Confidentiality of this key is ensured by
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/AA_CA_KEY_READ. The Chip Authentication Protocol
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[TR_03110] requires additional TSF according to FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA (for the derivation
of the session keys) using FCS_RND.1, FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC (for
the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging).
OT.AA_Proof The security objective OT.AA_Proof is ensured by the Active Authentication
Protocol as defined in FIA_API.1/AA. The FCS_CKM.1/AA provides key generation for
Active Authentication. The Active Authentication relies on FCS_COP.1/AA and FCS_RND.1.
It is performed using a TOE internally stored confidential private key as required by
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK. It ensures that the Active Authentication Keys cannot be read as per
FMT_MTD.1/AA_CA_KEY_READ.
9.3.2 Rationale tables of Security Objectives and SFRs
Security Objectives Security Functional Requirements Rationale
OT.AC_Pers FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/AUTH, FCS_RND.1,
FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5/BAC, FDP_ACC.1/BAC,
FDP_ACF.1/BAC, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ,
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK, FMT_MTD.1/AA_CA_KEY_READ,
FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.3, FCS_COP.1/SHA,
FCS_CKM.1, FIA_UAU.6/BAC, FDP_UCT.1/BAC,
FDP_UIT.1/BAC, FCS_COP.1/ENC, FCS_COP.1/MAC,
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK
Section 9.3.1
OT.Data_Int FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.4,
FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_COP.1/ENC, FCS_COP.1/AUTH,
FCS_COP.1/MAC, FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA,
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC, FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC,
FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5/BAC, FIA_UAU.6/BAC,
FIA_UAU.6/CA, FDP_ACC.1/BAC, FDP_ACF.1/BAC,
FDP_UCT.1/BAC, FDP_UCT.1/CA, FDP_UIT.1/BAC,
FDP_UIT.1/CA, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ,
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK, FMT_MTD.1/AA_CA_KEY_READ,
FDP_ACC.1/CA, FDP_ACF.1/CA, FCS_RND.1
Section 9.3.1
OT.Data_Conf FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.4,
FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_COP.1/ENC, FCS_COP.1/MAC,
FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA, FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC, FCS_RND.1, FIA_UID.1,
FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5/BAC,
FIA_UAU.5/CA, FIA_UAU.6/BAC, FIA_UAU.6/CA,
FIA_AFL.1/BAC, FDP_ACC.1/BAC, FDP_ACF.1/BAC,
FDP_UCT.1/BAC, FDP_UCT.1/CA, FDP_UIT.1/BAC,
FDP_UIT.1/CA, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ,
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK, FMT_MTD.1/AA_CA_KEY_READ,
FDP_ACC.1/CA, FDP_ACF.1/CA
Section 9.3.1
OT.Identification FAU_SAS.1, FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1, FIA_AFL.1/BAC,
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA, FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
Section 9.3.1
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2 Section 9.3.1
97
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_TST.1, FPT_PHP.3 Section 9.3.1
OT.Prot_Phys-
Tamper
FPT_PHP.3 Section 9.3.1
OT.Prot_Malfunction FPT_FLS.1, FPT_TST.1 Section 9.3.1
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA,
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC, FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC,
FCS_RND.1, FIA_API.1/CA, FMT_MTD.1/CAPK,
FMT_MTD.1/AA_CA_KEY_READ, FMT_MOF.1/PROT
Section 9.3.1
OT.AA_Proof FCS_COP.1/AA, FCS_RND.1, FMT_MTD.1/AAPK,
FCS_CKM.1/AA, FIA_API.1/AA,
FMT_MTD.1/AA_CA_KEY_READ
Section 9.3.1
Table 16 Security Objectives and SFRs - Coverage
Security Functional Requirements Security Objectives
FAU_SAS.1 OT.Identification
FCS_CKM.1 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FCS_CKM.1/AA OT.AA_Proof
FCS_CKM.1/CA OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf,
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FCS_CKM.4 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FCS_COP.1/SHA OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FCS_COP.1/ENC OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FCS_COP.1/AUTH OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int
FCS_COP.1/MAC OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf,
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf,
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf,
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FCS_COP.1/AA OT.AA_Proof
FCS_RND.1 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf,
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof, OT.AA_Proof
FIA_UID.1 OT.Data_Conf, OT.Identification
FIA_UAU.1 OT.Data_Conf, OT.Identification
FIA_UAU.4 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FIA_UAU.5/BAC OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FIA_UAU.5/CA OT.Data_Conf
98
FIA_UAU.6/BAC OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FIA_UAU.6/CA OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FIA_AFL.1/BAC OT.Data_Conf, OT.Identification
FIA_API.1/CA OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FIA_API.1/AA OT.AA_Proof
FDP_ACC.1/BAC OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FDP_ACC.1/CA OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FDP_ACF.1/BAC OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FDP_ACF.1/CA OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FDP_UCT.1/BAC OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FDP_UCT.1/CA OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FDP_UIT.1/BAC OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FDP_UIT.1/CA OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FMT_MOF.1/PROT OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FMT_SMF.1 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FMT_SMR.1 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FMT_LIM.1 OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
FMT_LIM.2 OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA OT.Identification
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS OT.Identification
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf,
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK OT.AC_Pers, OT.AA_Proof
FMT_MTD.1/AA_CA_KEY_READ OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf,
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof, OT.AA_Proof
FPT_EMS.1 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
FPT_FLS.1 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Prot_Inf_Leak,
OT.Prot_Malfunction
FPT_TST.1 OT.Prot_Inf_Leak, OT.Prot_Malfunction
FPT_PHP.3 OT.AC_Pers, OT.Prot_Inf_Leak,
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
Table 17 SFRs and Security Objectives
99
9.3.3 Dependencies
9.3.3.1 SFRs Dependencies
Requirements CC Dependencies Satisfied Dependencies
FAU_SAS.1 No Dependencies
FCS_CKM.1 (FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/ENC,
FCS_COP.1/MAC
FCS_CKM.1/AA (FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/AA
FCS_CKM.1/CA (FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4,
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC
FCS_CKM.4 (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2)
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.1/CA
FCS_COP.1/SHA (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2)
and (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/ENC (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2)
and (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/AUTH (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2)
and (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/MAC (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2)
and (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2)
and (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2)
and (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2)
and (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/AA (FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2)
and (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1/AA, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_RND.1 No Dependencies
FIA_UID.1 No Dependencies
FIA_UAU.1 (FIA_UID.1) FIA_UID.1
100
FIA_UAU.4 No Dependencies
FIA_UAU.5/BAC No Dependencies
FIA_UAU.5/CA No Dependencies
FIA_UAU.6/BAC No Dependencies
FIA_UAU.6/CA No Dependencies
FIA_AFL.1/BAC (FIA_UAU.1) FIA_UAU.1
FIA_API.1/CA No Dependencies
FIA_API.1/AA No Dependencies
FDP_ACC.1/BAC (FDP_ACF.1) FDP_ACF.1/BAC
FDP_ACC.1/CA (FDP_ACF.1) FDP_ACF.1/CA
FDP_ACF.1/BAC (FDP_ACC.1) and
(FMT_MSA.3)
FDP_ACC.1/BAC
FDP_ACF.1/CA (FDP_ACC.1) and
(FMT_MSA.3)
FDP_ACC.1/CA
FDP_UCT.1/BAC (FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1) and
(FTP_ITC.1 or
FTP_TRP.1)
FDP_ACC.1/BAC
FDP_UCT.1/CA (FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1) and
(FTP_ITC.1 or
FTP_TRP.1)
FDP_ACC.1/CA
FDP_UIT.1/BAC (FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1) and
(FTP_ITC.1 or
FTP_TRP.1)
FDP_ACC.1/BAC
FDP_UIT.1/CA (FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1) and
(FTP_ITC.1 or
FTP_TRP.1)
FDP_ACC.1/CA
FMT_MOF.1/PROT (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1 No Dependencies
FMT_SMR.1 (FIA_UID.1) FIA_UID.1
FMT_LIM.1 (FMT_LIM.2) FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.2 (FMT_LIM.1) FMT_LIM.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
101
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/AA_CA_KEY_READ (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FPT_EMS.1 No Dependencies
FPT_FLS.1 No Dependencies
FPT_TST.1 No Dependencies
FPT_PHP.3 No Dependencies
Table 18 SFRs Dependencies
102
Rationale for the exclusion of Dependencies
The dependency FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 of FCS_COP.1/SHA is
discarded. The hash algorithm required by FCS_COP.1/SHA does not need any key
material. Therefore neither a key generation (FCS_CKM.1) nor an import (FDP_ITC.1/2) is
necessary.
The dependency FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 of FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA is
discarded. The hash algorithm required by FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA does not need any key
material. Therefore neither a key generation (FCS_CKM.1) nor an import (FDP_ITC.1/2) is
necessary.
The dependency FMT_MSA.3 of FDP_ACF.1/BAC is discarded. The access control TSF
according to FDP_ACF.1/BAC uses security attributes which are defined during the
personalization and are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No management of
these security attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3) is necessary here.
The dependency FMT_MSA.3 of FDP_ACF.1/CA is discarded. The access control TSF
according to FDP_ACF.1/CA uses security attributes which are defined during the
personalization and are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No management of
these security attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3) is necessary here.
The dependency FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1 of FDP_UCT.1/BAC is discarded. The SFR
FDP_UCT.1/BAC requires the use of secure messaging between the MRTD and the BIS.
There is no need for SFR FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this communication channel to be
logically distinct from other communication channels since there is only one channel.
Since the TOE does not provide a direct human interface a trusted path as required by
FTP_TRP.1 is not applicable here.
The dependency FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1 of FDP_UCT.1/CA is discarded. The SFR
FDP_UCT.1/CA requires the use of secure messaging between the MRTD and the BIS.
There is no need for SFR FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this communication channel to be
logically distinct from other communication channels since there is only one channel.
Since the TOE does not provide a direct human interface a trusted path as required by
FTP_TRP.1 is not applicable here.
The dependency FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1 of FDP_UIT.1/BAC is discarded. The SFR
FDP_UIT.1/BAC requires the use of secure messaging between the MRTD and the BIS.
There is no need for SFR FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this communication channel to be
logically distinct from other communication channels since there is only one channel.
Since the TOE does not provide a direct human interface a trusted path as required by
FTP_TRP.1 is not applicable here.
The dependency FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1 of FDP_UIT.1/CA is discarded. The SFR
FDP_UIT.1/CA requires the use of secure messaging between the MRTD and the BIS.
There is no need for SFR FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this communication channel to be
logically distinct from other communication channels since there is only one channel.
Since the TOE does not provide a direct human interface a trusted path as required by
FTP_TRP.1 is not applicable here.
103
9.3.3.2 SARs Dependencies
Requirements CC Dependencies Satisfied Dependencies
ADV_ARC.1 (ADV_FSP.1) and (ADV_TDS.1) ADV_FSP.5, ADV_TDS.4
ADV_FSP.5 (ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.1) ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4
ADV_IMP.1 (ADV_TDS.3) and (ALC_TAT.1) ADV_TDS.4, ALC_TAT.2
ADV_TDS.4 (ADV_FSP.5) ADV_FSP.5
ADV_INT.2 (ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.3) and
(ALC_TAT.1)
ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4,
ALC_TAT.2
AGD_OPE.1 (ADV_FSP.1) ADV_FSP.5
AGD_PRE.1 No Dependencies
ALC_CMC.4 (ALC_CMS.1) and (ALC_DVS.1) and
(ALC_LCD.1)
ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2,
ALC_LCD.1
ALC_CMS.5 No Dependencies
ALC_DEL.1 No Dependencies
ALC_DVS.2 No Dependencies
ALC_LCD.1 No Dependencies
ALC_TAT.2 (ADV_IMP.1) ADV_IMP.1
ASE_CCL.1 (ASE_ECD.1) and (ASE_INT.1) and
(ASE_REQ.1)
ASE_ECD.1, ASE_INT.1,
ASE_REQ.2
ASE_ECD.1 No Dependencies
ASE_INT.1 No Dependencies
ASE_OBJ.2 (ASE_SPD.1) ASE_SPD.1
ASE_REQ.2 (ASE_ECD.1) and (ASE_OBJ.2) ASE_ECD.1, ASE_OBJ.2
ASE_SPD.1 No Dependencies
ASE_TSS.1 (ADV_FSP.1) and (ASE_INT.1) and
(ASE_REQ.1)
ADV_FSP.5, ASE_INT.1,
ASE_REQ.2
ATE_COV.2 (ADV_FSP.2) and (ATE_FUN.1) ADV_FSP.5, ATE_FUN.1
ATE_DPT.3 (ADV_ARC.1) and (ADV_TDS.4) and
(ATE_FUN.1)
ADV_ARC.1, ADV_TDS.4,
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_FUN.1 (ATE_COV.1) ATE_COV.2
ATE_IND.2 (ADV_FSP.2) and (AGD_OPE.1) and
(AGD_PRE.1) and (ATE_COV.1) and
(ATE_FUN.1)
ADV_FSP.5, AGD_OPE.1,
AGD_PRE.1, ATE_COV.2,
ATE_FUN.1
AVA_VAN.3 (ADV_ARC.1) and (ADV_FSP.4) and
(ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.3) and
(AGD_OPE.1) and (AGD_PRE.1) and
(ATE_DPT.1)
ADV_ARC.1, ADV_FSP.5,
ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4,
AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1,
ATE_DPT.3
Table 19 SARs Dependencies
104
9.3.4 Rationale for the Security Assurance Requirements
The EAL4 was chosen to permit a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is
the highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing
product line. EAL4 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur sensitive security specific engineering costs.
9.3.5 ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
The TOE actually target an EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 and is only limited to EAL4+
due to the restriction of [PP_BAC] on AVA_VAN level.
Other MRTDs TOE are targeting the same physical scope are not affected by this limitation
and provide the full EAL5+ set of SARs. This EAL5+ is required to reach a higher level of
assurance due to sensitivity of ID documents.
9.3.6 ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
The TOE actually target an EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 and is only limited to EAL4+
due to the restriction of [PP_BAC] on AVA_VAN level.
Other MRTDs TOE are targeting the same physical scope are not affected by this limitation
and provide the full EAL5+ set of SARs. This EAL5+ is required to reach a higher level of
assurance due to sensitivity of ID documents.
9.3.7 ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
The TOE actually target an EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 and is only limited to EAL4+
due to the restriction of [PP_BAC] on AVA_VAN level.
Other MRTDs TOE are targeting the same physical scope are not affected by this limitation
and provide the full EAL5+ set of SARs. This EAL5+ is required to reach a higher level of
assurance due to sensitivity of ID documents.
9.3.8 ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
The TOE actually target an EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 and is only limited to EAL4+
due to the restriction of [PP_BAC] on AVA_VAN level.
Other MRTDs TOE are targeting the same physical scope are not affected by this limitation
and provide the full EAL5+ set of SARs. This EAL5+ is required to reach a higher level of
assurance due to sensitivity of ID documents.
9.3.9 ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
The selection of the component ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the security of
the MRTD’s development and manufacturing especially for the secure handling of the
MRTD’s material.
105
The component ALC_DVS.2 augmented to EAL4 has no dependencies to other security
requirements
9.3.10 ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
The TOE actually target an EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 and is only limited to EAL4+
due to the restriction of [PP_BAC] on AVA_VAN level.
Other MRTDs TOE are targeting the same physical scope are not affected by this limitation
and provide the full EAL5+ set of SARs. This EAL5+ is required to reach a higher level of
assurance due to sensitivity of ID documents.
9.3.11 ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
The TOE actually target an EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 and is only limited to EAL4+
due to the restriction of [PP_BAC] on AVA_VAN level.
Other MRTDs TOE are targeting the same physical scope are not affected by this limitation
and provide the full EAL5+ set of SARs. This EAL5+ is required to reach a higher level of
assurance due to sensitivity of ID documents.
106
10 TOE Summary Specification
10.1TOE Summary Specification
Access Control in Reading
This function controls access to read functions and enforces the security policy for data
retrieval. Prior to any data retrieval, it authenticates the actor trying to access the data,
and checks the access conditions are fulfilled as well as the life cycle state. It ensures that
at any time, the following keys are never readable:
o Pre-personalization Agent keys and Personalization Agent keys,
o BAC keys,
o CA private key
o AAK (Active Authentication Keys)
In the Operational Use phase:
The terminal can read user data, the Document Security Object, (EF.COM, EF.SOD,
EF.DG1 to EF.DG16) only after BAC or CA respectively authentication and through a valid
secure channel as defined by [ICAO-9303].
In the Production and preparation stage: The Manufacturer can read the Initialization
Data in Stage 2 “Production”. The pre-personalization agent and the Personalization Agent
can read only the random identifier in Stage 3 “Preparation” stored in the TOE. Other
data-elements can only be read after they are authenticated by the TOE (using their
authentication keys).
It controls read access prior to authentication and identification as defined by FIA_UID.1
and FIA_UAU.1.
It ensures as well that no other part of the memory can be accessed at any time.
Access Control in Writing
This function controls access to write functions (in NVM) and enforces the security policy
for data writing. Prior to any data update, it authenticates the actor, and checks the
access conditions are fulfilled as well as the life cycle state.
Regarding the file structure:
In the Production and preparation stage: The Manufacturer can write all the Initialization
and data for the Pre-personalization. The Personalization Agent can write through a valid
secure channel all the data Document Basic Access Keys and Active Authentication Keys
after it is authenticated by the TOE (using its authentication keys). The Pre-
Personalization Agent can write through a valid secure channel data to be used by the
personalization agent (after it is authenticated by the TOE using its authentication keys).
The Pre-personalization agent is only active after delivery. The key that is written in the
TOE for authentication purposes during manufacturing in meant for the pre-
personalization agent. The Pre-personalization agent (which is seen as a sub-role of the
Personalization agent) will refresh this key.
In the Operational Use phase: It is not possible to create any files (system or data files).
Furthermore, it is not possible to update any files (system or data files) as defined by the
security policy in [ICAO-9303].
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Active Authentication
This security functionality ensures the Active Authentication is performed as described in
[ICAO-9303] (if it is activated by the personalizer).
Basic Access Control
This TSF provides the Basic Access Control, authentication and session keys generation to
be used by the security function Secure Messaging, as described in [ICAO_9303].
The BAC Session Keys are derived from the MRZ of the MRTD’s chip: this is done using
SHA-1 (FCS_COP.1/SHA). The authentication initialization requires that the MRTD’s chip
generate 8 bytes challenge (nonce rPICC) that is read by the Basic Inspection System
(FIA_UAU.1). The MRTD BAC authentication stages also require TDES encryption of 32
bytes of concatenated data and a Retail MAC computation over the 32 bytes of encryption
output (FCS_COP.1/MAC). The Basic Inspection System also generated a pair (KPCD,
rPCD). The use of challenges enforces a protection against replay (FIA_UAU.4).
Completion of the BAC Authentication protocol means that a Secure Messaging session, in
ENC_MAC_Mode (FCS_COP.1/ENC), is started with the session keys (KENC and KMAC)
derived according to [ICAO_9303] from the common master secret KMaster =
KPICC?KPCD and a Send Sequence Counter SSC derived from rPICC and rPCD
(FCS_CKM.1/BAC). All further communication with the TOE is handled by the security
function Secure Messaging, enforcing confidentiality and integrity over transferred data
(FIA_UAU.5/BAC). In case the BAC authentication protocol fails (the TOE being unable to
identify the Terminal as being a legitimate Basic Inspection System) the TOE records one
authentication failure. If the Terminal reaches the amount of consecutive authentication
failures that is configured by the administrator, the BAC Authentication Key is delayed
(FIA_AFL.1/BAC). The implementation contributes also to FDP_ACC.1/BAC and by
FDP_ACF.1/BAC for read and write access control management and FMT_SMR.1 for
security roles.
Chip Authentication
This TSF provides the Chip Authentication, authentication and session keys generation to
be used by Secure Messagig, as described in [TR_03110]. The session keys are obtained
using SHA-1 or SHA-256 (FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA).
It also handles key generation based on ECDH and DH (FCS_CKM.1/CA).
MRTD Personalization
This security functionality ensures that the TOE, when delivered to the Personalization
Agent, provides and requires authentication for data exchange. This function allows to:
o Manage symmetric authentication using Personalization Agent keys,
o Write the Document Basic Acces Keys,
o Enable and disable Active Authentication,
o Determine the number of failed consecutive attempts allowed for the BAC
protocol,
o Load or generate Active Authentication Keys,
o Load user data,
o Load or generate Chip Authentication keys.
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Physical Protection
This Security Function protects the TOE against physical attacks, so that the integrity and
confidentiality of the TOE is ensured, including keys, user data and TOE life cycle. It
detects physical tampering, responds automatically, and also controls the emanations sent
out by the TOE. It furthermore prevents deploying test features after TOE delivery. This
SF also preserve a secure state when any failure is detected or a malfunction occurs.
MRTD Pre-personalization
This security functionality ensures that the TOE, when delivered to the Manufacturer,
provides and requires an authentication mechanism for data exchange. This
authentication is based on Triple DES symmetric authentication mechanism. This function
allows to:
o Manage symmetric authentication using Pre-personalization Agent keys,
o Store the IC identification data,
o Enable Chip Authentication,
o Load Personalization Agent keys.
Secure Messaging
This security functionality ensures the confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of the
communication between the TOE and the interface device. In the operational phase, after
a successful Authentication Procedure (i.e. BAC or CA), a secure channel is established,
based on Triple DES algorithm in case of BAC and based on Triple DES/AES algorithms in
case of CA, such that the TOE is able to verify the integrity and authenticity of exchanged
data. The protocols can be configured to protect the exchanges integrity and/or
confidentiality. If an error occurs in the secure messaging layer, the session keys are
destroyed.
Self Tests
The TOE performs self-tests to verify the integrity of the TSF data:
o At Reset. The implementation contributes to FPT_TST.1
Cryptographic Support
This Security Function provides the following cryptographic features:
o Document Basic Access Key Generation with key size 112 bits
o Key generation based on ECDH compliant to [TR_03111] with key sizes 192, 224,
256, 320, 384, 512 and 521 bits in combination with 112 bits 3DES or 128, 192 or
256 bits AES.
o Key generation based on DH with key size 2048 bits.
o RSA Key generation with key sizes 1536, 1792, 2048, 2560, 3072, 3584 and 4096
o ECkeyP generation with key sizes 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512 and 521
o Secure messaging - BAC (encryption and decryption) using Triple DES in CBC
mode (key size 112 bits).
o Secure messaging - BAC (message authentication code) using Triple DES Retail
MAC with key size 112 bits.
o Secure messaging (encryption and decryption) using:
 Triple DES in CBC mode (key size 112 bits).
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 AES in CBC mode (key sizes 128,192,256 bits).
o Secure messaging (message authentication code) using:
 Triple DES Retail MAC with key size 112 bits.
 AES CMAC with key sizes 128,192 and 256 bits.
o Digital signature generation using:
 ECDSA with key sizes 192 to 521 bits.
 RSA with key sizes 1536, 1792, 2048, 2560, 3072, 3584 and 4096 bits.
o Symmetric Authentication (encryption and decryption) using Triple DES with key
size 112 bits.
o Hashing in accordance with SHA-1 and SHA-256.
o The deterministic random number generation specified by FCS_RNG.1 Quality
metric for random numbers of [PLTF-ST].
Clear Residual Information
This security function ensures clearing of sensitive information
o Authentication state is securely cleared in case an error is detected or a new
authentication is attempted
o Authentication data related to Active Authentication, Chip authentication, and BAC
authentication data is securely cleared to prevent reuse
o Session keys are securely erased in case an error is detected or the secure
communication session is closed
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10.2SFRs and TSS
10.2.1 SFRs and TSS - Rationale
Class FAU Security Audit
FAU_SAS.1 is met by MRTD Pre-personalization based on authentication of pre-
personalization agent.
Class FCS Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.1 is met by Cryptographic Support and Basic Access Control
FCS_CKM.1/AA is met by Cryptographic Support and Active Authentication
FCS_CKM.1/CA is met by Cryptographic Support and Chip Authentication
FCS_CKM.4 is met by Clear Residual Information and Secure Messaging that destroys the
session keys upon closure of a secure messaging session.
FCS_COP.1/SHA is met by Cryptographic Support and Basic Access Control
FCS_COP.1/ENC is met by Cryptographic Support, Secure Messaging and Basic Access
Control
FCS_COP.1/AUTH is met by Cryptographic Support and MRTD Personalization
FCS_COP.1/MAC is met by Cryptographic Support, Secure Messaging and Basic Access
Control
FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA is met by Cryptographic Support and Chip Authentication
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC is met by Cryptographic Support, Secure Messaging and Chip
Authentication
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC is met by Cryptographic Support, Secure Messaging and Chip
Authentication
FCS_COP.1/AA is met by Cryptographic Support and Active Authentication
FCS_RND.1 is met by Cryptographic Support
Class FIA Identification and Authentication
FIA_UID.1 is met by Access Control in Reading
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FIA_UAU.1 is met by Access Control in Reading
FIA_UAU.4 is met by Clear Residual Information that prevents reuse of any authentication
data
FIA_UAU.5/BAC is met by Basic Access Control and MRTD Personalization
FIA_UAU.5/CA is met by Chip Authentication
FIA_UAU.6/BAC is met by Secure Messaging
FIA_UAU.6/CA is met by Secure Messaging
FIA_AFL.1/BAC is met by Basic Access Control and MRTD Personalization
FIA_API.1/CA is met by Chip Authenticaion
FIA_API.1/AA is met by Active Authentication
Class FDP User Data Protection
FDP_ACC.1/BAC is met by Access Control in Writing and Access Control in Reading that
control read and write access to the data based on the current authentication state using
authentication mechanism provided by Basic Access Control and MRTD Personalization
FDP_ACC.1/CA is met by Access Control in Writing and Access Control in Reading that
control read and write access to the data based on the current authentication state using
authentication mechanism provided Chip Authentication
FDP_ACF.1/BAC is met by Access Control in Writing and Access Control in Reading that
control read and write access to the data based on the current authentication state using
authentication mechanism provided by Basic Access Control and MRTD Personalization
FDP_ACF.1/CA is met by Access Control in Writing and Access Control in Reading that
control read and write access to the data based on the current authentication state using
authentication mechanism provided Chip Authentication
FDP_UCT.1/BAC is met by Secure Messaging
FDP_UCT.1/CA is met by Secure Messaging
FDP_UIT.1/BAC is met by Secure Messaging
FDP_UIT.1/CA is met by Secure Messaging
Class FMT Security Management
112
FMT_MOF.1/PROT is met by MRTD Pre-personalization.
FMT_SMF.1 is met by Chip Authentication, MRTD Personalization and MRTD Pre-
personalization.
FMT_SMR.1 is met by Basic Access Control, MRTD Personalization and MRTD Pre-
personalization
FMT_LIM.1 is met by Physical Protection
FMT_LIM.2 is met by Physical Protection
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA is met by Access Control in Writing and MRTD Pre-personalization
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS is met byAccess Control in Reading and MRTD Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE is met by MRTD Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ is met by Access Control in Reading that ensures nobody can
read the keys
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK is met by MRTD Personalization that allows the user to load or create
Chip Authentication keys
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK is met by MRTD Personalization that allows the user to load or create
Active Authentication keys
FMT_MTD.1/AA_CA_KEY_READ is met by Access Control in Reading
Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions
FPT_EMS.1 is met by Physical Protection
FPT_FLS.1 is met by Physical Protection
FPT_TST.1 is met by Physical Protection
FPT_PHP.3 is met by Physical Protection
10.2.2 Association tables of SFRs and TSS
Security Functional Requirements TOE Summary Specification
FAU_SAS.1 MRTD Pre-personalization
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Support, Basic Access Control
FCS_CKM.1/AA Cryptographic Support, Active Authentication
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FCS_CKM.1/CA Cryptographic Support, Chip Authentication
FCS_CKM.4 Clear Residual Information, Secure Messaging
FCS_COP.1/SHA Basic Access Control, Cryptographic Support
FCS_COP.1/ENC Basic Access Control, Cryptographic Support, Secure
Messaging
FCS_COP.1/AUTH MRTD Personalization, Cryptographic Support
FCS_COP.1/MAC Basic Access Control, Secure Messaging, Cryptographic
Support
FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA Chip Authentication, Cryptographic Support
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC Secure Messaging, Chip Authentication, Cryptographic
Support
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC Secure Messaging, Chip Authentication, Cryptographic
Support
FCS_COP.1/AA Active Authentication, Cryptographic Support
FCS_RND.1 Basic Access Control
FIA_UID.1 Access Control in Reading
FIA_UAU.1 Access Control in Reading
FIA_UAU.4 Clear Residual Information
FIA_UAU.5/BAC Basic Access Control, MRTD Personalization
FIA_UAU.5/CA Chip Authentication
FIA_UAU.6/BAC Secure Messaging
FIA_UAU.6/CA Secure Messaging
FIA_AFL.1/BAC Basic Access Control, MRTD Personalization
FIA_API.1/CA Chip Authentication
FIA_API.1/AA Chip Authentication
FDP_ACC.1/BAC Access Control in Reading, Access Control in Writing,
Basic Access Control, MRTD Personalization
FDP_ACC.1/CA Access Control in Writing, Chip Authentication, Secure
Messaging
FDP_ACF.1/BAC Access Control in Reading, Access Control in Writing,
Basic Access Control, MRTD Personalization
FDP_ACF.1/CA Chip Authentication
FDP_UCT.1/BAC Secure Messaging
FDP_UCT.1/CA Secure Messaging
FDP_UIT.1/BAC Secure Messaging
FDP_UIT.1/CA Secure Messaging
FMT_MOF.1/PROT MRTD Pre-personalization
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FMT_SMF.1 Chip Authentication, MRTD Personalization, MRTD Pre-
personalization
FMT_SMR.1 Basic Access Control, MRTD Personalization, MRTD Pre-
personalization
FMT_LIM.1 Physical Protection
FMT_LIM.2 Physical Protection
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Access Control in Writing, MRTD Pre-personalization
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Access Control in Reading, MRTD Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE MRTD Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Access Control in Reading
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK MRTD Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK Access Control in Writing, MRTD Personalization
FMT_MTD.1/AA_CA_KEY_READ Access Control in Reading
FPT_EMS.1 Physical Protection
FPT_FLS.1 Physical Protection
FPT_TST.1 Self Tests
FPT_PHP.3 Physical Protection
Table 20 SFRs and TSS - Coverage
TOE Summary
Specification
Security Functional Requirements
Access Control in
Reading
FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1, FDP_ACC.1/BAC, FDP_ACF.1/BAC,
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ,
FMT_MTD.1/AA_CA_KEY_READ
Access Control in
Writing
FDP_ACC.1/BAC, FDP_ACC.1/CA, FDP_ACF.1/BAC,
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA, FMT_MTD.1/AAPK
Active
Authentication
FCS_CKM.1/AA, FCS_COP.1/AA
Basic Access
Control
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_COP.1/ENC, FCS_COP.1/MAC,
FCS_RND.1, FIA_UAU.5/BAC, FIA_AFL.1/BAC, FDP_ACC.1/BAC,
FDP_ACF.1/BAC, FMT_SMR.1
Chip
Authentication
FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA, FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC, FIA_UAU.5/CA, FIA_API.1/CA, FIA_API.1/AA,
FDP_ACC.1/CA, FDP_ACF.1/CA, FMT_SMF.1
MRTD
Personalization
FCS_COP.1/AUTH, FIA_UAU.5/BAC, FIA_AFL.1/BAC, FDP_ACC.1/BAC,
FDP_ACF.1/BAC, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1, FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE, FMT_MTD.1/CAPK, FMT_MTD.1/AAPK
Physical Protection FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2, FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.3
MRTD Pre- FAU_SAS.1, FMT_MOF.1/PROT, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1,
115
personalization FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
Secure Messaging FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/ENC, FCS_COP.1/MAC, FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC, FIA_UAU.6/BAC, FIA_UAU.6/CA, FDP_ACC.1/CA,
FDP_UCT.1/BAC, FDP_UCT.1/CA, FDP_UIT.1/BAC, FDP_UIT.1/CA
Self Tests FPT_TST.1
Cryptographic
Support
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.1/AA, FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_COP.1/SHA,
FCS_COP.1/ENC, FCS_COP.1/AUTH, FCS_COP.1/MAC,
FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA, FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC, FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC,
FCS_COP.1/AA
Clear Residual
Information
FCS_CKM.4, FIA_UAU.4
Table 21 TSS and SFRs - Coverage