CRP-C0267-01
Certification Report
Kazumasa Fujie, Chairman
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan
Target of Evaluation
Application date/ID 2009-09-24 (ITC-9264)
Certification No. C0267
Sponsor KYOCERA MITA Corporation
Name of TOE Data Security Kit (E) Software Type I
Version of TOE V1.00
PP Conformance None
Assurance Package EAL3
Developer KYOCERA MITA Corporation
Evaluation Facility Electronic Commerce Security Technology
Laboratory Inc.
Evaluation Center
This is to report that the evaluation result for the above TOE is certified as
follows.
2010-08-31
Takumi Yamasato, Technical Manager
Information Security Certification Office
IT Security Center
Evaluation Criteria, etc.: This TOE is evaluated in accordance with the following
criteria prescribed in the "IT Security Evaluation and
Certification Scheme".
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Version 3.1 Revision 2
- Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Version 3.1 Revision 2
Evaluation Result: Pass
"Data Security Kit (E) Software Type I V1.00" has been evaluated in accordance
with the provision of the "IT Security Certification Procedure" by
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, and has met the specified
assurance requirements.
CRP-C0267-01
Notice:
This document is the English translation version of the Certification Report
published by the Certification Body of Japan Information Technology Security
Evaluation and Certification Scheme.
CRP-C0267-01
Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary.............................................................................. 1
1.1 Product Overview ............................................................................ 1
1.1.1 Assurance Package...................................................................... 1
1.1.2 TOE and Security Functionality ................................................... 1
1.1.2.1 Threat and Security Objectives .................................................. 1
1.1.2.2 Configuration and Assumptions ................................................ 2
1.1.3 Disclaimers ................................................................................ 3
1.2 Conduct of Evaluation..................................................................... 3
1.3 Certification ................................................................................... 3
2. Identification ....................................................................................... 4
3. Security Policies .................................................................................. 5
3.1 Security Function Policies ............................................................... 5
3.1.1 Threats and Security Function Policies ......................................... 5
3.1.1.1 Threats ................................................................................... 5
3.1.1.2 Security Function Policies against Threats ................................. 6
3.1.2 Organizational Security Policy and Security Function Policy ........... 6
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope ................................................. 7
4.1 Usage Assumptions ......................................................................... 7
4.2 Environment Assumptions............................................................... 8
4.3 Clarification of scope ...................................................................... 9
5. Architectural Information ................................................................... 10
5.1 TOE boundary and component ....................................................... 10
5.2 IT Environment............................................................................. 12
6. Documentation .................................................................................. 13
7. Evaluation conducted by Evaluation Facility and results....................... 14
7.1 Evaluation Approach..................................................................... 14
7.2 Overview of Evaluation Activity ...................................................... 14
7.3 IT Product Testing ........................................................................ 14
7.3.1 Developer Testing...................................................................... 14
7.3.2 Evaluator Independent Testing................................................... 17
7.3.3 Evaluator Penetration Testing .................................................... 19
7.4 Evaluated Configuration................................................................ 21
7.5 Evaluation Results........................................................................ 21
7.6 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations......................................... 22
8. Certification ...................................................................................... 23
8.1 Certification Result ....................................................................... 23
8.2 Recommendations ......................................................................... 23
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9. Annexes ............................................................................................ 24
10. Security Target................................................................................ 24
11. Glossary ......................................................................................... 25
12. Bibliography ................................................................................... 27
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1. Executive Summary
This Certification Report describes the content of certification result in relation to IT
Security Evaluation of "Data Security Kit (E) Software Type I V1.00" (hereinafter
referred to as "the TOE") developed by KYOCERA MITA Corporation, and evaluation of
the TOE was finished on 2010-08-19 by Electronic Commerce Security Technology
Laboratory Inc. Evaluation Center (hereinafter referred to as "Evaluation Facility"). It
reports to the sponsor, KYOCERA MITA Corporation and provides information to the
users and system operators who are interested in this TOE.
The reader of the Certification Report is advised to read the Security Target
(hereinafter referred to as "the ST") that is the appendix of this book together.
Especially, the TOE security functional requirements, the assurance requirements for
TOE and rationale of sufficiency about those are specifically described in ST.
This certification report assumes such as "system administrator in consumer site
which the TOE is introduced and used" to be a reader. Note that the Certification
Report presents the certification result based on assurance requirements conformed to
the TOE, and does not certify individual IT product itself.
1.1 Product Overview
Overview of the TOE function and operational condition are as follows; Refer since
Chapter 2 for details.
1.1.1 Assurance Package
Assurance package of the TOE is EAL3.
1.1.2 TOE and Security Functionality
The TOE is the firmware that controls Multi Function Printer (hereinafter referred to
as "MFP") and the special custom IC (ASIC) that performs security algorithm after the
license is granted to use the Data Security Kit (E) for the MFP having mainly copy
function, scan function and print function. The firmware and the ASIC after being
granted the license are called the Data Security Kit (E) Software Type I V1.00.
The TOE overwrites an actual image data area when deleting the image data on the
HDD and protects the image data against leakage.
The TOE encrypts the image data and then stores it in order to protect against the
image data leakage when temporarily storing the image data in the HDD for the MFP
functions (copy function etc.).
Regarding these security functionalities, the validity of the design policy and the
accuracy of the implementation were evaluated in the scope of the assurance package.
The TOE assumes threats and assumptions as described in the following items.
1.1.2.1 Threat and Security Objectives
The TOE provides the following security functions for countermeasure to the
respective threats.
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2
- It is assumed the threat is that the HDD inside the MFP is pulled out when
operating or after discarding/returning, and the image data temporarily stored in
the HDD because of the MFP functions (copy function etc.) is leaked.
Here the object is the image data (for example, it is the scanned image data using
the copy function and will be stored until completion of printing operation.) stored
for the MFP functions that is nothing related to user's intention. The image data
that the user intentionally stored is not the object.
To counter this threat, the TOE encrypts the image data and then stores it when
storing the image data in the HDD.
- It is assumed the threat is that the HDD inside the MFP is pulled out when
operating or after discarding/returning, and the deleted image data is recovered and
leaked.
Here the object will be the case that the stored image data is intentionally deleted
by a user and another case that the image data temporarily stored for the MFP
functions is automatically deleted.
To counter this threat, when deleting the image data on the HDD, the TOE
overwrites the actual image data area and that disables re-usage of the data.
Therefore it protects against the image data leakage.
1.1.2.2 Configuration and Assumptions
It is assumed that the evaluated products are managed under the following
configurations and assumptions.
- The TOE is installed to be used for the following MFP manufactured by KYOCERA
MITA Corporation:
> TASKalfa 500ci
> TASKalfa 400ci
> TASKalfa 300ci
> TASKalfa 250ci
> TASKalfa 500ciG
> TASKalfa 400ciG
> TASKalfa 300ciG
> TASKalfa 250ciG
> CS 500ci
> CS 400ci
> CS 300ci
> CS 250ci
> CDC 1840/DCC 2840
> CDC 1740/DCC 2740
> CDC 1730/DCC 2730
> CDC 1725/DCC 2725
- It is assumed that the MFP including the TOE is located in offices where are
managed by organizations such as enterprises or these departments etc.
- In this usage environment, it is assumed that the place where the MFP is located
can be watched by employees, and actions that can be at least clearly recognized as
attacks are prevented. However considering the configuration of the MFP, it is
relatively easy to remove the HDD. Thus there is still a possibility not to be able to
prevent it.
- When the MFP is connected to the network, it is assumed that it is connected to the
LAN in the office. Even when the LAN is connected to the external network (The
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3
Internet etc, that is outside of the organization), access to the MFP from the
external network is controlled to be restricted.
- It is assumed that the service person is reliable.
1.1.3 Disclaimers
This evaluation assurance is limited to the "overwrite function" and the "encryption
function" that become valid after the license is granted to use the Data Security Kit (E)
for the MFP.
Although there are functions that are recognized as security function in general even
before the license is granted to use the Data Security Kit (E) for the MFP, but these
functions are not certified by this evaluation.
1.2 Conduct of Evaluation
Based on the IT Security Evaluation/Certification Program operated by the
Certification Body, TOE functionality and its assurance requirements are being
evaluated by evaluation facility in accordance with those publicized documents such as
"IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme"[1], "IT Security Certification
Procedure"[2] and "Evaluation Facility Approval Procedure"[3]. Evaluation was
completed on 2010-08.
1.3 Certification
The Certification Body verifies the Evaluation Technical Report [13] and Observation
Report prepared by the evaluation facility and evaluation evidence materials, and
confirmed that the TOE evaluation is conducted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure.
Certification review is also prepared for those concerns found in the certification
process.
Those concerns pointed out by the Certification Body are fully resolved and confirmed
that the TOE evaluation is appropriately conducted in accordance with CC ([4][5][6] or
[7][8][9]) and CEM ([10] or [11]).
The Certification Body prepared this Certification Report based on the Evaluation
Technical Report submitted by the evaluation facility and concluded fully certification
activities.
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2. Identification
The TOE is identified as follows;
Name of TOE: Data Security Kit (E) Software Type I
Version of TOE: V1.00
Developer: KYOCERA MITA Corporation
The condition for being the TOE which has been evaluated and certified is that the
license is granted to use the Data Security Kit (E) for the correct MFP and firmware.
Users can confirm it by the following methods.
- Confirmation of the MFP
MFP can be identified by the description on the MFP main body. The confirmation
can be made if it is consistent with any of a list of the MFP as described in the
guidance. Thus the MFP can be confirmed as the correct one.
- Confirmation of the Firmware
The firmware version can be printed out by operating the MFP according to the
procedure as described in the guidance. The printed version can be checked with the
correct version of the firmware as described in the guidance. Thus the firmware can
be confirmed as the correct one.
- Confirmation if the license of the Data Security Kit (E) is granted to use (i.e.
activated)
The icon displayed on the operation panel when the license is granted, is described
in the guidance. It can be checked with the operation panel according to the
guidance and thus it can be confirmed if the license is granted to use.
(Supplement)
ASIC identification is uniquely fixed when the MFP identification is fixed, since the
manufacturing management is maintained. Thus to get a confirmation of the correct
MFP will also be to get a confirmation of the correct ASIC.
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3. Security Policies
This chapter describes how the TOE performs the function as security services in
accordance with what kind of policies or rules.
The TOE is the firmware and the ASIC, and performs copy function, scan function and
print function by controlling the MFP. When operating these functions, image data is
temporarily stored in the HDD as needed. It is called "temporary storage" when the
image data is temporarily stored for the MFP functions without users being conscious
about it.
When operations of these functions are completed and so the temporary stored image
data become unnecessary, it is then automatically deleted.
The TOE also provides function that stores image data in the HDD for a long period of
time by user's instruction. It is called "long period storage" when the image data is
stored over a long period of time with user's intention, and this should be
distinguished from the temporary storage.
The image data stored for a long period of time is not deleted without user's
instruction.
When temporarily storing image data in the HDD for the MFP functions (copy
functions etc.), the TOE encrypts the image data and then stores it so that leakage of
the image data is prevented.
When deleting the temporary stored image data or the stored image data for a long
period of time, the TOE overwrites on the actual image data area so that leakage of the
image data is prevented.
(Note)
As long as the stored image data over a long period of time is not deleted, it is not
considered as the image data that should be protected against leakage.
3.1 Security Function Policies
The TOE has the security functions that counter the threats as shown in 3.1.1.
3.1.1 Threats and Security Function Policies
3.1.1.1 Threats
The TOE assumes threats as listed in table 3-1, and has the functions to counter the
threats.
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Table 3-1 Assumed Threats
Identifier Threat
T.TEMP Unauthorized access to the temporary stored
data.
Attackers may remove the HDD and be
unauthorized to read out and steal the image data
temporarily stored in the HDD by using the tools
that are easily available.
T.RESIDUAL Unauthorized access to the residue data.
Attackers may remove the HDD and be
unauthorized to recover, decode, read out and
steal the remaining data in the HDD even after
deletion of the image data by using the tools that
are easily available.
(Supplement) Both of the following are the objects
for deletion of the image data.
- The TOE automatically deletes the temporary
stored image data.
- The TOE deletes the stored image data for a
long period of time by user's instruction.
3.1.1.2 Security Function Policies against Threats
The TOE counters the following security function policies against the threats as
presented in the table 3-1.
(1) Countermeasure to threat "T.TEMP"
To counter this threat, the TOE encrypts image data and then stores it when
storing the image data in the HDD.
(2) Countermeasure to threat "T.RESIDUAL"
To counter this threat, the TOE overwrites an actual image data area with
meaningless data when deleting the image data on the HDD.
Countermeasure to threat "T.TEMP" (as above) counters threat that the
temporary stored image data is read out. Thus this threat is countered doubly.
3.1.2 Organizational Security Policy and Security Function Policy
There is no organizational security policy that the TOE supports.
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4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
This chapter describes the assumptions and the operational environments required in
use of the TOE, as useful information for assumed readers to determine if they use the
TOE.
4.1 Usage Assumptions
Assumptions required in using the TOE are shown in table 4-1.
The effective performance of the TOE security functions are not assured unless these
assumptions are satisfied.
Table 4-1 Assumptions in Use of the TOE
Identifier Assumptions
A.LOCATION Safe security of the TOE in the operational
environment
To protect the hardware inside the MFP from
being possibly attacked (i.e. violating the TOE
security), it is assumed that the TOE operates in
mutually watchable and manageable
environment. Regarding the attacking to the
hardware, it is assumed that the attacker opens
up the MFP to make it connect to devices for
analyzing or replacing the MFP board.
(Supplement)
This indicates that it is used under mutually
watchable and in the manageable
environment so that actions that are clearly
recognized as the attacking such as opening
the internal MFP, connecting it to devices and
analyzing, or replacing the MFP board, can be
prevented.
However, to remove the HDD may be not
completely prevented by mutual watching,
because it is relatively easier than the clearly
recognizable attacking as above-mentioned
because of configuration of the MFP.
Therefore even if the assumption is satisfied,
but it is still regarded as the possible attack
method and is raised as threat.
A.NETWORK Safety of The TOE from the external network
It is assumed that the TOE is used by connecting
to the internal network that is protected against
unauthorized access from the external network.
(Supplement)
This is the assumption that the MFP in which
the TOE is installed, is connected to the
internal network.
A.CE The service person reliability
It is assumed that the TOE service person is a
reliable person and does not act unfaithfully.
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4.2 Environment Assumptions
The TOE is installed into the following MFPs manufactured by KYOCERA MITA
Corporation and used.
- TASKalfa 500ci
- TASKalfa 400ci
- TASKalfa 300ci
- TASKalfa 250ci
- TASKalfa 500ciG
- TASKalfa 400ciG
- TASKalfa 300ciG
- TASKalfa 250ciG
- CS 500ci
- CS 400ci
- CS 300ci
- CS 250ci
- CDC 1840/DCC 2840
- CDC 1740/DCC 2740
- CDC 1730/DCC 2730
- CDC 1725/DCC 2725
It is assumed that the MFPs including the TOE are located in offices managed by
organizations such as enterprises and these departments. A typical operational
environment of the TOE is as shown in figure 4-1.
Figure 4-1 Operational Environment of the TOE
Although it is not necessary to connect it to the internal network, but in order to use
the functions of the MFP that connects to the internal network, the following software
are needed for client PC and server. (Which one is necessary, depends on which
function of the MFP is used.)
- Printer driver and TWAIN driver identified by the guidance
- SMTP server, SMB server and FTP server
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The firewall is provided to achieve A.NETWORK.
Reliability of the part of the MFP outside the scope of the TOE (the part that excludes
the firmware and the ASIC), clients PC and server that connect to the internal network,
software that is executed by client PC and firewall are outside the evaluation scope.(It
is assumed that these are reliable enough.)
4.3 Clarification of scope
What this evaluation assures is limited to the following security functions that become
activated by using the Data Security Kit (E) for MFP.
- The function that encrypts image data when temporarily storing the image data in
the HDD for the functions of the MFP (such as the copy function etc.)
- The function that overwrites the actual image data area when deleting the image
data on the HDD.
The MFP in which the Data Security Kit (E) is not being granted, also has functions
that are generally recognized as security functions (for example,
identification/authentication or access control to protect the image data stored over a
long period of time from unauthorized access) however, these functions are not assured
by this evaluation.
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5. Architectural Information
This chapter describes purposes and relations with respect to the scope of the TOE and
main configuration (components).
5.1 TOE boundary and component
TOE is the MFP firmware and ASIC. Main components are constituted as shown in
figure 5-1. The part of the MFP except the firmware and ASIC is outside the scope of
the TOE.
The TOE performs MFP control including access control to the HDD. Therefore, the
TOE will perform all the controls to the HDD including the following; storage of the
image data in the HDD when user utilizes the MFP or deletion of the image data from
the HDD. That is, regarding the image data that is created by users to utilize the
MFP, performance of the overwrite-erase function and the encryption function
confirmed for this evaluation are reliable.
Copy / Network Scan / Print /
Document Management Box Function
HDD
Encryption / Decryption
Function
Overwrite-Erase
Function
Hypas Function
LAN Port USB Port
Operation
Panel
MFP
Firmware
TOE
ASIC
Scan Unit/
Print Unit
Encryption /
Decryption
Algorithm Function
Figure 5-1 TOE Boundary
Main components comprising the TOE (Copy Function, Network Scan Function, Print
Function, Document Management Box Function, Overwrite-Erase Function,
Encryption/Decryption Function, Encryption/Decryption Algorithm Function and
HyPAS Function) are explained.
- Copy/Network Scan/Print/Document Management Box function
These functions can be used no matter if the license of the Data Security Kit (E) is
granted or not. These functions are not the security functions.
Respective functions of the MFP are provided as follows:
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> Copy Function
A function that reads image data from the scanner device, and outputs from the
printer unit by inputting or operating from the operation panel.
> Network Scan Function
A function that transmits image data read from the scanner unit, via LAN by
inputting or operating from the operation panel.
> Print Function
A function that outputs image data transmitted from server PC or client PC
connected over LAN or to USB, from the printer unit by operating from the client
PC or serve PC.
> Document Management Box Function
The image data inputted by inputting/operating from the operation panel or
operating through the client PC or the server PC connected over LAN or to USB is
stored in the HDD for a long period of time. The image data stored in the HDD
for a long period of time can be printed out, forwarded to the client PC or the
server PC and deleted.
When these functions are provided, it will be implemented to store image data into
the HDD, to read out the image data from the HDD and to delete the image data on
the HDD.
As for reading and writing data on the HDD, the data written into the HDD is
encrypted, and the data read out from the HDD is decrypted by performing
"Encryption/Decryption Function".
When data is deleted on the HDD, "Overwrite-Erase Function" is used. Thus it will
be difficult to get back the deleted data.
- Encryption/Decryption Function
This function will become available after the license is granted to use the Data
Security Kit (E), and is the security function.
It is the function that reads and writes image data on the HDD.
When writing into the HDD, encryption is performed by using the AES encryption
algorithm based on FIPS PUB 197. When reading out from the HDD, decryption is
performed by using the same algorithm.
Encryption/Decryption algorithm is performed by using "Encryption/Decryption
Algorithm Function".
- Encryption/Decryption Algorithm Function
This function will become available after the license is granted to use the Data
Security Kit (E), and is the security function.
The AES Encryption Algorithm is performed based on FIPS PUB 197.
- Overwrite-Erase Function
This function will become available after the license is granted to use the Data
Security Kit (E), and is the security function.
An area on the HDD where the specified image data exists is overwritten with
meaningless data, and that makes it difficult to recover, and the management
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information of the image data is then deleted.
- HyPAS Function
This function can be used no matter if the Data Security Kit (E) license is granted or
not. However, it indirectly contributes to the security function by meaning of
protecting the part of the security function.
This function is to install an application in the MFP and to activate it on the MFP.
The application installed is not included in the TOE.
Only limited operations are allowed for the application, and any operation that
would cause the security infringement is not possible.
5.2 IT Environment
The TOE is installed in the MFP and performs. The MFP configuration components,
especially related to the TOE are as follows:
- Environment to perform the firmware (CPU or Memory)
- Scanner Unit to optically read image
- Printer Unit to perform printing
- HDD to store image data
- Operation Panel, LAN Port and USB Port that provides interfaces with users, client
PC and server PC.
Client PC or Server PC are connected via LAN Port or USB Port to be able to use the
print function and the document management box function as well as to be able to
receive the image data transmitted by using the network scan function.
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6. Documentation
The identification of documents attached to the TOE is listed below. TOE users are
required full understanding of following documents and compliance with descriptions
in order to fulfill the assumptions.
- User Manual
Name Version Destination
Data Security Kit (E) Operation Guide Rev.2 2010.8 Japan
Data Security Kit (E) Operation Guide Rev.2 2010.8 Overseas
Notice
303MS56320
2010.1
Japan/
Overseas
Data Security Kit (E) Operation Guide Set-Up
Edition
303MS56710
2008.12
Japan/
Overseas
TASKalfa 250ci/300ci/400ci/500ci Operation
Guide
Rev.1 2009.6 Japan
250ci/300ci/400ci/500ci Operation Guide Rev.1 2009.6 Overseas
CDC 1725/DCC 2725 CDC 1730/DCC 2730 CDC
1740/DCC 2740 CDC 1840/DCC 2840 Operation
Guide
Rev.1 2009.6 Overseas
- Service Manual
Name Version Destination
TASKalfa 250ci/300ci/400ci/500ci Service
Manual
2H7SM002
Rev.2 2009.4
Japan
TASKalfa 250ci/300ci/400ci/500ci Service
Manual
2H7SM063
Rev.3 2009.4
Overseas
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7. Evaluation conducted by Evaluation Facility and results
7.1 Evaluation Approach
Evaluation was conducted by using the evaluation methods prescribed in CEM in
accordance with the assurance requirements in CC Part 3. Details for evaluation
activities are reported in the Evaluation Technical Report. It described the description
of overview of the TOE, and the contents and verdict evaluated by each work unit
prescribed in CEM.
7.2 Overview of Evaluation Activity
The history of evaluation conducted was present in the Evaluation Technical Report as
follows; Evaluation has started on 2009-09 and concluded by completion the
Evaluation Technical Report dated 2010-08 The evaluation facility received a full set of
evaluation deliverables necessary for evaluation provided by developer, and examined
the evidences in relation to a series of evaluation conducted. Additionally, the
evaluation facility directly visited the development and manufacturing sites on
2009-12, 2010-01 and 2010-03 and examined procedural status conducted in relation to
each work unit for configuration management, delivery and operation and lifecycle by
investigating records and staff hearing. Further, the evaluation facility executed
sampling check of the developer testing and the evaluator testing by using developer
testing environment at developer site on 2010-03.
Concerns found in evaluation activities for each work unit were all issued as
Observation Report and were reported to developer. These concerns were reviewed by
the developer and all concerns were solved eventually.
These concerns that the Certification Body found by the process of the evaluation
confirmation was described as a certification review, and it was passed to the
evaluation facility. After the evaluation facility and the developer examine it, these
concerns were reflected in the evaluation report.
7.3 IT Product Testing
The evaluator confirmed the validity of the test that the developer had executed. The
evaluator executed reappearance tests, additional tests and penetration tests based on
vulnerability assessments judged to be necessary from the evidence shown by the
process of the evaluation and results by the verification of the developer testing.
7.3.1 Developer Testing
The evaluator evaluated the integrity of developer testing that the developer executed
and the test documentation of actual test results. The overview of evaluated
developer testing is shown as follows;
1) Developer Test Environment
Configuration of the test performed by the developer is as shown in Figure 7-1.
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サーバー
Evaluated MFP
USB
Client PC
for evaluating and monitoring
Internal Network
Server PC
Converter
Figure 7-1 Configuration of the developer testing
- TOE
The function that records log, was added to the TOE identified in ST for the purpose
of the testing, and this was used for the evaluated MFP.
The evaluator confirmed that the function added to the TOE would not influence on
behavior of the TOE functions by reviewing source code.
- MFP (Operational Environment of the TOE)
TASKalfa 500ci was used.
Although TASKalfa 400ci, TASKalfa 300ci and TASKalfa 250ci provide the same
functions as the TASKalfa 500ci but, these are different models in terms of speed
and number of HDDs. The testing was conducted using TASKalfa 500ci that has
the maximum speed and the largest number of HDDs so that the evaluator
determined that this includes the cases of using TASKalfa 400ci, TASKalfa 300ci
and TASKalfa 250ci.
There are however, no differences between the following models, and TASKalfa
500ci, TASKalfa 400ci, TASKalfa 300ci and TASKalfa 250ci except these
appearances. Since configuration of the testing includes the cases of using the
MFP such as TASKalfa 500ci, TASKalfa 400ci, TASKalfa 300ci and TASKalfa 250ci,
all of the MFP models identified in ST are included
> TASKalfa 500ciG, TASKalfa 400ciG, TASKalfa 300ciG, TASKalfa 250ciG
> CS 500ci, CS 400ci, CS 300ci, CS 250ci
> CDS 1840/DCC 2840, CDC 1740/DCC 2740, CDC 1730/DCC 2730, CDC 1725/DCC
2725
- Printer Driver and TWAIN Driver (Operational Environment of the TOE)
The following drivers were used for client PC.
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> Kyocera TASKalfa KX Ver 5.0.2130a
> Kyocera TWAIN Driver Ver 1.7.1106
These are consistent with the one identified in the guidance. Also, ST requires the
one identified in the guidance. Thus these are consistent with the one identified in
ST.
- SMTP server, SMB server and FTP server (Operation Environment of the TOE)
The server software corresponding to SMTP, SMB and FTP protocol was used for the
server PC. Thus this is consistent with the one identified in ST.
From the above-mentioned, the developer testing was conducted in the same TOE
operational Environment as configuration of the TOE identified in the ST.
2) Outline of Developer Testing
The testing performed by the developer is as follows:
a. Test Outline
Outline of the testing performed by the developer is as follows:
<Developer Testing Approach>
Although the function that can be confirmed through an external interface of the
TOE (changing an icon relating to the security function displayed on the operation
panel etc) was tested by stimulating and observing through the external interface
but, the developer could not get enough confirmation by using this method
regarding the overwrite-erase function and the encryption function. Therefore the
testing was supplemented by the following method.
- The approach to confirm if the encryption is correctly performed.
Obtain the data encrypted by the TOE function and written to the HDD in a state
of the data without being decoded by debug operation.
Decode the above-obtained data by using the same key as the one used for
encryption in accordance with the different software AES from the TOE, and
confirm the data that is consistent with the data before being encrypted.
- The approach to confirm if the overwrite-erase function is correctly performed.
Regarding the additional function to the TOE that records a log, it enables
recording the content of the appropriate portion in the HDD before and after
overwrite-erase operation. Then the developer operates the overwrite-erase to
be performed, and observes the recorded log.
<Developer Testing Tools>
The tools used in the developer testing are shown in table 7-1. The evaluator
determined these tools would not affect behavior of the TOE functions.
With regard to converter and cable, the developer confirmed that these tools
correctly operate. With regard to the software AES, its reliability is confirmed by
the testing conducted using clear text/coded message and encryption key that are
published by the NIST.
CRP-C0267-01
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Table 7-1 Tools used in Developer Testing
Name of tool Outline and purpose of use
Converter, Cable Debugging equipments for developer.
It confirms if a log is recorded, and
implements debugging operation.
Software AES Software that performs encryption and
decryption by using the AES. It is
used for confirmation of the encryption
function.
<Implementation of Developer Testing>
Observation results of the external interface as well as of recorded logs were
compared to the expected values as shown in the test plan.
Encrypted data obtained by the debug operations, was decoded by using the
software AES, and it was then compared to see consistency with the data before
being encrypted.
b. Scope of Test Performed
103 items of testing are performed by the developers.
The coverage analysis was conducted and examined to testing satisfactorily all of
the security functions described in the functional specification and the external
interface. Then, the depth analysis was conducted and examined to testing
satisfactorily all the subsystems described in the TOE design and the subsystem
interfaces.
c. Result
The evaluator confirmed consistencies between the expected test results and the
actual test results provided by the developer. The evaluator confirmed the developer
testing approach performed and legitimacy of items performed, and confirmed
consistencies between the testing approach described in the test plan and the actual
test results.
7.3.2 Evaluator Independent Testing
The evaluators performed the independent testing using the evidence, which were
provided during the evaluation process, in order to revalidate the security functions of
the product are securely performed. The following are the overview of the independent
testing that the evaluators performed.
1) Evaluator Independent Testing Environment
Configuration of test performed by the evaluator is the same configuration as the
developer testing.
Configuration of test performed by the evaluator is the same configuration as the
developer test configuration shown in the figure 7-1.
The TOE and environment used in the evaluator independent testing were the same as
the one used for the developer testing. Therefore the evaluator independent testing
was conducted in the same TOE testing environment as the configuration of the TOE
identified in the ST.
CRP-C0267-01
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2) Overview of Evaluator Independent Testing
Independent testing performed by the evaluator is as follows;
a. Viewpoints of the Evaluator Independent Testing
The evaluator devised the evaluator independent testing in the following points of
view from the developer testing and the provided evaluation documents.
Sampling of developer testing was conducted as follows.
- Selected all the testing items related to behavior of the subsystem implementing
the security functions.
- Regarding an external interface that calls a subsystem implementing the security
functions so that it can provide with these security functions, selected any
possible external interfaces to make sure not to omit any one of them and to cover
differences between the interface providing methods.
Since there was a concern that the overwrite-erase function could be affected by
other operations, the evaluator devised the independent testing to obtain assurance
that the overwrite-erase function would correctly perform under the different
condition and at the different timing from the developer testing. With regard to
buffer overflow prevention mechanism, the evaluator also devised the test
conducted by different inputs from the developer testing.
<Viewpoints of the Independent Testing>
1. Confirm that the overwrite-erase function does not perform when parameters
related to the temporary stored data are different from the ones used for the
developer testing.
2. Confirm that the overwrite-erase function correctly performs when it is interfered
with the sleep mode operation.
3. Confirm that the overwrite-erase function correctly performs when it is interfered
with usage of the MFP functions.
4. Confirm that the buffer overflow prevention mechanism correctly performs when
the independent testing is conducted by providing the different input from the
ones inputted in the developer testing.
b. Outline of the Independent Testing
Outline of the independent testing performed by the evaluator is as follows;
<Independent Testing Approach>
The independent testing was conducted using the same approach as the one used in
the developer testing.
<Independent Testing Tools>
The tools used in the developer testing as listed in the table 7-1 were used.
<Implementation of the independent testing>
The viewpoints of the independent testing devised by the evaluator and the
corresponding testing contents are described in table 7-2.
CRP-C0267-01
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Table 7-2 the Independent Testing Conducted
Viewpoint of
the
Independent
Testing
Test Outline
1 Confirm that the overwrite-erase function does not
operate when using the MFP functions without generating
the temporary stored data.
2 Manually switch on the sleep mode during processing of
the overwrite-erase, and then confirm if overwrite-erase
operation is correctly completed.
3 Operate the copy function during processing of the
overwrite-erase, and then confirm if the overwrite-erase is
correctly completed.
4 Attempt to print out the image data that will become large
size after developing to the original image, and the image
data that has the different size of the information from
the actual image data size, and then confirm if there is no
problem caused.
c. Result
All the evaluator independent testing conducted were correctly completed, and the
behavior of the TOE was confirmed. The evaluator confirmed consistencies
between all the test results and the expected behaviors.
7.3.3 Evaluator Penetration Testing
The evaluator devised and conducted the necessary penetration testing about the
possibility of exploitable concern at assumed environment of use and attack level from
the evidence provided through the evaluation process. Outlining of the evaluator
penetration testing is as follows:
1) Outlining of Evaluator Penetration Testing
The penetration testing performed by the evaluator is as follows;
a. Vulnerability concerned
The evaluator searched the potential vulnerability from the evidence provided and
the well-known information, and identified the following vulnerability that requires
the penetration testing.
1. When non-assumed port opens, there is a possibility that the port may become a
spot of a channel for invasion.
2. When the FTP service is not appropriately configured, there is a possibility of
unauthorized access to data.
3. In a state of small remaining capacity in the HDD, there is a possibility that the
security functions may incorrectly perform because of the running out of
resources or time-out.
4. Consistencies between the job contents may be destroyed by rearranging the
order of jobs (using the MFP functions) with respect to the same image data so
that there is a possibility that the security functions may incorrectly perform.
5. When the web server function is not appropriately configured, there is a
possibility of unauthorized access to data.
6. There is a possibility that the activation information of the security functions
may be physically changed to a state of non-activation and be used for a wrong
CRP-C0267-01
20
purpose.
7. There is a possibility that the TOE may be changed by using the update function
of the firmware.
8. Due to mechanism for domain separation, unauthorized access from HyPAS
application to an area where image data is stored can not be done but, assurance
has not been fully made if the TOE behaves as expected.
9. There was a concern at the evaluation of initializing the TOE that the security kit
does not correctly activate when turning off the power during activation of the
security kit.
b. Penetration Test Outline
The evaluator conducted the following penetration testing to determine if there is a
possibility of using the potential vulnerability for a wrong purpose.
<Penetration Test Environment>
The penetration test was conducted in the same environment as the developer
testing. However, Nmap 5.21 was additionally used for performing port scan.
<Implementation of Vulnerability Testing>
The concerned vulnerability identified by searching the potential vulnerability and
the corresponding evaluator penetration test are described in table 7-3. The
evaluator conducted the following evaluator penetration test to determine if there is
a possibility of using the potential vulnerability for a wrong purpose.
Table 7-3 Penetration Testing Outline
Vulnerability Test Outline
1 Tests were conducted to confirm if a port that is not
mentioned in the specification is opened or not by using the
port scan tool.
2 Tests were conducted to confirm that unauthorized access
to image data in HDD is not available by connecting to FTP
service and attempting to move directory or to obtain files.
3 Tests were conducted to perform many functions and so
that makes remaining capacity small in the HDD, and to
further perform the MFP functions. Even in such a case,
the tests were conducted to confirm that performance of the
overwrite-erase is correctly completed.
Same as the above, tests were conducted to attempt to store
image data exceeding the remaining capacity in the HDD in
a state of small remaining capacity in the HDD. Even in
such a case, the tests were conducted to confirm that the
TOE still does not incorrectly activate.
4 Tests were conducted to confirm that rearranging the
waiting order of the jobs (using the MFP functions) with
respect to the same image data would not cause the
incorrect activation of the TOE. Specifically, when the
outcome is "print after deletion" after rearranging the job
order, this would be a concern.
5 Tests were conducted to confirm that there would not be the
directory traversal on the TOE web server functions by
inputting that could cause a concern about the directory
traversal.
CRP-C0267-01
21
Vulnerability Test Outline
6 Tests were conducted to confirm that even if someone
attempt to physically change the activation information of
the security functions to a state of non-activation but,
unauthorized changes still can not be done.
7 Tests were conducted to prepare the different content of the
firmware data from the one officially provided by vendors,
and to confirm that even if someone attempt unauthorized
update on TOE but, this attempt would still be rejected.
8 Tests were conducted to confirm that even if someone
attempt unauthorized access from HyPAS application to an
area where image data is stored, however this still can not
be done.
9 Tests were conducted to confirm that even if the power is
turned off during the activation of the security kit, however
the security kit would still continue to correctly activate
after the power is again turned on.
c. Result
In the conducted evaluator penetration testing, the exploitable vulnerability that
attackers who have the assumed attack potential could not be found.
7.4 Evaluated Configuration
Multiple models of MFP in the operational environment of the TOE are described in ST.
One of those models was selected for this evaluation. The evaluator determined the
validity. (Please refer to "7.3.1 Developer Testing")
There are printer driver, TWAIN driver, SMTP server, SMB server and FTP server as
the assumed software that is installed into client PC or server PC. These were
prepared to be consistent with the ones described in ST.
Although it is not clearly described in ST, but it is assumed that Web browser is also
installed into client PC or server PC. There is no operation relating to the TOE
security functions from a web browser, so only one (Internet Explorer ver 6.0 sp1) was
prepared.
7.5 Evaluation Results
The evaluator had the conclusion that the TOE satisfies all work units prescribed in
CEM by submitting the Evaluation Technical Report.
As a result of the evaluation, the following assurance components were judged,
"Passed".
- All assurance components of EAL3 package
In the evaluation, the following were confirmed.
- PP Conformance: none
- Security functional requirements: Common Criteria Part 2 Conformant
- Security assurance requirements: Common Criteria Part 3 Conformant
The result of the evaluation is applied to the composed by corresponding TOE to the
CRP-C0267-01
22
identification described in the chapter 2.
7.6 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations
The configuration excluding "the fax function" and other optional functions was
evaluated. Determination for the validity of the security functions is out of this
evaluation scope when having the fax function or other optional functions.
CRP-C0267-01
23
8. Certification
The certification body conducted the following certification based on each materials
submitted by evaluation facility during evaluation process.
1. Contents pointed out in the Observation Report shall be adequate.
2. Contents pointed out in the Observation Report shall properly be reflected.
3. Evidential materials submitted were sampled, its contents were examined, and
related work units shall be evaluated as presented in the Evaluation Technical
Report.
4. Rationale of evaluation verdict by the evaluator presented in the Evaluation
Technical Report shall be adequate.
5. The evaluator's evaluation methodology presented in the Evaluation Technical
Report shall conform to the CEM.
Concerns found in certification process were prepared as certification review and were
sent to evaluation facility. The Certification Body confirmed such concerns pointed out
in Observation Report and certification review were solved in the ST and the
Evaluation Technical Report and issued this certification report.
8.1 Certification Result
The Certification Body verified the Evaluation Technical Report, the Observation
Report and the related evaluation evidential materials submitted and confirmed that
all evaluator action elements required in CC Part 3 are conducted appropriately to the
TOE. The Certification Body determined the TOE is satisfied the assurance
requirements of EAL3 components prescribed in CC Part 3.
8.2 Recommendations
It is necessary to be aware of what is evaluated as the security functions among the
functions that the TOE has. For more details, please refer to "4.3 Clarification of
scope".
CRP-C0267-01
24
9. Annexes
There is no annex.
10. Security Target
Security Target of the TOE [12] is published as follow, separately from this report.
KYOCERA MITA Data Security Kit (E) Software Type I Security Target Version 1.10
(July 27, 2010) KYOCERA MITA Corporation
CRP-C0267-01
25
11. Glossary
The abbreviations relating to CC used in this report are listed below.
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
PP Protection Profile
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
The abbreviations relating to TOE used in this report are listed below.
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
ASIC Application Specific Integrated Circuit
HDD Hard Disc Drive
MFP Multi Function Printer
USB Universal Serial Bus
The definition of terms used in this report is listed below.
Client PC It indicates the computers that connect to the network, and
utilizes the TOE services (functions) of the TOEs that are
connected to the network.
Image data It indicates the image information that is processed inside
the MFP when TOE users use copy function, network scan
function, print function and document management box
function.
Long period storage
Keeping the image data on the HDD. The users will have
to consciously conduct the storage operation for this storage.
This should be compared to temporary storage.
Network scan A function to transmit the scanned image data or the stored
image data in the document management box, to the client
PCs. There is PC transmission that transmits them via
the LAN, e-mail transmission that transmits them via
e-mails, and a TWAIN function that captures images of the
originals by operations from the client PC.
CRP-C0267-01
26
Operation panel
This is installed on the uppermost part of the MFP, and is
constituted by a liquid crystal panel. It is an external
interface, and users can utilize the TOE via this operation
panel.
Overwrite-erase
This is to overwrite on the actual image data area with
meaningless character strings when receiving an
instruction for deletion of the stored image data in the HDD,
and to delete the management information of the image
data after the actual data area is completely erased. Thus
it disables re-usage of the data.
Temporary storage
Keeping the received image data temporarily on the HDD
without outputting it or forwarding it as is, or keeping the
image data temporarily on the HDD during the image
processing. This is executed automatically during the
process of the MFP without the users being conscious about
it. This should be compared to long period storage.
CRP-C0267-01
27
12. Bibliography
[1] IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme, May 2007,
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan CCS-01
[2] IT Security Certification Procedure, May 2007,
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan CCM-02
[3] Evaluation Facility Approval Procedure, May 2007,
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan CCM-03
[4] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part1:
Introduction and general model Version 3.1 Revision 1 September 2006
CCMB-2006-09-001
[5] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part2:
Security functional components Version 3.1 Revision 2 September 2007
CCMB-2007-09-002
[6] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part3:
Security assurance components Version 3.1 Revision 2 September 2007
CCMB-2007-09-003
[7] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part1:
Introduction and general model Version 3.1 Revision 1 September 2006
CCMB-2006-09-001 (Japanese Version 2.0, March 2008)
[8] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part2:
Security functional components Version 3.1 Revision 2 September 2007
CCMB-2007-09-002 (Japanese Version 2.0, March 2008)
[9] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part3:
Security assurance components Version 3.1 Revision 2 September 2007
CCMB-2007-09-003 (Japanese Version 2.0, March 2008)
[10] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation :
Evaluation methodology Version 3.1 Revision 2 September 2007
CCMB-2007-09-004
[11] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation :
Evaluation methodology Version 3.1 Revision 2 September 2007
CCMB-2007-09-004 (Japanese Version 2.0, March 2008)
[12] KYOCERA MITA Data Security Kit (E) Software Type I Security Target Version
1.10 (July 27, 2010) KYOCERA MITA Corporation
[13] Data Security Kit (E) Software Type I Evaluation Technical Report Version 1.1,
August 19, 2010, Electronic Commerce Security Technology Laboratory Inc.
Evaluation Center