C034 Certification Report
Northern Light Video Conferencing System (NLVC)
File name: ISCB-5-RPT-C034-CR-v1a
Version: v1a
Date of document: 22 March 2012
Document classification: PUBLIC
For general inquiry about us or our services,
please email: mycc@cybersecurity.my
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C034 Certification Report
Northern Light Video Conferencing System
(NLVC)
22 March 2012
ISCB Department
CyberSecurity Malaysia
Level 8, Block A, Mines Waterfront Business Park,
No 3 Jalan Tasik, The Mines Resort City
43300 Seri Kembangan, Selangor, Malaysia


Tel: +603 8946 0999 Fax: +603 8946 0888
http://www.cybersecurity.my
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Document Authorisation
DOCUMENT TITLE: C034 Certification Report - Northern Light Video
Conferencing System (NLVC)
DOCUMENT REFERENCE: ISCB-5-RPT-C034-CR-v1a
ISSUE: v1a
DATE: 22 March 2012
DISTRIBUTION: UNCONTROLLED COPY - FOR UNLIMITED USE AND
DISTRIBUTION
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Copyright Statement
The copyright of this document, which may contain proprietary information, is the
property of CyberSecurity Malaysia.
The document shall be held in safe custody.
©CYBERSECURITY MALAYSIA, 2012
Registered office:
Level 8, Block A,
Mines Waterfront Business Park,
No 3 JalanTasik, The Mines Resort City,
43300 Seri Kembangan
Selangor Malaysia
Registered in Malaysia – Company Limited by Guarantee
Company No. 726630-U
Printed in Malaysia
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Forward
The Malaysian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification (MyCC) Scheme has been
established under the 9th
Malaysian Plan to increase Malaysia’s competitiveness in quality
assurance of information security based on the Common Criteria (CC) standard and to
build consumers’ confidence towards Malaysian information security products.
The MyCC Scheme is operated by CyberSecurity Malaysia and provides a model for
licensed Malaysian Security Evaluation Facilities (MySEFs) to conduct security evaluations
of ICT products, systems and protection profiles against internationally recognised
standards. The results of these evaluations are certified by the Malaysian Common
Criteria Certification Body (MyCB) Unit, a unit established within Information Security
Certification Body (ISCB) Department, CyberSecurity Malaysia.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the MyCB asserts that the product complies
with the security requirements specified in the associated Security Target. A Security
Target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the evaluation
activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the Security Target, in
addition to this certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any
assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, its
security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the evaluation assurance level)
that the product satisfies the security requirements.
This certification report is associated with the certificate of product evaluation dated 22
March 2012, and the Security Target (Ref [6]). The certification report, Certificate of
product evaluation and security target are posted on the MyCC Scheme Certified Product
Register (MyCPR) at www.cybersecurity.my/mycc and the Common Criteria Portal (the
official website of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement at
www.commoncriteriaportal.org).
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its
entirety.
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Disclaimer
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report and its
associate certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed evaluation facility
established under the Malaysian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification (MyCC)
Scheme (Ref [4]) using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, version 3.1
revision 3 (Ref [3]), for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation,
version 3.1 revision 3 (Ref [2]). This certification report and its associated certificate
apply only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of
the MyCC Scheme and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation
technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This certification report and
its associated certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by CyberSecurity
Malaysia or by any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certification
report and its associated certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by CyberSecurity
Malaysia or by any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
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Document Change Log
RELEASE DATE PAGES
AFFECTED
REMARKS/CHANGE REFERENCE
v1 6 March 2012 All Final Released
v1a 22 March 2012 Page iv Add the date of the certificate.
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Executive Summary
The Northern Light Video Conferencing System (NLVC) (hereafter referred as NLVC) from
JMCS Sdn Bhd is the Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 2
evaluation.
NLVC is a multipoint-to-multipoint video conferencing system. It allows conferencing of
any desired number of people around the world using existing LAN infrastructure,
without affecting current applications. It is software based and uses non-proprietary
hardware.
The TOE is software that comprises of three components:
• NLVC Client version 6.3.0.0. A user based GUI application that works on the end
user’s PC or NLVC boardroom codec system.
• NLVC Server Webadmin Tool version 7.0.0.1. A web based interface use to ease
the administration of the TOE (NLVC Server).
• NLVC Server version 6.1-0.21. The main purpose is to maintain and control
conference according to the Real Time Switching (RSW) control criteria used.
The security functions within the scope of the evaluation include:
• Identification and Authentication – the TOE provides identification and
authentication of users before users are allowed to access the functionality of the
TOE.
• Secure communication – the TOE provides a secure SSL session between the
client and the server.
• Security Management – the TOE provides functions that allow management of
the TOE and its security functions. The TOE restricts access to the management
functions based on the role of the user.
• User Data Protection – the TOE manages access control on configuration data
and functions based on user roles and access control lists.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the Security Target (Ref [6]), which identifies
assumptions made during the evaluation, the intended environment for NLVC, the
security functional requirements, and the evaluation assurance level at which the product
is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers are advised to verify that
their operating environment is consistent with that specified in the security target, and
to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this
certification report.
This report describes the findings of the IT security evaluation of NLVC to the Common
Criteria (CC) evaluation assurance level of EAL2. The report confirms that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the relevant criteria and the requirements of the
Malaysian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification (MyCC) Scheme (Ref [4]). The
evaluation was performed by the STRATSEC.NET SDN BHD (Stratsec) Security Evaluation
Facility (Stratsec MySEF) and was completed on 22 February 2012.
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Malaysian Common Criteria Certification Body (MyCB), as the MyCC Scheme Certification
Body, declares that the NLVC evaluation meets all the conditions of the Arrangement on
the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and the product will be listed on the
MyCC Scheme Certified Products Register (MyCPR) at www.cybersecurity.my/mycc and
the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the Common Criteria Recognition
Arrangement at www.commoncriteriaportal.org).
It is the responsibility of the user to ensure that the NLVC meets their requirements and
security needs. It is recommended that a potential user of the NLVC to refer to the
Security Target (Ref [6]) and this Certification Report prior to deciding whether to
purchase and deploy the product.
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Table of Contents
1 Target of Evaluation ....................................................................... 1
1.1 TOE Description............................................................................................... 1
1.2 TOE Identification............................................................................................ 1
1.3 Security Policy.................................................................................................. 2
1.4 TOE Architecture ............................................................................................. 3
1.5 Clarification of Scope...................................................................................... 4
1.6 Assumptions .................................................................................................... 6
1.6.1 Usage Assumptions ........................................................................................ 6
1.6.2 Environment Assumptions............................................................................. 7
1.7 Evaluated Configuration................................................................................. 7
1.8 Delivery Procedures ........................................................................................ 7
1.9 Documentation ................................................................................................ 8
2 Evaluation.......................................................................................... 9
2.1 Evaluation Analysis Activities ........................................................................ 9
2.1.1 Life-cycle support ........................................................................................... 9
2.1.2 Development.................................................................................................... 9
2.1.3 Guidance documents ...................................................................................... 9
2.1.4 IT Product Testing......................................................................................... 10
3 Result of the Evaluation................................................................18
3.1 Assurance Level Information ....................................................................... 18
3.2 Recommendation........................................................................................... 18
Annex A References........................................................................................20
A.1 References...................................................................................................... 20
A.2 Terminology................................................................................................... 20
A.2.1 Acronyms........................................................................................................ 20
A.2.2 Glossary of Terms ......................................................................................... 21
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Index of Tables
Table 1: TOE identification ........................................................................................................... 1
Table 2: Independent Functional Testing................................................................................. 10
Table 3: List of Acronyms ........................................................................................................... 20
Table 4: Glossary of Terms......................................................................................................... 21
Index of Figures
Figure 1: NLVC System Architecture............................................................................................ 3
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1 Target of Evaluation
1.1 TOE Description
1 The Target of Evaluation (TOE), Northern Light Video Conferencing System (NLVC)
(hereafter referred as NLVC) is a multipoint-to-multipoint video conferencing
system. It allows conferencing of any desired number of people around the world
using existing LAN infrastructure, without affecting current applications. It is
software based and uses non-proprietary hardware. The TOE components include:
a) NLVC Client version 6.3.0.0. A user based GUI application that works on the
end user’s PC or NLVC boardroom codec system.
b) NLVC Server Webadmin Tool version 7.0.0.1. A web based interface use to ease
the administration of the TOE (NLVC Server).
c) NLVC Server version 6.1-0.21. The main purpose is to maintain and control
conference according to the Real Time Switching (RSW) control criteria used.
2 The evaluated security functionalities for the TOE includes:
a) Identification and Authentication – the TOE requires that each user is
successfully identified (User ID) and authenticated (password) before they are
allowed to access the functionality of the TOE.
b) Secure communication – the TOE provides a secure SSL session between the
client and the server in order to protect the video feeds and command data
when transmitted between the client and the server.
c) Security Management – the TOE manages functions to ensure efficient and
secure management of the TOE and its security functions. The TOE restricts
access to the management functions based on the role of the user. The roles
maintained by the TOE are: Chairman, Participant, Observer, and
Administrator. Each access control list maps users and roles to the operations
that they are permitted to perform on the object.
d) User Data Protection – the TOE manages access control on configuration data
and functions based on user role and access control lists.
1.2 TOE Identification
3 The details of the TOE are identified in Table 1 below.
Table 1: TOE identification
Evaluation Scheme
Malaysian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification
(MyCC) Scheme
Project Identifier C034
TOE Name Northern Light Video Conferencing System (NLVC)
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TOE Version
NLVC System version consist of:
• NLVC Client version 6.3.0.0
• NLVC Server Webadmin Tool version 7.0.0.1
• NLVC Server version 6.1-0.21
Security Target Title
JMCS Northern Light Video Conferencing System Security
Target
Security Target Version 1.2
Security Target Date 22 February 2012
Assurance Level Evaluation Assurance Level 1 (EAL2)
Criteria
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, July 2009, Version 3.1 Revision 3 (Ref [2])
Methodology Common Methodology for Information Technology
Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3 (Ref [3])
Protection Profile
Conformance
None
Common Criteria
Conformance
CC Part 2 Conformant
CC Part 3 Conformant
Package conformant to EAL2
Sponsor and Developer
JMCS Sdn Bhd
National Advances IPv6 Centre,
Universiti Sains Malaysia,
11800 Penang,
MALAYSIA
Evaluation Facility STRATSEC.NET SDN BHD known as Stratsec MySEF
1.3 Security Policy
4 In order to provide user data protection, the TOE enforces access control policy on
TOE configuration data and functions. Only Administrator can access the
management functions through web interface that has access rights to TOE
configuration data and TOE functions.
5 Users need to be identified and authenticated before the users can establish a video
conferencing session. Only the Chairman can create and configure the session, invite
the users, and choose the role of users using the NLVC Client.
6 The TOE also enforces communication policy on the establishment of a secure
channel between the NLVC Clients and the NLVC Server. Only a NLVC Client with a
valid certificate can establish a secure VPN channel with the NLVC Server.
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7 The details of the security policy are described in Section 5 and Section 6 of the
Security Target (Ref [6]).
1.4 TOE Architecture
8 The Security Target (Ref [6]) defines clearly both logical and physical boundaries.
9 Figure 1 below identifies the major architectural components that comprise the
entire NLVC system and identifies all the major supporting elements that combine to
deliver the system.
Figure 1: NLVC System Architecture
10 NLVC is a multipoint-to-multipoint video conferencing system that consists of NLVC
Server and NLVC Client(s). It allows conferencing of any desired number of people
around the world using existing LAN infrastructure. It is software based and uses
non-proprietary hardware.
11 NLVC uses multicast technology within the LAN and unicast technology within the
WAN. This enables NLVC to keep the conference bandwidth constant no matter how
many users are connected to the conference.
12 NLVC also uses the RSW Control Criteria which is an advanced set of controls for
Multimedia Conferencing that focused more on bandwidth reduction and prioritizes
the participants to avoid confusion when everybody speaks up during conference.
13 Physically, the TOE comprises of 2 systems:
a) NLVC Server (version 6.1-0.21) – the main purpose is to maintain and control
conference according to the RSW control criteria used. RSW control criterion is
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a set of rules that uses the client-server style of communication. NLVC Server
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de:
the chosen RSW control criteria.
. However,
b) GUI application that is used to
tem; or
tform with a high
14 The operational environment is an important element in
1.5 Clarification of Scope
15 The TOE is designed to be suitable for use in well-protected environments that have
valuation was limited to those claims made in the Security Target
LVC Client,
re being used to authenticate
ors will login to the NLVC Server through Webadmin Tool interface
LVC Clients when they are
is managed through the Webadmin Tool (version 7.0.0.1) which is a web based
interface for accessing the various user management and security function
capabilities of the NLVC Server.
The functions of the server inclu
• Controlling the conference using
• Allowing users to login into the system.
• Allowing users to change passwords.
• Establishing inter-server links (during multi-server conferences
this is not in the scope of the evaluation).
NLVC Client (version 6.3.0.0) – user based
control and monitors the conference. It works on:
• end user’s PC – can be any Windows based sys
• NLVC boardroom codec system – a standalone pla
resolution monitor, Windows system, camera, and advanced echo
cancellation system.
secure installation of the
ensuring that the TOE is initialized correctly and protection from tampering. The
Security Target assumes that the server is to be located in a secure area that is free
from physical access to unauthorised parties. This would restrict access to the
application through only logical access.
effective countermeasures, particularly in the areas of physical access, personnel and
communication security in accordance with administrator guidance that is supplied
with the product.
16 The scope of the e
(Ref [6]) and includes only the following evaluated security functionality:
a) When a user logon using the N
Identification and authentication.
the TOE requires that the users identify and authenticate themselves before
performing any TSF mediated action on behalf of the user. The TOE checks the
credentials presented by the user upon the login module of the client against
the authentication information in the database.
All users presented passwords are hashed befo
the user or when users change their passwords and is being written to the
database.
Administrat
which can only be accessed by the administrator.
The TOE also checks the authenticity of the N
requesting to establish a secure channel to the NLVC Server. This is done
through the use of digital certificates which are pre-installed on the client side.
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b) Secure communication - The TOE protects the video feeds, audio and
command data from disclosure when they are transmitted between the server
and the client through the establishment of secure SSL channel. The VPN API
(server) will invoke open-source OpenVPN server program and wait for VPN API
(client) connection. The VPN API (client) will connect to VPN API (server) by
establishing TLS based dynamic key exchange using client certificates. Once
the SSL authentication is done, a SSL tunnel will be established.
c) Security management - The TOE contains various management functions to
ensure efficient and secure management of the TOE as follows:
i) User Management - only Administrator is allowed to query, create, delete,
and modify user. All users can change their password only.
ii) Permission Management for Functions and Data - the person who starts
the video session will have the Chairman role. Only the Chairman can invite
users to the video conferencing session and assign them roles (Participants
or Observers). The Administrator of the TOE can configure the certificate
settings on the NLVC Server for identification and authentication of NLVC
Clients.
iii) Configuration of session - when the user setup the video conferencing
session, he/she can edit the settings of the video conferencing (SSL,
protocols, etc).
The TOE maintains 4 roles within the TOE to ensure that the functions are
restricted to only those users that need to have access to privileged functions.
The roles maintained by the TOE are: Chairman, Participant, Observer and
Administrator.
The TOE allows no one to change the default values of the TSF data and
security attributes of the TOE but only allows the Administrator to change the
security attributes for the identification and authentication of NLVC client
through digital certificates.
d) User data protection – The access control function permits a user to access
configuration data and functions only if a user role of the user has permission
to perform the requested action. It also permits a NLVC Client with a valid
certificate to request to establish a secure SSL channel with the NLVC Server.
Users will be assigned a role after they have been identified and authenticated.
The following user assignment rules are enforced:
i) When no user authentication has taken place, the user has been assigned
no role. Only authenticated user can access the TOE functions.
ii) When the user successfully authenticates himself/herself, he can be
assigned any of the 4 roles depending on the event:
o Conference Roles:
1. Chairman (creator) – can view, listen and transmit audio and video
streams in a conference session. Once a user creates a conference,
he is automatically the “Chairman” and can invite user into their
conference. Chairman is always active.
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2. Participant – can view and listen to audio, video streams in a
conference session. Once he is active, he could transmit audio and
video. This role is assigned by Chairman during conference
invitation.
3. Observer – can only view and listen to others audio and video
streams in a conference session. He can change status to active by
requesting to become “active”. This role is assigned by Chairman
during conference invitation.
o Administrator Roles:
1. Administrator – can perform users’ management and monitor
system status through Webadmin Tool interface to the TOE.
iii) Users can only operate in the organisation that they are assigned to. Only
Administrator has access to all organisations data.
17 Potential consumers of the TOE are advised that some functions and services may
not have been evaluated as part of the evaluation. Potential consumers of the TOE
should carefully consider their requirements for using functions and services outside
of the evaluated configuration.
18 Functions and services which are not included as part of the evaluated configuration,
but these IT environment are required to ensure that the TOE perform in its intended
operations, are as follows:
a) A Hardware Server;
b) An Operating System on which the TOE is installed on;
c) A Database Software on which the TOE is dependent on as its database;
d) Other supporting software;
i) SSH server v4.3.
ii) Apache web server v2.2.3-6.
iii) Yum v3.0.5-1
iv) OpenVPN v2.0.9-1
1.6 Assumptions
19 This section summarises the security aspects of the environment or configuration in
which the IT product is intended to operate. Consumers should understand their own
IT environments and what is required for secure operation of the TOE as defined in
the Security Target (Ref [6]). Consumers can make informed decisions about the risks
associated with using the TOE by considering assumptions about usage and
environment settings as requirements for the product’s installation and its operating
environment, to ensure its proper and secure operation.
1.6.1 Usage Assumptions
20 Assumptions for the TOE usage listed in the Security Target are:
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a) The administrator who manages the TOE is not hostile and is competent.
b) All management of the TOE will be performed through the management
interfaces of the TOE and not through the underlying environment.
1.6.2 Environment Assumptions
21 Assumptions for the TOE environment listed in the Security Target are:
a) The TOE environment will provide appropriate authentication and authorisation
controls for all users and administrators in the underlying environment
(including the Operating System, RDBMS, and Web Server).
b) Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that the TOE environment is free of
vulnerabilities that allow an attacker to bypass the TOE security functions.
c) The IT environment provides the TOE with appropriate physical security,
commensurate with the value of the IT assets protected by the TOE.
d) The databases in the TOE environment have been correctly configured
according to the principle of least privilege.
e) The encryption of user password in the TOE environment has been performed
to ensure confidentiality or integrity of user or management data.
1.7 Evaluated Configuration
22 This section describes the configurations of the TOE that are included within the
scope of the evaluation. The assurance gained via evaluation applies specifically to
the TOE in the defined evaluated configuration according to the documented
preparative and operational user guidance, and only by trustworthy staff.
23 The TOE, and its supporting hardware and software listed in the Security Target (Ref
[6]) are configured based on secure installation guidance as follows:
a) Installation and configuration of NLVC Server.
b) Installation and configuration of OpenVPN.
c) Installation and configuration of web administration page.
d) Installation and configuration of the NLVC Client.
1.8 Delivery Procedures
24 NLVC is delivered to the end-user (i.e. the Administrator) by JMCS’s trusted
representative. Before the TOE is delivered, all necessaries steps are performed by
JMCS representative, including:
a) The NLVC System components to be delivered consist of NLVC Client (NLVC
Boardroom codec System(s)) and NLVC Server.
b) Software installation including the TOE (according to the Getting Started with
NLVC Boardroom Codec System and Northern Light Video Conferencing Server
User Guide) and the underlying platform are installed by JMCS’s representative
along with the hardware specification.
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c) Default accounts and passwords are created by JMCS’s representative.
d) Schedule is given out via email or phone call to end-user regarding the delivery
of the TOE so that the end-user can know when the TOE is expected to be
delivered by representative of JMCS.
25 Once the TOE has been installed and configured, user then has to check and verify
the version of the components according to the methods listed in Section 3.3 of
JMCS NLVC System Guidance Documentation (Ref [8]).
1.9 Documentation
26 It is important that the NLVC is used in accordance with guidance documentation in
order to ensure secure usage of the product.
27 The following documentation is provided by the developer to the end user as
guidance to ensure secure usage and operation of the product:
a) JMCS NLVC System Guidance Documentation (Ref [8]).
b) Northern Light Video Conferencing System (NLVC) User Guide.chm, v1.0
28 The following guidance documentation is used by the developer’s authorised
personnel and administrator as guidance to ensure secure installation of the
product:
a) Northern Light Video Conferencing Server User Guide, v6.0.1, 17 February
2011.
b) Getting Started with NLVC Boardroom Codec System v6.3, October 2010
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2 Evaluation
29 The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Common
Criteria, Version 3.1 Revision 3 (Ref [2]) and the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 Revision 3 (Ref [3]). The evaluation was
conducted at Evaluation Assurance Level 2 (EAL2). The evaluation was performed
conformant to the MyCC Scheme Policy (MyCC_P1) (Ref [4]) and MyCC Scheme
Evaluation Facility Manual (MyCC_P3) (Ref [5]).
2.1 Evaluation Analysis Activities
30 The evaluation activities involved a structured evaluation of NLVC, including the
following components:
2.1.1 Life-cycle support
31 An analysis of the TOE configuration management system and associated
documentation was performed. The evaluators found that the configuration items
were clearly and uniquely labelled, and that the access control measures as
described in the configuration management documentation are effective in
preventing unauthorized access to the configuration items. The developer’s
configuration management system was evaluated, and it was found to be consistent
with the provided evidence.
32 The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it
described all of the procedures required to maintain the integrity of TOE during
distribution to the consumer.
2.1.2 Development
33 The evaluators analysed the TOE functional specification; they determined that the
design completely and accurately describes the TOE security functionality (TSF)
interfaces (TSFIs), and how the TSF implements the security functional requirements
(SFRs).
34 The evaluators examined the TOE design specification; they determined that the
structure of the entire TOE is described in terms of subsystems. They also
determined that, it provides a complete, accurate, and high-level description of the
SFR-enforcing behaviour of the SFR-enforcing subsystems.
35 The evaluators examined the TOE security architecture description; they determined
that the information provided in the evidence is presented at a level of detail
commensurate with the descriptions of the SFR-enforcing abstractions contained in
the functional specification and TOE design.
2.1.3 Guidance documents
36 The evaluators examined the TOE preparative user guidance and operational user
guidance, and determined that it sufficiently and unambiguously described how to
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securely transform the TOE into its evaluated configuration, and how to use and
administer the product in order to fulfil the security objectives for the operational
environment. The evaluators examined and tested the preparative and operational
guidance, and determined that they were complete and sufficiently detailed to result
in a secure configuration.
2.1.4 IT Product Testing
37 Testing at EAL2 consists of assessing developer tests, independent function test, and
performing penetration tests. NLVC testing was conducted by Stratsec MySEF at
Stratsec lab in Plaza Sentral, Kuala Lumpur. The detailed testing activities, including
configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and actual results are
documented in a separate Test Plan Reports.
2.1.4.1 Assessment of Developer Tests
38 The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by
examining their test plans, and reviewing their test results, as documented in the
Evaluation Technical Report (Ref [7]) (not a public document because it contains
information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator).
39 The evaluators analysed the developer’s test coverage and found them to be
complete and accurate. The correspondence between the tests identified in the
developer’s test documentation and the interfaces in the functional specification,
TOE design and security architecture description was complete.
2.1.4.2 Independent Functional Testing
40 Independent functional testing is the evaluation conducted by evaluator based on the
information gathered by examining design and guidance documentation, examining
developer’s test documentation, executing a sample of the developer’s test plan, and
creating test cases that augmented the developer tests.
41 The results of the independent test developed and performed by the evaluators to
verify the TOE functionality as follows:
Table 2: Independent Functional Testing
DESCRIPTION SECURITY FUNCTION TSFI RESULT
The TSF shall perform
[hashing] in accordance
with a specified
cryptographic algorithm
[SHA256] and
cryptographic key sizes
[none] that meet the
following: [FIPS 180-2]
FCS_COP.1
Cryptographic
operation
Webadmin
Interface
PASS. Result as
expected.
The TSF shall enforce the
[Access Control SFP] on [
FDP_ACC.1 Subset
access control
• NLVC Client
Interface
• Webadmin
PASS. Result as
expected.
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DESCRIPTION SECURITY FUNCTION TSFI RESULT
Subjects:
a) TOE users
Objects:
a) TOE configuration
data
b) Functions
Operations:
Manipulate]
Interface
FDP_ACF.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the
[Access Control SFP] to
objects based on the
following: [
Subject attribute:
a) ID of the user
b) corresponding user
role
Object attributes:
Access Control List]
FDP_ACF.1.2
The TSF shall enforce the
following rules to
determine if an operation
among controlled subjects
and controlled objects is
allowed: [
The operation is allowed,
if:
a) The Access Control
List for an object
permits the user ID
to access that object;
AND
b) The Access Control
List for an object
permits the User Role
to access that
FDP_ACF.1 Security
attribute based access
control
• NLVC Client
Interface
• Webadmin
Interface
PASS. Result as
expected.
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DESCRIPTION SECURITY FUNCTION TSFI RESULT
Object.]
FDP_ACF.1.3
The TSF shall explicitly
authorise access of
subjects to objects based
on the following additional
rules: [the Administrator
role can access all
functions and data].
FDP_ACF.1.4
The TSF shall explicitly
deny access of subjects to
objects based on the
following additional rules:
[None].
The TSF shall enforce the
[Communication SFP] on
[NLVC server and client
when the client machine
requests a secure
channel between the
NLVC server and client
for transmitting and
receiving and
transmitting user data]
FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow
control
• NLVC Client
Interface
• VPN API
PASS. Result as
expected.
FDP_IFF.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the
[Communication SFP]
based on the following
types of subject and
information security
attributes: [
a) Identification and
authentication of the
client machine
].
FDP_IFF.1 Simple
security attributes
• NLVC Client
Interface
• VPN API
PASS. Result as
expected.
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DESCRIPTION SECURITY FUNCTION TSFI RESULT
FDP_IFF.1.2
The TSF shall permit an
information flow between
a controlled subject and
controlled information via
a controlled operation if
the following rules hold: [
a) For the transmission
of user data from the
NLVC server and the
NLVC client; the
requesting client
machine has been
identified as
authorised by the
server using
certificates. ]
FDP_IFF.1.3
The TSF shall enforce the
[no additional
information flow control
SFP rules].
FDP_IFF.1.4
The TSF shall provide the
following [no additional
SFP capabilities].
FDP_IFF.1.5
The TSF shall explicitly
authorise an information
flow based on the
following rules: [none].
FDP_IFF.1.6
The TSF shall explicitly
deny an information flow
based on the following
rules: [none].
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DESCRIPTION SECURITY FUNCTION TSFI RESULT
The TSF shall enforce the
[Communication SFP] to
prevent the [disclosure,
modification] of user data
when it is transmitted
between physically-
separated parts of the
TOE.
FDP_ITT.1 Basic
internal transfer
Protection
• NLVC Client
Interface
• VPN API
PASS. Result as
expected.
FIA_UAU.2a
The TSF shall require each
user to be successfully
authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-
mediated actions on
behalf of that user.
FIA_UID.2a
The TSF shall require each
user to be successfully
identified before allowing
any other TSF-mediated
actions on behalf of that
user.
FIA_UAU.2 User
authentication before
any action
FIA_UID.2
User identification
before any action
• Webadmin
Interface
• VPN API
PASS. Result as
expected.
FIA_UAU.2b
The TSF shall require each
NLVC Client to be
successfully authenticated
before allowing any other
TSF-mediated actions on
behalf of that user.
FIA_UID.2b
The TSF shall require each
NLVC Client to be
successfully identified
before allowing any other
TSF-mediated actions on
behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.2 User
authentication before
any action
FIA_UID.2 User
identification before
any action
• NLVC Client
Interface
• VPN API
PASS. Result as
expected.
The TSF shall restrict the
ability to [determine the
FMT_MOF.1
Management of
• Webadmin PASS. Result as
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DESCRIPTION SECURITY FUNCTION TSFI RESULT
behaviour of, disable,
enable, modify the
behaviour of] the
functions [all functions]
to [the users with
appropriate
permissions].
security functions
behaviour
Interface
• NLVC Client
Interface
expected.
FMT_MSA.1a
The TSF shall enforce the
[Access Control SFP] to
restrict the ability to
[write or delete] the
security attributes [that
map user IDs to roles
only the users that are
mapped] to [none].
FMT_MSA.1b
The TSF shall enforce the
[Communication SFP] to
restrict the ability to
[create, modify, delete]
the security attributes
[identification and
authentication of NLVC
clients] to
[Administrator].
FMT_MSA.1
Management of
security attributes
NLVC Client
Interface
PASS. Result as
expected.
FMT_MSA.3.1
The TSF shall enforce the
[Access Control SFP] to
provide [restrictive]
default values for security
attributes that are used to
enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3a.2
The TSF shall allow the
[none] to specify
alternative initial values to
override the default values
when an object or
FMT_MSA.3 Static
attribute initialisation
Webadmin
Interface
PASS. Result as
expected.
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DESCRIPTION SECURITY FUNCTION TSFI RESULT
information is created.
FMT_MSA.3.1
The TSF shall enforce the
[Communication SFP] to
provide [permissive]
default values for security
attributes that are used to
enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3b.2
The TSF shall allow the
[administrator] to specify
alternative initial values to
override the default values
when an object or
information is created.
FMT_MSA.3 Static
attribute initialisation
Webadmin
Interface
PASS. Result as
expected.
Default
The TSF shall restrict the
ability to [change_default,
query, modify, delete] the
[TOE configuration data]
to [Users with
appropriate permission].
FMT_MTD.1/Default
Management of TSF
data
• Webadmin
Interface
• NLVC Client
Interface
PASS. Result as
expected.
The TSF shall restrict the
ability to [query, modify,
delete, clear [Create]] the
[User accounts] to
[Administrator].
FMT_MTD.1/user
Management of TSF
data
• Webadmin
Interface
• NLVC Client
Interface
PASS. Result as
expected.
The TSF shall restrict the
ability to [modify] the
[User password] to
[users (that is related to
the password)].
FMT_MTD.1/password
Management of TSF
data
• Webadmin
Interface
• NLVC Client
Interface
PASS. Result as
expected.
The TSF shall be capable
of performing the
following management
functions: [security
attribute management,
TSF data management,
and security function
FMT_SMF.1
Specification of
Management
Functions
• Webadmin
Interface
• NLVC Client
Interface
PASS. Result as
expected.
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DESCRIPTION SECURITY FUNCTION TSFI RESULT
management].
TSF shall maintain the
roles [chairman,
participant, observer and
administrator]
FMT_SMR.1 Security
roles
Webadmin
Interface
PASS. Result as
expected.
The TSF shall protect TSF
data from [disclosure]
when it is transmitted
between separate parts of
the TOE.
FPR_ITT.1 Basic
internal TSF data
transfer protection
VPN API PASS. Result as
expected.
42 All tests performed by the evaluators produced the expected results and as such the
TOE behaved as expected.
2.1.4.3 Penetration Testing
43 The evaluators performed a vulnerability analysis of the TOE in order to identify
potential vulnerabilities in the TOE. This vulnerability analysis considered public
domain sources and an analysis of guidance documentation, functional specification,
TOE design and security architecture description.
44 From the vulnerability analysis, the evaluators conducted penetration testing to
determine that the TOE is resistant to attacks performed by an attacker possessing
Basic attack potential. The following factors have been taken into consideration
during the penetration tests:
a) Time taken to identify and exploit (elapsed time);
b) Specialist technical expertise required (specialised expertise);
c) Knowledge of the TOE;
d) Window of opportunity; and
e) IT hardware/software or other requirement required for exploitation.
45 The penetration tests focused on:
a) Information leakage; and
b) Cross-Site Scripting.
46 The results of the penetration testing note that there is no residual vulnerability
found. However, it is important to ensure that the TOE is use only in its evaluated
configuration and in secure environment.
2.1.4.4 Testing Results
47 Tests conducted for the NLVC produced the expected results and demonstrated that
the product behaved as specified in its Security Target and functional specification.
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3 Result of the Evaluation
48 After due consideration during the oversight of the execution of the evaluation by
the certifiers and of the Evaluation Technical Report (Ref [7]), the Malaysian Common
Criteria Certification Body certifies the evaluation of NLVC performed by the Stratsec
Security Evaluation Facility which known as Stratsec MySEF.
49 Stratsec MySEF found that NLVC upholds the claims made in the Security Target (Ref
[6]) and supporting documentation, and has met the requirements of the Common
Criteria (CC) assurance level EAL2.
50 Certification is not a guarantee that a TOE is completely free of exploitable
vulnerabilities. There will remain a small level of risk that exploitable vulnerabilities
undiscovered in its claimed security functionality. This risk is reduced as the certified
level of assurance increases for the TOE.
3.1 Assurance Level Information
51 EAL2 provides assurance by a full security target and an analysis of the SFRs in that
ST, using a functional and interface specification, guidance documentation and a
basic description of the architecture of the TOE, to understand the security
behaviour.
52 The analysis is supported by independent testing of the TSF, evidence of developer
testing based on the functional specification, selective independent confirmation of
the developer test results, and a vulnerability analysis (based upon the functional
specification, TOE design, security architecture description and guidance evidence
provided) demonstrating resistance to penetration attackers with a basic attack
potential.
53 EAL2 also provides assurance through use of a configuration management system
and evidence of secure delivery procedures.
3.2 Recommendation
54 In addition to ensure secure usage of the product, below are additional
recommendations for NLVC users:
a) The users of the TOE should make themselves familiar with the developer
guidance provided with the TOE and pay attention to all security warnings.
b) Those responsible for the server must ensure that appropriate authentication
and authorization controls for all users and administrators in the underlying
environment (including the Operating System, RDBMS, and Web Server) and
must ensure that appropriate network layer protection, such as firewall is in
place that only permits access through web ports for external users to access
the web-server.
c) The underlying operating system, web-server and database server are patched
and hardened to protect against known vulnerabilities and security
configuration issues.
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d) That all SSL certificates are maintained and valid (not revoked or expired), are
sourced from a trusted entity.
e) The servers that host the web and database servers are hosted in a secure
operating facility with restricted physical access and on dedicated hardware.
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Annex A References
A.1 References
[1] Arrangement on the recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the field of
Information Technology Security, May 2000.
[2] The Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Revision 3, July 2009.
[3] The Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 3, July 2009.
[4] MyCC Scheme Policy (MyCC_P1), v1a, CyberSecurity Malaysia, December 2009.
[5] MyCC Scheme Evaluation Facility Manual (MyCC_P3), v1, December 2009.
[6] JMCS Northern Light Video Conferencing System Security Target, Version 1.2, 22
February 2012.
[7] Evaluation Technical Report EAL2 Evaluation of JMCS Northern Light Video
Conferencing (NLVC) System, Version 1.0, 23 February 2012.
[8] JMCS Northern Light Video Conferencing System Guidance Documentation, version
1.0, 22 February 2012.
A.2 Terminology
A.2.1 Acronyms
Table 3: List of Acronyms
Acronym Expanded Term
CB Certification Body
CC Common Criteria (ISO/IEC15408)
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology (ISO/IEC 18045)
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
ISO International Organisation for Standardization
ISCB Information Security Certification Body
MyCB Malaysian Common Criteria Certification Body
MyCC Malaysian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification
Scheme
MyCPR MyCC Scheme Certified Products Register
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Acronym Expanded Term
MySEF Malaysian Security Evaluation Facility
NLVC Northern Light Video Conferencing System
PP Protection Profile
SFP Security Function Policy
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Function
A.2.2 Glossary of Terms
Table 4: Glossary of Terms
Term Definition and Source
Certificate The official representation from the CB of the certification of
a specific version of a product to the Common Criteria.
Certification Body An organisation responsible for carrying out certification and
for overseeing the day-today operation of an Evaluation and
Certification Scheme. Source CCRA
Certifier The certifier responsible for managing a specific certification
task.
Consumer The organisation that uses the certified product within their
infrastructure.
Developer The organisation that develops the product submitted for CC
evaluation and certification.
Evaluation The assessment of an IT product, IT system, or any other
valid target as defined by the scheme, proposed by an
applicant against the standards covered by the scope defined
in its application against the certification criteria specified in
the rules of the scheme. Source CCRA and MS ISO/IEC Guide
65.
Evaluation and Certification
Scheme
The systematic organisation of the functions of evaluation
and certification under the authority of a certification body
in order to ensure that high standards of competence and
impartiality are maintained and that consistency is achieved.
Source CCRA.
Evaluator The evaluator responsible for managing the technical aspects
of a specific evaluation task.
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Term Definition and Source
Hashing A procedure or mathematical function that changes large
data into smaller data. Mostly, the value is used to check any
modification in the data and to ensure that an attacker cannot
see sensitive information in plain text.
Interpretation Expert technical judgement, when required, regarding the
meaning or method of application of any technical aspect of
the criteria or the methodology.
LAN (Local Area Network) A computer network that interconnects computers in a
limited area such as a home, school, computer laboratory, or
office building.
Maintenance Certificate The update of a Common Criteria certificate to reflect a
specific version of a product that has been maintained under
the MyCC Scheme.
Multicast Technology Data transmission technology that transmit data only to
interested destinations by using special address assignments.
MyCB Personnel Includes all members of the Certification Subcommittee, the
Scheme Manager, the Senior Certifier, Certifiers and the
Quality Manager.
National Interpretation An interpretation of the CC, CEM or MyCC Scheme rules that
is applicable within the MyCC Scheme only.
OpenVPN An open source software application that implements virtual
private network.
RSW (Real Time Switching)
Control Criteria
RSW Control Criteria is an advanced set of controls for
Multimedia Conferencing that focused more on bandwidth
reduction and prioritizes the participants to avoid confusion
when everybody speaks up during conference.
Security Evaluation Facility An organisation (or business unit of an organisation) that
conducts ICT security evaluation of products and systems
using the CC and CEM in accordance with Evaluation and
Certification Scheme policy
Sponsor The organisation that submits a product for evaluation and
certification under the MyCC Scheme. The sponsor may also
be the developer.
SSL (Secure Socket Layer) Protocol that helps to protect data integrity that is
transmitting in the network by encrypting the data itself.
TSF data Data created by and for the TOE, which might affect the
operation of the TOE.
TSP TOE Security Policy, a set of rules that regulate how assets are
managed, protected and distributed.
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Term Definition and Source
Unicast Technology Data transmission technology that transmit the same data to
all possible destinations.
User It means any entity (human user or external IT entity) outside
the TOE that interacts with the TOE. In this case, users of the
TOE are developers who will build custom application to run
over the TOE and users of the custom applications.
VPN (Virtual Private
Network)
A techniques for creating secure point-to-point or site-to-
site connections in routed or bridged configurations and
remote access facilities.
WAN (Wide Area Network) A computer network that covers a broad area / public
telecommunication infrastructure, such as internet.
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