National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung Galaxy Devices
on Android 13 - Spring
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11342-2023
Dated: April 26, 2023
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, Suite 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Validation Report Version 1.0, April 26, 2023
Android 13 - Spring
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Patrick Mallet, Ph.D.
Jerome Myers, Ph.D.
Dave Thompson
The Aerospace Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
James Arnold
Tammy Compton
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Validation Report Version 1.0, April 26, 2023
Android 13 - Spring
iii
Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 2
3 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 3
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms ................................................................................... 4
3.2 TOE Architecture................................................................................................ 4
3.3 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................ 5
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 5
4.1 Security audit ...................................................................................................... 5
4.2 Cryptographic support ........................................................................................ 5
4.3 User data protection ............................................................................................ 6
4.4 Identification and authentication......................................................................... 6
4.5 Security management.......................................................................................... 6
4.6 Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................... 7
4.7 TOE access.......................................................................................................... 7
4.8 Trusted path/channels ......................................................................................... 7
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope ....................................................................... 7
6 Documentation............................................................................................................ 8
7 IT Product Testing ...................................................................................................... 9
7.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................... 9
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................... 9
8 Evaluated Configuration ............................................................................................. 9
9 Results of the Evaluation .......................................................................................... 14
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE).......................................................... 14
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)............................................................ 14
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ............................................... 15
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)................................... 15
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ............... 15
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)....................................................... 15
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results........................................................................ 16
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................. 16
11 Annexes..................................................................................................................... 17
12 Security Target.......................................................................................................... 17
13 Glossary .................................................................................................................... 17
14 Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 18
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Validation Report Version 1.0, April 26, 2023
Android 13 - Spring
1
1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of “Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 13 –
Spring” solution provided by Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. It presents the evaluation
results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report is not an
endorsement of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) by any agency of the U.S. government, and
no warranty is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, MD, United States of America, and was
completed in April 2023. The information in this report is largely derived from the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer
Security Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria
Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements of the
PP-Configuration for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Bluetooth, Virtual Private Network
(VPN) Clients, and WLAN Clients, Version 1.1, 2023-02-06 (CFG_MDF-BT-VPNC-
WLANC_V1.1)
• Base PP: Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.2, 15 April
2021 (PP_MDF_V3.2) with the
• PP-Module for Bluetooth, Version 1.0, 15 April 2021 (MOD_BT_V1.0),
• PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 2.4, 31 March 2022
(MOD_VPNC-MDF_V2.4),
• PP-Module for WLAN Clients, Version 1.0, 31 March 2022
(MOD_WLAN_CLI_V1.0)
Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 12 February 2019
(PKG_TLS_V1.1).
The TOE is the Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 13 - Spring.The TOE has been
evaluated at a NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common
Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5). This Validation Report
applies only to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been
conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP CCEVS (Common Criteria
Evaluation and Validation Scheme) and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in
the Security Target (ST). Therefore, the validation team concludes that the testing
laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Validation Report Version 1.0, April 26, 2023
Android 13 - Spring
2
are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence produced.
The technical information included In this report was obtained from the Samsung
Electroncs Co., Ltd. Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 13 – Spring Security Target,
version 0.5, April 13, 2023 and analysis performed by the Validation Team.
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products that desire
a security evaluation must contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s
evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s
Validated Products List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as
evaluated.
• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profiles to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 13–- Spring
(Specific models identified in Section 8)
Protection Profiles PP-Configuration for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Bluetooth, Virtual Private
Network (VPN) Clients, and WLAN Clients, Version 1.1, 2023-02-06
(CFG_MDF-BT-VPNC-WLANC_V1.1)
Base PP: Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.2, 15
April 2021 (PP_MDF_V3.2)
• PP-Module for Bluetooth, Version 1.0, 15 April 2021 (MOD_BT_V1.0),
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Validation Report Version 1.0, April 26, 2023
Android 13 - Spring
3
Item Identifier
• PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 2.4, 31
March 2022 (MOD_VPNC-MDF_V2.4),
• PP-Module for WLAN Clients, Version 1.0, 31 March 2022
(MOD_WLAN_CLI_V1.0)
Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 12 February
2019 (PKG_TLS_V1.1)
Security Target Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 13 – Spring
Security Target, version 0.5, April 23, 2023
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 13–-
Spring, version 0.2, April 13, 2023
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 Extended, CC Part 3 Extended
Sponsor Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
Developer Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
CCEVS Validators Patrick Mallett, Ph.D.
Jerome Myers|, Ph.D.
Dave Thompson
3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) are the Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 13 - Spring.
The TOE is a mobile device based on Android 13 with a built-in IPsec VPN client and
modifications made to increase the level of security provided to end users and enterprises.
The TOE is intended for use as part of an enterprise mobility solution providing mobile
staff with enterprise connectivity.
The TOE includes a Common Criteria mode (or “CC mode”) that an administrator can
invoke using an MDM (Mobile Device Management) system. The TOE must meet the
following prerequisites in order for an administrator to transition the TOE to and remain in
the CC configuration.
• Require a boot and device lock password (swipe, PIN, pattern, accessibility
(direction), screen locks are not allowed). Acceptable biometrics vary with the
device for the device lock.
• The maximum password failure retry policy should be less than or equal to 30.
• A screen lock password required to decrypt data on boot.
• Revocation checking must be enabled.
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Validation Report Version 1.0, April 26, 2023
Android 13 - Spring
4
• Security and audit logging must be enabled.
• External storage must be encrypted.
• Developer debugging must be disabled.
• When CC mode has been enabled, the TOE behaves as follows:
o The TOE sets the system wide Android CC mode property to be enabled.
o The TOE prevents loading of custom firmware/kernels and requires all
updates occur through FOTA.
o The TOE utilizes NIST ACVP/CAVP (Automated Cryptographic Algorithm
Validation / Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program) approved
cryptographic ciphers for TLS.
The TOE includes the ability to create separate profiles under control of the Knox Platform.
A profile provides a way to segment applications and data into two separate areas on the
device, such as a personal area and a work area, each with its own separate apps, data and
security policies. For this effort, the TOE was evaluated both with and without profiles
created. Thus, the evaluation includes several Knox-specific claims that apply when these
profiles are created.
There are different models of the TOE, the Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 13, and
these models differ in their internal components (as described in the table below). All
devices utilize the ARM A64 architecture.
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms
Detail regarding the evaluated configuration is provided in Section 8 below.
3.2 TOE Architecture
The TOE combines with a Mobile Device Management solution (note that this evaluation
does not include an MDM agent nor server) that enables the Enterprise to watch, control
and administer all deployed mobile devices, across multiple mobile service providers as
well as facilitate secure communications through a VPN. This partnership provides a secure
mobile environment that can be managed and controlled by the environment and reduces
the risks inherent in any mobile deployment.
Data on the TOE is protected through the implementation of Samsung File-Based
Encryption (FBE) that utilizes ACVP/CAVP certified cryptographic algorithms to encrypt
device storage. This functionality is combined with a number of on-device policies
including local wipe, remote wipe, password complexity, automatic lock and privileged
access to security configurations to prevent unauthorized access to the device and stored
data.
The Knox Platform for Enterprise provides a set of flexible deployment options for work
environments. With Knox Platform for Enterprise, it is possible to segment the device into
two separate areas, by convention called the personal profile and the work profile. In
creating a work profile, the Enterprise establishes a completely separate workspace, with its
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Validation Report Version 1.0, April 26, 2023
Android 13 - Spring
5
own authentication, applications and services, and ensure they are kept separate from
anything the user may do in the personal profile. Another option for deployment is Knox
Separated Apps, a folder where the Enterprise can isolate a group of applications from the
rest of the device, restricting access to shared information, while maintaining seamless
access to the isolated applications for the user.
The Samsung Knox Software Development Kit (SDK) builds on top of the existing
Android security model by expanding the current set of security configuration options to
more than 600 configurable policies and including additional security functionality such as
application allow and block listing.
3.3 Physical Boundaries
The TOE is a multi-user capable mobile device based on Android 13 that incorporates the
Samsung Knox SDK. The TOE does not include the user applications that run on top of the
operating system, but does include controls that limit application behavior. The TOE
includes an IPsec VPN client integrated into the firmware (as opposed to a downloadable
application). Within an Enterprise environment, the Enterprise can manage the
configuration of the mobile device, including the VPN client, through a compliant device
management solution.
The TOE communicates and interacts with 802.11-2012 Access Points and mobile data
networks to establish network connectivity, and the through that connectivity interacts with
MDM servers that allow administrative control of the TOE.
4 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Security audit
2. Cryptographic support
3. User data protection
4. Identification and authentication
5. Security management
6. Packet filtering
7. Protection of the TSF
8. TOE access
9. Trusted path/channels
4.1 Security audit
The TOE generates logs for a range of security relevant events. The TOE stores the logs
locally so they can be accessed by an administrator, or they can be exported to an MDM.
4.2 Cryptographic support
The TOE includes multiple cryptographic libraries with ACVP/CAVP certified algorithms
for a wide range of cryptographic functions including the following: asymmetric key
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Validation Report Version 1.0, April 26, 2023
Android 13 - Spring
6
generation and establishment, symmetric key generation, encryption/decryption,
cryptographic hashing and keyed-hash message authentication. These functions are
supported with suitable random bit generation, key derivation, salt generation, initialization
vector generation, secure key storage, and key and protected data destruction. These
primitive cryptographic functions are used to implement security protocols such as TLS,
EAP-TLS, IPsec, and HTTPS and to encrypt the media (including the generation and
protection of data and key encryption keys) used by the TOE. Many of these cryptographic
functions are also accessible as services to applications running on the TOE.
4.3 User data protection
The TOE controls access to system services by hosted applications, including protection of
the Trust Anchor Database. Additionally, the TOE protects user and other sensitive data
using encryption so that even if a device is physically lost, the data remains protected. The
functionality provided by work profiles and Knox Separated Apps enhance the security of
user data by providing an additional layer of separation between different categories of
apps and data while the device is in use. The TOE ensures that residual information is
protected from potential reuse in accessible objects such as network packets.
4.4 Identification and authentication
The TOE supports a number of features related to identification and authentication. From a
user perspective, except for making phone calls to an emergency number, a password or
Biometric Authentication Factor (BAF) must be correctly entered to unlock the TOE. In
addition, even when the TOE is unlocked the password must be re-entered to change the
password or re-enroll the biometric template. Passwords are obscured when entered so they
cannot be read from the TOE's display, the frequency of entering passwords is limited and
when a configured number of failures occurs, the TOE will be wiped to protect its contents.
Passwords can be constructed using upper and lower case characters, numbers, and special
characters and passwords between 4 and 16 characters are supported.
The TOE can also serve as an 802.1X supplicant and can use X.509v3 and validate
certificates for EAP-TLS, TLS and IPsec exchanges. The TOE can also act as a client or
server in an authenticated Bluetooth pairing. In addition to storing X.509 certificates used
for IPsec connections, the TOE can also securely store pre-shared keys for VPN
connections.
4.5 Security management
The TOE provides all the interfaces necessary to manage the security functions (including
the VPN client) identified throughout this Security Target as well as other functions
commonly found in mobile devices. Many of the available functions are available to users
of the TOE while many are restricted to administrators operating through a Mobile Device
Management solution once the TOE has been enrolled. Once the TOE has been enrolled
and then un-enrolled, it removes all MDM policies and disables CC mode.
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Validation Report Version 1.0, April 26, 2023
Android 13 - Spring
7
4.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements a number of features to protect itself to ensure the reliability and
integrity of its security features. It protects particularly sensitive data such as cryptographic
keys so that they are not accessible or exportable. It also provides its own timing
mechanism to ensure that reliable time information is available (e.g., for log
accountability). It enforces read, write, and execute memory page protections, uses address
space layout randomization, and stack-based buffer overflow protections to minimize the
potential to exploit application flaws. It also protects itself from modification by
applications as well as isolates the address spaces of applications from one another to
protect those applications.
The TOE includes functions to perform self-tests and software/firmware integrity checking
so that it might detect when it is failing or may be corrupt. If any self-tests fail, the TOE
will not go into an operational mode. It also includes mechanisms (i.e., verification of the
digital signature of each new image) so that the TOE itself can be updated while ensuring
that the updates will not introduce malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE.
Digital signature checking also extends to verifying applications prior to their installation.
4.7 TOE access
The TOE can be locked, obscuring its display, by the user or after a configured interval of
inactivity. The TOE also has the capability to display an advisory message (banner) when
users unlock the TOE for use.
The TOE is also able to attempt to connect to wireless networks as configured.
4.8 Trusted path/channels
The TOE supports the use of 802.11-2012, 802.1X, EAP-TLS, TLS, HTTPS and IPsec to
secure communications channels between itself and other trusted network devices.
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope
Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
• Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.2, 15 April 2021
(PP_MDF_V3.2)
• PP-Module for Bluetooth, Version 1.0, 15 April 2021 (MOD_BT_V1.0)
• PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 2.4, 31 March
2022 (MOD_VPNC-MDF_V2.4)
• PP-Module for WLAN Clients, Version 1.0, 31 March 2022
(MOD_WLAN_CLI_V1.0)
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Validation Report Version 1.0, April 26, 2023
Android 13 - Spring
8
• Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 12 February
2019 (PKG_TLS_V1.1)
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
above Protection Profiles as described in the Security Target. Other functionality included
in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided
by the devices must be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be drawn about
their effectiveness.
Clarification of scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and
clarifications of this evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance
activities specified in the Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile with the
Bluetooth, WLAN Clients, and VPNC Modules plus the TLS Package and
performed by the evaluation team).
• This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in
this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
• Apart from the Admin Guide, additional customer documentation for the specific
Mobile Device models was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore
should not to be relied upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
• This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
• The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the Protection Profiles identified in this document and in
applicable Technical Decisions. Any additional security related functional
capabilities of the TOE were not covered by this evaluation.
6 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
• Samsung Android 13 on Galaxy Devices Administrator Guide, Version
9.0.2, April 13, 2023
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available
online was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not to be relied
upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Validation Report Version 1.0, April 26, 2023
Android 13 - Spring
9
Only the Administrator Guide listed above the specific sections of the other documents
referenced by that guide should be trusted for the installation, administration, and use of
this product in its evaluated configuration.
7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the proprietary Detailed Test Report for Samsung
Galaxy Devices on Android 13 - Spring, Version 0.1, March 17, 2023 (DTR), as
summarized in the evaluation Assurance Activity Report (AAR).
7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according to a Common Criteria Certification
document and ran the tests specified in the applicable PPs, including the tests associated
with optional requirements. The AAR, in sections 1.1 lists the tested devices, provides a list
of test tools, and has diagrams of the test environment.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration consists of the hardware and software listed below when
configured in accordance with the documentation specified in section 6. The model
numbers of the mobile devices used during evaluation testing are as follows:
Device Name
Chipset
Vendor
SoC Arch Kernel Build Number
Galaxy S23 Ultra 5G Qualcomm
Snapdragon 8 Gen 2
Mobile Platform
ARMv8 5.15 TP1A.220624.014
Galaxy S22 Ultra 5G Samsung Exynos 2200 ARMv8 5.10 TP1A.220624.014
Galaxy S22 5G Qualcomm
Snapdragon 8 Gen 1
Mobile Platform
ARMv8 5.10 TP1A.220624.014
Galaxy S21 Ultra 5G Samsung Exynos 2100 ARMv8 5.4 TP1A.220624.014
Galaxy S21 Ultra 5G Qualcomm Snapdragon 888 ARMv8 5.4 TP1A.220624.014
Galaxy S20+ 5G Samsung Exynos 990 ARMv8 4.19 TP1A.220624.014
Galaxy S20+ 5G Qualcomm Snapdragon 865 ARMv8 4.19 TP1A.220624.014
Galaxy Z Flip Qualcomm Snapdragon 855+ ARMv8 4.14 TP1A.220624.014
Galaxy XCover Pro Samsung Exynos 9611 ARMv8 4.14 TP1A.220624.014
Galaxy A53 5G Samsung Exynos 1280 ARMv8 5.10 SP1A.210812.016
Galaxy XCover6 Pro Qualcomm Snapdragon 778G ARMv8 5.4 SP1A.210812.016
Evaluated Devices
In addition to the evaluated devices, the following are claimed as equivalent:
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Validation Report Version 1.0, April 26, 2023
Android 13 - Spring
10
Evaluated
Device
SoC Equivalent Devices Differences
Galaxy S23
Ultra 5G
Qualcomm
Galaxy S23+ 5G S23 Ultra > S23+ > S23 in terms of display size
Galaxy S23 5G
Galaxy S22
Ultra 5G
Exynos 2200
Galaxy S22+ 5G S22 Ultra > S22+ > S22 in terms of display size
Galaxy S22 5G
S22+ & S22 devices have S21 Ultra 5G Wi-Fi
chip
Galaxy S22
5G
Snapdragon
8 Gen 1
Galaxy S22 Ultra 5G S22 Ultra > S22+ > S22 in terms of display size
Galaxy S22+ 5G
S22+ & S22 devices have S21 Ultra 5G Wi-Fi
chip
Galaxy Tab S8 Ultra
Tab S8 devices are tablets (no voice calling)
with S Pen
Galaxy Tab S8+
Tab S8 Ultra > Tab S8+ > Tab S7 in terms of
display size
Galaxy Tab S8
Tab S8 Ultra & Tab S8+ have under screen
image fingerprint sensor
Tab S8 has power button fingerprint sensor
Galaxy Z Flip4 5G
Z Flip4 & Z Fold4 have 2 displays & folding
display
Galaxy Z Fold4 5G Z Fold4 > Z Flip4 in terms of display size
Galaxy S21
Ultra 5G
Exynos 2100
Galaxy S21+ 5G
S21 Ultra > S21+ > S21 > S21 FE in terms of
display size
Galaxy S21 5G S21+ & S21 devices have S20+ 5G Wi-Fi chip
Galaxy S21
Ultra 5G
Snapdragon
888
Galaxy S21+ 5G
S21 Ultra > S21+ > S21 > S21 FE in terms of
display size
Galaxy S21 5G S21+ & S21 devices have S20+ 5G Wi-Fi chip
Galaxy S21 5G FE
Z Fold3 5G & Z Flip3 5G have 2 displays &
folding display
Galaxy Z Fold3 5G
Z Fold3 5G & Z Flip3 5G have power button
fingerprint sensor
Galaxy Z Flip3 5G Z Fold3 & Z Flip3 have S22 Ultra Wi-Fi chip
Galaxy S20+
5G
Exynos 990
Galaxy Note20 Ultra 5G S20 Ultra > S20+ > S20 > S20 FE in terms of
display size
Galaxy Note20 Ultra LTE
Galaxy Note20 5G
5G devices have different cellular modem
Galaxy Note20 LTE
Galaxy S20 Ultra 5G
Note20 Ultra > Note20 in terms of display size
Galaxy S20+ LTE
Galaxy S20 5G Note20 devices include S Pen & functionality to
take advantage of it for input (not security
related)
Galaxy S20 LTE
Galaxy S20 FE
Galaxy S20+
5G
Snapdragon
865
Galaxy Z Fold2 5G
S20 Ultra > S20+ > S20 > S20 FE in terms of
display size
Galaxy Note20 Ultra 5G Note20 Ultra > Note20 in terms of display size
Galaxy Note20 5G
Note20 devices include S Pen & functionality to
take advantage of it for input (not security
related)
Galaxy Tab S7+
Z Fold2 5G & Z Flip have 2 displays & folding
display
Galaxy Tab S7
Tab S7 devices are tablets (no voice calling)
with S Pen
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Validation Report Version 1.0, April 26, 2023
Android 13 - Spring
11
Evaluated
Device
SoC Equivalent Devices Differences
Galaxy Z Flip 5G
Tx70 tablets only have Wi-Fi, others have
cellular
Galaxy S20 Ultra 5G Tab S7+ > Tab S7 in terms of display size
Galaxy S20 5G
Tab S7+ & S20 FE have under screen image
fingerprint sensor
Galaxy S20 FE
Tab S7 & Z Flip 5G have power button
fingerprint sensor
Galaxy Z
Flip
Snapdragon
855+
N/A
Galaxy
XCover Pro
Exynos 9611 Galaxy A51
XCover Pro is ruggedized
XCover Pro has Push-to-Talk button
XCover Pro has removable battery
A51 has under screen image fingerprint sensor
Equivalent Devices
Equivalent devices are claimed as equivalent with a note about the differences between the
evaluated device (first column) and the equivalent models (noted in the third column with
the differences in the fourth column). Equivalence in this table is determined by the use of
identical processors, kernel and build number, and is not made across processor types. For
example, the Galaxy S22 Ultra 5G has variants with a Samsung Exynos processor and a
Qualcomm Snapdragon processor that were evaluated. The other Galaxy S22 devices are
claimed as equivalent based on their processor, so S22 devices with a Qualcomm processor
are not considered equivalent to S22 devices with a Samsung processor.
The Differences column in the table denotes the differences between the evaluated device
and those listed in the Equivalent column (which typically contains multiple different
derivative devices), and are not meant to line up with the devices listed in the Equivalent
column itself. Except in the case of a different Wi-Fi radios or biometric sensors (in which
case the radio or biometric is tested on a different device and so always verified as part of
the evaluation), any differences between the evaluated device and claimed equivalent
devices are outside the requirements of the evaluation requirements, such as screen
size/type/resolution, battery size, position of ports. In general, the devices include a final
letter or number at the end of the name that denotes that the device is for a specific carrier
or region (for example, U = US Carrier build and F = International, which were used during
the evaluation).
For each device, there are specific models that are validated. This table lists the specific
carrier models that have the validated configuration (covering both evaluated and
equivalent devices).
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Validation Report Version 1.0, April 26, 2023
Android 13 - Spring
12
Device Name
Chipset
Vendor
Chipset Name
Base Model
Number
Carrier Models
Galaxy S23 Ultra 5G Qualcomm
Snapdragon 8 Gen2
(SM8550)
SM-S918
W, B, N, U1, U, SC52D*,
SCG20*
Galaxy S23+ 5G Qualcomm
Snapdragon 8 Gen2
(SM8550)
SM-S916 W, B, N, U1, U
Galaxy S23 5G Qualcomm
Snapdragon 8 Gen2
(SM8550)
SM-S911
W, B, N, U1, U, SC51D*,
SCG19*
Galaxy S22 Ultra 5G Samsung Exynos 2200 SM-G908 B
Galaxy S22 Ultra 5G Qualcomm
Snapdragon 8 Gen 1
(SM8450)
SM-G908
W, E, N, U1, U, SC52C*,
SCG14*
Galaxy S22+ 5G Samsung Exynos 2200 SM-G906 B
Galaxy S22+ 5G Qualcomm
Snapdragon 8 Gen 1
(SM8450)
SM-G906 W, E, N, U1, U
Galaxy S22 5G Samsung Exynos 2200 SM-G901 B
Galaxy S22 5G Qualcomm
Snapdragon 8 Gen 1
(SM8450)
SM-G901
W, E, N, U1, U, SC51C*,
SCG13*
Galaxy S21 Ultra 5G Samsung Exynos 2100 SM-G998 B, N
Galaxy S21 Ultra 5G Qualcomm
Snapdragon 888
(SM8350)
SM-G998 W, U1, U, SC52B*
Galaxy S21+ 5G Samsung Exynos 2100 SM-G996 B, N
Galaxy S21+ 5G Qualcomm
Snapdragon 888
(SM8350)
SM-G996 W, U1, U, SCG10*
Galaxy S21 5G Samsung Exynos 2100 SM-G991 B, N
Galaxy S21 5G Qualcomm
Snapdragon 888
(SM8350)
SM-G991
W, Q, U1, U, SC51B*,
SCG09*
Galaxy S21 5G FE Qualcomm
Snapdragon 888
(SM8350)
SM-G990
W, W2, B, B2, U1, U3, U,
U2
Galaxy S20 Ultra 5G Samsung Exynos 990 SM-G988 B
Galaxy S20 Ultra 5G Qualcomm
Snapdragon 865
(SM8250)
SM-G988 W, N, U1, U, SCG03*
Galaxy S20+ 5G Samsung Exynos 990 SM-G986 B
Galaxy S20+ 5G Qualcomm
Snapdragon 865
(SM8250)
SM-G986
W, N, U1, U, SC52A*,
SCG02*
Galaxy S20+ LTE Samsung Exynos 990 SM-G985 F
Galaxy S20 5G Samsung Exynos 990 SM-G981 B
Galaxy S20 5G Qualcomm
Snapdragon 865
(SM8250)
SM-G981
W, N, U1, V, U, SC51A*,
SCG01*
Galaxy S20 LTE Samsung Exynos 990 SM-G980 F
Galaxy S20 FE Samsung Exynos 990 SM-G780 F
Galaxy S20 FE Qualcomm
Snapdragon 865
(SM8250)
SM-G781 W, B, N, U1, V, U
Galaxy Z Fold4 5G Qualcomm
Snapdragon 8+ Gen
1 (SM8475)
SM-F936
W, B, N, U1, U, SC-55C*,
SCG16*
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Validation Report Version 1.0, April 26, 2023
Android 13 - Spring
13
Device Name
Chipset
Vendor
Chipset Name
Base Model
Number
Carrier Models
Galaxy Z Fold3 5G Qualcomm
Snapdragon 888
(SM8350)
SM-F926
W, B, N, U1, U, SC-55B*,
SCG11*
Galaxy Z Fold2 5G Qualcomm
Snapdragon 865+
(SM8250)
SM-F916 W, B, N, U1, U
Galaxy Z Flip4 Qualcomm
Snapdragon 8+ Gen
1 (SM8475)
SM-F721
W, B, C, N, U1, U, SC-54C*,
SCG17*,
Galaxy Z Flip3 5G Qualcomm
Snapdragon 888
(SM8350)
SM-F711
W, B, N, U1, U, SC-54B*,
SCG12*
Galaxy Z Flip 5G Qualcomm
Snapdragon 865+
(SM8250)
SM-F707 W, B, N, U1, U, SCG04*
Galaxy Z Flip Qualcomm
Snapdragon 855+
(SM8150)
SM-F700 W, F, N, U1, U, SCV47*
Galaxy Note20 Ultra
5G
Samsung Exynos 990 SM-N986 B
Galaxy Note20 Ultra
5G
Qualcomm
Snapdragon 865+
(SM8250)
SM-N986
W, N, U1, U, SC53A*,
SCG06*
Galaxy Note20 Ultra
LTE
Samsung Exynos 990 SM-N985 F
Galaxy Note20 5G Samsung Exynos 990 SM-N981 B
Galaxy Note20 5G Qualcomm
Snapdragon 865+
(SM8250)
SM-N981 W, N, U1, U
Galaxy Note20 LTE Samsung Exynos 990 SM-N980 F
Galaxy Tab S8 Ultra Qualcomm
Snapdragon 8 Gen 1
(SM8450)
SM-X906 B, N
SM-X900 None
Galaxy Tab S8+ Qualcomm
Snapdragon 8 Gen 1
(SM8450)
SM-X808 U
SM-X806 B, N, E
SM-X800 None
Galaxy Tab S8 Qualcomm
Snapdragon 8 Gen 1
(SM8450)
SM-X708 U
SM-X706 B, N
SM-X700 None
Galaxy Tab S7+ Qualcomm
Snapdragon 865+
(SM8250)
SM-T978 U
SM-T976 B, N
SM-T975 N, None
SM-T970 None
Galaxy Tab S7 Qualcomm
Snapdragon 865+
(SM8250)
SM-T878 U
SM-T875 N, None
SM-T870 None
Galaxy XCover Pro Samsung Exynos 9611 SM-G715 A, FN, U, W
Galaxy A51 Samsung Exynos 9611
SM-A515 F, U, U1, W
SM-S515 DL
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Validation Report Version 1.0, April 26, 2023
Android 13 - Spring
14
Carrier Models
9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to
the corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC
version 3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Samsung
Galaxy Devices on Android 13 - Spring TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the SARs
contained in the identified Protection Profiles.
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
of security requirements claimed to be met by the Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 13
- Spring products that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security
function descriptions that support the requirements.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification
contained in the Security Target and Guidance documents. Additionally, the evaluator
Device Name
Chipset
Vendor
Chipset Name
Base Model
Number
Carrier Models
Galaxy XCover6 Pro Qualcomm
Snapdragon 778G
(SM7325)
SM-G736 W, B, U1, U
Galaxy A53 5G Samsung
Exynos 1280
(S5E8825)
SM-A536
W, E, B, N, U1, V, U, SC-
53C*, SCG15*
SM-S536 DL
Galaxy Tab Active4
Pro
Qualcomm
Snapdragon 778G
(SM7325)
SM-T636 B, N
SM-T638 U
SM-T630 None
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Validation Report Version 1.0, April 26, 2023
Android 13 - Spring
15
performed the assurance activities specified in the Protection Profiles related to the
examination of the information contained in the TSS.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,
the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how
to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and
testing phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the
TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of
tests specified by the assurance activities in the Protection Profiles and recorded the results
in a Test Report, summarized in the AAR.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes
a public search for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities did not uncover any
residual vulnerability.
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Validation Report Version 1.0, April 26, 2023
Android 13 - Spring
16
The evaluator searched the National Vulnerability Database
(https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search) and Vulnerability Notes Database
(http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/) updated on 4/13/2023 (from 3/1/2023) with the following
search terms: “Samsung S23”, “Galaxy S23”, “Samsung S23+”, “Galaxy S23+”, “SM-
S918”, “SM-S916”, “SM-S911”, “Samsung S22”, “Galaxy S22”, “Samsung S22+”,
“Galaxy S22+”, “SM-S908”, “SM-S906”, “SM-S901”, “Samsung S21”, “Galaxy S21”,
“Samsung S21+”, “Galaxy S21+”, “SM-G998”, “SM-G996”, “SM-G991”, “SM-G990”,
“Samsung S20”, “Galaxy S20”, “Samsung S20+”, “Galaxy S20+”, “SM-G988”, “SM-
G986”, “SM-G985”, “SM-G981”, “SM-G980”, “SM-G781”, “SM-G780”, “Samsung Z
Flip”, “Galaxy Z Flip”, “SM-F707”, “SM-F700”, “Samsung Z Flip4”, “Galaxy Z Flip4”,
“SM-F721”, “Samsung Z Flip3”, “Galaxy Z Flip3”, “SM-F711”, “Samsung Z Fold4”,
“Galaxy Z Fold4”, “SM-F936”, “Samsung Z Fold3”, “Galaxy Z Fold3”, “SM-F926”,
“Samsung Z Fold2”, “Galaxy Z Fold2”, “SM-F916”, “Samsung Note20”, “Galaxy
Note20”, “SM-N986”, “SM-N985”, “SM-N981”, “SM-N980”, “Samsung Tab S8”,
“Galaxy Tab S8”, “Samsung Tab S8+”, “Galaxy Tab S8+”, “SM-X906”, “SM-X900”,
“SM-X808”, “SM-X806”, “SM-X800”, “SM-X708”, “SM-X706”, “SM-X700”, “Samsung
Tab S7”, “Galaxy Tab S7”, “Samsung Tab S7+”, “Galaxy Tab S7+”, “SM-T978”, “SM-
T976”, “SM-T975”, “SM-T970”, “SM-T878”, “SM-T875”, “SM-T870”, “Samsung Xcover
Pro”, “Galaxy Xcover Pro”, “SM-G715”, “Samsung Xcover6 Pro”, “Galaxy Xcover6 Pro”,
“SM-G736”, “Samsung A53”, “Galaxy A53”, “SM-A536”, “SM-S536”, “Samsung Tab
Active4”, “Galaxy Tab Active4”, “SM-T636”, “SM-T638”, “SM-T630”, “Samsung A51”,
“Galaxy A51”, “SM-A515”, “SM-S515”, “Knox”, “BoringSSL”, “strongswan”, “charon”,
“Android”.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims
in the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE
being configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in the Administrator Guide
document listed in Section 6. No versions of the TOE and software, either earlier or later
were evaluated. Please note that the functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the
security functional requirements specified in the Security Target. Other functionality
included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. Other functionality
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Validation Report Version 1.0, April 26, 2023
Android 13 - Spring
17
provided by devices in the operational environment, such as an MDM agent or server, must
be assessed separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
11 Annexes
Not applicable
12 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung Galaxy
Devices on Android 13 – Spring Security Target, Version 0.5, April 23, 2023.
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims
made are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common
Criteria using the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is
complete, consistent, technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of
requirements for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor
or developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or
an IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the
issue of a Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
Samsung Galaxy Devices on Validation Report Version 1.0, April 26, 2023
Android 13 - Spring
18
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[4] Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.2, 15 April 2021
(MDFPP32).
[5] PP-Module for Bluetooth, Version 1.0, 15 April 2021 (BT10).
[6] PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 2.4, 31 March 2022
(VPNC24).
[7] PP-Module for WLAN Clients, Version 1.0, 31 March 2022 (WLANC10).
[8] Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 12 February
2019 (PKGTLS11).
[9] Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 13 – Spring
Security Target, Version 0.5, April 23, 2023 (ST).
[10] Assurance Activity Report for Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 13 - Spring ,
Version 0.2, April 13, 2023 (AAR).
[11] Detailed Test Report for Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 13 - Spring ,
Version 0.2, April 13, 2023 (DTR).
[12] Evaluation Technical Report for Samsung Galaxy Devices on Android 13 - Spring,
Version 0.2, April; 13, 2023 (ETR)