UNCLASSIFIED
© Government of Canada. This document is the property of the Government of Canada. It shall not be altered,
distributed beyond its intended audience, produced, reproduced or published, in whole or in any substantial part
thereof, without the express permission of CSE.
COMMON CRITERIA
CERTIFICATION REPORT
WorkCentre® 3655/3655i 2016 Xerox® ConnectKey® Technology
17 August 2016
v1.0
383-4-377
UNCLASSIFIED
FOREWORD
This certification report is an UNCLASSIFIED publication, issued under the authority of the Chief,
Communications Security Establishment (CSE). Suggestions for amendments should be forwarded through
departmental communications security channels to your Client Services Representative at CSE.
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has
been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility – established under the Canadian Common Criteria Scheme –
using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4, for
conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4.
This certification report, and its associated certificate, applies only to the identified version and release of the
product in its evaluated configuration. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of
the Canadian CC Scheme, and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation report are consistent
with the evidence adduced. This report, and its associated certificate, are not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Communications Security Establishment, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this
report, and its associated certificate, and no warranty for the IT product by the Communications Security
Establishment, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
If your department has identified a requirement for this certification report based on business needs and would
like more detailed information, please contact:
ITS Client Services
Telephone: (613) 991-7654
E-mail: itsclientservices@cse-cst.gc.ca
UNCLASSIFIED
OVERVIEW
The Canadian Common Criteria Scheme provides a third-party evaluation service for determining the
trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT) security products. Evaluations are performed by a commercial
Common Criteria Evaluation Facility (CCEF) under the oversight of the Certification Body, which is managed by
the Communications Security Establishment.
A CCEF is a commercial facility that has been approved by the Certification Body to perform Common Criteria
evaluations; a significant requirement for such approval is accreditation to the requirements of ISO/IEC
17025:2005, the General Requirements for the Competence of Testing and Calibration Laboratories.
Accreditation is performed under the Program for the Accreditation of Laboratories - Canada (PALCAN),
administered by the Standards Council of Canada.
The CCEF that carried out this evaluation is CSC Security Testing/Certification Laboratories.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the Certification Body asserts that the product complies with the
security requirements specified in the associated security target. A security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT products should
review the security target, in addition to this certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any
assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, the evaluated security
functionality, and the testing and analysis conducted by the CCEF.
The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target are posted to the Certified Products
list (CPL) for the Canadian CC Scheme, and to the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the
International Common Criteria Project).
UNCLASSIFIED
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Executive Summary........................................................................................................................................1
1 Identification of Target of Evaluation......................................................................................................2
1.1 Common Criteria Conformance..................................................................................................................2
1.2 TOE description ..........................................................................................................................................2
1.3 TOE architecture.........................................................................................................................................3
2 Security policy .......................................................................................................................................4
2.1 Cryptographic functionality........................................................................................................................4
3 Assumptions and Clarifications of Scope.................................................................................................5
3.1 Usage and Environmental assumptions .....................................................................................................5
4 Evaluated Configuration.........................................................................................................................6
4.1 Documentation...........................................................................................................................................6
5 Evaluation Analysis Activities .................................................................................................................7
5.1 Development..............................................................................................................................................7
5.2 Guidance Documents .................................................................................................................................7
5.3 Life-cycle Support.......................................................................................................................................7
6 Testing Activities....................................................................................................................................8
6.1 Assessment of Developer Tests..................................................................................................................8
6.2 Conduct of Testing......................................................................................................................................8
6.3 Independent Functional Testing.................................................................................................................8
6.4 Independent Penetration Testing ........................................................................................................... 10
7 Results of the Evaluation......................................................................................................................11
8 Supporting Content..............................................................................................................................12
8.1 List of Abbreviations................................................................................................................................ 12
8.2 References............................................................................................................................................... 13
UNCLASSIFIED
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1 TOE Architecture ....................................................................................................................................3
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 TOE Identification.......................................................................................................................................2
Table 2 Cryptographic Module(s)............................................................................................................................4
UNCLASSIFIED
v1.0 1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
WorkCentre® 3655/3655i 2016 Xerox® ConnectKey® Technology (hereafter referred to as the Target of
Evaluation, or TOE), from Xerox Corporation, was the subject of this Common Criteria evaluation. The results of
this evaluation demonstrate that TOE meets the requirements of the conformance claim listed in Table 1 for the
evaluated security functionality.
The TOE is a multi-function device that copies and prints with scan and fax capabilities. The Xerox embedded fax
component provides local analog fax capability over public switched telephone network connections and also
enables LanFax, a feature that allows a document to be faxed from a workstation without printing it. Xerox’s
workflow scanning component allows documents to be scanned at the device with the resulting image being
sent via email, transferred to a remote file repository or kept in a private (scan) mailbox or placed on a personal
USB storage device.
CSC Security Testing/Certification Laboratories is the CCEF that conducted the evaluation. This evaluation was
completed on 17 August 2016 and was carried out in accordance with the rules of the Canadian Common
Criteria Scheme.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target, which identifies assumptions made during the
evaluation, the intended environment for TOE, and the security functional/assurance requirements. Consumers
are advised to verify that their operating environment is consistent with that specified in the security target, and
to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.
Communications Security Establishment, as the Certification Body, declares that the TOE evaluation meets all
the conditions of the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will
be listed on the Certified Products list (CPL) and the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the
International Common Criteria Project).
UNCLASSIFIED
v1.0 2
1 IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET OF EVALUATION
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is identified as follows:
Table 1 TOE Identification
TOE Name and Version WorkCentre® 3655/3655i 2016 Xerox® ConnectKey® Technology
Developer Xerox Corporation
Conformance Claim (EAL) 2 + ALC_FLR.3
1.1 COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 4, for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 4.
1.2 TOE DESCRIPTION
The TOE is a multi-function device that copies and prints with scan and fax capabilities. The Xerox embedded fax
component provides local analog fax capability over public switched telephone network connections and also
enables LanFax, a feature that allows a document to be faxed from a workstation without printing it. Xerox’s
workflow scanning component allows documents to be scanned at the device with the resulting image being
sent via email, transferred to a remote file repository or kept in a private (scan) mailbox or placed on a personal
USB storage device.
UNCLASSIFIED
v1.0 3
1.3 TOE ARCHITECTURE
A diagram of the TOE architecture is as follows:
Connectivity
• TSF_FDP_FILTER
• TSF_NET_SEC
• TSF_FLOW
Auditing
• TSF_FAU
Authentication
• TSF_AUT
• TSF_NET_ID
Overwrite & Purge
• TSF_IOW_PURGE
Cryptography
• TSF_FDP_UDE
• TSF_FCS
Security Management
• TSF_FMT
Network Communications
TOE
Scanner Marking Engine Support Services
Apache
XUI WebUI
Local UI
Operating System
Fax
Controller
A
A
B
B
C
C
Figure 1 TOE Architecture
A - Connectivity
B - Authentication
C - Cryptography
UNCLASSIFIED
v1.0 4
2 SECURITY POLICY
The TOE implements policies pertaining to the following security functional classes:
• Security Audit;
• Cryptographic Support;
• User Data Protection;
• Identification and Authentication;
• Security Management;
• Protection of the TSF;
• TOE Access; and
• Trusted Path/Channel.
Complete details of the security functional requirements (SFRs) can be found in the Security Target (ST)
referenced in section 8.2.
2.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC FUNCTIONALITY
The following cryptographic modules were evaluated by the CMVP to the FIPS 140-2 Standard and implemented
in the TOE:
Table 2 Cryptographic Module(s)
Cryptographic Module Certificate Number
Mocana v5.4f CMVP Cert #1614
OpenSSL v2.0 CMVP Cert #1747
UNCLASSIFIED
v1.0 5
3 ASSUMPTIONS AND CLARIFICATIONS OF SCOPE
Consumers of the TOE should consider assumptions about usage and environmental settings as requirements
for the product’s installation and its operating environment. This will ensure the proper and secure operation of
the TOE.
3.1 USAGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS
The following assumptions are made regarding the use and deployment of the TOE:
• TOE users are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organization, and are trained and
competent to follow those policies and procedures;
• Administrators are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organization, are trained and
competent to follow the manufacturer’s guidance and documentation, and correctly configure and
operate the TOE in accordance with those policies and procedures;
• Administrators do not use their privileged access rights for malicious purposes; and
• The TOE is located in a restricted or monitored environment that provides protection from unmanaged
access to the physical components and data interfaces of the TOE.
UNCLASSIFIED
v1.0 6
4 EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
The evaluated configuration for the TOE comprises:
Model System Software
WorkCentre® 3655/3655i 073.060.075.34540 with patch 905956v2.dlm
4.1 DOCUMENTATION
The following documents are provided to the consumer to assist in the configuration and installation of the TOE:
a. Xerox® WorkCentre® 3655/3655i Multifunction Printer 2016 Xerox® ConnectKey® Technology System
Administrator Guide, version 1.3, February 2016;
b. Xerox® WorkCentre® 3655/3655i Multifunction Printer 2016 Xerox® ConnectKey® Technology User
Guide, version 1.2, February 2016 ; and
c. Secure Installation and Operation of Your WorkCentre® 3655/3655i, WorkCentre™
5845/5855/5865/5865i/5875/5875i/5890/5890i, WorkCentre™ 5945/5945i/5955/5955i, WorkCentre™
6655/6655i, WorkCentre™ 7220/7220i/7225/7225i, WorkCentre™
7830/7830i/7835/7835i/7845/7845i/7855/7855i, WorkCentre™ 7970/7970i 2016 Xerox® ConnectKey®
Technology, version 1.2, July 2016.
UNCLASSIFIED
v1.0 7
5 EVALUATION ANALYSIS ACTIVITIES
The evaluation analysis activities involved a structured evaluation of the TOE. Documentation and process
dealing with Development, Guidance Documents, and Life-Cycle Support were evaluated.
5.1 DEVELOPMENT
The evaluators analyzed the TOE functional specification and design documentation; they determined that the
design completely and accurately describes the TOE security functionality (TSF) interfaces, the TSF subsystems
and how the TSF implements the security functional requirements (SFRs). The evaluators analyzed the TOE
security architectural description and determined that the initialization process is secure, that the security
functions are protected against tamper and bypass, and that security domains are maintained. The evaluators
also independently verified that the correspondence mappings between the design documents are correct.
5.2 GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS
The evaluators examined the TOE preparative user guidance and operational user guidance and determined that
it sufficiently and unambiguously describes how to securely transform the TOE into its evaluated configuration
and how to use and administer the product. The evaluators examined and tested the preparative and
operational guidance, and determined that they are complete and sufficiently detailed to result in a secure
configuration.
Section 4.1 provides details on the guidance documents.
5.3 LIFE-CYCLE SUPPORT
An analysis of the TOE configuration management system and associated documentation was performed. The
evaluators found that the TOE configuration items were clearly marked.
The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it described all of the procedures
required to maintain the integrity of the TOE during distribution to the consumer.
The evaluators reviewed the flaw remediation procedures used by developer for the TOE. During a site visit, the
evaluators also examined the evidence generated by adherence to the procedures. The evaluators concluded
that the procedures are adequate to track and correct security flaws, and distribute the flaw information and
corrections to consumers of the TOE.
UNCLASSIFIED
v1.0 8
6 TESTING ACTIVITIES
Testing consists of the following three steps: assessing developer tests, performing independent functional tests,
and performing penetration tests.
6.1 ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPER TESTS
The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by examining their test evidence,
and reviewing their test results, as documented in the ETR.
The evaluators analyzed the developer’s test coverage analysis and found it to be complete and accurate. The
correspondence between the tests identified in the developer’s test documentation and the functional
specification was complete.
6.2 CONDUCT OF TESTING
The TOE was subjected to a comprehensive suite of formally documented, independent functional and
penetration tests. The detailed testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected
results and observed results are documented in a separate Test Results document.
6.3 INDEPENDENT FUNCTIONAL TESTING
During this evaluation, the evaluator developed independent functional tests by examining design and guidance
documentation.
All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability of the testing
procedures and results. The following testing activities were performed:
a. Repeat of Developer's Tests: The evaluator repeated a subset of the developers tests;
b. Local User: The objective of this test case is to demonstrate creation of a normal user account by
configuring the security password parameters;
c. Create System Administrator: The objective of this test case is to demonstrate creation of a Privileged
user account by configuring the security password parameters;
d. System Administrator and unprivileged user Login: The objective of this test goal is to demonstrate that
an administrator as well as an unprivileged user must present a valid username and password to
authenticate;
e. Secure Print Job: The objective of this test goal is to demonstrate that only the user that submitted a
secure print job will be able to access the data;
f. Confirm Roles Rules: The objective of this test goal is to demonstrate that unprivileged users cannot
access administrative functions;
g. Audit Verify: The objective of this test goal is to demonstrate that specific records are written to the
audit log;
h. Immediate Image Overwrite: The objective of this test goal is to demonstrate that a submitted job has
been properly overwritten;
UNCLASSIFIED
v1.0 9
i. Audit Log Rollover: The objective of this test goal is to demonstrate that the most recent events are
retained when the number of log entries exceeds the maximum; and
j. SSL Verification: The objective of this test goal is to demonstrate that only certified versions of SSL can
be used to connect to the TOE.
6.3.1 FUNCTIONAL TEST RESULTS
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests yielded the expected results, providing assurance
that the TOE behaves as specified in its ST and functional specification.
UNCLASSIFIED
v1.0 10
6.4 INDEPENDENT PENETRATION TESTING
Subsequent to the independent review of public domain vulnerability databases and all evaluation deliverables,
limited independent evaluator penetration testing was conducted. The penetration tests focused on:
a. Use of automated vulnerability scanning tools to discover potential network, platform and application
layer vulnerabilities such as Heartbleed, Shellshock, FREAK, POODLE, and GHOST;
b. Port Scan: The objective of this test goal is to discover open ports on the TOE for further investigation;
c. Session Management: The objective of this test goal is to attempt to perform a session hijack;
d. Verify Input Validation: The objective of this test goal is to demonstrate that the TOE is not vulnerable to
unexpected inputs and SQL injections at the Login Page;
e. Illicit Software Update: The objective of this test goal is to attempt to load a custom software package;
and
f. PostScript Hack: The objective of this test goal is to attempt to access the TOE directories by submitting
malicious PostScript print jobs.
6.4.1 PENETRATION TEST RESULTS
The independent penetration testing did not uncover any exploitable vulnerabilities in the intended operating
environment.
UNCLASSIFIED
v1.0 11
7 RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION
This evaluation has provided the basis for the conformance claim documented in Table 1. The overall verdict for
the evaluation is PASS. These results are supported by evidence in the ETR.
The IT product identified in this report has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility established under
the Canadian Common Criteria Scheme using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 4, for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4. These
evaluation results apply only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and
in conjunction with the complete certification report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Canadian Common Criteria Scheme
and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This is not an endorsement of the IT product by CSE or by any other organization that recognizes or gives effect
to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by CSE or by any other organization that recognizes or gives
effect to this certificate, is expressed or implied.
UNCLASSIFIED
v1.0 12
8 SUPPORTING CONTENT
8.1 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Term Definition
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CCEF Common Criteria Evaluation Facility
CCS Canadian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme
CM Configuration Management
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CPL Certified Products List
CSE Communications Security Establishment
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
GC Government of Canada
IT Information Technology
ITS Information Technology Security
ITSET Information Technology Security Evaluation and Testing
PALCAN Program for the Accreditation of Laboratories – Canada
PP Protection Profile
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Function
USB Universal Serial Bus
XUI User Interface Subsystem
UNCLASSIFIED
v1.0 13
Term Definition
8.2 REFERENCES
Reference
CCS Publication #4, Technical Oversight, Version 1.8, October 2010.
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM, Version 3.1 Revision 4,
September 2012.
Xerox Multi-Function Device Security Target, WorkCentre® 3655/3655i 2016 Xerox® ConnectKey®
Technology, version 1.2, July 2016
Evaluation Technical Report WorkCentre® 3655/3655i 2016 Xerox® ConnectKey® Technology, version 1.0,
August 2016