KECS-CR-24-51
Echelon V4.5
Certification Report
Certification No.: KECS-CISS-1329-2024
2024. 9. 27.
IT Security Certification Center
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History of Creation and Revision
No. Date
Revised
Pages
Description
00 2024.09.27. -
Certification report for Echelon V4.5
- First documentation
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This document is the certification report for Echelon V4.5 of UbimInfo Co.,
Ltd.
The Certification Body
IT Security Certification Center
The Evaluation Facility
Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA)
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Table of Contents
Certification Report ....................................................................................................1
Executive Summary.............................................................................................5
Identification.........................................................................................................7
Security Policy .....................................................................................................8
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope............................................................9
Architectural Information ..................................................................................10
Documentation...................................................................................................10
TOE Testing........................................................................................................ 11
Evaluated Configuration.................................................................................... 11
Results of the Evaluation ..................................................................................12
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)............................................................12
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC) ......................................................12
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD).................................................13
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV) ..............................................................13
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE).............................................................................13
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)..............................................................13
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary ...................................................................14
Recommendations.............................................................................................15
Security Target ...................................................................................................16
Acronyms and Glossary....................................................................................16
Bibliography.......................................................................................................16
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Executive Summary
This report describes the evaluation result drawn by the certification body on the results
of the EAL1+ evaluation of Echelon V4.5(“TOE” hereinafter) with reference to the
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (“CC” hereinafter) [1].
It describes the evaluation result and its soundness and conformity.
The TOE provides column-level encryption/decryption functions through a plug-in type
to protect user data, and the operating environment for operating the TOE is shown in
[Figure 1]. The TOE consists of Management tool, Manager, and Agent and the
functions provided by each component are as follows.
The Management tool installed on the authorized administrator PC is an administrator
access tool that provides the ability for administrators (security manager) to perform
security management.
The Manager installed on the management server performs core functions such as
security management, encryption key management, audit history management and
notification services.
The Agent installed on the database server performs encryption/decryption of user data
according to the security policy received from the manager.
An application server and an external entity (NTP server, mail server, etc.) are required
for TOE operation. The NTP server is used to reliable time information for the audit data
generated by the manager, and the mail server sends emails to the authorized
administrator regarding security alert events.
TOE components (Management tool, Manager, Agent) provide encrypted
communication based on standard protocols. The contents of the KCMVP (Korea
Cryptographic Module Validation Program) cryptographic module, installed in each TOE
component and performing encryption/decryption, are as shown in [Table 1].
Classification Contents
cryptographic module name MPowerCrypto V3.0
Verification number CM-249-2029.6
verification level VSL1
developer UbimInfo Co.,Ltd.
verification date 2024-06-17
expiration date 2029-06-17
[Table 1] KCMVP cryptographic module information
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The TOE is used to encrypt the user data according to the security policy set by the
authorized administrator to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of the confidential
information. In order that the authorized administrator can operate the TOE securely in
the operational environment of the organization, the TOE provides various security
features such as the security audit function that records and manages major auditable
events; cryptographic support function such as cryptographic key management and
cryptographic operation; user data protection function that encrypts the user data and
protects the residual information; identification and authentication function such as
verifying the identity of the authorized administrator, authentication failure handling, and
mutual authentication among the TOE components; security management function for
security functions and TSF data; TSF protection functions including protecting the TSF
data transmitted among the TOE components, protecting the TSF data stored in the
storage that is controlled by the TSF, and TSF self-test; and TOE access function to
manage the access session of the authorized administrator. The DEK (Data Encryption
Key) used to encrypt/decrypt the user data is protected by encryption with the KEK (Key
Encryption Key).
The evaluation of the TOE was carried out by the Telecommunications Technology
Association (TTA) and completed on September 25, 2024. This report is based on the
evaluation technical report (ETR)[6] submitted by TTA and the Security Target (ST) [7][8].
The ST claims strict conformance to the Korean National Protection Profile for Data
Encryption V3.0 [3]. All Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) in the ST are based
only upon assurance component in CC Part 3. The ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part
3 conformant. The Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) are based upon both
functional components in CC Part 2 and a newly defined component in the Extended
Component Definition chapter of the PP, therefor the ST, and the TOE satisfies the SFRs
in the ST. Therefore the ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The operational environment of the TOE is shown in [Figure 1] TOE Operational
Environment. The operational environment of the TOE includes plug-in type defined in
the PP [3].
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Certification Validity: The certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the
government of Republic of Korea or by any other organization that recognizes or gives
effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the government of Republic
of Korea or by any other organization recognizes or gives effect to the certificate, is either
expressed or implied.
Identification
The TOE reference is identified as follows.
TOE Echelon V4.5
Version V4.5
Build version 4.5.0.0.2
TOE
Components
- Echelon V4.5-AdministratorV1.02
- Echelon V4.5-ManagerV1.02
- Echelon V4.5-AgentV1.02
Guidance
Documents
- Echelon V4.5-PRE.1-r1.2.pdf
- Echelon V4.5-OPE.1-r1.2.pdf
- Echelon V4.5-OPE.2-r1.2.pdf
[Table 2] TOE identification
[Figure 1] Operational environment of the TOE
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[Table 3] summarizes additional identification information for scheme, developer, sponsor,
evaluation facility, certification body, etc..
Scheme Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security
(October 31, 2022)
Korea Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT Security
(May 17, 2021)[4]
TOE Echelon V4.5
Common Criteria Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001 ~
CCMB-2017-04-003, April 2017
EAL EAL1+
(augmented by ATE_FUN.1)
Developer UbimInfo Co., Ltd.
Sponsor UbimInfo Co., Ltd.
Evaluation Facility Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA)
Completion Date of
Evaluation
September 25, 2024
Certification Body IT Security Certification Center
[Table 3] Additional identification information
Security Policy
The TOE provides following security features. For more details refer to the ST [7][8].
TSF Explanation
Security Audit
The TOE generates audit records of security relevant events such as
the start-up/shutdown of the audit functions, integrity violation, self-
test failures, and stores them in the DBMS.
Cryptographic
Support
The TOE performs cryptographic operation such as
encryption/decryption, and cryptographic key management such as
key generation/distribution/destruction.
User data
protection
The TOE provides encryption / decryption function for each column of
Database to protect user data.
Identification
and
The TOE provides identification and authentication functions for the
administrator based on ID/PW and mutual authentication between
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TSF Explanation
Authentication TOE components.
Security
Management
Only the authorized administrator who can access the management
interface provided by TOE can performs security management of the
TOE.
Protection of
the TSF
The TOE provides secure communications to protect confidentiality
and integrity of the transmitted data between TOE components.
The TOE protects stored TSF data through encryption and performs
self-test of TSF.
TOE Access
When an authorized administrator connects, the TOE verifies whether
the IP address is allowed and terminates the session if the inactivity
period exceeds a certain time.
[Table 4] Security features
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
There are no explicit Assumptions in the Security Problem Definition in the Low
Assurance ST. The followings are procedural method supported from operational
environment in order to provide the TOE security functionality accurately.
⚫ The place where the TOE components are installed and operated shall be
equipped with access control and protection facilities so that only authorized
administrator can access.
⚫ The authorized administrator of the TOE shall be non-malicious users, have
appropriately trained for the TOE management functions and accurately fulfill
the duties in accordance with administrator guidances.
⚫ The developer who uses the TOE to interoperate with the user identification and
authentication function in the operational environment of the business system
shall ensure that the security functions of the TOE are securely applied in
accordance with the requirements of the manual provided with the TOE.
⚫ The authorized administrator of the TOE shall periodically check a spare space
of audit data storage in case of the audit data loss, and carries out the audit data
backup (external log server or separate storage device, etc.) to prevent audit
data loss.
⚫ The authorized administrator of the TOE shall ensure the reliability and security
of the operating system by performing the reinforcement on the latest
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vulnerabilities of the operating system in which the TOE is installed and operated.
⚫ The TOE shall accurately record security-related events using the reliable
timestamp provided by the TOE operating environment.
⚫ The DBMS that interacts with the TOE stores the audit records, so the stored
audit records shall be protected from unauthorized deletion and modification.
⚫ Since the mail server linked with the TOE sends a security warning email to the
security manager, the channel between the TOE and the mail server shall be
safely protected with encrypted communication.
Architectural Information
The TOE package consists of a CD 1EA and documents (product license certificate,
technical support agreement) and is provided by direct delivery method. The CD consists
of TOE installation files (Management tool, Manager, Agent), manuals, and required
software. The TOE installation files are provided in the form of software, and preparative
procedures necessary for installation, Operation Guide(administrator manual and user
operation manual) necessary for operation are provided as PDF files. In addition,
essential software (JRE, Eclipse, MPowerPlus) required for TOE installation is included,
which is excluded from the scope of the TOE.
The physical scope of the TOE is Management tool, Manager, Agent, Guidance
Documents. The major security functions of the TOE and logical scope of the TOE are
shown in chapter 3, [Table 4].
For the detailed description, refer to the ST [7][8].
Documentation
The following documentation is evaluated and provided with the TOE by the developer
to the customer.
Identifier Release Date
Echelon V4.5-PRE.1-r1.2.pdf V1.2 Sep. 8, 2024
Echelon V4.5-OPE.1-r1.2.pdf V1.2 Sep. 8, 2024
Echelon V4.5-OPE.2-r1.2.pdf V1.2 Sep. 8, 2024
[Table 5] Documentation
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TOE Testing
The developer took a testing approach based on the security services provided by each
TOE component based on the operational environment of the TOE. Each test case
includes the following information:
⚫ Test no. and conductor: Identifier of each test case and its conductor
⚫ Test Purpose: Includes the security functions to be tested
⚫ Test Configuration: Details about the test configuration
⚫ Test Procedure detail: Detailed procedures for testing each security function
⚫ Expected result: Result expected from testing
⚫ Actual result: Result obtained by performing testing
⚫ Test result compared to the expected result: Comparison between the expected
and actual result
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests according to the assurance
component ATE_FUN.1.
The evaluator has installed the product using the same evaluation configuration and tools
as the developer’s test and performed all tests provided by the developer. The evaluator
has confirmed that, for all tests, the expected results had been consistent with the actual
results. In addition, the evaluator conducted penetration testing based upon test cases
devised by the evaluator resulting from the independent search for potential
vulnerabilities. The evaluator testing effort, the testing approach, configuration, depth,
and results are summarized in the ETR [6].
Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is software consisting of the following components:
TOE: Echelon V4.5(build version 4.5.0.0.2)
- Echelon V4.5-AdministratorV1.02
- Echelon V4.5-ManagerV1.02
- Echelon V4.5-AgentV1.02
The Administrator can identify the complete TOE reference after installation using the
product’s Info check menu. And the guidance documents listed in this report chapter 6,
[Table 5] were evaluated with the TOE
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Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation facility provided the evaluation result in the ETR [6] which references
Single Evaluation Reports for each assurance requirement and Observation Reports.
The evaluation result was based on the CC [1] and CEM [2].
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict PASS is assigned to all assurance components.
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)
The ST Introduction correctly identifies the ST and the TOE, and describes the TOE in a
narrative way at three levels of abstraction (TOE reference, TOE overview and TOE
description), and these three descriptions are consistent with each other. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_INT.1.
The Conformance Claim properly describes how the ST and the TOE conform to the CC
and how the ST conforms to PP and requirement packages. Therefore the verdict PASS
is assigned to ASE_CCL.1.
The Security Objectives for the operational environment are clearly defined. Therefore
the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_OBJ.1.
The Extended Components Definition has been clearly and unambiguously defined, and
it is necessary. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_ECD.1.
The Security Requirements is defined clearly and unambiguously, and they are internally
consistent. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_REQ.1.
The TOE Summary Specification meets all SFRs, and it is consistent with other narrative
descriptions of the TOE. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_TSS.1.
Thus, the ST is sound and internally consistent, and suitable for use as the basis for the
TOE evaluation.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ASE.
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC)
The Configuration Management Capabilities clearly identifies the TOE. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_CMC.1.
The Configuration Management Scope verifies that the configuration list includes the
TOE and the evaluation evidence. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
ALC_CMS.1.
Also the evaluator confirmed that the correct version of the software is installed in device.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ALC.
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9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD)
The procedures and steps for the secure preparation of the TOE have been documented
and result in a secure configuration. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
AGD_PRE.1.
The operational user guidance describes for each user role the security functionality and
interfaces provided by the TSF, provides instructions and guidelines(including warnings)
for the secure use of the TOE, addresses secure procedures for all modes of operation
except for misleading and unreasonable guidance. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to AGD_OPE.1.
Thus, the guidance documents are adequately describing the user can handle the TOE
in a secure manner. The guidance documents take into account the various types of
users (e.g. those who accept, install, administrate or operate the TOE) whose incorrect
actions could adversely affect the security of the TOE or of their own data.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AGD.
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV)
The functional specifications specifies a high-level description of the SFR-enforcing and
SFR-supporting TSFIs, in terms of descriptions of their parameters. Therefore the verdict
PASS is assigned to ADV_FSP.1.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ADV.
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE)
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests in the test documentation.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_FUN.1.
By independently testing a subset of the TSF, the evaluator confirmed that the TOE
behaves as specified in the functional specification and guidance documentation.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_IND.1.
Thus, the TOE behaves as described in the ST and as specified in the evaluation
evidence (described in the ADV class).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ATE.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)
By penetrating testing, the evaluator confirmed that there are no exploitable
vulnerabilities by attackers possessing basic attack potential in the operational
environment of the TOE. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to AVA_VAN.1.
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Thus, potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and
anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), don’t
allow attackers possessing basic attack potential to violate the SFRs.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AVA.
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ASE ASE_INT.1 ASE_INT.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ASE_INT.1.2E PASS
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_CCL.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_OBJ.1 ASE_OBJ.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1 ASE_ECD.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1.2E PASS
ASE_REQ.1 ASE_REQ.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1 ASE_TSS.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1.2E PASS
ALC ALC_CMS.1 ALC_CMS.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ALC_CMC.1 ALC_CMC.1.1E PASS PASS
AGD AGD_PRE.1 AGD_PRE.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
AGD_PRE.1.2E PASS PASS
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1.1E PASS PASS
ADV ADV_FSP.1 ADV_FSP.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ADV_FSP.1.2E PASS PASS
ATE ATE_FUN.1 ATE_FUN.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ATE_IND.1 ATE_IND.1.1E PASS PASS
ATE_IND.1.2E PASS
AVA AVA_VAN.1 AVA_VAN.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
AVA_VAN.1.2E PASS
AVA_VAN.1.3E PASS
[Table 6] Evaluation Result Summary
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Recommendations
The TOE security functionality can be ensured only in the evaluated TOE operational
environment with the evaluated TOE configuration, thus the TOE shall be operated by
complying with the followings:
⚫ The authorized administrator should install and operate the TOE and DBMS in a
physically secure environment accessible only by the authorized administrator, and
should not allow remote management from the outside.
⚫ The authorized administrator is innocuous, properly trained in TOE management
functions, and shall perform their duties accurately in accordance with manager
guidelines.
⚫ Developers who link the encryption function to the application or DBMS should
ensure that the security functions of the TOE are applied safely in accordance with
the requirements of the manual.
⚫ The TOE shall accurately record security-related events using reliable timestamps
provided by the TOE operating environment.
⚫ It is necessary to maintain the reliability and safety of the operating system by
performing reinforcement work on the latest vulnerabilities of the operating system
installed and operated by the TOE.
⚫ The authorized administrator shall periodically check the free space of the audit data
storage in preparation for the loss of the audit records and perform the backup of the
audit records so that the audit records are not deleted.
⚫ Since the mail server linked to the TOE sends security warning mail to the authorized
administrator, the channel between them shall be secured by encrypted
communication.
⚫ Since DBMS that interact with TOE stores audit records, they shall be protected from
unauthorized modification and deletion of the stored audit records.
⚫ During product operation, the authorized administrator must maintain a secure state
by periodically changing passwords.
⚫ The authorized administrator must set only the necessary policies and delete unused
ones to prevent potential vulnerabilities.
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Security Target
The Echelon V4.5 Security Target V1.2, September 8, 2024 [7] is included in this report
by reference. For the purpose of publication, it is provided as sanitised version [8]
according to the CCRA supporting document ST sanitising for publication [9].
Acronyms and Glossary
CC Common Criteria
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSFI TSF Interface
Bibliography
The evaluation facility has used following documents to produce this report.
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001 ~ CCMB-2017-04-003, April, 2017
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version
3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004, April, 2017
[3]
[4]
Korean National Protection Profile for Database Encryption V3.0, KECS-PP-
1232-2023, April 27, 2023
Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security, October 31, 2022
[5] Korea Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT Security, May 17, 2021
[6] TTA-CCE-23-006 Echelon V4.5 Evaluation Technical Report V1.1, September
25, 2024
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[7] Echelon V4.5 Security Target V1.2, September 8, 2024
[8] Echelon V4.5 Security Target Lite r1.0, September 8, 2024
[9] ST sanitising for publication, CCDB-2006-04-004, April 2006