Document Version 1.0, Revision 1.11
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203
Security Target
Version 1.0
Prepared by:
Xerox Corporation Computer Sciences Corporation
800 Phillips Road 7231 Parkway Drive
Webster, New York 14580 Hanover, Maryland 21076
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
ii
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
©2009 Xerox Corporation. All rights reserved. Xerox and the sphere of connectivity design are trademarks of
Xerox Corporation in the United States and/or other counties.
All copyrights referenced herein are the property of their respective owners. Other company trademarks are also
acknowledged.
Document Version: 1.0 (December 2012).
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
3
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
Table of Contents
1. SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION ......................................................................... 6
1.1. ST AND TOE IDENTIFICATION ............................................................................................... 6
1.2. TOE OVERVIEW................................................................................................................. 7
1.2.1. USAGE AND MAJOR SECURITY FEATURES............................................................................ 7
1.2.2. TOE TYPE.................................................................................................................. 11
1.2.3. REQUIRED NON-TOE HARDWARE, SOFTWARE AND FIRMWARE ........................................... 11
1.3. TOE DESCRIPTION............................................................................................................ 11
1.3.1. PHYSICAL SCOPE OF THE TOE......................................................................................... 11
1.3.2. LOGICAL SCOPE OF THE TOE.......................................................................................... 13
1.4. EVALUATED CONFIGURATION ............................................................................................. 18
2. CONFORMANCE CLAIMS ............................................................................................. 20
2.1. COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE CLAIMS......................................................................... 20
2.2. PROTECTION PROFILE CLAIMS............................................................................................. 20
2.3. PACKAGE CLAIMS............................................................................................................. 20
2.4. RATIONALE ..................................................................................................................... 21
3. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION............................................................................ 23
3.1. DEFINITIONS.................................................................................................................... 23
3.1.1. USERS ....................................................................................................................... 23
3.1.2. OBJECTS (ASSETS)........................................................................................................ 23
3.1.3. OPERATIONS............................................................................................................... 25
3.1.4. CHANNELS.................................................................................................................. 25
3.2. ASSUMPTIONS ................................................................................................................. 26
3.3. THREATS......................................................................................................................... 26
3.3.1. THREATS ADDRESSED BY THE TOE .................................................................................. 26
3.3.2. THREATS ADDRESSED BY THE IT ENVIRONMENT................................................................. 27
3.4. ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES................................................................................... 27
4. SECURITY OBJECTIVES ............................................................................................... 28
4.1. SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE .................................................................................... 28
4.2. SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT................................................... 29
4.3. SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE NON-IT ENVIRONMENT ........................................................... 29
4.4. RATIONALE FOR SECURITY OBJECTIVES ................................................................................. 30
5. EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINTION ................................................................... 34
5.1. FPT_FDI_EXP RESTRICTED FORWARDING OF DATA TO EXTERNAL INTERFACES............................. 34
6. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS........................................................................................ 37
6.1. CONVENTIONS................................................................................................................. 37
6.2. TOE SECURITY POLICIES .................................................................................................... 37
6.2.1. INFORMATION FLOW CONTROL POLICY (TSP_FLOW) ....................................................... 38
6.2.2. SSLSEC SFP (TSP_SSL)............................................................................................... 38
6.2.3. IP FILTER SFP (TSP_FILTER)........................................................................................ 38
6.2.4. IPSEC SFP (TSP_IPSEC).............................................................................................. 38
6.2.5. SNMPSEC SFP (TSP_SNMP)...................................................................................... 39
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
4
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
6.2.6. PRIVUSERACCESS SFP (TSP_FMT)................................................................................ 39
6.2.7. USER ACCESS CONTROL SFP (UAC_SFP) (IEEE STD. 2600.2-2009) .................................. 39
6.2.8. TOE FUNCTION ACCESS CONTROL SFP (TF_SFP) (IEEE STD. 2600.2-2009) ....................... 41
6.3. SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS................................................................................ 41
6.3.1. CLASS FAU: SECURITY AUDIT ......................................................................................... 43
6.3.2. CLASS FCO: COMMUNICATION ...................................................................................... 45
6.3.3. CLASS FCS: CRYPTOGRAPHIC SUPPORT ............................................................................ 45
6.3.4. CLASS FDP: USER DATA PROTECTION .............................................................................. 49
6.3.5. CLASS FIA: IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION ............................................................ 56
6.3.6. CLASS FMT: SECURITY MANAGEMENT............................................................................. 57
6.3.7. CLASS FPR: PRIVACY.................................................................................................... 63
6.3.8. CLASS FPT: PROTECTION OF THE TSF.............................................................................. 63
6.3.9. CLASS FTA: TOE ACCESS .............................................................................................. 64
6.3.10. CLASS FTP: TRUSTED PATHS/CHANNELS...................................................................... 64
6.4. TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS .............................................................. 65
6.5. EXPLICITLY STATED REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TOE .................................................................. 66
6.5.1. FPT_FDI_EXP.1 RESTRICTED FORWARDING OF DATA TO EXTERNAL INTERFACES (IEEE STD.
2600.2-2009)......................................................................................................................... 66
6.6. RATIONALE FOR SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS.......................................................... 67
6.7. RATIONALE FOR SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS ............................................ 74
6.8. RATIONALE FOR DEPENDENCIES.................................................................................. 75
6.8.1. SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENT DEPENDENCIES........................................................ 75
6.8.2. SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENT DEPENDENCIES......................................................... 78
7. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION ............................................................................... 80
7.1. TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONS ......................................................................................... 80
7.1.1. IMAGE OVERWRITE (TSF_IOW) .................................................................................... 80
7.1.2. INFORMATION FLOW SECURITY (TSF_FLOW) .................................................................. 81
7.1.3. AUTHENTICATION (TSF_ AUT)...................................................................................... 82
7.1.4. NETWORK IDENTIFICATION (TSF_NET_ID)...................................................................... 82
7.1.5. SECURITY AUDIT (TSF_FAU)......................................................................................... 83
7.1.6. CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATIONS (TSF_FCS) ....................................................................... 83
7.1.7. USER DATA PROTECTION – SSL (TSF_FDP_SSL).............................................................. 83
7.1.8. USER DATA PROTECTION – IPSEC (TSF_FDP_IPSEC)........................................................ 84
7.1.9. USER DATA PROTECTION – DISK ENCRYPTION (TSF_FDP_UDE) ......................................... 84
7.1.10. USER DATA PROTECTION – IP FILTERING (TSF_FDP_FILTER) ....................................... 85
7.1.11. NETWORK MANAGEMENT SECURITY (TSF_NET_MGMT) ............................................ 85
7.1.12. SECURITY MANAGEMENT (TSF_FMT) ....................................................................... 85
8. GLOSSARY (NORMATIVE)............................................................................................ 88
9. ACRONYMS (INFORMATIVE)...................................................................................... 92
10. BIBLIOGRAPHY (INFORMATIVE).............................................................................. 94
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
5
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
List of Figures
Figure 1: Architectural Diagram of the TOE...................................................................................8
Figure 2: Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203.............................................................................9
List of Tables
Table 1: Models and capabilities ....................................................................................................8
Table 2: Evaluated Software/Firmware version ...........................................................................12
Table 3: System User and Administrator Guidance .....................................................................13
Table 4: Users ...............................................................................................................................23
Table 5: User Data ........................................................................................................................24
Table 6: TSF Data.........................................................................................................................24
Table 7: TSF Data Categorization ................................................................................................24
Table 8: SFR Package Functions for IEEE Std. 2600.2-2009......................................................25
Table 9: Assumptions for the TOE ...............................................................................................26
Table 10: Threats to User Data for the TOE.................................................................................27
Table 11: Threats to TSF Data for the TOE .................................................................................27
Table 12: Organizational Security Policies for the TOE ..............................................................27
Table 13: Security Objectives for the TOE...................................................................................28
Table 14: Security Objectives for the IT Environment.................................................................29
Table 15: Security Objectives for the Non-IT Environment ........................................................29
Table 16: Completeness of Security Objectives ...........................................................................30
Table 17: Sufficiency of Security Objectives ...............................................................................30
Table 18: User Access Control SFP...............................................................................................39
Table 19: Attributes Definition......................................................................................................40
Table 20: TOE Security Functional Requirements........................................................................41
Table 21: Audit Data Requirements ..............................................................................................43
Table 22: IEEE 2600.2 Security Assurance Requirements ...........................................................66
Table 23: Completeness of Security Functional Requirements.....................................................67
Table 24: Sufficiency of Security Functional Requirements.........................................................69
Table 25: SFR Dependencies Satisfied..........................................................................................75
Table 26: EAL2 (Augmented with ALC_FLR.3) SAR Dependencies Satisfied...........................78
Table 27: Acronyms.......................................................................................................................92
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
6
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
1. SECURITY
TARGET
INTRODUCTION
This Chapter presents Security Target (ST) identification information and an
overview of the ST. An ST contains the information technology (IT) security
requirements of an identified Target of Evaluation (TOE) and specifies the
functional and assurance security measures offered by that TOE to meet stated
requirements. An ST principally defines:
a) A security problem expressed as a set of assumptions about the
security aspects of the environment, a list of threats that the
product is intended to counter, and any known rules with which the
product must comply (Chapter 3, TOE Security Environment).
b) A set of security objectives and a set of security requirements to
address the security problem (Chapters 4, 5 and 6, Security
Objectives, Extended Components Definition, and IT Security
Requirements, respectively).
c) The IT security functions provided by the TOE that meet the set of
requirements (Chapter 7, TOE Summary Specification).
The structure and content of this ST comply with the requirements specified in the
Common Criteria (CC), Part 1, Annex A, and Part 3, Chapter 11.
1.1. ST and TOE Identification
This section provides information needed to identify and control this ST and its
associated TOE. This ST targets Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 2 augmented
with ALC_FLR.3.
ST Title: Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
ST Version: 1.0
Revision Number: Revision 1.11
Publication Date: December 19, 2012
Authors: CSC Security Testing/Certification Laboratories, Xerox
Corporation
TOE Identification: Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 (see Section 1.3.1 for
software version numbers)
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
7
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
ST Evaluator: CSC Security Testing/Certification Laboratories
Keywords: Xerox, Multi Function Device, Image Overwrite, ColorQube™,
Color, Mono, Hardcopy, Paper, Document, Printer, Scanner,
Copier, Facsimile, Fax, Document Server, Document Storage and
Retrieval, Nonvolatile storage, Residual data, Temporary data,
Disk overwrite, Network interface, Shared communications
medium, Multifunction Device, Multifunction Product, All-In-
One, MFD, MFP, Network, Office, ISO/IEC 15408, Common
Criteria, Protection Profile, Security Target
1.2. TOE Overview
1.2.1.Usage and Major Security Features
The product is a multi-function device (MFD) that copies and prints in
monochrome (black and white) and full color, with scan-to-email, workflow scan
(including “scan-to-mailbox1
”), and FAX options. A standard component of the
TOE is the Image Overwrite Security package. This function forces any
temporary image files created during a copy, print, scan or Fax jobs to be
overwritten when those files are no longer needed.
For reference, the architecture of the TOE is illustrated in Figure 1: Architectural
Diagram of the TOE below:
1
In Xerox terminology, the terms “mailbox” and “folder” are used interchangeably, both referring to logical place holders
under which files are stored.
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
8
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
Figure 1: Architectural Diagram of the TOE
The optional Xerox Embedded Fax accessory, when purchased and installed,
provides local analog fax capability over PSTN connections. Table 1 shows the
configurations and printing speeds available in the various models of the TOE.
Table 1: Models and capabilities
(X – included in all configurations; O – product options ordered separately)
Print Copy
Workflow
Scan
Embedded
Fax2
Scan 2
email
Print Speed
(Color)
Print Speed
(Mono)
ColorQube™
9201
x x x o x Up to 38 ppm Up to 50 ppm
ColorQube™
9202
x x x o x Up to 45 ppm Up to 50 ppm
ColorQube™
9203
x x x o x Up to 50 ppm Up to 50 ppm
2
Embedded FAX jobs are not spooled to the HDDs.
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
9
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
An optional Finisher, which is not part of the TOE, provides “after print” services
such as document collation and stapling. The hardware included in the TOE is
shown in the figure below. This figure also shows an optional Finisher connected
to the TOE at the right side of the picture and an optional Paper Feeder at the left
side of the picture, neither of which are part of the TOE.
Figure 2: Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203
* Also shown are an optional Paper Feeder (left) and Finisher (right).
The TOE stores temporary image data created during a copy, print, workflow
scan, scan-to-email, internet fax and LanFax job on the single shared HDD. This
temporary image data consists of the original data submitted and additional files
created during a job. All partitions of the HDD used for spooling temporary files
are encrypted. The encryption key is created dynamically on each power-up.
The TOE provides an Image Overwrite function to enhance the security of the
MFD. The Image Overwrite function overwrites temporary document image data
at the completion of each job; also upon deletion of each job or of a workflow
scan/fax file/mailbox in the following cases: at the instruction of the owner; after
a reboot; once the TOE is turned back on after a power failure/unorderly
shutdown; or on demand of the TOE system administrator.
The optional Xerox Embedded Fax accessory provides analog FAX capability
over Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) connections and also enables
LanFax jobs, if purchased by the consumer. A separate non-volatile memory
resource is dedicated to embedded fax, and the image files written to this memory
are zeroized at the completion of a fax job.
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
10
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
Xerox’s Workflow Scanning Accessory is part of the TOE configuration. This
accessory allows documents to be scanned at the device with the resulting image
being sent via email, transfered to a remote (SSL scan) repository or kept in a
private (scan) mailbox.
All models of the TOE support auditing. The TOE generates audit logs that track
events/actions (e.g., print/scan/fax job submission) to identified users. The audit
logs, which are stored locally in a 15000 entry circular log, are available to TOE
administrators and can be exported for viewing and analysis. SSL must be
configured in order for the system administrator to download the audit records;
the downloaded audit records are in comma separated format so that they can be
imported into an application such as Microsoft Excel™.
All models of the TOE support network security. The system administrator can
enable and configure the network security support, as well as 802.1x device
authentication. Filtering rules can be specified for IPv4 based on both address and
port number. Additional network security support is based on SSL. When SSL
support is enabled on the device, the following network security features can be
enabled/configured: HTTPS support over both IPv4 and IPv6 (for both the
device’s Web UI and secure workflow scan data transfer); system administrator
download of the device’s audit log; IPSec support for IPP, lpr and port 9100 print
jobs over IPv4 or IPv6; secure remote authentication (if supported by the remote
authentication server) and secure network device management through SNMPv3.
Scan-to-email and FAX data are not protected from sniffing by the IPSec or SSL
support. The transmission of LanFax data over the Ethernet connection is
protected by IPSec, but the transmission over the PSTN is not. IPSec and
SNMPv3 can only be activated if SSL has been enabled and an SSL-based
certificate (either “self-signed” or generated by an external Certificate Authority)
has been loaded into the TOE via the Web UI. Once this has occurred SSL could
be disabled; however, the TOE would no longer be in its evaluated configuration.
The TOE controls and restricts the information flow from the external interfaces
to the network controller (which covers the information flow to and from the
internal network).
The TOE requires users and system administrators to authenticate before granting
access to user (copy, print, fax etc) or system administration functions via the
Web User Interface (Web UI) or the Local User Interface (LUI). The user or
system administrator must enter a username and password at either the Web User
Interface or the Local User Interface. The password will be obscured3
as it is
being entered. The TOE provides for user identification and authorization as
configured by the system administrator.
The TOE restricts (normal) users’ access to the documents. A user can only
access his/her own documents.
3
The LUI obscures input with the asterisk character. The specific character used to obscure input at the WebUI is browser
dependent.
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
11
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
The TOE can integrate with an IPv4 or IPv6 network with native support for
dhcp/dhcpv6.
The TOE supports the Common Access Card (CAC) standard and other methods
(refer to chapter 1.3.2.3) for remote authentication.
1.2.2.TOE Type
The TOE is a multi-function device (MFD) that provides copy and print
(monochrome and color), document scanning (monochrome and color) and
optional FAX services.
1.2.3.Required Non-TOE Hardware, Software and Firmware
The TOE does not require any additional hardware, software or firmware in order
to function as a multi-function device, however, the network security and fax flow
features are only useful in environments where the TOE is connected to a network
or PSTN. TSF_NET_ID is only available when one of the following remote
authentication services is present on the network that the TOE is connected to:
LDAP or Kerberos. CAC based TSF_NET_ID requires CAC compliant smart
cards and smart card readers.
1.3. TOE Description
This section provides context for the TOE evaluation by identifying the logical
and physical scope of the TOE, as well as its evaluated configuration.
1.3.1.Physical Scope of the TOE
The TOE is a Multi-Function Device (Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203) that
consists of a printer, copier, scanner, FAX (when purchased by the consumer),
and email, as well as all Administrator and User guidance. The difference
between the three models is their printing speed. The hardware included in the
TOE is shown in Figure 2 above. This figure also shows an optional Finisher
connected to the TOE at the right side of the picture and an optional Paper Feeder
at the left side of the picture, neither of which are part of the TOE. The optional
FAX card is not shown in this figure4
.
The various software and firmware (“Software”) that comprise the TOE are listed
in Table 2. A system administrator can ensure that they have a TOE by printing a
configuration sheet and comparing the version numbers reported on the sheet to
the table below.
4
For installation, the optional FAX card must be fitted into the machine. After powering on the machine, the Fax Install
window pops up on the Local UI with step by step instructions for installation.
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
12
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
Table 2: Evaluated Software/Firmware version
Software/Firmware
Item
ColorQube
9201/9202/9203
System Software 061.080.221.36200
Network Controller Software 061.081.36140
User Interface Software 061.051.34940
Marking Engine Software 008.036.006
Copy Controller Software 061.051.35740
Document Feeder Software
(Options)
DADH 75 016.027.000
DADH 100 025.020.000
DADH 100 Quiet Mode 020.012.000
Finisher Software (Options)
LCSS 002.000.045
High Volume Feeder (HVF) 002.003.097
HVF with BookletMaker 010.020.000
Fax Software 003.010.004
Scanner Software 010.159.000
The UI software controls the User Interface. Copy Controller software controls
the Copy Controller and is able to interface with all other software components.
Marking Engine software controls the marking engine that prints to paper.
DADH software controls the input tray. Finisher software controls the optional
Finisher attachment. FAX software resides on the FAX board and controls some
fax functions. Scanner software controls some scan functions. The Copy
Controller software and Network Controller software reside on a single
controller.
NOTE: For the remainder of this Security Target, the terms “Network
Controller” and “Copy Controller” will refer to the “Network Controller” and
“Copy Controller” software subsystems.
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
13
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
A customer of the TOE can determine whether the Xerox Embedded Fax
accessory, Xerox Workflow Scan accessory and Image Overwrite Security
Package5
are installed by reviewing the TOE configuration report. A consumer of
the TOE can also determine that they have the evaluated version of the TOE by
reviewing the TOE configuration report and comparing the version numbers to
the content of Table 2, above.
The Administrator and User guidance included in the TOE are listed in Table 3. A
system administrator or user can ensure that they have the appropriate guidance
by comparing the software version number to the version numbers listed in the
table below.
Table 3: System User and Administrator Guidance
Title Document Number Date
ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203
System Administrator Guide v1.0
None May 2009
ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203
Interactive User Guide
538E12581 May 2009
Secure Installation and Operation of
Your ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203
v1.3
None Mar 2012
The TOE’s physical interfaces include a power port, an Ethernet port, USB ports,
serial ports, FAX ports (if the optional FAX card is installed), Local User
Interface (LUI) with keypad, a document scanner, a document feeder and a
document output.
1.3.2.Logical Scope of the TOE
The logical scope of the TOE includes all software and firmware that are installed
on the product (see Table 2). The TOE logical boundary is composed of the
security functions provided by the product.
The following security functions are controlled by the TOE:
 Image Overwrite (TSF_IOW)
 Authentication (TSF_ AUT)
 Network Identification (TSF_NET_ID)
 Security Audit (TSF_FAU)
 Cryptographic Operations (TSF_FCS)
 User Data Protection – SSL (TSF_FDP_SSL)
 User Data Protection – IP Filtering (TSF_FDP_FILTER)
5
Xerox Embedded Fax accessory, Xerox Workflow Scan accessory and Image Overwrite Security Package are a part of
the Network Controller or Copy Controller software package and do not have individual version identifiers.
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
14
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
 User Data Protection – IPSec (TSF_FDP_IPSec)
 Network Management Security (TSF_NET_MGMT)
 Information Flow Security (TSF_ FLOW)
 Security Management (TSF_FMT)
 User Data Protection – Disk Encryption (TSF_FDP_UDE)
1.3.2.1. Image Overwrite (TSF_IOW)
The TOE has an “Immediate Image Overwrite” (IIO) function that overwrites
files created during job processing. This IIO process automatically starts for all
abnormally terminated copy, print, or scan jobs stored on the HDD and fax jobs
stored on the fax card flash memory prior to coming “on line” when any of the
following occurs: a reboot or once the MFD is turned back on after a power
failure/unorderly shutdown.
The TOE also has an “On-Demand Image Overwrite” (ODIO) function that
overwrites the hard drive(s) and embedded fax card flash memory on-demand of
the system administrator. The ODIO function operates in two modes: full ODIO
and standard ODIO. A standard ODIO overwrites all files written to temporary
storage areas of the HDD and zeroizes the temporary storage areas of the fax card
flash memory. A full ODIO overwrites those files as well as the Fax mailbox/dial
directory and Scan-to-mailbox data.
Contents stored on the hard disk are overwritten using a three pass overwrite
procedure. Contents of the embedded fax card flash memory are overwritten using
a single-pass zeroization method.
LanFax jobs are overwritten (using three pass overwrite) on the shared hard disk
after the image is transferred from the Network Controller to Copy Controller,
and zeroized on the fax card flash memory once the image has been sent.
1.3.2.2. Authentication (TSF_AUT)
A user must authenticate by entering a username and password prior to being
granted access to the Local UI or the Web UI. While the user is typing the
password, the TOE obscures6
each character entered.
Upon successful authentication, users are granted access based on their role and
predefined privileges. Only a system administrator is allowed full access to the
TOE including all the system administration functions. Each common user’s
access is determined by which function (copy, scan, print, fax etc.) they have
permission for.
6
The LUI obscures input with the asterisk character. The specific character used to obscure input at the WebUI is browser
dependent
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
15
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
If configured for local authentication the system requires the system administrator
to enter a username and password for each user. The system will authenticate the
user against an internal database.
By default, the Local UI will terminate any session that has been inactive for 60
minutes. By default, the Web UI will terminate any session that has been inactive
for 15 minutes. The system administrator can configure both the Local UI and
Web UI session timeouts to terminate an inactive session after some other period
of time.
1.3.2.3. Network Identification (TSF_NET_ID)
As an alternative to TSF_AUT, the TOE allows user name and password for a
user to be validated by a designated authentication server (a trusted remote IT
entity). The user is not required to login to the network; account information
entered at Local UI or Web UI of the TOE is authenticated at the server instead of
the TOE. The remote authentication services supported by the TOE in the
evaluated configuration are: CAC authentication, LDAP v4, Kerberos v5 (Solaris)
and Kerberos v5 (Windows 2000/2003).
The TOE maintains the username from a successful authentication during the
context of the job, and this value is entered into the audit log as the user name.
By default, the Local UI will terminate any session that has been inactive for 60
minutes. By default, the Web UI will terminate any session that has been inactive
for 15 minutes. The system administrator can configure both the Local UI and
Web UI session timeouts to terminate an inactive session after some other period
of time.
1.3.2.4. Security Audit (TSF_FAU)
The TOE generates audit logs that track events/actions (e.g., copy/print/scan/fax
job completion) to identified users. The audit logs, which are stored locally in a
15000 entry circular log, are available to TOE administrators and can be exported
for viewing and analysis. SSL must be configured in order for the system
administrator to download the audit records; the downloaded audit records are in
comma separated format so that they can be imported into an application such as
Microsoft Excel™.
1.3.2.5. Cryptographic Operations (TSF_FCS)
The TOE utilizes data encryption (AES, RSA, RC4, DES, TDES) and
cryptographic checksum generation and secure hash computation (MD5 and
SHA-1), as provided by the OpenSSL cryptographic libraries, to support secure
communication between the TOE and remote trusted products. Those packages
include provisions for the generation and destruction of cryptographic keys and
checksum/hash values and meet the following standards: AES-256-FIPS-197,
3DES – FIPS-42-2, FIPS-74, FIPS-81; MD5 – RFC1321; SHA-1 – FIPS-186,
SSLv3, and SNMPv3.
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
16
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
NOTE: The strength of the cryptographic algorithms supported by the TOE
is not part of the evaluation. The following table identifies relevant FIPS
certificates.
Cryptographic Operations
Cryptographic
Algorithm
Key Sizes
(bits)
Standards / CAVP*
Symmetric encryption and
decryption
Triple DES (CBC) 168
FIPS 46-3 (cert #826 and
#1174)
AES (CBC) 256
FIPS 197 (cert #1131 and
#1821)
Digital signature generation
and verification
RSA 1024
FIPS 186-3 (cert #914)
Message digest SHA-1 N/A FIPS 180-3 (cert #1599)
Message authentication HMAC 160
FIPS 198 (cert #644 and
#1076)
*Cryptographic Algortithm Validation Program (CAVP) certificates
1.3.2.6. User Data Protection – SSL (TSF_FDP_SSL)
The TOE provides support for SSL through the use of the OpenSSL cryptographic
libraries, and allows the TOE to act as either an SSL server or SSL client,
depending on the function the TOE is performing. SSL must be enabled before
setting up either IPSec, SNMPv3, or before the system administrator can retrieve
the audit log. The SSL functionality also permits the TOE to be securely
administered from the Web UI, as well as being used to secure the connection
between the TOE and the repository server when utilizing the remote scanning
option. If the system administrator-managed function is enabled, then the TOE
creates and enforces the informal security policy model, “All communications to
the Web server will utilize SSL (HTTPS).” As provided for in the SSLv3
standard, the TOE will negotiate with the client to select the encryption standard
to be used for the session, to include operating in backward-compatible modes for
clients that do not support SSLv3. SSL does not protect scan-to-email, LanFax or
FAX data. The HTTPS web server supports both IPv4 and IPv6 protocols.
1.3.2.7. User Data Protection – IPSec (TSF_FDP_IPSec)
Printing clients initiate the establishment of a security association with the MFD.
Thereafter, all IP-based traffic to and from this destination will pass through
IPSec until either end powers down, or resets, after which IPSec must be
reestablished. The use of IPSec for communication with a particular destination
is based on the presumed address of the printing client. IPSec does not protect
scan-to-email or FAX data. The transmission of LanFax data over the Ethernet
connection is protected by IPSec, but the transmission over the PSTN is not. The
TOE implements IPSec for both IPv4 and IPv6; however, IPSec is not available
for AppleTalk or IPX.
Note: The TOE cannot enforce the IPSec (TSF_FDP_IPSec) security
function when it is configured for AppleTalk or IPX networks.
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
17
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
1.3.2.8. User Data Protection – Disk Encryption
(TSF_FDP_UDE)
The TOE utilizes data encryption (AES) and cryptographic checksum generation
and secure hash computation (SHA-1), as provided by the Loop_AES
cryptographic libraries, to support encryption and decryption of designated
portions of the hard disk(s) where user files may be stored. Those packages
include provisions for the generation and destruction of cryptographic keys and
meet the following standards: AES-256-FIPS-197. AES data encryption and its
associated cryptographic keys are used to encrypt and decrypt all areas of the hard
drive where user jobs are temporarily stored for processing.
NOTE: the strength of the cryptographic algorithms supported by the TOE
is not part of the evaluation.
1.3.2.9. User Data Protection – IP Filtering (TSF_FDP_FILTER)
The TOE provides the ability for the system administrator to configure a network
information flow control policy based on a configurable rule set. The information
flow control policy (IPFilter SFP) is generated by the system administrator
specifying a series of rules to “accept,” “deny,” or “drop” packets. These rules
include a listing of IP addresses that will be allowed to communicate with the
TOE. The IP Filter supports the construction of IPv4 filtering policies.
Additionally, rules can be generated specifying filtering options based on port
number given in the received packet. IP Filtering is not available for IPv6,
AppleTalk or IPX; however, the effect of IP Filtering can be accomplished for
IPv6 by configuring IPSec associations.
1.3.2.10. Network Management Security (TSF_NET_MGMT)
The TOE supports SNMPv3 as part of its security solution (SNMPSec SFP). The
SNMPv3 protocol is used to authenticate each SNMP message, as well as provide
encryption of the data as described in RFC 3414.
1.3.2.11. Information Flow Security (TSF_FLOW)
The TOE controls and restricts the data/information flow from the Local User
Interface (LUI), document scanner and document feeder to the network controller
hardware or software (which covers the information flow to and from the internal
network). All data and/or commands received from these interfaces are processed
and in most cases transformed by the copy controller before submitted to the
network controller. The network controller further processes the data before
sending them to the internal network.
The TOE controls and restricts the information flow between the PSTN port of
the optional FAX processing board (if installed) and the network controller
hardware or software. Data and/or commands cannot be sent to the internal
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
18
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
network via the PSTN. A direct connection from the internal network to external
entities by using the telephone line of the TOE is also denied.
If the optional FAX board is not installed, an information flow from or to the
FAX port is not possible at all.
1.3.2.12. Security Management (TSF_FMT)
Only authenticated system administrators can enable or disable the Immediate
Image Overwrite function, change the system administrator password, and start an
On Demand Image Overwrite operation.
While IIO can be disabled, doing so will remove the TOE from its evaluated
configuration.
Additionally, only authenticated system administrators can assign authorization
privileges to users, establish a recurrence schedule for “On Demand Image
Overwrite, enable/disable SSL support, enable/disable and configure IPSec,
enable/disable and configure SNMPv3, create/install X.509 certificates,
enable/disable and download the audit log, enable/disable and configure (rules) IP
filtering, configure inactive session timeout settings, enable/disable disk
encryption, enable/disable use of Common Access Cards, verify TOE software
binary code integrity, or enable/disable and configure 802.1x.
User’s access to the TOE functions, Job or Image Data stored inside the TOE is
restricted, in accordance with the applicable TOE Security Policies.
The TOE is capable of verifying the integrity of the TSF at the request of the
administrator.
1.4. Evaluated Configuration
In its evaluated configuration, IIO and ODIO (the Image Overwrite Security
Package) are installed and enabled on the TOE; SSL is enabled on the TOE; and
User Authorization is enabled on the TOE. The FAX (Xerox Embedded Fax
accessory) option, if purchased by the consumer, is installed and enabled on the
TOE. The LanFax option is included in the evaluated configuration of the TOE.
USB Direct Printing is not included in the evaluated configuration of the TOE.
In its evaluated configuration, the following options should be disabled:
 Network Accounting
 Copy/Print, Store and Reprint
 SMart eSolutions
 Xerox Extensible Interface Platform (EIP)
 USB direct printing
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
19
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
Please see http://www.xerox.com/information-security/product/enus.html for
more specific information about maintaining the security of this TOE.
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
20
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
2. CONFORMANCE
CLAIMS
This section describes the conformance claims of this Security Target.
2.1. Common Criteria Conformance Claims
The Security Target is based upon:
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and General Model; Version 3.1, Revision 1, CCMB-2006-09-001,
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security
Functional Components; Version 3.1, Revision 2, CCMB-2007-09-002,
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security
Assurance Components; Version 3.1, Revision 2, CCMB-2007-09-003
referenced hereafter as [CC].
This Security Target claims the following CC conformance:
 Part 2 extended
 Part 3 conformant
 Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 2+
2.2. Protection Profile Claims
This Security Target claims demonstrable conformance to the “U.S. Government Protection
Profile for Hardcopy Devices Version 1.0 (IEEE Std. 2600.2-2009)” Protection Profile dated 26
February 2010 (IEEE 2600.2™-2009). 7
2.3. Package Claims
7
The Hardcopy Device, IEEE Std. 2600.2™-2009, was Validated/Certified by BSI (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik ) in
Germany. NIAP has reviewed this PP and has determined that it is acceptable, with additional functional requirements defined in NIAP CCEVS
Policy #20, as an Approved U.S. Government PP. This Security Target claims demonstrable conformance to both IEEE Std. 2600.2™-2009 and
NIAP CCEVS Policy #20.
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
21
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
This Security Target claims conformance to the EAL2 package augmented with ALC_FLR.3,
and the following additional packages from the “U.S. Government Protection Profile for
Hardcopy Devices Version 1.0 (IEEE Std. 2600.2-2009)” Protection Profile dated 26 February
2010:
 2600.2-PRT, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Print Functions, Operational
Environment B
 2600.2-SCN, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Scan Functions, Operational
Environment B
 2600.2-CPY, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Copy Functions, Operational
Environment B
 2600.2-FAX, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Fax Functions, Operational
Environment B
 2600.2-DSR, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Document Storage and Retrieval
Functions, Operational Environment B
 2600.2-SMI, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Shared-medium Interface Functions,
Operational Environment B
2.4. Rationale
The TOE type in this ST (multifunction or hardcopy device) is the same as the TOE type for
IEEE 2600.2.
The Security Problem Definition (Threats, Assumptions and Organizational Security Policies)
and Objectives have been copied directly from IEEE Std. 2600.2-2009 and have not been
modified. One security objective for the TOE (O.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED) has been
added in accordance to application notes 7 from IEEE Std. 2600.2-2009. Only one security
objective for the IT environment (OE.USER.AUTHENTICATED) has been added in accordance
to application notes 37, 42 and 43 from IEEE Std. 2600.2-2009. The statement of Security
Requirements contains the SFRs from IEEE Std. 2600.2-2009 as well as additional SFRs that are
taken from CC Part 2. By including all of the SFRs from IEEE Std. 2600.2-2009 and including
additional SFRs (none of which conflict with each other), the statement of Security
Requirements is necessarily at least as strict as the statement in IEEE Std. 2600.2-2009, if not
more strict. The rationales for objectives, threats, assumptions, organizational security policies
and security requirements have been copied from IEEE Std. 2600.2-2009 and have been
augmented to address the requirements that have been added from CC Part 2.
The IEEE Std. 2600.2-2009 statement of Common Security Functional Requirements has been
augmented with additional (including iterated) SFRs from CC Part 2:
Family Augmentation
Audit FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.2, FAU_STG.1, FAU_STG.4
Cryptographic
Support
FCS_CKM.1 (SSL), FCS_CKM.2 (SSL 1), FCS_CKM.2 (SSL 2),
FCS_COP.1 (SSL), FCS_CKM.1 (IPSEC), FCS_COP.1 (IPSEC 1),
FCS_COP.1 (IPSEC 2), FCS_CKM.1 (SNMP), FCS_COP.1
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
22
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
(SNMP), FCS_CKM.1 (UDE), FCS_CKM.4
User Data
Protection
FDP_ACC.1 (MGMT), FDP_ACF.1 (MGMT)
Identification and
Authentication
FIA_UAU.7
Security
Management
FMT_MOF.1 (FMT 1), FMT_MOF.1 (FMT 2)
The following packages from IEEE Std. 2600.2-2009 have been augmented with additional
(including iterated) SFRs from CC Part 2:
Package Augmentation
PRT
SCN
CPY
FAX FDP_RIP.1 (IOW 2)
DSR FCS_COP.1(UDE)
SMI FDP_IFC.1 (FILTER), FDP_IFF.1 (FILTER), FDP_UCT.1
(IPSEC), FDP_UIT.1 (IPSEC), FDP_UCT.1 (SSL), FDP_UIT.1
(SSL), FDP_UCT.1 (SNMP), FDP_UIT.1 (SNMP), FTP_TRP.1
(IPSEC), FTP_TRP.1 (SSL), FTP_TRP.1 (SNMP)
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
23
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
3. SECURITY PROBLEM
DEFINITION
The Security Problem Definition describes assumptions about the operational environment in
which the TOE is intended to be used and represents the conditions for the secure operation of
the TOE.
Note: The content in this section appears exactly as it does in IEEE Std. 2600.2-2009 and is
copied here for completeness.
3.1. Definitions
3.1.1.Users
Users are entities that are external to the TOE and which interact with the TOE. There may be
two types of Users: Normal and Administrator.
Table 4: Users
Designation Definition
U.USER Any authorized User.
U.NORMAL A User who is authorized to perform User Document Data processing
functions of the TOE
U.ADMINISTRATOR A User who has been specifically granted the authority to manage some
portion or all of the TOE and whose actions may affect the TOE security
policy (TSP). Administrators may possess special privileges that provide
capabilities to override portions of the TSP.
3.1.2.Objects (Assets)
Objects are passive entities in the TOE, that contain or receive information, and upon which
Subjects perform Operations. In this Security Target, Objects are equivalent to TOE Assets.
There are three types of Objects: User Data, TSF Data, and Functions.
3.1.2.1. User Data
User Data are data created by and for Users and do not affect the operation of the TOE Security
Functionality (TSF). This type of data is composed of two objects: User Document Data, and
User Function Data.
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
24
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
Table 5: User Data
Designation Definition
D.DOC User Document Data consists of the information contained in a user’s document. This
includes the original document itself in either hardcopy or electronic form, image data, or
residually-stored data created by the hardcopy device while processing an original
document and printed hardcopy output.
D.FUNC User Function Data are the information about a user’s document or job to be processed by
the TOE.
3.1.2.2. TSF Data
TSF Data is data created by and for the TOE and might affect the operation of the TOE. This
type of data is composed of two objects: TSF Protected Data and TSF Confidential Data. The
TSF Data assets for this TOE has been categorized according to whether they require protection
from unauthorized alteration (TSF Protected Data) or protection from both unauthorized
disclosure and unauthorized alteration (TSF Confidential Data). The data assets have been
identified and categorized in Table 6: TSF Data and Table 7: TSF Data Categorization below.
Table 6: TSF Data
Designation Definition
D.PROT TSF Protected Data are assets for which alteration by a User who is neither an
Administrator nor the owner of the data would have an effect on the operational
security of the TOE, but for which disclosure is acceptable.
D.CONF TSF Confidential Data are assets for which either disclosure or alteration by a User who
is neither an Administrator nor the owner of the data would have an effect on the
operational security of the TOE.
Table 7: TSF Data Categorization
TSF Protected Data TSF Confidential Data
Configuration data Audit Log
Device and network status information and
configuration settings
Cryptographic keys (SNMPv3 – privacy key,
IPSec)
Device service and diagnostic data X.509 Certificate (SSL)
User IDs and Passwords
User Access Permissions
SNMPv3 authentication key
802.1x Credentials and Configuration
IP filter table (rules)
Email address for fax forwarding
Application Note: IEEE Std. 2600.2-2009 defines D.PROT and D.CONF, and requires the ST
author to categorize all TSF data as one of these two types: data that should be protected, but
does not affect the operational security of the TOE if it is disclosed (D.PROT), and data that
does affect the operational security of the TOE if it is disclosed (D.CONF).
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
25
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
3.1.2.3. Functions
Functions perform processing, storage, and transmission of data that may be present in HCD
products. These functions are used by SFR packages, and are identified and defined in the table
below.
Table 8: SFR Package Functions for IEEE Std. 2600.2-2009
Designation Definition
F.PRT Printing: a function in which electronic document input is converted to physical document
output
F.SCN Scanning: a function in which physical document input is converted to electronic
document output
F.CPY Copying: a function in which physical document input is duplicated to physical document
output
F.FAX Faxing: a function in which physical document input is converted to a telephone-based
document facsimile (fax) transmission, and a function in which a telephone-based
document facsimile (fax) reception is converted to physical document output
F.DSR Document storage and retrieval: a function in which a document is stored during one job
and retrieved during one or more subsequent jobs
F.SMI Shared-medium interface: a function that transmits or receives User Data or TSF Data over
a communications medium which, in conventional practice, is or can be simultaneously
accessed by multiple users, such as wired network media and most radio-frequency
wireless media
3.1.3.Operations
Operations are a specific type of action performed by a Subject on an Object. In this Security
Target, five types of operations are considered: those that result in disclosure of information
(Read), those that result in alteration of information (Create, Modify, Delete), and those that
invoke a function (Execute).
3.1.4.Channels
Channels are the mechanisms through which data can be transferred into and out of the TOE. In
this Security Target, four types of Channels are allowed:
Private Medium Interface: mechanisms for exchanging information that use (1) wired or
wireless electronic methods over a communications medium which, in conventional practice, is
not accessed by multiple simultaneous Users; or, (2) Operator Panel and displays that are part of
the TOE. It is an input-output channel.
Shared-medium Interface: mechanisms for exchanging information that use wired or wireless
network or non-network electronic methods over a communications medium which, in
conventional practice, is or can be simultaneously accessed by multiple Users. It is an input-
output channel.
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
26
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
Original Document Handler: mechanisms for transferring User Document Data into the TOE
in hardcopy form. It is an input channel.
Hardcopy Output Handler: mechanisms for transferring User Document Data out of the TOE
in hardcopy form. It is an output channel.
In practice, at least one input channel and one output channel would be present in any HCD
configuration, and at least one of those channels would be either an Original Document Handler
or a Hardcopy Output Handler.
3.2. Assumptions
The Security Objectives and Security Functional Requirements defined in subsequent sections of
this Security Target are based on the condition that all of the assumptions described in this
section are satisfied.
Table 9: Assumptions for the TOE
Assumption Definition
A.ACCESS.MANAGED The TOE is located in a restricted or monitored environment that provides
protection from unmanaged access to the physical components and data
interfaces of the TOE.
A.USER.TRAINING TOE Users are aware of the security policies and procedures of their
organization, and are trained and competent to follow those policies and
procedures.
A.ADMIN.TRAINING Administrators are aware of the security policies and procedures of their
organization, are trained and competent to follow the manufacturer’s guidance
and documentation, and correctly configure and operate the TOE in accordance
with those policies and procedures.
A.ADMIN.TRUST Administrators do not use their privileged access rights for malicious purposes.
3.3. Threats
3.3.1.Threats Addressed by the TOE
This security problem definition addresses threats posed by four categories of threat agents:
a) Persons who are not permitted to use the TOE who may attempt to use the TOE
b) Persons who are authorized to use the TOE who may attempt to use TOE functions for
which they are not authorized.
c) Persons who are authorized to use the TOE who may attempt to access data in ways for
which they not authorized.
d) Persons who unintentionally cause a software malfunction that may expose the TOE to
unanticipated threats.
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
27
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
The threats and policies defined in this Security Target address the threats posed by these threat
agents.
This section describes threats to assets described in Section 3.1.2.
Table 10: Threats to User Data for the TOE
Threat Affected Asset Description
T.DOC.DIS D.DOC User Document Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons
T.DOC.ALT D.DOC User Document Data may be altered by unauthorized persons
T.FUNC.ALT D.FUNC User Function Data may be altered by unauthorized persons
Table 11: Threats to TSF Data for the TOE
Threat Affected
Asset
Description
T.PROT.ALT D.PROT TSF Protected Data may be altered by unauthorized persons
T.CONF.DIS D.CONF TSF Confidential Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons
T.CONF.ALT D.CONF TSF Confidential Data may be altered by unauthorized persons
3.3.2.Threats Addressed by the IT Environment
There are no threats addressed by the IT Environment.
3.4. Organizational Security Policies
This section describes the Organizational Security Policies (OSPs) that apply to the TOE. OSPs
are used to provide a basis for security objectives that are commonly desired by TOE Owners in
this operational environment, but for which it is not practical to universally define the assets
being protected or the threats to those assets.
Table 12: Organizational Security Policies for the TOE
Name Definition
P.USER.AUTHORIZATION To preserve operational accountability and security,
Users will be authorized to use the TOE only as
permitted by the TOE Owner
P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION To detect corruption of the executable code in the TSF,
procedures will exist to self-verify executable code in the
TSF
P.AUDIT.LOGGING To preserve operational accountability and security,
records that provide an audit trail of TOE use and
security-relevant events will be created, maintained, and
protected from unauthorized disclosure or alteration, and
will be reviewed by authorized personnel
P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT To prevent unauthorized use of the external interfaces of
the TOE, operation of those interfaces will be controlled
by the TOE and its IT environment
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
28
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
4. SECURITY
OBJECTIVES
The purpose of the security objectives is to detail the planned response to a security
problem or threat. Threats can be directed against the TOE or the security environment
or both, therefore, the CC identifies two categories of security objectives:
 Security objectives for the TOE, and
 Security objectives for the environment.
Note: The content in this section appears exactly as it does in IEEE Std. 2600.2-2009 and
is copied here for completeness.
4.1. Security Objectives for the TOE
This section describes the security objectives that the TOE shall fulfill.
Table 13: Security Objectives for the TOE
Objective Definition
O.DOC.NO_DIS The TOE shall protect User Document Data from unauthorized disclosure.
O.DOC.NO_ALT The TOE shall protect User Document Data from unauthorized alteration.
O.FUNC.NO_ALT The TOE shall protect User Function Data from unauthorized alteration.
O.PROT.NO_ALT The TOE shall protect TSF Protected Data from unauthorized alteration.
O.CONF.NO_DIS The TOE shall protect TSF Confidential Data from unauthorized
disclosure.
O.CONF.NO_ALT The TOE shall protect TSF Confidential Data from unauthorized
alteration.
O.USER.AUTHORIZED The TOE shall require identification and authentication of Users, and shall
ensure that Users are authorized in accordance with security policies
before allowing them to use the TOE.
O.INTERFACE.MANAGED The TOE shall manage the operation of external interfaces in accordance
with security policies.
O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED The TOE shall provide procedures to self-verify executable code in the
TSF.
O.AUDIT.LOGGED The TOE shall create and maintain a log of TOE use and security-relevant
events, and prevent its unauthorized disclosure or alteration.
O.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROT
ECTED
The TOE shall ensure that internal audit records are protected from
unauthorized access, deletion and modifications.
O.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTH
ORIZED
The TOE shall ensure that internal audit records can be accessed in order
to detect potential security violations, and only by authorized persons
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
29
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
4.2. Security Objectives for the
Operational Environment
This section describes the security objectives that must be fulfilled by IT methods in the
IT environment of the TOE.
Table 14: Security Objectives for the IT Environment
Objective Definition
OE.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED If audit records are exported from the TOE to another trusted IT
product, the TOE Owner shall ensure that those records are
protected from unauthorized access, deletion and modifications.
OE.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED If audit records generated by the TOE are exported from the
TOE to another trusted IT product, the TOE Owner shall ensure
that those records can be accessed in order to detect potential
security violations, and only by authorized persons
OE.INTERFACE.MANAGED The IT environment shall provide protection from unmanaged
access to TOE external interfaces.
OE.USER.AUTHENTICATED The IT environment shall provide support for user identification
and authentication and protect the user credentials in transit
when TOE operates in remote identification and authentication
mode.
4.3. Security Objectives for the Non-
IT Environment
This section describes the security objectives that must be fulfilled by non-IT methods in
the non-IT environment of the TOE.
Table 15: Security Objectives for the Non-IT Environment
Objective Definition
OE.PHYSICAL.MANAGED The TOE shall be placed in a secure or monitored area that provides
protection from unmanaged physical access to the TOE.
OE.USER.AUTHORIZED The TOE Owner shall grant permission to Users to be authorized to use
the TOE according to the security policies and procedures of their
organization.
OE.USER.TRAINED The TOE Owner shall ensure that Users are aware of the security policies
and procedures of their organization, and have the training and
competence to follow those policies and procedures.
OE.ADMIN.TRAINED The TOE Owner shall ensure that TOE Administrators are aware of the
security policies and procedures of their organization, have the training,
competence, and time to follow the manufacturer’s guidance and
documentation, and correctly configure and operate the TOE in
accordance with those policies and procedures.
OE.ADMIN.TRUSTED The TOE Owner shall establish trust that TOE Administrators will not use
their privileged access rights for malicious purposes.
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
30
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
Objective Definition
OE.AUDIT.REVIEWED The TOE Owner shall ensure that audit logs are reviewed at appropriate
intervals for security violations or unusual patterns of activity.
4.4. Rationale for Security Objectives
This section demonstrates that each threat, organizational security policy, and assumption
are mitigated by at least one security objective for the TOE, and that those security
objectives counter the threats, enforce the policies, and uphold the assumptions.
Table 16: Completeness of Security Objectives
Threats. Policies, and
Assumptions
Objectives
O.DOC.NO_DIS
O.DOC.NO_ALT
O.FUNC.NO_ALT
O.PROT.NO_ALT
O.CONF.NO_DIS
O.CONF.NO_ALT
O.USER.AUTHORIZED
OE.USER.AUTHORIZED
O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED
O.AUDIT.LOGGED
O.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED
O.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED
OE.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED
OE.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED
OE.AUDIT.REVIEWED
OE.INTERFACE.MANAGED
OE.USER.AUTHENTICATED
OE.PHYISCAL.MANAGED
OE.INTERFACE.MANAGED
OE.ADMIN.TRAINED
OE.ADMIN.TRUSTED
OE.USER.TRAINED
T.DOC.DIS X X X X
T.DOC.ALT X X X X
T.FUNC.ALT X X X X
T.PROT.ALT X X X X
T.CONF.DIS X X X X
T.CONF.ALT X X X X
P.USER.AUTHORIZATION X X X
P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION X
P.AUDIT.LOGGING X X X X X X
P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT X X
A.ACCESS.MANAGED X
A.ADMIN.TRAINING X
A.ADMIN.TRUST X
A.USER.TRAINING X
Table 17: Sufficiency of Security Objectives
Threats. Policies, and
Assumptions
Summary Objectives and rationale
T.DOC.DIS User Document Data O.DOC.NO_DIS protects D.DOC from
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
31
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
Threats. Policies, and
Assumptions
Summary Objectives and rationale
may be disclosed to
unauthorized persons
unauthorized disclosure
O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user
identification and authentication as the
basis for authorization
OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes
responsibility of the TOE Owner to
appropriately grant authorization
OE.USER.AUTHENTICATED establishes
alternative (remote) means for user
identification and authentication as the
basis for authorization
T.DOC.ALT User Document Data
may be altered by
unauthorized persons
O.DOC.NO_ALT protects D.DOC from
unauthorized alteration
O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user
identification and authentication as the
basis for authorization
OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes
responsibility of the TOE Owner to
appropriately grant authorization
OE.USER.AUTHENTICATED establishes
alternative (remote) means for user
identification and authentication as the
basis for authorization
T.FUNC.ALT User Function Data may
be altered by
unauthorized persons
O.FUNC.NO_ALT protects D.FUNC from
unauthorized alteration
O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user
identification and authentication as the
basis for authorization
OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes
responsibility of the TOE Owner to
appropriately grant authorization
OE.USER.AUTHENTICATED establishes
alternative (remote) means for user
identification and authentication as the
basis for authorization
T.PROT.ALT TSF Protected Data may
be altered by
unauthorized persons
O.PROT.NO_ALT protects D.PROT from
unauthorized alteration
O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user
identification and authentication as the
basis for authorization
OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes
responsibility of the TOE Owner to
appropriately grant authorization
OE.USER.AUTHENTICATED establishes
alternative (remote) means for user
identification and authentication as the
basis for authorization
T.CONF.DIS TSF Confidential Data
may be disclosed to
unauthorized persons
O.CONF.NO_DIS protects D.CONF from
unauthorized disclosure
O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user
identification and authentication as the
basis for authorization
OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
32
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
Threats. Policies, and
Assumptions
Summary Objectives and rationale
responsibility of the TOE Owner to
appropriately grant authorization
OE.USER.AUTHENTICATED establishes
alternative (remote) means for user
identification and authentication as the
basis for authorization
T.CONF.ALT TSF Confidential Data
may be altered by
unauthorized persons
O.CONF.NO_ALT protects D.CONF from
unauthorized alteration
O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user
identification and authentication as the
basis for authorization
OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes
responsibility of the TOE Owner to
appropriately grant authorization
OE.USER.AUTHENTICATED establishes
alternative (remote) means for user
identification and authentication as the
basis for authorization
P.USER.AUTHORIZATION Users will be authorized
to use the TOE
O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user
identification and authentication as the
basis for authorization to use the TOE
OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes
responsibility of the TOE Owner to
appropriately grant authorization
OE.USER.AUTHENTICATED establishes
alternative (remote) means for user
identification and authentication as the
basis for authorization to use the TOE
P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION Procedures will exist to
self-verify executable
code in the TSF
O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED provides
procedures to self-verify executable code
in the TSF
P.AUDIT.LOGGING An audit trail of TOE use
and security-relevant
events will be created,
maintained, protected,
and reviewed.
O.AUDIT.LOGGED creates and maintains
a log of TOE use and security-relevant
events, and prevents unauthorized
disclosure or alteration
O.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED
protects internal audit records from
unauthorized access, deletion and
modifications
O.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED
establishes responsibility of, the TOE to
provide appropriate access to internal audit
records
OE.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED
protects exported audit records from
unauthorized access, deletion and
modifications
OE.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED
establishes responsibility of, the TOE
Owner to provide appropriate access to
exported audit records
OE.AUDIT.REVIEWED establishes
responsibility of the TOE Owner to ensure
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
33
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
Threats. Policies, and
Assumptions
Summary Objectives and rationale
that audit logs are appropriately reviewed
P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT Operation of external
interfaces will be
controlled by the TOE
and its IT environment.
O.INTERFACE.MANAGED manages the
operation of external interfaces in
accordance with security policies
OE.INTERFACE.MANAGED establishes
a protected environment for TOE external
interfaces
A.ACCESS.MANAGED The TOE environment
provides protection from
unmanaged access to the
physical components and
data interfaces of the
TOE.
OE.PHYSICAL.MANAGED establishes a
protected physical environment for the
TOE
A.ADMIN.TRAINING TOE Users are aware of
and trained to follow
security policies and
procedures
OE.ADMIN.TRAINED establishes
responsibility of the TOE Owner to
provide appropriate Administrator training.
A.ADMIN.TRUST Administrators do not use
their privileged access
rights for malicious
purposes.
OE.ADMIN.TRUST establishes
responsibility of the TOE Owner to have a
trusted relationship with Administrators.
A.USER.TRAINING Administrators are aware
of and trained to follow
security policies and
procedures
OE.USER.TRAINED establishes
responsibility of the TOE Owner to
provide appropriate User training.
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
34
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
5. EXTENDED
COMPONENTS
DEFINTION
This Security Target defines components that are extensions to Common Criteria 3.1 Release 2,
Part 2.
5.1. FPT_FDI_EXP Restricted forwarding of
data to external interfaces
Family behaviour:
This family defines requirements for the TSF to restrict direct forwarding of information from
one external interface to another external interface.
Many products receive information on specific external interfaces and are intended to transform
and process this information before it is transmitted on another external interface. However,
some products may provide the capability for attackers to misuse external interfaces to violate
the security of the TOE or devices that are connected to the TOE’s external interfaces. Therefore,
direct forwarding of unprocessed data between different external interfaces is forbidden unless
explicitly allowed by an authorized administrative role. The family FPT_FDI_EXP has been
defined to specify this kind of functionality.
Component leveling:
FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces, provides for the
functionality to require TSF controlled processing of data received over defined external
interfaces before this data is sent out on another external interface. Direct forwarding of data
from one external interface to another one requires explicit allowance by an authorized
administrative role.
Management:FPT_FDI_EXP.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces 1
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
35
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
a) definition of the role(s) that are allowed to perform the management activities;
b) management of the conditions under which direct forwarding can be allowed by an
administrative role;
c) revocation of such an allowance.
Audit: FPT_FDI_EXP.1
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is
included in the PP/ST:
a) There are no auditable events foreseen.
Rationale:
Quite often a TOE is supposed to perform specific checks and process data received on one
external interface before such (processed) data is allowed to be transferred to another external
interface. Examples are firewall systems but also other systems that require a specific work flow
for the incoming data before it can be transferred. Direct forwarding of such data (i. e. without
processing the data first) between different external interfaces is therefore a function that – if
allowed at all – can only be allowed by an authorized role.
It has been viewed as useful to have this functionality as a single component that allows
specifying the property to disallow direct forwarding and require that only an authorized role can
allow this. Since this is a function that is quite common for a number of products, it has been
viewed as useful to define an extended component.
The Common Criteria defines attribute-based control of user data flow in its FDP class.
However, in this Security Target, the authors needed to express the control of both user data and
TSF data flow using administrative control instead of attribute-based control. It was found that
using FDP_IFF and FDP_IFC for this purpose resulted in SFRs that were too unwieldy for
refinement in a Security Target. Therefore, the authors decided to define an extended component
to address this functionality.
This extended component protects both user data and TSF data, and could therefore be placed in
either the FDP or FPT class. Since its purpose is to protect the TOE from misuse, the authors
believed that it was most appropriate to place it in the FPT class. It did not fit well in any of the
existing families in either class, and this lead the authors to define a new family with just one
member.
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
36
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles.
FPT_FDI_EXP.1.1 The TSF shall provide the capability to restrict data received on
[assignment: list of external interfaces] from being forwarded without
further processing by the TSF to [assignment: list of external interfaces].
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
37
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
6. SECURITY
REQUIREMENTS
This section defines the IT security requirements that shall be satisfied by the TOE or its
environment:
The CC divides TOE security requirements into two categories:
 Security functional requirements (SFRs) (such as, identification and authentication,
security management, and user data protection) that the TOE and the supporting evidence
need to satisfy to meet the security objectives of the TOE.
 Security assurance requirements (SARs) that provide grounds for confidence that the
TOE and its supporting IT environment meet its security objectives (e.g., configuration
management, testing, and vulnerability assessment).
These requirements are discussed separately within the following subsections.
6.1. Conventions
All operations performed on the Security Functional Requirements or the Security Assurance
Requirements need to be identified. For this purpose the following conventions shall be used.
 Assignments will be written in [normal text with brackets]
 Selections will be written in underlined and italic text.
 Refinements will be written bold
 Iterations will be performed on components and functional elements. The component
ID defined by the Common Criteria (e.g. FDP_IFC.1) will be extended by an ID for
the iteration (e.g. “(SSL)”). The resulting component ID would be “FDP_IFC.1
(SSL)”.
 Where an iteration is identified in rationale discussion as “all”, the statement applies
to all iterations of the requirement (e.g. “FCS_CKM.1 (all)”)
 SFRs and TSPs that appear in the IEEE 2600.2 are marked as such; all unmarked
SFRs have been added to this ST from CC Part 2.
6.2. TOE Security Policies
This chapter contains the definition of security policies which must be enforced by the TSF.
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
38
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
6.2.1.Information Flow Control Policy (TSP_FLOW)
The security function “Information Flow” (TSF_FLOW) (see section 1.3.2.11) restricts the
information flow between the PSTN port and the internal network by implementing a store-and-
forward principle.
The following policy defines the rules according to which TSF_FLOW shall restrict the
information flow, if the fax is enabled:
 Only the copy controller (see section 1.3.2.11) may copy image information and job data
(e.g. the telephone number of the other fax machine) from and to a shared memory area
on the FAX board.
 RECEIVING FAX: The fax controller must have terminated the PSTN connection before
informing the copy controller about the fax that was received.
 SENDING FAX: The copy controller must have finished the copy operation of the fax
image to the shared memory area of the FAX board before informing the fax controller to
send the fax.
6.2.2.SSLSec SFP (TSP_SSL)
The security function “User Data Protection -- SSL” (TSF_FDP_SSL) requires that SSL is
enabled so that Web-based network traffic to and from the TOE will be encrypted using SSL
This policy will be enforced on:
 SUBJECTS: Web clients.
 INFORMATION: All web-based traffic to and from that destination.
 OPERATIONS: HTTP commands.
6.2.3.IP Filter SFP (TSP_FILTER)
The security function “User Data Protection -- IP Filtering” (TSF_FDP_FILTER) requires that
network traffic to and from the TOE will be filtered in accordance with the rules defined by the
system administrator at the Web User Interface configuration editor for IP Filtering. This policy
will be enforced on:
 SUBJECTS: External entities that send network traffic to the TOE.
 INFORMATION: All IP-based traffic to and from that destination.
 OPERATIONS: Pass network traffic.
Note: The TOE cannot enforce the IP Filtering (TSP_FILTER) when it is configured for
IPv6, AppleTalk or IPX networks.
6.2.4.IPSec SFP (TSP_IPSEC)
The security function “User Data Protection -- IPSec” (TSF_FDP_IPSec) requires that network
traffic to and from the TOE will be encrypted when the printing client initiates IPSec encryption.
This policy will be enforced on:
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
39
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
 SUBJECTS: Printing clients.
 INFORMATION: All lpr and port 9100 traffic to and from that destination.
 OPERATIONS: Print jobs.
6.2.5.SNMPSec SFP (TSP_SNMP)
The security function “Network Management Security” (TSF_NET_MGMT) requires that the
TOE applies SNMPv3 so that network traffic to and from the TOE will be encrypted in
accordance with SNMPv3. This policy will be enforced on:
 SUBJECTS: Remote SNMPv3 hosts.
 INFORMATION: All SNMPv3 traffic to and from that destination.
 OPERATIONS: SNMPv3 commands and messages.
6.2.6.PrivUserAccess SFP (TSP_FMT)
The security function “Security Management” (TSF_FMT) restricts management of TOE
security functions to the authorized system administrator.
6.2.7.User Access Control SFP (UAC_SFP) (IEEE Std. 2600.2-2009)
The Security Function Policy (SFP) described in Table 18: User Access Control SFP is
referenced by the Class FDP SFRs.
Table 18: User Access Control SFP
Object Attribute Operation(s) Subject Access Control Rule
D.DOC
+PRT
Read
U.NORMAL
Denied, except for his/her own
documents.
U.ADMINISTRATOR Allowed
Delete
U.NORMAL,
U.ADMINISTRATOR
Denied, except when the associated
D.FUNC is deleted.
+SCN Read, Delete
U.NORMAL,
U.ADMINISTRATOR
Denied, except for his/her own
documents
+CPY Read, Delete
U.NORMAL,
U.ADMINISTRATOR
Denied, except for his/her own
documents
+FAXIN
Read, Delete U.ADMINISTRATOR Allowed
Read, Delete U.NORMAL Denied
+FAXOUT Read, Delete
U.NORMAL,
U.ADMINISTRATOR
Denied, except for his/her own
documents
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
40
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
+DSR and
+SCN Read, Delete
U.NORMAL
Denied, except for his/her own
documents.
U.ADMINISTRATOR Allowed
D.FUNC Any
Attribute,
except +CPY
Modify
U.NORMAL,
U.ADMINISTRATOR
Denied
+PRT
+PC
Delete
U.NORMAL
Denied, except for his/her own
documents, for which only he/she
knows the pass code.
U.ADMINISTRATOR Allowed
+SCN Delete
U.NORMAL,
U.ADMINISTRATOR
Denied
+CPY
Delete,
Modify
U.NORMAL,
U.ADMINISTRATOR
Denied, except for his/her own
documents
+FAXIN Delete
U.NORMAL,
U.ADMINISTRATOR
Denied
+FAXOUT Delete U.NORMAL Denied
+FAXOUT Delete U.ADMINISTRATOR Allowed
Table 19: Attributes Definition
Designation Definition
+PRT Indicates data that are associated with a print job.
+SCN Indicates data that are associated with a scan job.
+CPY Indicates data that are associated with a copy job.
+FAXIN Indicates data that are associated with an inbound (received) fax job.
+FAXOUT Indicates data that are associated with an outbound (sent) fax job.
+DSR Indicates data that are associated with a document storage and retrieval job.
+SMI Indicates data that are transmitted or received over a shared-medium interface.
Application Note: IEEE Std. 2600.2-2009 specifies the contents of FDP_ACC.1 for each
function package that is claimed by a ST and a Common Access Control SFP for D.FUNC and
D.DOC (Operation: read). In this ST, the SFPs for each package are combined with the Common
Access Control SFP then refined to form Table 18 (User Access Control SFP). User Access
Control SFP represents more detail and a more restrictive requirement than the combination of
package SFPs and the Common Access Control SFP. Hence the ST is conformant to IEEE Std.
2600.2-2009.
Application Note: A document (D.DOC) is “owned” by a User (U.User) if that document was
created or submitted to the TOE by that User. The only exception are documents received as fax
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
41
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
(D.DOC +FAXIN), for which the system administrators are considered as the owner. This is in
conformance to IEEE Std. 2600.2-2009 application note 94 and 95.
Application Note: Access control rules for the “Create” Operation are not specified because
typically, any authorized U.User can create his/her own documents and cannot create documents
that are owned by another User.
Application Note: IEEE Std. 2600.2-2009 (table 23) defined attribute +DSR does not apply to
D.FUNC, and in this ST is only applicable to D.DOC with attribute +SCN. Attribute +SMI does
not apply to this SFP.
6.2.8.TOE Function Access Control SFP (TF_SFP) (IEEE Std. 2600.2-2009)
Users (U.NORMAL) require explicit authorization from system administrators
(U.ADMINISTRATOR) for them to be allowed to perform the following TOE Functions as
defined in the IEEE Std. 2600.2-2009 SFR Packages in Section 12.3 via the Web UI or the LUI:
 Print (PRT)
 Scan (SCN)
 Fax (FAX)
 Copy (CPY)
 Document Storage and Retrieval (DSR)
 Transmit data via Shared-medium Interfaces (SMI)
Any User who is authorized to establish an connection with the TOE through the Ethernet port is
allowed to perform the following TOE Functions as defined in the IEEE Std. 2600.2-2009 SFR
Packages in Section 12.3:
 Print (PRT)
 Fax (FAX) – LanFax only
 Transmit data via Shared-medium Interfaces (SMI)
6.3. Security Functional Requirements
The TOE satisfies the SFRs delineated in Table 20: TOE Security Functional Requirements. The
rest of this section contains a description of each component and any related dependencies.
Table 20: TOE Security Functional Requirements
Functional Component ID Functional Component Name
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
42
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
Functional Component ID Functional Component Name
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
FPT_TST.1 TSF Testing
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
43
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
6.3.1.Class FAU: Security audit
6.3.1.1. FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation (IEEE Std. 2600.2-2009)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following
auditable events:
 Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
 All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and
 [all Auditable Events as each is defined for its Audit Level (if
one is specified) for the Relevant SFR in Table 21].
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the
following information:
 Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if
applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event;
and
 For each audit event type, based on the auditable event
definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST,
[for each Relevant SFR listed in Table 21: (1) information as
defined by its Audit Level (if one is specified), and (2) all
Additional Information (if any is required),
 And the following audit attribute:
 Entry number (an integer value from 1 to the number of
entries in the audit log) ]
Table 21: Audit Data Requirements
Auditable Event Relevant SFR Audit Level8
Additional
Information
Job completion FDP_ACF.1 Not specified Type of job
Both successful and unsuccessful use of the
authentication mechanism
FIA_UAU.2 Basic None required
8
For certain auditable events, IEEE Std. 2600.2-2009 has specified the Audit Level required to be “minimum” instead of “minimal” as required
by CC part 2.
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
44
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
Auditable Event Relevant SFR Audit Level8
Additional
Information
Both successful and unsuccessful use of the
identification mechanism
FIA_UID.29
Basic Attempted user
identity, if available10
Use of the management functions FMT_SMF.1 Minimum None required
Modifications to the group of users that are part
of a role
FMT_SMR.1 Minimum None required
Changes to the time FPT_STM.1 Minimum None required
Locking of an interactive session by the session
locking mechanism
FTA_SSL.3 Minimum None required
Failure of the trusted channel functions11
FTP_ITC.1 Minimum Non required
6.3.1.2. FAU_GEN.2 User identity association (IEEE Std. 2600.2-2009)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF
shall be able to associate each auditable event with the identity of
the user that caused the event.
6.3.1.3. FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_SAR.1.1: The TSF shall provide [U.ADMINISTRATOR] with the capability
to read [all information] from the audit records.
FAU_SAR.1.2: The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for
the user to interpret the information.
6.3.1.4. FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.2.1: The TSF shall prohibit all users read access to the audit records,
except those users that have been granted explicit read-access.
9
FIA_UAU.2 and FIA_UID.2 are claimed in this ST instead of FIA_UAU.1 and FIA_UID.1 from IEEE Std. 2600.2-2009
10
Additional Information requirement specified in IEEE Std. 2600.2-2009.
11
This audit event is required by the addition of the IEEE 2600.2-SMI SFR Package. The developer added it to the existing table of events rather
than adding an iteration for FAU_GEN.1.
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
45
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
6.3.1.5. FAU_STG.1Protected audit trail storage
Hierarchical to: None.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_STG.1.1: The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail
from unauthorized deletion.
FAU_STG.1.2: The TSF shall be able to prevent unauthorized modifications to the
stored audit records in the audit trail.
6.3.1.6. FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss
Hierarchical to: FAU_STG.3.
Dependencies: FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG.4.1: The TSF shall overwrite the oldest stored audit records and [no
other actions to be taken] if the audit trail is full.
6.3.2.Class FCO: Communication
There are no Class FCO security functional requirements for this Security Target.
6.3.3.Class FCS: Cryptographic support
6.3.3.1. FCS_CKM.1 (SSL) Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1 (SSL) The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [RSA key pair
generation] and specified cryptographic key sizes [1024 bits or
smaller key sizes required for SSLv3 non-capable clients] that
meet the following: [not specified].
Application note: The SSL v3 standard does not define how the RSA key pair is
generated; the definition is implementation. The evaluation does not cover the assessment
of the strength of the keys generated, ONLY that a correct RSA key pair is generated. No
assessment of the strength of the key pair will be performed. The SSLv3 standard allows
for the TOE to operate in accordance with previous SSL standards when communicating
with clients that are not SSLv3 capable.
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
46
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
6.3.3.2. FCS_CKM.2 (SSL 1) Cryptographic key distribution
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.2.1 (SSL 1) The TSF shall distribute cryptographic keys in accordance
with a specified cryptographic key distribution method [RSA
encrypted exchange of session keys for SSL handshake] that meet
the following: [SSLv3 standard].
Application note: This requirement is intended for SSL client and server
authentication.
6.3.3.3. FCS_CKM.2 (SSL 2) Cryptographic key distribution
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.2.1 (SSL 2) The TSF shall distribute cryptographic keys in accordance
with a specified cryptographic key distribution method [digital
certificates for public RSA keys] that meet the following:
[certificate format given in X.509v3].
6.3.3.4. FCS_COP.1 (SSL)Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 (SSL) The TSF shall perform [digital signature generation and
verification] in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm [RSA] and cryptographic key sizes [1024 bits or smaller
key sizes required for SSLv3 non-capable clients] that meet the
following: [SSLv3 standard].
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
47
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
Application note: The SSLv3 standard allows for the TOE to operate in accordance
with previous SSL standards when communicating with clients that are not SSLv3
capable.
6.3.3.5. FCS_CKM.1 (IPSEC) Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1 (IPSEC) The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance
with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [Triple
Data Encryption Standard (3DES-EDE)] and specified
cryptographic key sizes [3 unique 56-bit keys] that meet the
following: [NIST 800-67].
6.3.3.6. FCS_COP.1 (IPSEC 1) Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 (IPSEC 1) The TSF shall perform [
a) IPSec Security Association data encryption/decryption
specified by IKE in RFC2409 as defined in TSP_IPSEC;
and
b) IPSec ESP bulk data encryption/decryption specified by
IKE in RFC2406 as defined in the TSP_IPSEC]
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [3DES-
EDE] and cryptographic key sizes [168 bits] that meet the
following: [NIST 800-67].
6.3.3.7. FCS_COP.1 (IPSEC 2) Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
48
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 (IPSEC 2) The TSF shall perform [cryptographic checksum generation
and secure hash (message digest) computation] in accordance with
a specified cryptographic algorithm [SHA-1] and cryptographic
key sizes [N/A] that meet the following: [FIPS-180-2].
6.3.3.8. FCS_CKM.1 (SNMP) Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1 (SNMP) The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance
with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [DES] and
specified cryptographic key sizes [64 bit] that meet the following:
[generation of keys as defined in the SNMPv3 standard with the
cipher suites defined in FCS_COP.1 (SNMP)].
6.3.3.9. FCS_COP.1 (SNMP) Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 (SNMP) The TSF shall perform [hashing and verification] in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [HMAC –
SHA1] and cryptographic key sizes [none] that meet the following:
[SNMPv3 standard].
6.3.3.10. FCS_CKM.1 (UDE) Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1 (UDE) The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance
with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [AES] and
specified cryptographic key sizes [256 bit] that meet the following:
[randomization of network interface MAC address upon boot up].
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
49
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
6.3.3.11. FCS_COP.1 (UDE) Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 (UDE) The TSF shall perform [encryptions and decryption] on user data
stored on the HDD(s) in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [AES] and cryptographic key sizes [256
bit] that meet the following: [none].
6.3.3.12. FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key destruction method [semiconductor
memory state loss at power-down, semiconductor memory
zeroization at power-up] that meets the following: [None].
6.3.4.Class FDP: User data protection
6.3.4.1. FDP_ACC.1 (USER) Subset access control (IEEE Std. 2600.2-2009)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 (USER) The TSF shall enforce the [User Access Control SFP in
Table 18] on [the list of users as subjects, objects, and operations
among subjects and objects covered by the User Access Control
SFP in Table 18].
Application Note: This SFR covers FDP_ACC.1 (a) and FDP_ACC.1 from all claimed
packages (PRT, SCN, CPY, FAX, DSR) in the IEEE Std. 2600.2
PP.
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
50
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
6.3.4.2. FDP_ACC.1 (FUNC) Subset access control (IEEE Std. 2600.2-2009)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 (FUNC) The TSF shall enforce the [TOE Function Access Control
SFP] on [users as subjects, TOE functions as objects, and the right
to use the functions as operations].
Application Note: This SFR is FDP_ACC.1 (b) from The IEEE Std. 2600.2 PP.
6.3.4.3. FDP_ACC.1 (MGMT) Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 (MGMT) The TSF shall enforce the [PrivUserAccess SFP] on [
 Subjects: authorized users;
 Object: functions accessible via WebUI and Local UI;
 Operations: access management interfaces].
6.3.4.4. FDP_ACF.1 (USER) Security attribute based access control (IEEE
Std. 2600.2-2009)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ACF.1.1 (USER) The TSF shall enforce the [User Access Control SFP in
Table 18] to objects based on the following: [the list of users as
subjects and objects controlled under the User Access Control SFP
in Table 18, and for each, the indicated security attributes in Table
18].
FDP_ACF.1.2 (USER) The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if
an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is
allowed: [rules specified in the User Access Control SFP in Table
18 governing access among controlled users as subjects and
controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled
objects].
FDP_ACF.1.3 (USER) The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to
objects based on the following additional rules: [none].
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
51
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
FDP_ACF.1.4 (USER) The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects
based on the [none].
Application Note: This SFR covers FDP_ACF.1 (a) and FDP_ACF.1 from all claimed
packages (PRT, SCN, CPY, FAX, DSR) in the IEEE Std. 2600.2
PP.
6.3.4.5. FDP_ACF.1 (FUNC) Security attribute based access control (IEEE
Std. 2600.2-2009)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ACF.1.1 (FUNC) The TSF shall enforce the [TOE Function Access Control
SFP] to objects based on the following: [users, roles and their
individual permissions to perform any or all of the following
functions: print, scan, copy, fax, document storage and retrieval,
access to shared-medium interface].
FDP_ACF.1.2 (FUNC) The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if
an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is
allowed: [the user who is explicitly authorized by
U.ADMINISTATOR to use a function is allowed to access the
function via Web UI or LUI].
FDP_ACF.1.3 (FUNC) The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to
objects based on the following additional rules: [
 the user acts in the role U.ADMINISTRATOR is allowed to
access all functions available;
 all users authorized for remote connection to the TOE are
allowed to access print, LanFax, and access to shared-medium
interface].
FDP_ACF.1.4 (FUNC) The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects
based on the [none].
Application Note: This SFR is FDP_ACF.1 (b) from The IEEE Std. 2600.2 PP.
6.3.4.6. FDP_ACF.1 (MGMT) Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
52
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
FDP_ACF.1.1 (MGMT) The TSF shall enforce the [PrivUserAccess SFP] to objects
based on the following: [
 Subjects: Authorized users – role;
 Objects: functions accessible via WebUI and Local UI – role].
FDP_ACF.1.2 (MGMT) The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if
an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is
allowed: [
Authorized user(s) in U.ADMINISTRATOR role will be
granted access to the TOE security relevant functions
accessible via the management interfaces].
FDP_ACF.1.3 (MGMT) The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to
objects based on the following additional rules: [none].
FDP_ACF.1.4 (MGMT) The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects
based on the [none].
6.3.4.7. FDP_IFC.1 (FILTER) Subset information flow control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
FDP_IFC.1.1 (FILTER) The TSF shall enforce the [IPFilter SFP] on [
 Subjects: External entities that send traffic to the TOE;
 Information: All IP-based traffic to/from that
source/destination;
 Operations: send or receive network traffic].
6.3.4.8. FDP_IFF.1 (FILTER) Simple security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization.
FDP_IFF.1.1 (FILTER) The TSF shall enforce the [IPFilter SFP] based on the
following types of subject and information security attributes: [
 Subjects: External entities that send traffic to the TOE
o IP address,
 Information: IP Packet
o Source IP address, protocol used (TCP or UDP),
destination TCP or UDP port].
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
53
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
FDP_IFF.1.2 (FILTER) The TSF shall permit an information flow between a
controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled
operation if the following rules hold: [
 The source IP address matches a rule in the TOE’s rule base
 If configured, the destination transport layer port matches a
rule in the TOE’s rule base.]
FDP_IFF.1.3 (FILTER) The TSF shall enforce the [implicit allow if no rules have
been defined].
FDP_IFF.1.4 (FILTER) The TSF shall explicitly authorize an information flow
based on the following rules: [if the rule is the default all].
FDP_IFF.1.5 (FILTER) The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on
the following rules: [if there are no rules with matching security
attributes or if a rule explicitly denies an information flow].
Application Note: When custom rules have not been defined by the system
administrator, the default rule (allow all traffic) will apply. Because it is a wildcard rule,
all IP addresses, ports and protocols (either TCP or UDP) will be a match for allowed
traffic.
6.3.4.9. FDP_RIP.1 (IOW 1) Subset residual information protection (IEEE
Std. 2600.2-2009)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FDP_RIP.1.1 (IOW 1) The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content
of a resource is made unavailable upon the deallocation of the
resource from the following objects: D.DOC, [copy, print, internet
fax, workflow scan or scan-to-email job].
5 Application Note: This SFR is taken directly from IEEE 2600.2. It has been marked
as iterated because this Security Target includes two instances of FDP_RIP.1. This SFR
shall ensure that all stored document image data written to the hard disk drive(s) will be
overwritten once the respective print, workflow scan or scan-to-email job has completed
or is deleted.
6.3.4.10. FDP_RIP.1 (IOW 2) Subset residual information protection
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies:No dependencies
FDP_RIP.1.1 (IOW 2) The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content
of temporary image files will be overwritten with zeroes upon
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
54
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
the deallocation of the resource from the following objects: [fax
card flash memory that contains embedded fax job data].
Application Note: The embedded fax card flash memory overwrite is one round only.
6.3.4.11. FDP_UCT.1 (IPSEC) Basic data exchange confidentiality
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FDP_UCT.1.1 (IPSEC) The TSF shall enforce the [IPSec SFP] to be able to
transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from
unauthorized disclosure.
6.3.4.12. FDP_UIT.1 (IPSEC) Data exchange integrity
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
FDP_UIT.1.1 (IPSEC) The TSF shall enforce the [IPSec SFP] to be able to
transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from
modification, deletion, insertion, and/or replay errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2 (IPSEC) The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data,
whether modification, deletion, insertion, and/or replay has
occurred.
6.3.4.13. FDP_UCT.1 (SSL) Basic data exchange confidentiality
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FDP_UCT.1.1 (SSL) The TSF shall enforce the [SSLSec SFP] to be able to transmit and
receive user data in a manner protected from unauthorized
disclosure.
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
55
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
6.3.4.14. FDP_UIT.1 (SSL) Data exchange integrity
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
FDP_UIT.1.1 (SSL) The TSF shall enforce the [SSLSec SFP] to be able to transmit and
receive user data in a manner protected from modification,
deletion, insertion, and/or replay errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2 (SSL) The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether
modification, deletion, insertion, and/or replay has occurred.
6.3.4.15. FDP_UCT.1 (SNMP) Basic data exchange confidentiality
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FDP_UCT.1.1 (SNMP) The TSF shall enforce the [SNMPSec SFP] to be able to
transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from
unauthorized disclosure.
6.3.4.16. FDP_UIT.1 (SNMP) Data exchange integrity
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
FDP_UIT.1.1 (SNMP) The TSF shall enforce the [SNMPSec SFP] to be able to
transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from
modification, deletion, insertion, and/or replay errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2 (SNMP) The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data,
whether modification, deletion, insertion, and/or replay has
occurred.
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
56
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
6.3.5.Class FIA: Identification and authentication
6.3.5.1. FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition (IEEE Std. 2600.2-2009)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes
belonging to individual users: [username, password, role, list of
objects and functions that the user has permission to access].
6.3.5.2. FIA_UAU.2User authentication before any action (IEEE Std. 2600.2-
2009)
Hierarchical to: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that
user.
Application Note: IEEE 2600.2 includes the FIA_UAU.1 requirement. FIA_UAU.2 is
hierarchical to FIA_UAU.1 and satisfies the requirement that the content in the ST be as
strict as or more strict than the PP in order to claim conformance to IEEE 2600.2.
6.3.5.3. FIA_UAU.7Protected authentication feedback
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of Authentication
FIA_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only [obscured feedback] to the user
while the authentication is in progress.
6.3.5.4. FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action (IEEE Std. 2600.2-
2009)
Hierarchical to: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UID.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
57
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
Application Note: IEEE 2600.2 includes the FIA_UID.1 requirement. FIA_UID.2 is
hierarchical to FIA_UID.1 and satisfies the requirement that the content in the ST be as
strict as or more strict than the PP in order to claim conformance to IEEE 2600.2.
6.3.5.5. FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding (IEEE Std. 2600.2-2009)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_USB.1.1 The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with
subjects acting on the behalf of that user: [identity, list of objects
and functions that the user has permission to access].
FIA_USB.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association
of user security attributes with the subjects acting on behalf of
users: [subjects will be assigned the security attributes of the user
that they are acting on behalf of].
FIA_USB.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the
user security attributes with the subjects acting on behalf of users:
[security attributes of subjects acting on behalf of a user will not be
changed while an action is in progress and cannot be changed by
anyone but U.ADMINISTRATOR].
Application Note: For the purposes of this requirement, a “subject” is a process within
the TOE that is acting (performing functions) on behalf of a user that is interacting with
the TOE through its external interfaces. The subject will be assigned the permissions
(security attributes) of the user and will act with only the permission set that the user
holds. These permissions cannot be changed by the user; they can only be changed by
the system administrator, and cannot be changed while an action is in progress. For
example, if a process on the TOE is printing a document on behalf of a user and a system
administrator revokes their permission to print, the user/subject pair will be denied
further printing rights once the print job in progress has completed.
6.3.6.Class FMT: Security management
6.3.6.1. FMT_MOF.1 (FMT 1) Management of security functions behavior
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
FMT_MOF.1.1 (FMT 1) The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable and enable the
functions [
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
58
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
 Immediate Image Overwrite (IIO),
 Audit Logging
 Disk Encryption
 Common Access Card Use]
to [U.ADMINISTRATOR].
6.3.6.2. FMT_MOF.1 (FMT 2) Management of security functions behavior
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
FMT_MOF.1.1 (FMT 2) The TSF shall restrict the ability to determine the behavior
of, disable, enable, and/or modify the behavior of the functions [
 Authentication,
 On Demand Image Overwrite (ODIO),
 Authorization,
 IP Filtering,
 Encryption / decryption (SSL, IPSec, SNMPv3),
 Inactive session timeout]
to [U.ADMINISTRATOR].
6.3.6.3. FMT_MSA.1 (USER) Management of security attributes (IEEE Std.
2600.2-2009)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1 (USER) The TSF shall enforce the [User Access Control SFP in
Table 18] to restrict the ability to change_default, modify, delete,
[read] the security attributes [all] to [U.ADMINISTRATOR].
Application Note: This SFR is FMT_MSA.1 (a) from The IEEE Std. 2600.2 PP.
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
59
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
6.3.6.4. FMT_MSA.1 (FUNC) Management of security attributes (IEEE Std.
2600.2-2009)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1 (FUNC) The TSF shall enforce the [TOE Function Access Control
SFP] to restrict the ability to change_default, modify, delete,
[read] the security attributes [user access permissions] to
[U.ADMINISTRATOR].
Application Note: This SFR is FMT_MSA.1 (b) from The IEEE Std. 2600.2 PP.
6.3.6.5. FMT_MSA.3 (USER) Static attribute initialisation (IEEE Std. 2600.2-
2009)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1 (USER) The TSF shall enforce the [User Access Control SFP in
Table 18] to provide permissive default values for security
attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 (USER) The TSF shall allow the [U.ADMINISTRATOR] to specify
alternative initial values to override the default values when an
object or information is created.
Application Note: This SFR is FMT_MSA.3 (a) from The IEEE Std. 2600.2 PP.
6.3.6.6. FMT_MSA.3 (FUNC) Static attribute initialisation (IEEE Std.
2600.2-2009)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1 (FUNC) The TSF shall enforce the [TOE Function Access Control
Policy] to provide permissive default values for security attributes
that are used to enforce the SFP.
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
60
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
FMT_MSA.3.2 (FUNC) The TSF shall allow the [U.ADMINISTRATOR] to specify
alternative initial values to override the default values when an
object or information is created.
Application Note: This SFR is FMT_MSA.3 (b) from The IEEE Std. 2600.2 PP.
6.3.6.7. FMT_MTD.1 (MGMT1) Management of TSF data (IEEE Std.
2600.2-2009)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MTD.1.1 (MGMT1) The TSF shall restrict the ability to [read (download)] the
[audit log] to [U.ADMINISTRATOR].
Application Note: This SFR is part of FMT_MTD.1 from The IEEE Std. 2600.2 PP.
6.3.6.8. FMT_MTD.1 (MGMT2) Management of TSF data (IEEE Std.
2600.2-2009)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MTD.1.1 (MGMT2) The TSF shall restrict the ability to change_default, modify,
delete, [read] the [security attributes of D.DOC and access
permissions of U.NORMAL] to [U.ADMINISTRATOR].
Application Note: FMT_MTD.1 (MGMT1) and FMT_MTD.1 (MGMT2) appear as a
single requirement in IEEE 2600.2. Because the Common Criteria does not allow for
iterating elements, this Security Target has iterated the entire requirement for
correctness.
Application Note: This SFR is part of FMT_MTD.1 from The IEEE Std. 2600.2 PP
6.3.6.9. FMT_MTD.1 (KEY) Management of TSF data (IEEE Std. 2600.2-
2009)
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
FMT_MTD.1.1 (KEY) The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify, delete, [create]
the [
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
61
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
 SNMPv3 authentication key,
 SNMPv3 privacy key,
 IPSec Secret Key,
 X.509 Server certificate]
to [U.ADMINISTRATOR].
6.3.6.10. FMT_MTD.1 (FILTER) Management of TSF data (IEEE Std. 2600.2-
2009)
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
FMT_MTD.1.1 (FILTER) The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify, delete, [create,
read] the [
 IP filter rules
 Fax forwarding email addresses]
to [U.ADMINISTRATOR].
6.3.6.11. FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions (IEEE Std.
2600.2-2009)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management
functions: [
 Enable/disable Immediate Image Overwrite (IIO)
[TSF_IOW] (Local User Interfaces);
 Create and Delete User (ID);
 Enable/disable and Configure Common Access Card use
(Web User Interface);
 Change System Administrator Password (Web User
Interface);
 Set and Change User Local Authentication Password (Web
User Interface);
 Invoke ODIO [TSF_IOW] (Web and Local User Interfaces);
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
62
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
 Create a recurrence schedule for “On Demand” image
overwrite (Web User Interface);
 Enable/disable audit function (Web User Interface);
 Transfer the audit records (if audit is enabled) to a remote
trusted IT product (Web User Interface);
 Enable/disable SSL (Web User Interface);
 Create/upload/download X.509 certificates (Web User
Interface);
 Enable/disable and configure 802.1x (Web User Interface);
 Enable/disable and configure IPSec (Web User Interface);
 Enable/disable and configure SNMPv3 (Web User Interface);
 Configure (specify the IP address and/or IP address range,
port and port range for remote trusted IT products (presumed)
allowed to connect to the TOE via the network interface) IP
filtering (Web User Interface);
 Enable/disable Disk Encryption (Web User Interface);
 Configure network authentication (Web User Interface);
 Configure local device and service authorization (Web User
Interface);
 Configure WebUI and Local UI session timeout (Web User
Interface);
 Configure Local UI session timeout (Local User Interface);
 Manage receive fax jobs and fax mailboxes pass codes;
 Enable/disable and configure fax forwarding to email; and,
 Perform Software Self-test (integrity verification of the
binary code)].
6.3.6.12. FMT_SMR.1 Security roles (IEEE Std. 2600.2-2009)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles [U.ADMINISTRATOR,
U.NORMAL, Nobody].
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles, except for the
role “Nobody” to which no user shall be associated.
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
63
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
Application Note: The role “Nobody” cannot be assigned to any user. It is included in
FMT_SMR.1.1 only because it has been used as a role in other SFRs. Only users who have been
assigned the role “U.ADMINISTRATOR” can exercise management functions of the TOE.
6.3.7.Class FPR: Privacy
There are no Class FPR security functional requirements for this Security Target.
6.3.8.Class FPT: Protection of the TSF
6.3.8.1. FPT_STM.1Reliable time stamps (IEEE Std. 2600.2-2009)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_STM.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.
6.3.8.2. FPT_TST.1 TSF testing (IEEE Std. 2600.2-2009)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests at the conditions: [
 reboot, or
 once the device is turned on after a power failure/unorderly
shutdown]
to demonstrate the correct operation of [the following parts of TSF:
 Hard disk Immediate Image Overwrite;
 Fax flash memory Immediate Image Overwrite].
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to
verify the integrity of [the following parts of TSF data:
 Software Module version (configuration data);
 IP Filtering Tables].
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to
verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code.
6.3.8.3. Class FRU: Resource utilization
There are no Class FRU security functional requirements for this Security Target.
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
64
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
6.3.9.Class FTA: TOE access
6.3.9.1. FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination (IEEE Std. 2600.2-2009)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FTA_SSL.3.1 The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after a
[U.ADMINISTRATOR configurable amount of time in the Local
UI or on the WebUI].
6.3.10. Class FTP: Trusted paths/channels
6.3.10.1. FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel (IEEE Std. 2600.2-2009)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself
and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other
communication channels and provides assured identification of its
end points and protection of the communicated data from
modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit the TSF, another trusted IT product to
initiate communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for
[communication of D.DOC, D.FUNC, D.PROT, and D.CONF over
any Shared-medium interface].
6.3.10.2. FTP_TRP.1 (IPSEC) Trusted path (NOTE: IPSec SFP)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FTP_TRP.1.1 (IPSEC) The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself
and remote users that is logically distinct from other
communication paths and provides assured identification of its end
points and protection of the communicated data from modification
or disclosure.
FTP_TRP.1.2 (IPSEC) The TSF shall permit remote users to initiate
communication via the trusted path.
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
65
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
FTP_TRP.1.3 (IPSEC) The TSF shall require use of the trusted path for [
 Print jobs submitted via lpr or port 9100].
6.3.10.3. FTP_TRP.1 (SSL) Trusted path (NOTE: SSLSec SFP)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FTP_TRP.1.1 (SSL) The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and
remote users that is logically distinct from other communication
paths and provides assured identification of its end points and
protection of the communicated data from modification or
disclosure.
FTP_TRP.1.2 (SSL) The TSF shall permit remote users to initiate communication via
the trusted path.
FTP_TRP.1.3 (SSL) The TSF shall require use of the trusted path for [
 Print jobs and LanFax jobs submitted via Web UI,
 the security management functions available to the system
administrator from the Web UI].
6.3.10.4. FTP_TRP.1 (SNMP) Trusted path (NOTE: SNMPSec SFP)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FTP_TRP.1.1 (SNMP) The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself
and remote users that is logically distinct from other
communication paths and provides assured identification of its end
points and protection of the communicated data from modification
or disclosure.
FTP_TRP.1.2 (SNMP) The TSF shall permit remote users and the TSF to initiate
communication via the trusted path.
FTP_TRP.1.3 (SNMP) The TSF shall require use of the trusted path for [SNMP
messages].
6.4. TOE Security Assurance Requirements
Table 22 lists the security assurance requirements for “U.S. Government Protection Profile for
Hardcopy Devices Version 1.0 (IEEE Std. 2600.2-2009)”, and related SFR packages, EAL2+
augmented with ALC_FLR.3. This Security Target claims conformance with these Security
Assurance Requirements; they are not iterated or refined from their counterparts in CC Part 3.
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
66
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
Table 22: IEEE 2600.2 Security Assurance Requirements
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
AGD: Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation (augmentation of EAL2)
ASE: Security Target evaluation ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ATE: Tests ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
AVA: Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
6.5. Explicitly Stated Requirements for the
TOE
6.5.1.FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces
(IEEE Std. 2600.2-2009)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
FPT_FDI_EXP.1.1 The TSF shall provide the capability to restrict data received on
[any external Interface] from being forwarded without further processing
by the TSF to [any Shared-medium Interface].
Application Note: IEEE 2600.2 PP Application Note 116 states the following: “The ST
Author can use this SFR to define the roles that are permitted to allow unmediated transmission
between Interfaces. If unmediated transmission is never allowed, “Nobody” should be
instantiated as the “authorized identified roles.” This extended component, as defined in IEEE
2600.2, does not provide a mechanism for specifying authorized identified roles. For this reason,
the authorized identified role that is not included in this extended requirement claim should be
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
67
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
“Nobody”. Additionally, for this TOE, the restricted forwarding from the external interfaces to
the network controller are architectural design features which cannot be configured; hence the
dependencies on FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1 are not met.
6.6. Rationale for Security Functional
Requirements
Table 23: Completeness of Security Functional Requirements and Table 24: Sufficiency of
Security Functional Requirements below demonstrate the completeness and sufficiency of SFRs
that fulfill the objectives of the TOE. These tables contain the original rationale from IEEE Std.
2600.2-2009. Rationales for the SFRs that have been added to this Security Target, that do not
originate in IEEE Std. 2600.2-2009, have been added to these tables. Bold typeface items
provide principal (P) fulfillment of the objectives, and normal typeface items provide supporting
(S) fulfillment.
Table 23: Completeness of Security Functional Requirements
SFRs
Objectives
O.DOC.NO_DIS
O.DOC.NO_ALT
O.FUNC.NO_ALT
O.PROT.NO_ALT
O.CONF.NO_DIS
O.CONF.NO_ALT
O.USER.AUTHORIZED
O.INTERFACE.MANAGED
O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED
O.AUDIT.LOGGED
O.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTE
D
O.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED
ED
FAU_GEN.1 P P P
FAU_GEN.2 P P P
FAU_SAR.1 P P
FAU_SAR.2 P P
FAU_STG.1 P P
FAU_STG.4 P P
FCS_CKM.1 (SSL) S S S S S S
FCS_CKM.2 (SSL 1) S S S S S S
FCS_CKM.2 (SSL 2) S S S S S S
FCS_COP.1 (SSL) S S S S S S
FCS_CKM.1 (IPSEC) S S S
FCS_COP.1 (IPSEC 1) S S S
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
68
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
SFRs
Objectives
O.DOC.NO_DIS
O.DOC.NO_ALT
O.FUNC.NO_ALT
O.PROT.NO_ALT
O.CONF.NO_DIS
O.CONF.NO_ALT
O.USER.AUTHORIZED
O.INTERFACE.MANAGED
O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED
O.AUDIT.LOGGED
O.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTE
D
O.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED
ED
FCS_COP.1 (IPSEC 2) S S S
FCS_CKM.1 (SNMP) S S S
FCS_COP.1 (SNMP) S S S
FCS_CKM.1 (UDE) S S S
FCS_COP.1 (UDE) S S S
FCS_CKM.4 S S S S S S
FDP_ACC.1 (USER) P P P
FDP_ACC.1 (FUNC) P
FDP_ACC.1 (MGMT) S S S
FDP_ACF.1 (USER) S S S
FDP_ACF.1 (FUNC) S
FDP_ACF.1 (MGMT) S S S
FDP_IFC.1 (FILTER) P
FDP_IFF.1 (FILTER) S
FDP_RIP.1 (IOW 1) P
FDP_RIP.1 (IOW 2) P
FDP_UCT.1 (IPSEC) S S S
FDP_UIT.1 (IPSEC) S S S
FDP_UCT.1 (SSL) S S S S S S
FDP_UIT.1 (SSL) S S S S S S
FDP_UCT.1 (SNMP) S S S
FDP_UIT.1 (SNMP) S S S
FIA_ATD.1 S
FIA_UAU.2 P P
FIA_UAU.7 S
FIA_UID.2 S S S S S S P P S S S
FIA_USB.1 P S
FMT_MOF.1 (FMT 1) S S S S S S S S P S
FMT_MOF.1 (FMT 2) S S S S S S S S S
FMT_MSA.1 (USER) S S S
FMT_MSA.1 (FUNC) S
FMT_MSA.3 (USER) S S S
FMT_MSA.3 (FUNC) S
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
69
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
SFRs
Objectives
O.DOC.NO_DIS
O.DOC.NO_ALT
O.FUNC.NO_ALT
O.PROT.NO_ALT
O.CONF.NO_DIS
O.CONF.NO_ALT
O.USER.AUTHORIZED
O.INTERFACE.MANAGED
O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED
O.AUDIT.LOGGED
O.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTE
D
O.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED
ED
FMT_MTD.1 (MGMT1) P P P P
FMT_MTD.1 (MGMT2) P P P
FMT_MTD.1 (FILTER) P P P
FMT_MTD.1 (KEY) P P P
FMT_SMF.1 S S S S S S S S
FMT_SMR.1 S S S S S S S
FPT_STM.1 S S S
FPT_TST.1 P
FPT_FDI_EXP.1 P
FTA_SSL.3 P P
FTP_ITC.1 P P P P P P
FTP_TRP.1 (IPSEC) S S S
FTP_TRP.1 (SSL) S S S S S S
FTP_TRP.1 (SNMP) S S S
Table 24: Sufficiency of Security Functional Requirements
Objectives Description SFRs Purpose
O.DOC.NO_DIS,
O.DOC.NO_ALT,
O.FUNC.NO_ALT
Protection of User
Data from
unauthorized
disclosure or
alteration
FCS_CKM.1 (IPSEC) Supports protection by
providing cryptographic
keys for IPSEC.
FCS_COP.1 (IPSEC 1)
FCS_COP.1 (IPSEC 2)
Supports protection by
providing cryptographic
operations for IPSEC.
FCS_CKM.1 (UDE) Supports protection by
providing cryptographic
keys for disk encryption.
FCS_COP.1 (UDE) Supports protection by
providing cryptographic
operations for disk
encryption.
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
70
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
Objectives Description SFRs Purpose
FDP_ACC.1(USER) Enforces protection by
establishing an access
control policy.
FDP_ACF.1(USER) Supports access control
policy by providing access
control function.
FDP_UCT.1 (IPSEC) Supports protection by
providing confidentiality for
print jobs.
FDP_UIT.1 (IPSEC) Supports protection by
providing integrity for print
jobs.
FIA_UID.2 Supports access control and
security roles by requiring
user identification.
FMT_MSA.1(USER) Supports access control
function by enforcing
control of security attributes.
FMT_MSA.3(USER) Supports access control
function by enforcing
control of security attribute
defaults.
FMT_SMF.1 Supports control of security
attributes by requiring
functions to control
attributes.
FMT_SMR.1 Supports control of security
attributes by requiring
security roles.
FTP_TRP.1 (IPSEC) Supports protection by
providing a trusted
communications path.
O.DOC.NO_DIS Protection of User
Document Data
from unauthorized
disclosure
FDP_RIP.1 (all) Enforces protection by
making residual data
unavailable.
O.CONF.NO_DIS,
O.PROT.NO_ALT,
O.CONF.NO_ALT
Protection of TSF
Data from
unauthorized
disclosure or
alteration
FCS_CKM.1 (SNMP) Supports protection by
providing cryptographic
keys for SNMP.
FCS_COP.1 (SNMP) Supports protection by
providing cryptographic
operations for SNMP.
FDP_ACC.1 (MGMT) Supports protection by
limiting user access to
administrative functions.
FDP_ACF.1 (MGMT) Supports protection by
limiting user access to
administrative functions.
FDP_UCT.1 (SNMP) Supports protection by
providing confidentiality of
SNMP data.
FDP_UIT.1 (SNMP) Supports protection by
providing integrity of
SNMP data.
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
71
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
Objectives Description SFRs Purpose
FIA_UID.2 Supports access control and
security roles by requiring
user identification.
FMT_MTD.1(MGMT
1)
FMT_MTD.1(MGMT
2)
Enforces protection by
restricting access.
FMT_MTD.1 (KEY)
FMT_MTD.1
(FILTER)
Enforces protection by
restricting access.
FMT_SMF.1 Supports control of security
attributes by requiring
functions to control
attributes.
FMT_SMR.1 Supports control of security
attributes by requiring
security roles.
FTP_TRP.1 (SNMP) Supports protection by
providing a trusted
communications path.
O.USER.AUTHORIZED Authorization of
Normal Users and
Administrators to
use the TOE
FDP_ACC.1(FUNC) Enforces authorization by
establishing an access
control policy.
FDP_ACF.1(FUNC) Supports access control
policy by providing access
control function.
FIA_ATD.1 Supports authorization by
associating security
attributes with users.
FIA_UAU.2 Enforces authorization by
requiring user
authentication.
FIA_UAU.7 Supports authorization by
protecting passwords.
FIA_UID.2 Enforces authorization by
requiring user
identification.
FIA_USB.1 Enforces authorization by
distinguishing subject
security attributes
associated with user roles.
FMT_MOF.1 (FMT 1)
FMT_MOF.1 (FMT 2)
Supports authorization by
restricting management
actions to administrators.
FMT_MSA.1(FUNC) Supports access control
function by enforcing
control of security attributes.
FMT_MSA.3(FUNC) Supports access control
function by enforcing
control of security attribute
defaults.
FMT_SMR 1 Supports authorization by
requiring security roles.
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
72
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
Objectives Description SFRs Purpose
FTA_SSL.3 Enforces authorization by
terminating inactive
sessions.
O.INTERFACE.MANAGED Management of
external interfaces
FDP_IFC.1 (FILTER) Enforces management of
external interfaces by
establishing an
information flow policy for
the network and fax
interfaces
FDP_IFF.1 (FILTER) Supports management of
external interfaces by
enforcing information flow
rules on the network and fax
interfaces
FIA_UAU.2 Enforces management of
external interfaces by
requiring user
authentication.
FIA_UID.2 Enforces management of
external interfaces by
requiring user
identification.
FMT_MOF.1 (FMT 1)
FMT_MOF.1 (FMT 2)
Supports management of
external interfaces by
providing management
functionality.
FTA_SSL.3 Enforces management of
external interfaces by
terminating inactive
sessions.
FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Enforces management of
external interfaces by
requiring (as needed)
administrator control of
data transmission from
external Interfaces to
Shared-medium
Interfaces.
O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED Verification of
software integrity
FPT_TST.1 Enforces verification of
software by requiring self
tests.
O.AUDIT.LOGGED Logging and
authorized access to
audit events
FAU_GEN.1 Enforces audit policies by
requiring logging of
relevant events.
FAU_GEN.2 Enforces audit policies by
requiring logging of
information associated
with audited events.
FIA_UID.2 Supports audit policies by
associating user identity
with events.
FMT_MOF.1 (FMT.1) Enforces audit policies by
enabling logging of
relevant events.
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
73
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
Objectives Description SFRs Purpose
FMT_SMF.1 Supports audit policies by
requiring functions to enable
logging of relevant events.
FPT_STM.1 Supports audit policies by
requiring time stamps
associated with events.
O.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTEC
TED,
O.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORI
ZED
Logging and
authorized access to
audit events
FAU_GEN.1 Enforces audit policies by
requiring logging of
relevant events.
FAU_GEN.2 Enforces audit policies by
requiring logging of
information associated
with audited events.
FAU_SAR.1 Enforces audit policies by
giving the administrator a
way to read the logs that
are collected.
FAU_SAR.2 Enforces the audit policies
by preventing
unauthorized users from
reading the logs.
FAU_STG.1 Enforces the audit policies
by preventing
unauthorized modification
or deletion.
FAU_STG.4 Enforces the audit policies
by preventing loss of
newer audit trail data.
FIA_UID.2 Supports audit policies by
requiring user identification
FPT_STM.1 Supports audit policies by
requiring time stamps
associated with events.
O.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORI
ZED
Authorized access
to audit events
FIA_USB.1 Supports authorization by
distinguishing subject
security attributes associated
with user roles.
FMT_MOF.1 (FMT 1)
FMT_MOF.1 (FMT 2)
Supports audit policies by
restricting management
actions to administrators.
FMT_MTD.1(MGMT
1)
Enforces protection by
restricting access to the
audit records.
FMT_SMF.1 Supports audit policies by
requiring functions to enable
access to the audit records.
O.DOC.NO_DIS,
O.DOC.NO_ALT,
O.FUNC.NO_ALT,
O.PROT.NO_ALT,
O.CONF.NO_DIS,
O.CONF.NO_ALT
Protection of User
and TSF Data from
unauthorized
disclosure or
alteration
FCS_CKM.1 (SSL) Supports protection by
generating cryptographic
keys for SSL.
FCS_CKM.2 (SSL 1)
FCS_CKM.2 (SSL 2)
Supports protection by
distributing cryptographic
keys for SSL.
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
74
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
Objectives Description SFRs Purpose
FCS_COP.1 (SSL) Supports protection by
providing cryptographic
operations for SSL.
FCS_CKM.4 Supports protection by
providing cryptographic key
destruction.
FDP_UCT.1 (SSL) Supports protection by
providing confidentiality of
transmitted data and
functions.
FDP_UIT.1 (SSL) Supports protection by
providing integrity of
transmitted data and
functions.
FMT_MOF.1 (FMT 1)
FMT_MOF.1 (FMT 2)
Supports protection by
restricting management
actions to administrators.
FTP_ITC.1 Enforces protection by
requiring the use of
trusted channels for
communication of data
over Shared-medium
Interfaces.
FTP_TRP.1 (SSL) Supports protection by
providing a trusted
communications path.
6.7. Rationale for Security Assurance
Requirements
This Security Target has been developed Using the “U.S. Government Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices
Version 1.0 (IEEE Std. 2600.2-2009)” and related SFR packages, EAL2+ augmented with
ALC_FLR.2; which was created to describe Hardcopy Devices used in commercial information
processing environments that require a relatively high level of document security, operational
accountability and information assurance. The TOE environment will be exposed to only a low
level of risk because it is assumed that the TOE will be located in a restricted or monitored
environment that provides almost constant protection from unauthorized and unmanaged access
to the TOE and its data interfaces. Agents cannot physically access any nonvolatile storage
without disassembling the TOE. Agents have limited or no means of infiltrating the TOE with
code to effect a change and the TOE self-verifies its executable code to detect unintentional
malfunctions. As such, the Evaluation Assurance Level 2 is appropriate.
While IEEE Std. 2600.2-2009 augments EAL2 with ALC_FLR.2, Flaw reporting procedures,
this ST augments EAL2 with ALC_FLR.3, Systematic flaw remediation. ALC_FLR.3 is
hierarchical to ALC_FLR.2 and encompasses all requirements of ALC_FLR.2 plus some
additional requirements. ALC_FLR.3 ensures that instructions and procedures for the reporting
and remediation of identified security flaws are in place and their inclusion is expected by the
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
75
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
consumers of this TOE, and that consumers of this TOE are automatically notified of flaws and
changes to the TOE.
6.8. Rationale for Dependencies
6.8.1.Security Functional Requirement Dependencies
Table 25: SFR Dependencies Satisfied is a cross-reference of the functional components, their
related dependencies, and whether the dependency was satisfied.
Table 25: SFR Dependencies Satisfied
Functional
Component ID
Dependency (ies) Satisfied
FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 Yes
FAU_GEN.2
FAU_GEN.1 Yes
FIA_UID.1 Yes, hierarchically by FIA_UID.2
FAU_SAR.1 FAU_GEN.1 Yes
FAU_SAR.2 FAU_SAR.1 Yes
FAU_STG.1 FAU_GEN.1 Yes
FAU_STG.4 FAU_STG.1 Yes
FCS_CKM.1 (SSL)
FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1
Yes, FCS_CKM.2(SSL 1), FCS_CKM.2 (SSL 2) and
FCS_COP.1 (SSL)
FCS_CKM.4 Yes
FCS_CKM.2 (SSL 1)
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
Yes, FCS_CKM.1 (SSL)
FCS_CKM.4 Yes
FCS_CKM.2 (SSL 2)
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
Yes, FCS_CKM.1 (SSL)
FCS_CKM.4 Yes
FCS_COP.1 (SSL)
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
Yes, FCS_CKM.1 (SSL)
FCS_CKM.4 Yes
FCS_CKM.1 (IPSEC)
FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1
Yes, FCS_COP.1 (IPSEC)
FCS_CKM.4 Yes
FCS_COP.1 (IPSEC
1)
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
Yes, FCS_CKM.1 (IPSEC)
FCS_CKM.4 Yes
FCS_COP.1 (IPSEC
2)
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
Yes, FCS_CKM.1 (IPSEC)
FCS_CKM.4 Yes
FCS_CKM.1 (SNMP)
FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1
Yes, FCS_COP.1 (SNMP)
FCS_CKM.4 Yes
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
76
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
Functional
Component ID
Dependency (ies) Satisfied
FCS_COP.1 (SNMP)
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
Yes, FCS_CKM.1 (SNMP)
FCS_CKM.4 Yes
FCS_CKM.1 (UDE)
FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1
Yes, FCS_COP.1 (UDE)
FCS_CKM.4 Yes
FCS_COP.1 (UDE)
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
Yes, FCS_CKM.1 (UDE)
FCS_CKM.4 Yes
FCS_CKM.4
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
Yes, FCS_CKM.1 (SSL) (IPSEC) (SNMP) (UDE)
FDP_ACC.1(USER) FDP_ACF.1 Yes, FDP_ACF.1(USER)
FDP_ACC.1(FUNC) FDP_ACF.1 Yes, FDP_ACF.1(FUNC)
FDP_ACC.1 (MGMT) FDP_ACF.1 Yes, FDP_ACF.1 (MGMT)
FDP_ACF.1(USER)
FDP_ACC.1 Yes, FDP_ACC.1(USER)
FMT_MSA.3 Yes, FMT_MSA.3(USER)
FDP_ACF.1(FUNC)
FDP_ACC.1 Yes, FDP_ACC.1(FUNC)
FMT_MSA.3 Yes, FMT_MSA.3 (FUNC)
FDP_ACF.1 (MGMT)
FDP_ACC.1 Yes, FDP_ACC.1 (MGMT)
FMT_MSA.3 No12
FDP_IFC.1 (FILTER) FDP_IFF.1 Yes, FDP_IFF.1 (FILTER)
FDP_IFF.1 (FILTER)
FDP_IFC.1 Yes, FDP_IFC.1 (FILTER)
FMT_MSA.3 No13
FDP_RIP.1 (IOW 1) None
FDP_RIP.1 (IOW 2) None
FDP_UCT.1 (IPSEC)
FDP_ITC.1 or
FTP_TRP.1
Yes, FTP_TRP.1 (IPSEC)
FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1
Yes, FDP_ACC.1 (FUNC)
FDP_UCT.1 (SSL)
FTP_ITC.1 or
FTP_TRP.1
Yes, FTP_TRP.1 (SSL)
FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1
Yes, FDP_ACC.1 (FUNC)
FDP_UCT.1 (SNMP)
FTP_ITC.1 or
FTP_TRP.1
Yes, FTP_TRP.1 (SNMP)
FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1
Yes, FDP_ACC.1 (FUNC)
FDP_UIT.1 (IPSEC) FDP_ACC.1 or Yes, FDP_ACC.1 (FUNC)
12
The dependency of FDP_ACF.1 (MGMT) on FMT_MSA.3 is not met because none of these functions support “a) managing the group of roles
that can specify initial values; b) managing the permissive or restrictive setting of default values for a given access control SFP; c) management
of rules by which security attributes inherit specified values.” (CC Part 2 Page 106). The TOE does not give system administrators the option of
managing or specifying default role values, permissive or otherwise, for the creation of user accounts. It is for these reasons that the
dependencies on FMT_MSA.3 are not and cannot be expected to be met.
13
The dependency of FDP_IFF.1 (FILTER) on FMT_MSA.3 is not met because none of these functions support “a) managing the group of roles
that can specify initial values; b) managing the permissive or restrictive setting of default values for a given access control SFP; c) management
of rules by which security attributes inherit specified values.” (CC Part 2 Page 106). The TOE does not give system administrators the option of
specifying default values, permissive or otherwise. In fact, these features are configured and, with the exception of IP Filter rules, cannot be
modified by the system administrator other than to enable or disable them. It is for these reasons that the dependency on FMT_MSA.3 is not and
cannot be expected to be met.
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
77
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
Functional
Component ID
Dependency (ies) Satisfied
FDP_IFC.1
FTP_ITC.1 or
FTP_TRP.1
Yes, FTP_TRP.1 (IPSEC)
FDP_UIT.1 (SSL)
FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1
Yes, FDP_ACC.1 (FUNC)
FTP_ITC.1 or
FTP_TRP.1
Yes, FTP_TRP.1 (SSL)
FDP_UIT.1 (SNMP)
FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1
Yes, FDP_ACC.1 (FUNC)
FTP_ITC.1 or
FTP_TRP.1
Yes, FTP_TRP.1 (SNMP)
FIA_ATD.1 None
FIA_UAU.2 FIA_UID.1 Yes, hierarchically by FIA_UID.2
FIA_UAU.7 FIA_UAU.1 Yes, hierarchically by FIA_UAU.2
FIA_UID.2 None
FIA_USB.1 FIA_ATD.1 Yes
FMT_MOF.1 (FMT 1)
FMT_SMF.1 Yes
FMT_SMR.1 Yes
FMT_MOF.1 (FMT 2)
FMT_SMF.1 Yes
FMT_SMR.1 Yes
FMT_MSA.1(USER)
FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1
FDP_ACC.1 (USER)
FMT_SMF.1 Yes
FMT_SMR.1 Yes
FMT_MSA.1(FUNC)
FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1
FDP_ACC.1 (FUNC)
FMT_SMF.1 Yes
FMT_SMR.1 Yes
FMT_MSA.3(USER)
FMT_MSA.1 Yes, FMT_MSA.1(USER)
FMT_SMR.1 Yes
FMT_MSA.3(FUNC)
FMT_MSA.1 Yes, FMT_MSA.1(FUNC)
FMT_SMR.1 Yes
FMT_MTD.1(MGMT
1)
FMT_SMF.1 Yes
FMT_SMR.1 Yes
FMT_MTD.1(MGMT
2)
FMT_SMF.1 Yes
FMT_SMR.1 Yes
FMT_MTD.1
(FILTER)
FMT_SMF.1 Yes
FMT_SMR.1 Yes
FMT_MTD.1 (KEY)
FMT_SMF.1 Yes
FMT_SMR.1 Yes
FMT_SMF.1 None
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 Yes, hierarchically by FIA_UID.2
FPT_STM.1 None
FPT_TST.1 None
FPT_FDI_EXP.1
FMT_SMF.1 No14
FMT_SMR.1 No15
14
For this TOE, the restricted forwarding from the external interfaces to the network controller are architectural design features which cannot be
configured, hence the dependencies on FMT_SMF.1 is not met.
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
78
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
Functional
Component ID
Dependency (ies) Satisfied
FTA_SSL.3 None
FTP_ITC.1 None
FTP_TRP.1 (IPSEC) None
FTP_TRP.1 (SSL) None
FTP_TRP.1 (SNMP) None
6.8.2.Security Assurance Requirement Dependencies
SAR dependencies identified in the CC have been met by this ST as shown in Table 26.
Table 26: EAL2 (Augmented with ALC_FLR.3) SAR Dependencies Satisfied
Assurance
Component ID
Dependencies Satisfied
ADV_ARC.1 ADV_FSP.1,
ADV_TDS.1
Yes, hierarchically
Yes
ADV_FSP.2 ADV_TDS.1 Yes
ADV_TDS.1 ADV_FSP.2 Yes
AGD_OPE.1 ADV_FSP.1 Yes, hierarchically
AGD_PRE.1 None
ALC_CMC.2 ALC_CMS.1 Yes, hierarchically
ALC_CMS.2 None
ALC_DEL.1 None
ALC_FLR.3 None
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_ECD.1
ASE_INT.1
ASE_REQ.1
Yes
Yes
Yes, hierarchically
ASE_ECD.1 None
ASE_INT.1 None
ASE_OBJ.2 ASE_SPD.1 Yes
ASE_REQ.2 ASE_ECD.1
ASE_OBJ.2
Yes
Yes
ASE_SPD.1 None
ASE_TSS.1 ADV_FSP.1
ASE_INT.1
ASE_REQ.1
Yes, hierarchically
Yes
Yes, hierarchically
ATE_COV.1 ADV_FSP.2
ATE_FUN.1
Yes
Yes
ATE_FUN.1 ATE_COV.1 Yes
ATE_IND.2 ADV_FSP.2
AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1
ATE_COV.1
ATE_FUN.1
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
AVA_VAN.2 ADV_ARC.1
ADV_FSP.2
Yes
Yes
15
For this TOE, the restricted forwarding from the external interfaces to the network controller are architectural design features which cannot be
configured; hence the dependencies on FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1 are not met.
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
79
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
Assurance
Component ID
Dependencies Satisfied
ADV_TDS.1
AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1
Yes
Yes
Yes
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
80
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
7. TOE SUMMARY
SPECIFICATION
This section presents an overview of the security functions implemented by the TOE.
7.1. TOE Security Functions
This section presents the security functions performed by the TOE to satisfy the identified SFRs
in Sections 6.3 and 6.5. For reference, the TOE architecture is depicted in Figure 1.
 Image Overwrite (TSF_IOW)
 Information Flow Security (TSF_FLOW)
 System Authentication (TSF_AUT)
 Network Identification (TSF_NET_ID)
 Security Audit (TSF_FAU)
 Cryptographic Support (TSF_FCS)
 User Data Protection – SSL (TSF_FDP_SSL)
 User Data Protection – IP Filtering (TSF_FDP_FILTER)
 User Data Protection – IPSec (TSF_FDP_IPSec)
 Network Management Security (TSF_NET_MGMT)
 Security Management (TSF_FMT)
 User Data Protection - Disk Encryption (TSF_FDP_UDE)
7.1.1.Image Overwrite (TSF_IOW)
FDP_RIP.1 (IOW 1), FDP_RIP.1 (IOW 2)
The TOE implements an image overwrite security function to overwrite all temporary files
created during processing of jobs, files (images) of completed or deleted jobs or any files that are
deleted16
.
The network controller spools and processes documents to be printed or scanned. Temporary
files are created as a result of this processing on a reserved section of the hard disk drive. The
definition of this reserved section is statically stored within the TOE and cannot be manipulated.
Immediately after the job has completed, the files are overwritten, and this is called Immediate
Image Overwrite (IIO).
16
Files are stored inside mailboxes. They may be deleted by their owner through individual file deletions or deletion of the mailbox.
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
81
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
The embedded fax card buffers incoming and outgoing fax images in flash memory.
Immediately after an embedded fax job has completed, the files are overwritten.
The TOE automatically starts an IIO procedure for all abnormally terminated copy, print or scan
jobs stored on the HDD and fax jobs on the fax card flash memory prior to coming “on line”
when any of the following occurs: a reboot or once the MFD is turned back on after a power
failure/unorderly shutdown.
The image overwrite security function can also be invoked manually (on demand) by the system
administrator (ODIO). Once invoked, the ODIO cancels all print and scan jobs, halts the printer
interface (network), performs the overwrites, and then the network controller reboots. A
scheduling function allows ODIO to be executed on a recurring basis as set up by the System
Administrator.
A standard On Demand Image Overwrite (ODIO) overwrites all files written to temporary
storage areas of the HDD(s) and the temporary storage area of the Fax card flash memory. A full
ODIO overwrites those files as well as the Fax mailbox/dial directory (in Fax card flash
memory), and Scan to mailbox data.
An ODIO cannot be aborted from either the WebUI or Local UI.
TSF_IOW overwrites the contents of the reserved section on the hard disk using a three pass
overwrite procedure. It overwrites the contents of the embedded fax card flash memory using a
single-pass zeroization method.
For example, LanFax jobs are overwritten (using three pass overwrite) on the shared hard disk
after the image is transferred from the Network Controller to Copy Controller, and zeroized on
the fax card flash memory once the image has been sent.
7.1.2.Information Flow Security (TSF_FLOW)
FPT_FDI_EXP.1
The only physical Shared-medium interface of the TOE is the Ethernet port directly controlled
by the network controller software.
The TOE controls and restricts the data/information flow from the Local User Interface (LUI),
document scanner and document feeder to the network controller software (which covers the
information flow to and from the internal network). All data and/or commands received from
these interfaces are processed and in most cases transformed by the copy controller before being
submitted to the network controller. The network controller further processes the data before
sending them to the internal network.
The TOE provides separation between the optional FAX processing board and the network
interface and therefore prevents an interconnection between the PSTN and the internal network.
This separation is realized in software as the network process has no method or API with which
to directly connect to the FAX processing board without the use of the copy process as an
intermediary. All internal command calls (API) and response messages for both the Network
Controller process and the FAX software process are statically defined within the TOE. No user
or system administrator is able to change their formats or functionalities.
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
82
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
The Fax software runs two independent processes, for sending and receiving job data through the
fax card respectively. There is no internal communication between these two processes.
The same job data will never be active on both the fax interface and network interface at the
same time. For network interface to fax interface (LanFax) jobs, the entire job must be received
as an image and buffered in memory before it is sent out through the fax interface. Likewise, for
fax interface to network interface (fax forwarding to email) jobs, the entire job must be received
from the fax interface and buffered in controller memory before it is transformed by the copy
controller process into an email attachment and sent out through the network interface.
7.1.3.Authentication (TSF_ AUT)
FIA_ATD.1, FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UAU.7, FIA_UID.2, FIA_USB.1, FMT_SMR.1, FTA_SSL.3
A user must authenticate by entering a username and password prior to being granted access to
the Local UI or the Web UI. While the user is typing the password, the TOE obscures17
each
character entered.
Upon successful authentication, users are granted access based on their role and predefined
privileges. Only a system administrator is allowed full access to the TOE including all the system
administration functions. Each common user’s access is determined by which function (copy,
scan, print, fax etc.) they have permission for.
If configured for local authentication the system requires the system administrator to enter a
username and password for each user. The system will authenticate the user against an internal
database.
By default, the Local UI will terminate any session that has been inactive for 60 minutes. By
default, the Web UI will terminate any session that has been inactive for 15 minutes. The system
administrator can configure both the Local UI and Web UI session timeouts to terminate an
inactive session after some other period of time.
7.1.4.Network Identification (TSF_NET_ID)
FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UAU.7, FIA_UID.2, FIA_USB.1, FMT_SMR.1, FTA_SSL.3
As an alternative to TSF_AUT, the TOE allows user name and password for a user to be
validated by a designated authentication server (a trusted remote IT entity). The user is not
required to login to the network; account information entered at Local UI or Web UI of the TOE
is authenticated at the server instead of the TOE. The remote authentication services supported
by the TOE in the evaluated configuration are: CAC authentication, LDAP v4, Kerberos v5
(Solaris) and Kerberos v5 (Windows 2000/2003).
When a user authenticates using the CAC method a PIN number is used instead of a password.
The PIN is authenticated by the CAC.
The TOE maintains the username from a successful authentication during the context of the job,
and this value is entered into the audit log as the user name.
17
The LUI obscures input with the asterisk character. The specific character used to obscure input at the WebUI is browser dependent
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
83
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
By default, the Local UI will terminate any session that has been inactive for 60 minutes. By
default, the Web UI will terminate any session that has been inactive for 15 minutes. The system
administrator can configure both the Local UI and Web UI session timeouts to terminate an
inactive session after some other period of time.
7.1.5.Security Audit (TSF_FAU)
FAU_GEN.1, FAU_GEN.2, FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.2, FAU_STG.1, FAU_STG.4,
FMT_MTD.1 (MGMT1), FPT_STM.1
The TOE generates audit logs that track events/actions (e.g., print/scan/fax job submission) to
logged-in users, and each log entry contains a timestamp. The audit logs are only available to
TOE administrators and can be downloaded via the web interface for viewing and analysis.
The audit log tracks user identification and authentication, session timeout, system administrator
actions, and failure of trusted channels. By adopting a policy of regularly downloading and
saving the audit logs, users can satisfy the tracking requirements for transmission of data outside
of the local environment, as required by such legislation as HIPAA, Sarbanes-Oxley, Gramm-
Leach-Bliley, etc.
The Web UI presents the only access to the audit log; the audit log is not viewable from the
Local UI. The system administrator must be logged in to download the audit log.
Application Note: For print and LanFax jobs not submitted from the web UI, the network
username associated with the logged in user at the client workstation will be recorded in the audit
log.
7.1.6.Cryptographic Operations (TSF_FCS)
FCS_CKM.1 (SSL), FCS_CKM.2 (SSL 1), FCS_CKM.2 (SSL 2), FCS_COP.1 (SSL),
FCS_CKM.1 (IPSEC), FCS_COP.1 (IPSEC 1), FCS_COP.1 (IPSEC 2), FCS_CKM.1
(SNMP), FCS_COP.1 (SNMP), FCS_CKM.4
The TOE utilizes data encryption (AES, RSA, RC4, DES, TDES) and cryptographic checksum
generation and secure hash computation (MD5 and SHA-1), as provided by the OpenSSL
cryptographic libraries, to support secure communication between the TOE and remote trusted
products. Those packages include provisions for the generation and destruction of cryptographic
keys and checksum/hash values and meet the following standards: 3DES – FIPS-42-2, FIPS-74,
FIPS-81; MD5 – RFC1321; SHA-1 – FIPS-186, AES-256-FIPS-197 SSLv3 and SNMPv3.
7.1.7.User Data Protection – SSL (TSF_FDP_SSL)
FCS_CKM.1 (SSL), FCS_CKM.2 (SSL 1), FCS_CKM.2 (SSL 2), FCS_COP.1 (SSL),
FDP_UCT.1 (SSL), FDP_UIT.1 (SSL), FTP_ITC.1, FTP_TRP.1 (SSL), FMT_MTD.1
(KEY)
The TOE provides support for SSL through the use of the OpenSSL cryptographic libraries, and
allows the TOE to act as either an SSL server or SSL client, depending on the function the TOE
is performing. SSL must be enabled before setting up either IPSec, SNMPv3, or before the
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
84
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
system administrator can retrieve the audit log. The SSL functionality also permits the TOE to be
securely administered from the Web UI, as well as, being used to secure the connection between
the TOE and the repository server when utilizing the remote scanning option. As provided for in
the SSLv3 standard, the TOE will negotiate with the clients to select the encryption standard to
be used for the session, to include operating in backward-compatible modes for clients that do
not support SSLv3. The TOE creates and enforces the security policy model, “All
communications to the Web server will utilize SSL (HTTPS).”
All information that is transmitted between the TOE and a remote trusted product using SSL is
protected from both disclosure and modification. The disclosure protection is accomplished by
the symmetric encryption of the data being transferred using the DES EDE (aka, Triple DES –
defined in FIPS-46-3) cipher or the AES (FIPS-197) cipher, and a per connection key generated
as part of the SSLv3 protocol. The modification protection is accomplished by the use of the
HMAC (Hashed Message Authentication Code – defined by IETF RFC2104) that is incorporated
into the SSLv3 record transfer protocol.
Once SSL is enabled on the TOE web services, requests from clients must be received through
HTTPS.
Additionally, the TOE can act as a web client in the case of workflow scanning. When acting as
an SSL client to SSL scan repository, the TOE can validate the remote server’s certificate against
a trusted CA; in this configuration, if it cannot validate the identity of the certificate received
from the remote server it will not communicate with the scan repository.
7.1.8. User Data Protection – IPSec (TSF_FDP_IPSec)
FCS_CKM.1 (IPSEC), FCS_COP.1 (IPSEC 1), FCS_COP.1 (IPSEC 2), FDP_UCT.1
(IPSEC), FDP_UIT.1 (IPSEC), FTP_ITC.1, FTP_TRP.1 (IPSEC), FMT_MTD.1 (KEY)
The TOE implements the IPSec SFP to ensure user data protection for all objects, information,
and operations handled or performed by the TOE through the lpr and port 9100 network
interfaces. Printing clients initiate the establishment of a security association with the MFD.
The MFD establishes a security association with the printing client using IPSec. Thereafter, all
IP-based traffic to and from this destination will pass through the IPSec tunnel until either end
powers down, or resets, after which IPSec must be reestablished. The use of IPSec for
communication with a particular destination is based on the presumed address of the printing
client.
IPSec secures packet flows through two protocols – Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and
Authentication Header (AH). ESP provides authentication, data confidentiality and message
integrity. The ESP extension header provides origin authenticity, integrity, and confidentiality of
a packet. AH provides authentication and message integrity, but does not offer confidentiality.
The AH guarantees connectionless integrity and data origin authentication of IP datagram.
Note: The TOE cannot enforce the IPSec (TSF_FDP_IPSec) security function when it is
configured for AppleTalk or IPX networks.
7.1.9.User Data Protection – Disk Encryption (TSF_FDP_UDE)
FCS_CKM.1 (UDE), FCS_COP.1 (UDE), FCS_CKM.4
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
85
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
The TOE utilizes data encryption (AES) and cryptographic checksum generation and secure hash
computation (SHA-1), as provided by the Loop_AES cryptographic libraries, to support
encryption and decryption of designated portions of the hard disk where user files may be stored.
Those packages include provisions for the generation and destruction of cryptographic keys.
AES data encryption and its associated cryptographic keys are used to encrypt and decrypt the
hard drive partition where user jobs are stored or temporarily stored during processing.
7.1.10. User Data Protection – IP Filtering (TSF_FDP_FILTER)
FDP_IFC.1 (FILTER), FDP_IFF.1 (FILTER), FMT_MTD.1 (FILTER)
The TOE provides the ability for the system administrator to configure a network information
flow control policy based on a configurable rule set. The information flow control policy
(IPFilter SFP) is defined by the system administrator through specifying a series of rules to
“accept,” “deny,” or “drop” packets. These rules include a listing of IP addresses that will be
allowed to communicate with the TOE. Additionally rules can be generated specifying filtering
options based on port number given in the received packet.
Note: The TOE cannot enforce the IP Filtering (TSF_FDP_FILTER) security function
when it is configured for IPv6, AppleTalk or IPX networks.
7.1.11. Network Management Security (TSF_NET_MGMT)
FCS_CKM.1 (SNMP), FCS_COP.1 (SNMP), FDP_UCT.1 (SNMP), FDP_UIT.1 (SNMP),
FMT_MTD.1 (KEY), FTP_TRP.1 (SNMP)
The TOE supports SNMPv3 as part of its security solution through the SNMPSec SFP. The
SNMPv3 protocol is used to authenticate each SNMP message, as well as provide encryption of
the data as described in RFC 3414.
As implemented, both an authentication and privacy (encryption) password must be set up both
at the device and at the manager. Both passwords must be a minimum of 8 characters. SNMP
uses SHA-1 for authentication and single-DES in Cipher Block Chaining mode for encryption.
SNMPv3 utilizes the OpenSSL crypto library for the authentication and encryption functions.
7.1.12. Security Management (TSF_FMT)
FDP_ACC.1 (USER), FDP_ACC.1 (FUNC), FDP_ACC.1 (MGMT), FDP_ACF.1 (USER),
FDP_ACF.1 (FUNC), FDP_ACF.1 (MGMT), FIA_ATD.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_MOF.1
(FMT 1), FMT_MOF.1 (FMT 2), FMT_MSA.1 (USER), FMT_MSA.1 (FUNC),
FMT_MSA.3 (USER), FMT_MSA.3 (FUNC), FMT_MTD.1 (MGMT1), FMT_MTD.1
(MGMT2), FTP_TST.1
Only authenticated system administrators can enable or disable the Image Overwrite function,
change the system administrator password, and invoke an On Demand Image Overwrite
operation.
While IIO can be disabled, doing so will remove the TOE from its evaluated configuration.
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
86
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
Additionally, only authenticated system administrators can assign authorization privileges to
users, create user IDs for local authentication, establish a recurrence schedule for On Demand
Image Overwrite, enable/disable SSL support, enable/disable and configure IPSec,
enable/disable and configure SNMPv3, create/install X.509 certificates, enable/disable and
download the audit log, enable/disable and configure (rules) IP filtering, enable/disable disk
encryption, enable/disable and configure use of Common Access Cards, configure inactive
session timeout settings, verify the integrity of TOE software binary code, and enable/disable
and configure 802.1x.
Only authenticated users with the necessary privileges are allowed to perform copy, print, scan
or fax on the TOE via the Web UI or the LUI.
All Users who are authorized to connect to the TOE can submit print or LanFax jobs.
All System Administrators are allowed full access to perform copy, print, scan or fax operations
on the TOE.
Copy has to be performed at the local user interface. A user can only read physical copies of the
documents (D.DOC +CPY Read). During job setup, a copy job (D.FUNC +CPY Delete, Modify)
or image (D.DOC +CPY Read, Delete) can be read, modified or deleted. Once a job is
committed, the job (D.FUNC +CPY Delete, Modify) can only be canceled (deleted) during its
execution. Once completed, the job is removed.
Print jobs can be submitted remotely via printing protocols (e.g. lpr, port 9100) or from the
WebUI using https. Once submitted to the TOE, there is no way for anyone to modify the job
(D.FUNC +PRT Modify) or the document (D.DOC +PRT Delete). Each print job has an
assigned pass code18
which is only known to the job owner. Only the job owner can release
printing of the document (D.DOC +PRT Read) or delete the print job (D.FUNC +PTR Delete)
using this pass code at the local user interface before the job is executed on the TOE. The owner
may also choose to delete a job (submitted from the Web UI) through Web UI before it is
released.
A system administrator has the capability for releasing (D.DOC +PRT Read) any print job on the
TOE through its authenticated Local UI session. A system administrator also has the capability
for deleting (D.FUNC +PRT Delete) any print job on the TOE through its authenticated Local UI
or Web UI19
session.
Once completed, a print job is removed.
Documents can only be scanned at the Local User Interface. During job setup, document image
(D.DOC +SCN Read, Delete) may be read or deleted. Once the job is committed, the owner may
send the image via email, transfer the image to a remote (SSL scan) repository or keep the image
in their private mailbox. (Scan to) Mailboxes are created and owned by individual users. Only
the owner is allowed to locate and access the mailbox, and this access to mailboxes is further
restricted with a pass code20
which the owner creates and owns. System Administrators have
access to all the (scan) mailboxes. (Scan) Images saved in a mailbox (D.DOC +DSR and +SCN
18
A four to ten characters numeric string assigned by the job owner during print job creation.
19
At the Web UI, the the System Administrator can only delete print jobs submitted from the Web UI.
20
An alphanumeric string with length between one to fifty characters owned and managed by the (scan to) mail box owner (creator).
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
87
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
Read, Delete) may only be downloaded via the Web UI or deleted. A user with proper access
may choose to delete the mailbox together with all images stored inside the mailbox.
Faxes can be submitted at the Local User Interface or remotely as LanFax (through the same
interfaces as for printing). During job setup, document image (D.DOC +FAXOUT Read,
Delete) created may be read or deleted. Once a job (D.FUNC +FAXOUT Delete) is submitted,
only a system administrator can delete the Job before it is fully completed, e.g. in the case of
delayed send.
Access to the received Faxes (D.DOC +FAXIN Read, Delete) is restricted to the system
administrators. All received faxes will be stored locally and assigned a (system administrator)
predefined pass code. The SA can print or delete secure received faxes by entering the
appropriate pass code. Once printed, the faxes are automatically deleted. Alternatively, the
system administrator may also choose designate email addresses for receiving fax images. Once
the fax job is forwarded as an attachment to an email, the job is automatically deleted.
Following recommendations from the user guidance document, an authenticated system
administrator can perform various tests to verify the integrity of the TSF.
During start up of the TOE after a reboot or power reset, an IIO is performed on U.DOC
remaining inside the TOE’s hard drive and the fax flash memory. Upon Hard drive IIO
completion, for a randomly picked contiguous block of disk space which is 10% the size of the
overall overwritten image, the resulting binary data pattern on the hard drive is compared against
the expected results, and any mismatch would be reported. Upon fax flash memory IIO
completion, the TOE will attempt to access the files that should be overwritten and report any
abnormalities. Also during initial start up, the version number of the software loaded is compared
to the expected software version number; any corruption of this data will be reported.
During normal operation of the TOE, integrity of the IP filtering table can be verified through
manual inspection from the Web UI, by the system administrator.. The System Administrator can
also verify the integrity of the TOE software image through the Web UI using a software
verification feature.
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
88
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
8. GLOSSARY
(NORMATIVE)
For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.
IEEE Std. 100, The Authoritative Dictionary of IEEE Standards, Seventh Edition,
should be referenced for terms not defined in this annex.
Access: Interaction between an entity and an object that results in the flow or
modification of data.
Access Control: Security service that controls the use of hardware and software
resources and the disclosure and modification of stored or communicated data.
Accountability: Property that allows activities in an IT system to be traced to the
entity responsible for the activity.
Administrator: A User who has been specifically granted the authority to
manage some portion or all of the TOE and whose actions may affect the TSP.
Administrators may possess special privileges that provide capabilities to override
portions of the TSP.
Asset: An entity upon which the TOE Owner, User, or manager of the TOE
places value.
Authentication: Security measure that verifies a claimed identity.
Authentication data: Information used to verify a claimed identity.
Authorization: Permission, granted by an entity authorized to do so, to perform
functions and access data.
Authorized User: An authenticated User who may, in accordance with the TSP,
perform an operation, This includes Users who are permitted to perform some
operations but may be able to attempt or perform operations that are beyond those
permissions.
Availability: (A) A condition in which Authorized Users have access to
information, functionality and associated assets when requested. (B) Timely
(according to a defined metric), reliable access to IT resources.
Channel: Mechanisms through which data can be transferred into and out of the
TOE.
Confidentiality: (A) A condition in which information is accessible only to those
authorized to have access. (B) A security policy pertaining to disclosure of data.
Enterprise: An operational context typically consisting of centrally-managed
networks of IT products protected from direct Internet access by firewalls.
Enterprise environments generally include medium to large businesses, certain
governmental agencies, and organizations requiring managed telecommuting
systems and remote offices
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
89
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
Evaluation Assurance Level: An assurance package, consisting of assurance
requirements drawn from CC Part 3, representing a point on the CC predefined
assurance scale.
External Interface: A non-hardcopy interface where either the input is being
received from outside the TOE or the output is delivered to a destination outside
the TOE.
Function: an entity in the TOE that performs processing, storage, or transmission
of data that may be present in the TOE.
Hardcopy Device (HCD): A system producing or utilizing a physical
embodiment of an electronic document or image. These systems include printers,
scanners, fax machines, digital copiers, MFPs (multifunction peripherals), MFDs
(multifunction devices), “all-in-ones”, and other similar products. See also:
multifunction device.
Hardcopy Output Handler: Mechanisms for transferring User Document Data
in hardcopy form out of the HCD.
Identity: A representation (e.g., a string) uniquely identifying an Authorized
User, which can either be the full or abbreviated name of that User or a
pseudonym.
Information assurance: Information operations that protect and defend
information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity,
authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. This includes providing for
restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and
reaction capabilities.
Information Technology (IT): The hardware, firmware and software used as part
of a system to collect, create, communicate, compute, disseminate, process, store
or control data or information.
Integrity: A) A condition in which data has not been changed or destroyed in an
unauthorized way. (B) A security policy pertaining to the corruption of data and
security function mechanisms.
Job: A document processing task submitted to the hardcopy device. A single
processing task may process one or more documents.
Multifunction Device (MFD) and Multifunction Product (MFP): A hardcopy
device that fulfills multiple purposes by using multiple functions in different
combinations to replace several, single function devices.
Nobody: A pseudo-role that cannot be assigned to any User.
Nonvolatile storage: Computer storage that is not cleared when the power is
turned off.
Normal User: A User who is authorized to perform User Document Data
processing functions of the TOE.
Object: A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
90
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
Operation: A specific type of action performed by a subject on an object.
Operational Environment: The total environment in which a TOE operates,
including the consideration of the value of assets and controls for operational
accountability, physical security and personnel.
Operator Panel: A local human interface used to operate the HCD. It typically
consists of a keypad, keyboard, or other controls, and a display device.
Organizational Security Policy (OSP): A set of security rules, procedures, or
guidelines imposed (or presumed to be imposed) now and/or in the future by an
actual or hypothetical organization in the operational environment.
Original Document Handler: Mechanisms for transferring User Document Data
in hardcopy form into the HCD.
Own or Ownership: May refer to a User Document or to User Function Data
associated with .processing a User Document. Depending upon the
implementation of conforming TOE applications, the Owner of a User Function
Data associated with a User Document may be different or may have different
access control rules. These should be specified in a conforming Security Target.
Private-medium interface: Mechanism for exchanging data that (1) use wired or
wireless electronic methods over a communications medium which, in
conventional practice, is not accessed by multiple simultaneous users; or, (2) use
Operator Panel and displays that are part of the TOE.
Protected: A condition in which data has not been changed or destroyed in an
unauthorized way.
Removable nonvolatile storage: nonvolatile storage that is part of an evaluated
TOE but is designed to be removed from the TOE by authorized personnel. See
also Nonvolatile storage.
Security attribute: A property of subjects, users (including external IT products),
objects, information, sessions and/or resources that is used in defining the SFRs
and whose values are used in enforcing the SFRs.
Security Function Policy (SFP): A set of rules describing specific security
behavior enforced by the TSF and expressible as a set of SFRs.
Security Functional Requirement (SFR): A functional requirement which is
taken from Part 2 of the Common Criteria and provide the mechanisms to enforce
the security policy.
Security Target (ST): An implementation-dependent statement of security needs
for a specific identified TOE.
SFR package: A named set of security functional requirements.
Shared-medium interface: Mechanism for transmitting or receiving data that
uses wired or wireless network or non-network electronic methods over a
communications medium which, in conventional practice, is or can be
simultaneously accessed by multiple users.
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
91
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
Subject: An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation (TOE): A set of software, firmware and/or hardware
possibly accompanied by guidance.
Telephone line: An electrical interface used to connect the TOE to the public
switch telephone network for transmitting and receiving facsimiles.
Threat: Capabilities, intentions and attack methods of adversaries, or any
circumstance or event, with the potential to violate the TOE security policy.
TSF Data: Data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the operation of the
TOE.
TSF Confidential Data: Assets for which either disclosure or alteration by a User
who is not an Administrator or the owner of the data would have an effect on the
operational security of the TOE.
TSF Protected Data: Assets for which alteration by a User who is not an
Administrator or the owner of the data would have an effect on the operational
security of the TOE, but for which disclosure is acceptable.
TOE Owner: A person or organizational entity responsible for protecting TOE
assets and establishing related security policies.
TOE security functionality (TSF): A set consisting of all hardware, software,
and firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of
the SFRs.
User: An entity (human user or external IT entity) outside the TOE that interacts
with the TOE.
User Data: Data created by and for the User, that do not affect the operation of
the TOE security functionality.
User Document Data: The asset that consists of the information contained in a
user’s document. This includes the original document itself in either hardcopy or
electronic form, image data, or residually-stored data created by the hardcopy
device while processing an original document and printed hardcopy output.
User Function Data: The asset that consists of the information about a user’s
document or job to be processed by the HCD.
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
92
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
9. ACRONYMS
(INFORMATIVE)
For the purposes of this document, the following acronyms and definitions apply.
IEEE Std. 100, The Authoritative Dictionary of IEEE Standards, Seventh Edition,
should be referenced for terms not defined in this annex.
Table 27: Acronyms
Acronym Definition
A. assumption (when used in hierarchical naming)
ADMIN. administrator (when used in hierarchical naming)
ALT alteration
CC Common Criteria
C/IA IEEE Computer Society Information Assurance
CONF. confidential (when used in hierarchical naming)
CPY copy
D. data (when used in hierarchical naming)
DIS disclosure
DOC. document (when used in hierarchical naming)
DSR document storage and retrieval
EAL evaluation assurance level
F. Function (when used in hierarchical naming)
FAX facsimile
FUNC. function (when used in hierarchical naming)
HCD hardcopy device
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IOT Image Output Terminal
IPP Internet Printing Protocol
IT information technology
LPR Line Printer Remote
MFD multifunctional device
MFP multifunctional product / peripheral / printer
NVS nonvolatile storage
O. security objective (of the TOE) (when used in hierarchical naming)
OE. security objective (of the operational environment) (when used in hierarchical naming)
OSP organizational security policy
P. organizational security policy (when used in hierarchical naming)
PP protection profile
PROT. protected (when used in hierarchical naming)
PRT print
SCN scan
SFP security function policy
SFR security functional requirement
SMI shared-medium interface
ST security target
Std standard
T. threat (when used in hierarchical naming)
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
93
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
Acronym Definition
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE security functionality
TSP TOE security policy
U. user (when used in hierarchical naming)
Xerox ColorQube™ 9201/9202/9203 Security Target
94
Copyright
2012 Xerox Corporation, All rights reserved
10. BIBLIOGRAPH
Y
(INFORMATIVE)
[B1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Version 3.1 Release 1 - Part 1: Introduction and General Model21
[B2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Version 3.1 Release 2 - Evaluation Methodology22
[B3] IEEE Std. 100, The Authoritative Dictionary of IEEE Standards Terms,
Seventh Edition, New York, Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers, Inc.23
21
Available from: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ccfiles/CCPART1V3.1R1.pdf
22
Available from: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ccfiles/CEMV3.1R2.pdf
23
IEEE publications are available from the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 445 Hoes Lane, Piscataway,
NJ 08854, USA (http://standards.ieee.org)