Australasian Information
Security Evaluation Program
Cisco WLAN 8.0
Certification Report
2016/100
07-10-2016
Version 1.0
07-10-2016 Version 1.0 ii
Commonwealth of Australia 2016
Reproduction is authorised provided
that the report is copied in its entirety.
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Amendment Record
Version Date Description
1.0 07-10-2016 External
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Executive Summary
This report describes the findings of the IT security evaluation of Cisco WLAN 8.0
against Common Criteria and Protection Profiles.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Cisco WLAN 8.0. The TOE is a Wireless LAN
(WLAN) Access System comprised of multiple products operating together to provide
secure wireless access to wired and wireless networks end-to-end wireless encryption,
and centralised administration of all WLAN controllers and Access Points (APs) in
the system.
The functionality defined in the Security Target that was subsequently evaluated is
summarised as follows:
 Security Audit – auditable events are stored internally in the TOE. The TOE
provides extensive auditing capabilities. The TOE can audit events related to
cryptographic functionality, identification and authentication, and
administrative actions. The Cisco WLAN generates an audit record for each
auditable event. Each security relevant audit event has the date, timestamp,
event description, and subject identity.
 Cryptological Support – The TOE provides cryptography in support of:
o IPsec to secure communications between the WLC and RADIUS
server
o TLS/HTTPS for secure remote administration using WebGUI
o TLS to secure communications between WLC remote syslog server
o Data TLS to secure communications between APs and WLC
o WPA2 to secure communications between APs and wireless clients.
This cryptography in Wireless LAN Controller (WLC) and AP components
has been validated for conformance to the requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level
2. The CMVP certificates are listed in the ST.
 User Data - The TOE ensures that all information flows from the TOE do not
contain residual information from previous traffic. Residual data is never
transmitted from the TOE, and when packets must be padded, they are padded
with zeros.
 Identification and Authentication – The TOE provides authentication
services for administrative users of the TOE who connect locally to the
Command Line Interface (CLI) via serial console of the WLAN Controller or
remotely to the GUI over TLS. The TOE requires administrators to
authenticate prior to being granted access to any of the management
functionality
Security Management – Through CLI and GUI of the Controller, the TOE
provides secure administrative services for management of general TOE
configuration and the security functionality provided by the TOE.
Protection of the TSF and resource allocation – The TOE protects against
interference and tampering by untrusted subjects by implementing
identification, authentication, and access controls to limit configuration to
Authorised Administrators. The TOE prevents reading of plaintext
cryptographic keys and passwords.
07-10-2016 Version 1.0 v
 TOE Access – Administrative sessions can be set to terminate after a
configurable idle-time limit. Once a session has been terminated the TOE
requires administrators to re-authenticate to establish a new session. A
customizable login-banner can be displayed at the CLI and GUI login prompts
prior to allowing any administrative access to the TOE. Wireless client session
establishment can be restricted by day, time, and ‘location’, which can be an
IP address or WLAN ID.
 Trusted Path / Channels – The wireless connections between the APs and
wireless clients are secured using Wi-Fi Protected Access 2 (WPA2).
The report concludes that the product has complied with the U.S Government
Protection Profile for Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Access Systems
(WLANPP) Version 1.0, December 1, 2011 and that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the Common Criteria and the requirements of the Australasian
Information Security Evaluation Program (AISEP). The evaluation was performed by
CSC Australia and was completed on 12 August 2016. The status of the evaluation
was concurrent for a large portion of the evaluation time.
With regard to the secure operation of the TOE, the Australasian Certification
Authority (ACA) recommends that administrators:
a) Ensure that the TOE is operated in the evaluated configuration and that
assumptions concerning the TOE security environment are fulfilled
b) Configure and operate the TOE according to the vendor’s product
administrator guidance
c) Maintain the underlying environment in a secure manner so that the integrity
of the TOE Security Function is preserved.
d) Avoid the use of self signed certificates
e) Use the Command line interface local console instead of the web GUI.
f) Note that workstations used for remote administration of the TOE must be
dedicated for performing administrative tasks on the TOE, and prevented from
communicating (sending and receiving traffic) with assets not related to
administration of the TOE
g) Note that Internet Explorer is not compatible with the WLC WebGUI.
This report includes information about the underlying security policies and
architecture of the TOE, and information regarding the conduct of the evaluation.
It is the responsibility of the user to ensure that the TOE meets their requirements. For
this reason, it is recommended that a prospective user of the TOE refer to the Security
Target and read this Certification Report prior to deciding whether to purchase the
product.
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Contents
Chapter 1 – Introduction ...............................................................................1
1.1 Overview .............................................................................................1
1.2 Purpose...............................................................................................1
1.3 Identification........................................................................................1
Chapter 2 – Target of Evaluation..................................................................3
2.1 Overview .............................................................................................3
2.2 Description of the TOE........................................................................3
2.3 TOE Functionality................................................................................3
2.4 TOE Architecture.................................................................................5
2.5 Clarification of Scope ..........................................................................5
2.5.1 Evaluated Functionality ................................................................................... 5
2.5.2 Non-evaluated Functionality and Services...................................................... 6
2.6 Usage..................................................................................................6
2.6.1 Evaluated Configuration.................................................................................... 6
2.6.2 Secure Delivery ............................................................................................... 6
2.6.3 Installation of the TOE..................................................................................... 7
2.7 Version Verification .............................................................................7
2.8 Documentation and Guidance.............................................................7
2.9 Secure Usage .....................................................................................7
Chapter 3 – Evaluation ..................................................................................8
3.1 Overview .............................................................................................8
3.2 Evaluation Procedures ........................................................................8
3.3 Testing ................................................................................................8
3.3.1 Testing Coverage.............................................................................................. 8
3.4 Entropy Testing ...................................................................................8
3.5 Penetration Testing .............................................................................8
Chapter 4 – Certification .............................................................................10
4.1 Overview ...........................................................................................10
4.2 Assurance .........................................................................................10
4.3 Certification Result ............................................................................10
4.4 Recommendations ............................................................................10
Annex A – References and Abbreviations.................................................12
A.1 References........................................................................................12
A.2 Abbreviations ....................................................................................13
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
1.1 Overview
This chapter contains information about the purpose of this document and how to
identify the Target of Evaluation (TOE).
1.2 Purpose
The purpose of this Certification Report is to:
a) Report the certification results of the IT security evaluation of the Cisco
WLAN 8.0 against the requirements of the Common Criteria (CC) and the
WLANPP
b) Provide a source of detailed security information about the TOE for any
interested parties.
This report should be read in conjunction with the TOE’s Security Target (Ref 1)
which provides a full description of the security requirements and specifications that
were used as the basis of the evaluation.
1.3 Identification
The TOE is the Cisco WLAN 8.0.
Table 1 Identification Information
Description Version
Evaluation Scheme Australasian Information Security Evaluation
Program.
TOE Cisco WLAN 8.0
Software Version 8.0.132.0
Hardware Platforms Cisco 2504, 5508, 7510, 8510, and WiSM2
Controllers; Cisco 1142, 1262, 1530, 1552,
1570 series, 1600 series, 1700 series, 2600
series, 2700 series, 3502, 3600 series with
3000M add-on module, and 3700 series APs,
and ISR 891 integrated AP.
Security Target Cisco WLAN 8.0 Common Criteria Security
Target Version 1.0, September 2016
07-10-2016 Version 1.0 2
Evaluation Technical
Report
Cisco WLAN 8.0, Evaluation Technical Report,
(T0080) REFERENCE: CSC-EFC-T0080-ETR
EVALUATION-IN-CONFIDENCE, Version 1.0
Criteria Common Criteria (CC) Version 3.1, Revision 4,
dated: September 2012
Methodology Common Methodology for Information
Technology Security version 3.1, Revision 4,
September 2012
Conformance U.S Government Protection Profile for Wireless
Local Area Network (WLAN) Access Systems
(WLANPP) Version 1.0, December 1, 2011
Developer Cisco Systems Inc.
170 West Tasman Drive,
San Jose,
California 95134
United States
Evaluation Facility CSC Australia Pty Limited
12 Brindabella Circuit
Brindabella Business Park
ACT 2609
Australia
07-10-2016 Version 1.0 3
Chapter 2 – Target of Evaluation
2.1 Overview
This chapter contains information about the Target of Evaluation (TOE), including a
description of functionality provided, its architectural components, the scope of
evaluation, security policies, and its secure usage.
2.2 Description of the TOE
The TOE is Cisco WLAN 8.0. The TOE is a Wireless LAN (WLAN) Access System
comprised of multiple products operating together to provide secure wireless access to
wired and wireless networks end-to-end wireless encryption, and centralised
administration of all WLAN controllers and APs in the system.
2.3 TOE Functionality
The functionality defined in the Security Target that was subsequently evaluated is
summarised as follows:
 Security Audit – auditable events are stored internally in the TOE. The TOE
provides extensive auditing capabilities. The TOE can audit events related to
cryptographic functionality, identification and authentication, and
administrative actions. The Cisco WLAN generates an audit record for each
auditable event. Each security relevant audit event has the date, timestamp,
event description, and subject identity
 Cryptological Support – The TOE provides cryptography in support of:
o IPsec to secure communications between the WLC and RADIUS
server
o TLS/HTTPS for secure remote administration using WebGUI
o TLS to secure communications between WLC remote syslog server
o Data TLS to secure communications between APs and WLC
o WPA2 to secure communications between APs and wireless clients.
This cryptography in WLC and AP TOE components has been validated for
conformance to the requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 2. The CVMP
certificates are listed in the ST.
 User Data - The TOE ensures that all information flows from the TOE do not
contain residual information from previous traffic. Residual data is never
transmitted from the TOE, and when packets must be padded, they are padded
with zeros.
 Identification and Authentication – The TOE provides authentication
services for administrative users of the TOE who connect locally to the CLI
via serial console of the WLAN Controller or remotely to the GUI over TLS.
The TOE requires administrators to authenticate prior to being granted access
to any of the management functionality. The TOE can be configured to require
a minimum password length and to enforce mandatory password complexity
rules. All of the local and remote CLI and GUI connections the TOE support
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password-based authentication of administrators against either a local user
database or remote RADIUS server. For authentication of wireless clients a
RADIUS server must be used (AAA servers are outside the TOE boundary).
The TOE requires the wireless client to perform 802.1X authentication, relying
on an authentication server to authenticate the client, before providing network
access. The TOE acts as a pass through device between the wireless client and
authentication server. The TOE facilitates authentication of wireless clients by
performing the role of authenticator in an 802.1X authentication exchange.
During an 802.1X authentication exchange, wireless client authentication is
relayed by the WLC to a RADIUS server. The TOE will block access to the
port until the authentication server returns an authentication success message
and 802.11 temporal keys are derived and installed on the wireless client and
AP. The TOE provides IPsec to protect the transfer of the Pairwise Master Key
the WLC receives from the RADIUS server.
 Security Management – Through CLI, and GUI of the Controller, the TOE
provides secure administrative services for management of general TOE
configuration and the security functionality provided by the TOE. Functions
available to authorised administrators include, but are not limited to:
o Enabling, disabling, and configuring audit collection
o Modifying the behaviour of cryptographic functions
o Configuring security of communications to/from an external servers
including RADIUS and syslog servers
o Adding/removing/modifying administrative accounts including
specifying a maximum number of successive failed authentication
attempts that will be permitted by remote administrators
o Defining inactivity timeout limits for interactive interfaces to terminate
inactive sessions
o Creating custom login banners for interactive interfaces to be displayed
at time of login.
Accounts with access to CLI and GUI can have read-write access, or can be
assigned to lesser sets of privileges that can be custom-defined. Authorised
administrators are users who have successfully authenticated to the TOE, and
have been granted the necessary privilege to perform some administrative
actions, which may be limited to read-only actions.
 Protection of the TSF and resource allocation – The TOE protects against
interference and tampering by untrusted subjects by implementing
identification, authentication, and access controls to limit configuration to
Authorised administrators. The TOE prevents reading of plaintext
cryptographic keys and passwords. Additionally none of the components of
the TOE includes a general-purpose operating systems and access to the
memory space is restricted to only system functions. Authorised
administrators have the option to verify the integrity of software updates using
cryptographic signatures prior to the software updates being installed. Self-
testing is performed during boot-up to verify correct operation of system
hardware and the cryptographic module. When power-on self-tests (POST) fail
for any controller or AP, the device will not progress to an operational mode
(e.g. will not forward network traffic, nor authenticate wireless clients or
administrators, etc.).
07-10-2016 Version 1.0 5
System resources used to support administrative interfaces are protected by
allowing authorised administrators to limit the number of concurrent sessions.
TOE components will detect and drop (not forward) replayed packets received
at network interfaces (including wireless radio interfaces).
Each TOE component internally maintains the date and time, and clocks are
synchronized among components. This date and time is used as the timestamp
that is applied to audit records generated by the TOE. Administrators can
update the TOE’s clock manually, and/or can configure the TOE to use NTP
to synchronize the TOE’s clock with an external time source.
 TOE Access – Administrative sessions can be set to terminate after a
configurable idle-time limit. Once a session has been terminated the TOE
requires administrators to re-authenticate to establish a new session. A
customizable login-banner can be displayed at the CLI and GUI login prompts
prior to allowing any administrative access to the TOE. Wireless client session
establishment can be restricted by day, time, and location, which can be an IP
address or WLAN ID.
 Trusted Path / Channels – The wireless connections between the APs and
wireless clients are secured using Wi-Fi Protected Access 2 (WPA2).
Specifically, the TOE uses Advanced Encryption Standard – Counter Mode
with Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code Protocol (AES-
CCMP), as defined in the WPA2 standard. TSF data (command and control
data, audit data, etc.) transmitted among controllers and APs of the TOE are
secured with Data TLS (for CAPWAP over DTLS) using ciphersuites required
by the WLANPP for the TLS connections.
2.4 TOE Architecture
The TOE consists of the following major architectural components:
 Wireless controllers
 Wireless integrated service module (WiSM2) controllers
 Access Points and antennae.
2.5 Clarification of Scope
The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria and
associated methodologies.
The evaluated configuration is based on the default installation of the TOE with
additional configuration implemented as per the Cisco WLAN Common Criteria
Operational User Guidance and Preparative Procedures (Ref 2).
The scope of the evaluation was limited to those claims made in the Security Target
(Ref 1).
2.5.1 Evaluated Functionality
All tests performed during the evaluation were taken from WLANPP (Ref 3) and
sufficiently demonstrate the security functionality of the TOE. Some of the tests were
combined for ease of execution.
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2.5.2 Non-evaluated Functionality and Services
Potential users of the TOE are advised that some functions and services have not been
evaluated as part of the evaluation. Potential users of the TOE should carefully
consider their requirements for using functions and services outside of the evaluated
configuration; Australian Government users should refer to Australian Government
Information Security Manual (ISM) (Ref 4) for policy relating to using an evaluated
product in an un-evaluated configuration. New Zealand Government users should
consult the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB).
The following components are outside of the scope of the TOE:
 The wireless connections between the APs and wireless
 Management workstation
 AAA server
 Syslog server
 Certification authority
 File server and
 NTP server
 RADIUS sever
2.6 Usage
2.6.1 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE consists of the Cisco WLAN v8.0.132.0 software. The evaluation was
conducted on the default installation and configuration of the TOE with additional
guidance and configuration information drawn from the Cisco WLAN 8.0 Controller
Configuration Guide (Ref 6).
2.6.2 Secure Delivery
To ensure that the software received is the evaluated product the customer must check
the version details received against the list specified in the TOE. The customer should
perform the following checks to ensure that they have received the correct version of
the TOE:
 Shipment of units from Cisco Distributors to the user is via a commercial
courier company who will pick up the unit from the Distribution Site and
deliver it directly to the user.
 For hardware components; using the packing slip and information on the
stickers, the customer must check that the product number and serial numbers
on the received hardware match what was ordered. Any discrepancies must be
immediately reported to Cisco using the contact information on the packing
slip.
 For Software, the customer will access CCO (Cisco Connection Online) to
download images. Customers will be prompted for their login and password.
To create an account on CCO a user must have a valid support contract with
Cisco and access to the contract number. Access control on the CCO site
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controls what software images a user account is allowed to download.
Encryption using SSL protects the software images as they are being
downloaded from the Cisco web server to the user’s computer.
2.6.3 Installation of the TOE
The installation, generation and start up of the TOE such that it is in evaluated
configuration are detailed in the Guidance documentation (Ref 2).
2.7 Version Verification
To ensure the hardware received is the evaluated product the customer must check the
models received against the list of TOE component hardware models at the beginning
of the PRE wrapper document (Ref 2). This document is made available on the Cisco
website for download.
In addition to verifying model numbers for hardware components, the software
versions must also be verified by the customer recipient. Software versions can be
checked by following the “Identifying the Evaluated Hardware and Software”
instruction included in the user guidance.
2.8 Documentation and Guidance
It is important that the TOE is used in accordance with guidance documentation in
order to ensure secure usage. The following documentation is available to the
consumer when the TOE is purchased. All guidance material is available for
download at www.cisco.com. All common criteria guidance material is available at
www.commoncriteriaportal.org. The Information Security Manual (ISM) is available
at www.asd.gov.au.
2.9 Secure Usage
The evaluation of the TOE took into account certain assumptions about its operational
environment. These assumptions must hold in order to ensure the security objectives
of the TOE are met.
TOE Environment Assumptions
A.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE It is assumed that there are no general-
purpose computing capabilities (e.g.,
compilers or user applications) available to
the TOE, other than those services
necessary for the operation, administration
and support of the TOE.
A.NO_TOE_BYPASS Information cannot flow between the wireless
client and the internal wired network without
passing through the TOE.
A.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the
value of the TOE and the data it contains, is
assumed to be provided by the environment.
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN TOE Administrators are trusted to follow and
apply all administrator guidance in a trusted
manner.
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Chapter 3 – Evaluation
3.1 Overview
This chapter contains information about the procedures used in conducting the
evaluation and testing as part of the evaluation.
3.2 Evaluation Procedures
The criteria against which the Target of Evaluation (TOE) has been evaluated are
contained in the WLANPP (Ref 3) and Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation Version 3.1 Revision 4, Parts 2 and 3 (Refs 5 and 6).
The methodology used is described in the Common Methodology for Information
Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1 Revision 4 (Ref 7).
The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the operational procedures of the
Australasian Information Security Evaluation Program (AISEP).
In addition, the conditions outlined in the Arrangement on the Recognition of
Common Criteria Certificates in the field of Information Technology Security were
also upheld.
The evaluation was based on the default installation and configuration of the TOE
with additional configuration taken from Cisco WLAN Common Criteria Operational
User Guidance and Preparative Procedures version-11 August 2016 (Ref 2).
3.3 Testing
3.3.1 Testing Coverage
All tests performed by the Evaluators were taken from the WLANPP. These tests are
designed in such a way as to provide a full coverage of testing for all security
functions claimed by the TOE. All SFRs listed in the Security Target and the
Protection Profile were exercised during testing.
3.4 Entropy Testing
The entropy design description, justification, operation and health tests are assessed
and documented in a separate report (Ref 8).
3.5 Penetration Testing
The Evaluators conducted independent and penetration testing between the 3rd July
2016 and the 2nd August 2016.
The Evaluators performed a vulnerability analysis of the TOE in order to identify any
obvious vulnerability in the product and to show that the vulnerabilities were not
07-10-2016 Version 1.0 9
exploitable in the intended environment of the TOE. This analysis included a search
for possible vulnerability sources in publicly-available information.
The following factors have been taken into consideration during the penetration tests:
a) Time taken to identify and exploit (elapsed time)
b) Specialist technical expertise required (specialist expertise)
c) Knowledge of the TOE design and operation (knowledge of the TOE)
d) Window of opportunity
e) IT hardware/software or other equipment required for the exploitation.
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Chapter 4 – Certification
4.1 Overview
This chapter contains information about the result of the certification, an overview of
the assurance provided and recommendations made by the Certifiers.
4.2 Assurance
This certification is focused on the evaluation of product compliance with a Protection
Profile that covers the technology area of WLAN access systems. Agencies can have
confidence that the scope of an evaluation against an ASD approved Protection
Profile covers the necessary security functionality expected of the evaluated product
and known security threats will have been addressed.
The effectiveness and integrity of cryptographic functions are also within the scope of
product evaluations performed in line with Protection Profiles (PPs). PPs provide
assurance by a full security target and an analysis of the SFR in that ST, guidance
documentation and a basic description of the architecture of the TOE, to understand
the security behaviour.
4.3 Certification Result
After due consideration of the conduct of the evaluation as witnessed by the certifiers
and of the Evaluation Technical Report (Ref 9) the Australasian Certification
Authority certifies the evaluation of the Cisco WLAN 8.0 product performed by the
Australasian Information Security Evaluation Facility, CSC Australia.
CSC Australia has determined that Cisco WLAN 8.0 upholds the claims made in the
Security Target (Ref 1) and has met the requirements of WLANPP.
The effectiveness and integrity of cryptographic functions are also within the scope of
product evaluations performed in line with Protection Profiles.
The analysis is supported by testing as outlined in the WLANPP assurance activities,
and a vulnerability survey demonstrating resistance to penetration attackers with a
basic attack potential. Compliance also provides assurance through evidence of secure
delivery procedures. Certification is not a guarantee of freedom from security
vulnerabilities.
4.4 Recommendations
Not all of the evaluated functionality present in the TOE may be suitable for
Australian and New Zealand Government users. For further guidance, Australian
Government users should refer to ISM (Ref 4) and New Zealand Government users
should consult the GCSB.
In addition to ensuring that the assumptions concerning the operational environment
are fulfilled and the guidance document is followed, the ACA also recommends that
users and administrators:
07-10-2016 Version 1.0 11
a) Ensure that the TOE is operated in the evaluated configuration and that
assumptions concerning the TOE security environment are fulfilled
b) Configure and operate the TOE according to the vendor’s product
administrator guidance
c) Maintain the underlying environment in a secure manner so that the integrity
of the TOE Security Function is preserved
h) Avoid the use of self signed certificates
i) Use the Command line interface (CLI) local console instead of the web GUI
j) Note that workstations used for remote administration of the TOE must be
dedicated for performing administrative tasks on the TOE, and prevented from
communicating (sending and receiving traffic) with assets not related to
administration of the TOE.
k) Note that Internet Explorer is not compatible with the WLC WebGUI.
07-10-2016 Version 1.0 12
Annex A – References and Abbreviations
A.1 References
1. Cisco WLAN 8.0 Common Criteria Security Target, Version 1.0, September 2016
2. Guidance Documentation:
 Cisco WLAN Common Criteria Operational User Guidance and Preparative
Procedures version 0-11, August 2016.
3. U.S Government Protection Profile for Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN)
Access Systems (WLANPP) Version 1.0, December 1, 2011
4. 2016 Australian Government Information Security Manual (ISM), Australian
Signals Directorate
5. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components 09- 2012, Version 3.1 Revision 4
6. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components 09-2012, Version 3.1 Revision 4
7. Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Evaluation methodology, 09- 2012, Version 3.1, Revision 4.
8. Entropy documentation
 Cisco WLAN 8.0(APs) Entropy documentation 01 July 2014
 Cisco WLAN Entropy Information Version 1.0 September 2016
9. Cisco WLAN 8.0, Evaluation Technical Report,(T0080) ,REFERENCE: CSC-
EFC-T0080-ETR, EVALUATION-IN-CONFIDENCE, Version 1.0
10. Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the field of
Information Technology Security, July 2, 2014.
11. NIST publication SP800-90B Recommendations for Random Number Generation
Using Deterministic Random Bit Generation, January 2016.
07-10-2016 Version 1.0 13
A.2 Abbreviations
AISEF Australasian Information Security Evaluation Facility
AISEP Australasian Information Security Evaluation Program
AP Access point
ASD Australian Signals Directorate
CA Certification Authority
CC Common Criteria
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology
CLI Command Line Interface
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FTP File Transfer Protocol
GCSB Government Communications Security Bureau
NTP Network Time Protocol
NDPP US Government approved Protection Profile for Network Devices
PP Protection Profile
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirements
SNMP Secure Network Management Protocol
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
WLC Wireless LAN Controller