National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for the
Kemp LoadMaster, OS Version 7.2.48.8
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11280-2023
Dated: 01/27/23
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, SUITE: 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6982
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Daniel Faigin
Swapna Katikaneni
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Rahul Joshi
Yogesh Pawar
Shaunak Shah
Adarsh Pandey
Yogita Kore
Acumen Security, LLC
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary............................................................................................................... 5
2 Identification.......................................................................................................................... 6
3 Architectural Information .................................................................................................... 7
4 Security Policy........................................................................................................................ 8
4.1 Security Audit .................................................................................................................................................8
4.2 Cryptographic Support..................................................................................................................................8
4.3 Identification and Authentication .................................................................................................................9
4.4 Security Management ....................................................................................................................................9
4.5 Protection of the TSF .....................................................................................................................................9
4.6 TOE access ......................................................................................................................................................9
4.7 Trusted Path/Channels ..................................................................................................................................9
5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope ............................................................... 10
5.1 Assumptions..................................................................................................................................................10
5.2 Threats...........................................................................................................................................................11
5.3 Organizational Security Policies .................................................................................................................13
5.4 Clarification of Scope...................................................................................................................................13
6 Documentation..................................................................................................................... 14
7 TOE Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................... 15
7.1 Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................................................15
7.2 Excluded Functionality ................................................................................................................................15
8 IT Product Testing............................................................................................................... 16
8.1 Developer Testing .........................................................................................................................................16
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing.......................................................................................................16
9 Results of the Evaluation .................................................................................................... 17
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target .....................................................................................................................17
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation...............................................................................................17
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents............................................................................................................17
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities...............................................................................................18
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity .........................................................................18
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity ..............................................................................................................18
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results..................................................................................................................19
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations ...................................................................... 20
11 Annexes................................................................................................................................. 21
12 Security Target .................................................................................................................... 22
13 Glossary................................................................................................................................ 23
14 Bibliography......................................................................................................................... 24
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1 Executive Summary
This Validation Report (VR) is intended to assist the end user of this product and any security
certification Agent for that end user in determining the suitability of this Information Technology
(IT) product for their environment. End users should review the Security Target (ST), which is
where specific security claims are made, in conjunction with this VR, which describes how those
security claims were tested and evaluated and any restrictions on the evaluated configuration.
Prospective users should carefully read the Assumptions and Clarification of Scope in Section 5
and the Validator Comments in Section 10, where any restrictions on the evaluated configuration
are highlighted.
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of the
evaluation of the Kemp LoadMaster Series Target of Evaluation (TOE). It presents the
evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This VR is not an
endorsement of the TOE by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the TOE is
either expressed or implied. This VR applies only to the specific version and configuration of
the product as evaluated and documented in the ST.
The evaluation was completed by Acumen Security in January 2023. The information in this
report is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test report,
all written by Acumen Security. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common
Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant and meets the assurance requirements defined in
the U.S. Government Protection Profile for Security Requirements for collaborative Protection
Profile for Network Devices Version 2.2e.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5), as interpreted by the Assurance Activities contained in
the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices Version 2.2e. This Validation Report
applies only to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted
in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes and
reviewed the individual work units documented in the ETR and the Assurance Activities Report
(AAR). The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all of the
functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the Security Target (ST). Based on
these findings, the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate,
the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence produced.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted
product evaluations.
Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs). CCTLs evaluate
products against Protection Profiles containing Assurance Activities, which are
interpretation of CEM work units specific to the technology described by the PP.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality
and consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products
desiring a security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product's
evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP's
Product Compliant List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as
evaluated.
• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances
of the product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile(s) to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Kemp LoadMaster
Protection Profile collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices Version 2.2e
Security Target Kemp LoadMaster Security Target v0.8
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Kemp LoadMaster v0.4
CC Version Version 3.1, Revision 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 Extended and CC Part 3 Conformant
Sponsor Progress Software Corporation
Developer Progress Software Corporation
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Acumen Security
2400 Research Blvd, Suite 395,
Rockville, MD 20850.
CCEVS Validators Daniel Faigin
Swapna Katikaneni
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3 Architectural Information
The TOE is Kemp LoadMaster X15, X25 and X40 and Virtual LoadMaster running on OS
7.2.48.8. The LoadMaster simplifies the management of networked resources, and optimizes and
accelerates user access to diverse servers, content, and transaction-based systems. The TOE is
comprised of hardware and software and represents a complete network device providing load
balancing functionality.
The TOE evaluated configuration consists of one of the appliances listed below. The LoadMaster
X15, X25 and X40 are physical devices while the Virtual LoadMaster is a virtual machine which
runs on ESXi.:
Table 2 IT Environment Components
Model LoadMaster X15 LoadMaster X25 LoadMaster X40 Virtual LoadMaster
Processor Intel Xeon E3-1275v6
(Kaby Lake)
Intel Xeon 4116 Silver
(Skylake)
Intel Xeon 6136 Gold
(Skylake)
Intel Xeon E5
(Broadwell)
RAM 32 GB RAM 64 GB RAM 64 GB RAM 2GB (evaluated)
Network 16 1Gb Ethernet
4 10Gb Ethernet Fiber
2 1Gb Ethernet
12 10Gb Ethernet Fiber
2 1Gb Ethernet
12 10Gb Ethernet Fiber
3 1Gb virtual NIC
(evaluated)
Platform LoadMaster OS
7.2.48.8
LoadMaster OS
7.2.48.8
LoadMaster OS 7.2.48.8 LoadMaster OS 7.2.48.8
on ESXi v6.7
The Virtual LoadMaster was tested on an Intel Xeon E5-4620v4 (Broadwell) and ESXi v6.7.
8
4 Security Policy
The TOE provides the security functionality required by [NDcPP].
• Security Audit
• Cryptographic Support
• Identification and Authentication
• Security Management
• Protection of the TSF
• TOE Access
• Trusted Path/Channels
4.1 Security Audit
The TOE generates audit records for security relevant events. The audit events are associated
with the administrator or processes. The audit records are transmitted over TLS to an external
audit server.
4.2 Cryptographic Support
The TOE provides following cryptographic services described below.
Table 3 Cryptographic Services
Service Use
TLS Client Secure connection to remote syslog servers.
TLS Client Secure connection to remote LDAP server.
TLS/HTTPS Server Secures connections with remote administrators.
Verification of Updates Digital signature verification prior to installing an update.
Each of these cryptographic algorithms have been validated for conformance to the requirements
specified in their respective standards, as identified below.
Table 4 CAVP Algorithm Testing References
Algorith
m
CAVP
Cert.
Standard Operation/Use SFR
RSA C2076 FIPS 186-4 RSA 2048 SigVer FCS_CKM.1
ECDSA C2076 FIPS 186-4 ECDSA P-256 SigGen, SigVer
ECDSA P-256, P-384, P-521 KeyGen,
KeyVer
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_COP.1/SigGe
n
ECDHE C2076 SP 800-56Ar2 ECDHE P-256, P-384, P-521 FCS_CKM.2
DRBG C2076 SP 800-90Ar1 CTR_DRBG(AES-256) FCS_RBG_EXT.1
AES C2076 FIPS 197
SP 800-38A
SP 800-38D
AES in CBC and GCM modes with 128-
bit and 256-bit keys
FCS_COP.1/DataE
ncryption
SHA C2076 FIPS 180-4 SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 FCS_COP.1/Hash
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Algorith
m
CAVP
Cert.
Standard Operation/Use SFR
HMAC C2076 FIPS 198-1 HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256,
HMAC-SHA-384
FCS_COP.1/Keye
dHash
4.3 Identification and Authentication
The TOE provides password-based and X.509 certificate-based logon mechanisms. This
password-based mechanism encores minimum length requirements. The TOE also validates and
authenticates X.509 certificates when they are used to identify a remote TLS server or an
administrator logging into the TOE.
4.4 Security Management
The TOE provides management capabilities via a Web-based GUI, accessed over HTTPS.
Management functions allow the administrators to configure the system, install updates, and
manage users.
4.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE prevents the reading of plaintext passwords and keys. The TOE provides a reliable
timestamp for its own use. The reliable timestamp can be set by a security administrator or
authenticated NTP. To protect the integrity of its security functions, the TOE implements a suite
of self-tests at startup and halts or disables affected functionality if a self-test fails. The TOE
ensures that updates to the TOE are authenticated by verifying a digital signature prior to
installing any update.
4.6 TOE access
The TOE monitors local and remote administrative sessions for inactivity and either locks or
terminates the session when a threshold time period is reached. An advisory notice is displayed
at the start of each session.
4.7 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE initiates a TLS trusted channel with a syslog server and LDAP authentication server
(as configured).
The TOE is a TLS/HTTPS server that allows remote administrators to establish a trusted path
with the TOE.
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5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope
5.1 Assumptions
The specific conditions listed in the following subsections are assumed to exist in the TOE’s
environment. These assumptions include both practical realities in the development of the TOE
security requirements and the essential environmental conditions on the use of the TOE.
Table 5 Assumptions
ID Assumption
A.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION The Network Device is assumed to be physically protected in its
operational environment and not subject to physical attacks that
compromise the security or interfere with the device’s physical
interconnections and correct operation. This protection is assumed to
be sufficient to protect the device and the data it contains. As a result,
the cPP does not include any requirements on physical tamper
protection or other physical attack mitigations. The cPP does not
expect the product to defend against physical access to the device that
allows unauthorized entities to extract data, bypass other controls, or
otherwise manipulate the device. For vNDs, this assumption applies to
the physical platform on which the VM runs.
A.LIMITED_FUNCTIONALITY The device is assumed to provide networking functionality as its core
function and not provide functionality/services that could be deemed
as general purpose computing. For example, the device should not
provide a computing platform for general purpose applications
(unrelated to networking functionality).
In the case of vNDs, the VS is considered part of the TOE with only
one vND instance for each physical hardware platform. The exception
being where components of the distributed TOE run inside more than
one virtual machine (VM) on a single VS. There are no other guest
VMs on the physical platform providing non-Network Device
functionality.
A.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION A standard/generic Network Device does not provide any assurance
regarding the protection of traffic that traverses it. The intent is for the
Network Device to protect data that originates on or is destined to the
device itself, to include administrative data and audit data. Traffic that
is traversing the Network Device, destined for another network entity,
is not covered by the ND cPP. It is assumed that this protection will
be covered by cPPs and PP-Modules for particular types of Network
Devices (e.g., firewall).
A.TRUSTED_ADMINISTRATOR The Security Administrator(s) for the Network Device are assumed to
be trusted and to act in the best interest of security for the
organization. This includes appropriately trained, following policy,
and adhering to guidance documentation. Administrators are trusted to
ensure passwords/credentials have sufficient strength and entropy and
to lack malicious intent when administering the device. The Network
Device is not expected to be capable of defending against a malicious
Administrator that actively works to bypass or compromise the
security of the device.
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ID Assumption
For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based authentication, the
Security Administrator(s) are expected to fully validate (e.g. offline
verification) any CA certificate (root CA certificate or intermediate
CA certificate) loaded into the TOE’s trust store (aka 'root store', '
trusted CA Key Store', or similar) as a trust anchor prior to use (e.g.
offline verification).
A.REGULAR_UPDATES The Network Device firmware and software is assumed to be updated
by an Administrator on a regular basis in response to the release of
product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
A.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE The Administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access the
Network Device are protected by the platform on which they reside.
A.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION The Administrator must ensure that there is no unauthorized access
possible for sensitive residual information (e.g. cryptographic keys,
keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on networking equipment
when the equipment is discarded or removed from its operational
environment.
A.VS_TRUSTED_ADMINISTRATOR The Security Administrators for the VS are assumed to be trusted and
to act in the best interest of security for the organization. This includes
not interfering with the correct operation of the device. The Network
Device is not expected to be capable of defending against a malicious
VS Administrator that actively works to bypass or compromise the
security of the device.
A.VS_REGULAR_UPDATES The VS software is assumed to be updated by the VS Administrator
on a regular basis in response to the release of product updates due to
known vulnerabilities.
A.VS_ISOLATON For vNDs, it is assumed that the VS provides, and is configured to
provide sufficient isolation between software running in VMs on the
same physical platform. Furthermore, it is assumed that the VS
adequately protects itself from software running inside VMs on the
same physical platform.
A.VS_CORRECT_CONFIGURATION For vNDs, it is assumed that the VS and VMs are correctly configured
to support ND functionality implemented in VMs.
5.2 Threats
The following table lists the threats addressed by the TOE and the IT Environment. The
assumed level of expertise of the attacker for all the threats identified below is Enhanced-Basic.
Table 6 Threats
ID Threat
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ADMINISTRATOR_ACCESS Threat agents may attempt to gain Administrator access to
the Network Device by nefarious means such as
masquerading as an Administrator to the device,
masquerading as the device to an Administrator, replaying
an administrative session (in its entirety, or selected
portions), or performing man-in-the-middle attacks, which
would provide access to the administrative session, or
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ID Threat
sessions between Network Devices. Successfully gaining
Administrator access allows malicious actions that
compromise the security functionality of the device and
the network on which it resides.
T.WEAK_CRYPTOGRAPHY Threat agents may exploit weak cryptographic algorithms
or perform a cryptographic exhaust against the key space.
Poorly chosen encryption algorithms, modes, and key
sizes will allow attackers to compromise the algorithms,
or brute force exhaust the key space and give them
unauthorized access allowing them to read, manipulate
and/or control the traffic with minimal effort.
T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS Threat agents may attempt to target Network Devices that
do not use standardized secure tunnelling protocols to
protect the critical network traffic. Attackers may take
advantage of poorly designed protocols or poor key
management to successfully perform man-in-the-middle
attacks, replay attacks, etc. Successful attacks will result
in loss of confidentiality and integrity of the critical
network traffic, and potentially could lead to a
compromise of the Network Device itself.
T.WEAK_AUTHENTICATION_ENDPOINTS Threat agents may take advantage of secure protocols that
use weak methods to authenticate the endpoints, e.g. a
shared password that is guessable or transported as
plaintext. The consequences are the same as a poorly
designed protocol, the attacker could masquerade as the
Administrator or another device, and the attacker could
insert themselves into the network stream and perform a
man-in-the-middle attack. The result is the critical
network traffic is exposed and there could be a loss of
confidentiality and integrity, and potentially the Network
Device itself could be compromised.
T.UPDATE_COMPROMISE Threat agents may attempt to provide a compromised
update of the software or firmware which undermines the
security functionality of the device. Non-validated
updates or updates validated using non-secure or weak
cryptography leave the update firmware vulnerable to
surreptitious alteration.
T.UNDETECTED_ACTIVITY Threat agents may attempt to access, change, and/or
modify the security functionality of the Network Device
without Administrator awareness. This could result in the
attacker finding an avenue (e.g., misconfiguration, flaw in
the product) to compromise the device and the
Administrator would have no knowledge that the device
has been compromised.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_COMPROMISE Threat agents may compromise credentials and device
data enabling continued access to the Network Device and
its critical data. The compromise of credentials includes
replacing existing credentials with an attacker’s
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ID Threat
credentials, modifying existing credentials, or obtaining
the Administrator or device credentials for use by the
attacker.
T.PASSWORD_CRACKING Threat agents may be able to take advantage of weak
administrative passwords to gain privileged access to the
device. Having privileged access to the device provides
the attacker unfettered access to the network traffic and
may allow them to take advantage of any trust
relationships with other Network Devices.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_FAILURE An external, unauthorized entity could make use of failed
or compromised security functionality and might therefore
subsequently use or abuse security functions without prior
authentication to access, change or modify device data,
critical network traffic or security functionality of the
device.
5.3 Organizational Security Policies
The following table lists the Organizational Security Policies imposed by an organization to
address its security needs.
Table 7 Organizational Security Policies
ID Assumption
P.ACCESS_BANNER The TOE shall display an initial banner describing restrictions of use, legal
agreements, or any other appropriate information to which users consent by accessing
the TOE.
5.4 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarifying. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets
the security claims made, with a certain level of assurance. The level of assurance for this
evaluation is defined within the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices
Version 2.2e.
• Consistent with the expectations of the Protection Profile, this evaluation did not
specifically search for, nor seriously attempt to counter, vulnerabilities that were not
“obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an
“obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding
of the TOE, technical sophistication, and resources.
• The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality
specified in the claimed PPs. Any additional security related functional capabilities
included in the product were not covered by this evaluation.
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6 Documentation
The following documents were provided by the vendor with the TOE for evaluation:
• Configuring LoadMaster for Common Criteria Conformance v0.2
• LoadMaster CLI Interface description 20 September 2022
• Web User Interface(WUI) Configuration Guide 04 October 2022
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available online
was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not be relied upon when
configuring or operating the device as evaluated. . Consumers are encouraged to download the
evaluated administrative guidance documentation from the NIAP website.
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7 TOE Evaluated Configuration
7.1 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE boundary consists of one of the appliances listed below. The LoadMaster X15, X25
and X40 are physical devices while the Virtual LoadMaster is a virtual machine which runs on
ESXi.:
Model LoadMaster X15 LoadMaster X25 LoadMaster X40 Virtual LoadMaster
Processo
r
Intel Xeon E3-
1275v6 (Kaby Lake)
Intel Xeon Silver
4116T (Skylake)
Intel Xeon Gold 6136
(Skylake)
Intel Xeon E5 4620 v4
(Broadwell)
RAM 32 GB RAM 64 GB RAM 64 GB RAM 2GB (evaluated)
Network 16 1Gb Ethernet
4 10Gb Ethernet
Fiber
2 1Gb Ethernet
12 10Gb Ethernet
Fiber
2 1Gb Ethernet
12 10Gb Ethernet
Fiber
3 1Gb virtual NIC
(evaluated)
Platform Loadmaster OS
7.2.48.8
Loadmaster OS
7.2.48.8
Loadmaster OS
7.2.48.8
Loadmaster OS
7.2.48.8 on ESXi v6.7
The TOE supports (sometimes optionally) secure connectivity with several other IT environment devices
as described below.
Table 8 IT Environment Components
Component Required Usage/Purpose Description
Management
Workstation
Yes Workstation providing local console access to the TOE.
Workstation providing a browser to connected to the Web User
Interface (WUI) over TLSv1.2 or TLSv1.1.
Audit Server Yes Syslog server that receives audit logs from the TOE over TLSv1.2
or TLSv1.1.
ESXi Server Yes (for
Virtual
LoadMaster)
ESXi v6.7 acting as the hypervisor for Virtual LoadMaster.
LDAP Server No Optional authentication server supporting LDAP over TLSv1.2 or
TLSv1.1.
NTP Server No Optional NTP server supporting SHA-1 integrity verification.
7.2 Excluded Functionality
The following functionality is excluded (disabled) in the evaluated configuration:
• SSH
• Management API
• Administrative Trusted Channels
• IPv6
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8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the evaluation team. It is derived
from information contained in Evaluation Test Report for Kemp LoadMaster, which is not
publicly available. The Assurance Activities Report provides an overview of testing and the
prescribed assurance activities.
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the Assurance Activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according the vendor-provided guidance documentation
and ran the tests specified in the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices Version
2.2e.
All testing was carried at the Acumen Security office located in 2400 Research Blvd Suite #395,
Rockville, MD 20850. Testing occurred from December 21, 2020 - December 16, 2022. The
Independent Testing configuration is documented in section 4 of the AAR and the test activities
are documented in section 6 of the AAR , which is publicly available, and is not duplicated here.
17
9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary documents: The Detailed Test Report (DTR) and the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR). The reader of this document can assume that activities and
work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version
3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Kemp LoadMaster to be
Part 2 extended, and meets the SARs contained in the PP. Additionally the evaluator performed
the Assurance Activities specified in the NDPP.
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of
security requirements claimed to be met by the Kemp LoadMaster Security Target that are
consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the
requirements. Additionally, the evaluator performed an assessment of the Assurance Activities
specified in the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices Version 2.2e.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed
the design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained
in the Security Target's TOE Summary Specification. Additionally, the evaluator performed the
Assurance Activities specified in the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices
Version 2.2e related to the examination of the information contained in the TOE Summary
Specification.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the
evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to
18
securely administer the TOE. The guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of
the evaluation to ensure they were complete. Additionally, the evaluator performed the
Assurance Activities specified in the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices
Version 2.2e related to the examination of the information contained in the operational guidance
documents.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by
the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found
that the TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set
of tests specified by the Assurance Activities in the collaborative Protection Profile for Network
Devices Version 2.2e and recorded the results in a Test Report, summarized in the Evaluation
Technical Report and Assurance Activities Report.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence was
provided by the evaluation team to show that the evaluation activities addressed the test activities
in the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices Version 2.2e, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 AVA CEM work unit. The evaluation team performed
a public search for vulnerabilities, performed vulnerability testing and did not discover any
issues with the TOE.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation addressed the
vulnerability analysis Assurance Activities in the collaborative Protection Profile for Network
Devices Version 2.2e, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
19
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team's test activities also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team performed the Assurance Activities in the collaborative
Protection Profile for Network Devices Version 2.2e, and correctly verified that the product
meets the claims in the ST.
20
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations
The validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE being
configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in the Common Criteria Administrator
Guide.
Please note that the functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the Security Target. The excluded functionality is specified in section
7.2 of this report. All other items and scope issues have been sufficiently addressed elsewhere in
this document.
21
11 Annexes
Not applicable.
22
12 Security Target
Kemp LoadMaster Security Target v0.8, January 19, 2023
23
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
24
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 1: Introduction
and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 2: Security
functional requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 3: Security
assurance requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
4. Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5.
5. Kemp LoadMaster Security Target v0.8, January 19, 2023
6. Configuring LoadMaster for Common Criteria Conformance v0.2, January 19, 2023
7. Evaluation Technical Report for Kemp LoadMaster v0.4, January 19, 2023
8. Assurance Activity Report for Kemp LoadMaster v0.4, January 19, 2023