KECS-CR-19-70
Magic SSO V4.0
Certification Report
Certification No.: KECS-CISS-0977-2019
2019. 11. 15.
IT Security Certification Center
Certification Report Page 2
History of Creation and Revision
No. Date
Revised
Pages
Description
00 2019.11.15. -
Certification report for Magic SSO V4.0
- First documentation
Certification Report Page 3
This document is the certification report for Magic SSO V4.0 of
Dreamsecurity Co., Ltd.
The Certification Body
IT Security Certification Center
The Evaluation Facility
Korea System Assurance (KoSyAs)
Certification Report Page 4
Table of Contents
Certification Report ......................................................................................................1
1. Executive Summary...............................................................................................5
2. Identification ..........................................................................................................9
3. Security Policy.....................................................................................................10
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope...........................................................10
5. Architectural Information....................................................................................10
6. Documentation..................................................................................................... 11
7. TOE Testing.......................................................................................................... 11
8. Evaluated Configuration .....................................................................................12
9. Results of the Evaluation....................................................................................13
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE).............................................................13
9.2 Development Evaluation (ADV) ...............................................................14
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD) .................................................14
9.4 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC) .......................................................14
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE) ..............................................................................15
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)...............................................................15
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary.....................................................................16
10. Recommendations...............................................................................................17
11. Security Target.....................................................................................................17
12. Acronyms and Glossary .....................................................................................17
13. Bibliography.........................................................................................................19
Certification Report Page 5
1. Executive Summary
This report describes the evaluation result drawn by the evaluation facility on the
results of the Magic SSO V4.0 developed by Dreamsecurity Co., Ltd. with reference
to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (“CC”
hereinafter)[1]. It describes the evaluation result and its soundness and conformity.
The Target of Evaluation (“TOE” hereinafter) is used to enable the user to access
various business systems and use the service through a single user login without
additional login action. Also, the TOE shall provide a variety of security features:
security audit, the user identification and authentication including mutual
authentication between TOE components, security management, the TOE access
session management, and the TSF protection function, etc.
The evaluation of the TOE has been carried out by Korea System Assurance
(KOSYAS) and completed on October 07, 2019.
The ST claims conformance to the Korean National PP for Single Sign On V1.0[3].
All Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) in the ST are based only upon
assurance component in CC Part 3, and the TOE satisfies the SARs of Evaluation
Assurance Level EAL1+. Therefore, the ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 3
conformant. The Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) are based upon both
functional components in CC Part 2 and a newly defined component in the Extended
Component Definition chapter of the PP, therefor the ST, and the TOE satisfies the
SFRs in the ST. Therefore, the ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE performs end user identification and authentication function through DBMS
that stores end user information in order to provide service without additional login
behavior to several work systems with single sign-on. The TOE provides the security
audit function that records and manages a critical events as audit data when
Certification Report Page 6
activating the security functionality and management function, function of protecting
the data that stored in the TSF controlled repository, and TSF protection function
such as TSF self-testing. In addition, the TOE provides authentication failure
handling, identification and authentication functions including mutual authentication
between the TOE components, cryptographic support function such as cryptographic
key management and cryptographic operation for issuing a token, security
management function for management of security functions behaviour and
configuration, and the TOE access function to manage the authorized administrator’s
interacting session. In addition, the token offer confidentiality and integrity protection,
and the TOE executable code offer integrity protection.
[Figure 1] TOE Operational Environment
TOE operational environment and consists of an SSO server and an SSO agent.
SSO server provides login verification, authentication token issue and management,
and policy setting. SSO server is mounted on Web Application Server and operates
as a single web application. The SSO Agent performs normal user login verification
requests, authentication token issuance, and verification request functions to the
SSO server and verifies the authentication token received from the SSO server. SSO
Certification Report Page 7
Agent is installed in each business system web application server in the form of
library file API. Wrapper is used for compatibility with various business systems and
Wrapper is excluded from the scope of the TOE.
An administrator PC operational environment on which Internet Explorer 11 web
browser that supports HTTPS (Hypertext Transfer Protocol over Secure Socket
Layer) is required for an administrator to access the SSO server and perform
security management functions such as SSO server configuration, status check and
audit log search.
■ DBMS(Oracle)
SSO server and Oracle, a relational database management system, are interlinked
for the purpose of the management of authentication and policy information.
■ Mail Server
A mail server is used as an external entity necessary for the operation of the TOE.
The mail server is utilized to notify an authorized administrator via email in case of
failed administrator authentication or possible audit data loss.
The requirements for hardware, software and operating system to install the TOE are
shown in [Table 1].
Classification Minimum Specification
SSO
Server
HW
CPU Intel Dual Core 2 GHz or higher
Memor
y
8 GB or more
HDD Space required for installation of TOE
Certification Report Page 8
: 100 GB or higher
NIC Ethernet 100/1000 Mbps * 1 Port or more
SW
OS CentOS 6.10(Kernel 2.6.32) 64 bit
DBMS Oracle 11g
Java Java(JDK) 1.8.0_221
WAS Apache Tomcat 8.5.45
SSO
Agent
HW
CPU Intel Dual Core 2 GHz or higher
Memor
y
8 GB or more
HDD
Space required for installation of TOE
: 100 GB or higher
NIC Ethernet 100/1000 Mbps * 1 Port or more
SW
OS CentOS 6.10(Kernel 2.6.32) 64 bit
Java Java(JDK) 1.8.0_221
WAS Apache Tomcat 8.5.45
[Table 1] TOE Hardware and Software specifications
Administrator uses the pc that can operate web browser to use the security
management. Administrator pc minimum requirements are shown in [Table 2]
Classification Minimum Specification
Management
PC
HW
CPU Intel Dual Core 2 GHz or higher
Memory 8 GB or more
HDD 50 GB or more
NIC Ethernet 100/1000 Mbps * 1 Port or more
SW
OS Windows 10 Pro 64 bit
Browser Internet Explorer 11
[Table 2] Management PC Requirements
Certification Validity: The certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the
government of Republic of Korea or by any other organization that recognizes or
gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the government of
Certification Report Page 9
Republic of Korea or by any other organization recognizes or gives effect to the
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification
The TOE reference is identified as follows.
TOE Magic SSO V4.0
Version v4.0.0.2
TOE
Components
Magic SSO V4.0 Server v4.0.0.2
Magic SSO V4.0 Agent v4.0.0.2
Manuals
Magic SSO V4.0 Operational Guidance v1.2
Magic SSO V4.0 Installation Guide v1.2
[Table 3] TOE identification
[Table 4] summarizes additional information for scheme, developer, sponsor,
evaluation, facility, certification body, etc.
Scheme
Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security
(August 24, 2017)
Korea Evaluation and Certification Regulation for IT Security
(September 12, 2017)
TOE Magic SSO V4.0
Common Criteria
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001 ~
CCMB-2017-04-003, April 2017
EAL EAL1+ (ATE_FUN.1)
Protection Profile Korean National PP for Single Sign On V1.0
Developer Dreamsecurity Co., Ltd.
Sponsor Dreamsecurity Co., Ltd.
Evaluation Facility Korea System Assurance (KOSYAS)
Certification Report Page 10
Completion Date of
Evaluation
October 07, 2019
[Table 4] Additional identification information
3. Security Policy
The TOE implements policies pertaining to the following security functional classes:
- Security Audit
- Cryptographic Support
- Identification and Authentication
- Security Management
- Prtoection of the TSF
- TOE Access
Complete details of the security functional requirements (SFRs) can be found in the
Security Target (ST) [4]
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
There are no Assumptions in the Security Problem Definition in the ST. The scope of
this evaluation is limited to the functionality and assurance covered in the Security
Target. This evaluation covers only the specific software version identified in this
document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process. (for the detailed
information of TOE version and TOE Components version refer to the [Table 3]).
5. Architectural Information
The TOE consists of SSO server, SSO agent, an operational guidance and an
installation guide. The SSO server is Magic SSO V4.0 Server v4.0.0.2 that verifies end
user login, manages authentication tokens and establishes policies. The SSO agent is
Magic SSO V4.0 Agent v4.0.0.2 that performs the function of requesting the verification
of end user login to the SSO server and requesting authentication token issuance.
Certification Report Page 11
Verified Cryptographic Module(MagicJCrypto V2.0.0.0) is embedded in the TOE
components. Any hardware and software in which the TOE is installed shall not fall
under the scope of the TOE.
6. Documentation
The following documentation is evaluated and provided with the TOE by the developer
to the customer.
Identification Date
Magic SSO V4.0 Installation Guide v1.2
(Magic_SSO_V4.0-PRE-v1.2.pdf)
September 25, 2019
Magic SSO V4.0 Operational Guidance v1.2
(Magic_SSO_V4.0-OPE-v1.2.pdf)
September 25, 2019
[Table 5] Documentation
7. TOE Testing
The evaluator conducted independent testing listed in Independent Testing Report
[5], based upon test cases devised by the evaluator. The evaluator took a testing
approach based on the security services provided by each TOE components based
on the operational environment of the TOE. Each test case includes the following
information:
- Test no. and conductor: Identifier of each test case and its conductor
- Test Purpose: Includes the security functions and modules to be tested
- Test Configuration: Details about the test configuration
- Test Procedure detail: Detailed procedures for testing each security function
- Expected result: Result expected from testing
- Actual result: Result obtained by performing testing
- Test result compared to the expected result: Comparison between the expected
Certification Report Page 12
and actual result
The evaluator set up the test configuration and testing environment consistent with
the ST [4]. In addition, the evaluator conducted penetration testing based upon test
cases devised by the evaluator resulting from the independent search for potential
vulnerabilities. These tests cover weakness analysis of privilege check of executable
code, bypassing security functionality, invalid inputs for interfaces, vulnerability
scanning using commercial tools, disclosure of secrets, and so on. No exploitable
vulnerabilities by attackers possessing basic attack potential were found from
penetration testing. The evaluator confirmed that all the actual testing results
correspond to the expected testing results. The evaluator testing effort, the testing
approach, configuration, depth, and results are summarized in the Penetration
Testing Report [6].
8. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is software consisting of the following components:
TOE: Magic SSO V4.0 (v4.0.0.2)
- Magic SSO V4.0 Server v4.0.0.2
- Magic SSO V4.0 Agent v4.0.0.2
The Administrator can identify the complete TOE reference after installation using
the product’s Info check menu. And the guidance documents listed in this report
chapter 7 were evaluated with the TOE.
Certification Report Page 13
9. Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation facility wrote the evaluation result in the ETR which references Single
Evaluation Reports for each assurance requirement and Observation Reports. The
evaluation result was based on the CC [1] and CEM [2]. The TOE was evaluated
based on Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation. (EAL1+).
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)
The ST Introduction correctly identifies the ST and the TOE, and describes the TOE
in a narrative way at three levels of abstraction (TOE reference, TOE overview and
TOE description), and these three descriptions are consistent with each other.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_INT.1. The Conformance Claim
properly describes how the ST and the TOE conform to the CC and how the ST
conforms to PPs and packages. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
ASE_CCL.1. The Security Objectives for the operational environment are clearly
defined. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_OBJ.1. The Extended
Components Definition has been clearly and unambiguously defined, and it is
necessary. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_ECD.1. The Security
Requirements is defined clearly and unambiguously, and they are internally
consistent. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_REQ.1. The TOE
Summary Specification addresses all SFRs, and it is consistent with other narrative
descriptions of the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_TSS.1.
Thus, the ST is sound and internally consistent, and suitable to be used as the basis
for the TOE evaluation. The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ASE.
Certification Report Page 14
9.2 Development Evaluation (ADV)
The functional specifications specify a high-level description of the SFR-enforcing
and SFR-supporting TSFIs, in terms of descriptions of their parameters. Therefore,
the verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_FSP.1. The verdict PASS is assigned to the
assurance class ADV.
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD)
The procedures and steps for the secure preparation of the TOE have been
documented and result in a secure configuration. Therefore, the verdict PASS is
assigned to AGD_PRE.1. The operational user guidance describes for each user
role the security functionality and interfaces provided by the TSF, provides
instructions and guidelines for the secure use of the TOE, addresses secure
procedures for all modes of operation, facilitates prevention and detection of
insecure TOE states, or it is misleading or unreasonable. Therefore, the verdict
PASS is assigned to AGD_OPE.1. Thus, the guidance documents are adequately
describing the user can handle the TOE in a secure manner. The guidance
documents take into account the various types of users (e.g. those who accept,
install, administrate or operate the TOE) whose incorrect actions could adversely
affect the security of the TOE or of their own data. The verdict PASS is assigned to
the assurance class AGD.
9.4 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC)
The developer has clearly identified the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is
assigned to ALC_CMC.1. The configuration management document verifies that the
configuration list includes the TOE and the evaluation evidence. Therefore, the
verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_CMS.1. Also, the evaluator confirmed that the
Certification Report Page 15
correct version of the software is installed in device. The verdict PASS is assigned to
the assurance class ALC.
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE)
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests in the test
documentation. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_FUN.1. By
independently testing a subset of the TSFI, the evaluator confirmed that the TOE
behaves as specified in the functional specification and guidance documentation.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_IND.1. Thus, the TOE behaves as
described in the ST and as specified in the evaluation evidence (described in the
ADV class). The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ATE.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)
By penetrating testing, the evaluator confirmed that there are no exploitable
vulnerabilities by attackers possessing basic attack potential in the operational
environment of the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to AVA_VAN.1.
Thus, potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development
and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses),
don’t allow attackers possessing basic attack potential to violate the SFRs. The
verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AVA.
Certification Report Page 16
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ASE
ASE_INT.1
ASE_INT.1.1E PASS
PASS
PASS
ASE_INT.1.2E PASS
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_CCL.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_OBJ.1 ASE_OBJ.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1
ASE_ECD.1.1E PASS
PASS
ASE_ECD.1.2E PASS
ASE_REQ.1 ASE_REQ.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1
ASE_TSS.1.1E PASS
PASS
ASE_TSS.1.2E PASS
ADV ADV_FSP.1
ADV_FSP.1.1E PASS
PASS PASS
ADV_FSP.1.2E PASS
AGD
AGD_PRE.1
AGD_PRE.1.1E PASS
PASS
PASS
AGD_PRE.1.2E PASS
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1.1E PASS PASS
ALC
ALC_CMC.1 ALC_CMC.1.1E PASS PASS
PASS
ALC_CMS.1 ALC_CMS.1.1E PASS PASS
ATE
ATE_FUN.1 ATE_FUN.1.1E PASS PASS
PASS
ATE_IND.1
ATE_IND.1.1E PASS
PASS
ATE_IND.1.2E PASS
AVA AVA_VAN.1
AVA_VAN.1.1E PASS
PASS PASS
AVA_VAN.1.2E PASS
AVA_VAN.1.3E PASS
Certification Report Page 17
[Table 6] Evaluation Result Summary
10. Recommendations
The TOE security functionality can be ensured only in the evaluated TOE operational
environment with the evaluated TOE configuration, thus the TOE shall be operated by
complying with the followings:
 The TOE must be installed and operated in a physically secure environment
accessible only by authorized administrators and should not allow remote
management from outside.
 The administrator shall maintain a safe state such as application of the latest
security patches, eliminating unnecessary service, change of the default
ID/password, etc., of the operating system and DBMS in the TOE operation.
 The administrator should periodically checks a spare space of audit data storage in
case of the audit data loss, and carries out the audit data backup to prvent audit
data loss.
 The developer who uses the TOE to interoperate with the user identification and
authentication function in the operational environment of the business system shall
ensure that the security functions of the TOE are securely applied in accordance
with the requirements of the manual provided with the TOE.
11. Security Target
Magic SSO V4.0 Security Target v1.4 [4] is included in this report for reference.
12. Acronyms and Glossary
(1) Acronyms
CC Common Criteria
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
Certification Report Page 18
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSFI TSF Interface
(2) Glossary
Application Programming Interface (API)
A set of system libraries existing between the application layer and the platform system,
enables the easy development of the application running on the platform
Authentication Data
Information used to verify a user's claimed identity
Authentication token
Authentication data that authorized end-users use to access the business system
Authorized Administrator
Authorized user to securely operate and manage the TOE
Authorized User
The TOE user who may, in accordance with the SFRs, perform an operation
Business System
An application server that authorized end-users access through ‘SSO’
Decryption
The act that restoring the ciphertext into the plaintext using the decryption key
Encryption
The act that converting the plaintext into the ciphertext using the cryptographic key
end-user
Users of the TOE who want to use the business system, not the administrators of the
TOE
External Entity
Human or IT entity possibly interacting with the TOE from outside of the TOE boundary
Certification Report Page 19
Monitoring administrator
As An authorized user who operates and manages the TOE securely, Only the audit log
can be viewed among the security management functions
Super Administrator
As an authorized user who operates and manages the TOE securely, it can perform all
security management functions
Validated Cryptographic Module
A cryptographic module that is validated and given a validation number by validation
authority
Wrapper
Interfaces for interconnection between the TOE and various types of business systems
or authentication systems
13. Bibliography
The evaluation facility has used following documents to produce this report.
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision
5, CCMB-2017-04-001 ~ CCMB-2017-04-003, April, 2017
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004, April, 2017
[3] Korean National Protection Profile for Single Sign On V1.0, August 18, 2017
[4] Magic SSO V4.0 Security Target v1.4, October 30, 2019
[5] Magic SSO V4.0 Independent Testing Report(ATE_IND.1) V2.00, November 08, 2019
[6] Magic SSO V4.0 Penetration Testing Report (AVA_VAN.1) V2.00, November 08, 2019