SERTIT, P.O. Box 14, N-1306 Bærum postterminal, NORWAY
Phone: +47 67 86 40 00 Fax: +47 67 86 40 09 E-mail: post@sertit.no Internet: www.sertit.no
Sertifiseringsmyndigheten for IT-sikkerhet Norwegian Certification Authority for IT Security
SERTIT-043 CR Certification Report
Issue 0.1 4 March 2013
ZTE Access System Series ZXA10 C300 V2.0.0T2, C300M V3.0T2, C350M V3.0T2
CERTIFICATION REPORT - SERTIT STANDARD REPORT TEMPLATE SD 009 VERSION 2.1 11.11.2011
ZTE Access System Series EAL 2 + ALC_FLR.2
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ARRANGEMENT ON THE RECOGNITION OF COMMON CRITERIA CERTIFICATES IN
THE FIELD OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SECURITY
SERTIT, the Norwegian Certification Authority for IT Security, is a member of the
above Arrangement and as such this confirms that the Common Criteria certificate
has been issued by or under the authority of a Party to this Arrangement and is the
Party’s claim that the certificate has been issued in accordance with the terms of
this Arrangement
The judgements contained in the certificate and Certification Report are those of
SERTIT which issued it and the Norwegian evaluation facility (EVIT) which carried
out the evaluation. There is no implication of acceptance by other Members of the
Agreement Group of liability in respect of those judgements or for loss sustained as
a result of reliance placed upon those judgements by a third party. [*]
* Mutual Recognition under the CC recognition arrangement applies to EAL 2 but not
to ALC_FLR.2.
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Contents
1 Certification Statement 5
2 Abbreviations 6
3 References 10
4 Executive Summary 11
4.1 Introduction 11
4.2 Evaluated Product 11
4.3 TOE scope 11
4.4 Protection Profile Conformance 11
4.5 Assurance Level 11
4.6 Security Policy 11
4.7 Security Claims 12
4.8 Threats Countered 12
4.9 Threats Countered by the TOE’s environment 12
4.10 Threats and Attacks not Countered 12
4.11 Environmental Assumptions and Dependencies 12
4.12 IT Security Objectives 12
4.13 Non-IT Security Objectives 13
4.14 Security Functional Requirements 14
4.15 Security Function Policy 14
4.16 Evaluation Conduct 14
4.17 General Points 15
5 Evaluation Findings 16
5.1 Introduction 16
5.2 Delivery 17
5.3 Installation and Guidance Documentation 17
5.4 Misuse 17
5.5 Vulnerability Analysis 17
5.6 Developer’s Tests 17
5.7 Evaluators’ Tests 17
6 Evaluation Outcome 18
6.1 Certification Result 18
6.2 Recommendations 18
Annex A: Evaluated Configuration 19
TOE Identification 19
TOE Documentation 19
TOE Configuration 20
ZTE Access System Series EAL 2 + ALC_FLR.2
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ZTE Access System Se ries EAL 2 + ALC_FLR.2
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1 Certification Statement
ZTE Corporation ZTE Access System Series is an Access System, which regulates the
access between networks. like a provider IP network or the PSTN or subscribers. who
wish to access these networks.
ZTE Access Syste m Se ri es ve rsi on ZXA 10 C300 V2.0.0T2, C300 M V3.0T2, C350M V3.0T2
has been evaluated under the terms of the Norwegian Certification Scheme for IT
Security and have met the Common Criteria Part 3 (ISO/IEC 15408) conformant
requirements of Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 2 augmented with ALC_FLR.2 for the
specified Common Criteria Part 2 (ISO/IEC 15408) conformant functionality in the
specified environment when running on the platforms specified in Annex A.
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Date approved 1 4 March 2013
SERTIT-043 CR Issue 1.0 Page 5 of 20
4 March 2013
ZTE Access System Series EAL 2 + ALC_FLR.2
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2 Abbreviations
ADSL Asymmetric DSL
AGCF Access Gateway Control Function
ATM Asynchronous Transfer Mode
BGP Border Gateway Protocol
BRI Basic Rate Interface
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(ISO/IEC 15408)
CCRA Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the
Field of Information Technology Security
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CLI Command Line Interface
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
DSL Digital Subscriber Line
E&M Earth & Magneto
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EMS Element Management System
EOR Evaluation Observation Report
EPNI EPON Network Interface
EPON Ethernet PON
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
EVIT Evaluation Facility under the Norwegian Certification Scheme for IT
Security
EWP Evaluation Work Plan
FE Fast Ethernet
FTP File Transfer Protocol
GE Gigabit Ethernet
GPNI GPON Network Interface
GPON Gigabit PON
IGMP Internet Group Management Protocol
IMS IP Multimedia Subsystem
IP Internet Protocol
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IPTV IP Television
ISDN Integrated Services Data Network
ISIS Intermediate System to Intermediate System
IUA ISDN User Adaptation
LE Local Exchange
NGN Next Generation Network
NTP Network Time Protocol
OLT Optical Line Terminal
OSPF Open Shortest Path First
P-CSCF Proxy Call Session Control Function
PIM Protocol Independent Multicast
PIM-DM PIM Dense Media
PIM-SM PIM Sparse Media
POC Point of Contact
PON Passive Optical Network
POTS Plain Old Telephony Service
PPP Point to Point Protocol
PPPoE PPP over Ethernet
PRI Primary Rate Interface
PSTN Public Switched Telephone Network
PWE3 Pseudo Wire Emulation Edge - Edge
QP Qualified Participant
RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial In User Service
RCTP Real Time Control Protocol
RIP Routing Information Protocol
RTP Real Time Protocol
SCP Session Control Protocol
SERTIT Norwegian Certification Authority for IT Security
SHDSL Single Rate High Speed DSL
SIP Session Initiation Protocol
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
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SPM Security Policy Model
SSH Secure Shell
ST Security Target
TACACS Terminal Access Controller Access Control System
TFTP Trivial FTP
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
VDSL Very High Bit Rate DSL
VF Voice Frequency
xPON EPON or GPON
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ZTE Access System Series EAL 2 + ALC_FLR.2
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3 References
[1] Security Target of the ZTE Access System Series ZXA10
C300/C300M/C350M, v 1.0, 2 August 2012.
[2] Common Criteria Part 1, CCMB-2009-07-001, Version 3.1 R3, July 2009.
[3] Common Criteria Part 2, CCMB-2009-07-002, Version 3.1 R3, July 2009.
[4] Common Criteria Part 3, CCMB-2009-07-003, Version 3.1 R3, July 2009.
[5] The Norwegian Certification Scheme, SD001E, Version 8.0, 20 August 2010 .
[6] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Evaluation Methodology, CCMB-2009-07-004, Version 3.1 R3, July 2009.
[7] Common Criteria EAL2+ Evaluation of ZTE Access System Series ZXA10
C300/C300M/C350M, v 1.1, 14 August 2012.
[8] ZXA10 C300(V2.0) Optical Access Convergence Equipment Configuration
Manual (CLI) Version R1.0
[9] ZXA10 C300(V2.0) Optical Access Convergence Equipment Configuration
Manual (NetNumen) Version R1.0
[10] ZXA10 C300M(V3.0) Multi-service Access Equipment Configuration Manual
(CLI) Version R1.0
[11] ZXA10 C300M(V3.0) Multi-Service Access Equipment Configuration Manual
(NetNumen) Version R1.0
[12] ZXA10 C350M(V3.0) Multi-Service Access Equipment Configuration Manual
(CLI) Version R1.0
[13] ZXA10 C350M(V3.0) Multi-Service Access Equipment Configuration Manual
(NetNumen) Version R1.0
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4 Executive Summary
4.1 Introduction
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security
evaluation of ZTE Access System Series version ZXA10 C300 V2.0.0T2, C300M V3.0T2,
C350M V3.0T2 to the Sponsor, ZTE Corporation, and is intended to assist prospective
consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security of the product for their
particular requirements.
Prospective consumers are advised to read this report in conjunction with the
Security Target[1] which specifies the functional, environmental and assurance
evaluation requirements.
4.2 Evaluated Product
The versions of the product evaluated were ZTE Access System Series - ZXA10 C300
V2.0.0T2, C300M V3.0T2, C350M V3.0T2.
This product is also described in this report as the Target of Evaluation (TOE). The
developer was ZTE Corporation.
The TOE regulates the access between networks, like a provider IP network or the
PSTN or subscribers, who wish to access these networks.
Details of the evaluated configuration, including the TOE’s support ing guidance
documentation, are given in Annex A.
4.3 TOE scope
The TOE scope is described in the ST[1], chapter 1.3.
4.4 Protection Profile Conformance
The Security Target[1] did not claim conformance to any protection profile.
4.5 Assurance Level
The assurance incorporated predefined evaluation assurance level EAL 2, augmented
by ALC_FLR.2. Common Criteria Part 3[4] describes the scale of assurance given by
predefined assurance levels EAL1 to EAL7. An overview of CC is given in CC Part 1[2].
4.6 Security Policy
There are no Organizational Security Policies or rules with which the TOE must
comply.
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4.7 Security Claims
The Security Target[1] fully specifies the TOE’s security objectives, the threats which
these objectives meet and security functional requirements and security functions to
elaborate the objectives. All of the SFR’s are taken from CC Part 2[3]; use of this
standard facilitates comparison with other evaluated products .
4.8 Threats Countered
 T.UNAUTHORISED_ADMIN
TA.NETWORK or TA.SUBSCRIBER gains access to the management functionality
of the TOE.
 T.UNAUTHORISED_ACCESS
TA.SUBSCRIBER gains access to a service on a Network that he is not
authorized to access
 T.PHYSICAL_ATTACK
TA.PHYSICAL gains physical access to the TOE and is able to perform actions
on the TOE.
 T.INTEGRITY
TA.SUBSCRIBER is able to modify traffic from/to another subscriber
 T.CONFIDENTIALITY
TA.SUBSCRIBER is able to read traffic from/to another subscriber
4.9 Threats Countered by the TOE’s environment
There are no threats countered by the TOE’s environment.
4.10 Threats and Attacks not Countered
No threats or attacks that are not countered are described
4.11 Environmental Assumptions and Dependencies
The Security Target describes one assumption:
It is assumed that the Network(s) (except the Management Network) are
trusted, such that they will not interfere with subscriber traffic. It is also
assumed that the EMS, RADIUS and TACACS+ servers will not be used to attack
the TOE.
4.12 IT Security Objectives
 O.ACCESS
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The TOE shall ensure that subscribers have only access to the services on the
networks that they are entitled to.
 O.MANAGE_ACCESS
The TOE shall offer administrators the possibility to modify the access that
subscribers have to networks.
 O.AUTHENTICATE_ADMIN
The TOE shall identify and authenticate administrators before allowing them
access to administrative functions.
 O.ENCRYPTED_MANAGEMENT
The TOE shall offer an encrypted channel for administrative actions,
preventing disclosure, insertion and/or modification of administrative
commands.
 O.SEPARATION_OF_PORTS
The TOE shall offer physical ports, and be able to separate traffic between
different ports, such that:
 It is not possible to listen in on traffic from one port on a different
port
 It is not possible to modify traffic on one port from another port
 O.xPON (only on TOEs offering xPON)
THE TOE shall offer physical xPON ports to subscribers, such that:
 It is not possible for one subscriber on a xPON port to listen in on
traffic from/to other subscribers on that xPON port
 It is not possible for one subscriber on a XPON port to modify traffic
from/to other subscribers on that xPON port
4.13 Non-IT Security Objectives
 OE.PHYSICAL_SECURITY
The operator shall ensure that the TOE shall be protected from physical
attacks.
 OE.MULTIPLE_SUBSCRIBERS
Where multiple subscribers are connected to a single non -xPON port, and it is
desired that the confidentiality and/or integrity of traffic from/to a subscriber
shall be protected from other subscribers, this must be arranged by the
environment.
 OE.TRUSTED_NETWORK
The environment shall ensure that the Network(s) are trusted (except the
Management Network), such that they will not interfere with subscriber traffic
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and that the EMS, RADIUS and TACACS+ servers will not be used to attack the
TOE.
4.14 Security Functional Requirements
The following Security Functional requirements were used:
 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
 FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
 FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
 FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel (not relevant for FSAP 9800 V1.0.6P9)
 FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
 FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
Details on the usage of there requirements are described in the ST[1], chapter 5.3
4.15 Security Function Policy
The TOE has the following general functionalities:
 Provide access of subscribers to networks (and vice versa)
 Convert the protocols used by the subscribers to protocols suitable for the
networks (and vice versa)
 Allow management of itself through a Management Network
The TOE
 provides secure management of itself, to ensure that only properly authorized
staff can manage the TOE
 ensures that subscribers have only access to the networks and
functionalities/entities on those networks that they are entitled to
 ensures that subscribers cannot read traffic from/to other subscribers
 ensures that subscribers cannot modify traffic from/to other subscribers.
4.16 Evaluation Conduct
The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the requirements of the
Norwegian Certification Scheme for IT Security as described in SERTIT Document
SD001[5]. The Scheme is managed by the Norwegian Certification Authority for IT
Security (SERTIT). As stated on page 2 of this Certification Report, SERTIT is a
member of the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in
the Field of Information Technology Security (CCRA), and the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the terms of this Arrangement.
The purpose of the evaluation was to provide assurance about the effectiveness o f
the TOE in meeting its Security Target[1], which prospective consumers are advised to
read. To ensure that the Security Target[1] gave an appropriate baseline for a CC
evaluation, it was first itself evaluated. The TOE was then evaluated against this
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baseline. Both parts of the evaluation were performed in accordance with CC Part
3[4] and the Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM)[6].
SERTIT monitored the evaluation which was carried out by the Brightsight B.V.
Commercial Evaluation Facility (CLEF/EVIT). The evaluation was completed when the
EVIT submitted the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR)[7] to SERTIT in 14 August 2012.
SERTIT then produced this Certification Report.
4.17 General Points
The evaluation addressed the security functionality claimed in t he Security Target[1]
with reference to the assumed operating environment specified by the Security
Target[1]. The evaluated configuration was that specified in Annex A. Prospective
consumers are advised to check that this matches their identified requirements and
give due consideration to the recommendations and caveats of this report.
Certification does not guarantee that the IT product is free from security
vulnerabilities. This Certification Report and the belonging Certificate only reflect
the view of SERTIT at the time of certification. It is furthermore the responsibility o f
users (both existing and prospective) to check whether any security vulnerabilities
have been discovered since the date shown in this report. This Certification Report is
not an endorsement of the IT product by SERTIT or any other organization that
recognizes or gives effect to this Certification Report, and no warranty of the IT
product by SERTIT or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this
Certification Report is either expressed or implied.
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5 Evaluation Findings
The evaluators examined the following assurance classes and components taken from
CC Part 3. These classes comprise the EAL 2 assurance package augmented with
ALC_FLR.2
Assurance class Assurance components
Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
Security Target
evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
Tests ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
5.1 Introduction
The evaluation addressed the requirements specified in the Security Target [1]. The
results of this work were reported in the ETR[7] under the CC Part 3[4] headings. The
following sections note considerations that are of particular relevance to either
consumers or those involved with subsequent assurance maintenance and re -
evaluation of the TOE.
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5.2 Delivery
On receipt of the TOE, the consumer is recommended to check that the evaluated
version has been supplied, and to check that the security of the TOE has not been
compromised in delivery.
5.3 Installation and Guidance Documentation
Installation of the TOE must be performed completely in accordance with the
guidance in the Operational User Guidance documents provided by the developer.
These documents are a collection of all security relevant operations and settings that
must be observed to ensure that the TOE operates in a secure manner
5.4 Misuse
There is always a risk of intentional and unintentional misconfigurations that could
possibly compromise confidential information. Developers should follow the guidance
for the TOE in order to ensure that the TOE operates in a secure manner.
The guidance documents [8] to[13] adequately describe the mode of operation of the
TOE, all assumptions about the intended environment and all requirements for
external security. Sufficient guidance is provided for the consum er to effectively use
the TOE’s security functions.
5.5 Vulnerability Analysis
The evaluators assessed all possible vulnerabilities found during evaluation of the
classes. This resulted in a list of possible vulnerabilities to be tested.
The evaluators assessed which potential vulnerabilities were already tested by the
developer and assessed the results.
Brightsight tested the remaining potential vulnerabilities on the final version of the
TOE at the premises of ZTE, Shanghai, China on 19th and 20th July 2012 .
5.6 Developer’s Tests
The developer test effort is considered already fairly complete. Any major missing
features reported by the evaluators such as user management, STP and LACP tests
have been added to the developer test set. And the developer integrated t ests for
similar functionality into bigger test case.
Brightsight performed these tests based on the final version of the TOE at the
premises of ZTE, Shanghai, China on 19th and 20th of July 2012.
5.7 Evaluators’ Tests
For independent testing, the evaluator has repeated 9 out of the 11 developer's tests
and added 12 tests (21 evaluator’s ATE_IND.2 tests in total). For each of the TSFI
available at least one test is performed.
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Brightsight performed these tests based on the final version of the TOE at the
premises of ZTE, Shanghai, China on 19th and 20th of July 2012.
6 Evaluation Outcome
6.1 Certification Result
After due consideration of the ETR[7], produced by the Evaluators, and the conduct
of the evaluation, as witnessed by the Certifier, SERTIT has determined that ZTE
Access System Series version ZXA10 C300 V2.0.0T2, C300M V3.0T2, C350M V3.0T2
meets the Common Criteria Part 3 conformant requirements of Evaluation Assurance
Level EAL 2 + ALC_FLR.2 for the specified Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
functionality, in the specified environment, when running on platforms specified in
Annex A.
6.2 Recommendations
Prospective consumers of ZTE Access System Series should understand the specific
scope of the certification by reading this report in conjunction with the Security
Target[1]. The TOE should be used in accordance with a number of environmental
considerations as specified in the Security Target.
Only the evaluated TOE configuration should be installed. This is specified in Annex A
with further relevant information given above under Section 4.3 “TOE Scope” and
Section 5 “Evaluation Findings”.
The TOE should be used in accordance with the supporting guidance documentation
included in the evaluated configuration.
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Annex A: Evaluated Configuration
TOE Identification
There is no special hardware requirement. Since the TOE already includes the
hardware components. The configuration of the hardware is listed below:
TYPE TOE NAME VERSION
Hardware ZXA10 C300 ZXA10 C300 V2.0.0T2
ZXA10 C300M ZXA10 C300M V3.0T2
ZXA10 C350M ZXA10 C350M V3.0T2
TOE Documentation
The supporting guidance documents evaluated were:
[a] ZXA10 C300(V2.0) Optical Access Convergence Equipment Configuration
Manual (CLI) Version R1.0
[b] ZXA10 C300(V2.0) Optical Access Convergence Equipment Configuration
Manual (NetNumen) Version R1.0
[c] ZXA10 C300(V2.0) Optical Access Convergence Equipment Maintenance
Manual Version R1.0
[d] ZXA10 C300(V2.0) Security Issues Version R1.0
[e] ZXA10 C300M(V3.0) Multi-service Access Equipment Configuration Manual
(CLI) Version R1.0
[f] ZXA10 C300M(V3.0) Multi-Service Access Equipment Configuration Manual
(NetNumen) Version R1.0
[g] ZXA10 C300M(V3.0) Multi-service Access Equipment Maintenance Manual
Version R1.0
[h] ZXA10 C300M(V3.0) Security Issues Version R1.0
[i] ZXA10 C350M(V3.0) Multi-Service Access Equipment Configuration Manual
(CLI) Version R1.0
[j] ZXA10 C350M(V3.0) Multi-Service Access Equipment Configuration Manual
(NetNumen) Version R1.0
[k] ZXA10 C350M(V3.0) Multi-Service Access Equipment Routine Maintenance
Manual Version R1.0
[l] ZXA10 C350M(V3.0) Security Issues Version R1.0
Further discussion of the supporting guidance material is given in Section 5.3
“Installation and Guidance Documentation”.
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TOE Configuration
The following configuration was used for testing:
1 TOE 2 ITEM 3 IDENTIFIER 4 VERSION
5 C300
6 V2.0.0T2
7 Hardware ZXA10 C300
8 Software ZXA10 C300
ZXIAP
ZXROS
Vxworks
V2.0.0T2
V2.0
04.08.35
5.5.1
9 Guidance ZXA10 C300(V2.0) Optical Access Convergence
Equipment Configuration Manual (CLI)
ZXA10 C300(V2.0) Optical Access Convergence
Equipment Configuration Manual (NetNumen)
ZXA10 C300(V2.0) Optical Access Convergence
Equipment Maintenance Manual
ZXA10 C300(V2.0) Security Issues
R1.0
10 C300M
V3.0T2
11 Hardware ZXA10 C300M
12 Software MSG_6000
ZXIAP
ZXROS
Vxworks
V3.0T2
v1.2
04.08.01
5.5.1
13 Guidance ZXA10 C300M(V3.0) Multi-service Access
Equipment Configuration Manual (CLI)
ZXA10 C300M(V3.0) Multi-Service Access
Equipment Configuration Manual (NetNumen)
ZXA10 C300M(V3.0) Multi-service Access
Equipment Maintenance Manual
ZXA10 C300M(V3.0) Security Issues
R1.0
14 C350M
V3.0T2
15 Hardware ZXA10 C350M
16 Software MSG_6000
ZXIAP
ZXROS
Vxworks
V3.0T2
v1.2
04.08.01
5.5.1
17 Guidance ZXA10 C350M(V3.0) Multi-Service Access
Equipment Configuration Manual (CLI)
ZXA10 C350M(V3.0) Multi-Service Access
Equipment Configuration Manual (NetNumen)
ZXA10 C350M(V3.0) Multi-Service Access
Equipment Routine Maintenance Manual
ZXA10 C350M(V3.0) Security Issues
R1.0
18 Development
Evidence
[ST] Access Gateways ST
[ADV] Access Gateways (Batch #2)
[FSP] ZXA10 C300 physical functional specification
[FSP] ZXA10 C300M physical functional specification
[FSP] ZXA10 C350M physical functional specification
[ATE C300] CC Test Specification ZTE
[ATE C300M] CC Test Specification ZTE
[ATE C350M] CC Test Specification ZTE
[ALC] ALC_DEL.1, ALC_CMC.2, ALC_CMS.2, ALC_FLR.2 for
Access System Series
V1.0
V0.2
V1.0
V1.0
V1.0
V1.1
V1.1
V1.0
Certificate
Product Manufacturer: ZTE Corporation
Product Naml:: lTE Access System Series
Type of Product: Telecommunication Access System
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SERTIT (f'+l-H
Norwegian CertJf,rotion Authartty far ITSecurtty
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