National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall (NGFW)
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-10995-2019
Dated: 10/28/2019
Version: 0.2
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall (NGFW)Validation Report Version 0.2, 10/28/2019
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
David Challener
Meredith Hennan
Jay Turner
Kenneth Stutterheim
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Cody Cummins
Katie Sykes
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Catonsville, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 1
3 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 2
3.1 TOE Evaluated Configuration ............................................................................ 3
3.2 TOE Architecture................................................................................................ 3
3.3 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................ 5
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 7
4.1 Security audit ...................................................................................................... 7
4.2 Communication................................................................................................... 8
4.3 Cryptographic support ........................................................................................ 8
4.4 Firewall ............................................................................................................... 8
4.5 Identification and authentication......................................................................... 8
4.6 Security management.......................................................................................... 8
4.7 Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................... 8
4.8 TOE access.......................................................................................................... 9
4.9 Trusted path/channels ......................................................................................... 9
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope ....................................................................... 9
6 Documentation.......................................................................................................... 10
7 IT Product Testing .................................................................................................... 10
7.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................. 10
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................. 10
8 Results of the Evaluation .......................................................................................... 10
8.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE).......................................................... 11
8.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)............................................................ 11
8.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ............................................... 11
8.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC) ................................... 11
8.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ............... 12
8.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)....................................................... 12
8.7 Summary of Evaluation Results........................................................................ 12
9 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................. 13
10 Annexes..................................................................................................................... 13
11 Security Target.......................................................................................................... 13
12 Glossary .................................................................................................................... 13
13 Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 14
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall (NGFW)
solution provided by Forcepoint. It presents the evaluation results, their justifications and
the conformance results. This Validation Report is not an endorsement of the Target of
Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either expressed or
implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Catonsville, MD, United States of America, and was
completed in October 2019. The information in this report is largely derived from the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer
Security Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria
Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements of the
collaborative Protection Profile for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, Version 2.0 + Errata
20180314, 14-March-2018.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall (NGFW) 6.5.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5). This Validation Report applies only to the specific
version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the
provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the
conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in
the Security Target (ST). Therefore, the validation team concludes that the testing
laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are
correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Forcepoint NGFW
6.5 (FWcPP20E) Security Target, version 1.5, 10/07/2019 and analysis performed by the
Validation Team.
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
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Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products
List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall (NGFW) 6.5
Protection Profile (Specific models identified in Section 8)
collaborative Protection Profile for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, Version 2.0 +
Errata 20180314, 14-March-2018
ST Forcepoint NGFW 6.5 (FWcPP20E) Security Target, version 1.5, 10/07/2019
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall (NGFW)
6.5, version 0.2, 10/08/2019
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor Forcepoint
Developer Forcepoint
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Catonsville, MD
CCEVS Validators David Challener, Jay Turner, Meredith Hennan, Kenneth Stutterheim
3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
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The Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall is a stateful packet filtering firewall. The
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall (NGFW) system is composed of two physical
appliances: the NGFW Engine and the Security Management Center (SMC) Appliance. The
NGFW Engine controls connectivity and information flow between internal and external
connected networks. The SMC Appliance provides administrative functionality supporting
the configuration and operation of NGFW Engines. The NGFW Engine controls connectivity
and information flow between internal and external connected networks. The NGFW Engine
also provides a means to keep the internal host’s IP-address private from external users. The
NGFW Engine is intended to be used as a network perimeter security gateway that provides
a controlled connection.
3.1 TOE Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration consists of the following series and models
Forcepoint NGFW Security Management Center (SMC) Appliance running software
version 6.5.7:
- Appliance SMC 1000 G2
Forcepoint NGFW Engine running software version 6.5.4 and including the
following models:
- Desktop models: 330, 335
- 1U models: 1101, 1105, 2101, 2105,
- 2U models: 3301, 3305
- 4U model: 6205
- Virtual model: ESXi 6.5 on Dell PowerEdge R440
3.2 TOE Architecture
The Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall (NGFW) system is a distributed TOE consisting
of the Security Management Center (SMC) Appliance and one or more NGFW Engines
under the control of the SMC. These NGFW Engines provide firewall functionality and
communicate securely with the SMC using its embedded Forcepoint NGFW Engine FIPS
Object Module 2.0.14 library to provide all cryptographic functionality. The SMC Appliance
provides Management Server, Log Server functionality, and securely manage Engines. As
the SMC utilizes both Java and C, the SMC relies upon both SMC FIPS Java API 1.0.2 with
a Java runtime environment and SMC FIPS Object Module 2.0.13 for cryptographic
functionality. In the evaluated configuration, the SMC Appliance communicates with
NGFW Engines through a TLS-protected trusted channel.
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TOE Components, Communication Paths and IT Environment.
The following communication pathways are represented in the Figure above.
 Management Server to Log Server communications use the internal loopback
interface within the SMC Appliance. These communications involve the
configuration of the Log Server by the management Server.
 Management and Log Server to External Syslog Server communications use
TLS to protect the audit data transmitted from the Management and Log Server
to the external syslog server.
 NGFW Engine to Log Server communications use the TLS-based trusted
channel to protect the audit data transmitted from the NGFW Engine to the Log
Server.
 NGFW Engine to/from Management Server communications use the TLS-
based trusted channel to protect the configuration information exchanged
between the Management Server and the NGFW Engine. Either party in this
communication pathway can initiate the communications. Typically, the
Management Server initiates configuration changes by sending updated security
policies to the NGFW Engine. However, the NGFW Engine also polls for
configuration changes on a regular basis.
 Client GUI to Management and Log Server communications uses TLS to
protect the communication over which remote administration actions occur.
 The NGFW Engines control connectivity and information flow between internal
and external connected networks that they are protecting.
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The NGFW Engines (a.k.a., the Engines) are responsible for performing all firewall packet
handling, analysis and filtering that is provided by the NGFW system as well as securely
transmitting audit logs to the SMC’s Log server.
The Management Server portion of the SMC Appliance provides the majority of the
administrative capabilities in the NGFW system through the SMC Client GUI. The SMC
Appliance provides a very limited console interface that allows administrators to verify and
update TOE software, to manually set the time, and configure the console timeout.
The NGFW Engines do not have local administrative interfaces, and can only be configured
through the SMC Appliance. The Management Server is responsible for securely
transferring the administrator defined configuration to NGFW Engines as the administrator
makes configuration changes (these configuration changes are known as a 'security policy').
The Log Server in the SMC Appliance is responsible for securely collecting audit events
from the NGFW Engine components of the TOE and securely re-transmitting the audit data
to an external syslog server. The Management Server component directly transmits its audit
data to an external syslog server.
The administrator interfaces with the TOE mainly through the Client GUI, a Java program
provided by Forcepoint. The administrator may download the GUI from the SMC Appliance
using the Java Web Start or alternatively install it from a Forcepoint provided installation
package. The Client GUI (along with the administrator’s workstation on which the Client is
installed), is part of the TOE’s Operational Environment, and the Client GUI interacts with
the Management Server which performs all identification, authentication, and permission
enforcement. The Client GUI can also interact with the Log Server, allowing the
administrator to query the NGFW Engine audit records that the Log Server has aggregated.
The cryptographic operations occurring as part of the communication on the SMC Appliance
involving the Management Server and Log Server are performed using the SMC FIPS Java
API 1.0.2 (library). This provider provides the encryption, decryption, signing and hashing
functions necessary to support the SMC Appliance use of the trusted channel mechanism and
the trusted path mechanism. The SMC Appliance also uses the OpenSSL library to perform
signature verification supporting the TOE trusted update mechanism.
The NGFW Engine utilizes its Forcepoint NGFW Engine FIPS Object Module 2.0.14 to
provide the encryption, decryption, signing and hashing functions necessary to support the
NGFW Engine’s trusted update mechanism and its TLS, ITT secure channel.
3.3 Physical Boundaries
The TOE is composed of two or more physical components: one or more NGFW Engine
appliances and the SMC Appliance. Each of these appliances have physical network
connections to its environment, both to allow TLS protected management communications
between the SMC and its engines, and network connections allowing the NGFW Engines to
monitor and filter network traffic. The SMC Appliance provides all management
functionality, while the NGFW Engines provide all firewall packet filtering.
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The TOE is accessed and managed from the Forcepoint Security Management Center Client
(6.5) installed on a PC (admin workstation) in the environment, where the PC is expected to
have a network pathway to the SMC Appliance.
The TOE can be configured to forward its audit records to an external syslog server in the
environment. All audit records sent to the external syslog server, are sent from the SMC
Appliance. The NGFW Engine does not send audit data directly to an external syslog server.
Instead, a NGFW Engine passes all of its audit data to the Log Server on the SMC Appliance,
which can (if configured) forward the data to the external syslog server.
An administrator can manually set the TOE’s internal clock through the SMC console. The
SMC Appliance then configures the NGFW Engine’s time to be in synch with itself. The
NGFW Engine synchronizes only with the SMC.
The NGFW Engine utilizes its Forcepoint NGFW Engine FIPS Object Module 2.0.14 to
verify trusted engine software updates. The SMC Appliance uses its SMC FIPS Java API
1.0.2 Library to provide TLS (which protects the trusted channel mechanism and the trusted
path mechanism) and uses its SMC FIPS Object Module 2.0.13 to verify SMC updates.
Each Engine model provides different performance as described in the table below.
Model Form
factor/CPU
Fixed ports 1G
copper
10G
Fiber
40G
Fiber
Network
I/O slots
Max FW
throughput
330 Desktop
Atom
C3338
8 8 0 0 0 4 Gbps
335 Desktop
Atom
C3558
8 8 to 16 0 0 2 7 Gbps
1101 1U
Pentium
D1508
8x GE
RJ45,
2x 10Gbps
SFP+
8 to 16 2 to 6 0 1 50 Gbps
1105 1U Xeon
D-1518
8x GE
RJ45,
2x 10Gbps
SFP+
8 to 16 2 to 6 0 1 60 Gbps
2101 1U Xeon
D-1548
12x GE
RJ45,
2x 10Gbps
SFP+
12 to 28 2 to 10 0 to 4 2 60 Gbps
2105 1U Xeon
D-1567
12x GE
RJ45,
2x 10Gbps
SFP+
12 to 28 2 to 10 0 to 4 2 80 Gbps
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3301 2U Xeon
E5-2618L
v3
2x GE RJ45 2 to 34 0 to 16 0 to 8 4 80 Gbps
3305 2U Xeon
E5-2680 v3
2x GE
RJ45,
1x 40Gbps
QSFP+
2 to 34 0 to 16 1 to 9 4 160 Gbps
6205 4U Xeon
E5-2680 v4
2x GE RJ45 2 to 66 0 to 32 1 to 17 8 240 Gbps
ESXi
6.5
Xeon
Silver 4112
on Dell
PowerEdge
R440
3x GE RJ45 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
The SMC model is as follows:
 SMC 1000 G2 with the Intel Xeon® Silver 4112 2.6GHz, 8.25M cache processor
4 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Security audit
2. Communication
3. Cryptographic support
4. Firewall
5. Identification and authentication
6. Security management
7. Protection of the TSF
8. TOE access
9. Trusted path/channels
4.1 Security audit
The TOE generates audit events for numerous activities including policy enforcement,
system management and authentication. A syslog server in the environment is relied on to
store audit records generated by the TOE. The TOE generates a complete audit record
including the IP address of the TOE, the event details, and the time the event occurred. The
time stamp is provided by the TOE’s Linux-based operating system in conjunction with the
appliance hardware. When the syslog server writes the audit record to the audit trail, it applies
its own time stamp, placing the entire TOE-generated syslog protocol message MSG contents
into an encapsulating syslog record.
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4.2 Communication
The TOE is a distributed solution consisting of the Security Management Center and NGFW
Engines. The Security Management Center can manage one or more NGFW Engines. The
TOE uses a registration process to join Engines to an SMC.
4.3 Cryptographic support
Because the TOE consists of distributed components, each physical component of the TOE
must be considered when discussing the TOE cryptographic support. Both types of
components (the SMC and its Engines) of the TOE utilize cryptography to verify trusted
updates, for TLS protected management communications between the SMC and its Engines,
and the SMC uses cryptography to support its use of the TLS protocol to protect network
communications with external IT entities.
4.4 Firewall
The TOE provides an information flow control mechanism using a rule base that comprises
a set of security policy rules, i.e., the firewall security policy. The NGFW Engine enforces
the firewall security policy on all traffic that passes through the engine, via its internal or
external network Ethernet interfaces.
4.5 Identification and authentication
The TOE requires users to be identified and authenticated before they can use functions
mediated by the TOE, with the exception of reading the login banner and performing firewall
packet filtering operations. The TOE authenticates administrative users. In order for an
administrative user to access the TOE, a user account including a user name and password
must be created for the user.
4.6 Security management
Security management commands are limited to authorized users (i.e., administrators) and
available only after they have provided acceptable user identification and authentication data
to the TOE. Administrators access the TOE remotely using a TLS protected communication
channel between the Management Server and the Client GUI (which runs on a workstation
in the IT environment). Administrators can also access the TOE via a local console which
provides limited functionality.
4.7 Protection of the TSF
The TOE provides a variety of means of protecting itself. The TOE performs self-tests that
cover the correct operation of the TOE. It provides functions necessary to securely update
the TOE. It’s Linux-based operating system utilizes a hardware clock to ensure reliable
timestamps. It protects sensitive data such as stored passwords and cryptographic keys so
that they are not accessible through the TOE, even to a Security Administrator. The TOE
also utilizes a dedicated, local network for communications between the TOE’s components.
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4.8 TOE access
The TOE can be configured to display a logon banner before a user session is established.
The TOE also enforces inactivity timeouts for local and remote sessions.
4.9 Trusted path/channels
The TOE protects interactive communication with administrators using TLS for GUI access,
ensuring both integrity and disclosure protection. If the negotiation of an encrypted session
fails, the attempted connection will not be established.
The TOE protects communication with network peers, such as an external syslog server,
using TLS connections to prevent unintended disclosure or modification of logs.
The TOE protects communications between distributed components using a TLS-based
trusted channel. The TOE uses TLS while registering new Engines with the SMC and once
registered, the Engine and SMC use mutually-authenticated TLS to protect management
communications.
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope
Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
 collaborative Protection Profile for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, Version 2.0 +
Errata 20180314, 14-March-2018
That information has not been reproduced here and the FWcPP20E should be consulted if
there is interest in that material.
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
FWcPP20E as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other functionality included in
the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by
the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be drawn about
their effectiveness.
Clarification of scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications
of this evaluation. Note that:
 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance
activities specified in the Protection Profile for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls and
performed by the evaluation team).
 This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in
this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
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 This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
 The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the FWcPP20E and applicable Technical Decisions. Any
additional security related functional capabilities of the TOE were not covered by this
evaluation.
6 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
 Forcepoint NGFW Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide 6.5.4, Rev D
 Forcepoint NGFW 6.5 (FWcPP20E) Security Target
7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the Assurance Activity Report (FWcPP20E) for
Forcepoint NGFW 6.5, Version 0.2, 10/08/2019 (AAR).
7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according a Common Criteria Certification
document and ran the tests specified in the FWcPP20E including the tests associated with
optional requirements.
8 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC
version 3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Forcepoint
Next Generation Firewall (NGFW) TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the SARs
contained in the FWcPP20E.
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8.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
of security requirements claimed to be met by the Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall
(NGFW) 6.5 products that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security
function descriptions that support the requirements.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
8.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification
contained in the Security target and Guidance documents. Additionally, the evaluator
performed the assurance activities specified in the FWcPP20E related to the examination of
the information contained in the TSS.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
8.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,
the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how
to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing
phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
8.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the
TOE was identified.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
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8.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of
tests specified by the assurance activities in the FWcPP20E and recorded the results in a Test
Report, summarized in the AAR.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
8.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes
a public search for vulnerabilities and fuzz testing. Neither the public search for
vulnerabilities nor the fuzz testing uncovered any residual vulnerability.
The evaluation team performed a public search for vulnerabilities in order to ensure there
are no publicly known and exploitable vulnerabilities in the TOE from the following
sources:
 National Vulnerability Database (https://web.nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search)
 Vulnerability Notes Database (http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/)
 Rapid7 Vulnerability Database (https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities)
 Tipping Point Zero Day Initiative (http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories )
 Exploit / Vulnerability Search Engin (http://www.exploitsearch.net)
 SecurITeam Exploit Search (http://www.securiteam.com)
 Tenable Network Security (http://nessus.org/plugins/index.php?view=search)
 Offensive Security Exploit Database (https://www.exploit-db.com/)
The search was performed on 10/07/2019 with the following search terms: "TCP", "router",
"switch", “UDP”, “IPv4”, “IPv6”, "TLS", "ICMP", "firewall", “Forcepoint”, "OpenSSL",
“NGFW”, and “Bouncy Castle”.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
8.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy
of the claims in the ST.
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The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
9 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The virtualized product version was tested on a Dell PowerEdge R440 running ESXi 6.5.
Any other combination of hardware and virtual platform was not tested and therefore there
is no assurance that any other platform will perform as required by the protection profiles.
The SMC is intended to be managed on an IPv4 network per the Forcepoint Next Generation
Firewall Installation Guide.
Although the product supports network time protocol (NTP), NTP is not to be used in the
Common Criteria evaluated configuration.
Cryptographic modules other than OpenSSL FIPS Object Module SE #2398 version
2.0.13, Bouncy Castle FIPS Java API #3514 version 1.0.2 JCA/JCE provider, Forcepoint
NGFW Cryptographic Library #2319, and OpenSSL FIPS Object Module SE #2398
version 2.0.14, have not been evaluated nor tested during this Common Criteria evaluation.
10 Annexes
Not applicable
11 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: Forcepoint NGFW 6.5 (FWcPP20E) Security Target,
Version 1.5, 10/07/2019.
12 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall (NGFW)Validation Report Version 0.2, 10/28/2019
14
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
13 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[4] collaborative Protection Profile for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, Version 2.0 +
Errata 20180314, 14-March-2018.
[5] Forcepoint NGFW 6.5 (FWcPP20E) Security Target, Version 1.5, 10/07/2019 (ST).
[6] Assurance Activity Report (FWcPP20E) for Forcepoint NGFW 6.5, Version 0.2,
10/08/2019 (AAR).
[7] Detailed Test Report (FWcPP20E) for Forcepoint NGFW 6.5, Version 1.0,
10/07/2019 (DTR).
[8] Evaluation Technical Report for Forcepoint Next Generation Firewall (NGFW),
Version 0.2, 10/08/2019 (ETR)