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Reference: 2021-36-INF-4157- v1
Target: Limitada al expediente
Date: 25.09.2023
Created by: I003
Revised by: CALIDAD
Approved by: TECNICO
CERTIFICATION REPORT
Dossier # 2021-36
TOE THD89 1.0.3 Secure Element version 1.0
Applicant 911100007334588792 - Tongxin Microelectronics Co., Ltd.
References
[EXT-7011] 2021-06-15_2021-36_solicitud_certificacion
[EXT-7041] 2021-07-08_2021-15_ORs
Certification report of the product THD89 1.0.3 Secure Element version 1.0, as requested in [EXT-
7011] dated 15/06/2021, and evaluated by Applus Laboratories, as detailed in the Evaluation
Technical Report [EXT-7041] received on 26/07/2023.
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CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................ 3
TOE SUMMARY................................................................................................................................ 3
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS .......................................................................................... 4
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS......................................................................................... 5
IDENTIFICATION.................................................................................................................................. 5
SECURITY POLICIES.............................................................................................................................. 5
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ....................................................................... 6
CLARIFICATIONS ON NON-COVERED THREATS................................................................................ 6
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY ............................................................................. 6
ARCHITECTURE.................................................................................................................................... 6
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE ................................................................................................................. 6
PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE................................................................................................................ 8
DOCUMENTS....................................................................................................................................... 9
PRODUCT TESTING.............................................................................................................................. 9
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION .......................................................................................................... 10
EVALUATION RESULTS ...................................................................................................................... 10
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM ............................................. 11
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS....................................................................................................... 11
GLOSSARY ......................................................................................................................................... 12
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................................. 12
SECURITY TARGET / SECURITY TARGET LITE (IF APPLICABLE)............................................................ 13
RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS............................................................................................................ 14
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA).................................................... 14
International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)................................................................... 14
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This document constitutes the Certification Report for the certification file of the product THD89
1.0.3 Secure Element version 1.0.
The TOE is a secure element with 3 crypto libraries suitable for instance to support embedded SE,
embedded SIM applications, etc.
Developer/manufacturer: Tongxin Microelectronics Co., Ltd.
Sponsor: Tongxin Microelectronics Co., Ltd..
Certification Body: Centro Criptológico Nacional (CCN) del Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI).
ITSEF: Applus Laboratories.
Protection Profile: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 (version 1.0,
13.01.2014).
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria 3.1 R5 EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5.
Evaluation end date: 07/08/2023.
Expiration Date1
: 26/09/2028.
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL5 (augmented with ALC_DVS.2 +
AVA_VAN.5) have been assigned a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the laboratory Applus
Laboratories assigns the “PASS” VERDICT to the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are
satisfied for the EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5, as defined by the Common Criteria 3.1 R5 and the
CEM 3.1 R5.
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request of the
product THD89 1.0.3 Secure Element version 1.0, a positive resolution is proposed.
TOE SUMMARY
The TOE consists of hardware and IC dedicated software. The hardware is based on a 32-bit secure
CPU with ROM (Non-Volatile Read-Only Memory), NVM (Non-volatile Programmable Memory) and
RAM (Volatile Memory). The hardware of the TOE also incorporates communication peripherals
and cryptographic coprocessors for execution and acceleration of symmetric and asymmetric
1
This date refers to the expiration date of the certificate recognition within the scope of the mutual recognition
arrangements signed by this Certification Body.
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cryptographic algorithms. The IC dedicated software consists of boot code and 3 libraries of
cryptographic services.
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
The product was evaluated with all the evidence required to fulfil the evaluation level EAL5 and the
evidences required by the additional component ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5 to the table, according
to Common Criteria v3.1 R5.
ASSURANCE CLASS ASSURANCE COMPONENT
ASE ASE_CCL.1
ASE_ECD.1
ASE_INT.1
ASE_OBJ.2
ASE_REQ.2
ASE_SPD.1
ASE.TSS.1
ADV ADV_ARC.1
ADV_FSP.5
ADV_IMP.1
ADV_INT.2
ADV_TDS.4
AGD AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1
ALC ALC_CMC.4
ALC_CMS.5
ALC_DEL.1
ALC_DVS.2
ALC_LCD.1
ALC_TAT.2
ATE ATE_COV.2
ATE_DPT.3
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_IND.2
AVA AVA_VAN.5
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SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The product security functionality satisfies the following functional requirements, according to the
Common Criteria v3.1 R5:
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENT
FRU_FLT.2
FPT_FLS.1
FMT_LIM.1
FMT_LIM.2
FAU_SAS.1
FPT_PHP.3
FDP_ITT.1
FDP_IFC.1
FPT_ITT.1
FDP_SDC.1
FDP_SDI.2
FCS_RNG.1[PTG.2]
FCS_COP.1[TDES]
FCS_COP.1[AES]
FCS_COP.1[RSA-CRT]
FCS_COP.1[ECC]
IDENTIFICATION
Product: THD89 1.0.3 Secure Element version 1.0
Security Target: THD89 1.0.3 Secure Element version 1.0 Security Target, version 1.9 (Apr.2023).
Protection Profile: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 (version 1.0,
13.01.2014).
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria 3.1 R5 EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5.
SECURITY POLICIES
The use of the product THD89 1.0.3 Secure Element version 1.0 shall implement a set of security
policies assuring the fulfilment of different standards and security demands.
The detail of these policies is documented in the Security Target, section 3.3 (“Organisational
Security Policies”).
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ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The following assumptions are constraints to the conditions used to assure the security properties
and functionalities compiled by the security target. These assumptions have been applied during
the evaluation in order to determine if the identified vulnerabilities can be exploited.
In order to assure the secure use of the TOE, it is necessary to start from these assumptions for its
operational environment. If this is not possible and any of them could not be assumed, it would not
be possible to assure the secure operation of the TOE.
The detail of these assumptions is documented in the Security Target, section 3.4 (“Assumptions”).
CLARIFICATIONS ON NON-COVERED THREATS
The following threats do not suppose a risk for the product THD89 1.0.3 Secure Element version
1.0, although the agents implementing attacks have the attack potential according to the High of
EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5 and always fulfilling the usage assumptions and the proper
security policies satisfaction.
For any other threat not included in this list, the evaluation results of the product security
properties and the associated certificate, do not guarantee any resistance.
The threats covered by the security properties of the TOE are those defined in the Security Target,
section 3.2 (“Threats”).
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY
The product requires the cooperation from its operational environment to fulfil some of the
objectives of the defined security problem.
The security objectives declared for the TOE operational environment are those defined in the
Protection Profile and they are documented in the Security Target, section 4.3 (“Security objectives
for the operational environment”).
ARCHITECTURE
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE
The TOE provides ROM for executing the boot code and Crypto Library code, NVM for Crypto SU
library code and CryptoECCSec library code, the other code and data access, and RAM for the
temporary data access.
The Memory management unit is performed by the AHBMMU, and it also performs the access
control of boot mode, test mode and normal mode.
There are four communication interfaces available, including SWP interface, ISO/IEC 7816 contact
interface, SPI interface, I2C interface.
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The TOE provides the system control functions to handle the reset, clock, interrupt signals, etc.
The TOE provides the test circuitry to perform the TOE testing under the test mode.
The TOE provides the timers for the security IC embedded software to abort irregular executions of
the program.
The TOE provides power management functionality under boot mode, test mode, and normal
mode, also contact and contactless interfaces.
The TOE provides strong security functionalities against malfunction, including the environmental
sensors to monitor if environmental conditions are within the specified range, the abnormality
check of TRNG to verify the quality of the generated random data, also the integrity to monitor if
the data is manipulated.
The TOE provides strong security functionalities against leakage, including memory encryption, bus
masking and random OSC clock jitter which configures the oscillator frequency to a random value
for each cycle.
The TOE provides strong security functionalities against physical manipulation and probing,
including the dedicated shielding techniques, data integrity checks for verifying the integrity of the
data, also the memory and bus encryption.
The TOE provides strong security functionalities against abuse of functionality and identification by
the means of test access control mechanism. It is implemented by a combination with hardware
fuse and software access control mechanism.
The TOE provides a true random number generator, which is accessible by the crypto library. The
true random number generator is composed of entropy sources, self-test circuit and postprocessing
circuit. The self-test circuit includes the total failure test and online test. The total failure test is
performed on the entropy source. The on line testing is performed on the raw random number
sequence, aiming to prevent malfunctioning. The true random number also fulfils the AIS20/31
PTG.2 level.
The TOE provides the following cryptographic services to the Security IC embedded software:
• TDES
• AES
• RSA-CRT
• ECC
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PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE
The main functional blocks of the TOE hardware are depicted below.
The hardware of the TOE has the following components:
• 32-bit secure CPU
• NVM
• ROM
• RAM
• AHBMMU
• Interfaces I/O
- SWP interface
- ISO/IEC 7816 contact interface
- SPI interface
- I2C interface
• True Random Number Generator
• Block Cryptography Engine for TDES supporting
• Block Cryptography Engine for AES supporting
• Public-Key Engine for RSA-CRT supporting
• Public-Key Engine for ECC supporting
• System control circuitry
• Test circuitry
• Timers
• Security Circuitry
• Sensors
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- Voltage sensor
- Glitch sensor
- Frequency sensor
- Temperature sensor
- Light sensor
• Power Management Circuitry
• Clock circuitry
• Reset circuitry
The AHBMMU is a bus component which also provides user controllable bus masking.
DOCUMENTS
The product includes the following documents that shall be distributed and made available
together to the users of the evaluated version.
• THD89 Operational guidance, version 0.8.
• THD89 Secure Microcontroller with Crypto Library Preparative guidance, version 1.2.
• THD89 Secure Microcontroller Security guidelines, version 2.0.
• THD89 Cryptographic Algorithm API version 0.8.
PRODUCT TESTING
The developer has executed test for all the security functions. All the tests have been performed by
the developer in its premises, with a satisfactory result.
During the evaluation process it has been verified each unit test checking that the security
functionality that covers is been identified and also that the kind of test is appropriate to the
function that is intended to test.
All the tests have been developed using the testing scenario appropriate to the established
architecture in the security target. It has also been checked that the obtained results during the
tests fit or correspond to the previously estimated results.
To verify the results of the developer tests, the evaluator has repeated all the developer functional
tests in the evaluator premises. In addition, the lab has devised a test for each of the security
function of the product verifying that the obtained results are consistent with the results obtained
by the developer.
It has been checked that the obtained results conform to the expected results and in the cases
where a deviation in respect to the expected results was present, the evaluator has confirmed that
this variation neither represents any security problem nor a decrease in the functional capacity of
the product.
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PENETRATION TESTING
Based on the list of potential vulnerabilities applicable to the TOE in its operational environment,
the evaluation team has devised attack scenarios for penetration tests according to JIL supporting
documents [JILAAPS] and [JILADVARC]. Within these activities all aspects of the security
architecture which were not covered by functional testing have been considered.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the actual test
results. No attack scenario with the attack potential High has been successful in the TOE’s
operational environment as defined in the security target when all security measures required by
the developer in the security guidance defined in DOCUMENTS section are applied.
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
The software and hardware requirements, as well as the referenced options are indicated below.
Therefore, for the operation of the product THD89 1.0.3 Secure Element version 1.0 it is necessary
the disposition of the following components:
• THD89 HW module.
• Crypto Library.
• Boot code.
• Header file.
Among all the possibilities offered by these software and hardware requirements, the configuration
selected for the evaluation is the following:
TYPE NAME VERSION PACKAGE
Hardware THD89 1.0.3 Module
Software Crypto Library 2.1.0 SW library in ROM
Crypto SU Library 2.2.0 SW library in NVM
CryptoECCSec Library 1.0.0 SW library in NVM
Boot code 1.0 Boot code in ROM
Header file 0.1 cryptolib.h
EVALUATION RESULTS
The product THD89 1.0.3 Secure Element version 1.0 has been evaluated against the Security
Target THD89 1.0.3 Secure Element version 1.0 Security Target, version 1.9 (Apr.2023).
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5
have been assigned a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the laboratory Applus Laboratories assigns the
“PASS” VERDICT to the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are satisfied for the
evaluation level EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5, as defined by the Common Criteria 3.1 R5 and the
CEM 3.1 R5.
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COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM
Next, recommendations regarding the secure usage of the TOE are provided. These have been
collected along the evaluation process and are detailed to be considered when using the product.
• To follow the security guidance’s of the TOE strictly.
• To keep the TOE under personal control and set all other security measures available from
the environment.
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request of the
product THD89 1.0.3 Secure Element version 1.0, a positive resolution is proposed.
The Certification Body strongly recommends to the TOE consumer to strictly follow the security
recommendations that can be found on guidance documents, taking special care of those included
in document THD89 Secure Microcontroller Security guidelines, version 2.0, as well as to observe
the operational environment requirements and assumptions defined in the applicable security
target. The scope of the certificate only covers those product configurations that implement all
security recommendations defined in THD89 Secure Microcontroller Security guidelines, version
2.0; otherwise, the certificate is not applicable.
The TOE consumer should also observe the application notes defined in the applicable security
target. The recommended cryptographic algorithms and key lengths are those defined in SOGIS
Agreed Cryptographic Mechanisms, version 1.2. All other algorithms and key lengths are out of the
scope of the certificate. The algorithms and key sizes within the scope of the certificate are
described in the table below.
CRYPTOGRAPHIC
MECHANISM
STANDARD OF
IMPLEMENTATION
KEY/MODULE SIZE
[BITS]
AGREED
CRYPTOGRAPHIC
MECHANISMS v1.2
TDES-ECB
(encryption,
decryption)
NIST SP800-67 Rev.2
NIST SP800-38A
112
168
ECB MODE NOT
INCLUDED
AES-ECB
(encryption,
decryption)
FIPS PUB 197 v1 128
192
256
ECB MODE NOT
INCLUDED
RSA-CRT PKCS #1 v2.2 1900-2999 LEGACY
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(decryption) 3000 - 4096 RECOMMENDED
ECC (ECDSA
signature and
verification, point
multiplication, key
pair generation)
TR-03111 v2.10
RFC 5639 v1
ANS X9.62-2005 v1
ansix9p256r1
ansix9p384r1
ansix9p521r1
brainpoolP256r1
brainpoolP384r1
brainpoolP512r1
RECOMMENDED
ansix9p224r1
brainpoolP224r1
brainpoolP320r1
NOT INCLUDED
The Certification Body considers necessary to remark that PDMC uses MD5 algorithm for integrity
verification of the logical mask data sent by UMC. This algorithm is not included in SOGIS Agreed
Cryptographic Mechanisms (version 1.2), not even as legacy. This fact was communicated to the
laboratory which answer was that “the use of MD5 is the formal procedure defined in the scope of
the delivery procedures of the UMC sites, which are covered by the certificates of the UMC sites
under the BSI scheme (BSI-DSZCC-S 0228 and BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0201-2022). Therefore, the results of this
certified procedure of the UMC sites are being reused and the evaluator considers this MD5 integrity
validation procedure as acceptable, for consistency with the BSI certificates of the UMC sites”.
GLOSSARY
CCN Centro Criptológico Nacional
CNI Centro Nacional de Inteligencia
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
OC Organismo de Certificación
TOE Target Of Evaluation
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The following standards and documents have been used for the evaluation of the product:
[CC_P1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction and
general model, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
[CC_P2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional
components, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
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[CC_P3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance
components, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Version 3.1, R5 Final,
April 2017.
[JILAAPS] Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, version 2.9. Jan.2013. Joint Interpretation
Library.
[JILADVARC] Security Architecture requirements (ADV_ARC) for Smart Cards and similar devices,
version 2.2. Jan. 2013. Joint Interpretation Library.
[CCDB‐2006‐04‐004] Common Criteria. Additional CCRA Supporting Documents. ST sanitising for
publication. Document number 2006‐04‐004, April 2006.
[ST] THD89 1.0.3 Secure Element version 1.0 Security Target, version 1.9 (Apr.2023).
[ST Lite] THD89 1.0.3 Secure Element version 1.0 Security Target Lite, version 0.1 (Jun. 2023).
SECURITY TARGET / SECURITY TARGET LITE (IF APPLICABLE)
Along with this certification report, the complete security target of the evaluation is stored and
protected in the Certification Body premises. This document is identified as:
• THD89 1.0.3 Secure Element version 1.0 Security Target, version 1.9 (Apr.2023).
The public version of this document constitutes the ST Lite. The ST Lite has also been reviewed for
the needs of publication according to [CCDB-2006-04-004], and it is published along with this
certification report in the Certification Body and CCRA websites. The ST Lite identifier is:
• THD89 1.0.3 Secure Element version 1.0 Security Target Lite, version 0.1 (Jun. 2023).
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RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under
certain conditions was agreed.
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in April 2010. It
defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition level and, in addition, at
higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels EAL 1 to EAL
4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For "Smartcards and similar devices" a
SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical
Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common
Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
The new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France, Germany,
Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The current list of
signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition, and the history of the
agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this
agreement by the nations listed above.
The certificate of this TOE is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC (Common
Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08 September 2014. It covers
CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP) (exact use), CC certificates based on
assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation
(ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates based on CCRA-
2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition according to the rules of CCRA-
2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification procedures and for Assurance Continuity
(maintenance and re-certification)of old certificates a transition period on the recognition of
certificates according to the rules of CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL
4 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
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As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA-2014 are government representatives from
the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the
United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the
website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this
certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
The certificate of this TOE is recognized under CCRA for all assurance components up to EAL2 and
ALC_FLR.