SailPoint
File Access Manager 8.3 SP5
Security Target
ST Version: 1.0
July 7, 2023
SailPoint Technologies, Inc.
11120 Four Points Drive
Suite 100
Austin, TX 78726
Prepared By:
Cyber Assurance Testing Laboratory
1100 West Street
Laurel, MD 20707
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Table of Contents
1 Security Target Introduction.................................................................................................................5
1.1 ST Reference.................................................................................................................................5
1.1.1 ST Identification ...................................................................................................................5
1.1.2 Document Organization........................................................................................................5
1.1.3 Terminology..........................................................................................................................6
1.1.4 Acronyms..............................................................................................................................6
1.1.5 References.............................................................................................................................7
1.2 TOE Reference..............................................................................................................................7
1.3 Product Overview .........................................................................................................................7
1.4 TOE Type......................................................................................................................................9
2 TOE Description.................................................................................................................................10
2.1 Evaluated Components of the TOE ............................................................................................10
2.2 Components and Applications in the Operational Environment.................................................10
2.3 Excluded from the TOE..............................................................................................................10
2.3.1 Not Installed........................................................................................................................11
2.3.2 Installed but Requires a Separate License...........................................................................11
2.3.3 Installed But Not Part of the TSF........................................................................................11
2.4 Physical Boundary ......................................................................................................................11
2.5 Logical Boundary........................................................................................................................11
2.5.1 Cryptographic Support........................................................................................................11
2.5.2 User Data Protection...........................................................................................................12
2.5.3 Security Management .........................................................................................................12
2.5.4 Privacy ................................................................................................................................12
2.5.5 Protection of the TSF..........................................................................................................12
2.5.6 Trusted Path/Channel..........................................................................................................12
3 Conformance Claims ..........................................................................................................................13
3.1 CC Version..................................................................................................................................13
3.2 CC Part 2 Conformance Claims..................................................................................................13
3.3 CC Part 3 Conformance Claims..................................................................................................13
3.4 PP Claims....................................................................................................................................13
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3.5 Package Claims...........................................................................................................................13
3.6 Package Name Conformant or Package Name Augmented........................................................13
3.7 Conformance Claim Rationale....................................................................................................13
3.8 Technical Decisions....................................................................................................................14
4 Security Problem Definition ...............................................................................................................15
4.1 Threats.........................................................................................................................................15
4.2 Organizational Security Policies.................................................................................................15
4.3 Assumptions................................................................................................................................15
4.4 Security Objectives .....................................................................................................................15
4.4.1 TOE Security Objectives ....................................................................................................16
4.4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment........................................................16
4.5 Security Problem Definition Rationale.......................................................................................17
5 Extended Components Definition.......................................................................................................18
5.1 Extended Security Functional Requirements..............................................................................18
5.2 Extended Security Assurance Requirements ..............................................................................18
6 Security Functional Requirements......................................................................................................19
6.1 Conventions ................................................................................................................................19
6.2 Security Functional Requirements Summary..............................................................................19
6.3 Security Functional Requirements..............................................................................................20
6.3.1 Class FCS: Cryptographic Support.....................................................................................20
6.3.2 Class FDP: User Data Protection........................................................................................20
6.3.3 Class FMT: Security Management .....................................................................................21
6.3.4 Class FPR: Privacy..............................................................................................................22
6.3.5 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF .......................................................................................22
6.3.6 Class FTP: Trusted Path/Channel .......................................................................................23
6.4 Statement of Security Functional Requirements Consistency ....................................................24
7 Security Assurance Requirements ......................................................................................................25
7.1 Class ASE: Security Target.........................................................................................................25
7.1.1 ST introduction (ASE_INT.1).............................................................................................25
7.1.2 Conformance claims (ASE_CCL.1)....................................................................................26
7.1.3 Security objectives for the operational environment (ASE_OBJ.1) ...................................27
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7.1.4 Extended components definition (ASE_ECD.1).................................................................27
7.1.5 Stated security requirements (ASE_REQ.1).......................................................................28
7.1.6 TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS.1).........................................................................29
7.2 Class ADV: Development...........................................................................................................29
7.2.1 Basic Functional Specification (ADV_FSP.1)....................................................................29
7.3 Class AGD: Guidance Documentation .......................................................................................30
7.3.1 Operational User Guidance (AGD_OPE.1) ........................................................................30
7.3.2 Preparative Procedures (AGD_PRE.1) ...............................................................................31
7.4 Class ALC: Life Cycle Support ..................................................................................................32
7.4.1 Labeling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1)..................................................................................32
7.4.2 TOE CM Coverage (ALC_CMS.1) ....................................................................................32
7.4.3 Timely Security Updates (ALC_TSU_EXT.1)...................................................................33
7.5 Class ATE: Tests.........................................................................................................................33
7.5.1 Independent Testing - Conformance (ATE_IND.1) ...........................................................33
7.6 Class AVA: Vulnerability Assessment.......................................................................................34
7.6.1 Vulnerability Survey (AVA_VAN.1) .................................................................................34
8 TOE Summary Specification ..............................................................................................................35
8.1 Cryptographic Support................................................................................................................35
8.1.1 FCS_CKM_EXT.1:.............................................................................................................35
8.1.2 FCS_RBG_EXT.1: .............................................................................................................35
8.1.3 FCS_STO_EXT.1:..............................................................................................................35
8.2 User Data Protection...................................................................................................................35
8.2.1 FDP_DAR_EXT.1:.............................................................................................................35
8.2.2 FDP_DEC_EXT.1: .............................................................................................................35
8.2.3 FDP_NET_EXT.1:..............................................................................................................35
8.3 Security Management .................................................................................................................36
8.3.1 FMT_CFG_EXT.1:.............................................................................................................36
8.3.2 FMT_MEC_EXT.1:............................................................................................................36
8.3.3 FMT_SMF.1: ......................................................................................................................36
8.4 Privacy ........................................................................................................................................36
8.4.1 FPR_ANO_EXT.1:.............................................................................................................36
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8.5 Protection of the TSF..................................................................................................................37
8.5.1 FPT_AEX_EXT.1:..............................................................................................................37
8.5.2 FPT_API_EXT.1: ...............................................................................................................37
8.5.3 FPT_IDV_EXT.1:...............................................................................................................37
8.5.4 FPT_LIB_EXT.1: ...............................................................................................................37
8.5.5 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 and FPT_TUD_EXT.2:........................................................................46
8.6 Trusted Path/Channel..................................................................................................................47
8.6.1 FTP_DIT_EXT.1: ...............................................................................................................47
Table of Figures
Figure 1: TOE Boundary ..............................................................................................................................8
Table of Tables
Table 1: Customer Specific Terminology.....................................................................................................6
Table 2: Acronym Definition........................................................................................................................6
Table 3: Evaluated Components of the TOE ..............................................................................................10
Table 4: Components of the Operational Environment ..............................................................................10
Table 5: Requirements for Operational Environment Components............................................................11
Table 6: Technical Decisions......................................................................................................................14
Table 7: TOE Threats..................................................................................................................................15
Table 8: TOE Assumptions.........................................................................................................................15
Table 9: TOE Security Objectives ..............................................................................................................16
Table 10: Operational Environment Objectives..........................................................................................16
Table 11: Security Functional Requirements for the TOE..........................................................................19
Table 12: .NET Core APIs..........................................................................................................................37
Table 13: Dynamic Libraries included with TOE.......................................................................................37
Table 14: Non-Dynamic Libraries Included with TOE ..............................................................................44
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1 Security Target Introduction
This chapter presents the Security Target (ST) identification information and an overview. An ST
contains the Information Technology (IT) security requirements of an identified Target of Evaluation
(TOE) and specifies the functional and assurance security measures offered by the TOE.
1.1 ST Reference
This section provides information needed to identify and control this ST and its Target of Evaluation.
1.1.1 ST Identification
ST Title: SailPoint File Access Manager 8.3 SP5 Security Target
ST Version: 1.0
ST Publication Date: July 7, 2023
ST Author: Booz Allen Hamilton
1.1.2 Document Organization
Chapter 1 of this document provides identifying information for the ST and TOE as well as a brief
description of the TOE and its associated TOE type.
Chapter 2 describes the TOE in terms of its physical boundary, logical boundary, exclusions, and
dependent Operational Environment components.
Chapter 3 describes the conformance claims made by this ST.
Chapter 4 describes the threats, assumptions, objectives, and organizational security policies that apply to
the TOE.
Chapter 5 defines extended Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security Assurance
Requirements (SARs).
Chapter 6 describes the SFRs that are to be implemented by the TSF.
Chapter 7 describes the SARs that will be used to evaluate the TOE.
Chapter 8 provides the TOE Summary Specification, which describes how the SFRs that are defined for
the TOE are implemented by the TSF.
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1.1.3 Terminology
This section defines the terminology used throughout this ST. The product-specific terminology used
throughout this ST is defined in Table 1. Technology terms that are related to the security functionality
claimed by the TOE are defined in the introductory materials of the claimed Protection Profile. These
tables are to be used by the reader as a quick reference guide for terminology definitions.
Table 1: Customer Specific Terminology
Term Definition
Administrator
An administrator is an individual who has permissions to modify the behavior of the
TOE. This includes the individual that installs it on the underlying platform but can
also include other individuals if administrator access is granted to them on the TOE’s
GUI or fat client.
Fat Client
The portion of the TOE which allows local authentication to and administration of the
TOE.
Governed Data
The data created by the File Access Manager for its primary functionality that is an
abstract of information gathered from a managed resource, for example, file names and
data-type tags.
GUI
The GUI is a web-based interface of the TOE that can be used to manage the TOE
remotely using HTTPS.
Managed Resource
Remote system which the File Access Manager product monitors to create governed
data for its primary functionality.
Trusted Channel
An encrypted connection between the TOE and a system in the Operational
Environment.
Trusted Path
An encrypted connection between the TOE and the application (web browser, terminal
client, etc.) an Administrator uses to manage the TOE.
User An individual who has access to the TOE but is not able to manage its behavior.
1.1.4 Acronyms
The acronyms used throughout this ST are defined in Table 2. This table is to be used by the reader as a
quick reference guide for acronym definitions.
Table 2: Acronym Definition
Acronym Definition
AA Assurance Activity
API Application Programing Interface
ASLR Address Space Layout Randomization
CA Certification Authority
CC Common Criteria
CFG Control Flow Guard
CVSS Common Vulnerability Scoring System
DEP Data Execution Prevention
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
EAF Export Address Filtering
EKU extendedKeyUsage
FAM File Access Manager
GUI Graphical User Interface
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
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HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
IAF Import Address Filtering
IIS Internet Information Services
IP Internet Protocol
IT Information Technology
OCSP Online Certificate Status Protocol
OS Operating System
OSP Organizational Security Policy
PII Personally Identifiable Information
PP Protection Profile
NIAP National Information Assurance Partnership
RBG Random Bit Generator
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SQL Structured Query Language
ST Security Target
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Function
UI User Interface
1.1.5 References
[1] Protection Profile for Application Software, version 1.4 (App PP)
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 1: Introduction and
general model, dated April 2017, version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 2: Security
functional components, dated April 2017, version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-002
[4] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 3: Security
assurance components, dated April 2017, version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-003
[5] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Evaluation
Methodology, dated April 2017, version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004
[6] SailPoint File Access Manager Administrator Guide Version: 8.3 Revised: March 30, 2022
[7] SailPoint File Access Manager Installation Guide Version: 8.3 SP5 Revised: June 30, 2023
[8] SailPoint File Access Manager v8.3 SP5 Supplemental Administrative Guidance for
Common Criteria, Version 1.0
1.2 TOE Reference
The TOE is SailPoint File Access Manager (FAM) 8.3 SP5, which is an application installed/operated on
an operating system.
1.3 Product Overview
The TOE is the SailPoint File Access Manager (FAM) 8.3 SP5 application, referred to as FAM or TOE
from this point forward. FAM’s primary functionality is to allow its users to review and manage the
governed data created by FAM for monitoring enterprise data stored on one or more managed resources.
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The governed data allows FAM users to identify and classify data, understand on which managed
resources within the network the data is stored, and understand which enterprise users have access to the
data. FAM’s primary functionality of monitoring enterprise data was not evaluated, except where the
product’s functionality relates to the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) included within the scope
of the evaluation.
The following figure depicts the TOE boundary in the evaluated configuration:
Windows Server 2019
File Access
Manager
SQL Database
Legend
TOE Subsystem
Environment Object
E2
HTTPS
E1 External Interface
E1
.NET Core
Management
Workstation
IIS
GUI
Fat Client
Local User
Windows File Server
(managed resource)
Activity Monitor
Server Message
Block
Server Message
Block
E3
E4
TLS
Figure 1: TOE Boundary
As illustrated in Figure 1, the TOE is comprised of the following components:
• File Access Manager – The main portion of the TOE which performs all functionality of the
application not related to direct interaction with administrators which are handled by the Fat
Client and GUI.
• Fat Client – The portion of the TOE which allows local authentication to and administration of
the TOE.
• GUI – The portion of the TOE, which is comprised of only web pages, that allows remote
administration of the TOE.
o Window’s Internet Information Services (IIS) is required to host the TOE’s website
content. IIS is a Windows service that is initiated during the platform’s startup. The
platform’s IIS web server, via the .NET Core, enforces the establishment of the HTTPS
trusted channel. IIS collects and authenticates the user provided credentials and then
delivers the TOE’s website content (remote management functionality) only to
successfully authenticated users. The TOE (web pages) provides no functionality to
control IIS nor does it collect, read, store, or authenticate the user provided credentials.
The TOE is installed on a Windows Server and through APIs the TOE utilizes several functions of the
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operating system to perform its operations. The TOE relies on .NET Core to function and IIS to host its
GUI web pages. The diagram also depicts the use of the Windows operating system’s Server Message
Block component to receive information about data on managed resources which FAM turns into
governed data.
The TOE also communicates with the Windows operating system’s Active Directory component which
contains enterprise user data. The TOE verifies enterprise user credentials which are used for
authenticating to the TOE’s fat client as well as queries enterprise user account information for the FAM
product’s primary functionality. Although it is not a direct interface to the FAM product, IIS also uses the
Windows operating system’s Active Directory to authenticate users attempting to access the TOE’s GUI.
The TOE stores all of its configuration data, TOE managed user credentials, and governed data within a
separately installed SQL Database. During operation, the TOE will read and write this data to the SQL
Database. In the evaluated configuration, the SQL Database resides on the same Windows Server as the
TOE.
The TOE has the following external interfaces:
• E1: Local User to fat client – Accessed through the Windows operating system, this is the local
interface for authentication to and administration of the TOE.
• E2: Remote Workstation to IIS (TOE GUI) – Accessed through a web browser on a remote
general-purpose management workstation, this is the remote administration interface of the TOE.
This interface is over a secure HTTPS connection (HTTPS server) which is provided by .NET
Core invoked by IIS. IIS and .NET Core are components of the Windows platform. This interface
is being described for completeness of the required operational environment. To be clear, this
operational environment interface is out-of-scope for testing but is required in order to test the
GUI TOE component, which is in-scope of the evaluation.
• E3: Server Message Block to Server Message Block – This is not a direct interface for the
FAM product as the connection is completely handled between the instance of Windows on each
managed resource and the Windows platform FAM is installed on. This interface is being
described for completeness since the FAM product creates governed data based upon the
information provided over this interface which can result in the invocation of or display of data
through the interfaces described above. This interface is not tested as part of the evaluated
configuration.
• E4: FAM to Activity Monitor – If an Activity Monitor is installed on a managed resource, the
TOE will communicate with the Activity Monitor to collect data on the managed resource for the
FAM product’s primary purpose. This interface is over a secure TLS connection (TLS server)
which is provided by .NET Core component of the Windows platform.
1.4 TOE Type
The TOE type for SailPoint FAM 8.3 SP5 is Application Software. The Protection Profile for Application
Software specifies several use cases that conformant TOEs may implement. In particular, Use Case 2,
Content Consumption, is defined as follows: “The application allows a user to consume content,
retrieving it from either local or remote storage.” SailPoint FAM 8.3 SP5 meets the expectations of Use
Case 2 because it implements content consumption by allowing its users to review and manage governed
data created by FAM for the monitoring of enterprise data stored on one or more managed resources.
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2 TOE Description
This section provides a description of the TOE in its evaluated configuration. This includes the physical
and logical boundaries of the TOE.
2.1 Evaluated Components of the TOE
The following table describes the TOE components in the evaluated configuration:
Table 3: Evaluated Components of the TOE
Component Definition
File Access Manager v8.3 SP5
The data monitoring software application. The TOE’s software includes the
main application, the fat client, and the web pages which comprise the GUI.
2.2 Components and Applications in the Operational Environment
The following table lists components and applications in the TOE’s operational environment that must be
present for the TOE to be operating in its evaluated configuration:
Table 4: Components of the Operational Environment
Component Definition
Activity Monitor
A SailPoint software application which optionally can be installed on a Windows File
Server (managed resource) to collect additional information to create governed data
for the FAM product’s primary functionality. Although this software is produced by
the same vendor as the TOE, the Activity Monitor is not part of the TOE and is not
required for FAM to perform its primary functionality.
Host Server Physical system on which the FAM software is installed.
Host Platform
The Microsoft Windows Server 2019 Datacenter (version 1809) operating system on
which the FAM software is installed. This includes the required Windows Server
components: Internet Information Services (IIS), .NET Core (.NET), Active
Directory, and Server Message Block (SMB).
SQL Database
Stores a variety of configuration, operation, and governed data for the FAM product.
The connection to the SQL database is required in order for the TOE to function.
Management
Workstation
Any general-purpose computer that is used by an administrator to manage the TOE
remotely via a web browser. Note that the fat client can also be used to administer the
TOE locally.
Windows File Server(s)
One or more Windows Servers which the FAM product monitors as a managed
resource to create governed data for its primary functionality. Each Windows Server
may optionally have an Activity Monitor installed on it to collect additional data for
the FAM product’s primary functionality.
2.3 Excluded from the TOE
The following optional products, components, and/or applications can be integrated with the TOE but are
not included in the evaluated configuration. They provide no added security related functionality for the
evaluated product. They are separated into three categories: not installed, installed but requires a separate
license, and installed but not part of the TSF.
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2.3.1 Not Installed
There are no optional components that are omitted from the installation process.
2.3.2 Installed but Requires a Separate License
There are no excluded components, applications, and or functionality that are installed and require a
separate license for activation.
2.3.3 Installed But Not Part of the TSF
The TOE includes a number of functions that are outside the scope of the claimed Protection Profile.
These functions are not part of the TSF because there are no SFRs that apply to them. This includes
FAM’s primary functionality which allows its users to review and manage the governed data created by
FAM for the monitoring of enterprise data stored on one or more managed resources. The governed data
allows FAM users to identify and classify data, understand on which managed resources within the
network the data is stored, and which enterprise users have access to the data.
2.4 Physical Boundary
SailPoint FAM 8.3 SP5 is a software-only TOE and therefore its physical boundary is its software. The
TOE does not include the hardware or operating system of the system on which it is installed. It also does
not include the third-party software which is required for the TOE to run. The following table lists the
components that are required for the TOE’s use in the evaluated configuration. These Operational
Environment components are expected to be patched to include the latest security fixes for each
component.
Table 5: Requirements for Operational Environment Components
OE Component Requirement
Host Platform
Microsoft Windows Server 2019 Datacenter (version 1809)
(includes: IIS, .NET Core, Active Directory, and SMB services)
Host Platform OS Type 64-bit
Host Server’s Processor Intel Xeon Gold 6230 (Cascade Lake)
SQL Database SQL Server 2016
2.5 Logical Boundary
The TOE is comprised of several security features. Each of the security features identified above consists
of several security functionalities, as identified below.
1. Cryptographic Support
2. User Data Protection
3. Security Management
4. Privacy
5. Protection of the TSF
6. Trusted Path/Channel
2.5.1 Cryptographic Support
The TOE invokes the Windows platform’s cryptographic services to secure data in transit
communication. Due to this, the TOE does not directly invoke any DRBG functionality nor does the TOE
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perform generation of asymmetric cryptographic keys. The TOE also uses the Windows platform’s Data
Protection API to store the credentials for accessing the SQL database.
2.5.2 User Data Protection
The TOE relies on the Windows platform to handle the following network connections, to include all of
their cryptographic operations:
• respond to TLS connection requests from an Activity Monitor to receive managed resource data.
2.5.3 Security Management
The administrator that installs the TOE will set the initial credentials for accessing the TOE and will also
be assigned the owner permissions for the TOE’s software by the Windows platform. Due to the
Windows platform’s access permissions and the TOE’s install directory being C:\Program Files, the
TOE’s binaries and data files are protected from unprivileged modification. The TOE’s administrators are
able to configure the TOE and perform tasks via the TOE’s GUI and fat client. All TOE configuration
options are stored per the mechanisms recommended by the Windows platform vendor for .NET Core
applications.
2.5.4 Privacy
The TOE ensures the privacy of its administrators and users by not providing any ability to collect or
transmit personally identifiable information (PII) over the network.
2.5.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE relies on the Windows platform to request memory and will not request an explicit memory
address. The TOE does not allocate any memory region with both write and execute permissions. As a
.NET Core application, the TOE has stack-based buffer overflow protections. The TOE uses a number of
Windows platform APIs and third-party libraries as part of its operation.
Administrators can verify the TOE’s version by checking any of the TOE’s binary files or by
authenticating to the fat client. The TOE automatically checks its software version against the latest
available software version provided by SailPoint. TOE software, including patch updates, is signed with a
DigiCert certificate. Administrators can initiate the software update process through the fat client. The
TOE’s uninstallation process results in the deletion of all traces of the application, with the exception of
configuration settings, output files, and audit/log events.
2.5.6 Trusted Path/Channel
The TOE invokes the Windows platform to encrypt all data-in-transit communications between itself and
another trusted IT product. The trusted IT products, encryption protocols used, and the purpose of the
connection have been described under the “User Data Protection” section above.
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3 Conformance Claims
3.1 CC Version
This ST is compliant with Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5 April 2017.
3.2 CC Part 2 Conformance Claims
This ST and Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Part 2 extended to include all applicable NIAP and
International interpretations through July 7, 2023.
3.3 CC Part 3 Conformance Claims
This ST and Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Part 3 extended to include all applicable NIAP and
International interpretations through July 7, 2023.
3.4 PP Claims
This ST claims exact conformance to the following Protection Profile:
• Protection Profile for Application Software, version 1.4 (App PP)
3.5 Package Claims
The TOE claims exact conformance to the App PP, version 1.4, which is extended with CC Part 3.
The TOE claims following Selection-Based SFRs that are defined in the appendices of the claimed PP:
• FPT_TUD_EXT.2
This does not violate the notion of exact conformance because the PP specifically indicates these as
allowable selections and options and provides both the ST author and evaluation laboratory with
instructions on how these claims are to be documented and evaluated.
3.6 Package Name Conformant or Package Name Augmented
This ST and TOE are in exact conformance with the App PP.
3.7 Conformance Claim Rationale
The App PP states the following:
“The requirements in this document apply to application software which runs on any type of platform.
Some application types are covered by more specific PPs, which may be expressed as PP-Modules of this
PP. Such applications are subject to the requirements of both this PP and the PP-Module that addresses
their special functionality. PPs for some particularly specialized applications may not be expressed as PP-
Modules at this time, though the requirements in this document should be seen as objectives for those
highly specialized applications.
Although the requirements in this document apply to a wide range of application software, consult
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guidance from the relevant national schemes to determine when formal Common Criteria evaluation is
expected for a particular type of application. This may vary depending upon the nature of the security
functionality of the application.”
The TOE is a standalone application which runs on a desktop/server Windows platform and is therefore
considered to be relevant to the App PP. There are no PP-Modules to the App PP that are applicable to
File Access Manager, so the TOE is characterized only as a software application.
3.8 Technical Decisions
Technical Decisions that effected the SFR wording have been annotated with a Footnote. The following is
a complete list of Technical Decisions that apply to the App PP evaluation activities that must be
performed during the evaluation of this TOE:
Table 6: Technical Decisions
TD # Title References
Changes Analysis to this evaluation
SFR AA Notes NA Reason
TD0624
Addition of DataStore for
Storing and Setting
Configuration Options
FMT_MEC_EXT.1 X X
The AA update is only
applicable to a product
that is installed on the
Android platform
which is not the
underlying platform in
this evaluation.
TD0628
Addition of Container Image
to Package Format
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.1 X X
SFR claimed. SFR and
Test AA updated.
Footnote 2
TD0650
Conformance claim sections
updated to allow for
MOD_VPNC_V2.3 and 2.4
Section 2 X
Updates PP but is non-
impactful
TD0664
Testing activity for
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.2
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.2 X Updates tests for SFR
TD0669
FIA_X509_EXT.1 Test 4
Interpretation
FIA_X509_EXT.1 X X
The SFR is not claimed
for this TOE
TD0717
Format changes for
PP_APP_V1.4
FCS_CKM.1,
FCS_CKM.2,
FCS_CKM.1/AK,
FCS_CKM.1/PBKDF,
FCS_COP.1/Hash,
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash,
FCS_COP.1/Sig,
FCS_COP.1/SKC
X X
FCS_CKM_EXT.1
SFR claimed, and
reference updated.
Footnote 1
TD0719 ECD for PP APP V1.3 and 1.4 --- X
Updates PP but is non-
impactful
TD0736
Number of elements for
iterations of
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.3
/Server
X X X
The SFR is not claimed
for this TOE
TD0743
FTP_DIT_EXT.1.1 Selection
exclusivity
FTP_DIT_EXT.1.1 X
Updates SFR and
clarifies its usage.
Footnote 3
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TD0756
Update for platform-provided
full disk encryption
FDP_DAR_EXT.1 X Updates Test AA.
4 Security Problem Definition
4.1 Threats
This section identifies the threats against the TOE. These threats have been taken from the App PP.
Table 7: TOE Threats
Threat Threat Definition
T.NETWORK_ATTACK
An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the
network infrastructure. Attackers may engage in communications with the
application software or alter communications between the application
software and other endpoints in order to compromise it.
T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP
An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the
network infrastructure. Attackers may monitor and gain access to data
exchanged between the application and other endpoints.
T.LOCAL_ATTACK
An attacker can act through unprivileged software on the same computing
platform on which the application executes. Attackers may provide
maliciously formatted input to the application in the form of files or other
local communications.
T.PHYSICAL_ACCESS An attacker may try to access sensitive data at rest.
4.2 Organizational Security Policies
There are no Organizational Security Policies in the App PP.
4.3 Assumptions
The specific conditions listed in this section are assumed to exist in the TOE’s Operational Environment.
These assumptions have been taken from the App PP.
Table 8: TOE Assumptions
Assumption Assumption Definition
A.PLATFORM
The TOE relies upon a trustworthy computing platform with a reliable time
clock for its execution. This includes the underlying platform and whatever
runtime environment it provides to the TOE.
A.PROPER_USER
The user of the application software is not willfully negligent or hostile, and
uses the software in compliance with the applied enterprise security policy.
A.PROPER_ADMIN
The administrator of the application software is not careless, willfully negligent
or hostile, and administers the software in compliance with the applied
enterprise security policy.
4.4 Security Objectives
This section identifies the security objectives of the TOE and its supporting environment. The security
objectives identify the responsibilities of the TOE and its environment in meeting the security needs.
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4.4.1 TOE Security Objectives
This section identifies the security objectives of the TOE as defined by the App PP.
Table 9: TOE Security Objectives
Objective Objective Definition
O.INTEGRITY
Conformant TOEs ensure the integrity of their installation and update packages,
and also leverage execution environment-based mitigations. Software is seldom,
if ever, shipped without errors. The ability to deploy patches and updates to
fielded software with integrity is critical to enterprise network security.
Processor manufacturers, compiler developers, execution environment vendors,
and operating system vendors have developed execution environment-based
mitigations that increase the cost to attackers by adding complexity to the task of
compromising systems. Application software can often take advantage of these
mechanisms by using APIs provided by the runtime environment or by enabling
the mechanism through compiler or linker options.
O.QUALITY
To ensure quality of implementation, conformant TOEs leverage services and
APIs provided by the runtime environment rather than implementing their own
versions of these services and APIs. This is especially important for
cryptographic services and other complex operations such as file and media
parsing. Leveraging this platform behavior relies upon using only documented
and supported APIs.
O.MANAGEMENT
To facilitate management by users and the enterprise, conformant TOEs provide
consistent and supported interfaces for their security-relevant configuration and
maintenance. This includes the deployment of applications and application
updates through the use of platform-supported deployment mechanisms and
formats, as well as providing mechanisms for configuration. This also includes
providing control to the user regarding disclosure of any PII.
O.PROTECTED_STORAGE
To address the issue of loss of confidentiality of user data in the event of loss of
physical control of the storage medium, conformant TOEs will use data-at-rest
protection. This involves encrypting data and keys stored by the TOE in order to
prevent unauthorized access to this data. This also includes unnecessary network
communications whose consequence may be the loss of data.
O.PROTECTED_COMMS
To address both passive (eavesdropping) and active (packet modification)
network attack threats, conformant TOEs will use a trusted channel for sensitive
data. Sensitive data includes cryptographic keys, passwords, and any other data
specific to the application that should not be exposed outside of the application.
4.4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
The TOE’s operating environment must satisfy the following objectives:
Table 10: Operational Environment Objectives
Objective Objective Definition
OE.PLATFORM
The TOE relies upon a trustworthy computing platform for its execution. This
includes the underlying operating system and any discrete execution
environment provided to the TOE.
OE.PROPER_USER The user of the application software is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses
the software within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.
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OE.PROPER_ADMIN
The administrator of the application software is not careless, willfully negligent
or hostile, and administers the software within compliance of the applied
enterprise security policy.
4.5 Security Problem Definition Rationale
The assumptions, threats, OSPs, and objectives that are defined in this ST represent the assumptions,
threats, OSPs, and objectives that are specified in the Protection Profile to which the TOE claims
conformance.
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5 Extended Components Definition
5.1 Extended Security Functional Requirements
The extended Security Functional Requirements that are claimed in this ST are taken directly from the PP
to which the ST and TOE claim conformance. These extended components are formally defined in the PP
in which their usage is required.
5.2 Extended Security Assurance Requirements
The extended Security Assurance Requirements that are claimed in this ST are taken directly from the PP
to which the ST and TOE claim conformance. These extended components are formally defined in the PP
in which their usage is required.
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6 Security Functional Requirements
6.1 Conventions
The CC permits four functional component operations—assignment, refinement, selection, and
iteration—to be performed on functional requirements. This ST will highlight the operations in the
following manner:
• Assignment: allows the specification of an identified parameter. Indicated with italicized text.
• Refinement: allows the addition of details. Indicated with bold text and italicized text.
• Selection: allows the specification of one or more elements from a list. Indicated with underlined
text.
• Iteration: allows a component to be used more than once with varying operations. Indicated with
a sequential number in parentheses following the element number of the iterated SFR.
When multiple operations are combined, such as an assignment that is provided as an option within a
selection or refinement, a combination of the text formatting is used. Although the SFR text is reproduced
verbatim from text that was formatted in a claimed PP (such as if the PP’s instantiation of the SFR has a
refinement or a completed assignment), the PP formatting is not preserved in this ST. This is so that the
reader can identify the operations that are performed by the ST author as opposed to the PP author.
6.2 Security Functional Requirements Summary
The following table lists the SFRs claimed by the TOE:
Table 11: Security Functional Requirements for the TOE
Class Name Component Identification Component Name
Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Generation Services
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services
FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials
User Data Protection
FDP_DAR_EXT.1 Encryption of Sensitive Application Data
FDP_DEC_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources
FDP_NET_EXT.1 Network Communications
Security Management
FMT_CFG_EXT.1 Secure by Default Configuration
FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Supported Configuration Mechanism
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Privacy FPR_ANO_EXT.1
User Consent for Transmission of Personally
Identifiable Information
Protection of the TSF
FPT_AEX_EXT.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities
FPT_API_EXT.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs
FPT_IDV_EXT.1 Software Identification and Versions
FPT_LIB_EXT.1 Use of Third Party Libraries
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Integrity for Installation and Update
FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Integrity for Installation and Update
Trusted Path/Channel FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit
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6.3 Security Functional Requirements
6.3.1 Class FCS: Cryptographic Support
6.3.1.1 FCS_CKM_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Generation Services
FCS_CKM_EXT.1.11
The application shall [
• generate no asymmetric cryptographic keys
].
6.3.1.2 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1
The application shall [
• use no DRBG functionality
] for its cryptographic operations.
6.3.1.3 FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials
FCS_STO_EXT.1.1
The application shall [
• invoke the functionality provided by the platform to securely store [SQL database
credentials]
] to non-volatile memory.
6.3.2 Class FDP: User Data Protection
6.3.2.1 FDP_DAR_EXT.1 Encryption of Sensitive Application Data
FDP_DAR_EXT.1.1
The application shall [
• protect sensitive data in accordance with FCS_STO_EXT.1
] in non-volatile memory.
6.3.2.2 FDP_DEC_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources
FDP_DEC_EXT.1.1
The application shall restrict its access to [
• network connectivity
1
TD0717
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].
FDP_DEC_EXT.1.2
The application shall restrict its access to [
• [Active Directory]
].
6.3.2.3 FDP_NET_EXT.1 Network Communications
FDP_NET_EXT.1.1
The application shall restrict network communication to [
• respond to [connection requests from an Activity Monitor],
].
6.3.3 Class FMT: Security Management
6.3.3.1 FMT_CFG_EXT.1 Secure by Default Configuration
FMT_CFG_EXT.1.1
The application shall provide only enough functionality to set new credentials when configured with
default credentials or no credentials.
FMT_CFG_EXT.1.2
The application shall be configured by default with file permissions which protect the application
binaries and data files from modification by normal unprivileged users.
6.3.3.2 FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Supported Configuration Mechanism
FMT_MEC_EXT.1.1
The application shall [invoke the mechanisms recommended by the platform vendor for storing and
setting configuration options].
6.3.3.3 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [
• [configuration of the Active Directory to which the TOE will communicate,
perform tasks that read data from Active Directory,
perform tasks that read or write data to the SQL database,
query the current version of the TOE,
perform the software update process]
].
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6.3.4 Class FPR: Privacy
6.3.4.1 FPR_ANO_EXT.1 User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable Information
FPR_ANO_EXT.1.1
The application shall [
• not transmit PII over a network
].
6.3.5 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF
6.3.5.1 FPT_AEX_EXT.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.1
The application shall not request to map memory at an explicit address except for [none].
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.2
The application shall [
• not allocate any memory region with both write and execute permissions
].
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.3
The application shall be compatible with security features provided by the platform vendor.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.4
The application shall not write user-modifiable files to directories that contain executable files unless
explicitly directed by the user to do so.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.5
The application shall be built with stack-based buffer overflow protection enabled.
6.3.5.2 FPT_API_EXT.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs
FPT_API_EXT.1.1
The application shall use only documented platform APIs.
6.3.5.3 FPT_IDV_EXT.1 Software Identification and Versions
FPT_IDV_EXT.1.1
The application shall be versioned with [[major release number, minor release number, patch
number, service pack number]].
6.3.5.4 FPT_LIB_EXT.1 Use of Third Party Libraries
FPT_LIB_EXT.1.1
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The application shall be packaged with only [third-party libraries listed in Table 13].
6.3.5.5 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Integrity for Installation and Update
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1
The application shall [provide the ability] to check for updates and patches to the application
software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2
The application shall [provide the ability] to query the current version of the application software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3
The application shall not download, modify, replace or update its own binary code.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.4
Application updates shall be digitally signed such that the application platform can cryptographically
verify them prior to installation.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.5
The application is distributed [as an additional software package to the platform OS].
6.3.5.6 FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Integrity for Installation and Update
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.12
The application shall be distributed using [the format of the platform-supported package manager].
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.2
The application shall be packaged such that its removal results in the deletion of all traces of the
application, with the exception of configuration settings, output files, and audit/log events.
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.3
The application installation package shall be digitally signed such that its platform can
cryptographically verify them prior to installation.
6.3.6 Class FTP: Trusted Path/Channel
6.3.6.1 FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit
FTP_DIT_EXT.1.13
The application shall [
• invoke platform-provided functionality to encrypt all transmitted data with [TLS] for
[responding to TLS connection requests from Activity Monitor(s) for receiving managed
resource data]
2
TD0628
3
TD0743
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] between itself and another trusted IT product.
6.4 Statement of Security Functional Requirements Consistency
The Security Functional Requirements included in the ST represent all required SFRs specified in the
claimed App PP, and all applicable selection-based requirements that have been included as specified for
the claimed App PP. All hierarchical relationships, dependencies, and unfulfilled dependency rationales
in the ST are considered to be identical to those that are defined in the claimed PP.
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7 Security Assurance Requirements
This section identifies the Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) that are claimed for the TOE. The
SARs which are claimed are in exact conformance with the App PP.
7.1 Class ASE: Security Target
7.1.1 ST introduction (ASE_INT.1)
7.1.1.1 Developer action elements:
ASE_INT.1.1D
The developer shall provide an ST introduction.
7.1.1.2 Content and presentation elements:
ASE_INT.1.1C
The ST introduction shall contain an ST reference, a TOE reference, a TOE overview and a TOE
description.
ASE_INT.1.2C
The ST reference shall uniquely identify the ST.
ASE_INT.1.3C
The TOE reference shall uniquely identify the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.4C
The TOE overview shall summarise the usage and major security features of the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.5C
The TOE overview shall identify the TOE type.
ASE_INT.1.6C
The TOE overview shall identify any non-TOE hardware/software/firmware required by the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.7C
The TOE description shall describe the physical scope of the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.8C
The TOE description shall describe the logical scope of the TOE.
7.1.1.3 Evaluator action elements:
ASE_INT.1.1E
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
ASE_INT.1.2E
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The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE reference, the TOE overview, and the TOE description are
consistent with each other.
7.1.2 Conformance claims (ASE_CCL.1)
7.1.2.1 Developer action elements:
ASE_CCL.1.1D
The developer shall provide a conformance claim.
ASE_CCL.1.2D
The developer shall provide a conformance claim rationale.
7.1.2.2 Content and presentation elements:
ASE_CCL.1.1C
The conformance claim shall contain a CC conformance claim that identifies the version of the CC to
which the ST and the TOE claim conformance.
ASE_CCL.1.2C
The CC conformance claim shall describe the conformance of the ST to CC Part 2 as either CC Part 2
conformant or CC Part 2 extended.
ASE_CCL.1.3C
The CC conformance claim shall describe the conformance of the ST to CC Part 3 as either CC Part 3
conformant or CC Part 3 extended.
ASE_CCL.1.4C
The CC conformance claim shall be consistent with the extended components definition.
ASE_CCL.1.5C
The conformance claim shall identify all PPs and security requirement packages to which the ST
claims conformance.
ASE_CCL.1.6C
The conformance claim shall describe any conformance of the ST to a package as either package-
conformant or package-augmented.
ASE_CCL.1.7C
The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the TOE type is consistent with the TOE type
in the PPs for which conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.8C
The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of the security problem
definition is consistent with the statement of the security problem definition in the PPs for which
conformance is being claimed.
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ASE_CCL.1.9C
The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of security objectives is
consistent with the statement of security objectives in the PPs for which conformance is being
claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.10C
The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of security requirements is
consistent with the statement of security requirements in the PPs for which conformance is being
claimed.
7.1.2.3 Evaluator action elements:
ASE_CCL.1.1E
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
7.1.3 Security objectives for the operational environment (ASE_OBJ.1)
7.1.3.1 Developer action elements:
ASE_OBJ.1.1D
The developer shall provide a statement of security objectives.
7.1.3.2 Content and presentation elements:
ASE_OBJ.1.1C
The statement of security objectives shall describe the security objectives for the operational
environment.
7.1.3.3 Evaluator action elements:
ASE_OBJ.1.1E
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
7.1.4 Extended components definition (ASE_ECD.1)
7.1.4.1 Developer action elements:
ASE_ECD.1.1D
The developer shall provide a statement of security requirements.
ASE_ECD.1.2D
The developer shall provide an extended components definition.
7.1.4.2 Content and presentation elements:
ASE_ECD.1.1C
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The statement of security requirements shall identify all extended security requirements.
ASE_ECD.1.2C
The extended components definition shall define an extended component for each extended security
requirement.
ASE_ECD.1.3C
The extended components definition shall describe how each extended component is related to the
existing CC components, families, and classes.
ASE_ECD.1.4C
The extended components definition shall use the existing CC components, families, classes, and
methodology as a model for presentation.
ASE_ECD.1.5C
The extended components shall consist of measurable and objective elements such that conformance
or nonconformance to these elements can be demonstrated.
7.1.4.3 Evaluator action elements:
ASE_ECD.1.1E
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
ASE_ECD.1.2E
The evaluator shall confirm that no extended component can be clearly expressed using existing
components.
7.1.5 Stated security requirements (ASE_REQ.1)
7.1.5.1 Developer action elements:
ASE_REQ.1.1D
The developer shall provide a statement of security requirements.
ASE_REQ.1.2D
The developer shall provide a security requirements rationale.
7.1.5.2 Content and presentation elements:
ASE_REQ.1.1C
The statement of security requirements shall describe the SFRs and the SARs.
ASE_REQ.1.2C
All subjects, objects, operations, security attributes, external entities and other terms that are used in
the SFRs and the SARs shall be defined.
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ASE_REQ.1.3C
The statement of security requirements shall identify all operations on the security requirements.
ASE_REQ.1.4C
All operations shall be performed correctly.
ASE_REQ.1.5C
Each dependency of the security requirements shall either be satisfied, or the security requirements
rationale shall justify the dependency not being satisfied.
ASE_REQ.1.6C
The statement of security requirements shall be internally consistent.
7.1.5.3 Evaluator action elements:
ASE_REQ.1.1E
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
7.1.6 TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS.1)
7.1.6.1 Developer action elements:
ASE_TSS.1.1D
The developer shall provide a TOE summary specification.
7.1.6.2 Content and presentation elements:
ASE_TSS.1.1C
The TOE summary specification shall describe how the TOE meets each SFR.
7.1.6.3 Evaluator action elements:
ASE_TSS.1.1E
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
ASE_TSS.1.2E
The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE summary specification is consistent with the TOE overview
and the TOE description.
7.2 Class ADV: Development
7.2.1 Basic Functional Specification (ADV_FSP.1)
7.2.1.1 Developer action elements:
ADV_FSP.1.1D
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The developer shall provide a functional specification.
ADV_FSP.1.2D
The developer shall provide a tracing from the functional specification to the SFRs.
7.2.1.2 Content and presentation elements:
ADV_FSP.1.1C
The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of use for each SFR-enforcing and
SFR-supporting TSFI.
ADV_FSP.1.2C
The functional specification shall identify all parameters associated with each SFR-enforcing and
SFR-supporting TSFI.
ADV_FSP.1.3C
The functional specification shall provide rationale for the implicit categorization of interfaces as
SFR-non-interfering.
ADV_FSP.1.4C
The tracing shall demonstrate that the SFRs trace to TSFIs in the functional specification.
7.2.1.3 Evaluator action elements:
ADV_ FSP.1.1E
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
ADV_ FSP.1.2E
The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is an accurate and complete
instantiation of the SFRs.
7.3 Class AGD: Guidance Documentation
7.3.1 Operational User Guidance (AGD_OPE.1)
7.3.1.1 Developer action elements:
AGD_OPE.1.1D
The developer shall provide operational user guidance.
7.3.1.2 Content and presentation elements:
AGD_OPE.1.1C
The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the user-accessible functions and
privileges that should be controlled in a secure processing environment, including appropriate
warnings.
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AGD_OPE.1.2C
The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, how to use the available interfaces
provided by the TOE in a secure manner.
AGD_OPE.1.3C
The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the available functions and interfaces,
in particular all security parameters under the control of the user, indicating secure values as
appropriate.
AGD_OPE.1.4C
The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, clearly present each type of security-relevant
event relative to the user-accessible functions that need to be performed, including changing the
security characteristics of entities under the control of the TSF.
AGD_OPE.1.5C
The operational user guidance shall identify all possible modes of operation of the TOE (including
operation following failure or operational error), their consequences, and implications for maintaining
secure operation.
AGD_OPE.1.6C
The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, describe the security measures to be followed
in order to fulfill the security objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.
AGD_OPE.1.7C
The operational user guidance shall be clear and reasonable.
7.3.1.3 Evaluator action elements:
AGD_OPE.1.1E
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
7.3.2 Preparative Procedures (AGD_PRE.1)
7.3.2.1 Developer action elements:
AGD_PRE.1.1D
The developer shall provide the TOE, including its preparative procedures.
7.3.2.2 Content and presentation elements:
AGD_ PRE.1.1C
The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure acceptance of the
delivered TOE in accordance with the developer's delivery procedures.
AGD_ PRE.1.2C
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The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure installation of the TOE
and for the secure preparation of the operational environment in accordance with the security
objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.
7.3.2.3 Evaluator action elements:
AGD_ PRE.1.1E
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
AGD_ PRE.1.2E
The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to confirm that the TOE can be prepared
securely for operation.
7.4 Class ALC: Life Cycle Support
7.4.1 Labeling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1)
7.4.1.1 Developer action elements:
ALC_CMC.1.1D
The developer shall provide the TOE and a reference for the TOE.
7.4.1.2 Content and presentation elements:
ALC_CMC.1.1C
The application shall be labeled with a unique reference.
7.4.1.3 Evaluator action elements:
ALC_CMC.1.1E
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
7.4.2 TOE CM Coverage (ALC_CMS.1)
7.4.2.1 Developer action elements:
ALC_CMS.1.1D
The developer shall provide a configuration list for the TOE.
7.4.2.2 Content and presentation elements:
ALC_CMS.1.1C
The configuration list shall include the following: the TOE itself; and the evaluation evidence
required by the SARs.
ALC_CMS.1.2C
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The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.
7.4.2.3 Evaluator action elements:
ALC_CMS.1.1E
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
7.4.3 Timely Security Updates (ALC_TSU_EXT.1)
7.4.3.1 Developer Actions Element:
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.1D
The developer shall provide a description in the TSS of how timely security updates are made to the
TOE.
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.2D
The developer shall provide a description in the TSS of how users are notified when updates change
security properties or the configuration of the product.
7.4.3.2 Content and presentation elements:
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.1C
The description shall include the process for creating and deploying security updates for the TOE
software.
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.2C
The description shall express the time window as the length of time, in days, between public
disclosure of a vulnerability and the public availability of security updates to the TOE.
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.3C
The description shall include the mechanisms publicly available for reporting security issues
pertaining to the TOE.
7.4.3.3 Evaluator action elements:
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.1E
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
7.5 Class ATE: Tests
7.5.1 Independent Testing - Conformance (ATE_IND.1)
7.5.1.1 Developer action elements:
ATE_IND.1.1D
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The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
7.5.1.2 Content and presentation elements:
ATE_IND.1.1C
The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
7.5.1.3 Evaluator action elements:
ATE_IND.1.1E
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
ATE_IND.1.2E
The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm that the TSF operates as specified.
7.6 Class AVA: Vulnerability Assessment
7.6.1 Vulnerability Survey (AVA_VAN.1)
7.6.1.1 Developer action elements:
AVA_VAN.1.1D
The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
7.6.1.2 Content and presentation elements:
AVA_VAN.1.1C
The application shall be suitable for testing.
7.6.1.3 Evaluator action elements:
AVA_VAN.1.1E
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
AVA_VAN.1.2E
The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain sources to identify potential vulnerabilities in
the TOE.
AVA_VAN.1.3E
The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, based on the identified potential vulnerabilities, to
determine that the TOE is resistant to attacks performed by an attacker possessing Basic attack
potential.
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8 TOE Summary Specification
8.1 Cryptographic Support
8.1.1 FCS_CKM_EXT.1:
The TOE does not perform generation of asymmetric cryptographic keys.
8.1.2 FCS_RBG_EXT.1:
The TOE does not directly invoke any DRBG functionality for any SFR related functionality.
8.1.3 FCS_STO_EXT.1:
The credentials for accessing the SQL database are stored using the Data Protection API. The TOE will
invoke the Windows platform to encrypt these credentials using a certificate located in the Windows
Certificate Store and will then invoke the Windows platform to store the encrypted credentials.
Note that the following credentials are not applicable to this SFR because they are not stored by the TOE.
The user credentials used for authentication to the TOE are stored in the Windows platform’s Active
Directory or in the SQL database (both external to the TOE). Active Directory contains the enterprise user
credentials for authenticating the fat client and for authenticating to IIS for access to the GUI. The SQL
database contains the local user credentials for authenticating to the TOE's fat client. The SQL database
also contains the credentials for accessing the Windows platform’s Active Directory.
8.2 User Data Protection
8.2.1 FDP_DAR_EXT.1:
The credentials for accessing the SQL database are stored using the Data Protection API, in accordance
with FCS_STO_EXT.1. The TOE will invoke the Windows platform to encrypt these credentials using a
certificate located in the Windows Certificate Store and then invoke the Windows platform to store the
encrypted credentials.
8.2.2 FDP_DEC_EXT.1:
During operation of the TOE, access to the underlying Windows platform is limited to use of network
connectivity hardware for communication with web browsers for GUI access and Activity Monitor
application(s). The TOE accesses the Windows operating system’s Active Directory component which is
a sensitive data repository that contains enterprise user data. The TOE verifies enterprise user credentials
which are used for authenticating to the TOE’s fat client as well as queries enterprise user account
information for the FAM product’s primary functionality.
8.2.3 FDP_NET_EXT.1:
During TOE operation, the TOE will rely on the Windows platform to handle the following network
connections, to include all of their cryptographic operations:
• respond to TLS connection (TCP port 8000) requests from an Activity Monitor to receive
managed resource data.
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Note the TOE opens default TCP ports 8001, 8005, 8006, 8010, and 9200 for local communication
between components on the machine where the TOE is installed.
The following description is for completeness in understanding the operational environment network
requirements of the TOE. The host platform’s IIS web server (part of the OE) is required to handle user-
initiated HTTPS requests from a web browser for remote access to the administrative GUI TOE
component (TCP port 443). IIS is a Windows service, of which the TOE has no control over, and is
initiated during the platform’s startup. IIS performs the credential collection and authentication prior to
allowing access to the TOE’s website content (remote management functionality).
8.3 Security Management
8.3.1 FMT_CFG_EXT.1:
The TOE's installation directory is C:\Program Files. The administrator that performs the installation will
receive the owner permissions for the TOE's binaries and data files. Due to C:\Program Files being the
installation directory, the Windows platform will protect the TOE's binaries and data files from
modification by unprivileged users. There are no default credentials for the TOE. During the installation
process, the administrator that performs the installation will define their own password for the TOE’s
main administrative account.
8.3.2 FMT_MEC_EXT.1:
The TOE maintains a set of configuration options to run in the evaluated configuration. These
configuration options are stored per the mechanisms recommended by the Windows platform vendor for
.NET Core applications.
8.3.3 FMT_SMF.1:
The TOE provides the following management functions to its users:
• configuration of the Active Directory to which the TOE will communicate via the fat client
• perform tasks that read data from Active Directory via the GUI and the fat client
• perform tasks that read or write data (i.e., local user credentials, configuration data, governed
data) to the SQL database via the GUI and the fat client
• query the current version of the TOE via the fat client
• perform the software update process via the fat client
8.4 Privacy
8.4.1 FPR_ANO_EXT.1:
The TOE application does not collect personally identifiable information (PII) for administrators or users.
Therefore, the TOE application does not transmit PII data over the network.
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8.5 Protection of the TSF
8.5.1 FPT_AEX_EXT.1:
The TOE relies on the Windows platform to request memory and will not request an explicit memory
address. During the compilation of the TOE's software, the /NXCOMPAT flag is set to ensure that Data
Execution Prevention (DEP) protections are enabled. The TOE does not allocate any memory region with
both write and execute permissions. The TOE's software runs as Managed Code in the .NET Core, and
therefore no additional stack-based buffer overflow protection needs to be enabled. The TOE will operate
on Windows Server with the security features of Windows Defender Exploit Guard Exploit Protection
configured on, with the following enabled: Control Flow Guard (CFG), randomize memory allocations
(Bottom-Up ASLR), Export Address Filtering (EAF), Import Address Filtering (IAF), and DEP. The
TOE does not write user-modifiable files to directories that contain executable files.
8.5.2 FPT_API_EXT.1:
The TOE is installed on the Windows platform and uses only the following supported Windows platform
APIs in order to function.
Table 12: .NET Core APIs
System.Buffers System.ComponentModel System.Memory System.Data
System.Diagnostics System.Net System.Configuration System.DirectoryServices
System.Numerics System.ServiceProcess System.Drawing System.Runtime
System.Threading System.IO System.Security System.Management
System.IdentityModel System.ServiceModel System.Xml Microsoft.Bcl
Microsoft.Windows Microsoft.PowerShell Microsoft.Extensions Microsoft Sharepoint
Microsoft.SharePointOnline Microsoft.Data Microsoft.Net Microsoft.VisualStudio
Microsoft.Win32 Microsoft.SqlServer Microsoft.IdentityModel
8.5.3 FPT_IDV_EXT.1:
Every binary file of the TOE is marked with the TOE’s version. An administrator can right click the
binary file, click properties, and view the TOE’s version under the details tab. The versioning
nomenclature used by the TOE is #.#.#.#. The first number indicates the major release number and is
incremented by the value of 1. The second number is the minor release number and is incremented by the
value of 1. The third number represents the patch number and is incremented by the value of 1000. The
fourth number represents the service pack number and is incremented by the value of 1000.
8.5.4 FPT_LIB_EXT.1:
The following two tables consist of a list of the third-party dynamic libraries and non-dynamic libraries
used by the TOE.
Table 13: Dynamic Libraries included with TOE
AntiXssLibrary.dll mscorlib.dll
Antlr3.Runtime.dll mscorrc.debug.dll
api-ms-win-core-console-l1-1-0.dll mscorrc.dll
api-ms-win-core-datetime-l1-1-0.dll Namotion.Reflection.dll
Security Target SailPoint FAM 8.3 SP5
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api-ms-win-core-debug-l1-1-0.dll Nest.dll
api-ms-win-core-errorhandling-l1-1-0.dll Nest.JsonNetSerializer.dll
api-ms-win-core-file-l1-1-0.dll netstandard.dll
api-ms-win-core-file-l1-2-0.dll Newtonsoft.Json.Bson.dll
api-ms-win-core-file-l2-1-0.dll Newtonsoft.Json.dll
api-ms-win-core-handle-l1-1-0.dll NHibernate.dll
api-ms-win-core-heap-l1-1-0.dll NJsonSchema.dll
api-ms-win-core-interlocked-l1-1-0.dll NLog.dll
api-ms-win-core-libraryloader-l1-1-0.dll NLog.Extensions.Logging.dll
api-ms-win-core-localization-l1-2-0.dll NLog.Targets.Syslog.dll
api-ms-win-core-memory-l1-1-0.dll NLog.Web.AspNetCore.dll
api-ms-win-core-namedpipe-l1-1-0.dll Novell.Directory.Ldap.NETStandard.dll
api-ms-win-core-processenvironment-l1-1-0.dll NuGet.Frameworks.dll
api-ms-win-core-processthreads-l1-1-0.dll Oracle.ManagedDataAccess.dll
api-ms-win-core-processthreads-l1-1-1.dll Perceptive.DocumentFilters.dll
api-ms-win-core-profile-l1-1-0.dll PowerShell.Core.Instrumentation.dll
api-ms-win-core-rtlsupport-l1-1-0.dll protobuf-net.dll
api-ms-win-core-string-l1-1-0.dll pwrshplugin.dll
api-ms-win-core-synch-l1-1-0.dll Python.Runtime.dll
api-ms-win-core-synch-l1-2-0.dll python3.dll
api-ms-win-core-sysinfo-l1-1-0.dll python39.dll
api-ms-win-core-timezone-l1-1-0.dll Quartz.dll
api-ms-win-core-util-l1-1-0.dll Quartz.Jobs.dll
api-ms-win-crt-conio-l1-1-0.dll Quartz.Plugins.dll
api-ms-win-crt-convert-l1-1-0.dll RabbitMQ.Client.dll
api-ms-win-crt-environment-l1-1-0.dll Remotion.Linq.dll
api-ms-win-crt-filesystem-l1-1-0.dll Remotion.Linq.EagerFetching.dll
api-ms-win-crt-heap-l1-1-0.dll Renci.SshNet.dll
api-ms-win-crt-locale-l1-1-0.dll RestSharp.dll
api-ms-win-crt-math-l1-1-0.dll Scrutor.dll
api-ms-win-crt-multibyte-l1-1-0.dll SimpleIdServer.Jwt.dll
api-ms-win-crt-private-l1-1-0.dll SimpleIdServer.Scim.dll
api-ms-win-crt-process-l1-1-0.dll SimpleIdServer.Scim.Swashbuckle.dll
api-ms-win-crt-runtime-l1-1-0.dll sni.dll
api-ms-win-crt-stdio-l1-1-0.dll sqlite3.dll
api-ms-win-crt-string-l1-1-0.dll SQLitePCLRaw.batteries_v2.dll
api-ms-win-crt-time-l1-1-0.dll SQLitePCLRaw.core.dll
api-ms-win-crt-utility-l1-1-0.dll SQLitePCLRaw.nativelibrary.dll
Aspose.Cells.dll SQLitePCLRaw.provider.dynamic_cdecl.dll
AutoMapper.dll SshNet.Security.Cryptography.dll
AutoMapper.Extensions.Microsoft.DependencyInjecti
on.dll Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.Annotations.dll
AWSSDK.Core.dll Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.Filters.dll
Security Target SailPoint FAM 8.3 SP5
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AWSSDK.IdentityManagement.dll Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.Newtonsoft.dll
AWSSDK.Organizations.dll Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.Swagger.dll
AWSSDK.S3.dll Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.SwaggerGen.dll
AWSSDK.S3Control.dll Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.SwaggerUI.dll
AWSSDK.SecurityToken.dll System.AppContext.dll
BouncyCastle.Crypto.dll System.Buffers.dll
C1.WPF.4.dll System.CodeDom.dll
C1.WPF.DataGrid.4.dll System.Collections.Concurrent.dll
C1.WPF.FlexGrid.4.dll System.Collections.dll
C1.WPF.FlexGrid.GroupPanel.4.dll System.Collections.Immutable.dll
C1.WPF.FlexGridFilter.4.dll System.Collections.NonGeneric.dll
C1.WPF.Theming.4.dll System.Collections.Specialized.dll
Caliburn.Micro.dll System.ComponentModel.Annotations.dll
Cloudtoid.Framework.dll System.ComponentModel.Composition.dll
Cloudtoid.Interprocess.dll
System.ComponentModel.Composition.Registratio
n.dll
clrcompression.dll System.ComponentModel.DataAnnotations.dll
clretwrc.dll System.ComponentModel.dll
clrjit.dll System.ComponentModel.EventBasedAsync.dll
CommandLine.dll System.ComponentModel.Primitives.dll
coreclr.dll System.ComponentModel.TypeConverter.dll
dbgshim.dll System.Composition.AttributedModel.dll
dotnet-aspnet-codegenerator-design.dll System.Composition.Convention.dll
e_sqlite3.dll System.Composition.Hosting.dll
Elasticsearch.Net.dll System.Composition.Runtime.dll
Ensure.That.dll System.Composition.TypedParts.dll
FluentNHibernate.dll System.Configuration.ConfigurationManager.dll
GongSolutions.Wpf.DragDrop.dll System.Configuration.dll
Google.Apis.Admin.Directory.directory_v1.dll System.Console.dll
Google.Apis.Admin.Reports.reports_v1.dll System.Core.dll
Google.Apis.Auth.dll System.Data.Common.dll
Google.Apis.Auth.PlatformServices.dll System.Data.DataSetExtensions.dll
Google.Apis.Core.dll System.Data.dll
Google.Apis.dll System.Data.Odbc.dll
Google.Apis.Drive.v3.dll System.Data.OleDb.dll
Google.Apis.DriveActivity.v2.dll System.Data.SqlClient.dll
Google.Apis.PlatformServices.dll System.Diagnostics.Contracts.dll
Google.Protobuf.dll System.Diagnostics.Debug.dll
Grpc.AspNetCore.Server.ClientFactory.dll System.Diagnostics.DiagnosticSource.dll
Grpc.AspNetCore.Server.dll System.Diagnostics.EventLog.dll
Grpc.Core.Api.dll System.Diagnostics.FileVersionInfo.dll
Grpc.Core.dll System.Diagnostics.PerformanceCounter.dll
Grpc.HealthCheck.dll System.Diagnostics.Process.dll
Security Target SailPoint FAM 8.3 SP5
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Grpc.Net.Client.dll System.Diagnostics.StackTrace.dll
Grpc.Net.ClientFactory.dll System.Diagnostics.TextWriterTraceListener.dll
Grpc.Net.Common.dll System.Diagnostics.Tools.dll
grpc_csharp_ext.x64.dll System.Diagnostics.TraceSource.dll
grpc_csharp_ext.x86.dll System.Diagnostics.Tracing.dll
hostfxr.dll System.DirectoryServices.AccountManagement.dll
hostpolicy.dll System.DirectoryServices.dll
HtmlSanitizationLibrary.dll System.DirectoryServices.Protocols.dll
IbanNet.dll System.dll
ICU4N.Collation.dll System.Drawing.Common.dll
ICU4N.CurrencyData.dll System.Drawing.dll
ICU4N.dll System.Drawing.Primitives.dll
ICU4N.LanguageData.dll System.Dynamic.Runtime.dll
ICU4N.RegionData.dll System.Globalization.Calendars.dll
ICU4N.Transliterator.dll System.Globalization.dll
IdentityModel.AspNetCore.OAuth2Introspection.dll System.Globalization.Extensions.dll
IdentityModel.dll System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt.dll
IdentityServer4.AccessTokenValidation.dll System.IO.Abstractions.dll
IdentityServer4.dll System.IO.Compression.Brotli.dll
IdentityServer4.Storage.dll System.IO.Compression.dll
Iesi.Collections.dll System.IO.Compression.FileSystem.dll
ISYS11df.dll System.IO.Compression.ZipFile.dll
ISYSautocad.dll System.IO.dll
ISYSpdf6.dll System.IO.FileSystem.AccessControl.dll
ISYSreaders.dll System.IO.FileSystem.dll
ISYSreadershd.dll System.IO.FileSystem.DriveInfo.dll
ISYSreadersocr.dll System.IO.FileSystem.Primitives.dll
ITfoxtec.Identity.Saml2.dll System.IO.FileSystem.Watcher.dll
ITfoxtec.Identity.Saml2.MvcCore.dll System.IO.IsolatedStorage.dll
J2N.dll System.IO.MemoryMappedFiles.dll
LazyCache.AspNetCore.dll System.IO.Packaging.dll
LazyCache.dll System.IO.Pipes.AccessControl.dll
libcrypto-1_1.dll System.IO.Pipes.dll
libffi-7.dll System.IO.Ports.dll
libopenblas.XWYDX2IKJW2NMTWSFYNGFUWK
QU3LYTCZ.gfortran-win_amd64.dll System.IO.UnmanagedMemoryStream.dll
libssl-1_1.dll System.Linq.dll
LiteDB.dll System.Linq.Expressions.dll
LogoFX.Core.dll System.Linq.Parallel.dll
LogoFX.Data.dll System.Linq.Queryable.dll
LogoFX.Infra.dll System.Management.Automation.dll
Lucene.Net.Analysis.Common.dll System.Management.dll
Lucene.Net.Analysis.SmartCn.dll System.Memory.dll
Security Target SailPoint FAM 8.3 SP5
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Lucene.Net.dll System.Net.dll
Lucene.Net.Highlighter.dll System.Net.Http.dll
Lucene.Net.ICU.dll System.Net.Http.Formatting.dll
Lucene.Net.Memory.dll System.Net.Http.Json.dll
Lucene.Net.Queries.dll System.Net.Http.WinHttpHandler.dll
Lucene.Net.QueryParser.dll System.Net.HttpListener.dll
Lucene.Net.Sandbox.dll System.Net.Mail.dll
ManageOntap.dll System.Net.NameResolution.dll
Markdig.Signed.dll System.Net.NetworkInformation.dll
mi.dll System.Net.Ping.dll
Microsoft.ApplicationInsights.dll System.Net.Primitives.dll
Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.Certificate.dll System.Net.Requests.dll
Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer.dll System.Net.Security.dll
Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.OpenIdConnect
.dll System.Net.ServicePoint.dll
Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authorization.dll System.Net.Sockets.dll
Microsoft.AspNetCore.JsonPatch.dll System.Net.WebClient.dll
Microsoft.AspNetCore.Metadata.dll System.Net.WebHeaderCollection.dll
Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.NewtonsoftJson.dll System.Net.WebProxy.dll
Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.Razor.Extensions.dll System.Net.WebSockets.Client.dll
Microsoft.AspNetCore.Owin.dll System.Net.WebSockets.dll
Microsoft.AspNetCore.Razor.Language.dll System.Net.WebSockets.WebSocketProtocol.dll
Microsoft.Bcl.AsyncInterfaces.dll System.Numerics.dll
Microsoft.CodeAnalysis.CSharp.dll System.Numerics.Vectors.dll
Microsoft.CodeAnalysis.CSharp.resources.dll System.ObjectModel.dll
Microsoft.CodeAnalysis.CSharp.Workspaces.dll System.Private.CoreLib.dll
Microsoft.CodeAnalysis.CSharp.Workspaces.resource
s.dll System.Private.DataContractSerialization.dll
Microsoft.CodeAnalysis.dll System.Private.ServiceModel.dll
Microsoft.CodeAnalysis.Razor.dll System.Private.Uri.dll
Microsoft.CodeAnalysis.resources.dll System.Private.Xml.dll
Microsoft.CodeAnalysis.Workspaces.dll System.Private.Xml.Linq.dll
Microsoft.CodeAnalysis.Workspaces.resources.dll System.Reactive.dll
Microsoft.CSharp.dll System.Reflection.Context.dll
Microsoft.Data.Sqlite.dll System.Reflection.DispatchProxy.dll
Microsoft.Data.Tools.Sql.BatchParser.dll System.Reflection.dll
Microsoft.DiaSymReader.Native.amd64.dll System.Reflection.Emit.dll
Microsoft.DotNet.PlatformAbstractions.dll System.Reflection.Emit.ILGeneration.dll
Microsoft.Expression.Interactions.dll System.Reflection.Emit.Lightweight.dll
Microsoft.Extensions.Caching.Abstractions.dll System.Reflection.Extensions.dll
Microsoft.Extensions.Caching.Memory.dll System.Reflection.Metadata.dll
Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Abstractions.dll System.Reflection.Primitives.dll
Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Binder.dll System.Reflection.TypeExtensions.dll
Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.CommandLine.dll System.Resources.Reader.dll
Security Target SailPoint FAM 8.3 SP5
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Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.dll System.Resources.ResourceManager.dll
Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.EnvironmentVari
ables.dll System.Resources.Writer.dll
Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.FileExtensions.dll System.Runtime.Caching.dll
Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Json.dll System.Runtime.CompilerServices.Unsafe.dll
Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.UserSecrets.dll System.Runtime.CompilerServices.VisualC.dll
Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection.Abstractio
ns.dll System.Runtime.dll
Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection.dll System.Runtime.Extensions.dll
Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyModel.dll System.Runtime.Handles.dll
Microsoft.Extensions.FileProviders.Abstractions.dll System.Runtime.InteropServices.dll
Microsoft.Extensions.FileProviders.Physical.dll
System.Runtime.InteropServices.RuntimeInformati
on.dll
Microsoft.Extensions.FileSystemGlobbing.dll
System.Runtime.InteropServices.WindowsRuntime
.dll
Microsoft.Extensions.Hosting.Abstractions.dll System.Runtime.Intrinsics.dll
Microsoft.Extensions.Hosting.dll System.Runtime.Loader.dll
Microsoft.Extensions.Hosting.Systemd.dll System.Runtime.Numerics.dll
Microsoft.Extensions.Hosting.WindowsServices.dll System.Runtime.Serialization.dll
Microsoft.Extensions.Http.dll System.Runtime.Serialization.Formatters.dll
Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions.dll System.Runtime.Serialization.Json.dll
Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Configuration.dll System.Runtime.Serialization.Primitives.dll
Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Console.dll System.Runtime.Serialization.Xml.dll
Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Debug.dll System.Runtime.WindowsRuntime.dll
Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.dll System.Runtime.WindowsRuntime.UI.Xaml.dll
Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.EventLog.dll System.Security.AccessControl.dll
Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.EventSource.dll System.Security.Claims.dll
Microsoft.Extensions.Options.ConfigurationExtension
s.dll System.Security.Cryptography.Algorithms.dll
Microsoft.Extensions.Options.dll System.Security.Cryptography.Cng.dll
Microsoft.Extensions.Primitives.dll System.Security.Cryptography.Csp.dll
Microsoft.IdentityModel.Clients.ActiveDirectory.dll System.Security.Cryptography.Encoding.dll
Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens.dll System.Security.Cryptography.OpenSsl.dll
Microsoft.IdentityModel.Logging.dll System.Security.Cryptography.Pkcs.dll
Microsoft.IdentityModel.Protocols.dll System.Security.Cryptography.Primitives.dll
Microsoft.IdentityModel.Protocols.OpenIdConnect.dll System.Security.Cryptography.ProtectedData.dll
Microsoft.IdentityModel.Tokens.dll System.Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates.dll
Microsoft.IdentityModel.Tokens.Saml.dll System.Security.Cryptography.Xml.dll
Microsoft.IdentityModel.Xml.dll System.Security.dll
Microsoft.Management.Infrastructure.CimCmdlets.dll System.Security.Permissions.dll
Microsoft.Management.Infrastructure.dll System.Security.Principal.dll
Microsoft.Management.Infrastructure.Native.dll System.Security.Principal.Windows.dll
Microsoft.Management.Infrastructure.Native.Unmana
ged.dll System.Security.SecureString.dll
Microsoft.Office.Client.Policy.dll System.ServiceModel.dll
Security Target SailPoint FAM 8.3 SP5
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Microsoft.Office.Client.TranslationServices.dll System.ServiceModel.Duplex.dll
Microsoft.Office.SharePoint.Tools.dll System.ServiceModel.Http.dll
Microsoft.Online.SharePoint.Client.Tenant.dll System.ServiceModel.NetTcp.dll
Microsoft.OpenApi.dll System.ServiceModel.Primitives.dll
Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.Diagnostics.dll System.ServiceModel.Security.dll
Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.Management.dll System.ServiceModel.Syndication.dll
Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.Utility.dll System.ServiceModel.Web.dll
Microsoft.PowerShell.ConsoleHost.dll System.ServiceProcess.dll
Microsoft.PowerShell.CoreCLR.Eventing.dll System.ServiceProcess.ServiceController.dll
Microsoft.PowerShell.MarkdownRender.dll System.Text.Encoding.CodePages.dll
Microsoft.PowerShell.SDK.dll System.Text.Encoding.dll
Microsoft.PowerShell.Security.dll System.Text.Encoding.Extensions.dll
Microsoft.ProjectServer.Client.dll System.Text.Encodings.Web.dll
Microsoft.SharePoint.Client.dll System.Text.Json.dll
Microsoft.SharePoint.Client.DocumentManagement.dl
l System.Text.RegularExpressions.dll
Microsoft.SharePoint.Client.Portable.dll System.Threading.AccessControl.dll
Microsoft.SharePoint.Client.Publishing.dll System.Threading.Channels.dll
Microsoft.SharePoint.Client.Runtime.dll System.Threading.dll
Microsoft.SharePoint.Client.Runtime.Portable.dll System.Threading.Overlapped.dll
Microsoft.SharePoint.Client.Runtime.Windows.dll System.Threading.Tasks.Dataflow.dll
Microsoft.SharePoint.Client.Search.Applications.dll System.Threading.Tasks.dll
Microsoft.SharePoint.Client.Search.dll System.Threading.Tasks.Extensions.dll
Microsoft.SharePoint.Client.Taxonomy.dll System.Threading.Tasks.Parallel.dll
Microsoft.SharePoint.Client.UserProfiles.dll System.Threading.Thread.dll
Microsoft.SharePoint.Client.WorkflowServices.dll System.Threading.ThreadPool.dll
Microsoft.SqlServer.Assessment.dll System.Threading.Timer.dll
Microsoft.SqlServer.BatchParser.dll System.Transactions.dll
Microsoft.SqlServer.ConnectionInfo.dll System.Transactions.Local.dll
Microsoft.SqlServer.Dmf.dll System.ValueTuple.dll
Microsoft.SqlServer.Management.Assessment.dll System.Web.dll
Microsoft.SqlServer.Management.Dmf.dll System.Web.HttpUtility.dll
Microsoft.SqlServer.Management.RegisteredServers.d
ll System.Windows.dll
Microsoft.SqlServer.Management.Sdk.Sfc.dll System.Windows.Extensions.dll
Microsoft.SqlServer.Management.SmoMetadataProvid
er.dll System.Windows.Interactivity.dll
Microsoft.SqlServer.Management.SqlParser.dll System.Xml.dll
Microsoft.SqlServer.Management.SqlScriptPublishMo
del.dll System.Xml.Linq.dll
Microsoft.SqlServer.Management.XEvent.dll System.Xml.ReaderWriter.dll
Microsoft.SqlServer.Management.XEventDbScoped.d
ll System.Xml.Serialization.dll
Microsoft.SqlServer.Management.XEventDbScopedE
num.dll System.Xml.XDocument.dll
Security Target SailPoint FAM 8.3 SP5
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Microsoft.SqlServer.Management.XEventEnum.dll System.Xml.XmlDocument.dll
Microsoft.SqlServer.PolicyEnum.dll System.Xml.XmlSerializer.dll
Microsoft.SqlServer.ServiceBrokerEnum.dll System.Xml.XPath.dll
Microsoft.SqlServer.Smo.dll System.Xml.XPath.XDocument.dll
Microsoft.SqlServer.SmoExtended.dll Telerik.Windows.Controls.dll
Microsoft.SqlServer.SqlEnum.dll Telerik.Windows.Controls.GridView.dll
Microsoft.VisualBasic.Core.dll Telerik.Windows.Controls.Input.dll
Microsoft.VisualBasic.dll Telerik.Windows.Controls.Navigation.dll
Microsoft.VisualStudio.Web.CodeGeneration.Contract
s.dll Telerik.Windows.Controls.RibbonView.dll
Microsoft.VisualStudio.Web.CodeGeneration.Core.dll Telerik.Windows.Controls.RichTextBoxUI.dll
Microsoft.VisualStudio.Web.CodeGeneration.dll Telerik.Windows.Data.dll
Microsoft.VisualStudio.Web.CodeGeneration.EntityFr
ameworkCore.dll Telerik.Windows.Documents.dll
Microsoft.VisualStudio.Web.CodeGeneration.Templat
ing.dll
Telerik.Windows.Documents.FormatProviders.Ht
ml.dll
Microsoft.VisualStudio.Web.CodeGeneration.Utils.dll
Telerik.Windows.Documents.FormatProviders.Ope
nXml.dll
Microsoft.VisualStudio.Web.CodeGenerators.Mvc.dll
Telerik.Windows.Documents.FormatProviders.Pdf.
dll
Microsoft.Web.Administration.dll
Telerik.Windows.Documents.FormatProviders.Rtf.
dll
Microsoft.Win32.Primitives.dll
Telerik.Windows.Documents.FormatProviders.Xa
ml.dll
Microsoft.Win32.Registry.AccessControl.dll
Telerik.Windows.Documents.Proofing.Dictionaries
.En-US.dll
Microsoft.Win32.Registry.dll ucrtbase.dll
Microsoft.Win32.SystemEvents.dll vcruntime140.dll
Microsoft.Windows.Design.Extensibility.dll vcruntime140_1.dll
Microsoft.WSMan.Management.dll wbapi.dll
Microsoft.WSMan.Runtime.dll WcfCoreMtomEncoder.dll
miutils.dll WindowsBase.dll
mscordaccore.dll WPFToolkit.dll
mscordaccore_amd64_amd64_4.700.20.20201.dll WPFToolkit.Extended.dll
mscordbi.dll WPFVisifire.Charts.dll
Table 14: Non-Dynamic Libraries Included with TOE
@angular/animations es5-shim
@angular/common font-awesome
@angular/compiler fortawesome/fontawesome-pro
@angular/core Grpc.Tools
@angular/forms jquery
@angular/platform-browser jquery.easy-pie-chart
@angular/platform-browser-dynamic jQuery-contextMenu
@angular/router jQuery-contextMenuRtl
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@microsoft/signalr jquery-ui
@ngrx/core json3
@ngrx/effects jstree
@ngrx/store jstree-bootstrap-theme
AlphaFS LazyCache.AspNetCore
am-js-tree lodash
angular-animate Microsoft.Data.SqlClient
angular-bind-html-compile Microsoft.Extensions.Logging
angular-bootstrap Microsoft.Net
angular-bootstrap-colorpicker Microsoft.SharePointOnline.CSOM
angular-cache Microsoft.SqlServer.SqlManagementObjects
angular-cookies Microsoft.Windows.Compatibility
angular-daterangepicker modernizr
angular-drag-and-drop-lists Netapp ManageOntap API
angular-loading ngx-progressbar
angular-messages nvd3
angular-mocks offline
angular-nvd3 Open XML
angular-resizable Portable.BouncyCastle
angular-resource Python
angular-slick-carousel pythonnet_netstandard_py39_win
angular-translate Quartz.Net
angular-translate-loader-static-files Quartz.Plugins
angular-translate-once rangy
angular-translate-storage-cookie requirejs
angular-translate-storage-local reselect
angular-ui-grid restangular
angular-ui-router rxjs
angular-xeditable slick-carousel
babel-polyfill spaCy
bootstrap CSS spectrum
bootstrap-daterangepicker spin.js
bootstrap-rtl SSH.Net
bootstrap-sass System.ServiceModel.Security
classlist.js textAngular
core-js ua-parser-js
d3 web-animations-js
Elasticsearch.Nest zone.js
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8.5.5 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 and FPT_TUD_EXT.2:
Each customer that is entitled to the TOE software has a username and password for accessing SailPoint’s
customer portal. Connections to the SailPoint customer portal are protected using HTTPS. SailPoint’s
customer portal contains a full list of all versions of the product that are currently still supported. The
TOE administrator downloads the software installation package or software update package from
SailPoint’s customer portal. This is the only method for distributing TOE software. Therefore, the TOE
does not have the capability to download, modify, replace or update its own binary code.
The software installation package is in either the standard Windows Installer (.MSI) format or .EXE
format. During the build process, SailPoint digitally signs the .MSI or .EXE file using their private key
and their certificate signed by DigiCert. During the installation process, the platform will validate the
certificate using the public key from DigiCert that is already loaded on the platform and verifies the
digital signature on the .MSI or .EXE file using the public key in the certificate. The installation process
will only occur if the signature validation is successful.
The software version of the TOE is always displayed after the administrator authenticates to the TOE via
the fat client. The TOE automatically checks its software version against the latest available software
version provided by SailPoint. If a newer software version is available, the TOE will send an email to the
configured email address of an administrator.
Software update packages are in the Windows Universal Application package (.APPX) format. During
the build process, SailPoint digitally signs a software update package using their private key and their
certificate signed by DigiCert. Once a software update package is on the system where the TOE is
installed, any administrator account with permission to the ‘Start Installation’ button via the fat client can
initiate the update process. The administrator would identify the location of the software update package
and select it for import through the fat client. The fat client will request the platform to validate the
certificate using the public key from DigiCert that is already loaded on the platform and verifies the
digital signature on the software update package using the public key in the certificate. If signature
validation is successful, the administrator can click the ‘Start Installation’ button to initiate the update. If
the validation of the digital signature fails, an error will be generated and the ‘Start Installation’ button
will not be displayed.
The TOE’s uninstallation process results in the deletion of all traces of the application, with the exception
of configuration settings, output files, and audit/log events. The administrator will execute the uninstall
through the TOE’s installers which will stop and remove all services and will then begin removing files
related to the application. The administrator will then use the platform’s uninstall application program to
complete the TOE’s uninstall.
8.5.5.1 Timely Security Updates:
SailPoint has defined a Product Vulnerability Management Policy for their operations which applies to all
of their product lines, including the entire FAM product. The contents of this section are the publicly
releasable description of SailPoint’s Product Vulnerability Management Policy.
SailPoint continuously performs security assessments of FAM for vulnerabilities by performing internal
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testing as well as contracting third-party security verification organizations. Customers can report security
issues by opening a support case through SailPoint’s support website: https://support.sailpoint.com/. The
support website is protected with HTTPS and requires customers to enter their email address and
password associated with their SailPoint customer account.
When a potential vulnerability is discovered or reported, SailPoint will confirm internally that a
vulnerability is present in FAM. SailPoint will then develop a mitigation to address the vulnerability
which can either be a configuration change to FAM or the development of a software update package.
The mitigation will be relayed to customers by providing a security notification on the SailPoint support
site along with information regarding the mitigation. SailPoint’s support team also provide their
customers a public key for support team emails which can contain updates regarding security
notifications. This allows SailPoint to send signed and encrypted emails to customers which have signed
up for email updates. Mitigations which require configuration changes to FAM will have the steps defined
within the security notification. Mitigations which require software updates will result in a software
update package being created and released per the process described in Section 8.5.5.
SailPoint utilizes the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) v3 scoring system to weight the
severity of confirmed vulnerabilities. SailPoint is committed to having mitigations available for Critical
and High vulnerabilities within 30 days. Medium vulnerabilities will have mitigations available within 90
days. Items that score as Low and Informational have no set commitment period but are often placed into
consideration by SailPoint’s Product Management team for prioritization in a future release.
8.6 Trusted Path/Channel
8.6.1 FTP_DIT_EXT.1:
The TOE invokes the platform’s .NET Core to encrypt the communications between the TOE and one or
more remote Activity Monitors. The TOE calls the .NET System.ServiceModel API for this interface. All
communication over this interface is protected by TLS, whereas the TOE platform acts as a TLS server
with no mutual authentication.