Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0378-2006
for
PR/SM™ LPAR for the
IBM System z9™ Enterprise Class and the
IBM System z9™ Business Class
from
International Business Machine Corporation
(IBM)
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)3018 9582-5455, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-330 V3.31
BSI-DSZ-CC-0378-2006
PR/SM™ LPAR for the
IBM System z9™ Enterprise Class and the
IBM System z9™ Business Class
from
International Business Machine Corporation
(IBM)
Common Criteria Arrangement
for components up to EAL4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3
(ISO/IEC 15408:2005) extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL4
for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC
15408:2005).
Evaluation Results:
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL5
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, September 4th
, 2006
The Vice President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Hange L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0 - Fax +49 228 9582-5455 - Infoline +49 228 9582-111
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0378-2006 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0378-2006
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
VI
BSI-DSZ-CC-0378-2006 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), version 2.35
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), version 2.3
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4 (AIS 34)
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger
dated 19 May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0378-2006
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended to
include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2 CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United
States. Israel joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February
2002, Austria in November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003,
Japan in November 2003, the Czech Republic in September 2004, the Republic
of Singapore in March 2005, India in April 2005.
This evaluation contains the components ACM_SCP.3, ADV_FSP.3,
ADV_HLD.3, ADV_IMP.2, ADV_INT.1, ADV_RCR.2, ADV_SPM.3, ALC_LCD.2,
ALC.TAT.2, ATE_DPT.2, AVA_CCA.1 and AVA_VLA.3 that are not mutually
recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual
recognition the EAL4-components of these assurance families (if applicable) are
relevant.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0378-2006 Certification Report
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product PR/SM LPAR for the IBM System z9 Enterprise Class (EC) and z9
Business Class (BC) has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a
re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0324-2006. For this evaluation specific
results from the evaluation process based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0324-2006 were re-
used.
The evaluation of the product PR/SM LPAR for the IBM System z9 EC and z9
BC was conducted by atsec information security GmbH. The atsec information
security GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by BSI.
The developer is:
International Business Machine Corporation (IBM)
2455 South Road, P329
Poughkeepsie, NY 12601, USA
The certification is concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on September 4th, 2006.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0378-2006
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-26.
The product PR/SM LPAR for the IBM System z9 EC and z9 BC has been
included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly
(see also Internet: http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained
from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor7
of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
7
International Business Machine Corporation (IBM)
2455 South Road, P329
Poughkeepsie, NY 12601, USA
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0378-2006 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0378-2006
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 11
3 Security Policy 11
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 12
5 Architectural Information 15
6 Documentation 18
7 IT Product Testing 19
8 Evaluated Configuration 19
9 Results of the Evaluation 19
10 Comments/Recommendations 21
11 Annexes 21
12 Security Target 22
13 Definitions 22
14 Bibliography 24
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0378-2006 Certification Report
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Microcode kernel of the Processor
Resource / System Manager™ (PR/SM) LPAR running on the IBM hardware
platform z9 EC and z9 BC.
PR/SM is intended for use in environments where separation of workloads is a
requirement, but where the use of a single hardware platform is desirable for
reasons of economy, flexibility, security or management.
Leasing or purchase costs may be lower for a single large machine than for a
number of smaller machines of equivalent total processing capacity. There may
also be savings in operational costs resulting from lower machine room capacity
and fewer operations staff.
PR/SM provides flexibility by allowing the single machine to be set up to provide
a wide range of virtual machine configurations. As one workload grows, more
resources can be allocated to it, providing significant advantages where the
required configuration is subject to frequent change.
PR/SM provides the facility to partition a single platform to run any combination
of z/OS™; z/VM™; VIF, VM/ESA®
, VSE/ESA™, TPF or LINUX allowing
requirements for different operating system environments to be met.
Where confidentiality is a concern, PR/SM provides separation of workloads,
and prevents the flow of information between partitions. This trusted separation
may be used where the separation is based on need to know, or where data at
different national security classifications must be isolated.
The IT product PR/SM LPAR for the IBM System z9 EC and z9 BC was
evaluated by atsec information security GmbH. The evaluation was completed
on August 21st, 2006. The atsec information security GmbH is an evaluation
facility (ITSEF)8
recognised by BSI.
The developer is
International Business Machine Corporation (IBM)
2455 South Road, P329
Poughkeepsie, NY 12601, USA
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Annex C or [1], part
3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level
EAL5 (Evaluation Assurance Level 5).
8
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0378-2006
1.2 Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target are Common Criteria Part 2 conformant as shown in the following tables.
The following SFRs are taken from CC part 2:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FAU Security Audit
FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
FAU_GEN.2 User Identity association
FAU_SAR.1 Audit Review
FAU_SAR.2 Restricted Audit Review
FAU_SAR.3 Selectable Audit Review
FAU_STG.1 Protected Audit Trail Storage
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of Audit Data Low
FDP User data protection
FDP_ACC.2 Complete access control
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access
control
FDP_IFC.1 Subset Information Flow Control
FDP_IFF.1 Information Flow Control
FDP_RIP.2 Full residual information protection.
FIA Identification and authentication
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action.
FMT Security Management
FMT_MSA.1 Management of Security Attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management
Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
FPT Protection of the TOE Security
Functions
FPR_UNO.1 Unobservability
FPT_AMT.1 Abstract machine test
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer
protection
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0378-2006 Certification Report
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FPT_SEP.3 Complete reference monitor
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
FPT_TRC.1 Internal TSF consistency
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
FRU Resource Utilisation
FRU_RSA.1 Maximum quotas
FTA TOE access
FTA_TSE.1 TOE session establishment
Table 1: SFRs for the TOE taken from CC Part 2
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST chapter 5.1.
The following Security Functional Requirements are defined for the IT-
Environment of the TOE:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FDP User data protection
FDP_ACC.1 Access control policy
FDP_ACF.1 Access control functions
FMT Security Management
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
Table 2: SFRs for the IT-Environment
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST chapter 5.2.
These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the TOE Security
Functions:
Logical Partition Identity: The TOE implements an image profile to define the
initial operational characteristics of a logical partition. In a given configuration
each logical partition is uniquely named and has a corresponding image profile.
One of the parameters in the image profile is the logical partition identifier (i.e.
zone number). If a logical partition is in the current configuration, then the zone
number uniquely identifies that partition.
Authorized Administration: The authority level of a subject determines which
tasks are available for that subject. Subjects are System Administrators and
logical partitions.
Authorized Operations: The TOE implements the I/O Configuration Data Set
(IOCDS) used to define the logical partitions and the allocation of resources to
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0378-2006
these logical partitions. The TOE ensures that resources are allocated to a
logical partition as specified in the IOCDS.
Audit and Accountability: The TOE implements a Security Log that is always
enabled and contains a record of security relevant events. The View Security
Log task allows an administrator to view the log recorded while the Archive
Security Log task allows an administrator to create an archival copy of the
security log. The View Security Log task also allows an administrator to search
or sort the security relevant events based on date or event criteria.
Object Reuse: The TOE ensures that the contents of physical processors,
storage or I/O utilized by different logical partitions will be cleared of any
residual information before being utilized by the receiving logical partition.
Reliability of Service: The TOE implements a Reset profile to define the initial
operational characteristics of the physical processors. Two of the parameters in
the Reset profile are the processor running time and wait completion. These
parameters provide the ability to share physical processor resources on either
an event-driven basis or a time-driven basis. Disabling event driven dispatching
causes shared physical processor resources to be distributed on the basis of
time intervals according to the weights specified to effectively prevent
unauthorized denial of service.
Self Test: The TOE implements a set of self-test functions that are executed
when the TOE is started or reset, and periodically during normal execution.
Alternate Support Element: The TOE implements functions that permit a quick
switch to another Support Element when the primary Support Element has a
hardware problem. Mirroring functions are performed on a regular basis to
communicate any hard disk changes from the primary Support Element to the
alternate Support Element.
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.
1.3 Strength of Function
The strength of function claim is not applicable since no TOE security function is
based on permutational or probabilistic mechanisms.
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies
(OSPs) addressed by the evaluated IT product
The assumed threats can be classified into the following two categories:
• Users may gain access to data belonging to another partition, for which they
do not have clearance, specific authorization, or a need-to-know. This may
be achieved either directly (for example, by reading storage allocated to
another partition, or by failure to clear a resource before reallocation), or
indirectly (for example, through a covert channel). Unauthorized access to
audit data may lead to a false record of System Administrator actions.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0378-2006 Certification Report
• Users may gain unauthorized access to system resources (i.e. channel path,
control unit, I/O device, physical or logical processor): such actions being
contrary to the security or resource policy of an organization.
There have no organisational security policies been defined in the security
target.
1.5 Special configuration requirements
There is only one configuration of the TOE.
The TOE has to be configured in accordance with the Security Target and the
respective guidance documents (refer to the chapters 4 and 6 of this report).
This means among other things that it is configured as strict separation virtual
machine monitor (SVMM).
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
The operating environment of the TOE comprises the IBM z9 EC and z9 BC
hardware.
The various models use identical but different numbers of processor chips as
specified in the following table for the z9 EC.
z9 EC Model number Feature Code Number of CPs
S08
S08
S08
S08
S08
S08
S08
S08
4501
4502
4503
4504
4505
4506
4507
4508
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
S18
S18
S18
S18
S18
S18
S18
S18
4509
4510
4511
4512
4513
4514
4515
4516
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
S28
S28
S28
S28
4517
4518
4519
4520
17
18
19
20
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0378-2006
z9 EC Model number Feature Code Number of CPs
S28
S28
S28
S28
4521
4522
4523
4524
21
22
23
24
S38
S38
S38
S38
S38
S38
S38
S38
4525
4526
4527
4528
4529
4530
4531
4532
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
S54
S54
S54
S54
S54
S54
S54
S54
S54
S54
S54
S54
S54
S54
S54
S54
S54
S54
S54
S54
S54
S54
4533
4534
4535
4536
4537
4538
4539
4540
4541
4542
4543
4544
4545
4546
4547
4548
4549
4550
4551
4552
4553
4554
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
Table 3: z9 EC Capabilities and number of processors
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0378-2006 Certification Report
The following table specifies the possible variety for the z9 BC.
z9 BC Model number Feature Code Number of CPs
R07
R07
R07
R07
R07
R07
R07
R07
R07
R07
R07
R07
R07
R07
R07
R07
R07
R07
R07
R07
4901
4902
4903
4905
4906
4907
4909
4910
4911
4913
4914
4915
4917
4918
4921
4922
4925
4929
4933
4937
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
S07
S07
S07
S07
S07
S07
S07
S07
S07
S07
S07
S07
S07
S07
S07
S07
S07
S07
S07
4944
4947
4948
4951
4952
4954
4955
4956
4958
4959
4960
4962
4963
4964
4966
4967
4968
4969
4970
4
3
4
3
4
2
3
4
2
3
4
2
3
4
2
3
4
1
2
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0378-2006
z9 BC Model number Feature Code Number of CPs
S07
S07
S07
S07
S07
S07
S07
S07
S07
S07
S07
S07
S07
S07
S07
S07
S07
S07
S07
S07
S07
S07
S07
S07
S07
S07
S07
S07
S07
S07
S07
S07
S07
S07
4971
4972
4973
4974
4975
4976
4977
4978
4979
4980
4981
4982
4983
4984
4985
4986
4987
4988
4989
4990
4991
4992
4993
4994
4995
4996
4997
4998
4999
5000
5001
5002
5003
5004
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
Table 4: z9 BC Capabilities and number of processors
1.7 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0378-2006 Certification Report
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
PR/SM LPAR for the IBM System z9 EC and z9 BC
The TOE is the Microcode Driver Level D63 Date: 15 Sept 2005 at MCL bundle
22a, with the HMC support provided in Microcode Driver Level D64X, Bundle 2.
PR/SM is a hardware facility that enables the resources of a single physical
machine to be divided between distinct, predefined logical machines, called
“logical partitions”. Each logical partition is a domain of execution and is
considered to be an object capable of running a conventional System Control
Program (SCP) such as z/OS™, z/VM™, VIF, VM/ESA®
, VSE/ESA™, TPF or
LINUX.
The TOE is only runnable on a special hardware. Thus, an IBM technician
deliveres the TOE personally either installing new hardware or upgrading the
Licensed Internal Code and HMC/SE.
The following table outlines the components the TOE is delivered with. As the
TOE is only runnable on a special hardware, the following table contains the
configuration of hard- and software and documentation that is required for the
operation of the TOE. Thus, not only the TOE but more items are included in
the table. A specification of the release is only mentioned for parts of the TOE.
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1. SW IBM PR/SM LPAR for
z9 EC and z9 BC including:
• all required Licensed
Internal Code (LIC) at
driver level D63
• Support Element (SE)
LIC
• Hardware Management
Console (HMC) LIC
Driver Level D63 of
September 15, 2005
at MCL bundle 22a
Driver Level D64X, Bundle 2
Delivered together
with IBM z9 EC or
z9 BC System
Hardware
Table 5: Deliverables of the TOE
3 Security Policy
The TOE implements several policies which are specified in the security
functional requirements. Those policies are:
Access Control Security Function Policy
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0378-2006
The TOE implements an access control policy between subjects and objects.
The subjects are the logical partitions (LPAR) defined in the IOCDS and the
System Administrator. The objects are the physical resources of the processor,
the logical processors and the TSF data. Access to objects by subjects will be
mediated by this policy to ensure that subjects are only able to gain authorized
access to objects.
Information Flow Control Security Function Policy
The TOE implements an information flow control policy between subjects and
objects, and between objects and objects. The subjects are the logical partitions
(LPAR) defined in the IOCDS and the System Administrator. The objects are
the physical resources of the processor and the logical processors instantiated
on a physical processor on behalf of a logical partition. Flow of information
between objects and subjects, and between objects and objects will be
mediated by this policy to ensure that information flow is only possible when
subjects and objects are associated with the same logical partition.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Usage assumptions
The following usage assumptions are defined in the Security Target of the TOE:
A.Sep_Mode - Strict Separation Mode
A strict separation virtual machine monitor (SVMM) restricts the allocation of
resources so that there is absolutely no sharing of objects amongst their clients.
Although PR/SM may be configured as a SVMM, it may also be configured to
run in a mode where sharing of some resources is permitted. To be used as a
strict separation virtual machine monitor, PR/SM must be configured in the
following manner:
1. Devices must be configured so that no device is accessible by more than
one partition (although they may be accessible by more than one channel
path);
2. Each I/O (physical) control unit must be allocated to a single partition in the
current configuration;
3. The Security Administrator must not reconfigure a channel path unless all
attached devices and control units are attached to that path only;
4. The Security Administrator must ensure that all devices and control units on
a reconfigurable path are reset before the path is allocated to another
partition;
5. No channel paths must be shared between partitions;
6. The amount of reserved storage for a partition must be zero;
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0378-2006 Certification Report
7. The System Administrator must ensure that the number of processors and
coprocessors dedicated to activated partitions is less than the total number
available.
8. Dynamic I/O configuration changes must be disabled (i.e. changes require a
power-on reset);
9. I/O Priority Queuing must be disabled.
10.Workload Manager must be disabled so that CPU and I/O resources are not
managed across partitions.
11.No partition must be configured to enable hipersockets (Internal Queued
Direct I/O).
12.Partitions must be prevented from receiving performance data from
resources that are not allocated to them (no partition should have global
performance data control authority);
13.At most one partition can have I/O configuration control authority (i.e. no
more than one partition must be able to update any IOCDS) and this
partition must be administered by a trustworthy administrator (i.e. the
administrator of this partition is considered a System Administrator of the
TOE);
14.The Security Administrator must ensure that write access is disabled for
each IOCDS, unless that IOCDS is to be updated (the current IOCDS must
not be updated);
15.The Security Administrator must verify any changed IOCDS after a power-on
reset with that IOCDS, before any partitions have been activated (the
Security Administrator may determine whether the IOCDS has been
changed by inspecting the date of the IOCDS);
16.No partition should have cross-partition control authority (i.e. no partition
should be able to reset or deactivate another partition);
17.No partition must have coupling facility channels that would allow
communication to a Coupling Facility partition;
18.Replication of HMC Customizable Data must be disabled.
4.2 Environmental assumptions
The following assumptions on physical and connectivity aspects are defined in
the Security Target of the TOE:
A.Data_Secure – Physical and/or controlled access of TOE audit log is
required.
The TOE records security-relevant actions performed by the System
Administrator in an audit log. The TOE will prune the audit log to two-thirds (2/3)
of its capacity when the audit log has been filled. It is the customer’s
responsibility to back-up the audit log prior to the log reaching its capacity.
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Physical access of archived audit log data is also the responsibility of the
customer.
A.Phys_Secure – Physical protection of processor, I/O and HMC is required
The environment of the hardware is physically secured against unauthorized
access. Access to I/O devices is restricted to authorized personnel. In particular
the hardware management console and the Local Area Network (LAN)
connecting it to the SEs must be physically protected from access other than by
authorized system administrators.
A.No_Remote – The remote support facility must be disabled.
The phone line and modem connection to the remote support center must be
disabled to prohibit unauthorized connections for remote service.
A.Admin_Secure – Administrative Personnel Security
Logical partitions within the System z9 EC and z9 BC can be operated from the
Hardware Management Console (HMC) and the Support Element (SE). The
administrator/operators of the system must be cleared for the highest security
classification of work being performed on the system.
4.3 Clarification of scope
There are no threats defined in the Security Target which have to be averted by
the TOEs IT environment.
Nevertheless the following Objectives have to be met by the environment of the
TOE:
OE.Data_Store – Off-TOE Data Storage
Audit Log data stored off of the TOE must be controlled for confidentiality and
integrity according to the owner’s needs.
OE.Perss – Personnel
Personnel working as System Administrators or other privileged positions must
be carefully selected and trained.
OE.Sec_Setup – Secure Setup
The TOE must be protected during the setup phase.
OE.Phys_Prot – Restricted physical and remote access
Physical access and remote access to the HMC and System z9 EC and z9 BC
must be restricted only to authorized and approved users.
OE.SIE – Memory access control
The underlying hardware must provide separation mechanism that can be used
by the TOE to protect the TSF and TSF data from unauthorized access and
modification.
OE.CHANNEL – Channel access control
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The underlying physical I/O LIC must provide separation mechanism that can
be used by the TOE to restrict access of one partition to authorized logical I/O
resources.
5 Architectural Information
The TOE is implemented in LIC (licensed internal code), which is microcode
licensed by IBM. The use of LIC prevents untrusted code from masquerading as
part of the TOE and abusing TOE privileges. The TOE is composed of:
a) Logical partition (LPAR) LIC, which is the LIC that is responsible for
maintaining the isolation of partitions;
b) Hardware Management Console/Support Element LIC, which provides the
system administration, functions to maintain the current configuration;
PR/SM is a hardware facility that enables the resources of a single physical
machine to be divided between distinct, predefined logical machines called
"logical partitions". Each logical partition is a domain of execution, and is
considered to be a subject capable of running a conventional system control
program (SCP) such as such as z/OS™, z/VM™, VIF, VM/ESA®
, VSE/ESA™,
TPF or LINUX.
A Hardware Management Console (HMC) / Support Element (SE) workplace is
used as a window to start tasks for monitoring and operating the CPC. A user
ID determines which tasks and controls can be used. Not all tasks are available
for each user ID. The following predefined default user IDs are available:
User ID Description
Operator A person with Operator authority typically performs basic
system startup and shutdown operations using predefine
procedures.
Advanced Operator A person with Advanced Operator authority possesses
Operator authority plus the ability to perform some additional
recovery and maintenance tasks.
System Programmer A person with System Programmer authority has the ability to
customize the system in order to determine its operation.
Access Administrator A person with Access Administrator authority has the ability to
create, modify, or delete user profiles for the user modes on
the Hardware Management Console or for service mode on
the support element. A user profile consists of a user
identification, password, and user mode.
Service Representative A person with Service Representative authority has access to
tasks related to the repair and maintenance of the system.
Table 6: User IDs
The following general definitions apply to the above user modes:
Security Administrator – any user(s) of the HMC who is defined with a user
mode of System Programmer or Service Representative.
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System Administrator – the System Administrator is defined to be any user(s)
with access to the Hardware Management Console (HMC).
A table identifing all specific tasks allowed for each of the 5 user IDs is provided
in [7], chapter 2.2.
The Security Administrator uses an I/O configuration program (IOCP) to define
an Input/Output configuration data set (IOCDS) of the I/O resources and their
allocation to specific logical partitions. The IOCDS may be verified by the
Security Administrator prior to activating the partitions. PR/SM allows I/O
resources to be dedicated to a single partition, relocatable amongst a defined
set of partitions, or shared by a defined set of partitions9
. When a System
Administrator wishes to activate a partition, the activation request is initiated
from the HMC. LPAR will receive an external interrupt identified as coming from
a BFYCALL command and issue the PCCALL instruction to obtain the
description of the partition the System Administrator wishes to activate. LPAR
will attempt to construct the partition and will inform the HMC of the success or
failure of the command via the PCCALL instruction.
Several different configurations may be stored, but only one is in effect at any
time. The configuration becomes effective as part of the activation sequence.
Standard hardware resources such as a central processor, including
computation and control registers, timers, clocks and optional co-processors,
storage and I/O resources are objects allocated to logical partitions.
These objects are subject to a non-discretionary access control policy under
which each logical partition is only permitted access to resources allocated to it.
Logical partitions are logical objects that are built from existing physical objects.
These logical objects fall into one of three classes:
a) Logical processor facilities, which are supported by similar physical objects.
Each such logical object is represented by an internal control block that
contains current state information each time context is switched to a different
logical partition.
b) Logical storage, both central and expanded, is represented by the same
amount of contiguous physical storage. PR/SM does not perform paging or
move logical partitions once they have been placed in real storage. Physical
storage can be de-allocated from one logical partition and reallocated to
another. This feature can be disabled, and is subject to full object reuse
control.
c) Logical I/O resources (channels) are implemented by physical resources of
the same type. Such resources can be configured so that they are not
shared by partitions. A channel can be de-allocated from one logical partition
and reallocated to another, under the control of the Security Administrator.
9
Please consider the constraints for the evaluated configuration described in chapter 4 of this
report.
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The z/Architecture™ and S/390®
architecture support two instruction states:
problem and supervisor. Problem state instructions can be executed in either
problem or supervisor state. Semi-privileged instructions can be executed in
supervisor state, or in problem state subject to one or more additional
authorizations. Privileged instructions can be executed only in supervisor state.
PR/SM exports a virtual machine including all architected instructions, and
initiates the execution in supervisor state, so that all three classes of instruction
can be executed within the logical partition. Thus each logical partition has both
execution states available. PR/SM does not interfere with the logical partition's
use of those states.
A system control program (SCP) running in a logical partition can support
z/Architecture S/390®
architectural mode. This is set when a partition is defined,
and cannot be altered while the partition is activated. PR/SM supports and uses
the "start interpretive execution" (SIE) instruction to create an interpretative
execution environment in which the logical partitions execute. PR/SM begins
execution in non-SIE mode. When a logical partition is to be activated PR/SM
establishes the parameters for each logical processor allocated to the partition
in a control block called a "state description". PR/SM executes a SIE instruction,
which dispatches the logical processor in SIE mode. The PR/SM hardware
executes instructions in the logical processor in SIE mode until an exception
condition occurs, which causes control to return to PR/SM in non-SIE mode.
The exception conditions are events that cannot be handled in interpretative
mode. PR/SM receives control in non-SIE mode. PR/SM maintains a state
description for each logical processor of each logical partition so that each time
a logical processor is dispatched, it is in the same context as when it last had
control. Since this state description is updated by the hardware, it is impossible
for one logical partition to acquire control with the wrong context (i.e. the context
of another logical partition). The non-SIE/SIE distinction is a powerful privilege
differentiation between PR/SM and the logical partitions.
In LPAR mode, the zSeries provides support for several features that are very
helpful in many customer environments. However, these features are not
recommended in a secure environment. As a result, the TOE provides security
related controls to disable such features assuring separation of the logical
partition(s). The security related controls are outlined below:
• Logical Partition Isolation
This control reserves reconfigurable unshared channel paths for the
exclusive use of a logical partition. Channel paths assigned to an isolated
logical partition are not available to other logical partitions and remain
reserved for that LP when they are configured offline.
• I/O Configuration Control Authority
This control can limit the ability of the logical partition to read or write any
IOCDS in the configuration locally or remotely. Logical partitions with control
authority for the I/O configuration data can read and write any non-write
protected IOCDS in the configuration, and can change the I/O configuration
dynamically.
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• Global Performance Data Control Authority
This control limits the ability of a logical partition to view central processor
activity data for other logical partitions. Logical partitions with control
authority for global performance data can view CP utilization data and
Input/Output (IOP) busy data for all of the logical partitions in the
configuration. A logical partition without control authority for the performance
data can view only the CP utilization data for itself.
• Cross-Partition Authority
This control can limit the capability of the logical partition to issue certain
control program instructions that affect other logical partitions. Logical
partitions with cross-partition authority can issue instructions to perform a
system reset of another logical partition, deactivate any other logical
partition, and provide support for the automatic reconfiguration facility.
In addition to the security controls mentioned above, the TOE also insures that
central and expanded storage for each logical partition is isolated and cannot be
shared with other logical partitions. The TOE rigidly enforces this “no sharing”
rule during logical partition definition, logical partition activation, logical partition
reconfiguration and during logical partition execution.
The TOE also “removes” central processors (CPs) from logical partitions by
virtualizing physical CPs. Virtualized physical CPs are referred to as logical
processors. Within the TOE, each logical CP is represented as a data structure
that is associated with its specific logical partitions preventing the transfer of
data between partitions.
Thus, when PR/SM is initialized for secure operation, one partition cannot gain
access to the data within another partition nor modify any aspect of another
partition.
With z/Architecture™ or S/390®
architecture (which includes the functions of
ESA/370 Architecture), these models have problem-program compatibility with
S/360, S/370, and 4300 processors. They can access virtual storage in multiple
address spaces and data spaces. This extends addressability for system,
subsystem, and application functions that use z/Architecture™ or S/390®
architectures.
6 Documentation
The following documention belongs to the TOE:
• System z Hardware Management Console Operations Guide, [9]
• System z9 Business Class and Enterprise Class and eserver® zSeries 890
and 990 Input/Output Configuration Program User’s Guide for ICP IOCP,
[10]
• System z9 Processor Resource/Systems Manager Planning Guide, [11]
• System z9 Stand-Alone Input/Output Configuration Program User’s Guide,
[12]
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• System z9 Support Element Operations Guide, [13]
• System z9 Enterprise Class Service Guide, [14]
• System z9 Business Class Service Guide, [15]
• System z9 Enterprise Class Installation Manual for Physical Planning, [16]
• System z9 Business Class Installation Manual for Physical Planning, [17]
7 IT Product Testing
The test platforms were set up by the developer according to the ST and all
relevant guidance, ensuring that the evaluated configuration as defined in the
ST was tested. The developer testing was performed successfully on the
evaluated configuration of the TOE. Complete coverage was achieved for all the
TOE security functions as provided by the developer. The overall test depth of
the developer tests comprises the low-level and the high-level design
subsystems and the internal interfaces of those subsystems as required for the
assurance level of the evaluation.
A selected subset from the security test suite have been successfully repeated
by the evaluation facility. The achieved test results matched the expected
results as documented by the developer in the developer test documentation.
Furthermore, a set of independent tests has been performed successfully by the
evaluation facility.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE subject of this Security Target is Microcode Driver Level D63 Date: 15
Sept 2005 at at MCL bundle 22a, with the HMC support provided in Microcode
Driver Level D64X, Bundle 2. All z9 EC and z9 BC models possess the
common z/Architecture, system software, applications, channel I/O and
operational environment. Therefore, the TOE can be used on each model that is
part of these families of servers without any modification. For a list of supported
models see the table provided in chapter 1.6 of this report.
9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [8] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL4. For components beyond EAL4 the methodology was defined in co-
ordination with the Certification Body [4] (AIS 34).
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The verdicts for the CC, part 3 assurance classes and components (according
to EAL5 and the class ASE for the Security Target evaluation) are summarised
in the following table.
Assurance classes and components Verdict
Security Target evaluation CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration Management CC Class ACM PASS
Partial CM automation ACM_AUT.1 PASS
Generation support and acceptance procedures ACM_CAP.4 PASS
Development tools CM coverage ACM_SCP.3 PASS
Delivery and operation CC Class ADO PASS
Detection of modification ADO_DEL.2 PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC Class ADV PASS
Semiformal functional specification ADV_FSP.3 PASS
Semiformal high-level design ADV_HLD.3 PASS
Implementation of the TSF ADV_IMP.2 PASS
Modularity ADV_INT.1 PASS
Descriptive low-level design ADV_LLD.1 PASS
Semiformal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.2 PASS
Formal TOE security policy model ADV_SPM.3 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.1 PASS
Standardised life-cycle model ALC_LCD.2 PASS
Compliance with implementation standards ALC_TAT.2 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
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Assurance classes and components Verdict
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: low-level design ATE_DPT.2 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing – sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Covert channel analysis AVA_CCA.1 PASS
Analysis and testing for insecure states AVA_MSU.2 PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Moderately resistant AVA_VLA.3 PASS
Table 7: Verdicts for the assurance components
A strength of function claim is not applicable since no TOE security function is
based on a permutational or probabilistic mechanism.
Porting the TOE to the new hardware platform IBM z9 EC and z9 BC was the
main goal of this re-evaluation.
The evaluation has shown that:
• Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 conformant.
• The assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, evaluation
assurance level EAL5.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the PR/SM LPAR for the
IBM System z9 EC and z9 BC as described in chapter 2.
The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification or assurance continuity of the
modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the
evaluation of the modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
10 Comments/Recommendations
The operational documents as listed in chapter 6 of this report contain
necessary information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein
have to be considered.
11 Annexes
None.
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12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the security target [7] of the target of evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document. According to AIS 35 [4] it is a
sanitized version of the complete security target [6] used for the evaluation
performed.
13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CP Central Processor
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
HMC Hardware Management Console
IOCDS I/O Configuration Data Set
IOCP I/O Configuration Program
IT Information Technology
LIC Licensed Internal Code
LPAR Logical Partition
PP Protection Profile
SE Support Element
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SIE Start Interpretive Execution
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
SVMM Strict Separation Virtual Machine Monitor
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
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13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
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TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.3, August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0378-2006, Version 6.0.4, 2006-06-21, Security
Target for PR/SM for the IBM System zTM
Enterprise Class (z9 EC) and
IBM System zTM
Business Class (z9 BC), IBM Corporation (confidential
document)
[7] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0378-2006, Version 6.0.4, 2006-08-17, Security
Target for PR/SM for the IBM System zTM
Enterprise Class (z9 EC) and
IBM System zTM
Business Class (z9 BC), IBM Corporation (public
document)
[8] Evaluation Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0378, Version 1.0, 2006-08-
17, atsec information security GmbH (confidential document)
[9] System z Hardware Management Console Operations Guide, Version
2.9.1, SC28-6857-00, First Edition (May 2006)
[10] System z9 Business Class and Enterprise Class and eserver® zSeries
890 and 990 Input/Output Configuration Program User’s Guide for ICP
IOCP, SB10-7037-05, Sixth Edition (May 2006)
[11] System z9 Processor Resource/Systems Manager Planning Guide,
SB10-7041-01, Second Edition (April 2006)
[12] System z9 Stand-Alone Input/Output Configuration Program User’s
Guide, SB10-7152-01, Second Edition (May 2006)
[13] System z9 Support Element Operations Guide, Version 2.9.1, SC28-
6858-00, First Edition (May 2006)
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[14] System z9 Enterprise Class Service Guide, GC28-6841-02, Third Edition
(May 2006)
[15] System z9 Business Class Service Guide, GC28-6853-00, First Edition
(May 2006)
[16] System z9 Enterprise Class Installation Manual for Physical Planning,
GC28-6844-01, Second Edition (April 2006)
[17] System z9 Business Class Installation Manual for Physical Planning,
GC28-6855-00, First Edition (April 2006)
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3
(assurance requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of
requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
a) CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the
functional requirements are based only upon functional components in
CC Part 2.
b) CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the
functional requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
a) CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the
assurance requirements are based only upon assurance components in
CC Part 3.
b) CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the
assurance requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part
3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
a) Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) include all components in the
packages listed as part of the conformance result.
b) Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all
components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
a) PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of
the conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
ADV: Development TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component”
is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it
the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of
the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended
with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-
engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-
specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for
AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant)
attack potential.”
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