Riverbed Technology Security Target
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Riverbed Technology
Riverbed SteelHead CX with RiOS 9.1.4
Security Target
December 2016
199 Fremont Street
San Francisco, CA 94105
Phone: (415) 247-8801
http://www.riverbed.com
Document prepared by:
Ark Infosec Labs, Inc.
www.arkinfosec.net
Document prepared for:
1410 Blair Place, 7th floor
Ottawa, ON K1J 9B9, Canada
www.cgi.com/securitylab
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Document History
Version Date Author Description
1.0 Jan 18, 2016 L Turner Release for evaluation.
1.1 Feb 25, 2016 L Turner Address evaluator observations.
1.2 Mar 21, 2016 L Turner Address evaluator observations.
1.3 Mar 22, 2016 L Turner Address evaluator observations.
1.4 Jun 20, 2016 L Turner Address evaluator observations.
1.5 July 28, 2016 M Lanoue TOE Version update.
1.6 Aug 11, 2016 L Turner Clarify user roles.
1.7 Nov 8, 2016 L Turner Address evaluator observations.
1.8 Dec 12, 2016 L Turner Final clarifications.
1.9 Dec 15, 2016 L Turner Update guidance references.
2.0 Dec 19, 2016 L Turner Finalized for certification.
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction............................................................................................................................ 5
1.1 Overview ......................................................................................................................... 5
1.2 Identification.................................................................................................................... 5
1.3 Conformance Claims ...................................................................................................... 5
1.4 Terminology .................................................................................................................... 5
2 TOE Description..................................................................................................................... 7
2.1 Type ................................................................................................................................ 7
2.2 Overview and Usage....................................................................................................... 7
2.3 Security Functions .......................................................................................................... 9
2.4 Physical Scope.............................................................................................................. 10
2.5 Logical Scope................................................................................................................ 14
3 Security Problem Definition ............................................................................................... 15
3.1 Threats.......................................................................................................................... 15
3.2 Organizational Security Policies ................................................................................... 15
3.3 Assumptions.................................................................................................................. 15
4 Security Objectives ............................................................................................................. 17
4.1 Objectives for the Operational Environment................................................................. 17
4.2 Objectives for the TOE.................................................................................................. 17
5 Security Requirements ....................................................................................................... 19
5.1 Conventions .................................................................................................................. 19
5.2 Extended Components Definition ................................................................................. 19
5.3 Functional Requirements.............................................................................................. 19
5.4 Assurance Requirements.............................................................................................. 29
6 TOE Summary Specification .............................................................................................. 31
6.1 Security Audit................................................................................................................ 31
6.2 Secure Communications............................................................................................... 31
6.3 User Data Protection..................................................................................................... 33
6.4 Security Management ................................................................................................... 33
6.5 Cryptographic Module................................................................................................... 35
7 Rationale............................................................................................................................... 36
7.1 Security Objectives Rationale....................................................................................... 36
7.2 Security Requirements Rationale ................................................................................. 38
7.3 TOE Summary Specification Rationale ........................................................................ 45
List of Tables
Table 1: Evaluation identifiers .......................................................................................................... 5
Table 2: Terminology........................................................................................................................ 5
Table 3: TOE Appliance Models .................................................................................................... 13
Table 4: TOE Guidance Documents .............................................................................................. 13
Table 5: Threats ............................................................................................................................. 15
Table 6: Assumptions..................................................................................................................... 15
Table 7: Operational environment objectives................................................................................. 17
Table 8: Security objectives ........................................................................................................... 17
Table 9: Summary of SFRs............................................................................................................ 19
Table 10: Assurance Requirements............................................................................................... 29
Table 11: Security Audit SFRs ....................................................................................................... 31
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Table 12: Security Communication SFRs ...................................................................................... 32
Table 13: User Data Protection SFRs............................................................................................ 33
Table 14: Security Management SFRs .......................................................................................... 34
Table 15: Cryptographic Module SFRs.......................................................................................... 35
Table 16: Security Objectives Mapping.......................................................................................... 36
Table 17: Suitability of Security Objectives.................................................................................... 36
Table 18: Security Requirements Mapping.................................................................................... 38
Table 19: Suitability of SFRs.......................................................................................................... 39
Table 20: Dependencies ................................................................................................................ 43
Table 21: Map of SFRs to TSS Security Functions ....................................................................... 45
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1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
1 Riverbed SteelHead CX with RiOS 9.1.4 is a Wide Area Network (WAN) optimization
solution designed to reduce bandwidth and increase performance of network
dependent applications.
2 This Security Target (ST) defines the Riverbed SteelHead CX with RiOS 9.1.4
Target of Evaluation (TOE) for the purposes of Common Criteria (CC) evaluation.
1.2 Identification
Table 1: Evaluation identifiers
Target of
Evaluation
Riverbed SteelHead CX with RiOS 9.1.4
Security Target Riverbed SteelHead CX with RiOS 9.1.4 Security Target, v2.0
1.3 Conformance Claims
3 This ST supports the following conformance claims:
a) CC version 3.1 Release 4
b) CC Part 2 conformant
c) CC Part 3 conformant
d) Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 2 augmented (ALC_FLR.1)
1.4 Terminology
Table 2: Terminology
Term Definition
API Application Programming Interface
CC Common Criteria
CLI Command Line Interface
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
GUI Graphical User Interface
LZW Lempel-Ziv-Welch compression
OSP Organizational Security Policy
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Term Definition
PP Protection Profile
RBM User Role Based Management User
SDR Scalable Data Referencing
SFP Security Function Policy
ST Security Target
TA Transaction Acceleration
TOE Target of Evaluation
TP Transaction Prediction
TSF TOE Security Functionality
WAN Wide Area Network
WDS Wide Area Data Services - application acceleration, WAN
optimization, Wide Area File Services, QoS, traffic shaping and
web caching.
QoS Quality of Service
RiOS Riverbed Optimization System
VWE Virtual Window Expansion
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2 TOE Description
2.1 Type
4 The TOE is a network appliance, OS, and application software (RiOS) that provide
WAN optimization. The TOE type is WAN Optimization.
2.2 Overview and Usage
5 The TOE transparently applies a proprietary algorithm to optimize performance of
network traffic and applications across an enterprise network. The TOE optimizes
only outbound traffic. However, in a typical deployment the SteelHead CX is
deployed in pairs, with each member of the pair optimizing its outbound traffic to
other. In this typical deployment, the TOE communicates with a peer SteelHead CX
at the other end of the WAN.
6 The TOE uses TLS to protect optimized user traffic across the WAN. Underlying
cryptography is implemented by a Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS)
140-2 validated cryptography module.
7 The TOE provides QoS, which allows administrators to control the prioritization of
different types of network traffic and to ensure that SteelHead CXs give certain
network traffic priority over other types of traffic. In addition to standard QoS
services, the SteelHead CX offers a QoS service that allows administrators to set the
minimum bandwidth for certain applications that require a constant data rate. The
TOE is able to provide these applications with the minimum acceptable bandwidth
the applications require because the TOE separates bandwidth and priority in
defining QoS rules. In addition to QoS, the Path Selection feature can route traffic
over different links based on established rules.
8 The TOE can be deployed in a number of configurations depending on the individual
requirements of the network where the TOE is being deployed. A typical deployment
called Physical In-Path deployment is shown below. In the Physical In-Path
deployment, the Steelhead Appliance is located physically in the data stream
between clients and servers. Other deployment scenarios are depicted and
explained in the Riverbed Steelhead Appliance Deployment Guide.
9 The SteelHead CX’s management interfaces are role-based and are restricted to
authorized administrators. The SteelHead CX’s management and access control
functions control access to the various commands available through a Command
Line Interface (CLI) and a web-based Graphical User Interface (GUI). Each
interface provides identification and authentication functionality for administrators.
The SteelHead CX is transparent to end users.
10 Figure 1 below shows the details of the Physical In-Path deployment configuration of
the TOE.
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Figure 1: Physical In-Path Configuration
2.2.1 Key Concepts
11 This section presents the key concepts necessary to understanding the way the
SteelHead CX functions. The SteelHead CX works through Transaction
Acceleration (TA). TA is composed of three components: Scalable Data
Referencing (SDR), Virtual Window Expansion (VWE), and Transaction Prediction
(TP).
2.2.1.1 Scalable Data Referencing
12 SDR refers to the proprietary algorithm the TOE uses to optimize bandwidth. SDR
breaks up TCP data into data chunks that the TOE stores in a data store (non-
volatile memory). The TOE assigns a unique integer label as a reference to each
data chunk, and then sends the reference and data chunk to the peer SteelHead CX
across the WAN. If the TOE must transmit the same byte sequence again, the TOE
sends the integer reference instead. The peer SteelHead CX uses the reference to
reconstruct the original data chunk. The TOE and its peer maintain the correlation of
data to references in their respective data stores in a structure known as a secure
vault.
13 When the TOE first sends data across a network, all data and labels are new and
are sent to the SteelHead CX on the far side of the network. The TOE creates new
labels whenever the TOE must send new data chunks across the network. If the
TOE has already sent a data chunk across the network, the TOE only sends the
reference in place of the data chunk.
14 One use of the SteelHead CX is to optimize files being sent across the network.
Different files from either the same or different applications can share the same
reference if the underlying bits are common to both (for example, if a text file and an
executable file both contain the bit sequence 01011101). The underlying bits that
compose files might be the same if the same text is used in multiple files, or if two
different applications code different information with the same binary sequences.
15 The TOE compresses the data and accompanying references with conventional
compression algorithms (such as Lempel-Ziv-Welch (LZW)) if the compression will
improve performance.
2.2.1.2 Virtual Window Expansion
16 VWE refers to the TOE’s ability to repack TCP datagrams into larger packets in a
new TCP session. This allows the TOE to buffer data until a larger effective byte
sequence can be sent, optimizing the use of bandwidth by reducing the overhead of
sending less data per round trip time.
2.2.1.3 Transaction Prediction
17 TP allows the TOE to reduce the overhead that normally occurs during session
handshakes by pipe-lining transactions. During TP, the TOE predicts when a
specific exchange is likely to take place based on a history of transactions. If the
TOE determines that there is a high likelihood that a future transaction will occur, the
TOE performs that transaction immediately. By pipe-lining transactions, the
overhead of waiting for each step to travel across the WAN is greatly reduced. The
TOE is programmed with sufficient knowledge of individual protocols to determine
when it is “safe” (i.e. when performing TP will not cause problems) to pipe-line
transactions.
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2.3 Security Functions
18 The TOE provides the following security functions:
a) Security Audit. The SteelHead CX provides functionality for generation and
viewing of audit records. The SteelHead CX administrators can view all audit
information from the audit logs, as well as search the audit records. The
SteelHead CX provides reliable time stamps that it will use to record the
accurate time for audit records.
b) Secure Communications. The SteelHead CX provides TLS protection on a
secure channel between SteelHead CXs. In addition, the TOE uses HTTPS
(web) and SSH (CLI) to secure management connections. The TOE also uses
SNMPv3 with AES to protect SNMP messages (SNMP traps generated by the
TOE are excluded from the scope of evaluation).
c) User Data Protection. The SteelHead CX implements functionality for
controlling access and traffic information flows. Access to the SteelHead CX
requires an authorized username and role. Access to the management
functions on the SteelHead CX is partitioned according to the administrator’s
role. The SteelHead CX enforces an Optimization Policy that applies a set of
rules to TCP traffic passing through the SteelHead CX. Within the
Optimization Policy there exists a subset of rules that an administrator can
apply to prioritize TCP and UDP traffic passing through the SteelHead CX.
d) Security Management. The SteelHead CX provides functionality that allows
administrators to manage the SteelHead CX Security Function, including
security function behavior and security attributes. The Security Management
function specifies the roles defined for managing the SteelHead CX and how
administrators assume the roles. The SteelHead CX terminates an inactive
administrator session after a preconfigured time period, depending on which
interface is being used (the CLI or the GUI). Administrators must re-
authenticate after being logged out. This prevents an unauthorized individual
from gaining access to the SteelHead CX management functions through an
unattended session.
e) Cryptographic Module. A FIPS 140-2 validated cryptographic module
performs all cryptographic operations.
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2.4 Physical Scope
19 The TOE comprises the hardware and software of the SteelHead CX. Figure 2
illustrates the physical scope of the TOE and identifies the components of the TOE
Environment.
Figure 2: TOE Physical Scope
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2.4.1 TOE Components
20 The following SteelHead CX components are part of the TOE and the TOE Security
Functionality (TSF):
a) Management Interfaces
i) Web GUI. The TOE includes a web-based GUI that provides
administrators with a set of forms and buttons to manage the TOE. The
interface is organized through tabs and menus into the major functional
categories of the TOE. The GUI requires administrators to be
authenticated before providing any management functionality.
Administrators must access the GUI through a web browser that
supports Secure Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTPS).
a. Administrators can manage optimization services, host settings,
advanced networking configurations, proxy file service (if
available), port labels, reports, logging, date and time,
authentication, licenses, secure vault, scheduled jobs, the
configuration manager, start and stop services, and restart and
shut down the appliance through the GUI.
b. Administration supports the roles identified in section 2.4.3.
ii) Command Line Interface. The TOE includes a CLI that provides
administrators with a set of text-based commands to manage the TOE.
The CLI requires administrators to authenticate before providing any
management functionality. Remote access to the CLI is protected
through SSH, and an SSH client is required to access the CLI.
a. The administrator is given monitor permissions upon first
authenticating through the CLI. Administrators with read-only
permissions are limited to viewing the system configuration and
logs and may execute a limited set of CLI commands. The
administrator must explicitly request the Administrator role by
entering the enable and configure commands. Only
administrators who assume the Administrator role can configure
the TOE through the CLI.
iii) SNMP Interface. The TOE supports SNMPv3 with AES for status
monitoring by a Network Management Station. SNMP traps generated
by the TOE are excluded from the scope of evaluation.
b) Managers
i) The TOE has a centralized architecture with all parts residing within the
same physical hardware. However, there are several processes that
act as managers of certain data:
a. Data manager. Handles requests for data in the local database.
Requests come in via a proprietary database connector. The
database holds system information, statistics, and configuration
files.
b. Configuration manager. Handles all configuration changes,
actions taken on the appliance, and any events that occur that
require the SteelHead CX to perform processing.
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c) Services
i) Network services. RiOS (all of the components within the green box in
Figure 2) supports a suite of network services including basic packet
filtering, QoS, optimization of traffic, etc. These services use various
protocols to ensure that the appropriate rules are applied to user traffic.
Network services implement an administrator-definable Optimization
Policy.
ii) Management services. RiOS allows authorized administrators to
access the security functionality for the TOE configuration.
Administrators can view the configuration and make changes as
necessary. These changes are handled through the GUI and the CLI.
iii) Reporting and logging services. RiOS allows authorized
administrators to view complex statistics on the history of user traffic
that has gone through the TOE. Administrators can view reports on
many different statistics and specify variables about the data shown
(such as showing data starting from a certain date). The logging
services allow the TOE to keep formatted audit records and display
them to authorized administrators in a human-readable format.
2.4.2 Data
21 The TOE works with four kinds of data:
a) User data. All data that TOE users send over the network that passes through
the TOE. User data may be stored on the TOE in the encrypted data store in
the form of SDR references. When the TOE receives user data, the TOE
applies the Optimization Security Function Policy (SFP) to the data. Any
operations that the TOE performs on user data are a result of administrator-
defined rules in the Optimization SFP.
b) Management data. All data that TOE administrators send to or request from
the TOE. Management data includes all system settings and logs that are
sent to be displayed on an administrator’s workstation, and any commands an
administrator sends to the TOE. Access to management data is regulated by
the Access Control SFP. An Administrator is not given access to data that the
administrator is not authorized to access.
c) TSF data. All data stored in the secure vault and all configuration data that
affects the TSFs (such as Optimization SFP rules). TSF data is managed
through the Management Interfaces as a result of commands given by
administrators. Access to TSF data is regulated by the Access Control SFP.
d) System data. All configuration data on the system that is not related to
enforcement of the TSFs (such as licenses, scheduled jobs, and
startup/shutdown of the appliance). System data is managed through the
Management Interfaces as a result of commands given by administrators.
Access to system data is regulated by the Access Control SFP.
22 All TSF and system data resides within the local database or in configuration files on
the local file system. It may be that some types of data overlap, for example, some
management data may also be TSF data.
2.4.3 Users and Administrators
23 A SteelHead CX user is anyone who sends TCP or UDP traffic through the TOE.
Users have no roles and do not need to be aware of the presence of the TOE on the
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network. All user traffic is generated by client devices that users are working from
and servers that these clients are communicating with.
24 A SteelHead CX administrator is anyone who connects to one of the TOE
Management Interfaces who is authorized to manage the TOE. Administrators are
divided into the following roles:
a) Administrator. An administrator that has read-write access to all TOE
settings and data.
b) Monitor. An administrator that has read-only access to TOE settings and
data (with the exception that the Monitor role can execute the ‘no
authentication policy login max-failures’ and ‘no authentication policy
password expire’ CLI commands).
25 These roles are the same for both Management Interfaces. For CLI users to attain
read-write privileges, they must enter the enable command.
2.4.4 Appliance Models
26 Table 3 identifies the SteelHead CX models that are addressed by this Security
Target.
Table 3: TOE Appliance Models
Model Processor Family Processor Clock / Cores Chassis Firmware
CX570 Intel Pentium (Gladden
Ivy Bridge)
Intel Pentium
B925C
2.0 GHz (2
cores)
Desktop RiOS
9.1.4
CX770 Intel Xeon E3 v2 (Ivy
Bridge)
Intel Xeon
E3-1125Cv2
2.5 GHz (4
cores)
Desktop RiOS
9.1.4
CX3070 Intel Xeon E5 v2 (Ivy
Bridge)
Intel Xeon
E5-2609v2
2.5 GHz (4
cores)
1RU RiOS
9.1.4
CX5070 Intel Xeon E5 v2 (Ivy
Bridge)
Intel Xeon
E5-2630v2
2.6 GHz (2x 6
cores)
2RU RiOS
9.1.4
CX7070L/M Intel Xeon E5 v2 (Ivy
Bridge)
Intel Xeon
E5-2650v2
2.6 GHz (2x 8
cores)
2RU RiOS
9.1.4
CX7070H Intel Xeon E5 v2 (Ivy
Bridge)
Intel Xeon
E5-2690v2
2.6 GHz (2x
10 cores)
2RU RiOS
9.1.4
2.4.5 Guidance Documents
27 The TOE includes the guidance documents identified in Table 4.
Table 4: TOE Guidance Documents
Name Version / Part No.
Network and Storage Card Installation Guide 712-00018-21
SteelHead Deployment Guide 712-00003-21
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Name Version / Part No.
Getting Started Guide 712-00102-14
SteelHead Installation and Configuration Guide 712-00001-21
Rack Installation Guide 712-00010-21
Riverbed Command Line Interface Reference Manual 712-00002-23
Upgrade and Maintenance Guide 712-00016-21
SteelHead Management Console User’s Guide 712-00007-21
FIPS Administrator’s Guide 712-00047-03
Riverbed SteelHead CX with RiOS 9.1.4 Operational User Guidance and
Preparative Procedures
v0.9, 13 December
2016
Riverbed SteelHead CX with RiOS 9.1.4 Monitor Role CLI Reference v1.0, 13 December
2016
2.4.6 Non-TOE Components
28 The TOE operates with the following components in the environment in addition to
standard networking equipment:
a) Application clients
b) Application servers
c) Network Management Station (SNMP)
2.5 Logical Scope
29 The logical scope of the TOE comprises the security functions defined in section 2.3.
2.5.1 Unevaluated Features
30 The Riverbed SteelHead CX contains software and hardware components that are
included with the product but are not part of the evaluated configuration:
a) Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Management,
b) Telnet-server Management interface
c) REST API
d) IPSec
e) TLS versions other than TLS 1.2
f) SNMP versions other than SNMPv3
g) Virtual In-Path deployments
h) Out-Of-Path deployments
i) RBM User
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3 Security Problem Definition
3.1 Threats
31 Table 5 identifies the threats addressed by the TOE.
Table 5: Threats
Identifier Description
T.MASQUERADE An attacker may masquerade as another entity in order to gain
unauthorized access to data or TOE resources.
T.UNAUTH A user may gain access to security data on the TOE, even though the
user is not authorized in accordance with the TOE security policy.
T.NO_AUDIT An attacker may perform security-relevant operations on the TOE
without being held accountable for it.
T.SYSDATA An attacker who is not a TOE administrator could access and
interpret TSF data stored on the TOE in the secure vault.
T.NACCESS An attacker may be able to view data that is transmitted between the
TOE and a remote authorized external IT entity.
T.LATENCY A high volume of user traffic may overwhelm the communications link
between users and the IT systems they are attempting to access.
3.2 Organizational Security Policies
32 There are no Organizational Security Policies (OSPs) that are addressed by the
TOE.
3.3 Assumptions
33 Table 6 identifies the assumptions related to the TOE’s environment.
Table 6: Assumptions
Identifier Description
A.INSTALL It is assumed that the TOE will be installed and configured at an
appropriate point in the network according to the appropriate
installation guides.
A.NETCON It is assumed that the TOE environment provides the network
connectivity required to allow the TOE to provide secure Wide Area
Data Services (WDS).
A.LOCATE It is assumed that the TOE is located within a controlled access
facility and is physically available to authorized administrators only.
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Identifier Description
A.MANAGE It is assumed that there are one or more competent individuals
assigned to manage the TOE and the security of the information it
contains.
A.NOEVIL It is assumed that the administrators who manage the TOE are not
careless, negligent, or willfully hostile, are appropriately trained, and
follow all guidance.
A.FIREWALL It is assumed that all ports needed for proper operation of the TOE
will be opened at the firewall.
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4 Security Objectives
4.1 Objectives for the Operational Environment
34 Table 7 identifies the objectives for the operational environment.
Table 7: Operational environment objectives
Identifier Description
OE.TRAFFIC The TOE environment must be implemented such that the TOE is
appropriately located within the network to perform its intended function.
OE.FIREWALL The Firewall must have all ports needed for proper operations of the TOE
opened.
OE.MANAGE Sites deploying the TOE will provide administrators for the TOE who are not
careless, negligent, or willfully hostile, are appropriately trained and follow all
administrator guidance. TOE administrators will ensure the system is used
securely, including management of the audit trail.
OE.PHYCAL Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that the TOE is protected from
any physical attack.
OE.AUDIT Authorized managers of the audit facilities must ensure that the audit facilities
are used and managed effectively. In particular, audit logs should be
inspected on a regular basis, appropriate and timely action should be taken
on the detection of breaches of security, or events that are likely to lead to a
breach in the future. Also, the audit logs should be archived in a timely
manner to ensure that the machine does not run out of audit log data storage
space.
OE.REVIEW The configuration of the TOE will be inspected on a regular basis to ensure
that the configuration continues to meet the organization’s security policies in
the face of:
Changes to the TOE configuration
 Changes in the security objectives
 Changes in the threats presented by the hostile network
 Changes (additions and deletions) in the services available between
the hostile network and the corporate network
4.2 Objectives for the TOE
35 Table 8 identifies the security objectives for the TOE.
Table 8: Security objectives
Identifier Description
O.AUTHENTICATE The TOE must require administrators to authenticate before gaining
access to the TOE interfaces.
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Identifier Description
O.LOG The TOE must record events of security relevance at the “not specified
level” of audit. The TOE must record the resulting actions of the
security functional policies and provide the authorized administrators
with the ability to review the audit trail. The TOE must be able to
provide reliable timestamps for its own use in order to record events in
the correct order in which they occurred.
O.ADMIN The TOE must include a set of functions that allow efficient
management of its functions and data, ensuring that TOE
administrators with the appropriate privileges and only those TOE
administrators, may exercise such control.
O.SECVAULT The TOE must encrypt keys and certificates stored on the TOE in a
secure vault and restrict access to the secure vault to authorized
administrators only.
O.SEC_COMMS The TOE must protect the confidentiality of WAN traffic, as specified
by the Optimization Policy, and communication with remote
administrators.
O.OPTIMIZE The TOE must optimize traffic flowing through the TOE according to
the rules defined in the Optimization Policy.
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5 Security Requirements
5.1 Conventions
36 This document uses the following font conventions to identify the operations defined
by the CC:
a) Assignment. Indicated with italicized text.
b) Refinement. Indicated with bold text and strikethroughs.
c) Selection. Indicated with underlined text.
d) Assignment within a Selection: Indicated with italicized and underlined text.
e) Iteration. Indicated by appending the iteration number in parenthesis, e.g.,
(1), (2), (3).
5.2 Extended Components Definition
37 There are no extended components defined for this ST.
5.3 Functional Requirements
Table 9: Summary of SFRs
Requirement Title
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.3 Selectable audit review
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
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Requirement Title
FMT_MSA.3(a) Static attribute initialization
FMT_MSA.3(b) Static attribute initialization
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMR.3 Assuming roles
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path
5.3.1 Security Audit (FAU)
FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following
auditable events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and
c) Login, Logout, Change Password, System Failures.
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following
information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if
applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of
the functional components included in the PP/ST, additional details
specified in the above table.
Application Note: Audit of logout event is applicable to the CLI only.
FAU_SAR.1 Audit Review
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
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FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide Administrators and Monitors with the capability to
read all recorded information from the audit records.
FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user
to interpret the information.
FAU_SAR.3 Selectable Audit Review
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.3.1 The TSF shall provide the ability to apply searches of audit data based
on an administrator-specified keyword or string.
5.3.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm listed in the table below
and specified cryptographic key sizes listed in the table below that meet
the following: standards listed in the table below.
Algorithm Key Size Standards (RNG) CAVP (RNG)
3DES 168
SP800-90 DRBG #310
AES
128, 192,
256
RSA 2048
DSA 2048, 3072
ECDSA
Curves:
P-224,
P-384,
P-521.
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction
Hierarchical to: No other components.
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Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method zeroization that meets the
following: FIPS 140-2 zeroization requirements.
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform cryptographic operations shown in the table
below in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm shown in
the table below and cryptographic key sizes shown in the table below
that meet the following: standards shown in the table below.
Operation Algorithm Key Size Standards CAVP
Symmetric
encryption and
decryption
3DES CBC 168 SP 800-67 #1485
AES ECB,
CFB, GCM
& CBC
128, 192,
256 FIPS 197 #2374
Asymmetric
encryption and
decryption
RSA 2048 FIPS 186-2 #1229
DSA 2048,
3072
FIPS 186-4
#745
ECDSA Curves:
P-224,
P-384,
P-521.
FIPS 186-2
#392
Message Digest SHA-1,
SHA-2
(224, 256,
384, 512)
N/A FIPS 180-3
#2046
Message
Authentication
HMAC 160-512 FIPS-198
#1476
Random
Number
Generation
SP 800-90
DRBG:
Hash
DRBG
N/A SP 800-90
#310
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Operation Algorithm Key Size Standards CAVP
HMAC
DRBG, no
reseed
CTR DRBG
(AES), no
derivation
function
5.3.3 User Data Protection (FDP)
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP on
Subjects: Administrators attempting to establish an interactive session
with the TOE
Objects: User interface menu items, rules, services, product features,
CLI commands, SSL Certificates
Operations: All interactions between the subjects and objects identified
above
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to objects based on the
following:
Subject attributes:
 Role
 Identification (ID)
and Object attributes:
 Permissions assigned to objects
 Absence of permissions assigned to objects
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
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 If a subject with the Administrator role requests access to an object
then access is granted.
 If a subject with the monitor role requests read access to an object,
then access is granted.
 If none of the above rules apply, access is denied.
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on
the following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: none.
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
FDP_IFC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Optimization SFP on
 SUBJECTS: external IT entities that send or receive information
through the TOE
 INFORMATION: traffic flowing through the TOE
 OPERATIONS: Optimize, pass-through, deny, discard
FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_IFF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Optimization SFP based on the following
types of subject and information security attributes:
Subject Attributes:
 IP address
Information Attributes:
 Source IP address
 Destination IP address
 Port number
 Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN) tag ID
 TLS status
 Application protocol
FDP_IFF.1.2 The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject
and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules
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hold: Apply the appropriate operation based on the information attributes
evaluated against the policy rules.
FDP_IFF.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the: no additional rules.
FDP_IFF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the
following rules: the TOE will permit all information flows without applying
any other rules when in Bypass Mode.
FDP_IFF.1.5 The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following
rules: none.
5.3.4 Identification and Authentication (FIA)
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
Hierarchical to: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.2.1 The TSF shall require each user administrator to be successfully
authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf
of that user administrator.
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
Hierarchical to: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UID.2.1 The TSF shall require each user administrator to be successfully
identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of
that user administrator.
5.3.5 Security Management (FMT)
FMT_MOF.1 Management of Security Functions Behavior
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to determine the behavior of, disable,
enable, modify the behavior of the functions shown in the table below to
the roles show in the table below:
Role Permissions
Monitor View all settings and logs.
Administrator View all settings and logs, determine the behavior of,
disable, enable, modify the behavior of system
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Role Permissions
settings, the Access Control SFP, and the
Optimization SFP, modify administrator passwords.
Application note: The Monitor role can execute the following CLI commands:
 no authentication policy login max-failures
 no authentication policy password expire
 alarms reset-all
 no service cloud-accel application * svcgroup * enable
 service cloud-accel application * svcgroup * enable
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP, Optimization SFP to
restrict the ability to manage the security attributes:
Access Control SFP attributes
 Role
 Identification (ID)
 Permissions
Optimization SFP attributes
 Optimization Policy Rules
to Administrator.
FMT_MSA.3(a) Static attribute initialization
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to provide restrictive
default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the authorized administrator to specify alternative
initial values to override the default values when an object or information
is created.
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FMT_MSA.3(b) Static attribute initialization
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the Optimization SFP to provide permissive
default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the authorized administrator to specify alternative
initial values to override the default values when an object or information
is created.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management
functions:
 Manage audit functions
 Manage users, roles and permissions
 Manage optimization policies
 Manage time
 Manage cryptographic functions
 Manage trusted paths and trusted channels
FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles:
 Monitor
 Administrator
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
FMT_SMR.3 Assuming roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMR.3.1 The TSF shall require an explicit request to assume the following roles:
Administrator role from the CLI in user mode.
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5.3.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FPT_STM.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.
5.3.7 TOE Access (FTA)
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FTA_SSL.3.1 The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after an administrator-
defined time interval of administrator inactivity between 1 and 43200
minutes for the GUI or between 1 and 1440 minutes for the CLI.
Application Note: A value of 0 disables session termination.
5.3.8 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and
another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other
communication channels and provides assured identification of its end
points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit the TSF, another trusted IT product to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for TLS
communications with a peer appliance, SNMPv3 communication with an
SNMP Network Management Station.
Application Note: Peer appliance refers to another Riverbed SteelHead CX appliance as
listed in Table 3.
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
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FTP_TRP.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and remote
users that is logically distinct from other communication paths and
provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the
communicated data from modification, disclosure.
FTP_TRP.1.2 The TSF shall permit remote users to initiate communication via the
trusted path.
FTP_TRP.1.3 The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for remote
administration via HTTPS (web GUI) and SSH (CLI).
5.4 Assurance Requirements
38 The TOE security assurance requirements are summarized in Table 10
commensurate with EAL2+ (ALC_FLR.1).
Table 10: Assurance Requirements
Assurance Class Components Description
Development ADV_ARC.1 Security Architecture Description
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing Functional Specification
ADV_TDS.1 Basic Design
Guidance Documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational User Guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative User Guidance
Life Cycle Support ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM System
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM Coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery Procedures
ALC_FLR.1 Flaw Remediation Procedures
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance Claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended Components Definition
ASE_INT.1 ST Introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security Objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived Security Requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security Problem Definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE Summary Specification
Tests ATE_COV.1 Evidence of Coverage
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Assurance Class Components Description
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent Testing – sample
Vulnerability Assessment AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability Analysis
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6 TOE Summary Specification
6.1 Security Audit
39 The Security Audit function provides the TOE with the functionality for generation
and viewing of audit records.
Table 11: Security Audit SFRs
SFR Fulfillment
FAU_GEN.1 The TOE generate audit records for the following events occurring at the GUI or
CLI:
 Login
 Logout (CLI only)
 Change Password
The TOE will also log system failures. The TOE records the date and time of the
event, the type of event, the subject identity (for actions initiated by subjects) and
the outcome (success or failure) of the event.
Auditing of GUI events cannot be disabled – logs of the startup and shutdown of
the TOE therefore signify the start and stop of audit functions.
FAU_SAR.1 The SteelHead CX GUI provides a means to view audit records stored on the
TOE. All administrator roles can view audit records through the logging screens
in the GUI or through the show logging command in the CLI. Audit records are
displayed in a human-readable format. Administrators can specify a keyword or
string that is used to search the audit records.
FAU_SAR.3
FPT_STM.1 The TOE contains a hardware chip that an administrator can set to the current
date and time. The chip provides time stamps to the TOE as requested. To set
the system time an administrator must have write privileges and be
authenticated through one of the Management Interfaces.
6.2 Secure Communications
40 The SteelHead CX provides TLS protection on a secure channel between SteelHead
CXs. In addition, the TOE uses HTTPS (web) and SSH (CLI) to secure management
connections and SNMPv3 with AES for communication with a Network Management
Station (SNMP traps generated by the TOE are excluded from the scope of
evaluation).
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Table 12: Security Communication SFRs
SFR Fulfillment
FTP_ITC.1 The TOE can be configured to use TLS to secure communications between
SteelHead CXs.
TLS
The TOE supports TLS 1.2. When in FIPS Mode (evaluated configuration) the
TOE supports the following ciphersuites:
KeyExch: Auth: Enc.: Mac:
ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 ECDH RSA AESGCM(256) AEAD
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 ECDH ECDSA AESGCM(256) AEAD
ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384 ECDH RSA AES(256) SHA384
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384 ECDH ECDSA AES(256) SHA384
ECDH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 ECDH/RSA ECDH AESGCM(256) AEAD
ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 ECDH/ECDSA ECDH AESGCM(256) AEAD
ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA384 ECDH/RSA ECDH AES(256) SHA384
ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384 ECDH/ECDSA ECDH AES(256) SHA384
AES256-GCM-SHA384 RSA RSA AESGCM(256) AEAD
AES256-SHA256 RSA RSA AES(256) SHA256
ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 ECDH RSA AESGCM(128) AEAD
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 ECDH ECDSA AESGCM(128) AEAD
ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 ECDH RSA AES(128) SHA256
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256 ECDH ECDSA AES(128) SHA256
ECDH-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 ECDH/RSA ECDH AESGCM(128) AEAD
ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 ECDH/ECDSA ECDH AESGCM(128) AEAD
ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA256 ECDH/RSA ECDH AES(128) SHA256
ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256 ECDH/ECDSA ECDH AES(128) SHA256
AES128-GCM-SHA256 RSA RSA AESGCM(128) AEAD
AES128-SHA256 RSA RSA AES(128) SHA256
AES256-SHA RSA RSA AES(256) SHA1
AES128-SHA RSA RSA AES(128) SHA1
DES-CBC3-SHA RSA RSA 3DES(168) SHA1
SNMPv3 with AES
TOE appliance status may be monitored from an SNMPv3 Network Management
Station (other SNMP versions are supported but are disabled in the evaluated
configuration). SNMPv3 is implemented using the User Security Model with
ciphersuite CFB 128-AES-128 and authentication protocol HMAC-SHA-96 as
defined by RFC3414 and RFC3826. The SNMPv3 protocol is used to
authenticate each SNMP message, as well as provide encryption of the data –
the TOE requires that authPriv (authentication and privacy) be enabled for all
SNMPv3 messages. No configuration changes can be made via SNMPv3. SNMP
traps generated by the TOE are excluded from the scope of evaluation.
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SFR Fulfillment
FTP_TRP.1 The TOE uses TLS/HTTPS to protect the Web GUI and SSH to protect the CLI.
TLS/HTTPS
The TOE supports TLS 1.2. When in FIPS Mode (evaluated configuration) the
TOE supports the following ciphersuites: (see table above).
SSHv2
Remote access to the TOE CLI is protected using SSHv2 with the following
allowed cryptographic parameters:
 3des-cbc, aes{128,192,256}-{cbc,ctr}
 hmac-sha1, hmac-sha2-{256,512}
6.3 User Data Protection
41 The User Data Protection function implements an Access Control SFP for authorized
administrators attempting to access TOE management functions and an
Optimization SFP on user traffic flowing through the TOE.
Table 13: User Data Protection SFRs
SFR Fulfillment
FDP_ACC.1 The TOE enforces an Access Control SFP on all access requests to the TOE
management functions. This functionality is provided by the TOE access control
mechanisms. The Access Control SFP enforces access roles based on the role
of the authenticated administrator. Administrators with the monitor role have
read-only access to TOE data. Administrators with the Administrator role have
read-write access to TOE data. Administrators can only modify data that can be
modified through one of the Management Interfaces.
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_IFC.1 The TOE enforces an Optimization SFP on user data flowing through the TOE.
The user data is network traffic. The Optimization SFP functionality is provided
by the combination of Optimization and other network rules in place on the TOE
(such as QoS rules or allow/deny/discard rules). The Optimization SFP enforces
rules on subjects that send or receive traffic through the TOE. The rules
determine what types of operations should be applied to the traffic as the traffic
is flowing through the TOE based on: source IP address, destination IP address,
port number, VLAN tag ID, TLS status, and application protocol. Authorized
administrators define the rules that dictate how traffic flows through the TOE.
FDP_IFF.1
6.4 Security Management
42 The Security Management function specifies the management of several aspects of
the TSF, including security function behavior and security attributes. The
permissions of the administrator roles are also defined here.
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Table 14: Security Management SFRs
SFR Fulfillment
FIA_UID.2 The TOE requires all administrators to authenticate themselves to the TOE
before allowing access to the Management Interfaces. Administrators
cannot perform any actions before identifying and authenticating themselves.
Once an administrator provides correct authentication credentials to the
TOE, the TOE will mediate access to the management functions of the TOE
based on the administrator’s role.
FIA_UAU.2
FMT_MOF.1 The TOE provides the capability for administrators to view, modify the
behavior of, determine the behavior of, disable, and enable The Access
Control SFP, the Optimization SFP, the system settings, and the
administrator passwords.
Administrators with the monitor role can view all settings and logs and
execute the following CLI commands:
 no authentication policy login max-failures
 no authentication policy password expire
 alarms reset-all
 no service cloud-accel application * svcgroup * enable
 service cloud-accel application * svcgroup * enable
Monitors can also view and generate reports through the GUI.
Administrators with the Administrator role have full access to modify all
system settings and TSF settings.
The different categories of settings that can be managed are: optimization
service, host settings, advanced networking, proxy file service, port labels,
reports, logging, date and time, authentication, licenses, secure vault,
scheduled jobs, configuration manager, service availability, and system
state.
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_MSA.3(a) The TOE uses restrictive default values for the Access Control SFP. This
means that the Access Control SFP rejects all non-authorized commands by
default.
The TOE uses permissive default values for the Optimization SFP. This
means that the Optimization SFP will forward traffic through the TOE by
default if optimization is not enabled or no specific rule is in place to block
the traffic. The TOE allows administrators to enforce rules and settings to
change the way the Optimization SFP handles traffic.
FMT_MSA.3(b)
FMT_SMF.1 The TOE allows authorized administrators to manage the TSFs, security
attributes, and TSF data on the TOE. Administrators manage these items
through the Management Interfaces.
FMT_SMR.1 The TSF maintains a list of permissions for the Administrator and monitor
roles. When an administrator authenticates through the Management
Interfaces, the administrator is assigned one of these roles. When using the
CLI, the administrators have read-only access upon initial authentication,
and write privileges must be requested through the enable command.
FMT_SMR.3
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SFR Fulfillment
FTA_SSL.3 The TOE is capable of terminating an inactive session after a configurable
time interval of administrator inactivity through the GUI, defaulting to 1000
minutes. The TOE allows administrators with appropriate permissions to
modify this value to any positive integer greater than 0 and less than 43,200.
The CLI can have an inactivity timeout value between 1 and 1440 minutes.
Specifying a value of 0 disables session termination. When the TOE
terminates an inactive session, the administrator must log in again through
the main login screen.
6.5 Cryptographic Module
43 The TOE includes the following FIPS 140-2 validated cryptographic module that
handles all cryptographic functions:
a) Riverbed Cryptographic Security Module v1.0, CMVP Certificate #2099.
Reference: http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-
1/140sp/140sp2099.pdf
Vendor Affirmation: Riverbed affirms equivalency between the tested RiOS
8.6 and RiOS 9.1.4 and affirms that the module has been implemented in
accordance with the Security Policy.
Table 15: Cryptographic Module SFRs
SFR Fulfillment
FCS_CKM.1 The cryptographic module is capable of generating keys for Triple-DES, AES-
128, AES-192, AES-256, RSA-1024, RSA-2048, DSA-1024, and HMAC (160
bits to 512 bits). The method of key generation is the SP 800-90 standard.
FCS_CKM.4 The cryptographic module is capable of destroying keys using the FIPS 140-2
zeroization method of destroying keys.
FCS_COP.1 The cryptographic module is capable of performing:
 Symmetric encryption and decryption with Triple-DES and AES-128,
AES-192, and AES-256
 Asymmetric encryption with RSA-2048
 Message digest with SHA-1 and SHA-2
 Random number generation with SP 800-90 DRBG
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7 Rationale
7.1 Security Objectives Rationale
44 Table 16 provides a coverage mapping between security objectives, threats, OSPs
and assumptions.
Table 16: Security Objectives Mapping
T.MASQUERADE
T.UNAUTH
T.NO_AUDIT
T.SYSDATA
T.NACCESS
T.LATENCY
A.INSTALL
A.NETCON
A.LOCATE
A.MANAGE
A.NOEVIL
A.FIREWALL
O.AUTHENTICATE X X X
O.LOG X X
O.ADMIN X
O.SECVAULT X
O.SEC_COMMS X
O.OPTIMIZE X
OE.TRAFFIC X
OE.FIREWALL X
OE.MANAGE X X X
OE.PHYCAL X
OE.AUDIT X
OE.REVIEW X
45 Table 17 provides the justification to show that the security objectives are suitable to
address the security problem.
Table 17: Suitability of Security Objectives
Element Justification
T.MASQUERADE O.AUTHENTICATE counters this threat by ensuring that the
TOE is able to identify and authenticate administrators prior to
allowing access to TOE administrative functions and data.
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Element Justification
T.UNAUTH O.AUTHENTICATE counters this threat by ensuring that
administrators are identified and authenticated prior to gaining
access to TOE security data.
O.LOG counters this threat by ensuring that unauthorized
attempts to access the TOE are recorded.
O.ADMIN counters this threat by ensuring that access to TOE
security data is limited to those users with access to the
management functions of the TOE.
T.NO_AUDIT O.LOG counters this threat by ensuring that an audit trail of
management events on the TOE is preserved. O.LOG
ensures that accurate timestamps are provided for all audit
records, allowing the order of events to be preserved.
T.SYSDATA O.AUTHENTICATE counters this threat by ensuring that
external entities attempting to access data stored on the TOE
be authenticated before that access is allowed.
O.SECVAULT counters this threat by encrypting sensitive
information stored in the secure vault, making it impossible for
an attacker to interpret the data without the appropriate
cryptographic keys and algorithms.
T.NACCESS O.SEC_COMMS counters this threat by allowing the TOE to
create a secure channel to protect information sent to a trusted
external IT entity.
T.LATENCY O.OPTIMIZE counters this threat by allowing the TOE to apply
an Optimization Policy on traffic flowing through the TOE,
greatly increasing the efficiency of bandwidth across a
communication link.
A.INSTALL OE.MANAGE upholds this assumption by ensuring that the
TOE administrators read and follow the guidance for
installation and deployment of the TOE.
A.NETCON OE.TRAFFIC upholds this assumption by ensuring that the
environment provides the TOE with the appropriate network
configuration to provide secure WDS.
A.LOCATE OE.PHYCAL upholds this assumption by ensuring that the
environment provides protection against physical attack.
A.MANAGE OE.MANAGE upholds this assumption by ensuring that those
responsible for the TOE will provide competent individuals to
perform management of the security of the environment, and
restrict these functions and facilities from unauthorized use.
OE.AUDIT upholds this assumption by ensuring that
administrators assigned to manage the TOE will review the
audit logs on a regular basis and take the appropriate actions
when breaches of security are detected.
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Element Justification
OE.REVIEW upholds this assumption by ensuring that
administrators assigned to manage the TOE will review the
configuration on a regular basis to ensure that it accurately
reflects the intended configuration.
A.NOEVIL OE.MANAGE upholds this assumption by ensuring that all
administrators assigned to manage the TOE are not careless,
negligent, or willfully hostile, are appropriately trained, and
follow all administrator guidance.
A.FIREWALL OE.FIREWALL upholds this assumption by ensuring that all
ports necessary for the operation of the TOE are opened.
7.2 Security Requirements Rationale
7.2.1 SAR Rationale
46 EAL2 was chosen to provide a level of assurance that is consistent with good
commercial practices with the addition of ALC_FLR.2 to provide assurance that any
identified security flaws will be addressed.
7.2.2 SFR Rationale
Table 18: Security Requirements Mapping
O.AUTHENTICATE
O.LOG
O.ADMIN
O.SECVAULT
O.SEC_COMMS
O.OPTIMIZE
FAU_GEN.1 X
FAU_SAR.1 X X
FAU_SAR.3 X
FCS_CKM.1 X X
FCS_CKM.4 X X
FCS_COP.1 X X
FDP_ACC.1 X
FDP_ACF.1 X
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O.AUTHENTICATE
O.LOG
O.ADMIN
O.SECVAULT
O.SEC_COMMS
O.OPTIMIZE
FDP_IFC.1 X X
FDP_IFF.1 X X
FIA_UAU.2 X X
FIA_UID.2 X X
FMT_MOF.1 X
FMT_MSA.1 X
FMT_MSA.3(a) X X
FMT_MSA.3(b) X
FMT_SMF.1 X
FMT_SMR.1 X
FMT_SMR.3 X
FPT_STM.1 X
FTA_SSL.3 X
FTP_ITC.1 X
FTP_TRP.1 X
Table 19: Suitability of SFRs
Objective Addressed By Rationale
O.AUTHENTICATE FIA_UAU.2 User
authentication before any
action
This requirement supports
O.AUTHENTICATE by requiring all
TOE administrators to authenticate
before any other TSF-mediated
actions are performed.
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Objective Addressed By Rationale
FIA_UID.2 User
identification before any
action
This requirement supports
O.ATHENTICATE by ensuring the
TOE administrators are identified
before any other TSF-mediated
actions are performed.
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated
termination
This requirement supports
O.AUTHENTICATE by ensuring
TOE administrators are logged off
after an administrator-defined period
of inactivity, ensuring that
unauthenticated entities do not gain
access to the TOE through an
unattended session.
O.LOG FAU_GEN.1 Audit data
generation
This requirement supports O.LOG
by requiring the TOE to produce
audit records for the system security
events and for actions caused by
enforcement of the Access Control
and Optimization Policies.
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review This requirement supports O.LOG
by requiring the TOE to make the
recorded audit records available for
review.
FAU_SAR.3 Selectable
audit review
This requirement supports O.LOG
by allowing administrators to
perform searches of the audit
records using a keyword string.
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time
stamps
This requirement supports O.LOG
by ensuring that the TOE can
provide reliable time stamps for its
own use. The time stamps allow the
TOE to place events in the order
that they occurred.
O.ADMIN FAU_SAR.1 Audit review This requirement supports O.ADMIN
by requiring the TOE to make the
recorded audit records available for
review.
FIA_UAU.2 User
authentication before any
action
This requirement supports O.ADMIN
by ensuring that the TOE
administrators are authenticated
before any other TSF-mediated
actions are performed.
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Objective Addressed By Rationale
FIA_UID.2 User
identification before any
action
This requirement supports O.ADMIN
by ensuring the TOE administrators
are identified before any other TSF-
mediated actions are performed.
FMT_MOF.1 Management
of security functions
behaviour
This requirement supports O.ADMIN
by specifying which functions of the
TOE can be managed, and defining
which roles can manage those
functions.
FMT_MSA.1 Management
of security attributes
This requirement supports O.ADMIN
by allowing authorized TOE
administrators to manage the TOE
security attributes.
FMT_MSA.3(a) Static
attribute initialization
This requirement supports
O.ADMIN. The Access Control
Policy is restrictive by default,
limiting access to authorized
administrators only.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification
of management functions
This requirement supports O.ADMIN
by specifying that the TOE supports
the management functions of the
TOE.
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles This requirement supports O.ADMIN
by supporting two roles:
administrator and monitor.
FMT_SMR.3 Assuming
roles
This requirement supports O.ADMIN
by requiring CLI administrators to
explicitly request enable privileges
before being granted full
administrative rights to the CLI.
O.SECVAULT FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic
key generation
This requirement supports
O.SECVAULT by requiring that
cryptographic keys are generated
according to an assigned standard.
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic
key destruction
This requirement supports
O.SECVAULT by ensuring that
cryptographic keys are destroyed
according to FIPS 140-2 zeroization
requirements.
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic
operation
This requirement supports
O.SECVAULT by requiring
cryptographic operations be
performed according to the specified
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Objective Addressed By Rationale
algorithms with the specified key
sizes.
FDP_ACC.1 Subset
access control
This requirement supports
O.SECVAULT by defining the
subjects, objects, and operations the
Access Control Policy is based on.
FDP_ACF.1 Security
attribute based access
control
This requirement supports
O.SECVAULT by defining the
attributes of subjects and objects
that the Access Control Policy is
based on.
FMT_MSA.3(a) Static
attribute initialisation
This requirement supports
O.SECVAULT by specifying that the
Access Control Policy shall be
applied restrictively. This means
that administrators attempting to
authenticate with the TOE must use
correct login credentials to be
granted access to the TOE
interfaces controlling the secure
vault.
O.SEC_COMMS FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic
key generation
This requirement supports
O.SEC_COMMS by requiring that
cryptographic keys are generated
according to an assigned standard.
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic
key destruction
This requirement supports
O.SEC_COMMS by ensuring that
cryptographic keys are destroyed
according to FIPS 140-2 zeroization
requirements.
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic
operation
This requirement supports
O.SEC_COMMS by requiring
cryptographic operations be
performed according to the specified
algorithms with the specified key
sizes.
FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control
This requirement supports
O.SEC_COMMS by defining the
types of subjects, information, and
operations for the Optimization
Policy that is applied to traffic
flowing through the TOE.
FDP_IFF.1 Simple security
attributes
This requirement supports
O.SEC_COMMS by defining a list of
attributes of subjects and
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Objective Addressed By Rationale
information for the Optimization
Policy that is applied to traffic
flowing through the TOE.
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF
trusted channel
This requirement supports
O.SEC_COMMS by providing a
trusted channel through protected
information can be exchanged
securely with a remote trusted IT
entity.
FTP_TRP.1 This requirement supports
O.SEC_COMMS by requiring that
communication with remote
administrators be secured.
O.OPTIMIZE FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control
This requirement supports
O.OPTIMIZE by defining the types
of subjects, information, and
operations for the Optimization
Policy that is applied to traffic
flowing through the TOE.
FDP_IFF.1 Simple security
attributes
This requirement supports
O.OPTIMIZE by defining a list of
attributes of subjects and
information for the Optimization
Policy that is applied to traffic
flowing through the TOE.
FMT_MSA.3(b) Static
attribute initialization
This requirement supports
O.OPTIMIZE by specifying that the
Optimization Policy shall be applied
permissively to traffic flowing
through the TOE. This means that
data that can't be optimized
(because it has already been
optimized or because it is encrypted
by an unknown key or algorithm) will
be passed through the TOE
unmodified.
Table 20: Dependencies
SFR Dependency Rationale
FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 Met
FAU_SAR.1 FAU_GEN.1 Met
FAU_SAR.3 FAU_SAR.1 Met
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SFR Dependency Rationale
FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.4 Met
FCS_COP.1 Met
FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.1 Met
FCS_COP.1 FCS_CKM.4 Met
FCS_CKM.1 Met
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 Met
FDP_ACF.1 FMT_MSA.3(a) Met
FDP_ACC.1 Met
FDP_IFC.1 FDP_IFF.1 Met
FDP_IFF.1 FDP_IFC.1 Met
FMT_MSA.3(b) Met
FIA_UAU.2 FIA_UID.1 Met by FIA_UID.2
FIA_UID.2 None Met
FMT_MOF.1 FMT_SMR.1 Met
FMT_SMF.1 Met
FMT_MSA.1 FDP_ACC.1 Met
FDP_IFC.1 Met
FMT_SMF.1 Met
FMT_SMR.1 Met
FMT_MSA.3(a) FMT_SMR.1 Met
FMT_MSA.1 Met
FMT_MSA.3(b) FMT_MSA.1 Met
FMT_SMR.1 Met
FMT_SMF.1 None Met
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 Met by FIA_UID.2
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SFR Dependency Rationale
FMT_SMR.3 FMT_SMR.1 Met
FPT_STM.1 None Met
FTA_SSL.3 None Met
FTP_ITC.1 None Met
FTP_TRP.1 None Met
7.3 TOE Summary Specification Rationale
47 Table 21 provides a coverage mapping showing that all SFRs are mapped to the
security functions described in the TSS.
Table 21: Map of SFRs to TSS Security Functions
Security
Audit
Secure
Communications
User
Data
Protection
Secure
Management
Cryptographic
Module
FAU_GEN.1 X
FAU_SAR.1 X
FAU_SAR.3 X
FCS_CKM.1 X
FCS_CKM.4 X
FCS_COP.1 X
FDP_ACC.1 X
FDP_ACF.1 X
FDP_IFC.1 X
FDP_IFF.1 X
FIA_UAU.2 X
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Security
Audit
Secure
Communications
User
Data
Protection
Secure
Management
Cryptographic
Module
FIA_UID.2 X
FMT_MOF.1 X
FMT_MSA.1 X
FMT_MSA.3(a) X
FMT_MSA.3(b) X
FMT_SMF.1 X
FMT_SMR.1 X
FMT_SMR.3 X
FPT_STM.1 X
FTA_SSL.3 X
FTP_ITC.1 X
FTP_TRP.1 X