Certification Report
EAL 2 Evaluation of
Hugin Yazılım Teknolojileri A.Ş.
HCRX v1.0
issued by
Turkish Standards Institution
Common Criteria Certification Scheme
Certificate Number: 21.0.01/TSE-CCCS-24
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Doküman No YTBD-01-01-FR-01
CCCS CERTIFICATION REPORT
Yayın Tarihi 23/01/2015
RevizyonTarihi No 00
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
DOCUMENT INFORMATION .......................................................................................................................................................3
DOCUMENT CHANGE LOG..........................................................................................................................................................3
DISCLAIMER..................................................................................................................................................................................3
FOREWORD ...................................................................................................................................................................................3
RECOGNITION OF THE CERTIFICATE .....................................................................................................................................4
1 – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................................................5
1.1 BRIEF DESCRIPTION.....................................................................................................................................................................5
1.2 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONS ..........................................................................................................................................................6
1.3 THREATS .....................................................................................................................................................................................7
2 – CERTIFICATION RESULTS .............................................................................................................................................................9
2.1 IDENTIFICATION OF TOE..............................................................................................................................................................9
2.2 SECURITY POLICY ......................................................................................................................................................................10
2.3 ASSUMPTIONS AND CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE .........................................................................................................................12
2.4 ARCHITECTURAL INFORMATION ...............................................................................................................................................13
2.5 DOCUMENTATION ....................................................................................................................................................................14
2.6 IT PRODUCT TESTING ................................................................................................................................................................14
2.6.1 DEVELOPER TESTING..............................................................................................................................................................15
2.6.2 EVALUATOR TESTING .............................................................................................................................................................15
2.7 EVALUATED CONFIGURATION...................................................................................................................................................16
2.8 RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION ..................................................................................................................................................16
2.9 EVALUATOR COMMENTS / RECOMMENDATIONS .....................................................................................................................17
3 SECURITY TARGET........................................................................................................................................................................18
4 GLOSSARY....................................................................................................................................................................................18
5 BIBLIOGRAPHY.............................................................................................................................................................................19
6 ANNEXES .....................................................................................................................................................................................19
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Document Information
Date of Issue 13.04.2015
Version of Report 1.0
Author İbrahim Halil KIRMIZI
Technical Responsible Zümrüt MÜFTÜOĞLU
Approved Mariye UMAY AKKAYA
Date Approved 13.04.2015
Certification Report Number 21.0.01/15-029
Developer Hugin Yazılım Teknolojileri A.Ş.
Sponsor Hugin Yazılım Teknolojileri A.Ş.
Evaluation Lab TÜBİTAK BİLGEM OKTEM
TOE HCRX v1.0
Pages 19
Document Change Log
Release Date Pages Affected Remarks/Change Reference
V1.0 19 All First Released
DISCLAIMER
This certification report and the IT product defined in the associated Common Criteria document has been
evaluated at an accredited and licensed evaluation facility conformance to Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation, version 3.1, revision 4, using Common Methodology for IT Products Evaluation, version 3.1, revision
4. This certification report and the associated Common Criteria document apply only to the identified version
and release of the product in its evaluated configuration. Evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the
provisions of the CCCS, and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation report are consistent with
the evidence adduced. This report and its associated Common Criteria document are not an endorsement of the
product by the Turkish Standardization Institution, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to
this report and its associated Common Criteria document, and no warranty is given for the product by the Turkish
Standardization Institution, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report and its
associated Common Criteria document.
FOREWORD
The Certification Report is drawn up to submit the Certification Commission the results and evaluation
information upon the completion of a Common Criteria evaluation service performed under the Common Criteria
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Certification Scheme. Certification Report covers all non-confidential security and technical information related
with a Common Criteria evaluation which is made under the STCD Common Criteria Certification Scheme. This
report is issued publicly to and made available to all relevant parties for reference and use.
The Common Criteria Certification Scheme (CCSS) provides an evaluation and certification service to ensure
the reliability of Information Security (IS) products. Evaluation and tests are conducted by a public or
commercial Common Criteria Evaluation Facility (CCTL) under CCCS’ supervision.
CCEF is a facility, licensed as a result of inspections carried out by CCCS for performing tests and evaluations
which will be the basis for Common Criteria certification. As a prerequisite for such certification, the CCEF has
to fulfill the requirements of the standard ISO/IEC 17025 and should be accredited by accreditation bodies. The
evaluation and tests related with the concerned product have been performed by TÜBİTAK BİLGEM OKTEM
which is a public CCTL.
A Common Criteria Certificate given to a product means that such product meets the security requirements
defined in its security target document that has been approved by the CCCS. The Security Target document is
where requirements defining the scope of evaluation and test activities are set forth. Along with this certification
report, the user of the IT product should also review the security target document in order to understand any
assumptions made in the course of evaluations, the environment where the IT product will run, security
requirements of the IT product and the level of assurance provided by the product.
This certification report is associated with the Common Criteria Certificate issued by the CCCS for HCRX v1.0.
whose evaluation was completed on 30.03.2015 and whose evaluation technical report was drawn up by
TÜBİTAK BİLGEM OKTEM (as CCTL), and with the Security Target document with version no 2.2 of the
relevant product.
The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target document are posted on the STCD
Certified Products List at bilisim.tse.org.tr portal and the Common Criteria Portal (the official web site of the
Common Criteria Project).
RECOGNITION OF THE CERTIFICATE
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo is printed on the certificate to indicate that this certificate
is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA.
The CCRA has been signed by the Turkey in 2003 and provides mutual recognition of certificates based on the
CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including EAL4. The current list of signatory nations and approved
certification schemes can be found on:
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/
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1 – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report constitutes the certification results by the certification body on the evaluation results
applied with requirements of the Common Criteria for Information Security Evaluation.
Evaluated IT product name: HCRX
IT Product version: v1.0
Developer’s Name: Hugin Yazılım Teknolojileri A.Ş.
Name of CCTL: TÜBİTAK BİLGEM OKTEM
Assurance Package: EAL 2
Completion date of evaluation: 30.03.2015
1.1 Brief Description
The TOE is an an application software which is the main items of a Fiscal Cash Register (FCR).
TOE is used to process the transaction amount of purchases which can be viewed by both seller and
buyer. Since transaction amount is used to determine tax revenues; secure processing, storing and
transmission of this data is very important.
The FCR is mandatory for first-and second-class traders and is not mandatory for sellers who sell
the goods back to their previous seller as completely the same as the purchased good.
Figure 1 shows the general overview of the TOE and related components as regarded in this ST.
The dark blue part of Figure 1 is the TOE. The operational environment is also shown in the figure
including Input/output interface, fiscal memory, daily memory, database, ERU, fiscal certificate
memory (HSM). These components are non-TOE environments which are crucial parts of the FCR
for functionality and security. Connections between the TOE and its environment are also subject of
the evaluation since they are interfaces of the TOE.
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Figure 1 TOE and Related Components
1.2 TOE Security Functions
TOE Security functions are;
 TOE supports access control.
 The cases where the main processor and the fiscal memory are included within the same
electronic seal secure communication is not mandatory. TOE is able to detect disconnection
between main processor and fiscal memory and enter into the maintenance mode.
 TOE supports usage of ITU X509 v3 formatted certificate and its protected private key for
authentication and secure communication with PRA- IS and TSM.
 TOE supports secure communication between FCR-PRA-IS and FCR–TSM.
 TOE ensures the integrity of event data, sales data, authentication data, characterization data
and FCR parameters.
 TOE records important events defined in PRA Messaging Protocol Document and send
urgent event data immediately to PRA-IS in a secure way.
 TOE detects physical attacks to FCR and enters into the maintenance mode in such cases.
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1.3 Threats
 T.AccessControl
Adverse action: Authenticated users could try to use functions which are not allowed.
Threat agent: An attacker who has basic attack potential, has physical and logical access to
FCR.
Asset: Event data, sales data, time information.
 T.Authentication
Adverse action: Unauthorized users could try to use FCR functions.
Threat agent: An attacker who has basic attack potential, has logical and physical access to
the FCR
Asset: Sales data, event data, time information
 T.MDData
Adverse action: This threat deals with four types of data: event data, sales data,
characterization data and FCR parameters.
An attacker could try to manipulate the event data to hide its actions and unauthorised access
to the FCR, failure reports, and deletion of logs. An attacker also could try to disclose
important events while transmitted between PRA-IS and FCR.
An attacker could try to manipulate or delete the sales data generated by TOE which may
result in tax fraud. In addition, an attacker also could try to disclose sales data while
transmitted between PRA-IS and FCR. Manipulation and deletion of sales data may be
caused by magnetic and electronic reasons.
An attacker could try to manipulate the characterization data to cover information
about tax fraud; to masquerade the user identity.
An attacker could try to manipulate the FCR parameters to use FCR in undesired condition.
Threat agent: An attacker who has basic attack potential, has physical and logical access to
the FCR.
Asset: Event data, sales data, characterization data, FCR parameters.
 T.Eavesdrop
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Adverse action: An attacker could try to eavesdrop event data, sales data and
characterization data transmitted between the TOE and the PRA-IS and also between the
TOE and the distributed memory units (Fiscal memory, Database, Daily memory, ERU).
Threat agent: An attacker who has basic attack potential, physical and logical access to the
FCR.
Asset: Characterization data, sales data, and event data.
 T.Skimming
Adverse action: An attacker could try to imitate PRA-IS to receive information from FCR
and to imitate TSM to set parameters to FCR via the communication channel.
Threat agent: An attacker who has basic attack potential and logical access to the FCR.
Asset : Sales data, and event data, FCR parameters.
 T.Counterfeit
Adverse action: An attacker could try to imitate FCR by using sensitive(session keys) data
while communicating with PRA-IS and TSM to cover information about tax fraud.
Threat agent: An attacker who has basic attack potential, has physical and logical access
to the FCR.
Asset: Sensitive data (session keys).
 T.Malfunction
Adverse action: An attacker may try to use FCR out of its normal operational conditions to
cause malfunction without the knowledge of TOE.
Threat agent: An attacker who has basic attack potential, has physical access to the FCR.
Asset: Sales data, event data.
 T.ChangingTime
Adverse action: An attacker may try to change time to invalidate the information about
logged events and reports in FCR.
Threat agent: An attacker who has basic attack potential, has physical and logical access to
the FCR.
Asset: Time Information
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2 – CERTIFICATION RESULTS
2.1 Identification of TOE
Certificate Number 21.0.01/TSE-CCCS-24
TOE Name and Version HCRX v1.0
Security Target Title HCRX v1.0 Security Target
Security Target Version 2.2
Security Target Date 03.03.2015
Assurance Level EAL 2
Criteria  Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and General Model;
CCMB-2012-09-001, Version 3.1, Revision 4,
September 2012
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional Components;
CCMB-2012-09-002, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September
2012
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance Components;
CCMB-2012-09-003, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September
2012
Methodology Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology; CCMB-2012-09-004,
Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
Protection Profile Conformance New Generation Fiscal Application Software Protection
Profile TSE-CCCS/PP-006, version 1.8, 18 December 2014
Common Criteria Conformance  Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional Components;
CCMB-2012-09-002, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September
2012, conformant
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance Components;
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CCMB-2012-09-003, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September
2012, conformant
Sponsor Hugin Yazılım Teknolojileri A.Ş.
Developer Hugin Yazılım Teknolojileri A.Ş.
Evaluation Facility TÜBİTAK BİLGEM OKTEM
Certification Scheme TSE-CCCS
2.2 Security Policy
The Security Target for the TOE claims conformance to the New Generation Fiscal Application
Software Protection Profile TSE-CCCS/PP-006, version 1.8, 18 December 2014
Organizational Security Policies are;
 P.Certificate
It has to be assured that certificates which are installed at initialization step, are compatible
with ITU X.509 v3 format. FCR contains FCR certificate, Certification Authority root
certificate, Certification Authority sub-root (subordinate) certificate and UpdateControl
certificate. UpdateControl certificate is used to verify the signature of the TOE
 P.Comm_EXT
It has to be assured that communication between TOE and external devices is used to
encrypted using AES algorithm with 256 bits according to External Device Communication
Protocol Document
 P.InformationLeakage
It has to be assured that TOE’s environment provides a secure mechanism which prevents
attacker to obtain sensitive information (secret key) when FCR performs encryption
operation; i.e by side channel attacks like SPA (Simple Power Analysis), SEMA (Simple
Electromagnetic Analysis), DPA (Differential Power Analysis), DEMA (Differential
Electromagnetic Analysis)
 P.SecureEnvirconment
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It has to be assured that environment of TOE senses disconnection between fiscal memory
and main processor. Then TOE enters into the maintenance mode and logs urgent event.
Moreover, it has to be assured that fiscal memory doesn't accept transactions with negative
amounts which results in a decrease of total tax value. Also it has to be assured that
environment of TOE provides a mechanism that sales data in daily memory which is not
reflected to the fiscal memory cannot be deleted and modified in an uncontrolled way. In
addition to this, it has to be assured that sales data in ERU cannot be deleted and modified
 P.PhysicalTamper
It has to be assured that TOE environment and TOE provide a tamper respondent system
which is formed by electromechanical seals. It has to be assured that physical tampering
protection system protects the keys (asymmetric key, symmetric key), the certificates, event
data, characterization data, FCR parameters and sales data in FCR. It has to be assured that
TOE logs this type of events and enters into the maintenance mode when physical tampering
protection system detect unauthorised access. On the other hand it has to be assured that
authorised access such as maintenance work or service works are logged
 P.PKI
It has to be assured that IT environment of the TOE provides public key infrastructure for
encryption, signing and key agreement
 P.UpdateControl
TOE is allowed to be updated by only TSM or Authorised Manufacturer User to avoid
possible threats during this operation, FCR shall verify the signature of the new version of
TOE to ensure that the TOE to be updated is signed by the correct organisation. Thus, the
TOE to be updated is ensured to be the correct certified version because only the certified
versions will be signed. In addition, FCR shall check version of TOE to ensure that it is the
latest version
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2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
Assumptions for the operational environment of the composite TOE are;
 A.TrustedManufacturer
It is assumed that manufacturing is done by trusted manufacturers. They process
manufacturing step in a manner which maintains IT security
 A.Control
It is assumed that PRA-IS personnel performs random controls on FCR. During these
controls PRA-IS personnel should check that if tax amount and total amount printed values
on receipt and sent to PRA-IS are the same. In addition to this, a similar check should be
made for events as well
 A.Initialisation
It is assumed that environment of TOE provides secure initialization steps. Initialization step
is consist of secure boot of operating system, and integrity check for TSF data. Moreover, it
is assumed that environment of TOE provides secure installation of certificate to the FCR in
initialization phase. Before certificate installation it is assumed that asymmetric key pair
generated in a manner which maintains security posture
 A.TrustedUser
User is assumed to be trusted. It is assumed that for each sale a sales receipt is provided to
the buyer
 A.Activation
It is assumed that environment of TOE provides secure activation steps at the beginning of
the TOE operation phase and after each maintenance process
 A.AuthorisedService
It is assumed that repairing is done by trusted authorised services. The repairing step is
processed in a manner which maintains legal limits
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 A.Ext_Key
It is assumed that External Device (EFT-POS, Main Unit) generates strong key for
communicating with TOE
2.4 Architectural Information
TOE consists of a fiscal software running on top of a Linux operating system covered by a special
cover outside and inside together composing the cash register hardware providing the following
services;
 Storing sales data in a fiscal memory
 Storing receipt details in daily memory
 Generating sales reports
 Transmitting sales reports and audit data to TSM
with the following hardware and software components;
 A fiscal memory storing all the sales data in database
 A daily memory storing daily sales data in database
 Electronic journal to save receipt copies
 A hardware security module
 A software controlled mesh covering the above units
 And a fiscal software running on top of above hardware providing necessary services to
TSM unit.
The main purpose of the TOE is to store and service the sales data as well as audit trails whenever
requested from central unit, TSM. These components implements the TSFs listed in Security Target
with the help of environmental elements.
TOE is composed of the environmental elements;
 A Linux OS running kernel [version Linux 2.6.36]
 SQLite RDBMS of [version 3.7.3]
 OpenSSL [version 1.0.0b] library for cryptographic operations and communication
 Fiscal memory for storing sales data
 Daily memory for copying daily sales data
 Electronic record unit for storing receipts
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 Hardware security module for storing encryption keys
 Ethernet and GPRS network adapters
 Iptables for controlling the network flow
 A printer for printing receipts
 Keyboard, display and battery
TSF is a software that is developed and running on top of Linux operating system managing the
environmental units having an architecture of;
 Display & keyboard unit is backed by the UI layer of the software
 UI Layer calls the business functions according to the actions performed by the user.
 Business Layer uses its external connections to store sales/audit data as well as data access
layer to access RDBMS.
 TOE is developed using C language on Linux platform and compiled using arm-linux cross
compiler whose gcc version is 4.3.5 with the default flags of –fstack-protector as well as
address space layout randomization for stack protection
2.5 Documentation
During the evaluation; the configuration of evaluation evidences which are composed of Software
source code, Common Criteria related documents, sustenance documents and guides are shown
below;
Name of Document Version Number Publication Date
HCRX v1.0 Security Target 2.2 03.03.2015
FT-202 User Manual 2.1 12.04.2015
FT-202 Service Procedures 1.6 12.04.2015
Table 1 – Evaluation Evidences
2.6 IT Product Testing
During the evaluation, all evaluation evidences of TOE were delivered and transferred completely
to CCTL by the developers. All the delivered evaluation evidences which include software,
documents, etc. are mapped to the assurance families Common Criteria and Common Methodology;
so the connections between the assurance families and the evaluation evidences has been
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established. The evaluation results are available in the final Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) of
HCRX v1.0
It is concluded that the TOE supports EAL 2. There are 19 assurance families which are all
evaluated with the methods detailed in the ETR.
IT Product Testing is mainly described in two parts:
2.6.1 Developer Testing:
 TOE Test Coverage: Developer has prepared TOE System Test Document according to the
TOE Functional Specification documentation.
 TOE Test Depth: Developer has prepared TOE System Test Document according to the
TOE Design documentation which include TSF subsystems and its interactions.
 TOE Functional Testing: Developer has made functional tests according to the test
documentation. Test plans, test scenarios, expected test results and actual test results are in
the test documentation.
2.6.2 Evaluator Testing:
 Independent Testing: Evaluator has done a total of 10 sample independent tests. 5 of them
are selected from developer`s test plans. The other 5 tests are evaluator`s independent tests.
All of them are related to TOE security functions.
 Penetration Testing: Evaluator has done 8 penetration tests to find out if TOE`s
vulnerabilities can be used for malicious purposes. The potential vulnerabilities and the
penetration tests are in “TOE Security Functions Penetration Tests Scope”
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2.7 Evaluated Configuration
During the evaluation; the configuration of evaluation evidences which are composed of Common
Criteria documents, sustenance documents and guides are shown below;
Name of Document Version
Number
Publication Date
HCRX v1.0 Security Target 2.2 03.03.2015
HCRX v1.0 Functional Specification 1.6 12.04.2015
HCRX v1.0 Security Architecture 1.4 28.03.2015
HCRX v1.0 TOE Design 1.6 28.03.2015
FT-202 User Manual 2.1 12.04.2015
FT-202 Service Procedures 1.6 12.04.2015
HCRX v1.0 Configuration Management Plan 3.1 12.04.2015
HCRX v1.0 Test Documentation 1.6 12.04.2015
Table 2 – Documentation
2.8 Results of the Evaluation
Table 2 below provides a complete listing of the Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE.
These requirements consists of the Evaluation Assurance Level 2 (EAL 2) components as specified
in Part 3 of the Common Criteria;
Assurance Class Component Component Title
Development
ADV_ARC.1 Security Architecture Description
ADV_FSP.4 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_TDS.1 Basic Design
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational User Guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative Procedures
Life-Cycle
Support
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery Procedures
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance Claims
YAZILIM TEST VE BELGELENDİRME
DAİRESİ BAŞKANLIĞI
Doküman No YTBD-01-01-FR-01
CCCS CERTIFICATION REPORT
Yayın Tarihi 23/01/2015
RevizyonTarihi No 00
Sayfa 17/19
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Basım tarih ve saati: 30.11.2016 11:54
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_ECD.1 Extended Components Definition
ASE_INT.1 ST Introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security Objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived Security Requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security Problem Definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE Summary Specification
Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_FUN.1 Functional Testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent Testing
Vulnerability
Analysis
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
Table 2 – Security Assurance Requirements of TOE
The Evaluation Team assigned a Pass, Fail, or Inconclusive verdict to each work unit of each EAL 2
assurance component. For Fail or Inconclusive work unit verdicts, the Evaluation Team advised the
developer about the issues requiring resolution or clarification within the evaluation evidence. In
this way, the Evaluation Team assigned an overall Pass verdict to the assurance component only
when all of the work units for that component had been assigned a Pass verdict. So for TOE “HCRX
v1.0” the results of the assessment of all evaluation tasks are “Pass”.
The result of AVA_VAN.2 evaluation is given below:
It is determined that TOE, in its operational environment, is resistant to an attacker possessing
“Basic” attack potential.
2.9 Evaluator Comments / Recommendations
No recommendations or comments have been communicated to CCCS by the evaluators related to
the evaluation process of “HCRX v1.0” product, result of the evaluation, or the ETR.
YAZILIM TEST VE BELGELENDİRME
DAİRESİ BAŞKANLIĞI
Doküman No YTBD-01-01-FR-01
CCCS CERTIFICATION REPORT
Yayın Tarihi 23/01/2015
RevizyonTarihi No 00
Sayfa 18/19
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Basım tarih ve saati: 30.11.2016 11:54
3 SECURITY TARGET
The Security Target associated with this Certification Report is identified by the following
terminology:
Title: HCRX v1.0 Security Target
Version: v2.2
Date of Document: 03.03.2015
4 GLOSSARY
ADV : Assurance of Development
AGD : Assurance of Guidance Documents
ALC : Assurance of Life Cycle
ASE : Assurance of Security Target Evaluation
ATE : Assurance of Tests Evaluation
AVA : Assurance of Vulnerability Analysis
BİLGEM : Bilişim ve Bilgi Güvenliği İleri Teknolojiler Araştırma Merkezi
CC : Common Criteria (Ortak Kriterler)
CCCS : Common Criteria Certification Scheme (TSE)
CCRA : Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CCTL : Common Criteria Test Laboratory (OKTEM)
CEM :Common Evaluation Methodology
CMC : Configuration Management Capability
CMS : Configuration Management Scope
DEL : Delivery
EAL : Evaluation Assurance Level
FCR: Fiscal Cash Register
GR : Observation Report
OKTEM : Ortak Kriterler Test Merkezi
OPE : Opretaional User Guidance
OSP : Organisational Security Policy
PP : Protection Profile
PRA: Presidency of Revenue Administration
PRE : Preperative Procedures
YAZILIM TEST VE BELGELENDİRME
DAİRESİ BAŞKANLIĞI
Doküman No YTBD-01-01-FR-01
CCCS CERTIFICATION REPORT
Yayın Tarihi 23/01/2015
RevizyonTarihi No 00
Sayfa 19/19
Bu dokümanın güncelliği, elektronik ortamda TSE Doküman Yönetim Sisteminden takip edilmelidir.
Basım tarih ve saati: 30.11.2016 11:54
SAR : Security Assurance Requirements
SFR : Security Functional Requirements
ST : Security Target
STCD :Software Test and Certification Department
TOE : Target of Evaluation
TSF : TOE Secırity Functionality
TSFI : TSF Interface
5 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4,
September 2012
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM, Version 3.1
Revision 4, September 2012
[3] CC Supporting Document Guidance, Mandatory Technical Document Composife Product
Evaluation for Smart Cards and Similar Devices,April,2012,CCDB-2012-04-001
[4] YTBD-01-01-TL-01 Certification Report Preparation Instructions, Rel.Date: July,30,2013
[5] PRA Messaging Protocol, v2.02
6 ANNEXES
There is no additional information which is inappropriate for reference in other sections