Echelon V4.5
Security Target Lite r1.0
The certified ST is written in Korean(including some English).This document is a translation
of the original from Korean into English.
UbimInfo Co., Ltd.
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Revision history
Document name Echelon V4.5-ASE.1-ST
Version
created
by
Date Content
Reviewed
by
remark
1.0 young ko 2024.09.08 Initial version
Jinhyun
Baek
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Contents
1. Security Target Introduction 1
1.1. ST REFERENCE 1
1.2. TOE REFERENCE 1
1.3. TOE overview 2
1.3.1. TOE overview 2
1.3.2. TOE type and scope 2
1.3.3. TOE usage and major security features 2
1.3.4. TOE operational environment 3
1.3.5. Non-TOE hardware, software Identification 4
1.4. TOE Description 6
1.4.1. Physical scope of the TOE 6
1.4.2. Logical scope of the TOE 8
1.5. Conventions 12
1.6. Terms and definitions 13
1.7. ST organization 19
2. Conformance claim 20
2.1. CC conformance claim 20
2.2. PP conformance claim 20
2.3. Package conformance claim 20
2.4. Conformance claim rationale 20
3. Security objectives 21
3.1. Security objectives for the operational environment 21
4. Extended components definition 22
4.1. Cryptographic support 22
4.1.1. Random Bit Generation 22
4.2. Identification and authentication 22
4.2.1. TOE Internal mutual authentication 22
4.3. User data protection 22
4.3.1. User data encryption 22
4.4. Security Management 23
4.4.1. ID and password 23
4.5. Protection of the TSF 24
4.5.1. Protection of stored TSF data 24
5. Security requirements 25
5.1. Security audit (FAU) 26
5.2. Cryptographic support (FCS) 30
5.3. User data protection (FDP) 37
5.4. Identification and authentication 38
5.5. Security management 40
5.6. Protection of the TSF 42
5.7. TOE access 44
6. Security assurance requirements 45
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6.2. Development 48
6.3. Guidance documents 49
6.4. Life cycle support 50
6.5. Tests 50
6.6. Vulnerability assessment 51
7. Security requirements rationale 52
7.1. Dependency rationale of security functional requirements 52
7.2. Dependency rationale of security assurance requirements 53
8. TOE Summary Specification 54
8.1. Security audit(FAU) 54
8.1.1. Security audit 54
8.1.2. Audit data review 54
8.1.3. Audit Data Loss Prevention 54
8.2. Cryptographic support(FCS) 56
8.2.1. Cipher key Generation 56
8.2.2. Cipher key Distribution 56
8.2.3. Cipher key Destruction 56
8.2.4. Cryptographic operation 56
8.3. User data protection(FDP) 58
8.4. Identification and authentication(FIA) 59
8.5. Security Management(FMT) 60
8.6. Protection of the TSF(FPT) 61
8.6.1. Internal TSF data transfer protection 61
8.6.2. Stored TSF data protection 61
8.6.3. Self Test 62
8.7. TOE access(FTA) 63
8.7.1. Limitation on concurrent sessions 63
[table 1] ST reference 1
[table 2] TOE reference 1
[table 3] TOE major security functions 2
[table 4] verified cryptographic module information 4
[table 5] hardware/software minimum specifications 4
[table 6] essential software description 5
[table 7] external IT entities 5
[table 8] Physical scope of the TOE 6
[Table 9] 3rd party software required for TOE operation 7
[table 10] Potential Security Violation Response Table 26
[table 11] auditable events 26
[table 12] other auditable events 27
[Table 13] methods of selection and ordering 28
[table 14] User Data cipher key Reference Standards 30
[table 15] User data cipher key generation method and type 30
[table 16] TSF Data cipher key Generation Reference Standards 31
[table 17] TSF data cipher key generation method and type 31
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[table 18] Cryptographic key distribution algorithm and reference standards 32
[table 19] cipher key distribution method and type 32
[Table 20] Encryption Key Destruction Method and Reference Standard 33
[table 21] Cryptographic Operation (User Data Encryption) Algorithms and Reference Standards 34
[table 22] List of User Data Cryptographic Operations 34
[table 23] Cryptographic operation (TSF data encryption) algorithm and reference standards 35
[table 24] List of TSF Data Cryptographic Operations 35
[table 25] List of cryptographic operations for encrypted communications based on standard
protocols 35
[table 26] Random number Generation Algorithms and Reference Standards 36
[table 27] Password Generation Rules 38
[table 28] List of security functions 40
[table 29] TSF data list 40
[Table 30] TOE inter-component cryptographic communication standard 42
[Table 31] Stored TSF Data Protection Policy 42
[Table 32] List of self-tests by TOE component 42
[Table 33] Rationale for the dependency of the security functional requirements 52
[Table 34] cipher key distribution method and type 56
[Table 35] Random number Generation Algorithms and Reference Standards 57
[Table 36] List of user data encryption/decryption methods 58
[figure 1] Plug-in type operational environment (Agent, management server separate type) 3
[figure 2] Physical scope of the TOE 7
[figure 3] Logical scope of the TOE 8
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1. Security Target Introduction
1.1. ST REFERENCE
1.2. TOE REFERENCE
Classification Description
Title Echelon V4.5 ST
Identification Echelon V4.5-ASE.1-ST-r1.0(Lite)
Version r1.0
publication Date 2024. 9. 8
Author UbimInfo Co., Ltd.
Common Criteria Version
Common Criteria for information Technology Security Evaluation
V3.1 r5
Protection Profile
Korean National Protection Profile for Database Encryption V3.0
KECS-PP-1232-2023
Evaluation Assurance Level EAL1+(ATE_FUN.1)
Keyword Database, Encryption
[table 1] ST reference
Classification Description
TOE Identification Echelon V4.5
TOE type Datebase Encryption
TOE version V4.5
build version V4.5.0.0.2
TOE
Components
Management tool Echelon V4.5-AdministratorV1.02
Manager Echelon V4.5-ManagerV1.02
Agent Echelon V4.5-AgentV1.02
Release Date 2024. 4. 3
TOE developer UbimInfo Co., Ltd.
publication Date 2024. 9. 8
Guidance
Echelon V4.5-PRE.1-r1.2
Echelon V4.5-OPE.1-r1.2
Echelon V4.5-OPE.2-r1.2
[table 2] TOE reference
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1.3. TOE overview
This chapter describes the TOE overview, TOE types and scope, TOE usage and major security
features, TOE operating environment, and non-TOE hardware/software.
1.3.1. TOE overview
Echelon V4.5(hereinafter referred to as 'TOE') is a database encryption product that encrypts
the database (hereinafter referred to as 'DB') to prevent unauthorized exposure of information
to be protected.
The encryption target of the TOE is user data managed by the database management system
(hereinafter referred to as 'DBMS') in the operating environment of the organization. The User
data is encrypted by column, and part or all of user data can be subject to encryption according
to the security policy of the organization operating the TOE.
The DBMS that controls the DB in the operational environment of the organization is different
from the DBMS that is directly used by the TOE to control the TSF data (security policy, audit
data, etc).
1.3.2. TOE type and scope
The TOE provides encryption/decryption functions for each column of user data in the form of
software, and the TOE can be classified as a plug-in type and consists of a management tool,
manager, and agent.
1.3.3. TOE usage and major security features
The TOE encrypts user data according to the policy set by the authorized administrator. The
TOE provides major security functions such as the following table to prevent leakage of
confidential information and to operate the TOE safely in the operating environment of the
organization.
Classification description
security audit
·Ability to generate audit data including the date and time of the event, the
type of event, the subject identity, the outcome of the event(success/failure)
·Audit data review function for security administrators
·Audit data loss prevention function
Cryptographic
support
·Function to generate, distribute, and destroy encryption keys through a
verified cryptographic module (KCMVP)
·Function to protect the encryption key (DEK) for user data using the key
encryption key (KEK)
·Function to perform cryptographic operation (data encryption/decryption)
using encryption key for user data
User data
protection
·Ability to generate different ciphertext for the same plaintext per column
for user data
·Data protection function by destroying original data (overwriting ‘0’)
Identification ·ID/password based user authentication mechanism
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1.3.4. TOE operational environment
The TOE provides column-level encryption/decryption functions through a plug-in type to
protect user data, and the operating environment for operating the TOE is shown in the [figure
1].
The TOE consists of management tool, manager, and agent and the functions provided by each
component are as follows.
The management tool is an administrator access tool that provides the ability for
administrators (security manager) to perform security management and encryption key management
(encryption key generation/destruction/inquiry function), and to review audit history.
The manager installed on the management server performs core functions such as security
management, encryption key management, audit history management, and notification services.
The agent installed on the database server performs encryption/decryption of user data
according to the security policy sent from the manager.
Classification description
and
Authentication
·Mutual authentication function between TOE components
·Reuse prevention function to protect authentication data
security
management
·Management of functions of the TSF, management of TSF data(Cipher key, ID/PW,
etc).
TSF protection
·TSF data protection function transmitted between TOE components
·TSF data protection function stored in storage controlled by TSF
·TSF self-test, integrity verification function
TOE access ·TOE access session management function of security administrator
[table 3] TOE major security functions
[figure 1] Plug-in type operational environment (Agent, management server separate type)
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An application server and an external IT entity (NTP server, mail server, etc.) are required
for TOE operation. The NTP server is used to reliable time information for the security audit
data generated by the manager, and the mail server sends e-mail to the authorized administrator.
TOE components (management tool, manager, agent) perform encrypted communication based on
standard protocols. The contents of the verified cryptographic module that passed KCMVP
installed in each the component are as shown in the [table 4].
1.3.5. Non-TOE hardware, software Identification
The minimum hardware and software requirements for TOE installation and operation are as
follows.
The Management tool that requires Eclipse RCP and JRE software to provide a GUI to
authenticated administrators is installed on the authorized administrator PC.
The Manager that requires software such as MPowerPlus and JRE is installed on the management
server and the manager stores the audit history in DBMS (PostgreSQL).
The Agent that requires software such as MPowerPlus and JRE is installed on the database
TOE Classification Specification
Management
tool
H/W
CPU Intel Core i3 @ 3.40GHz or higher
RAM 8GB or higher
HDD Space required for TOE Installation is 830MB or higher
NIC Ethernet 10/100/1000 Mbps * 1 port
OS Windows Server 2022 Standard (64bit)
S/W Eclipse RCP 4.19.0, JRE 11.0.24
Manager
H/W
CPU Intel Core i3 @ 3.40GHz or higher
RAM 8GB or higher
HDD Space required for TOE Installation is 860MB or higher
NIC Ethernet 10/100/1000 Mbps * 1 port
OS Ubuntu 22.04.4(64bit)(Kernel: 5.15.0-119)
S/W PostgreSQL 16.4, MPowerPlus 1.3.1, JRE 11.0.24
Agent
H/W
CPU Intel Core i3 @ 3.40GHz or higher
RAM 8GB or higher
HDD Space required for TOE Installation is 310MB or higher
NIC Ethernet 10/100/1000 Mbps * 1 port
OS Oracle linux 9.2(64bit)(Kernel:5.15.0-101)
S/W Oracle 19.3.0.0.0, MPowerPlus 1.3.1, JRE 11.0.24
[table 5] hardware/software minimum specifications
Classification Contents
cryptographic module name MPowerCrypto V3.0
Verification number CM-249-2029.6
verification level VSL1
developer UbimInfo Co.,Ltd.
verification date 2024-06-17
expiration date 2029-06-17
[table 4] verified cryptographic module information
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server, and the agent encrypts user data and stores it in DBMS (Oracle).
The software description required for TOE operation is as follows.
External IT entities required for TOE operation are as follows.
Classification software contents note
common
software
JRE(11.0.24)
·Framework environment required to run TOE components
(management tool, manager and agent)
Management
tool
Eclipse RCP
(4.19.0)
·Abbreviation for Rich Client Platform, a feature-rich
standalone application based on the Eclipse platform.
Manager
MPowerPlus
(1.3.1)
·An integrated platform solution that provides
functions such as database linkage, XML environment
setting loading, log output, and mail transmission as
a Java-based program
PostgreSQL
(16.4)
·Database for storing TSF data generated by the TOE
Agent
MPowerPlus
(1.3.1)
·An integrated platform solution that provides
functions such as database linkage, XML environment
setting loading, log output, and mail transmission as
a Java-based program
Oracle
(19.3.0.0.0)
·A database for storing user data created by the
application.
[table 6] essential software description
Classification contents note
mail server ·Mail server for sending mail to authorized administrators
NTP server
·Server for synchronizing the time of systems in the networked TOE
operating environment
(reliable time information for security audit data)
[table 7] external IT entities
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1.4. TOE Description
The TOE is operated in the plug-in type to perform encryption/decryption of user data. The
administrator accesses the manager through management tools to set policies, and the agent
performs encryption/decryption of user data based on the set policies. The physical and logical
scopes of the TOE are as follows.
1.4.1. Physical scope of the TOE
The physical scope of the TOE is as follows.
The TOE package consists of a CD 1EA and documents (product license certificate, technical
support agreement) and is provided by direct delivery method. The CD consists of TOE
installation files (management tool, manager, agent), manuals, and required software. The TOE
installation files are provided in the form of software, and preperative procedures necessary
for installation, Operation Guide(administrator manual and user operation manual) necessary for
operation are provided as PDF files. In addition, essential software (JRE, Eclipse, MPowerPlus)
required for TOE installation is included, which is excluded from the scope of the TOE.
classification Components
production
type
Deployment
type
TOE
Management
tool
Echelon V4.5-AdministratorV1.02
(EchelonV4.5@AdministratorV1.02.msi)
SW
CD
Manager
Echelon V4.5-ManagerV1.02
(EchelonV4.5@ManagerV1.02.jar)
Agent
Echelon V4.5-AgentV1.02
(EchelonV4.5@AgentV1.02.jar)
Guidance
Documents
Preparative
Procedure
Echelon V4.5-PRE.1-r1.2
(Echelon V4.5-PRE.1-r1.2.pdf)
PDF
Operation
Guide
Echelon V4.5-OPE.1-r1.2
(Echelon V4.5-OPE.1-r1.2.pdf)
Echelon V4.5-OPE.2-r1.2
(Echelon V4.5-OPE.2-r1.2.pdf)
Mandatory S/W
JRE 11.0.24
(PKG_JRE11_Windows.zip,
jre-11.0.24_linux-x64_bin.tar.gz)
Eclipse RCP 4.19.0
(Eclipse_RCP_4.19.0.zip)
MPowerPlus 1.3.1
(MPowerPlus1.3.1.zip)
SW
Certificate
Product license certificate Paper 1 copy
Technical support agreement Paper 1 copy
[table 8] Physical scope of the TOE
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The physical scope of the TOE is Management tool, Manager, Agent, non-TOE operational
environment. It is structured as follows.
The 3rd
party software required for TOE operation is as follows.
classification version contents note
BC-FJA 2.0.0
·Library for encrypted communication based on standard
protocol between TOE components
[Table 9] 3rd
party software required for TOE operation
[figure 2] Physical scope of the TOE
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1.4.2. Logical scope of the TOE
The logical scope of the TOE consists of security audit, cryptographic support, user data
protection, identification and authentication, security management, protection of TSF, and TOE
access. [Figure 3] shows the logical scope of each TOE component.
○ Management tool
⦁Security audit(FAU)
When a security-related event occurs in the management tool, it is transmitted to the manager
and the audit data is saved. Audit data includes information about event date and time, event
type, subject identity, and outcome of the event(success or failure), and all generated audit
data provides the ability to be reviewed by authorized administrators.
⦁Cryptographic support(FCS)
The management tool performs cryptographic operations using the verifed cryptographic module
passed the Korea Cryptographic Module Validation Program(KCMVP) and destroys the cryptographic
key by overwriting it with "0".
⦁Identification and authentication(FIA)
The management tool performs mutual authentication when communicating with a physically
separated manager. The management tool performs administrator authentication based on an ID and
password (9 to 30 characters, including uppercase and lowercase English letters, numbers, and
special characters), masks input characters (●) to prevent password exposure, and blocks
account access for 10 minutes after 3 failed authentication attempts.
[figure 3] Logical scope of the TOE
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⦁Security management(FMT)
The management tool provides security administrators with security functions (password
management, encryption key management, configuration information management, encryption key
history inquiry, audit data inquiry, integrity check) and TSF data(configuration information)
management functions.
⦁Protection of the TSF(FPT)
The management tool performs self-tests and integrity checks at initial startup, periodically
during normal operation, and at the administrator's request. TSF data transmitted between the
management tool and the manager is protected from unauthorized exposure or modification by
encrypted communication based on standard protocols.
⦁TOE access(FTA)
When the security manager accesses the site, it verifies whether the IP address is one of the
permitted IP addresses and only allows access for permitted IP and single sessions. If the
inactivity period exceeds a certain period of time, the security manager session is terminated.
○ Manager
⦁Security audit(FAU)
The manager saves audit data when a security-related event occurs and sends an alert email to
the system administrator if the audit event is a potential security violation. Audit data
includes information about event date and time, event type, subject identity, and event outcome
(success or failure).
A warning mail is sent to the administrator when the capacity of the DBMS that stores audit
data exceeds 80%. If it exceeds 90%, a warning message and the oldest stored audit record are
overwritten to prevent loss of audit data.
⦁Cryptographic support(FCS)
The manager generates and distributes all cryptographic keys to protect data transmitted
between TOE components (management tool and manager, agent and manager), and performs
cryptographic operations using the verifed cryptographic module passed the KCMVP and destroy the
encryption key by overwriting it with "0".
⦁Identification and authentication(FIA)
The manager performs mutual authentication when communicating with a physically separated
management tool (agent) and maintains session information generated through a random number
generator when identifying and authenticating the security manager, thereby blocking attempts to
reuse authentication data.
⦁Security management(FMT)
The manager performs security functions (password management, encryption key management,
configuration information management, encryption key history inquiry, audit data inquiry,
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integrity check) and TSF data(configuration information) management functions requested by the
security administrator through the management tool.
⦁Protection of the TSF(FPT)
The manager performs self-tests and integrity checks at initial startup, periodically during
normal operation, and at the administrator's request. TSF data transmitted between TOE
components (management tool and manager, agent and manager) is protected from unauthorized
exposure and modification by encrypted communication based on standard protocols, and stored TSF
data is protected by using the KCMVP cryprtographic module.
○ Agent
⦁Security audit(FAU)
When a security-related event occurs in the agent, it is sent to the manager to store audit
data. The audit data includes information about the event date and time, event type, subject
identity, and event outcome (success or failure).
⦁Cryptographic support(FCS)
The agent performs cryptographic operations using the verifed cryptographic module passed the
KCMVP to protect user data, and destroys the cryptographic key by overwriting it with "0".
⦁User data protection(FDP)
The agent performs encryption and decryption on user data on a column-by-column basis
according to the policy set by the security manager, and then performs a destruction operation
(overwriting with "0") to protect the original data.
⦁Identification and authentication(FIA)
The agent performs mutual authentication when communicating with a physically separate
manager.
⦁Protection of the TSF(FPT)
The agent performs self-tests and integrity checks at initial startup, periodically during
normal operation, and at the administrator's request. TSF data transmitted between the agent and
the manager is protected from unauthorized exposure or modification by encrypted communication
based on standard protocols.
○ Non-security features included in the evaluation scope include:
⦁Agent
- Query analysis: A function that analyzes the query requested by the user and excludes it
from TOE evalution scope.
⦁Manager
- None
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⦁Management tool
- None
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1.5. Conventions
The notation, formatting and conventions used in this ST are consistent with the Common Criteria
for Information Technology Security Evaluation.
The CC allows several operations to be performed for functional requirements: iteration,
assignment, selection and refinement. Each operation is used in this ST.
Iteration
Iteration is used when a component is repeated with varying operations. The result of
iteration is marked with an iteration number in parenthesis following the component identifier,
i.e., denoted as(iteration No.).
Assignment
This is used to assign specific values to unspecified parameters (e.g., password length). The
result of assignment is indicated in square brackets like [ assignment_value ].
Selection
This is used to select one or more options provided by the CC in stating a requirement. The
result of selection is shown as underlined and italicized.
Refinement
This is used to add details and thus further restrict a requirement. The result of refinement
is shown in bold text.
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1.6. Terms and definitions
Terms used in this ST, which are the same as in the CC, must follow those in the CC.
Agent
TOE component that provides encryption operation function for user data using TOE
Approved cryptographic algorithm
A cryptographic algorithm selected by Korea Cryptographic Module Validation Authority for block
cipher, secure hash algorithm, message authentication code, random bit generation, key
agreement, public key cipher, digital signatures cryptographic algorithms considering safety,
reliability and interoperability
Application Server
The application server defined in this PP refers to the server that installs and operates the
application, which is developed to provide a certain application service by the organization that
operates the TOE. The pertinent application reads the user data from the DB, which is located in
the database server, by the request of the application service user, or sends the user data to be
stored in the DB to the database server.
Approved mode of operation
The mode of cryptographic module using approved cryptographic algorithm
Assets
Entities that the owner of the TOE presumably places value upon
Assignment
The specification of an identified parameter in a component (of the CC) or requirement
Attack potential
Measure of the effort to be expended in attacking a TOE expressed as an attacker's expertise,
resources and motivation
Augmentation
Addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package
Authorized Administrator
Authorized user to securely operate and manage the TOE
Authentication Data
Information used to verify the claimed identity of a user
Authorized User
The TOE user who may, in accordance with the SFRs, perform an operation
BC-FJA(Bouncy Castle FIPS Java API)
Cryptographic library that meets the level 1 requirements of FIPS 140-2
Certificate
An electronic certificate that acts like an online seal/identification card.
Column
A set of data values of a particular simple type, one for each row of the table in a relational
database
- 14 -
Component
Smallest selectable set of elements on which requirements may be based
Critical Security Parameters (CSP)
Information related to security that can erode the security of the encryption module if exposed or
changed (e.g., verification data such as secret key/private key, password, or Personal
Identification Number).
Class
Set of CC families that share a common focus
Database
A set of data that is compiled according to a certain structure in order to receive, save, and
provide data in response to the demand of multiple users to support multiple application duties
at the same time. The database related to encryption by column, which is required by this ST,
refers to the relational database.
Database Server
The database server defined in this ST refer to the server in which the DBMS managing the
protected DB is installed in the organization that operates the TOE
DBMS(Database Management System)
A software system composed to configure and apply the database. The DBMS related to
encryption by column, which is required by this PP, refers to the database management system
based on the relational database model.
Data Encryption Key(DEK)
Key that encrypts and decrypts the data
Decryption
The act that restoring the ciphertext into the plaintext using the decryption key
Dependency
Relationship between components such that if a requirement based on the depending component
is included in the ST, a requirement based on the component that is depended upon must
normally also be included in the ST.
Echelon V4.5
A DB encryption product that performs the function of preventing unauthorized exposure of
information to be protected by encrypting the database.
Eclipse RCP
Abbreviation for Rich Client Platform, a standalone application with rich features based on the
Eclipse platform.
Encryption
The act that converts the plaintext into the ciphertext using the encryption key
Element
Indivisible statement of a security need
External Entity
Human or IT entity possibly interacting with the TOE from outside of the TOE boundary
- 15 -
Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL)
Set of assurance requirements drawn from CC Part 3, representing a point on the CC predefined
assurance scale, that form an assurance package
Family
Set of components that share a similar goal but differ in emphasis or rigour
Identity
Representation uniquely identifying entities (e.g. user, process or disk) within the context of the
TOE
Iteration
Use of the same component to express two or more distinct requirements
KCMVP(Korea Cryptographic Module Validation Program)
A system to validate the security and implementation conformance of cryptographic modules
used for the protection of important but not classified information among the data communicated
through the information and communication network of the government and public institutions.
JRE(Java Runtime Environment)
Framework environment required to run the management tools, managers, and agents that make
up TOE.
Key Encryption Key (KEK)
Key that encrypts and decrypts another cryptographic key
Mail Server
A server that forwards e-mail to another e-mail server using SMTP.
Management access
The access to the TOE to manage the TOE by administrator, remotely
Management tool
A TOE component that has the function of setting and controlling encryption policies according
to the definition of the TOE's role and managing encryption keys (user data, TSF data) used in
the TOE.
Manager
TOE component that provides encryption key generation used in TOE and TOE security audit
history storage and notification service functions
Manual recovery
Recovery through an update server, etc. by the user execution or user intervention
MPowerCrypto V3.0
A verification-based cryptographic module that is installed in TOE components (management tool,
manager, and agent) and is responsible for cryptographic operations.
MPowerPlus
An integrated platform solution that provides functions such as database connection, XML
environment setting loading, log output, and mail transmission through Java-based programs.
NTP Server
Time synchronization server via network protocol
- 16 -
Object
Passive entity in the TOE containing or receiving information and on which subjects perform
Operations
Operation (on a component of the CC) Modification or repetition of a component. Allowed
operations on components are assignment, iteration, refinement and selection
Operation (on a subject))
Specific type of action performed by a subject on an object
Oracle
An abbreviation for Oracle Database, an RDBMS created by a representative American software
company founded by Larry Ellison in 1977.
Oracle linux
A Linux distribution distributed by Oracle, partly based on the GNU General Public License, since
late 2006.
Organizational Security Policies
Set of security rules, procedures, or guidelines for an organization wherein the set is currently
given by actual or virtual organizations, or is going to be given
Private Key
A cryptographic key which is used in an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm and is uniquely
associated with an entity (the subject using the private key), not to be disclosed Protection
Profile (PP) Implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE type
PostgreSQL
An object-relational database management system that emphasizes extensibility and standards
compliance.
Protection Profile(PP)
Implementation-independent security requirements specification appropriate to the TOE type
Public Key
A cryptographic key which is used in an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm and is associated
with an unique entity (the subject using the public key), it can be disclosed
Public Key (asymmetric) cryptographic algorithm
A cryptographic algorithm that uses a pair of public and private keys
Random bit generator
A device or algorithm that outputs a binary string that is statistically independent and is not
biased. The RBG used for cryptographic application generally generates 0 and 1 bit string, and
the string can be combined into a random bit block. The RBG is classified into the deterministic
and non-deterministic type. The deterministic type RBG is composed of an algorithm that
generates bit strings from the initial value called a “seed key,” and the non-deterministic type
RBG produces output that depends on the unpredictable physical source.
Recommend/be recommended
The ‘recommend’ or ‘be recommended’ presented in Application notes is not mandatorily
recommended, but required to be applied for secure operations of the TOE
- 17 -
Refinement
Addition of details to a component
Role
Predefined set of rules on permissible interactions between a user and the TOE
Security Function Policy (SFP)
A Set of rules that describes the specific security action performed by TSF (TOE security
functionality) and describe them as SFR (security function requirement)
Secret Key
A cryptographic key which is used in an symmetric cryptographic algorithm and is uniquely
associated with one or several entity, not to be disclosed
Security Target (ST)
Implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific identified TOE
Security attribute
The characteristics of the subject used to define the SFR, user (including the external IT
product), object, information, session and/or resources. These values are used to perform the
SFR
Selection
Specification of one or more items from a list in a component
Self-test of cryptographic module
Pre-operational and conditional tests performed by the cryptographic module
Shall/must
The ‘shall’ or ‘must’ presented in Application notes indicates mandatory requirements applied to
the TOE
SSL(Secure Sockets Layer)
This is a security protocol proposed by Netscape to ensure confidentiality, integrity and security
over a computer network
Standard Protocol
Secure Socket Layer, the predecessor of Transport Layer Security, is a security protocol that
supports secure communication through encrypted connections.
Symmetric cryptographic technique
Encryption scheme that uses the same secret key in mode of encryption and decryption, also
known as secret key cryptographic technique
Subject
Active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects
Target of Evaluation (TOE)
Set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied by guidance
TLS (Transport Layer Security)
This is a cryptographic protocol between a SSL-based server and a client and is described in
RFC 2246
TOE Security Functionality (TSF)
- 18 -
Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon
for the correct enforcement of the SFRs
TSF Data
Data for the operation of the TOE upon which the enforcement of the SFR relies
Unique identification information
Identification information given to each component to indicate the uniqueness of the TOE
component.
Ubuntu
A Linux distribution developed by forking Debian Linux and focusing on ease of use compared to
Debian.
User
Refer to "External entity“
User Data
Data for the user, that does not affect the operation of the TSF
Windows Server 2022
A computer operating system developed by Microsoft.
- 19 -
1.7. ST organization
Chapter 1 introduces the Security Target, providing ST reference, TOE reference, TOE overview,
TOE description..
Chapter 2 declares conformance to the CC, PP, and package as a conformance declaration, and
describes the rationale for the conformance declaration and how to comply with the
ST.
Chapter 3 defines the security objectives for the operational environment
Chapter 4 defines extended components that require additional definition according to TOE
characteristics.
Chapter 5 describes the security function requirements provided by the TOE.
Chapter 6 describes the assurance requirements provided by the TOE.
Chapter 7 describes the rationale of security requirements.
Chapter 8 describes the TOE summary specification to accurately provide the TOE security
functionality.
- 20 -
2. Conformance claim
2.1. CC conformance claim
2.2. PP conformance claim
2.3. Package conformance claim
This ST claims conformance to assurance package EAL1 augmented with ATE_FUN.1.
2.4. Conformance claim rationale
If strict conformance is required by the PP to which conformance is being claimed no
conformance claim rationale is required.
Classification Description
CC
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1, Revision 5
·Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation. Part 1: Introduction and General Model, Version
3.1, Revision 5 (CCMB-2017-04-001, April, 2017)
·Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation. Part 2: Security Functional Components, Version
3.1, Revision 5 (CCMB-2017-04-002, April, 2017)
·Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation. Part 3: Security Assurance Components, Version
3.1, Revision 5 (CCMB-2017-04-003, April, 2017)
Confor-
mance
claim
Part 2 Security
functional
components
Extended: FCS_RBG.1, FDP_UDE.1, FIA_IMA.1, FMT_PWD.1, FPT_PST.1
Part 3 Security
assurance
components
Conformant
Package Augmented: EAL1 augmented (ATE_FUN.1)
Classification Description
title Korean National Protection Profile for Database Encryption
version 3.0
Evaluation Assurance Level EAL1+(ATE_FUN.1)
Issue Date 2023. 4. 27
Evaluation Criteria Version CC V3.1 r5
Certification Number KECS-PP-1232-2023
conformance strict PP conformance
- 21 -
3. Security objectives
The followings are the security objectives handled by technical and procedural method
supported from operational environment in order to provide the TOE security functionality
accurately.
3.1. Security objectives for the operational environment
Organizational
Security Policy
Contents
OE.PHYSICAL_CONTROL
·The place where the TOE components are installed and operated shall
be equipped with access control and protection facilities so that only
authorized administrator can access.
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN
·The authorized administrator of the TOE shall be non-malicious users,
have appropriately trained for the TOE management functions and
accurately fulfill the duties in accordance with administrator
guidances.
OE.SECURE_DEVELOPMENT
·The developer who uses the TOE to interoperate with the user
identification and authentication function in the operational
environment of the business system shall ensure that the security
functions of the TOE are securely applied in accordance with the
requirements of the manual provided with the TOE.
OE.LOG_BACKUP
·The authorized administrator of the TOE shall periodically checks a
spare space of audit data storage in case of the audit data loss, and
carries out the audit data backup (external log server or separate
storage device, etc.) to prevent audit data loss.
OE.OPERATION_SYSTEM_RE
INFORCEMENT
·The authorized administrator of the TOE shall ensure the reliability
and security of the operating system by performing the reinforcement
on the latest vulnerabilities of the operating system in which the TOE
is installed and operated.
OE. Timestamp
·The TOE must accurately record security-related events using a
reliable timestamp provided by the TOE operating environment.
OE. Secure DBMS
·The DBMS that interacts with the TOE stores audit records, so the
stored audit records must be protected from unauthorized deletion and
modification.
OE. Secure Channel
·Since the mail server linked with TOE sends a security warning email
to the security manager, the channel between TOE and the mail server
must be safely protected with encrypted communication.
- 22 -
4. Extended components definition
4.1. Cryptographic support
4.1.1. Random Bit Generation
4.2. Identification and authentication
4.2.1. TOE Internal mutual authentication
4.3. User data protection
4.3.1. User data encryption
Family
Behaviour
This family defines requirements for the TSF to provide the capability that
generates random bits required for TOE cryptographic operation.
Component
leveling
FCS_RBG.1 random bit generation, requires TSF to provide the capability that
generates random bits required for TOE cryptographic operation.
Management FCS_RBG.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit FCS_RBG.1
There are no auditable events foreseen.
FCS_RBG.1 Random bit generation
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FCS_RBG.1.1 The TSF shall generate random bit using the specified random bit generator
that meets the following [assignment: list of standards].
Family
Behaviour
This family defines requirements for providing mutual authentication between
TOE components in the process of user identification and authentication.
Component
leveling
FIA_IMA.1 TOE Internal mutual authentication requires that the TSF provides
mutual authentication function between TOE components in the process of user
identification and authentication.
Management FIA_IMA.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit FIA_IMA.1
The following actions are recommended to record if FAU_GEN Security audit data
generation family is included in the PP/ST:
a) Minimal: Success and failure of mutual authentication
FIA_IMA.1 FIA_IMA.1 TOE Internal mutual authentication
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FIA_IMA.1.1 The TSF shall perform mutual authentication between [assignment: different
parts of TOE] using the [assignment: authentication protocol] that meets the
following [assignment: list of standards].
Family
Behaviour
This family provides requirements to ensure confidentiality of user data.
- 23 -
4.4. Security Management
4.4.1. ID and password
Component
leveling
FDP_UDE.1 User data encryption requires confidentiality of user data
Management FDP_UDE.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) Management of user data encryption/decryption rules
Audit FDP_UDE.1
The following actions are recommended to record if FAU_GEN Security audit data
generation is included in the PP/ST:
a) Minimal : Success and failure of user data encryption/decryption
FDP_UDE.1 FDP_UDE.1 User data encryption
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
FDP_UDE.1.1 TSF shall provide TOE users with the ability to encrypt/decrypt user data
according to [assignment: the list of encryption/decryption methods] specified.
Family
Behaviour
This family defines the capability that is required to control ID and password
management used in the TOE, and set or modify ID and/or password by authorized
users.
Component
leveling
FMT_PWD.1 ID and password management, requires that the TSF provides the
management function of ID and password.
Management FMT_PWD.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) Management of ID and password configuration rules.
Audit FMT_PWD.1
The following actions are recommended to record if FAU_GEN Security audit data
generation is included in the PP/ST:
a) Minimal: All changes of the password.
FMT_PWD.1 Management of ID and password
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_PWD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the password of [assignment:list
of functions] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].
1. [assignment: password combination rules and/or length]
2. [assignment: other management such as management of special characters
unusable for password, etc.]
FMT_PWD.1.2 The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the ID of [assignment: list of
functions] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].
1. [assignment: ID combination rules and/or length]
2. [assignment: other management such as management of special characters
- 24 -
4.5. Protection of the TSF
4.5.1. Protection of stored TSF data
unusable for ID, etc.]
FMT_PWD.1.3 The TSF shall provide the capability for [selection, choose one of: setting ID
and password when installing, setting password when installing, changing the
ID and password when the authorized administrator accesses for the first time,
changing the password when the authorized administrator accesses for the first
time].
Family
Behaviour
This family defines rules to protect TSF data stored within containers
controlled by the TSF from the unauthorized modification or disclosure.
Component
leveling
FPT_PST.1 Basic protection of stored TSF data, requires the protection of TSF
data stored in containers controlled by the TSF.
Management FPT_PST.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit FPT_PST.1
There are no auditable events foreseen.
FPT_PST.1 Basic protection of stored TSF data
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FPT_PST.1.1 The TSF shall protect [assignment: TSF data] stored in containers controlled by
the TSF from the unauthorized [selection: disclosure, modification].
- 25 -
5. Security requirements
The security requirements specify security functional requirements and assurance requirements
that must be satisfied by the TOE that claims conformance to the PP.
The security functional requirements included in this ST are derived from CC Part 2 and
Chapter 4 Extended Components Definition.
The following table summarizes the security functional requirements used in the CC.
Security
functional
class
Security functional component
note
identification No. Security functional component name
FAU
FAU_ARP.1 ∙Security alarms
FAU_GEN.1 ∙Audit data generation
FAU_SAA.1 ∙Potential violation analysis
FAU_SAR.1 ∙Audit review
FAU_SAR.3 ∙Selectable audit review
FAU_STG.3 ∙Action in case of possible audit data loss
FAU_STG.4 ∙Prevention of audit data loss
FCS
FCS_CKM.1(1)
∙Cryptographic key generation
(User data encryption)
FCS_CKM.1(2)
∙Cryptographic key generation
(TSF data encryption)
FCS_CKM.2 ∙Cryptographic key distribution
FCS_CKM.4 ∙Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1(1)
∙Cryptographic operation
(User data encryption)
FCS_COP.1(2)
∙Cryptographic operation
(TSF data encryption)
FCS_RBG.1(Extended) ∙Random bit generation
FDP
FDP_UDE.1(Extended) ∙User data encryption
FDP_RIP.1 ∙Subset residual information protection
FIA
FIA_AFL.1 ∙Authentication failure handling
FIA_IMA.1(Extended) ∙TOE Internal mutual authentication
FIA_SOS.1 ∙Verification of secrets
FIA_UAU.2 ∙User authentication before any action
FIA_UAU.4 ∙Single-use authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.7 ∙Protected authentication feedback
FIA_UID.2 ∙User identification before any action
FMT
FMT_MOF.1 ∙Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MTD.1 ∙Management of TSF data
FMT_PWD.1(Extended) ∙Management of ID and password
FMT_SMF.1 ∙Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 ∙Security roles
FPT
FPT_ITT.1 ∙Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
FPT_PST.1(Extended) ∙Basic protection of stored TSF data
FPT_RCV.1 ∙Manual recovery
FPT_TST.1 ∙TSF testing
FTA
FTA_MCS.2
∙Per user attribute limitation on multiple
concurrent sessions
FTA_SSL.3 ∙TSF-initiated termination
FTA_TSE.1(1) ∙TOE session establishment
- 26 -
5.1. Security audit (FAU)
FAU_ARP.1 Security alarms
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis
FAU_ARP.1.1 The TSF shall take [[table 10] Potential Security Violation Response Table] upon
detection of a potential security violation.
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable
events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and
c) [ Refer to the “auditable events” in [table 11] auditable events, [ [table 1
2] Other auditable events ].
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable),
and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the
functional components included in the PP/ST [ Refer to the contents of
“additional audit record” in [table 10] Additional audit record ].
Security
functional
component
Auditable event
Additional audit
record
FAU_ARP.1 ∙Actions taken due to potential security violations
FAU_SAA.1
∙Enabling and disabling of any of the analysis mechanisms,
Automated responses performed by the tool
FAU_STG.3 ∙Actions taken due to exceeding of a threshold
FAU_STG.4 ∙Actions taken due to the audit storage failure
FCS_CKM.1(1) ∙Success and failure of actions
FCS_CKM.1(2) ∙Success and failure of actions
Potential Security Violation Potential Security Violation Response
Admin login failed 3 times
Send mail to authorized administrator, Terminate the
process, Block login (10 minutes)
Integrity
failure
executable file Send mail to authorized administrator
configuration file Send mail to authorized administrator
Audit data
storage
saturation
When 80% of the
threshold is exceeded
Send mail to authorized administrator
When 90% of the
threshold is exceeded
Send mail to authorized administrator
Failed self-test of cryptographic
module
Send mail to authorized administrator,
Terminate the process
Abnormal termination of process Send mail to authorized administrator
[table 10] Potential Security Violation Response Table
- 27 -
Security
functional
component
Auditable event
Additional audit
record
FCS_CKM.2 ∙Success and failure of actions
FCS_CKM.4 ∙Success and failure of actions
FCS_COP.1(1)
∙Success and failure of cryptographic operations, types of
cryptographic operations
FCS_COP.1(2)
∙Failure of cryptographic operation, type of cryptographic
operation
FDP_UDE.1 ∙Success and failure of user data encryption/decryption
FIA_AFL.1
∙The reaching of the threshold for the unsuccessful
authentication attempts and the actions taken, and the
subsequent, if appropriate, restoration to the normal
state
FIA_IMA.1 ∙Success and failure of mutual authentication
FIA_UAU.2 ∙All uses of the authentication mechanism
FIA_UAU.4 ∙Attempt to reuse authentication data
FIA_UID.2
∙All use of the user identification mechanism, including the
user identity provided
FMT_MOF.1
∙All modifications in the behaviour of the functions in the
TSF
FMT_MTD.1
∙All modifications to the values of TSF data
∙Changes in agent registration status
Modified values of
TSF data
FMT_PWD.1 ∙All changes to ID and password
FMT_SMF.1 ∙Use of the management functions
FMT_SMR.1 ∙modifications to the group of users that are part of a role
FPT_TST.1
∙Execution of the TSF self tests and the results of the
tests
Modified TSF data or
execution code in
case of integrity
violation
FTA_MCS.2
∙Rejection of a new session based on the limitation of
multiple concurrent sessions
FTA_SSL.3
∙Termination of an interactive session by the session
locking mechanism.
FTA_TSE.1
∙Denial of a session establishment due to the session
establishment mechanism. All attempts at establishment of
a user session.
[table 11] auditable events
Security functional
component
Auditable event note
- ∙Timestamp information for time change confirmation
[table 12] other auditable events
- 28 -
FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_SAA.1.1 The TSF shall be able to apply a set of rules in monitoring the audited events and
based upon these rules indicate a potential violation of the enforcement of the
SFRs.
FAU_SAA.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules for monitoring audited events:
a) Accumulation or combination of [ Among the auditable events of FIA_UAU.2, there
is an authentication failure audit event, among the auditable events of FPT_TST.1,
there is an integrity violation audit event and a self-test failure event of a
verified cryptographic module, an abnormal process termination, possible audit
data loss of FAU_STG.3, and the full of audit trail of FAU_STG.4.] known to
indicate a potential security violation
b) [ none ]
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide [authorized administrator] with the capability to read [all
the audit data] from the audit records.
FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the authorized
administrator to interpret the information.
FAU_SAR.3 Selectable audit review
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.3.1 The TSF shall provide the capability to apply [ [Table 13] methods of selection
and ordering ] of audit data based on [ [Table 13] methods of selection and
ordering ].
FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG.3.1 The TSF shall [ Notification to the authorized administrator, [ None ] if the
audit trail exceeds [ 80% of storage space ].
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss
Hierarchical to FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
Dependencies FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
condition ordering method note
∙ OR : IP, Term
∙ AND : count
·Audit history generation date (descending order)
[Table 13] methods of selection and ordering
- 29 -
FAU_STG.4.1 The TSF shall “overwrite the oldest stored audit records” and [ Send security
manager warning mail ] if the audit trail is full.
- 30 -
5.2. Cryptographic support (FCS)
1) Block cipher-based random number generator with 128-bit key length
FCS_CKM.1(1) Cryptographic key generation (User data encryption)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate data encryption keys(DEK) in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [ [table 15] User data cipher key
generation method and type ] and specified cryptographic key sizes [ [table 15]
User data cipher key generation method and type ] that meet the following: [
[table 14] User Data cipher key Reference Standards ].
classification Algorithm Standards
Random number generator ARIA128_CTR_DRBG1) TTAK.KO-12.0189/R2
[table 14] User Data cipher key Reference Standards
classification
Cryptographic key
generation algorithm
cryptographic
algorithm
cryptographic Key
Size
note
user data cipher key ARIA128_CTR_DRBG
ARIA |K|=128, 192, 256
SEED |K|=128
[table 15] User data cipher key generation method and type
- 31 -
FCS_CKM.1(2) Cryptographic key generation (TSF data encryption)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [ [table 17] TSF data cipher key
generation method and type ] and specified cryptographic key sizes [ [table 17]
TSF data cipher key generation method and type ] that meet the following: [
[table 16] TSF Data cipher key Generation Reference Standards ].
classification
Cryptographic key
generation algorithm
cryptograph
ic algorithm
cryptographic Key
Size
note
KEK
password
derivation
(for password
key)
SHA-256_HMAC_PBKDF2 ARIA |K|=256
Random number
generator based
ARIA128_CTR_DRBG ARIA |K|=128
TSF data cipher key ARIA128_CTR_DRBG
ARIA |K|=128,192,256
SEED |K|=128
For
mutual
authent
ication
private
authentication
Key
ARIA128_CTR_DRBG RSA-PSS
|P|=2048
hash=SHA-256
Public
authentication
key
[table 17] TSF data cipher key generation method and type
classification Algorithm description Standards
key derivation SHA-256_HMAC_PBKDF2
salt : 16byte
iteration : 2048
TTAK.KO-12.0334:2018
Random number
generator
ARIA128_CTR_DRBG - TTAK.KO-12.0189/R2
[table 16] TSF Data cipher key Generation Reference Standards
- 32 -
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.2.1 The TSF shall destruct cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method [ [table 18], [table 19] cipher key
distribution method and type ] that meets the following: [ [table 18]
Cryptographic key distribution algorithm and reference standards ].
classification usage
Distribution
process
cryptographic
algorithm
distribution method
user data
cipher key
For encrypting
and decrypting
user data
auto AES-GCM
·Encrypted with symmetric encryption
key by manager and sent to agent
[table 19] cipher key distribution method and type
classification Algorithm description Standards
Key agreement algorithm ECDHE P-256 NIST SP 800-52 Rev.2
[table 18] Cryptographic key distribution algorithm and reference standards
- 33 -
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destruct cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method [ [table 20] Encryption Key Destruction
Method and Reference Standard ] that meets the following: [ [table 20] Encryption
Key Destruction Method and Reference Standard ].
classification contents Standards
Dest#1 ·Overwrite 3 times with value '0' -
Dest#2
·Perform the zeroization operation of the cipher key by
calling the destroy() interface.
-
[Table 20] Encryption Key Destruction Method and Reference Standard
- 34 -
FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic operation (User data encryption)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [ [table 22] List of User Data Cryptographic Operations ]
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [ [table 22] List of User
Data Cryptographic Operations ] and cryptographic key sizes [ [table 22] List of
User Data Cryptographic Operations ] that meet the following: [ [table 21]
Cryptographic Operation (User Data Encryption) Algorithms and Reference
Standards ].
Classification cryptographic algorithm Standards
block cipher
algorithm
ARIA KS X 1213-1:2019
SEED TTAS.KO-12.0004/R1:2005
hash algorithm SHA-256 KS X ISO/IEC 10118-3_2001:2018
[table 21] Cryptographic Operation (User Data Encryption) Algorithms and Reference Standards
Classificat
ion
cryptographic
algorithm
contents
Operation
Mode
note
User Data
ARIA
Key Size |K|=128,192,256
approved
mode
Mode CBC
SEED
Key Size |K|=128
Mode CBC
SHA SHA-256
[table 22] List of User Data Cryptographic Operations
- 35 -
FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic operation (TSF data encryption)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [ [table 24] List of TSF Data Cryptographic Operations,
[table 25] List of cryptographic operations for encrypted communications based
on standard protocols ] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [
[table 24] List of TSF Data Cryptographic Operations, [table 25] List of
cryptographic operations for encrypted communications based on standard
protocols ] and cryptographic key sizes [ [table 24] List of TSF Data
Cryptographic Operations, [table 25] List of cryptographic operations for
encrypted communications based on standard protocols ] that meet the following:
[ [table 23] Cryptographic operation (TSF data encryption) algorithm and
reference standards ].
Classification cryptographic algorithm Standards
block cipher
ARIA KS X 1213-1:2019
SEED TTAS.KO-12.0004/R1:2005
AES-GCM
ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010
ISO/IEC 19772:2020
hash SHA
KS X ISO/IEC 10118-3_2001:2018
ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018
digital signature RSA-PSS KS X ISO/IEC 14888-2:2011
key agreement ECDHE NIST SP 800-52 Rev.2
key derivation PBKDF2
TTAK.KO-12.0334:2018
NIST SP 800-135 Rev.1
message digest HMAC ISO/IEC 9797-2:2021
[table 23] Cryptographic operation (TSF data encryption) algorithm and reference standards
Classific
ation
cryptographic algorithm contents note
TSF
Data
key derivation PBKDF2 HMAC-SHA-256
block cipher
ARIA
Key Size |K|=128,192,256
Mode CBC
SEED
Key Size |K|=128
Mode CBC
hash SHA SHA-256
digital signature RSA-PSS |P|=2048, hash=SHA-256
[table 24] List of TSF Data Cryptographic Operations
Classific
ation
cryptographic algorithm contents note
TSF
Data
key derivation PBKDF2 HMAC-SHA-256
block cipher AES-GCM Key Size |K|=128
- 36 -
FCS_RBG.1 Random number generation (Extended)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FCS_RBG.1.1 The TSF shall generate random bit using the specified random bit generator that
meets the following [[table 26] Random number Generation Algorithms and
Reference Standards]
classification Algorithm Standards
Random number
generator
Block cipher-based ARIA128_CTR_DRBG TTAK.KO-12.0189/R2
Hash-based SHA-256_HASH_DRBG NIST SP 800-90A Rev.1
[table 26] Random number Generation Algorithms and Reference Standards
Classific
ation
cryptographic algorithm contents note
Mode GCM
hash SHA SHA-256
key agreement ECDHE P-256
message digest HMAC HMAC-256(|K|=256)
[table 25] List of cryptographic operations for encrypted communications based on standard
protocols
- 37 -
5.3. User data protection (FDP)
FDP_UDE.1 User data encryption (Extended)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
FDP_UDE.1.1 The TSF shall provide a function that can encrypt/decrypt the user data to the
TOE user according to the specified [ encryption/decryption method by column,
[One-way encryption per column] ].
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FDP_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made
unavailable upon the allocation of the resource to, deallocation of the resource
from the following objects: [ user data ].
- 38 -
5.4. Identification and authentication
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when [ 3 ] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related
to [ administrator’s authentication attempt ].
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met, the
TSF shall [ Send security administrator alert email, close management tool,
disable login function (10 minutes) ]
FIA_IMA.1 TOE Internal mutual authentication (Extended)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FIA_IMA.1.1 The TSF shall perform mutual authentication between [ Management tool and Manager,
Agent and Manager ] using the [ Self-Implemented Authentication Protocol ] that
meets the following [ None ].
FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FIA_SOS.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet [ [table 27]
Password Generation Rules] ].
Classification Generation Rules
Compliance
·Length: 9 to 30 characters
·Allowable characters: English uppercase letters, English lowercase letters,
special characters, numbers
·Combination rules: Must include at least one English uppercase letter,
English lowercase letter, special character, or number
Prohibited
Items
·Do not set the same password as the user account (ID)
·Prohibition of consecutive repeated 3 or more input of the same
letter/number
·Prohibit sequential input of 3 or more consecutive letters or numbers on the
keyboard
·Prohibition of reuse of the password used immediately before
[table 27] Password Generation Rules
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
Hierarchical to FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Dependencies FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.2.1 The TSF shall require each administrator to be successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF mediated actions on behalf of that user
FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.4.1 The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to [ Administrator
authentication mechanism ]
- 39 -
FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only
[
⦁ The input password is masked (●) so that it cannot be seen on the screen.
⦁ In case of identification and authentication failure, feedback on the failure
is not provided.
]
to the user while the authentication is in progress.
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
Hierarchical to FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Dependencies No dependencies.
FIA_UID.2.1 The TSF shall require each administrator to be successfully identified before
allowing any other TSF mediated actions on behalf of that user
- 40 -
5.5. Security management
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to conduct management actions of the functions
[ [table 28] List of security functions] to [ the authorized administrator ].
security function Contents
Management action
determ
ine
the
behavi
or
dis-
able
en-
able
modify
the
behavi
our
Password
Management
·change password for administrator/ CipherKey O - - -
Configuration file
management
·Managemnet of configuration information O - - -
login management ·Security manager login/logout O - - -
cipher key
management
·generation/inquiry/destruction cipher key O - - -
Audit history
inquiry
·Audit history information inquiry O - - -
Help ·TOE components integrity check O - - -
[table 28] List of security functions
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage [ [table 29] TSF data list ] to [
Authorized Administrator ].
TSF data contents
management
crea
te
quer
y
modi
fy
dele
te
password for cipher key
·Authentication information for the cipher
key
- - O -
Admin
info.
id ·Information for Administrator
Authentication
- - O -
password
unique information
·Information to indicate the uniqueness of
TOE components
- - - O
KEK
password-derived
(for cipher key)
·password derived key for cipher key - - - -
Random number
generator based
∙ Random number generator based KEK - - - O
user data cipher key ∙ user data cipher key O O - O
TSF data cipher key ∙ TSF data cipher key O O O O
For
mutual
authenti
private
authentication
Key
∙ Private key for mutual authentication - O - O
- 41 -
TSF data contents
management
crea
te
quer
y
modi
fy
dele
te
cation
Public
authentication
key
∙ Public key for mutual authentication - O - O
audit history information ∙ Audit history information generated by TOE - O - -
Pref
eren
ces
info
rmat
ion
IP
Management tool
·IP address of management tool for access
control
- O O -
agent ·IP address of agent for access control - O O -
Admin Email Address
·Administrator email address for sending
emails
O O O -
Mail server address ·Mail server address for sending mail O O O -
Mail server id ·Mail server id for sending mail O O O -
Mail server password ·Mail server password for sending mail O O O -
TOE component version
information
·Manager/Agent/Management Tool Version
Information
- O - -
TOE Agent Information ·Whether the agent is activated - O - -
[table 29] TSF data list
FMT_PWD.1 Management of ID and password(Extended)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_PWD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the password of [ None ] to [
Authorized Administrator ].
1. [ None ]
2. [ None ]
FMT_PWD.1.2 The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the id of [ None ] to [ Authorized
Administrator ].
1. [ None ]
2. [ None ]
FMT_PWD.1.3 The TSF shall provide the capability for setting ID and password when installing.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [
List of security functions specified in FMT_MOF.1
TSF data management list specified in FMT_MTD.1
ID and password management list specified in FMT_PWD.1 ].
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles [Security Manager].
FMT_SMR.1.2 TSF shall be able to associate users and their roles defined in FMT_SMR.1.1.
- 42 -
5.6. Protection of the TSF
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests at the initial start-up, periodically
during normal operation, upon the request of authorized user to demonstrate the
correct operation of [ management tool, manager, agent ].
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorized administrators with the capability to verify the
integrity of [ configuration file ].
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorized administrators with the capability to verify the
integrity of [ executable file ].
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FPT_ITT.1.1 The TSF shall protect the TSF data from disclosure, modification when it is
transmitted between separate parts of the TOE.
FPT_PST.1 Basic protection of stored TSF data (Extended)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FPT_PST.1.1 The TSF shall protect [ [table 31] Stored TSF Data Protection Policy ] stored in
containers controlled by the TSF from the unauthorized disclosure, modification.
Classification contents
Authentication
information
for certificate ·password
for ciher key ·password
for administroator ·ID/Password
cipher key info
·Certificate, symmetric key,
asymmetric key (private key)
Setting information ·TOE Operation Information
DB account information ·ID/Password
[Table 31] Stored TSF Data Protection Policy
Classification version Cryptographic algorithm Confidentiality Integrity Standards
TLS v1.3 TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 AES128-GCM HMAC-256 RFC 8446
[Table 30] TOE inter-component cryptographic communication standard
Classification
Whether the
process is
running
Integrity Test
Point of view note
Executable
file
Configuration
file
Management
tool
O O -
On startup,
Periodically (1
hour), Upon
administrator
request
If self-test and
integrity check fail,
send email to security
manager
Manager O O O
Agent O O O
[Table 32] List of self-tests by TOE component
- 43 -
FPT_RCV.1 Manual recovery
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
FPT_RCV.1.1 After [ integrity check failure event ] the TSF shall enter a maintenance mode
where the ability to return to a secure state is provided.
- 44 -
5.7. TOE access
FTA_MCS.2 Per user attribute limitation on multiple concurrent sessions
Hierarchical to FTA_MCS.1 Basic limitation on multiple concurrent sessions
Dependencies FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FTA_MCS.2.1 The TSF shall restrict the maximum number of concurrent sessions
belonging to the same user according to the rules [ limiting the maximum number of
concurrent sessions to 1 for users who have the same administrator, rules on the
maximum number of concurrent sessions{None} ].
FTA_MCS.2.2 The TSF shall enforce a limit of [ 1 ] session per administrator by default.
FTA_TSE.1 TOE session establishment
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FTA_TSE.1.1 The TSF shall be able to deny the administrator’s management access session
establishment based on [ access IP, [ none ] ].
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FTA_SSL.3.1 The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after a [ Security Manager
Inactivity Period 10 minutes ].
- 45 -
6. Security assurance requirements
Assurance requirements of this ST are comprised of assurance components in CC part 3, and the
evaluation assurance level is EAL1+. The following table summarizes assurance components.
6.1. Security Target evaluation
Security
assurance class
Security assurance component
identification No. Security assurance component name
Security Target
evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ∙ ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 ∙ Conformance claims
ASE_OBJ.1 ∙ Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_ECD.1 ∙ Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 ∙ Stated security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 ∙ TOE summary specification
Development ADV_FSP.1 ∙ Basic functional specification
Guidance
documents
AGD_OPE.1 ∙ Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 ∙ Preparative procedures
Life-cycle
support
ALC_CMC.1 ∙ Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1 ∙ TOE CM coverage
Tests
ATE_FUN.1 ∙ Functional testing
ATE_IND.1 ∙ Independent testing - conformance
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 ∙ Vulnerability survey
ASE_INT.1 introduction
Dependencies No dependencies.
Developer action elements
ASE_INT.1.1D The developer shall provide an ST introduction.
Content and presentation elements
ASE_INT.1.1C The ST introduction shall contain an ST reference, a TOE reference, a TOE
overview and a TOE description.
ASE_INT.1.2C The ST reference shall uniquely identify the ST.
ASE_INT.1.3C The TOE reference shall uniquely identify the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.4C The TOE overview shall summarise the usage and major security features of the
TOE.
ASE_INT.1.5C The TOE overview shall identify the TOE type.
ASE_INT.1.6C The TOE overview shall identify any non-TOE hardware/software/firmware required
by the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.7C The TOE description shall describe the physical scope of the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.8C The TOE description shall describe the logical scope of the TOE.
Evaluator action elements
ASE_INT.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_INT.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE reference, the TOE overview, and the
TOE description are consistent with each other.
- 46 -
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
Dependencies ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
Developer action elements
ASE_CCL.1.1D The developer shall provide a conformance claim.
ASE_CCL.1.2D The developer shall provide a conformance claim rationale.
Content and presentation elements
ASE_CCL.1.1C The conformance claim shall contain a CC conformance claim that identifies the
version of the CC to which the ST and the TOE claim conformance.
ASE_CCL.1.2C The CC conformance claim shall describe the conformance of the ST to CC Part 2
as either CC Part 2 conformant or CC Part 2 extended.
ASE_CCL.1.3C The CC conformance claim shall describe the conformance of the ST to CC Part 3
as either CC Part 3 conformant or CC Part 3 extended.
ASE_CCL.1.4C The CC conformance claim shall be consistent with the extended components
definition.
ASE_CCL.1.5C The conformance claim shall identify all PPs and security requirement packages
to which the ST claims conformance.
ASE_CCL.1.6C The conformance claim shall describe any conformance of the ST to a package as
either package conformant or package augmented.
ASE_CCL.1.7C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the TOE type is
consistent with the TOE type in the PPs for which conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.8C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of the
security proble m definition is consistent with the statement of the security
problem definition in the PPs for which conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.9C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of
security objectives is consistent with the statement of security objectives in
the PPs for which conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.10C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of
security requirements is consistent with the statement of security requirements
in the PPs for which conformance is being claimed.
Evaluator action elements
ASE_CCL.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
Dependencies No dependencies.
Developer action elements
ASE_OBJ.1.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security objectives.
Content and presentation elements
ASE_OBJ.1.1C The statement of security objectives shall describe the security objectives for
- 47 -
the operational environment.
Evaluator action elements
ASE_OBJ.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
Dependencies No dependencies.
Developer action elements
ASE_ECD.1.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security requirements.
ASE_ECD.1.2D The developer shall provide an extended components definition.
Content and presentation elements
ASE_ECD.1.1C The statement of security requirements shall identify all extended security
requirements.
ASE_ECD.1.2C The extended components definition shall define an extended component for each
extended security requirement.
ASE_ECD.1.3C The extended components definition shall describe how each extended component
is related to the existing CC components, families, and classes.
ASE_ECD.1.4C The extended components definition shall use the existing CC components,
families, classes, and methodology as a model for presentation.
ASE_ECD.1.5C The extended components shall consist of measurable and objective elements such
that conformance or nonconformance to these elements can be demonstrated.
Evaluator action elements
ASE_ECD.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_ECD.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that no extended component can be clearly expressed
using existing components.
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
Dependencies ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
Developer action elements
ASE_REQ.1.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security requirements.
ASE_REQ.1.2D The developer shall provide a security requirements rationale.
Content and presentation elements
ASE_REQ.1.1C The statement of security requirements shall describe the SFRs and the SARs.
ASE_REQ.1.2C All subjects, objects, operations, security attributes, external entities and
other terms that are used in the SFRs and the SARs shall be defined.
ASE_REQ.1.3C The statement of security requirements shall identify all operations on the
security requirements.
ASE_REQ.1.4C All operations shall be performed correctly.
ASE_REQ.1.5C Each dependency of the security requirements shall either be satisfied, or the
security requirements rationale shall justify the dependency not being
satisfied.
- 48 -
6.2. Development
ASE_REQ.1.6C The statement of security requirements shall be internally consistent.
Evaluator action elements
ASE_REQ.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
Dependencies ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
Developer action elements
ASE_TSS.1.1D The developer shall provide a TOE summary specification
Content and presentation elements
ASE_TSS.1.1C The TOE summary specification shall describe how the TOE meets each SFR.
Evaluator action elements
ASE_TSS.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_TSS.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE summary specification is consistent
with the TOE overview and the TOE description.
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
Dependencies No dependencies.
Developer action elements
ADV_FSP.1.1D
The developer shall provide a functional specification.
ADV_FSP.1.2D The developer shall provide a tracing from the functional specification to the
SFRs.
Content and presentation elements
ADV_FSP.1.1C The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of use for
each SFR enforcing and SFR supporting TSFI.
ADV_FSP.1.2C The functional specification shall identify all parameters associated with each
SFR enforcing and SFR supporting TSFI.
ADV_FSP.1.3C The functional specification shall provide rationale for the implicit
categorization of interfaces as SFR non interfering.
ADV_FSP.1.4C The tracing shall demonstrate that the SFRs trace to TSFIs in the functional
specification.
Evaluator action elements
ADV_FSP.1.1E
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
- 49 -
6.3. Guidance documents
ADV_FSP.1.2E
The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is an accurate
and complete instantiation of the SFRs.
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
Dependencies ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
Developer action elements
AGD_OPE.1.1D The developer shall provide operational user guidance.
Content and presentation elements
AGD_OPE.1.1C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the user
accessible functions and privileges that should be controlled in a secure
processing environment, including appropriate warnings.
AGD_OPE.1.2C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, how to use
the available interfaces provided by the TOE in a secure manner.
AGD_OPE.1.3C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the available
functions and interfaces, in particular all security parameters under th e
control of the user, indicating secure values as appropriate.
AGD_OPE.1.4C The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, clearly present each
type of security relevant event relative to the user accessible functions that
need to be performed, including changing the security characteristics of
entities under the control of the TSF.
AGD_OPE.1.5C The operational user guidance shall identify all possible modes of operation of
the TOE (including operation following failure or operational error), t heir
consequences and implications for maintaining secure operation.
AGD_OPE.1.6C The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, describe the security
measures to be followed in order to fulfil the security objectives for the
operational environment as described in the ST.
AGD_OPE.1.7C The operational user guidance shall be clear and reasonable.
Evaluator action elements
AGD_OPE.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
AGD_PRE.1 Operational user guidance
Dependencies No dependencies.
Developer action elements
AGD_PRE.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE including its preparative procedures.
Content and presentation elements
AGD_PRE.1.1C The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure
acceptance of the delivered TOE in accordance with the developer's delivery
procedures.
AGD_PRE.1.2C The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure
installation of the TOE and for the secure preparation of the operational
environment in accordance with the security objectives for the operational
- 50 -
6.4. Life cycle support
6.5. Tests
environment as described in the ST.
Evaluator action elements
AGD_PRE.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
AGD_PRE.1.2E The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to confirm that the TOE
can be prepared securely for operation.
ALC_CMC.1 TOE Lavelling of the TOE
Dependencies ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
Developer action elements
ALC_CMC.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE and a reference for the TOE.
Content and presentation elements
ALC_CMC.1.1C The TOE shall be labelled with its unique reference.
Evaluator action elements
ALC_CMC.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meet requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
Dependencies No dependencies.
Developer action elements
ALC_CMS.1.1D The developer shall provide a configuration list for the TOE.
Content and presentation elements
ALC_CMS.1.1C The configuration list shall include the following: the TOE itself; and the
evaluation evidence required by the SARs.
ALC_CMS.1.2C The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.
Evaluator action elements
ALC_CMS.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
Dependencies ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
Developer action elements
ATE_FUN.1.1D The developer shall test the TSF and document the results.
ATE_FUN.1.2D The developer shall provide test documentation.
Content and presentation elements
ATE_FUN.1.1C The test documentation shall consist of test plans, expected test results and
- 51 -
6.6. Vulnerability assessment
actual test results.
ATE_FUN.1.2C The test plans shall identify the tests to be performed and describe the
scenarios for performing each test. These scenarios shall include any ordering
dependencies on the results of other tests.
ATE_FUN.1.3C The expected test results shall show the anticipated outputs from a successful
execution of the tests.
ATE_FUN.1.4C The actual test results shall be consistent with the expected test results.
Evaluator action elements
ATE_FUN.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing - conformance
Dependencies ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Developer action elements
ATE_IND.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
Content and presentation elements
ATE_IND.1.1C The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
Evaluator action elements
ATE_IND.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ATE_IND.1.2E The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm that the TSF operates
as specified.
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
Dependencies ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Developer action elements
AVA_VAN.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE for testing
Content and presentation elements
AVA_VAN.1.1C The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
Evaluator action elements
AVA_VAN.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
AVA_VAN.1.2E The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain sources to identify
potential vulnerabilities in the TOE.
AVA_VAN.1.3E The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, based on the identified
potential vulnerabilities, to determine that the TOE is resistant to attacks
performed by an attacker possessing Basic attack potential.
- 52 -
7. Security requirements rationale
7.1. Dependency rationale of security functional requirements
The following table shows dependency of security functional requirements.
No. SFR Dependency Reference No.
1 FAU_ARP.1 FAU_SAA.1 3
2 FAU_GEN.1 FPT.STM.1 Rationale(1)
3 FAU_SAA.1 FAU_GEN.1 2
4 FAU_SAR.1 FAU_GEN.1 2
5 FAU_SAR.3 FAU_SAR.1 4
6 FAU_STG.3 FAU_STG.1 Rationale(2)
7 FAU_STG.4 FAU_STG.1 Rationale(2)
8 FCS_CKM.1(1)
[FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1] 10, 12
FCS_CKM.4 11
9 FCS_CKM.1(2)
[FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1] 10, 13
FCS_CKM.4 11
10 FCS_CKM.2
[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1] 8, 9
FCS_CKM.4 11
11 FCS_CKM.4 [FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1] 8, 9
12 FCS_COP.1(1)
[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1] 8
FCS_CKM.4 11
13 FCS_COP.1(2)
[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1] 9
FCS_CKM.4 11
14 FCS_RBG.1 - -
15 FDP_UDE.1 FCS_COP.1 12
16 FDP_RIP.1 - -
17 FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1
20
Rationale(3)
18 FIA_IMA.1 - -
19 FIA_SOS.1 - -
20 FIA_UAU.2 FIA_UID.1
22
Rationale(4)
21 FIA_UAU.4 - -
22 FIA_UAU.7 FIA_UAU.1
20
Rationale(3)
23 FIA_UID.2 - -
24 FMT_MOF.1
FMT_SMF.1 28
FMT_SMR.1 29
25 FMT_MTD.1
FMT_SMF.1 28
FMT_SMR.1 29
26 FMT_PWD.1
FMT_SMF.1 28
FMT_SMR.1 29
27 FMT_SMF.1 - -
28 FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1
23
Rationale(4)
- 53 -
Rationale (1): FAU_GEN.1 has a dependency on FPT_STM.1, but it satisfies the dependency
because it uses reliable timestamp provided by OE.Timestamp, the security objective for the
operating environment of this Security Target.
Rationale (2): FAU_STG.3 and FAU_STG.4 have dependencies on FAU_STG.1, but they satisfy the
dependencies because they use the security objective OE. Secure DBMS for the operating
environment protected from unauthorized deletion or modification.
Rationale(3): FIA_AFL,1, FIA_UAU.7 depend on FIA_UAU.1, but are satisfied by FIA_UAU.2, which
has a hierarchical relationship with FIA_UAU.1.
Rationale(4): FIA_UAU.2, FMT_SMR.1, and FTA_MCS.2 depend on FIA_UID.1, but are satisfied by
FIA_UID.2, which has a hierarchical relationship with FIA_UID.1.
7.2. Dependency rationale of security assurance requirements
The dependency of EAL1 assurance package provided in the CC is already satisfied, the
rationale is omitted.
The augmented SAR ATE_FUN.1 has dependency on ATE_COV.1. but, ATE_FUN.1 is augmented to
require developer testing in order to check if the developer correctly performed and documented
the tests in the test documentation, ATE_COV.1 is not included in this ST since it is not
necessarily required to show the correspondence between the tests and the TSFIs.
No. SFR Dependency Reference No.
29 FPT_ITT.1 - -
30 FPT_PST.1 - -
31 FPT_TST.1 - -
32 FPT_RCV.1 AGD_OPE.1 EAL1+
33 FTA_MCS.2 FIA_UID.1
23
Rationale(4)
34 FTA_SSL.3 - -
35 FTA_TSE.1 - -
[Table 33] Rationale for the dependency of the security functional requirements
- 54 -
8. TOE Summary Specification
This chapter explains whether the assurance method for the TOE security function is
appropriate for the security function provided by the TOE.
The security functions provided by the TOE include security audit(FAU), cryptographic support
(FCS), user data protection(FDP), identification and authentication(FIA), security management
(FMT), Protection of the TSF(FPT), TOE access (FTA).
8.1. Security audit(FAU)
This chapter explains whether the assurance method for the TOE security function is
appropriate for the security function provided by the TOE.
8.1.1. Security audit
The TOE generates audit data for auditable events that occur during operation. The generated
audit data is stored in the database, and a reliable timestamp (time in the OS where the server
is installed) provided by the TOE operating environment is used to ensure that the audit data is
generated sequentially.
The TOE generates and stores auditable events according to the date and time of the event, the
type of event, the identity of the subject who caused the event, details of work, and results
(success/failure).
※ SFR Mapping
FAU_GEN.1
8.1.2. Audit data review
The TOE stores audit data in a database and provides the ability for security administrators
to review all audit data so that information in the audit record can be interpreted
appropriately. In addition, audit data can be reviewed by AND conditions of the review period,
IP, and number of inquiries, and the security administrator can search audit data using the
interface provided by the management tool.
※ SFR Mapping
FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.3
8.1.3. Audit Data Loss Prevention
The TOE stores audit records generated by the TOE in the database in the TOE operating
environment and periodically checks the audit record storage space. If the remaining space of
the storage set in the TOE exceeds the threshold (80%), an audit log is created for the event
exceeding the storage and a warning mail is sent to the security manager. And if the remaining
space exceeds the threshold (90%), the TOE overwrites the oldest audit data and sends a warning
mail to the security administrator.
※ SFR Mapping
FAU_STG.3, FAU_STG.4
- 55 -
8.1.4. Security alarm
The TOE applies a combination of rules that indicate potential security violations to the
audit data and issues a security alarm that sends a warning email to the defined administrator
in case of a violation. Potential security violations include:
- If the security manager fails to log in 3 times
- If the integrity check of the TOE executable file and configuration file fails
- When the storage space of the audit history storage exceeds 80% or exceeds 90%
- In the event that the self-test of the verified cryptographic module fails
- If the TOE (manager, management tool, agent) process terminates abnormally
※ SFR Mapping
FAU_ARP.1, FAU_SAA.1
- 56 -
8.2. Cryptographic support(FCS)
8.2.1. Cipher key Generation
The TOE generates cryptographic keys using the password derivation, random number generator,
and RSA key pair generation functions provided by the KCMVP cyprtographic module installed in
the TOE and executed in approved mode of operation.
※ SFR Mapping
FCS_CKM.1(1), FCS_CKM.1(2)
8.2.2. Cipher key Distribution
TOE provides standard protocol-based encrypted communication using key setting encryption
algorithm (ECDHE) provided by 3rd
party software (BC-FJA) between TOE components. The encryption
key types and distribution methods are as follows.
※ SFR Mapping
FCS_CKM.2
8.2.3. Cipher key Destruction
TOE provides two types of destruction methods to safely destroy encryption keys and core
security parameters. Encryption keys used in core security parameters and verified encryption
modules are destroyed by overwriting them three times with the value of '0' (Destruction #1),
and The cipher key for the encryption algorithm provided by 3rd party software (BC-FJA) is
destroyed by performing key zeroing by calling the destroy() interface (destruction #2).
※ SFR Mapping
FCS_CKM.4
8.2.4. Cryptographic operation
TOE performs cryptographic operations using key derivation, block cipher, hash, digital
signature, and message authentication algorithms provided by the verification-based
cryptographic module and key derivation, block cipher, key agreement, and message authentication
provided by 3rd
party software (BC-FJA).
※ SFR Mapping
FCS_COP.1(1), FCS_COP.1(2)
classification usage
Distribution
process
crypto-
graphic algorithm
Standards
encrypted
channel
key agreement auto ECDHE NIST SP 800-52 Rev.2
user data
cipher key
For encrypting and
decrypting user data
auto AES-GCM
ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010
ISO/IEC 19772:2020
[Table 34] cipher key distribution method and type
- 57 -
8.2.5. random number generation
TOE generates random numbers required for generating encryption keys using a random number
generator provided by 3rd party software (BC-FJA) and a random number generator that is the
encryption algorithm of the KCMVP cryprtographic module. The random number generation method is
shown in the table below.
※ SFR Mapping
FCS_RBG.1(Extended)
Classification algorithm Standards
Random number
generator
Block cipher-based ARIA128_CTR_DRBG TTAK.KO-12.0189/R2
Hash-based SHA-256_HASH_DRBG NIST SP 800-90A Rev.1
[Table 35] Random number Generation Algorithms and Reference Standards
- 58 -
8.3. User data protection(FDP)
The TOE provides a column-level encryption/decryption function for data stored in the DBMS to
be protected through the KCMVP cryprtographic module, and provides a function that prevents the
same ciphertext from being generated for the same plaintext when encrypting user data. And to
protect user data, all plain text original data used for user data encryption/decryption is
deleted.
The security manager sets the DB encryption policy in the management tool, the set policy is
stored in the database via the manager, and the agent performs two-way encryption and one-way
encryption of user data according to the set DB encryption/decryption policy. Two-way encryption
uses a block cipher algorithm to encrypt and decrypt user data, and one-way encryption uses a
hash algorithm to encrypt user data. The encryption/decryption methods and list of user data are
as follows.
After encryption/decryption, the agent initializes user data to “0” and releases the memory
area to completely delete user data from the memory area.
※ SFR Mapping
FDP_UDE.1(Extended), FDP_RIP.1
classification Way Algorithm contents
Column
based
Cipher
method
Encryp
tion
two-way
ARIA
SEED
∙ Enc([plaintext(random number + user data)]) = [cipher
text]
∙ Random number acquisition through random number generator
∙ Generate different cipher texts for the same plain text
(user data) through encryption algorithms
Decryp
tion
two-way
ARIA
SEED
∙ Dec([ciphertext]) = [random number + plaintext(user
data)]
∙ Remove random numbers from plain text
Encryp
tion
one-way SHA-256 ∙ Generating cipher text using hash algorithm (SHA-256)
[Table 36] List of user data encryption/decryption methods
- 59 -
8.4. Identification and authentication(FIA)
The TOE provides mutual authentication between TOE components, administrator identification
and authentication functions when a security administrator accesses the manager through
management tools.
8.4.1. Security manager identification and authentication
The security manager must register an account (ID and password) and an allowed IP so that
he/she can create his/her own information when installing the manager, and the management tool
performs security manager authentication using the ID and password before the security manager
performs security management functions.
When performing the identification and authentication of the security manager, the management
tool masks (●) the password entered by the security manager so that it cannot be seen on the
screen, and only provides an authentication failure message saying “Login failed.” If
authentication fails for a defined number of consecutive attempts (3 times), the manager blocks
access attempts to the account for 10 minutes (fixed value), saves an audit record for
authentication failures, and sends a warning email to the security manager.
TOE provides a verification mechanism that satisfies the administrator password creation rules
at the time of administrator authentication and password change as follows.
- The length must be 9 to 30 characters, and the allowed characters are English uppercase
letters, English lowercase letters, special characters, and numbers, and the combination rule
must include at least one English uppercase letter, English lowercase letter, special character,
and number.
- Passwords that are identical to the user account (ID), passwords entered by repeating the
same letters/numbers more than three times in a row, passwords entered by sequentially entering
three or more consecutive letters or numbers on the keyboard, and passwords used immediately
before cannot be used.
In addition, the manager provides a function to prevent reuse of authentication data by using
random number information generated by a random number generator to ensure the uniqueness of the
session used when the security manager accesses the management tool.
※ SFR Mapping
FIA_AFL.1, FIA_SOS.1, FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.7, FIA_UID.2
8.4.2. mutual authentication
When communicating between TOE components, mutual authentication is performed through
digital signature verification using the unique value (Unique ID) issued between the management
tool and the manager (agent and manager) in real time.
※ SFR Mapping
FIA_IMA.1(Extended)
- 60 -
8.5. Security Management(FMT)
8.5.1. Security role
When the TOE installs the manager, it generates the ID/password of the security manager and
identifies/authenticates the security manager through this. The security role provided by the
TOE is limited to the security manager only, and only the security manager can change the
ID/password through the management tool. Lastly, in the TOE, the ID/password combination rules
and length required for identification/authentication of the security administrator are fixed
and do not provide a separate management function.
※ SFR Mapping
FMT_PWD.1(Extended), FMT_SMR.1
8.5.2. Security Feature Behavior Management
The TOE provides security management functions only when administrator’s identification and
authentication are successfully performed. Only the security manager can access the security
management interface through the secure channel.
※ SFR Mapping
FMT_MOF.1, FMT_SMF.1
8.5.3. TSF data management
Only security administrators who have successfully authenticated the TOE can manage TSF data.
※ SFR Mapping
FMT_MTD.1, FMT_SMF.1
- 61 -
8.6. Protection of the TSF(FPT)
8.6.1. Internal TSF data transfer protection
TOE performs encrypted communication based on standard protocol (TLS V1.3) for TSF data
transmission for the purpose of protecting internal TSF data transmission, and protects
transmitted data through the encrypted communication.
※ SFR Mapping
FPT_ITT.1
8.6.2. Stored TSF data protection
The TOE stores important information(cryptographic key, password, etc.) using encryption, when
storing it in containers controlled by the TSF.
※ SFR Mapping
FPT_PST.1(Extended)
- 62 -
8.6.3. Self Test
The TSF testing consists of self-test of process and integrity verification. If the
self-test/integrity-check fails, a warning mail is sent to the e-mail address set by the
security administrator. The TOE periodically (1 minute) checks whether the processes between TOE
components are running,
The TOE performs an integrity verification test (verified cryptographic module,
execution/configuration file) at startup, periodically (1 hour), and upon request from the
security manager
In addition, if the integrity verification result for the integrity check target fails, the
TOE must perform manual recovery (refer to the administrator manual for reinstallation,
regeneration commands, etc.) as information such as the TOE agent is tampered with.
※ SFR Mapping
FPT_TST.1, FPT_RCV.1
- 63 -
8.7. TOE access(FTA)
8.7.1. Limitation on concurrent sessions
TOE allows access sessions based on the management tool access IP, limits simultaneous access
sessions to a maximum of 1, and terminates the session if the management tool inactivity period
exceeds 10 minutes.
※ SFR Mapping
FTA_MCS.2, FTA_SSL.3, FTA_TSE.1