ZTE Access System Series
Security Target
ZXA10 C300/C300M/C350M
Date August 2, 2012
Authors Bao Yintao (ZTE)
She Zuoliang (ZTE)
Dirk-Jan Out (Brightsight)
Version 1.0
ZTECORPORATION
NO. 55, Hi-tech Road South, ShenZhen, P.R.China
Postcode: 518057
Tel: (86) 755 26770801
URL: http://ensupport.zte.com.cn
E-mail: support@zte.com.cn
Security Target ZTE Access Gateways ZXA10 Series C300/C300M/C350M 2 | 26
Document history
Version Date Comment
0.1 March 23, 2012 First version, based on ST v0.6 of the first batch of
Access Systems
0.2 April 24, 2012 Changed version number of C300, changed version of
ZXIAP and ZXROS for C300M/C350M, removed V5.1
and V5.2 protocols from Appendix A.
0.3 May 31, 2012 Specify C300 precise version
1.0 August 2, 2012 Fix C300 version
References
[CCp1] Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1, v3.1r3, July 2009
[CCp2] Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Part 2, v3.1r3, July 2009
[CCp3] Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Part 3, v3.1r3, July 2009
[CEMe] Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, v3.1r3, July 2009
Security Target ZTE Access Gateways 3 | 26
Content
1 ST Introduction ....................................................................................... 4
1.1 ST and TOE References .......................................................................... 4
1.2 TOE Overview and usage ........................................................................ 5
1.2.1 Major security features ............................................................................. 6
1.2.2 Non-TOE Hardware/Software/Firmware .................................................. 6
1.3 TOE Description ....................................................................................... 7
1.3.1 Physical scope.......................................................................................... 7
1.3.2 Logical scope............................................................................................ 8
2 Conformance Claims.............................................................................. 9
3 Security Problem Definition ................................................................10
3.1 Organisational Security Policies.............................................................10
3.2 Threats....................................................................................................10
3.2.1 Assets and threat agents........................................................................10
3.2.2 Threats....................................................................................................11
3.3 Assumptions ...........................................................................................11
4 Security Objectives ..............................................................................12
4.1 Security objectives for the TOE..............................................................12
4.2 Security objectives for the Operational Environment .............................13
5 Security Requirements ........................................................................14
5.1 Extended components definition ............................................................14
5.2 Definitions...............................................................................................14
5.3 Security Functional Requirements..........................................................15
5.3.1 Management...........................................................................................15
5.3.2 Separation ..............................................................................................16
5.4 Security Assurance Requirements .........................................................17
5.5 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale.........................................18
6 TOE Summary Specification ...............................................................19
7 Rationales..............................................................................................20
7.1 Security Objectives Rationale.................................................................20
7.2 Security Functional Requirements Rationale .........................................21
7.3 Dependencies.........................................................................................22
A Supported Protocols ............................................................................23
B List of Acronyms ..................................................................................25
Security Target ZTE Access Gateways 4 | 26
1 ST Introduction
1.1 ST and TOE References
This is version 1.0 of the Security Target for the ZTE Access System Series.
The term ZTE Access System refers to the collective of:
Name Type SW Platform
ZXA10 C300 v2.0.0.T2 Narrowband and broadband ZXIAP v2.0
ZXROS 04.08.35
Vxworks 5.5.1
ZXA10 C300M V3.0T2 ZXIAP v1.2
ZXROS 04.08.01
Vxworks 5.5.1
ZXA10 C350M V3.0T2
Each of these is considered a TOE. The major differences between TOEs are the
type, the physical interfaces (various types of broadband and narrowband), and the
capacity. See Appendix A of this Security Target for details.
Security Target ZTE Access Gateways 5 | 26
1.2 TOE Overview and usage
The TOE is an Access System, which regulates the access between:
 networks, like a provider IP network or the PSTN
 subscribers, who wish to access these networks.
The TOE is depicted in Figure 1:
Figure 1: The TOE
The subscribers can access the TOE through a wide variety of technologies, like
POTS, ISDN, xDSL, FE/GE and xPON. The exact technologies depend on the
particular TOE. See Appendix A for details on the:
 specific network technologies
 specific subscriber access technologies
that are supported by each TOE.
The TOE has the following general functionalities
1
:
o Provide access of subscribers to networks (and vice versa)
o Convert the protocols used by the subscribers to protocols suitable
for the networks (and vice versa)
o Allow management of itself through a Management Network
1
Not all TOEs offer the same functionality. See Appendix A for details.
TOE
TOE
Environment
Subscribers
Network(s)
EMS
RADIUS
Or
TACACS+
(optional)
Platform
Running
SSH
Management
Network
Security Target ZTE Access Gateways 6 | 26
1.2.1 Major security features
The TOE:
o Provides secure management of itself, to ensure that only properly
authorized staff can manage the TOE
o Ensures that subscribers have only access to the networks and
functionalities/entities on those networks that they are entitled to
o Ensures that subscribers cannot read traffic from/to other subscribers
o Ensures that subscribers cannot modify traffic from/to other subscribers
Note that the TOE offers access to different subscribers through a set of physical
ports. In many cases, there will be a 1:1 relation between subscribers and ports,
but it is allowed to have multiple subscribers to a single port:
o If this port is based on xPON technology, the TOE will be able to protect
subscribers from each other by:
o Encrypting data downstream so that only a specific subscriber can
read it
o Using TDM upstream, so each subscriber has his own time-slice to
send data
o If this port uses a different protocol (e.g. FE/GE), the TOE itself will not
protect subscribers on that port against each other, and, if required, they
should take care of this protection themselves (e.g. by using cryptography).
1.2.2 Non-TOE Hardware/Software/Firmware
The TOE requires:
 networking connectivity, both to the Management Network, its upstream
networks and to its subscribers.
 A platform (connected to the Management Network) running SSH (RFC
4250-4256) for management of the TOE
 (Optional) An authentication server (connected to the Management
Network), either:
 A RADIUS Server that supports RFC 2865 (Authentication &
Authorization) and RFC 2866 (Accounting) for RADIUS
 A TACACS+ Server (connected to one of the Networks) that supports
TACACS+ Version 1.78（DRAFT);
 An EMS (connected to the Management Network). The EMS can also be
used to manage the TOE, but this option was not evaluated.
Security Target ZTE Access Gateways 7 | 26
1.3 TOE Description
1.3.1 Physical scope
C300 V2.0.0.T2
Hardware ZXA10 C300
Software C300 v2.0.0T2
ZXIAP v2.0
ZXROS 04.08.35
Vxworks (5.5.1)
Guidance ZXA10 C300(V2.0) Optical Access Convergence Equipment Configuration
Manual (CLI)
ZXA10 C300(V2.0) Optical Access Convergence Equipment Configuration
Manual (NetNumen)
ZXA10 C300(V2.0) Optical Access Convergence Equipment Maintenance
Manual
ZXA10 C300(V2.0) Security Issues
C300M V3.0T2
Hardware ZXA10 C300M
Software C300M V3.0T2
ZXIAP v1.2
ZXROS 04.08.01
Vxworks (5.5.1)
Guidance ZXA10 C300M(V3.0) Multi-service Access Equipment Configuration
Manual (CLI)
ZXA10 C300M(V3.0) Multi-Service Access Equipment Configuration
Manual (NetNumen)
ZXA10 C300M(V3.0) Multi-service Access Equipment Maintenance Manual
ZXA10 C300M(V3.0) Security Issues
C350M V3.0T2
Hardware ZXA10 C350M
Software C350M V3.0T2
ZXIAP v1.2
ZXROS 04.08.01
Vxworks (5.5.1)
Guidance ZXA10 C350M(V3.0) Multi-Service Access Equipment Configuration
Manual (CLI)
ZXA10 C350M(V3.0) Multi-Service Access Equipment Configuration
Manual (NetNumen)
ZXA10 C350M(V3.0) Multi-Service Access Equipment Routine
Maintenance Manual
ZXA10 C350M(V3.0) Security Issues
Security Target ZTE Access Gateways 8 | 26
1.3.2 Logical scope
The logical scope of the TOE consists of the following functionalities:
o Provides secure management of itself, to ensure that only properly
authorized staff can manage the TOE
o Ensures that subscribers have only access to the services on the networks
that they are entitled to
o Ensures that subscribers cannot read traffic from/to other subscribers
o Ensures that subscribers cannot modify traffic from/to other subscribers
Secure management of the TOE, to ensure that only properly authorized staff can
manage the TOE.
There are four ways of managing the TOE:
o Graphically, through an EMS (over the Management network).
o Text-based:
o Over telnet (over the Management Network)
o Through a local connection (Hyper Terminal over RS-232)
o Over SSH over the Management Network, possibly extended with
RADIUS or TACACS+
Only the last option (SSH, possibly extended with RADIUS or TACACS+) has been
evaluated.
Ensures that subscribers have only access to the services on the networks that
they are entitled to
The TOE can be configured to provide fine-grained access control: ensuring that
each subscriber has only access to the exact services that he is entitled to.
Ensures that subscribers cannot read traffic from/to other subscribers
Ensures that subscribers cannot modify traffic from/to other subscribers
The TOE provides separation between the traffic streams of subscribers so that
unauthorized disclosure/modification is prevented.
Security Target ZTE Access Gateways 9 | 26
2 Conformance Claims
This ST conforms to:
 CC, version 3.1R3, as defined by [CCp1], [CCp2], [CCp3] and [CEMe].
 CC Part 2 as CC Part 2 extended
 CC Part 3 as CC Part 3 conformant
This ST conforms to no Protection Profile.
This ST conforms to EAL 2+ALC_FLR.2, and to no other packages.
Security Target ZTE Access Gateways 10 | 26
3 Security Problem Definition
3.1 Organisational Security Policies
None
3.2 Threats
3.2.1 Assets and threat agents
The assets are:
1. The ability of administrators to manage various aspects of the TOE
securely
2. Access to certain networks and/or entities/services on those networks
3. Confidentiality and integrity of communication between subscribers and
networks
These assets are threatened by the following threat agents:
1. TA.SUBSCRIBER A Subscriber
2. TA.NETWORK An attacker with access to the Management
Network
3. TA.PHYSICAL An attacker with physical access to the TOE
Security Target ZTE Access Gateways 11 | 26
3.2.2 Threats
The combination of assets and threats gives rise to the following threats:
T.UNAUTHORISED_ADMIN
TA.NETWORK or TA.SUBSCRIBER gains access to the management functionality
of the TOE.
T.UNAUTHORISED_ACCESS
TA.SUBSCRIBER gains access to a service on a Network that he is not authorized
to access
T.PHYSICAL_ATTACK
TA.PHYSICAL gains physical access to the TOE and is able to perform actions on
the TOE.
T.CONFIDENTIALITY
TA.SUBSCRIBER is able to read traffic from/to another subscriber
T.INTEGRITY
TA.SUBSCRIBER is able to modify traffic from/to another subscriber
3.3 Assumptions
This Security Target uses one assumption:
A.TRUSTED_NETWORK
It is assumed that the Network(s) (except the Management Network) are trusted,
such that they will not interfere with subscriber traffic. It is also assumed that the
EMS, RADIUS and TACACS+ servers will not be used to attack the TOE.
Security Target ZTE Access Gateways 12 | 26
4 Security Objectives
These security objectives describe how the threats described in the previous
section will be addressed. It is divided into:
 The Security Objectives for the TOE, describing what the TOE will do to
address the threats
 The Security Objectives for the Operational Environment, describing
what other entities must do to address the threats
A rationale that the combination of all of these security objectives indeed
addresses the threats may be found in section 7.1 of this Security Target.
4.1 Security objectives for the TOE
O. ACCESS
The TOE shall ensure that subscribers have only access to the services on the
networks that they are entitled to.
O.MANAGE_ACCESS
The TOE shall offer administrators the possibility to modify the access that
subscribers have to networks.
O.AUTHENTICATE_ADMIN
The TOE shall identify and authenticate administrators before allowing them
access to administrative functions.
O.ENCRYPTED_MANAGEMENT
The TOE shall offer an encrypted channel for administrative actions, preventing
disclosure, insertion and/or modification of administrative commands.
O. SEPARATION_OF_PORTS
The TOE shall offer physical ports, and be able to separate traffic between different
ports, such that:
o It is not possible to listen in on traffic from one port on a different port
o It is not possible to modify traffic on one port from another port
O. xPON (only on TOEs offering xPON)
THE TOE shall offer physical xPON ports to subscribers, such that:
o It is not possible for one subscriber on a xPON port to listen in on traffic
from/to other subscribers on that xPON port
o It is not possible for one subscriber on a XPON port to modify traffic from/to
other subscribers on that xPON port
Security Target ZTE Access Gateways 13 | 26
4.2 Security objectives for the Operational Environment
OE.PHYSICAL_SECURITY
The operator shall ensure that the TOE shall be protected from physical attacks.
OE.MULTIPLE_SUBSCRIBERS
Where multiple subscribers are connected to a single non-xPON port, and it is
desired that the confidentiality and/or integrity of traffic from/to a subscriber shall be
protected from other subscribers, this must be arranged by the environment.
OE.TRUSTED_NETWORK
The environment shall ensure that the Network(s) are trusted (except the
Management Network), such that they will not interfere with subscriber traffic and
that the EMS, RADIUS and TACACS+ servers will not be used to attack the TOE.
Security Target ZTE Access Gateways 14 | 26
5 Security Requirements
5.1 Extended components definition
None.
5.2 Definitions
The following terms are used in the security requirements:
Roles:
o Administrator
Subjects/External Entities
o Services (on a Network)
o Ports (any physical Port to a subscriber)
o xPON Port (a virtual Port to an xPON subscriber)
2
Objects:
o Traffic
Operations:
 Receive
 Send
 Modify
None of the subjects or objects have attributes.
2
Note that a Port is a physical port, while an xPON port is a virtual port: one port supporting
xPON can support many xPON ports. Ports are physically separated, while xPON ports are
cryptographically and separated from each other by TDM.
Security Target ZTE Access Gateways 15 | 26
5.3 Security Functional Requirements
The following notational conventions are used in the requirements. Operations are
indicated in bold, except refinements, which are indicated in bold italic. In general
refinements were applied to clarify requirements and/or make them more readable.
Iterations were indicated by adding three letters to the component name.
5.3.1 Management
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles:
o Administrator
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
FIA_UID.2.1 The TSF shall require each Administrator to be
successfully identified by username before allowing any other TSF-
mediated Administrator actions on behalf of that Administrator.
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
FIA_UAU.2.1 The TSF shall require each Administrator to be
successfully authenticated
 by password
 through a non-TOE RADIUS server (when so configured)
 through a non-TOE TACACS+ server (when so
configured) 3
before allowing any other TSF-mediated Administrator actions on
behalf of that Administrator.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following
management functions by Administrators:
OMM Management function Related to SFR
Change Administrator username FIA_UID.2
Change Administrator password FIA_UAU.2
Manage the Traffic Policy Rules FDP_IFF.1
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication channel between
itself and an SSH-client that is logically distinct from other
communication channels and provides assured identification of its
end points and protection of the channel data from modification or
disclosure.
3
Not supported on MSG5208, ZXDSL 9806H, 9816 and 9836 TOEs
Security Target ZTE Access Gateways 16 | 26
FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit the SSH-client to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall not4
initiate communication via the trusted
channel.
5.3.2 Separation
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FDP_IFC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Traffic Policy on
 Ports, xPON Ports5
 Traffic
 Receive, Send, Modify.
FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
FDP_IFF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Traffic Policy based on the
following types of subject and information security attributes:
 Ports, xPON Ports6
 Traffic
FDP_IFF.1.2 The TSF shall permit an information flow between a
controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled
operation if the following rules hold:
 Ports and xPON Ports can Receive Traffic from a Service,
if so allowed by the Traffic Policy rules
 Ports and xPON Ports cannot Receive Traffic not destined
for that port
 Ports and xPON Ports can Send Traffic to a Service, if so
allowed by the Traffic Policy rules
 Ports and xPON Ports cannot Modify Traffic on other
Ports or xPON Ports
FDP_IFF.1.3, FDP_IFF.1.4, FDP_IFF.1.5 (refined away)
4
A refinement for readability.
5
Only MSG5200, C300M and C350M support xPON Ports.
6
Only MSG5200, C300M and C350M support xPON Ports.
Security Target ZTE Access Gateways 17 | 26
5.4 Security Assurance Requirements
The assurance requirements are EAL2+ALC_FLR.2 and have been summarized in
the following table:
Assurance Class
Assurance Components
Identifier Name
ADV: Development
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.2
Security-enforcing functional
specification
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
AGD: Guidance
documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ASE: Security Target
evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
Security Target ZTE Access Gateways 18 | 26
5.5 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
The Security Assurance Requirements for this Security Target are
EAL2+ALC_FLR.2. The reasons for this choice are that:
 EAL 2 is deemed to provide a good balance between assurance and
costs and is in line with ZTE customer requirements.
 ALC_FLR.2 provides assurance that ZTE has a clear and functioning
process of accepting security flaws from users and updating the TOE
when required. This is also in line with ZTE customer requirements.
 The refinements are derived from ZTE customer requirements as well.
Security Target ZTE Access Gateways 19 | 26
6 TOE Summary Specification
FMT_SMR.1, FIA_UID.2, FIA_UAU.2, FPT_ITC.1
Administrators can only login on the TOE by using a ssh-client
7
. They can then
login through a standard username/password mechanism, and all the
communication between TOE and ssh-client is encrypted through ssh.
Optionally, the login procedure can be handled through a TACACS+ or RADIUS
server (where supported by the TOE). This will still result in an encrypted ssh-
session.
FDP_IFC.1, FDP_IFF.1
The TOE uses several mechanisms to enforce the Traffic Policy:
 Ports are physically isolated from each other, and can only talk to each
other through a switch in the TOE, which switches the communication from
Subscribers to Networks and vice versa.
 The TOE supports VLANs, to ensure that certain ports can only talk to
certain networks.
 The TOE supports L2 Isolation, preventing ports in the same VLAN from
communicating with each other, thus preventing ports from talking to erach
other directly (they can then only talk through each other via an entity in
one of the Networks)
 The TOE supports ACL rules, both on Layer 2 (Ethernet) and Level 3 (IP),
allowing fine-grained access control on MAC-address (source and
destination), IP (source and destination) and ports.
 The TOE provides MAC Source Guard, IP/MAC binding, DHCP snooping
and DHCP IP Source Guard to prevent subscribers from modifying their
own MAC and or IP addresses to circumvent the ACL rules
 For xPON the TOE provides downstream encryption and upstream time-
division multiplexing or encryption as per the relevant xPON standards.
FMT_SMF.1
The TOE allows an administrator to manage:
 The usernames/passwords of administrators
 Manage the ACL-rules
through a command-line based interface.
7
There are other ways, but these are not available in the evaluated configuration (see 1.3.2).
Security Target ZTE Access Gateways 20 | 26
7 Rationales
7.1 Security Objectives Rationale
Assumptions/OSPs/Threats Objectives
T.UNAUTHORISED_ADMIN
TA.NETWORK or TA.SUBSCRIBER gains access to
the management functionality of the TOE.
This threat is countered by:
 O.AUTHENTICATE_ADMIN, ensuring that only
authorized administrators shall gain access to the
management functionality.
 O.ENCRYPTED_MANAGEMENT, ensuring that
the connection between administrator and TOE is
secure
T.UNAUTHORISED_ACCESS
TA.SUBSCRIBER gains access to a service on a
network that he is not authorized to access
This threat is countered by:
 O.ACCESS, regulating access to networks and\
 O.MANAGE_ACCESS, ensuring that
administrators can regulate this access
T.PHYSICAL_ATTACK
TA.PHYSICAL gains physical access to the TOE and
is able to perform actions on the TOE.
This threat is countered by OE.PHYSICAL_SECURITY,
preventing attackers physical access to the TOE.
T.CONFIDENTIALITY
T.SUBSCRIBER is able to read traffic from/to another
subscriber
This threat is countered by:
 O.SEPARATION_OF_PORTS, where there is a 1:1
relation between ports and subscribers
 O.xPON for xPON ports with multiple subscribers
per port
 OE.MULTIPLE_SUBSCRIBERS for other ports with
multiple subscribers
As these three cases cover all possibilities, these security
objectives counter the threat.
T.INTEGRITY
T.SUBSCRIBER is able to modify traffic from/to
another subscriber
This threat is countered by:
 O.SEPARATION_OF_PORTS, where there is a 1:1
relation between ports and subscribers
 O.xPON for xPON ports with multiple subscribers
per port
 OE.MULTIPLE_SUBSCRIBERS for other ports with
multiple subscribers
As these three cases cover all possibilities, these security
objectives counter the threat.
A.TRUSTED_NETWORK
It is assumed that the Network(s) are trusted (except
the Management Network), such that they will not
interfere with subscriber traffic. It is also assumed that
the EMS, RADIUS and TACACS+ servers will not be
used to attack the TOE.
This assumption is upheld by OE.TRUSTED_NETWORK,
which restates the assumption.
Security Target ZTE Access Gateways 21 | 26
7.2 Security Functional Requirements Rationale
Security objectives SFRs addressing the security objectives
O. ACCESS
The TOE shall ensure that subscribers have only access to
the services on the networks that they are entitled to.
This objective is met by FDP_IFF.1 and FDP_IFC.1 specifying that
there are Traffic Policy rules regulating the access.
O.MANAGE_ACCESS
The TOE shall offer administrators the possibility to
allow/deny subscribers access to services and/or entities on
networks.
This objective is met by FMT_SMF.1 allowing administrators to
manage the Traffic Policy rules
O. AUTHENTICATE_ADMIN
The TOE shall identify and authenticate administrators
before allowing them access to administrative functions.
This objective is met by:
 FMT_SMR.1 defining the role of administrator
 FIA_UID.2 stating that identification of administrators will be
done by username
 FIA_UAU.2 stating that administrators must be
authenticated by password, RADIUS or TACACS+
 FMT_SMF listing what the administrative functions relevant
to security are and that they can only be performed by an
Administrator
O.ENCRYPTED_MANAGEMENT
The TOE shall offer an encrypted channel for administrative
actions, preventing discloser and/or modification of
administrative commands.
This objective is met by FPT_ITC.1 providing a trusted channel
between the SSH-client used by administrators and the TSF.
O. SEPARATION_OF_PORTS
The TOE shall offer physical ports, and be able to separate
traffic between different ports, such that:
o It is not possible to listen in on traffic from one
port on a different port
o It is not possible to modify traffic on one port from
another port
This objective is implemented by FDP_IFC.1 and FDP_IFF.1, where
FDP_IFF.1 restates the objective.
O. xPON (only on TOEs offering xPON)
THE TOE shall offer physical xPON ports to subscribers,
such that:
o It is not possible for one subscriber on a xPON
port to listen in on traffic from/to other subscribers
on that xPON port
o It is not possible for one subscriber on a XPON
port to modify traffic from/to other subscribers on
that xPON port
This objective is implemented by FDP_IFC.1 and FDP_IFF.1, where
FDP_IFF.1 restates the objective.
Security Target ZTE Access Gateways 22 | 26
7.3 Dependencies
SFR Dependencies
FIA_UID.2 -
FIA_UAU.2 FIA_UID.1: met by FIA_UID.2
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1: met by FIA_UID.2
FPT_SMF.1 -
FPT_ITC.1 -
FDP_IFC.1 FDP_IFF.1: met
FDP_IFF.1 FDP_IFC.1: met
FMT_MSA.3: not met, as the policy does not use security attributes,
management of these attributes is unnecessary.
SAR Dependencies
EAL 2 All dependencies within an EAL are satisfied
ALC_FLR.2 -
Security Target ZTE Access Gateways 23 | 26
A Supported Protocols
Upstream Protocol Entity and goal C300 C300M C350M
E1 To TDM Network
T1 To TDM Network
STM-1 To TDM Network
STM-4 To TDM Network
GPNI To GPON OLT
PWE3 To IP network
FE/GE To IP network
GE10 To IP network
IUA/SCTP For ISDN services
H.248/Megaco(IPv4 only,
IPv6 in future)
From one of:
?Softswitch (in NGN)
?AGCF (in IMS)
SIP
To P-CSCF (in IMS)
To common SIP server or
Softswitch (in NGN)
RTP/RTCP To/from another media gateway
PPP/PPPoE Between end-user and BRAS
RADIUS/TACACS+ Authentication Server
RIP/OSPF Routers
ISIS/BGP Routers
PIM-SM/PIM-DM Routers
IGMP IPTV server
TFTP FTP-Server (for backup/restore) Do not use Do not use Do not use
FTP FTP-Server (for backup/restore)
RS-232 To CLI
Telnet Server To CLI Do not use Do not use Do not use
SSH To CLI
SNMP (v1, 2 or 3) To EMS Not evaluated Not evaluated Not evaluated
NTP
NTP Server. This could also be
the Softswitch or EMS if these
are configured as NTP Server
Downsteam Protocol Entity and goal C300 C300M C350M
POTS To end-user
ISDN BRI and PRI To end-user
V.35 G.703 To end-user
E1 To end user
T1 To end user
SHDSL (TDM Mode) To end user
ADSL, ADSL2, ADSL2+ To end user
VDSL2 To end user
SHDSL (ATM mode) To end user
SHDSL.bis To end user
FE/GE To end user
EPON To end user
GPON To end user
10G EPON To end user
XGPON To end user
Security Target ZTE Access Gateways 24 | 26
The cells in this table have the following meaning:
o Grey Cell: This feature does not exist in the TOE
o White Cell: This feature is supported in the evaluated configuration
o Not Evaluated: This feature exists in the TOE, but is not supported in the
evaluated configuration. Enabling it may have consequences for the
security of the TOE.
o Do not use: This feature exists in the TOE, but is not supported in the
evaluated configuration. Enabling it will likely have consequences for the
security of the TOE.
Security Target ZTE Access Gateways 25 | 26
B List of Acronyms
10G EPON 10 Gigabit EPON
ADSL Asymmetric DSL
AGCF Access Gateway Control Function
ATM Asynchronous Transfer Mode
BGP Border Gateway Protocol
BRI Basic Rate Interface
CLI Command Line Interface
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
DSL Digital Subscriber Line
EMS Element Management System
EPNI EPON Network Interface
EPON Ethernet PON
E&M Earth & Magneto
FE Fast Ethernet
FTP File Transfer Protocol
GE Gigabit Ethernet
GPNI GPON Network Interface
GPON Gigabit PON
IGMP Internet Group Management Protocol
IMS IP Multimedia Subsystem
IP Internet Protocol
IPTV IP Television
ISDN Integrated Services Data Network
ISIS Intermediate System to Intermediate System
IUA ISDN User Adaptation
LE Local Exchange
NGN Next Generation Network
NTP Network Time Protocol
OLT Optical Line Terminal
OSPF Open Shortest Path First
P-CSCF Proxy Call Session Control Function
PIM Protocol Independent Multicast
PIM-DM PIM Dense Media
PIM-SM PIM Sparse Media
PON Passive Optical Network
POTS Plain Old Telephony Service
PPP Point to Point Protocol
PPPoE PPP over Ethernet
PRI Primary Rate Interface
PSTN Public Switched Telephone Network
PWE3 Pseudo Wire Emulation Edge - Edge
Security Target ZTE Access Gateways 26 | 26
RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial In User Service
RCTP Real Time Control Protocol
RIP Routing Information Protocol
RTP Real Time Protocol
SCP Session Control Protocol
SHDSL Single Rate High Speed DSL
SIP Session Initiation Protocol
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SSH Secure Shell
TACACS Terminal Access Controller Access Control System
TFTP Trivial FTP
VDSL Very High Bit Rate DSL
VF Voice Frequency
xPON EPON, GPON, 10G EPON or XGPON
XGPON 10 Gigabit PON