Belkin Secure KM Validation Report, Version 1.5
National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Belkin Secure KM Models
F1DN102K-3, F1DN104K-3, F1DN108K-3
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID10984-2019
Dated: 31 July 2019
Version: 1.5
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory National Security Agency
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
Belkin Secure KM Validation Report, Version 1.5
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Daniel Faigin
The Aerospace Corporation
John Butterworth
The MITRE Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
DXC Technology
10830 Guilford Road, Suite #308
Annapolis Junction, MD 20701
Belkin Secure KM Validation Report, Version 1.5
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report is intended to assist the end-user of this product and any security certification
Agent for the end-user with determining the suitability of this Information Technology
(IT) product in their environment. End-users should review both the Security Target
(ST), which is where specific security claims are made, in conjunction with this
Validation Report (VR), which describes how those security claims were evaluated.
This report documents the assessment by the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of the Belkin Secure KM Switch, the Target of
Evaluation (TOE), performed by DXC Technology. It presents the evaluation results,
their justifications, and the conformance results. This report is not an endorsement of the
TOE by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either expressed or
implied.
The evaluation was performed by DXC Technology (DXC) of Hanover, MD in
accordance with the United States evaluation scheme and completed on July 31, 2019.
The information in this report is largely derived from the ST, the Evaluation Technical
Report (ETR) and the functional testing report. The evaluation was performed to
conform to the requirements of the Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5, dated April 2017 at Evaluation Assurance
Level 1, and the Common Evaluation Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM),
Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017 and the NIAP Peripheral Sharing Switch for Human
Interface Devices Protection Profile, Version 3.0, February 13, 2015.
The Belkin Secure Peripheral Sharing Switches (PSS) allows the secure sharing of a
single set of peripheral components such as keyboard and Mouse/Pointing devices among
multiple computers through standard USB interfaces.
The Evaluation Team performed an analysis of the NIAP Technical Decisions and found
that TD0298, published on March 9, 2018, was applicable to this PP. The evaluation team
investigated and determined that this technical decision is not applicable to this TOE. The
explanation for this, and a list of all Technical Decisions applicable to this PP and TOE,
is described in section 3.1 below and in section 2.3 of the Security Target.
The TOE is also compliant with all International interpretations with effective dates on or
before May 1, 2019.
Belkin Secure KM Validation Report, Version 1.5
2. IDENTIFICATION
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform
trusted product evaluations. Under this program, commercial testing laboratories called
Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common Evaluation
Methodology (CEM) for Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 1 and NIAP approved
Protection Profiles in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment
Program (NVLAP) accreditation conduct security evaluations.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality
and consistency across evaluations. Developers of IT products desiring a security
evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated
Products List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as
evaluated;
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances
of the product;
 The conformance result of the evaluation;
 Any Protection Profile to which the product is conformant;
 The organizations participating in the evaluation.
Belkin Secure KM Validation Report, Version 1.5
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Target of Evaluation Belkin Secure KM
Protection Profile
NIAP Peripheral Sharing Switch for Human Interface Devices Protection
Profile, Version 3.0, February 13, 2015
Security Target Belkin Secure KM Security Target, v4.5, July 2019
Dates of evaluation May 1, 2019 – July 31, 2019
Evaluation Technical Report BELKIN KM Switches Evaluation Technical Report, v.1.2a, July 2019
Assurance Activity Report BELKIN KM Switches Assurance Activity Report, v.1.2, July 2019
Conformance Result
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 1: Introduction and General Model, CCMB-2012-09-001,
Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 2: Security Functional Components, CCMB-2012-09-002,
Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 3: Security Assurance Components, CCMB-2012-09-003,
Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
4. Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, CCMB-2012-09-004, Version
3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
The following CC conformance:
 Part 2 extended
 Part 3 conformant
Common Criteria version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version
3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
Common Evaluation
Methodology (CEM) version
CEM version 3.1R4, September 2012
Sponsor Belkin
Developer Belkin
Evaluators Eve Pierre, John Daniels, Cheryl Dugan
Validation Team
The Aerospace Corporation: Daniel Faigin
The MITRE Corporation: John Butterworth
Belkin Secure KM Validation Report, Version 1.5
3. SECURITY POLICY
The TOE implements the Data Separation Security Function Policy (SFP) as outlined in
Section 4 of the claimed Protection Profile. Isolated USB device emulators are used for
the keyboard and mouse. There is one USB device emulator per each connected
computer. The use of isolated USB device emulators assures that connected computers
will not interact electrically or logically with shared TOE or peripheral resources. Data
exchange from computer emulators to device emulators is uses a proprietary protocol
called UNIDIR. The UNIDIR protocol is limited to basic HID transactions. No other data
may flow between emulators as it is not supported by the limited protocol. Keyboard and
mouse data flows are not combined or connected to any other TOE data flow. The
keyboard and mouse functions are completely isolated from all other functions (audio,
video etc.). There are no shared microcontrollers or any other electronic components. No
other external interfaces are coupled to the keyboard and mouse data flow paths.
a. Wireless keyboards are not allowed per applicable user guidance.
b. Wireless mice are not allowed per applicable user guidance.
c. TOE Keyboard and mouse USB console ports are interchangeable.
3.1. Technical Decisions
Section 2.3 of the ST, and the TOE addresses the following technical decisions:
TD0083 - AVA_VAN.1 – Applied.
TD0086 - FDP_IFF.1.5 – Applied.
TD0136 - FDP_RIP.1.1 – Applied.
TD0144 - FDP_RIP.1.1 - Applied.
TD0251 - FMT_MOF.1.1 - Applied.
TD0298 - FDP_IFF.1 Assurance Activities – Not applicable
Rationale:
TD0298 changes the testing Assurance Activities for the SFR, but not the SFR.
The FDP_IFF.1 requirement is not changed in the ST and is still applicable to the
TOE. However, the test steps added by the new TD are not applicable to the TOE
under evaluation. These procedures apply to a TOE that supports DisplayPort
video format passed through the switch. A TOE that supports DisplayPort
through conversion to other video formats through an external cable or dongle
should not be tested using these procedures or test steps. All TOE models under
evaluation support DisplayPort input by converting DisplayPort to HDMI and
therefore are not affected by the TD changes in part 2 of test 4.4. If necessary, the
evaluation team is prepared to raise a TRRT to request concurrence or a formal
decision based on this rationale.
Belkin Secure KM Validation Report, Version 1.5
4. ARCHITECTURAL INFORMATION
4.1. Logical Scope and Boundary
Secure KMs are used to enable a single user having a single set of peripherals to operate
in an environment having multiple isolated computers. KM switches keyboard, mouse,
audio, and other peripheral devices to one user selected computer.
The following Security Function provides the various KM TOE features and services that
were verified in the current evaluation.
Keyboard and mouse security
The TOE implements the Data Separation Security Function Policy (SFP) as outlined in
Section 4 of the claimed Protection Profile.
The TOE implements isolated keyboard and mouse USB device emulators per connected
computer to prevent direct interface between the TOE shared peripheral devices and
connected computers.
The TOE uses host (computer) emulators to interface with connected keyboard and
mouse peripheral devices, thus isolating external peripherals from TOE internal circuitry
and from connected computers.
Keyboard user data is not stored on TOE non-volatile memory. All USB stacks are
implemented in the TOE using SRAM (Static Random Access Memory) – a volatile
memory that clears data once the TOE is powered down.
TOE external interface security
The TOE supports only the following external interfaces protocols (as required by
referenced PP):
 USB keyboard and mouse;
 Analog audio output; and
 Power input (AC for 4 port or more or DC for 2 port)
Refer to section 4.1 in the Security Target for more information.
Audio Subsystem security
The TOE audio data flow path is electrically isolated from all other functions and
interfaces to prevent signaling data leakages to and from the audio paths. Refer to section
7.3 in the Security Target for more information.
User control and monitoring security
TOE is controlled and monitored by the user through front panel illuminated push-
buttons and switches. These controls and indications are coupled to the TOE system
controller function.
Tampering protection
The TOE implements an always-on anti-tampering system mechanically coupled to the
TOE enclosure to detect and attempt to access the TOE internal circuitry.
Belkin Secure KM Validation Report, Version 1.5
The TOE is equipped with special holographic Tampering Evident Labels located in
critical locations on the TOE enclosure.
Self-testing and Log
The TOE is equipped with a self testing function that begins operation at TOE power up
prior to normal use. The self-test function is running independently on each of the TOE
microcontrollers following power up.
The TOE is equipped with event log non-volatile memory that stores information about
abnormal security related events.
4.2. Administrative and User configuration of the KM TOE
The KM TOE enable user configuration of various minor operational parameters. User
may modify these parameters through predefined keyboard shortcuts.
The KM TOE enable identified and authenticated administrators’ configuration of
various operational and security parameters. Multiple administrators are supported by the
TOE. Access requires user name and password authentication. This access may be
performed using one of the following two methods (as further explained in the relevant
TOE administrator guidance):
1. Using connected computer and text editor application; and
2. Using special USB configuration loading cable and special configuration
utility software.
4.3. Physical Scope and Boundary
The TOE is a peripheral sharing switch.
The physical boundary of the TOE consists of:
• One BELKIN Secure KM Switch; Typically (but not necessarily) made internally
of system controller board and power supply;
• The firmware embedded inside the TOE that is permanently programmed into the
TOE multiple microcontrollers (refer to table 3 below for firmware versions);
• The log, state and settings data stored in the TOE;
• The TOE power supply that is shipped with the product (or integrated inside some
of the products);
• The TOE computer interface cables that are shipped with the product; and
• The accompanying User Guidance
The evaluated TOE configuration does not include any peripherals or computer
components, but do include supplied computer interface cables attached to the TOE.
Figure 1 and table 3 below describe the TOE and its typical installation environment.
Belkin Secure KM Validation Report, Version 1.5
4.3.1. Evaluated Environment
This table identifies hardware components and indicates whether or not each component
is in the TOE or Environment.
Table 2: Evaluated TOE and Environment Components
TOE / Environment Component Description
TOE Selectable product from table 2 above. TOE Hardware
Environment Standard USB or PS/2 Mouse Console USB
user mouse port
Environment Standard USB or PS/2 keyboard Console USB
user keyboard
port
TOE Belkin KVM Cables (as needed):
P/N Description
CWR05117 KVM Cable short (1.8 m), USB Type-A to
USB Type-B, Black
Cables for
connection of
computers to
TOE computers
TOE
Special Administrator Configuration Loading Cable (as needed):
P/N Description
HWR06579 USB Type-A to USB Type-A Configuration
Loading Cable, 1.8m, Black
USB-A to USB-A
Config. Loading
Cable
Environment
Standard amplified stereo speakers or analog headphones Audio output
console port
Environment Standard PC, Server, portable computer, tablet, thin-client or zero-
client device running any operating system; or
KVM extender connected to remote platform.
Connected
computers
Belkin Secure KM Validation Report, Version 1.5
Figure 1: Typical example of Belkin 4-port KM TOE Installation
4.3.2. KM TOE details
Table 3: Evaluated KM Products
No Model P/N Description
Eval.
Version
2-Port
1. F1DN102K-3 CGA06860 Belkin secure 2-port Flip KM w/audio, PP 3.0 30303-00C4
4-Port
1. F1DN104K-3 CGA10174 Belkin secure 4-port KM w/audio, PP 3.0 30303-00C4
8-Port
1. F1DN108K-3 CGA10183 Belkin secure 8-port KM Switch w/audio, PP 3.0
30303-00C4
Belkin Secure KM Validation Report, Version 1.5
5. ASSUMPTIONS AND CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE
5.1. Assumptions
The ST identified the following security assumptions:
Table: Secure Usage Assumptions
Assumption Definition
A.NO_TEMPEST It is assumed that the computers and peripheral devices
connected to the TOE are not TEMPEST approved.
A.NO_SPECIAL_ANALOG_CAPABILITIES It is assumed that the computers connected to the TOE are not
equipped with special analog data collection cards or peripherals
such as: Analog to digital interface, high performance audio
interface, Digital Signal Processing function, and analog video
capture function.
A.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and
the data it contains, is assumed to be provided by the
environment.
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN TOE Administrators and users are trusted to follow and apply all
guidance in a trusted manner.
A.TRUSTED_CONFIG Personnel configuring the TOE and its operational environment
will follow the applicable security configuration guidance.
5.2. Threats
The ST identified the following threats addressed by the TOE:
Table: Threats
Threat Definition
T.DATA_LEAK A connection via the PSS between computers
may allow unauthorized data flow through the
PSS or its connected peripherals.
T.SIGNAL_LEAK A connection via the PSS between computers
may allow unauthorized data flow through bit-by-
bit signaling.
T.RESIDUAL_LEAK A PSS may leak (partial, residual, or echo) user
data between the intended connected computer
and another unintended connected computer.
More specifically, a PSS may leak user keyboard
entries to a PSS-connected computer other than
the selected computer in real-time or at a later
time.
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T.UNINTENDED_SWITCHING A threat in which the user is connected to a
computer other than the one to which they
intended to be connected.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_DEVICES The use of an unauthorized peripheral device with
a specific PSS peripheral port may allow
unauthorized data flows between connected
devices or enable an attack on the PSS or its
connected computers.
T.AUTHORIZED_BUT_UNTRUSTED_DEVICES The use of an authorized peripheral device with
the PSS may still cause unauthorized data flows
between connected devices or enable an attack on
the PSS or its connected computers. Such threats
are possible due to known or unknown device
vulnerabilities or due to additional functions
within the authorized peripheral device.
T.MICROPHONE_USE
Microphone connected to the TOE used for audio
eavesdropping or to transfer data across an air-
gap through audio signaling.
T.AUDIO_REVERSED
Audio output device used by an attacker as a low-
gain microphone for audio eavesdropping. This
threat is an abuse of the computer and TOE audio
output path to reverse the analog data flow from
the headphones to the computer. The computer
then amplifies and filters the weak signal, and
then digitizes and streams it to another location.
T.LOGICAL_TAMPER An attached device (computer or peripheral) with
malware, or otherwise under the control of a
malicious user, could modify or overwrite code
embedded in the TOE’s volatile or non-volatile
memory to allow unauthorized information flows
between connected devices.
T.PHYSICAL_TAMPER A malicious human agent could physically
tamper with or modify the TOE to allow
unauthorized information flows between
connected devices.
T.REPLACEMENT A malicious human agent could replace the TOE
during shipping, storage, or use with an alternate
device that does not enforce the TOE security
policies.
T.FAILED Detectable failure of a PSS may cause an
unauthorized information flow, weakening of
PSS security functions, or unintended switching.
5.3. Organizational Security Policies
The Protection Profile claimed identifies no Organizational Security Policies (OSPs) to
which the TOE must comply.
Belkin Secure KM Validation Report, Version 1.5
5.4. Security Objectives
The following table, Security Objectives for the TOE, identifies the security objectives of
the TOE. These security objectives reflect the stated intent to counter identified threats
and/or comply with any security policies identified.
Security Objective Definition as applied to KM type TOE
O.COMPUTER_INTERFACE_ISOLATION The TOE must prevent unauthorized data flow to assure that
the TOE and/or its connected peripheral devices would not be
exploited in an attempt to leak data. The TOE computer
interface shall be isolated from all other TOE computer
interfaces while TOE is powered.
O.COMPUTER_INTERFACE_ISOLATION_
TOE_UNPOWERED
The same level of isolation defined in the dataflow objectives
must be maintained at all times, including periods while TOE
is unpowered.
O.USER_DATA_ISOLATION User data such as keyboard entries should be switched (i.e.,
routed) by the TOE only to the computer selected by the user.
The TOE must provide isolation between the data flowing from
the peripheral device to the selected computer and any non-
selected computer (or another connected computer at later time
in the case of Isolator TOE).
O.NO_USER_DATA_RETENTION The TOE shall not retain user data after it is powered down.
O.PURGE_TOE_KB_DATA_WHILE_SWIT
CHING
The TOE shall purge all user keyboard data from computer
interfaces following channel switching and before interacting
with the new connected computer.
O.NO_DOCKING_PROTOCOLS The use of docking protocols such as DockPort, USB docking,
Thunderbolt etc. is not allowed in the TOE.
O.NO_OTHER_EXTERNAL_INTERFACES The TOE may not have any wired or wireless external interface
with external entities (external entity is an entity outside the
TOE evaluated system, its connected computers and peripheral
devices).
O.NO_ANALOG_AUDIO_INPUT Shared audio input peripheral functions (i.e., analog audio
microphone input or line input) are not allowed in the TOE.
O.UNIDIRECTIONAL_AUDIO_OUT The TOE shall be designed to assure that reverse audio signal
attenuation will be at least 30 dBv measured with 200 mV and
2V input pure sinus wave at the extended audio frequency
range including negative swing signal. The level of the reverse
audio signal received by the selected computer shall be
minimal to assure that the signal level generated by
headphones will be well under the noise floor level.
O.COMPUTER_TO_AUDIO_ISOLATION The TOE audio dataflow shall be isolated from all other TOE
functions. Signal attenuation between any TOE computer
interface and any TOE audio interface shall be at least 45 dBv
measured with 2V input pure sinus wave at the extended audio
Belkin Secure KM Validation Report, Version 1.5
frequency range including negative swing signal.
O.AUTHORIZED_SWITCHING The TOE shall allow only authorized switching mechanisms to
switch between connected computers and shall explicitly
prohibit or ignore unauthorized switching mechanisms.
O.NO_AMBIGUOUS_CONTROL Only one switching method shall be operative at any given
time to prevent ambiguous commands.
O.CONTINUOUS_INDICATION The TOE shall provide continuous visual indication of the
computer to which the user is currently connected.
O.KEYBOARD_AND_MOUSE_TIED The TOE shall ensure that the keyboard and mouse devices are
always switched together
O.NO_CONNECTED_COMPUTER_CONTR
OL
The TOE shall not allow TOE control through a connected
computer.
O.PERIPHERAL_PORTS_ISOLATION The TOE shall prevent data flow between peripheral devices of
different SPFs and the TOE peripheral device ports of different
SPFs shall be isolated.
O.DISABLE_UNAUTHORIZED_PERIPHER
AL
The TOE shall only allow authorized peripheral device types
(See Annex C) per peripheral device port; all other devices
shall be identified and then rejected or ignored by the TOE.
O.DISABLE_UNAUTHORIZED_ENDPOINT
S
The TOE shall reject unauthorized peripheral devices
connected via a USB hub. Alternatively, the TOE may reject
all USB hubs.
O.KEYBOARD_MOUSE_EMULATED The TOE keyboard and pointing device functions shall be
emulated (i.e., no electrical connection other than the common
ground is allowed between peripheral devices and connected
computers).
O.KEYBOARD_MOUSE_UNIDIRECTIONA
L
The TOE keyboard and pointing device data shall be forced to
unidirectional flow from the peripheral device to the switched
computer only.
O.TAMPER_EVIDENT_LABEL The TOE shall be identifiable as authentic by the user and the
user must be made aware of any procedures or other such
information to accomplish authentication. This feature must be
available upon receipt of the TOE and continue to be available
during the TOE deployment.
The TOE shall be labeled with at least one visible and one
invisible unique identifying tamper-evident marking that can
be used to authenticate the device. The TOE manufacturer
must maintain complete list of manufactured TOE articles and
their respective identification markings’ unique identifiers.
Belkin Secure KM Validation Report, Version 1.5
O.ANTI_TAMPERING The TOE shall be physically enclosed so that any attempts to
open or otherwise access the internals or modify the
connections of the TOE would be evident. This shall be
accomplished through the use of an always-on active anti-
tampering system that serves to permanently disable the TOE
should its enclosure be opened. The TOE shall use an always-
on active anti-tampering system to permanently disable the
TOE in case physical tampering is detected.
O.ANTI_TAMPERING_BACKUP_POWER The anti-tampering system must have a backup power source
to enable tamper detection while the TOE is unpowered.
O.ANTI_TAMPERING_BACKUP_FAIL_TRI
GGER
A failure or depletion of the anti-tampering system backup
power source shall trigger TOE to enter tampered state.
O.ANTI_TAMPERING_INDICATION The TOE shall have clear user indications when tampering is
detected.
O.ANTI_TAMPERING_PERMANENTLY_D
ISABLE_TOE
Once the TOE anti-tampering is triggered, the TOE shall
become permanently disabled. No peripheral-to-computer data
flows shall be allowed.
O.NO_TOE_ACCESS The TOE shall be designed so that access to the TOE firmware,
software, or its memory via its accessible ports is prevented.
O.SELF_TEST The TOE shall perform self-tests following power up or
powered reset.
O.SELF_TEST_FAIL_TOE_DISABLE Upon critical failure detection the TOE shall disable normal
operation of the whole TOE or the respective failed
component.
O.SELF_TEST_FAIL_INDICATION The TOE shall provide clear and visible user indications in the
case of a self-test failure.
Notes:
1. Objectives O.UNIDIRECTIONAL_VIDEO, O.UNIDIRERCTIONAL_EDID and
O.DISPLAYPORT_AUX_FILTERING are not applicable for the KM type TOE
per referenced PP as it does not support video.
5.5. Security Objectives for the IT Environment
The following IT security objectives for the environment are to be addressed by the
Operational Environment by technical means.
Belkin Secure KM Validation Report, Version 1.5
Environment Security Objective Definition
OE. NO_TEMPEST The operational environment will not require the use
of TEMPEST approved equipment.
OE.
NO_SPECIAL_ANALOG_CAPABILITIES
The operational environment will not require special
analog data collection cards or peripherals such as:
Analog to digital interface, high performance audio
interface, Digital Signal Processing function, and
analog video capture function.
OE.PHYSICAL The operational environment will provide physical
security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and
the data it contains.
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN The operational environment will ensure that
appropriately trained and trusted TOE Administrators
and users are available to administer, configure and
use the TOE.
5.6. Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions
that need clarifying. This text covers some of the more important limitations and
clarifications of this evaluation. Note that:
As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets
the security claims made, with a certain level of assurance. The level of assurance for this
evaluation is defined within the Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Switches.
Consistent with the expectations of the Protection Profile, this evaluation did not
specifically search for, nor seriously attempt to counter, vulnerabilities that were not
“obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an
“obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding
of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality
specified in the claimed PPs. Any additional security related functional capabilities
included in the product were not covered by this evaluation.
The evaluated configuration of the TOE includes the products identified in Section 4.3.2
using the identified version in the same section for each product. The TOE includes all
the code that enforces the policies identified.
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6. DOCUMENTATION
The following guidance documents are provided with the TOE upon delivery in
accordance with the PP:
1. Advanced Secure 2-port Flip KM Switch, Rev D
2. Secure 4/8 port KM Switch, Rev D
3. BELKIN KM Configuration Tool, Rev C
4. BELKIN Administrator Guide, Rev C
All documentation delivered with the product is relevant to and within the scope of the
TOE.
Latest documentation may be found at Belkin website:
https://www.belkin.com/us/Resource-Center/Cybersecurity/Resources
Belkin Secure KM Validation Report, Version 1.5
7. IT PRODUCT TESTING
This section describes the testing efforts of the evaluation team.
7.1. Evaluation team independent testing
The evaluation team conducted independent testing at the Belkin facilities in Huntsville,
Alabama. The evaluation team installed and configured the TOE according to vendor
installation instructions and the evaluated configuration as identified in the Security
Target.
The evaluation team confirmed the technical accuracy of the setup and installation guide
during installation of the TOE. The evaluation team confirmed that the TOE version
delivered for testing was identical to the version identified in the ST.
The evaluation team used the Protection Profile test procedures as a basis for creating
each of the Independent tests as required by the Assurance Activities.
Each Assurance Activity was tested as required by the conformant Protection Profiles and
the evaluation team verified that each test passed.
7.2. Vulnerability analysis
The evaluation team performed a vulnerability analysis of the TOE evidence and a search
of publicly available information to identify potential vulnerabilities in the TOE. Based
on the results of this effort, there were no identifiable vulnerabilities found at the time of
certification.
Belkin Secure KM Validation Report, Version 1.5
8. RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION
The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the Common Criteria Evaluation and
Validation Scheme (CCEVS) processes and procedures. The TOE was evaluated against
the criteria contained in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1R4. The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to
conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology
Security Evaluation, Version 3.1R4.
DXC Technology (DXC) has determined that the product meets the security criteria in
the Security Target, which specifies conformance to the NIAP Peripheral Sharing Switch
for Human Interface Devices Protection Profile, Version 3.0, February 13, 2015. A team
of Validators, on behalf of the CCEVS Validation Body, monitored the evaluation. The
evaluation effort was finished on July 31 2019.
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9. VALIDATOR COMMENTS
The validation team’s observations support the evaluation team’s conclusion that the
Belkin Secure KM switch meets the claims stated in the Security Target.
The validators suggest that the consumer pay particular attention to the evaluated
configuration of the device(s). The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the
security functional requirements specified in the Security Target, and only the
functionality implemented by the SFR’s within the Security Target was evaluated. All
other functionality provided by the devices, to include software that was not part of the
evaluated configuration, needs to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can
be drawn about their effectiveness.
Consumers employing the devices must follow the configuration instructions provided in
the Configuration Guidance documentation to ensure the evaluated configuration is
established and maintained.
9.1. Validation Approach
This product was a reevaluation of a product originally evaluated as VID 10638 which
had previously underwent assurance maintenance on March 19, 2018 with no changes to
the evaluated product. As there were no changes in the implementation of the product,
model, or version number, the goal was to reuse as much previous evidence as possible;
additional testing of an unchanged product would be superfluous.
The approach taken by the validation team was to:
1. Ensure that all TDs had been addressed in the evaluation and that any impact on
assurance activities was assessed and addressed.
2. Evaluate the equivalence arguments to ensure there were no changes to the
product that would impact testing, require re-testing, or would be categorized as
something other than minor under assurance maintenance.
3. Compare the updated evaluation documentation to the prior evaluation
documentation to understand any changes and their rationale, and to ensure any
changes remained technically correct.
4. Ensure that the evaluation team reviewed all prior evaluation material to ensure
that it remained applicable to the updated evaluation.
Belkin Secure KM Validation Report, Version 1.5
10. ANNEXES
None
Belkin Secure KM Validation Report, Version 1.5
11. SECURITY TARGET
Belkin Secure KM Security Target, Revision 4.5, July 2019.
Belkin Secure KM Validation Report, Version 1.5
12. GLOSSARY
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL): An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP)
and approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
 Evaluation: The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims
made are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common
Criteria using the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is
complete, consistent, technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of
requirements for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence: Any tangible resource (information) required from the
sponsor or developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE): A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or
an IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security
evaluation under the CC.
 Threat: Means through which the ability or intent of a threat agent to adversely
affect the primary functionality of the TOE, facility that contains the TOE, or
malicious operation directed towards the TOE. A potential violation of security.
 Validation: The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the
issue of a Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body: A governmental organization responsible for carrying out
validation and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria
Evaluation and Validation Scheme.
 Vulnerabilities: A vulnerability is a hardware, firmware, or software flaw that
leaves an Automated Information System (AIS) open for potential exploitation. A
weakness in automated system security procedures, administrative controls, physical
layout, internal controls, and so forth, which could be exploited by a threat to gain
unauthorized access to information or disrupt critical processing.
Belkin Secure KM Validation Report, Version 1.5
13. BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, CCMB-2012-09-001, Version 3.1 Revision 4,
September 2012.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2:
Security Functional Components, CCMB-2012-09-002, Version 3.1 Revision 4,
September 2012.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3:
Security Assurance Components, CCMB-2012-09-003, Version 3.1 Revision 4,
September 2012.
4. Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Evaluation Methodology, CCMB-2017-04-004, Version 3.1, Revision 4,
September 2012.
5. Belkin Secure KM Security Target, Revision v.4.5, July 2019.
6. DXC Technology (DXC): Belkin Secure KM Assurance Activity Report, 1.2,
July 2019.