TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
Head Office:
Westervoortsedijk 73
NL-6827 AV Arnhem
P.O. Box 2220
NL-6802 CE Arnhem
The Netherlands
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Eiberkamp 10
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P.O. Box 37
NL-9350 AA Leek
The Netherlands
info@nl.tuv.com
www.tuv.com/nl
Tel. +31 (0)88 888 7 888
Fax +31 (0)88 888 7 879
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. is a
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Version
2022-02
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Certification Report
GEOP01 on GSEA01 Security Chip version 1.0
Sponsor and developer: Shenzhen Goodix Technology Co., Ltd.
Floor 13, Phase B, Tengfei Industrial Building
Futian Freetrade Zone, Shenzhen
China
Evaluation facility: SGS Brightsight B.V.
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-0583946-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: 0583946
Author(s): Wim Ton
Date: 2 June 2023
Number of pages: 13
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 7
2.3.1 Assumptions 7
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 7
2.4 Architectural Information 7
2.5 Documentation 8
2.6 IT Product Testing 8
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 8
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 8
2.6.3 Test configuration 9
2.6.4 Test results 9
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 9
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 9
2.9 Evaluation Results 9
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 10
3 Security Target 11
4 Definitions 11
5 Bibliography 13
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
The presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the
GEOP01 on GSEA01 Security Chip version 1.0. The developer of the GEOP01 on GSEA01 Security
Chip version 1.0 is Shenzhen Goodix Technology Co., Ltd. located in Shenzhen, China and they also
act as the sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist
prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their
particular requirements.
The TOE is a Smart Card Platform (IC and OS) along with the native applications, a cryptographic
library, and the Java Card System.
The Security Card Operating System (COS) implements GlobalPlatform functionality allowing the
installation of various applications, including but not limited to access control, mobile transaction,
digital ID and digital car key, etc. The TOE can load, install, instantiate and execute the off-card
verified Java Card applets.
The TOE has been evaluated by SGS Brightsight B.V located in Delft. The evaluation was completed
on 13 May 2023 with the approval of the ETR. The certification procedure has been conducted in
accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security
[NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the GEOP01 on GSEA01 Security Chip version
1.0, the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the
product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the GEOP01 on GSEA01
Security Chip version 1.0 are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the
security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in
this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] 1 for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL5 augmented (EAL5+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security
measures) and AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets
all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will
be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the
specific version of the product as evaluated.
1 The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the GEOP01 on GSEA01 Security Chip version
1.0 from Shenzhen Goodix Technology Co., Ltd. located in Shenzhen, China.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Hardware
GSEA01 Security IC A0
IC Dedicated Software 0101
Software
Card
Operating
System
COS Framework
RTE 1.0
VM 1.0
Common API 1.0
HCI API 1.0
Global Platform
GP API 1.0
GP APDU 1.0
Proprietary software
Yula NFC Tag
application
1.0
EDA framework 1.0
Kernel 1.0
Root2 Proprietary Sub OS
OS Update, OS
Configuration
1.0
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the GEOP01 on
GSEA01 Security Chip version 1.0. For details, see section 2.5 “Documentation” of this report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle, see the [ST], Chapter 1.3.4.
2.2 Security Policy
The following cryptographic primitives are supported and included within the TSF:
• DES/TDES for encryption/decryption (CBC and ECB) and MAC generation and verification (2-
key/3-key 3DES, Retail-MAC, CMAC). (single DES security not claimed)
• AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) for encryption/decryption (GCM, CBC, ECB, OFB, CFB,
CTR) and MAC generation and verification (CMAC)
• RSA and RSA CRT for encryption/decryption and signature generation and verification
• RSA and RSA CRT key generation
• ECC over GF(p) for signature generation and verification (ECDSA)
• ECC over GF(p) key generation for key agreement
• Random number generation conforming to class PTG.2 and DRG.3 of AIS 20/31
• SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 hash algorithm. (security not claimed)
• HMAC (security not claimed)
• OSCCA Algorithms (SM2, SM3, SM4 and SM9) (security not claimed)
The following Java Card 3.1.0 functionality is supported:
• Java Card Virtual Machine for bytecode execution.
• Transient and persistent memory management for applets
• Applet firewall protection
• Access control rules between applets and the JCRE
• Javacard wrapper layer for native implementations
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• Garbage Collection
• Support for Extended Length APDUs.
• Sensitive result, Sensitive array, array view
• Oneshot object.
The following GlobalPlatform 2.3.1 functionality is supported:
• Loading and installation of Java Card packages
• Java CAP file deletion
• Java applet deletion
• Supplementary Security Domains (APSD and CASD) creation
• Applet and Security Domain association
• Key installation
• Applet signature verification
• CVM (PIN) Management
• SCP 02 and SCP 03 secure channels
• Delegated Management, DAP (RSA up to 4096 bits and ECC up to 512 bit).
• Compliance to Secure Element configuration. (security not claimed)
HCI communication functionality
• HCI APIs for HCI communication
Goodix proprietary functionality
• EDA framework for task management
• Root2 OS for OS update and OS configuration over SCP 90 secure channel (only available for
Goodix authorized entities)
• Yula NFC Tag application (security not claimed)
• API for proprietary stream cipher functionality (security not claimed)
This is ensured by the construction of the TOE and its security functionality.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 5.2 of the [ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product
2.4 Architectural Information
The TOE is a composite TOE with the Security Card Operating System (COS) running on the Goodix
GSEA01 Security Chip. 40nm technology with IC Dedicated Software. The GSEA01 Security Chip and
associated IC Dedicated Software are Common Criteria certified to EAL5+ [CC3], comparable to a
smart card controller.
The TOE Software, other than the IC Dedicated Software, is composed of the following components:
• Java Card Virtual Machine Software and Runtime Environment,
• Common Application Programming Interface Software,
• Application Programming Interface for HCI,
• GlobalPlatform (GP) Software,
• OS Update/Config Software (Root2). This component ensures that only Goodix Authorized
updates may be applied,
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• Proprietary Application Programming Interface Software (Extension API), including OSCCA
algorithms (no security claimed),
• Proprietary Native Application, Yula, an NFC Tag application. (no security claimed)
• EDA (Event Driven Architecture) for task management.
• Kernel, a basic native functional set that provide functions such as non-volatile memory
management, key management, cryptographic API, etc.
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
GEOP ROOT2 User Manual 1.0
GEOP User Manual 1.6
GEOP01 Security Guidance 1.4
GEOP01 Preparative Procedures 1.7
GEOP01 Operational User Guidance 1.4
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer performed extensive testing on functional specification, subsystem and SFR-enforcing
module level. All parameter choices were addressed at least once. All boundary cases identified were
tested explicitly, and additionally the near-boundary conditions were covered probabilistically. The
testing was largely automated using industry standard and proprietary test suites. Test scripts were
used extensively to verify that the functions return the expected values.
The underlying hardware and crypto-library test results are extendable to composite evaluations,
because the underlying platform is operated according to its guidance and the composite evaluation
requirements are met.
For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer provided samples and a test environment.
The evaluators reproduced a selection of the developer tests, as well as a small number of test cases
designed by the evaluator.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
The independent vulnerability analysis performed was conducted along the following steps:
• When evaluating the evidence in the classes ASE, ADV and AGD the evaluator considered
whether potential vulnerabilities could already be identified due to the TOE type and/or
specified behaviour in such an early stage of the evaluation.
• For ADV_IMP a thorough implementation representation review was performed on the TOE.
During this attack-oriented analysis the protection of the TOE was analysed using the
knowledge gained from all evaluation classes. This resulted in the identification of (additional)
potential vulnerabilities. This analysis used the attack methods in [JIL-AM] and [JIL-AAPS].
• All potential vulnerabilities were analysed using the knowledge gained from all evaluation
classes and information from the public domain. A judgment was made on how to assure that
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these potential vulnerabilities are not exploitable. The potential vulnerabilities were addressed
by penetration testing, a guidance update or in other ways that are deemed appropriate.
The total test effort expended by the evaluators was 117 days. During that test campaign, 60% of the
total time was spent on Perturbation attacks, 28% on side-channel testing, and 12% on logical tests.
2.6.3 Test configuration
The evaluator used special applets for the logical tests of the JCVM.
The configuration of the sample used for independent evaluator testing and penetration testing was
the same as described in the [ST].
The evaluator testing and penetration testing was performed on the TOE in the operational life-cycle
state with applet instance configurations specified in the Security Target [ST].
The TOE was tested in the following configurations:
• The TOE in an exposed QFP100 package on a developer provided carrier board.
• Using T=0, T=1 (ISO/IEC 7816), SPI, and T=CL (ISO/IEC 14443)
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength for satisfying the
AVA_VAN.5 “high attack potential”. The TOE supports a wider range of key sizes (see [ST]), including
those with sufficient algorithmic security level to exceed 100 bits as required for high attack potential
(AVA_VAN.5).
The strength of the implementation of the cryptographic functionality has been assessed in the
evaluation, as part of the AVA_VAN activities. For composite evaluations, please consult the [ETRfC]
for details.
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
There has been extensive reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the development and
production of the TOE, by use of Site Technical Audit Reports.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number GEOP01 on GSEA01 Security Chip
version 1.0. The user can use the command in chapter 3.3 of the GEOP User Manual to read the TOE
version.
2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents, and a Site Technical Audit Report(s) for the
Wuhan site [STAR] 2. To support composite evaluations according to [COMP] a derived document
2 The Site Technical Audit Report contains information necessary to an evaluation lab and
certification body for the reuse of the site audit report in a TOE evaluation.
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[ETRfC] was provided and approved. This document provides details of the TOE evaluation that must
be considered when this TOE is used as platform in a composite evaluation.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the GEOP01 on GSEA01 Security
Chip version 1.0, to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the requirements of
EAL 5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5. This implies that the product satisfies the
security requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ‘demonstrable’ conformance to the Protection Profile [PP].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE.
This TOE is critically dependent on the operational environment to provide countermeasures against
specific attacks as described in the GEOP01 Security Guidance sections RSA_4, and GNRL_10.
Therefore, it is vital to maintain meticulous adherence to the user guidance of both the software and
the hardware part of the TOE.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: OSCCA Algorithms SM2, SM3, SM4 and SM9, which are out of scope as there
are no security claims relating to these.
Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength to satisfy the AVA_VAN.5
“high attack potential”. To be protected against attackers with a "high attack potential", appropriate
cryptographic algorithms with sufficiently large cryptographic key sizes shall be used (references can
be found in national and international documents and standards).
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3 Security Target
The Security Target of GEOP01 on GSEA01 Security Chip, v1.8, 2023-03-17 [ST] is included here by
reference.
Please note that, to satisfy the need for publication, a public version [ST-lite] has been created and
verified according to [ST-SAN].
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security
PP Protection Profile
TOE Target of Evaluation
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC Cipher Block Chaining (a block cipher mode of operation)
CBC-MAC Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code
DES Data Encryption Standard
DFA Differential Fault Analysis
ECB Electronic Code Book (a block-cipher mode of operation)
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EDA Event Driven Architecture
EMA Electromagnetic Analysis
HCI Host Controller Interface
IC Integrated Circuit
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
MAC Message Authentication Code
NFC Neat Field Communication
OSCCA Office of the State Commercial Cryptographic Administration
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
SCP Secure Channel Protocol
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SM Secure Messaging
SPA/DPA Simple/Differential Power Analysis
SPI Serial Protocol Interface
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SSH Secure Shell
TRNG True Random Number Generator
VLAN Virtual LAN
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II
and III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[COMP] Joint Interpretation Library, Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards
and similar devices, Version 1.5.1, May 2018
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report GEOP01 on GSEA01 Security Chip – EAL5+,
21-RPT-273,4.0, 27 April 2023
[ETRfC] Evaluation Technical Report for Composition GEOP01 on GSEA01 Security
Chip – EAL5+, 23-RPT-311,2.0, 27 April 2023
[HW-CERT] Certification Report – Security Chip GSEA01.x.D00 with IC Dedicated
Software, v.1, 24-02-22
[HW-ETRfC] Evaluation Technical Report for Composition "Security Chip GSEA01.x.D00
with IC Dedicated Software” – EAL5+, v5.0, 2022-02-24
[HW-ST] Security Target Lite of Security Chip GSEA01.x.D00 with IC Dedicated
Software, v1.31, 2022-01-21
[JIL-AAPS] JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.1, June 2020
[JIL-AM] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.4, January
2020 (sensitive with controlled distribution)
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.5,
28 March 2019
[PP] Java Card Protection Profile - Open Configuration, version 3.1.0, April 2020
registered under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0099-V2-2020
[ST] Security Target of GEOP01 on GSEA01 Security Chip, v1.8, 2023-03-17
[ST-lite] Security Target Lite of GEOP01 on GSEA01 Security Chip, v1.0, 2023-04-27
[ST-SAN] ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-004,
April 2006
[STAR] Site Technical Audit Report GEOP01 on GSEA01 Security Chip version
1.0Wuhan Site, 22-RPT-403, 2.0, 27 April 2023
(This is the end of this report.)