Dell Technologies, Inc.
Dell EMC VxRail Appliance
Security
Target
Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL): EAL2+
Document Version: 1.0
Prepared for: Prepared by:
Dell Technologies, Inc. Corsec Security, Inc.
1 Dell Way 13921 Park Center Road, Suite 460
Round Rock, TX 78682 Herndon, VA 20171
United States of America United States of America
Phone: +1 508 435 1000 Phone: +1 703 267 6050
https://www.delltechnologies.com www.corsec.com
Security Target, Version 1.0 February 23, 2018
Dell EMC VxRail Appliance with VxRail 4.0.400-6628128 on 160 and Dell EMC VxRail Appliance with VxRail 4.0.400-6628128 on 160F
©2017 Dell Technologies, Inc.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction.......................................................................................................................................................5
1.1 Purpose .....................................................................................................................................................5
1.2 Security Target and TOE References.........................................................................................................5
1.3 Product Overview......................................................................................................................................6
1.4 TOE Overview............................................................................................................................................8
1.4.1 Brief Description of the Components of the TOE.............................................................................9
1.4.2 TOE Environment........................................................................................................................... 10
1.4.3 Product Physical/Logical Features and Functionality not included in the TOE............................. 11
1.5 TOE Description...................................................................................................................................... 11
1.5.1 Physical Scope ............................................................................................................................... 11
1.5.2 Logical Scope ................................................................................................................................. 12
2. Conformance Claims....................................................................................................................................... 14
3. Security Problem............................................................................................................................................. 15
3.1 Threats to Security................................................................................................................................. 15
3.2 Organizational Security Policies............................................................................................................. 16
3.3 Assumptions........................................................................................................................................... 16
4. Security Objectives ......................................................................................................................................... 17
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE ............................................................................................................. 17
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment........................................................................... 17
4.2.1 IT Security Objectives.................................................................................................................... 17
4.2.2 Non-IT Security Objectives............................................................................................................ 18
5. Extended Components ................................................................................................................................... 19
5.1 Conventions ........................................................................................................................................... 19
5.2 Extended TOE Security Functional Components ................................................................................... 19
5.2.1 Class FHA: High Availability ........................................................................................................... 19
5.3 Extended TOE Security Assurance Components.................................................................................... 20
6. Security Requirements.................................................................................................................................... 21
6.1 Security Functional Requirements......................................................................................................... 21
6.1.1 Class FAU: Security Audit............................................................................................................... 22
6.1.2 Class FDP: User Data Protection.................................................................................................... 23
6.1.3 Class FIA: Identification and Authentication................................................................................. 24
6.1.4 Class FMT: Security Management................................................................................................. 24
6.1.5 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF.................................................................................................... 25
6.1.6 Class FRU: Resource Utilization..................................................................................................... 26
6.1.7 Class: TOE Access........................................................................................................................... 26
6.1.8 Class FHA: High Availability ........................................................................................................... 26
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements ......................................................................................................... 27
7. TOE Summary Specification............................................................................................................................ 28
7.1 TOE Security Functionality ..................................................................................................................... 28
7.1.1 Security Audit ................................................................................................................................ 29
7.1.2 User Data Protection..................................................................................................................... 31
7.1.3 Identification and Authentication ................................................................................................. 31
7.1.4 Security Management ................................................................................................................... 32
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7.1.5 Protection of the TSF..................................................................................................................... 33
7.1.6 Resource Utilization ...................................................................................................................... 33
7.1.7 TOE Access..................................................................................................................................... 34
7.1.8 High Availability............................................................................................................................. 34
8. Rationale......................................................................................................................................................... 35
8.1 Conformance Claims Rationale.............................................................................................................. 35
8.2 Security Objectives Rationale ................................................................................................................ 35
8.2.1 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Threats ........................................................................ 35
8.2.2 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Policies ........................................................................ 37
8.2.3 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Assumptions................................................................ 37
8.3 Rationale for Extended Security Functional Requirements................................................................... 38
8.4 Rationale for Extended TOE Security Assurance Requirements............................................................ 38
8.5 Security Requirements Rationale........................................................................................................... 38
8.5.1 Rationale for Security Functional Requirements of the TOE Objectives....................................... 39
8.5.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale ................................................................................ 41
8.5.3 Dependency Rationale .................................................................................................................. 41
9. Acronyms........................................................................................................................................................ 43
List of Figures
Figure 1 – VxRail Appliance ........................................................................................................................................6
Figure 2 – Deployment Configuration of the TOE ......................................................................................................9
Figure 3 – FHA family decomposition...................................................................................................................... 20
List of Tables
Table 1 – ST and TOE References ...............................................................................................................................5
Table 2 – Model Specifications...................................................................................................................................6
Table 3 – CC and PP Conformance .......................................................................................................................... 14
Table 4 – Threats ..................................................................................................................................................... 15
Table 5 – Assumptions............................................................................................................................................. 16
Table 6 – Security Objectives for the TOE ............................................................................................................... 17
Table 7 – IT Security Objectives............................................................................................................................... 18
Table 8 – Non-IT Security Objectives....................................................................................................................... 18
Table 9 – Extended TOE Security Functional Requirements ................................................................................... 19
Table 10 – TOE Security Functional Requirements ................................................................................................. 21
Table 11 – Assurance Requirements....................................................................................................................... 27
Table 12 – Mapping of TOE Security Functionality to Security Functional Requirements...................................... 28
Table 13 – VxRail Manager Event Record Contents ................................................................................................ 29
Table 14 – File System Audit Record Contents........................................................................................................ 29
Table 15 – File System Mystic Files Record Contents.............................................................................................. 30
Table 16 – Threats: Objectives Mapping................................................................................................................. 35
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Table 17 – Assumptions: Objectives Mapping ........................................................................................................ 37
Table 18 – Objectives: SFRs Mapping...................................................................................................................... 39
Table 19 – Functional Requirements Dependencies............................................................................................... 41
Table 20 – Acronyms ............................................................................................................................................... 43
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1. Introduction
This section identifies the Security Target (ST), Target of Evaluation (TOE), and the ST organization. Dell
Technologies, Inc. (Dell) develops the TOE. The TOE is the Dell EMC VxRail Appliance with VxRail 4.0.400-6628128
on 160 and Dell EMC VxRail Appliance with VxRail 4.0.400-6628128 on 160F and will hereafter be referred to as
the TOE or VxRail throughout this document. The TOE is developed by EMC Corporation, which is a subsidiary of
Dell. The TOE is a hyper-converged infrastructure appliance that provides fast and simple methods for standing
up a virtualized Software-Defined Data Center (SDDC). VxRail delivers compute, network, storage, virtualization,
and management for the SDDC.
1.1 Purpose
This ST is divided into nine sections, as follows:
 Introduction (Section 1) – Provides a brief summary of the ST contents and describes the organization of
other sections within this document. It also provides an overview of the TOE security functionality and
describes the physical and logical scope for the TOE, as well as the ST and TOE references.
 Conformance Claims (Section 2) – Provides the identification of any Common Criteria (CC), Protection
Profile (PP), and Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) package claims. It also identifies whether the ST contains
extended security requirements.
 Security Problem (Section 3) – Describes the threats, organizational security policies, and assumptions
that pertain to the TOE and its environment.
 Security Objectives (Section 4) – Identifies the security objectives that are satisfied by the TOE and its
environment.
 Extended Components (Section 5) – Identifies new components (extended Security Functional
Requirements (SFRs) and extended Security Assurance Requirements (SARs)) that are not included in CC
Part 2 or CC Part 3.
 Security Requirements (Section 6) – Presents the SFRs and SARs met by the TOE.
 TOE Summary Specification (Section 7) – Describes the security functions provided by the TOE that satisfy
the security functional requirements and objectives.
 Rationale (Section 8) – Presents the rationale for the security objectives, requirements, and SFR
dependencies as to their consistency, completeness, and suitability.
 Acronyms (Section 9) – Defines the acronyms and terminology used within this ST.
1.2 Security Target and TOE References
Table 1 below shows the ST and TOE references.
Table 1 – ST and TOE References
ST Title Dell Technologies, Inc. Dell EMC VxRail Appliance Security Target
ST Version Version 1.0
ST Author Corsec Security, Inc.
ST Publication Date February 23, 2018
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TOE Reference
Dell EMC VxRail Appliance with VxRail 4.0.400-6628128 on 160 and Dell EMC VxRail
Appliance with VxRail 4.0.400-6628128 on 160F
1.3 Product Overview
The Product Overview provides a high-level description of the product that is the subject of the evaluation. The
following section, TOE Overview, will provide the introduction to the parts of the overall product offering that are
specifically being evaluated.
VxRail appliances are built to provide all mission-critical services for a SDDC, including virtualization, compute, and
storage. Full integration with VMware’s vSphere, and Virtual SAN (vSAN) provide the backbone of the appliance.
The appliances are deployed in clusters ranging from 4 to 16 nodes. A node provide computation for the appliance
and contain multiple processors. Each 2U1
appliance includes the 4-node base that is required for cluster
operations. A single appliance can support up to 200 virtual machines (VMs). VxRail’s hyper-converged
infrastructure provides customer VMs with the power of an entire Storage Attached Network (SAN) in a single
appliance.
Figure 1 – VxRail Appliance
Hyper-convergence is an emerging technology that refers to complete systems that provide compute resources
for running a VM infrastructure and shared storage for use by VMs. Hyper-converged solutions run entirely on x86
servers with commodity internal solid-state and hard-disk drives for storage. Customers deploy the system as
appliances that scale in a linear fashion; each node added to a VxRail cluster contributes a fixed amount of
computational power and storage capacity. Hyper-convergence relies on software-defined storage as an
underlying technology that is provided by VMware vSphere and vSAN. This software-defined storage allows the
storage within individual servers to be shared across every node in a VxRail cluster.
The VxRail appliance models include four nodes in a 2U chassis. Models can include hybrid or all-flash drives.
Table 2 – Model Specifications
Model Type of Drives Processor Cores per node Raw Storage per node Network Interface
VxRail 60 Hybrid 1 x Intel Xeon Processor 6 3.6 – 10 TB2 4 x 1 GbE3 RJ45
VxRail 120 Hybrid 2 x Intel Xeon Processor 12 3.6 – 10 TB
2 x 10 GbE SFP+4 or
2 x RJ45
1
2U – two rack units
2
TB – Terabytes
3 GbE – Gigabit Ethernet
4 SFP+ – Enhanced Small Form-factor Pluggable
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Model Type of Drives Processor Cores per node Raw Storage per node Network Interface
VxRail 160 Hybrid 2 x Intel Xeon Processor 16 4.8 – 10 TB
2 x 10 GbE SFP+ or
2 x RJ45
VxRail 200 Hybrid 2 x Intel Xeon Processor 20 4.8 – 10 TB
2 x 10 GbE SFP+ or
2 x RJ45
VxRail 120F All-flash 2 x Intel Xeon Processor 12 7.6 – 19 TB
2 x 10 GbE SFP+ or
2 x RJ45
VxRail 160F All-flash 2 x Intel Xeon Processor 16 7.6 – 19 TB
2 x 10 GbE SFP+ or
2 x RJ45
VxRail 200F All-flash 2 x Intel Xeon Processor 20 7.6 – 19 TB
2 x 10 GbE SFP+ or
2 x RJ45
VxRail 240F All-flash 2 x Intel Xeon Processor 24 7.6 – 19 TB 2 x 10 GbE SFP+
VxRail 280F All-flash 2 x Intel Xeon Processor 28 7.6 – 19 TB 2 x 10 GbE SFP+
The VxRail 160 and VxRail 160F were tested as part of this evaluation. Each nodes can optionally support a 100
Mbps5
RJ45 management port.
The VxRail software is the same on each appliance. VxRail appliances come with the following pre-installed:
 VxRail 4.0.400-6628128
 VMware’s ESXi v6.0.0 build-6509460
 VMware’s vSAN v6.2 build 5572656
 VMware’s vCenter v6.0.0 build 6500546
Customers can use the MarketPlace within the VxRail Manager to download and install additional VMs onto the
appliance.
The VxRail Manager Graphical User Interface (GUI) is used to manage the TOE. The VxRail Manager GUI provides
simple deployment and configuration of VMs using the underlying VMware vSphere and vSAN components.
Additionally, the GUI provides alerts and graphical representations of system health to include:
 Node, disk, and power supply failures
 Expansion status
 Health of node, appliance, and cluster to include:
o CPU6
usage
o Memory usage
o Storage IOPS7
VxRail provides the ability to scale-out the cluster using VMware’s Loudmouth to discover all nodes and automate
node configurations. Loudmouth is a proprietary implementation of zero-configuration networking technology
that relies on IPv6 multicast technology to advertise and discover appliances. VMware vSAN, within the VMware
ESXi’s kernel, provides high-performance storage access with minimal CPU and memory overhead. vSAN pools
5
Mbps – Megabits per second
6 CPU – Central Processing Unit
7 IOPS – Input/Output Operations per Second
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solid state drives (SSDs) and hard disk drives (HDDs) to present hosts with a single datastore for the entire cluster.
Data is then distributed and mirrored across the entire datastore according to VM-specific storage policies. These
policies can determine if RAID8
, RAID-5, or RAID-6 is used to protect data, while also providing Quality of Service
(QoS) capabilities on a per VM basis using a maximum IOPS. The policies are configured within vCenter and sent
to the ESXi host for enforcement.
Additionally, VxRail provides a one click, graceful shutdown for the cluster ensuring that pre-checks are performed
and VMs are shut down before the host shuts down. Post checks are performed after shutdowns and vSAN
consistency is ensured. Restores can also be controlled by VxRail to ensure all checks are made during start-up.
Deployment of VMs is also automated by VxRail. Installation and deployment of VMs from the MarketPlace
use .ovf file properties to perform deployment. After the VM is deployed, VxRail can gracefully power-on the VM.
Lastly, VxRail periodically scans the VMs running on the internal vCenter VM and can detect renaming, caching
the latest data on the VM in the database, and perform garbage collection when a VM is removed.
1.4 TOE Overview
The TOE Overview summarizes the usage and major security features of the TOE. The TOE Overview provides a
context for the TOE evaluation by identifying the TOE type and describing the TOE.
The TOE provides a software defined data center that can support hundreds virtual machines and their associated
data. The TOE is a hyper-converged infrastructure hardware appliance that include VMware’s ESXi as a hypervisor
and a VxRail Manager virtual machine. The VMware ESXi hypervisor includes VMware’s vSAN, which aggregates
the underlying local storage to create a shared storage pool for installed VMs to use. Multiple appliances can be
clustered together to extend the storage resource and provide high availability options for the stored data.
The appliances included in the TOE boundary for this evaluation includes one of the following appliances:
 VxRail 160
 VxRail 160F
Figure 2 shows the details of the deployment configuration of the TOE and includes the following previously
undefined acronym:
 DNS – Domain Name Service
 PSC – Platform Services Controller
8
RAID – Redundant Array of Independent Disks
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VxRail Appliance
ESXi v6.0
VxRail
Manager
v4.0
VM
vCenter
PSC
VM
vCenter
VM
Log
Insight
VM
Other
VMs
vSAN v6.2
DNS Server
2nd
VxRail appliance
Legend
TOE component TOE environment TOE boundary
Administrator
workstation
Management
Network
NTP Server
Figure 2 – Deployment Configuration of the TOE
1.4.1 Brief Description of the Components of the TOE
The TOE consists of the following components:
 VxRail Appliance – VxRail 160 or 160F appliance
 VMware ESXi v6.0.0 build-6509460 – ESXi is the hypervisor running in the VxRail appliance. ESXi includes
VMware vSAN v6.2 in its kernel.
 VxRail 4.0.400-6628128 – VxRail Manager is the software that monitors nodes, disks, power supplies, and
VMs to alert an Administrator9
to potential issues. The VxRail software includes:
o VxRail Manager application – presents the VxRail GUI
o SUSE Linux operating system (OS) – host OS on the VxRail VM
To verify the VMware ESXi version, log into the VMware Host Client and click on Help -> About. A pop-up window
will show the ESXi version and build numbers. To verify the VMware vSAN version, visit
https://kb.vmware.com/s/article/2150753. The page shows mappings of ESXi version to vSAN versions. The ESXi
build-6509460 maps to the ESXi v6.0 Patch 5 version and includes the vSAN build-5572656.
The TOE boundary does not include customer supplied VMs or any external components such as a DNS server or
network infrastructure. VMware vCenter is also excluded from the boundary. Though not included in the TOE
boundary, all components are required in the TOE environment.
9 Note that an Administrator is a person using the TOE with an account that has either the Administrator or CLI Root roles assigned to
it. The vCenter System role is also and administrative account, but is a system role. When the term User is used, it refers to the VMs and
users of the VMs that access the TOE resources.
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Administrators of the TOE can access security services through four interfaces: VxRail Manager GUI, Linux Shell
Interface, vSphere API10
, and VMware Host Client.
 VxRail Manager GUI – The VxRail Manager GUI provides statistics and alerts about monitored hardware,
networks, and VMs as well as functionality to power down the appliance and deploy VMs.
 Linux Shell Interface – The Linux Shell Interface provides limited access to the host OS on the VxRail
Manager VM. Authorized Administrators can access audit logs through this interface and power off the
VxRail Manager VM.
 vSphere API – The vCenter VM in the TOE environment uses the vSphere API for communicating storage
policies and VM configurations to the ESXi hypervisor. The vSphere Web API is also an exposed web service
running on both the vCenter VM and on each ESXi host. In the evaluated configuration is recommended
that only the vSphere API on the vCenter Server be used to maintain consistency on all ESXi hosts.
 VMware Host Client – Each ESXi host maintains a VMware Host Client interface that can be used to
manage the single ESXi host. In the evaluated configuration it is recommended that this interface only be
used for emergency management when vCenter Server is unavailable.
Each ESXi node offers a vSphere Web UI and access to the vSphere API, but these should not be used for
administrative actions. The nodes should be administered through vCenter. The TOE can be deployed in various
configurations from a single appliance to multiple appliances clustered across physically separate datacenters.
The configurations for this CC evaluation will be as a single appliance and with two appliances clustered together.
1.4.2 TOE Environment
The TOE relies on non-TOE hardware/software for its essential operation. Though this hardware/software is
necessary for the TOE’s operation, it is not part of the TOE. The following non-TOE hardware/software is required
for essential operation of the TOE:
 VMware vCenter Server – The TOE is delivered with vCenter pre-installed on the VxRail appliance. The
TOE relies on vCenter for authentication, creation of storage policies, and to maintain the list of VMs
installed on the appliance. The vCenter component consists of two VMs on the appliance.
 DNS server – A DNS server is required for network address resolution.
 NTP server – An NTP server is required as a time source.
 Customer installed VMs – The TOE provides virtualization and storage for customer VMs to suit their
business needs. An arbitrary number of VMs can be deployed, not exceeding the physical resources
provided by the TOE.
 Firewall – A firewall protects the TOE interfaces.
 At least one 10GbE network switch with eight switch ports is also required to provide network switching
for the TOE.
 Cabling – the following cables or equivalent are required for each type of port:
o RJ45 Network Interface Cards (NIC) ports – 2 x CAT6 or higher cables per node which are shipped
with the TOE
o SFP+ NIC ports – 2 x compatible twinax DAC cables per node or 2 x fiber cables per node
 Administrator workstation – This workstation is used to access the VxRail GUI via an industry-standard
browser.
10 API – Application Programming Interface
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1.4.3 Product Physical/Logical Features and Functionality not
included in the TOE
The TOE includes other products that are out of the scope of the TOE. These products are not included in the TOE
and will not be evaluated, and therefore there is no assurance level associated with them. The following products
are not included in the TOE:
 N/A
1.5 TOE Description
This section primarily addresses the physical and logical components of the TOE that are included in the evaluation.
1.5.1 Physical Scope
The TOE is deployed on VxRail 160 and VxRail 160F as a hyper-converged infrastructure appliance. EMC
Professional Services delivers and sets up the TOE at customer sites.
1.5.1.1 TOE Hardware and Software
The TOE is an appliance with ESXi v6.0, vSAN v6.2, and VxRail Manager 4.0.400-6628128 that provides all mission-
critical services for a SDDC, including virtualization, compute, and storage. Each 2U appliance includes the 4-node
base that is required for the cluster operations. A single appliance can support up to 200 VMs. All software
components are pre-installed on the appliance prior to shipment to customers.
The TOE’s functionality is the same regardless of the hardware appliance on which they are installed. The software
varies only according to low-level driver differences needed for the different appliance models.
1.5.1.2 Guidance Documentation
The following guides are required reading and part of the TOE:
 Dell EMC VxRail Appliance Version 4.0 Administration Guide, REV 01
 Administering VMware Virtual SAN, Virtual SAN 6.2, EN-002061-03, VMware
 VMware Virtual SAN 6.2 Release Notes, Updated on: 24 February 2017, 15 March 2016
 vSphere Virtual Machine Administration, Update 1, ESXi 6.0, vCenter Server 6.0, EN-001887-04, VMware
 vSphere Web Services SDK Programming Guide vSphere Web Services SDK 6.0, EN-001411-02, VMware
 vSphere Single Host Management – VMware Host Client, Update 2, VMware vSphere 6.0, VMware ESXi
6.0, VMware Host Client 1.4, EN-001982-00, VMware
 Dell Technologies, Inc. Dell EMC VxRail Appliance Guidance Documentation Supplement, Evaluation
Assurance Level (EAL): EAL2+, Document Version: 0.4
The Dell documentation is provided in PDF format to customers via the EMC Support site (emc.com/vxrailsupport).
VMware’s documentation can be found online at https://www.vmware.com/support/pubs/vsphere-esxi-vcenter-
server-6-pubs.html. A printed copy of Dell EMC VxRail™ Appliance Version 4.0, Administration Guide, REV 01 is
delivered with the TOE.
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1.5.2 Logical Scope
The logical boundary of the TOE will be broken down into the following security classes, which are further
described in sections 6 and 7 of this ST. The logical scope also provides the description of the security features of
the TOE. The security functional requirements implemented by the TOE are usefully grouped under the following
Security Function Classes:
 Security Audit
 User Data Protection
 Identification and Authentication
 Security Management
 Protection of the TSF
 Resource Utilization
 TOE Access
 High Availability
1.5.2.1 Security Audit
The TOE generates audit records and stores them in the VxRail Manager filesystem. Each log type has a maximum
file size and maximum number of files that are saved. If all files become full, the oldest file is overwritten with a
new log file. Audit events include startup and shutdown of the appliance, disk failures, node failures, and
authentication events. The log file is protected from unauthorized deletion and modification. Only an authorized
Administrator can modify or delete these files.
1.5.2.2 User Data Protection
The TOE uses a VM-centric data access approach defined by the Virtual Disk Access SFP. VMs are assigned a virtual
disk when created. The TOE ensures that VMs can only access files stored in their assigned virtual disk. Additionally,
the ESXi processes can access files to distribute the data according to the VM’s defined storage policy.
The TOE monitors the stored data for integrity errors using an end-to-end checksum. If an error is detected, the
TOE will attempt to repair the data, update the disk statistics, and record an event in the event log.
1.5.2.3 Identification and Authentication
The TOE requires Administrators to identify and authenticate themselves prior to accessing the TSF. The TOE relies
on vCenter’s Single Sign-On (SSO) service to authenticate Administrators. Rules for creating usernames and
passwords are determined by policies established in vSphere. When an Administrator enters their password, the
TSF provides obscured feedback on its interfaces.
1.5.2.4 Security Management
The TOE provides the Administrator, vCenter System, ESXi Root, and CLI11
Root roles. The Administrator role has
access to the VxRail Manager GUI and can perform system monitoring, deploy a VM, and gracefully shutdowns of
VMs. The CLI Root role has access to the Linux shell interface to view information and submit commands and can
access log files. The vCenter Server is provided the vCenter System role within ESXi to communicate storage
policies and VM configurations. Storage policies are restrictive by default and can only be modified in vCenter and
sent to the TOE using the proxy account. Both the Administrator and vCenter proxy account can change a VM
11
CLI – Command Line Interface
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name. The ESXi Root role is used to access individual ESXi hosts for maintenance purposes and troubleshooting
only.
1.5.2.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE will maintain a secure state when disk read errors cause various disks on a node to fail. Different storage
policies can be set for each VM, allowing the protection level to vary per VM. VxRail monitors the appliances’
power supplies, nodes, and disks to ensure they are operational and it will show an alert in the VxRail Manager
GUI if an error is detected. The TOE also performs a set of network tests during initial setup and when additional
storage is added. The host OS provides a reliable timestamp for the TOE.
TSF data is sent from the vCenter VM to the ESXi hypervisor for enforcement of the storage policies and VM
configurations. The TOE consistently interprets this data by ensuring that available CPU, storage, and network
data is sent to vCenter. The TOE verifies that vCenter does not allocate more than the available resources for these
components when it receives updates. When an update is sent, the TOE will replace any previous data with the
updated data.
1.5.2.6 Resource Utilization
The TOE provides continuous functionality when disk read errors cause various disks on a node to fail. Increased
fault tolerance can be assigned to individual VMs. The TSF can enforce maximum size restrictions on VMs.
1.5.2.7 TOE Access
The TOE’s interfaces provide Administrators with an option to log out and end the session. This prevents the
session from sitting open when the Administrator is not at their workstation.
1.5.2.8 High Availability
The TOE monitors underlying disks, networks, and nodes to determine overall health and statistics on these
components. Alerts are shown on the VxRail Manager GUI if a component fails or is in a degraded state.
Additionally, if a disk has been improperly removed an alert is shown.
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2. Conformance Claims
This section and Table 3 provide the identification for any CC, PP, and EAL package conformance claims. Rationale
is provided for any extensions or augmentations to the conformance claims. Rationale for CC and PP conformance
claims can be found in Section 8.1.
Table 3 – CC and PP Conformance
Common Criteria (CC)
Identification and
Conformance
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Release 4,
September 2012; CC Part 2 extended; CC Part 3 conformant; PP claim (none); Parts 2 and 3
Interpretations of the CEM as of August 11, 2016 were reviewed, and no interpretations apply to
the claims made in this ST.
PP Identification None
Evaluation Assurance Level 2+ augmented, (Augmented with Flaw Reporting Procedures (ALC_FLR.2))
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3. Security Problem
This section describes the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used and the manner in
which the TOE is expected to be employed. It provides the statement of the TOE security environment, which
identifies and explains all:
 Known and presumed threats countered by either the TOE or by the security environment
 Organizational security policies with which the TOE must comply
 Assumptions about the secure usage of the TOE, including physical, personnel and connectivity aspects
3.1 Threats to Security
This section identifies the threats to the IT assets against which protection is required by the TOE or by the security
environment. The threat agents are divided into two categories:
 Attackers or Users who are not Administrators: They have public knowledge of how the TOE operates and
are assumed to possess a low skill level, limited resources to alter TOE configuration settings or
parameters and no physical access to the TOE.
 Administrators: They have extensive knowledge of how the TOE operates and are assumed to possess a
high skill level, moderate resources to alter TOE configuration settings or parameters and physical access
to the TOE. (Administrators are, however, assumed not to be willfully hostile to the TOE.)
All are assumed to have a low level of motivation. The IT assets requiring protection are the TSF12
and user data
saved on or transitioning through the TOE and the hosts on the protected network. Both the confidentiality and
integrity of the data must be protected. Removal, diminution and mitigation of the threats are through the
objectives identified in Section 4 below. Table 4 below lists the applicable threats.
Table 4 – Threats
Name Description
T.AUDIT_COMPROMISE An attacker may cause audit records to be lost or modified or prevent future records from being
recorded, thus masking an Administrator’s actions.
T.DATA_CORRUPTION An attacker may cause data to become corrupt or compromise TOE security due to hardware
failure.
T.EXPLOIT An attacker may attempt to gain unauthorized access to the resources of the managed devices
by exploiting vulnerabilities on a managed device.
T.UNAUTHORIZED _ACCESS An Administrator or User may gain unauthorized access (view, modify, or delete) to user data.
12 TSF – TOE Security Functionality
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3.2 Organizational Security Policies
An Organizational Security Policy (OSP) is a set of security rules, procedures, or guidelines imposed by an
organization on the operational environment of the TOE. There are no OSPs imposed upon the TOE or its
operational environment.
3.3 Assumptions
This section describes the security aspects of the intended environment for the evaluated TOE. The operational
environment must be managed in accordance with assurance requirement documentation for delivery, operation,
and user guidance. Table 5 lists the specific conditions that are required to ensure the security of the TOE and are
assumed to exist in an environment where this TOE is employed.
Table 5 – Assumptions
Name Description
A.ADMIN_AUTH The TOE environment provides a secure repository of Administrators that are authorized to
manage the TOE.
A.ADMIN_PROTECT The TOE environment provides the workstation used to manage the TOE that is free of malicious
software.
A.NETWORK The TOE environment provides the routers, switches, cabling, connectors, and firewalls required
for its operation and to ensure the TOE is secured and protected from interference or tampering.
A.NOEVIL The Administrators who manage the TOE are non-hostile, appropriately trained, and follow all
guidance.
A.PHYSICAL The TOE hardware, data it contains, firewalls, and 10 GbE switch are assumed to be located in a
physically secure facility.
A.PROTECT The TOE software will be protected from unauthorized modification.
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4. Security Objectives
Security objectives are concise, abstract statements of the intended solution to the problem defined by the
security problem definition (see Section 3). The set of security objectives for a TOE form a high-level solution to
the security problem. This high-level solution is divided into two part-wise solutions: the security objectives for
the TOE, and the security objectives for the TOE’s operational environment. This section identifies the security
objectives for the TOE and its supporting environment.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
The specific security objectives for the TOE are listed in Table 6 below.
Table 6 – Security Objectives for the TOE
Name Description
O.ACCESS The TOE must enforce an access control policy in order to prevent unauthorized Users from
gaining access to user data stored on the TOE. The TOE must also provide accessing
Administrators with the ability to manage the TOE and its security attributes. Any Administrator
accessing the TOE will be associated to a role.
O.AUDIT The TOE will provide the capability to detect security relevant events and create records of those
events in the audit trail. These events must be protected from unauthorized modification and
overwrite the oldest stored audit records once the log is full.
O.AUTHENTICATE The TOE must be able to identify and authenticate Administrators prior to allowing any access
to TOE administrative functions and TSF data. The TOE must also provide mechanisms to visually
protect passwords during authentication, verify that passwords meet the complexity
requirements, and to end the current session while logged into the TOE.
O.TSF_PROTECT The TOE must protect its functions and TSF data to ensure its data and capabilities are intact
when a disk read error causes a drive or node to fail. It also must provide the ability to check
that its nodes, disks, and storage network are operating correctly.
O.USER_DATA_PROTECT The TOE must ensure the integrity of stored user data by monitoring for errors and automatically
correcting the errors. The TOE must also ensure that denial of service will not occur because of
unauthorized monopolization of resources.
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
This section describes the environmental objectives.
4.2.1 IT Security Objectives
Table 7 below lists the IT security objectives that are to be satisfied by the environment.
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Table 7 – IT Security Objectives
Name Description
OE.ADMIN_PROTECT The Administrator workstation must be protected from any external interference or tampering.
OE.AUTH The TOE environment must provide a secure repository of Administrator accounts used to
manage the TOE.
OE.NETWORK The routers, switches, cabling, connectors, and firewalls on which the TOE is attached must be
properly implemented such that the TOE is secured and protected from interference or
tampering.
OE.PROTECT The TOE environment must protect itself and the TOE from external interference or tampering.
4.2.2 Non-IT Security Objectives
Table 8 below lists the non-IT environment security objectives that are to be satisfied without imposing technical
requirements on the TOE. That is, they will not require the implementation of functions in the TOE hardware
and/or software. Thus, they will be satisfied largely through application of procedural or administrative measures.
Table 8 – Non-IT Security Objectives
Name Description
NOE.PHYSICAL A secure access facility must protect the physical security of the TOE, data it contains, firewalls,
10GbE, and the TOE environment.
NOE.TRUSTED_ADMIN Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all administrative guidance in a trusted manner.
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5. Extended Components
This section defines the extended SFRs and extended SARs met by the TOE. These requirements are presented
following the conventions identified in Section 5.1.
5.1 Conventions
There are several font variations used within this ST. Selected presentation choices are discussed here to aid the
Security Target reader.
The CC allows for assignment, refinement, selection and iteration operations to be performed on security
functional requirements. All of these operations are used within this ST. These operations are performed as
described in Part 2 of the CC, and are shown as follows:
 Completed assignment statements are identified using [italicized text within brackets].
 Completed selection statements are identified using [italicized and underlined text within brackets].
 Refinements are identified using bold text. Any text removed is stricken (Example: TSF Data) and should
be considered as a refinement.
 Iterations are identified by appending a letter in parentheses following the component title. For example,
FAU_GEN.1(a) Audit Data Generation would be the first iteration and FAU_GEN.1(b) Audit Data
Generation would be the second iteration.
5.2 Extended TOE Security Functional Components
This section specifies the extended SFRs for the TOE. The extended SFRs are organized by class. Table 9 identifies
all extended SFRs implemented by the TOE.
Table 9 – Extended TOE Security Functional Requirements
Name Description
FHA_TST.1 System Testing
5.2.1 Class FHA: High Availability
The High Availability class ensures that the TOE provides high availability capabilities to minimize the downtime
experienced in the event of an error. The FHA: High Availability function class was modeled after the CC FPT:
Protection of the TSF class. The extended family FHA_TST: System Testing was modeled after the CC family
FPT_TST: TSF self-test.
5.2.1.1 System Testing (FHA_TST)
Family Behavior
This family defines the requirements for high availability tests that should be available to assist in determining if
there has been an error that hampers the proper functioning of the TOE.
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Component Leveling
FHA_TST.1: System Testing 1
Figure 3 – FHA family decomposition
FHA_TST: System Testing provides the capability for the TOE to perform tests on assigned functions to ensure its
proper function.
Management: FHA_TST.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
 Management of the high availability settings for the TOE.
Audit: FHA_TST.1
There are no auditable events foreseen.
FHA_TST.1 System Testing
Hierarchical to: No other components
FHA_TST.1.1
The TSF shall run a suite of self tests [selection: during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation,
at the request of the authorized administrator [assignment: administrator roles with this privildge], at the
conditions [assignment: conditions under which self test should occur]] to demonstrate the correct
operation of [assignment: functionality covered by self tests].
Dependencies: No dependencies
5.3 Extended TOE Security Assurance Components
There are no extended SARs defined for the TOE.
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6. Security Requirements
This section defines the SFRs and SARs met by the TOE. These requirements are presented following the
conventions identified in Section 5.1.
6.1 Security Functional Requirements
This section specifies the SFRs for the TOE. This section organizes the SFRs by CC class. Table 10 identifies all SFRs
implemented by the TOE and indicates the ST operations performed on each requirement.
Table 10 – TOE Security Functional Requirements
Name Description S A R I
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation   
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail   
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss  
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control   
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control   
FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity   
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action    
FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback   
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action    
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes  
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation  
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions   
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles   
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state   
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps    
FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency   
FRU_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance   
FRU_RSA.1 Maximum quotas  
FTA_SSL.4 User-initiated termination    
FHA_TST.1 TSF health testing  
Note: S=Selection; A=Assignment; R=Refinement; I=Iteration
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6.1.1 Class FAU: Security Audit
FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
FAU_GEN.1.1
The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
a. Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b. All auditable events, for the [not specified] level of audit; and
c. [
a. Successful Administrator login and logouts at VxRail Manager GUI
b. Successful login and logout at VxRail CLI shell
c. Authentication failures at VxRail Manager GUI and CLI shell
d. Disk failure
e. Node failure
].
FAU_GEN.1.2
The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a. Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome
(success or failure) of the event; and
b. For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components
included in the PP/ST, [Event ID13
, Event Code, Severity, Appliance, Component, Component ID,
ESXi Host, Message, and Time or In file system logs: Timestamp, Type, msg, success, uid, comm].
Note: Successful administrator login and logouts at VxRail Manager GUI will require a minimum of 30 minutes’
interval for generating an audit record. All failed authentication attempts at VxRail Manager GUI generate an audit
record.
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_STG.1.1
The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorized deletion.
FAU_STG.1.2
The TSF shall be able to [prevent] unauthorized modifications to the stored audit records in the audit trail.
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss
Hierarchical to: FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss.
Dependencies: FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG.4.1
The TSF shall [overwrite the oldest stored audit records] and [no other action] if the audit trail is full.
13
ID – Identification
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6.1.2 Class FDP: User Data Protection
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the [Virtual Data Access SFP] on: [
Subjects
 VMs
 ESXi process
Objects
 VM disks
Operations
 read
 write
 move
].
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_ACF.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the [Virtual Data Access SFP] to objects based on the following: [
Subjects
 VM: VM name, assigned VM storage policy
 ESXi process: process name
Objects
 Virtual disk name
 File type
FDP_ACF.1.2
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and
controlled objects is allowed: [A VM (identified by the VM name) can access stored data if the data is
stored within the VM’s assigned virtual disk (identified by the virtual disk name). Otherwise, access is
denied.]
FDP_ACF.1.3
The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:
[ESXi process (vMotion) can move or rename stored data to meet the VM’s assigned storage policy.]
FDP_ACF.1.4
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the [no additional rules].
FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action
Hierarchical to: FDP_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring
Dependencies: No dependencies
FDP_SDI.2.1
The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF for [integrity errors] on all
objects, based on the following attributes: [checksums of data].
FDP_SDI.2.2
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Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall [repair the data or report the error].
6.1.3 Class FIA: Identification and Authentication
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
Hierarchical to: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identifications
FIA_UAU.2.1
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated
actions on behalf of that user
FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.7.1
The TSF shall provide only [obscured feedback] to the user while the authentication is in progress.
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
Hierarchical to: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Dependencies: No dependencies
FIA_UID.2.1
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated
actions on behalf of that user.
6.1.4 Class FMT: Security Management
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the [Virtual Disk Access SFP] to restrict the ability to [change_default, modify, delete]
the security attributes [VM name, and assigned storage policy; file name and file type] to [vCenter System
role].
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1
The TSF shall enforce the [Virtual Disk Access SFP] to provide [restrictive] default values for security
attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2
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The TSF shall allow the [vCenter System role] to specify alternative initial values to override the default
values when an object or information is created.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No Dependencies
FMT_SMF.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [monitor system health,
deploy and shut down VMs, assign management IP14
address for VM].
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_SMR.1.1
The TSF shall maintain the roles [Administrator, vCenter System, and CLI Root, and ESXi Root].
FMT_SMR.1.2
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
6.1.5 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_FLS.1.1
The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: [disk read errors that
result in the failure of all disks on a node, multiple disks on a node, or one disk on a node].
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FPT_STM.1.1
The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.
FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FPT_TDC.1.1
The TSF shall provide the capability to consistently interpret [storage policies and VM configurations]
when shared between the TSF and another trusted IT product.
FPT_TDC.1.2
The TSF shall use [
 only the system account assigned to vCenter System role to change the policies and configurations
 requested configurations are checked against resource availability and are not applied if they
exceed resource availability
] when interpreting the TSF data from another trusted IT product.
14
IP – Internet Protocol
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6.1.6 Class FRU: Resource Utilization
FRU_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance
Hierarchical to: FRU_FLT.1 Degraded fault tolerance
Dependencies: FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
FRU_FLT.2.1
The TSF shall ensure the operation of all the TOE’s capabilities when the following failures occur: [disk
read errors that result in the failure of all disks on a node, multiple disks on a node, or one disk on a node].
FRU_RSA.1 Maximum quotas
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FRU_RSA.1.1
The TSF shall assign maximum quotas of the following resources: [VMDK file] that [subjects] can use
[Simultaneously].
6.1.7 Class: TOE Access
FTA_SSL.4 User-initiated termination
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FTA_SSL.4.1
The TSF shall allow user-initiated termination of the user’s own interactive session.
6.1.8 Class FHA: High Availability
FHA_TST.1 System testing
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FHA_TST.1.1
The TSF shall run a suite of self tests [periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorized
administrator [with Administrator role]] to demonstrate the correct operation of the [nodes, disks, and
storage network].
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6.2 Security Assurance Requirements
This section defines the assurance requirements for the TOE. Assurance requirements are taken from the CC Part
3 and are EAL2+ augmented with ALC_FLR.2. Table 11 summarizes these requirements.
Table 11 – Assurance Requirements
Assurance Requirements
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
Class ALC: Life Cycle Support ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM Coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery Procedures
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw Reporting Procedures
Class ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security Architecture Description
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
Class AGD: Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Class ATE: Tests ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
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7. TOE Summary Specification
This section presents information to detail how the TOE meets the functional requirements described in previous
sections of this ST.
7.1 TOE Security Functionality
Each of the security requirements and the associated descriptions correspond to a security functionality. Hence,
each security functionality is described by how it specifically satisfies each of its related requirements. This serves
to both describe the security functionality and rationalize that the security functionality satisfies the necessary
requirements. Table 12 lists the security functionality and their associated SFRs.
Table 12 – Mapping of TOE Security Functionality to Security Functional Requirements
TOE Security Functionality SFR ID Description
Security Audit FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss
User Data Protection FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity
Identification and Authentication FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
Security Management FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Protection of the TSF FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency
Resource Utilization FRU_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance
FRU_RSA.1 Maximum quotas
TOE Access FTA_SSL.4 User-initiated termination
High Availability FHA_TST.1 TSF health testing
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7.1.1 Security Audit
The TOE generates audit records and stores them within the filesystem in the VxRail Manager VM. The VxRail
Event log audits disk failures, node failures, and authentication events. Administrator login and logouts at the
VxRail Manager GUI generate an audit record. Successful administrator login and logouts at VxRail Manager GUI
will require a minimum of 30 minutes’ interval for generating an audit record. All failed authentication at VxRail
Manager GUI attempts generate an audit record. These logs are found on the Events page of the VxRail Manager
GUI and include the content detail in Table 13.
Table 13 – VxRail Manager Event Record Contents
Field Content
Timestamp Contains the date and time the event occurred.
Event ID An auto-generated code that is unique for each event.
Event Code A code that maps to a specific event definition.
MYSTIC11C002: User login succeeded
MYSTIC114002: User login failed
MYSTIC11C003: User logout
MYSTIC028005: Hardware health changed – node status
MYSTIC014000: Cluster health - Error
Severity Defined severity level of the event. Options include Info, Warning, Notice, Alert, Critical, and Error.
Appliance Lists which appliance the event came from, if applicable.
Component Lists the component name where the event came occurred if applicable.
Component ID Lists a unique ID for the component on which the event occurred, if applicable.
ESXi Host Lists the host name for the ESXi hypervisor where the event occurred, if applicable.
Message Verbose text for event that includes success or failure.
Additional audit logs are generated and stored in the VxRail Manager file system. These are accessible only
through the VxRail Manager CLI. In particular, audits of system startup and shutdown and logins and logouts to
the VxRail Manager CLI, are recorded in /var/log in the filesystem. Audit functions are implicitly started at the
startup of the appliance and close at application shutdown, therefore audits of appliance startup and application
shutdown are used to show start-up and shutdown of audit functions. The audit records on the file system should
be viewed using ausearch or aureport.
CLI successful and unsuccessful logins and logout are recorded in /var/log/audit. This file contains the record types
listed in Table 14.
Table 14 – File System Audit Record Contents
Field Content
Timestamp Contains the date and time the event occurred.
Type Contains the type of event, such as USER_AUTH, USER_LOGIN, USER_LOGOUT
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Field Content
msg This field contains a time stamp and a unique ID for the record in the form audit (time stamp: ID).
Multiple records can share the same time stamp and ID if they were generated as part of the same
audit event.
success This value can be ‘yes’ or ‘no’ and determines if the recorded event was successful
auid This is the users audit ID. It is assigned to each user upon login and is inherited by every process
invoked by the user.
uid This is the user ID of the user who invoked the process.
comm Records the command-line name of the command that was used to invoke the analyzed process.
Events related to the appliance startup and shutdown are recorded in /var/log/mystic/connectors-cluster.log.
Examples of these events include:
 Shutdown: Starting to shut down VxRail Manager
 Startup: ClusterMain.main:35 – Application Context initializing…
All log files within the /var/log/mystic folder contain the record contents detailed in Table 15.
Table 15 – File System Mystic Files Record Contents
Field Content
Timestamp Contains the date and time the event occurred.
Level The level of log message that is recorded. Possible values are INFO, DEBUG, ERROR, of WARN
Process This field is in brackets [ ] and contains details on the process that initiated the action.
Message This field includes a detailed message on what action occurred, including its success or failure.
All logs are protected from unauthorized deletion and modification. Only an authorized Administrator can modify
or delete these files. Each log file has a different rotation configuration. These configurations are:
 /var/log/mystic files (except /var/log/mystic/hibernate and /var/log/mystic/management-account)
o Maximum size is 50MB
o Logs are rotated after 20 files are filled
o No maximum age
 /var/log/mystic/hibernate.log
o Maximum size is 50MB
o Logs are rotated after 10 files are filled
o No maximum age
 /var/log/mystic/management-account.log
o Maximum size is 11MB
o Logs are rotated after 2 files are filled
o No maximum age
 /var/log/audit.log
o Maximum size is 11 MB
o Logs are rotated after 1 file is filled
o No maximum age
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Additionally, the /var/log/audit.log file is saved daily until the folder reaches a total of 50MB. Once the
/var/log/audit folder reaches 50MB the oldest daily audit.log file is deleted.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FAU_GEN.1, FAU_STG.1, and FAU_STG.4.
7.1.2 User Data Protection
The TOE uses VMware vSAN’s VM-centric storage policies to provide access control for VMs accessing the local
storage. These policies make up the Virtual Disk Access SFP and include fault protection and Quality of Service
(QoS) policies as well. VMs are identified by their name. Each VM is assigned to a defined virtual storage policy.
Since vSAN abstracts all storage into a single pool of storage, the storage resources are defined by their file name
and file type. Every file related to a particular VM is stored in that VM’s assigned virtual disk. The file type
determines what type of VM data is stored there. Virtual machine file types can include:
 .vmx – The VM configuration file includes metadata on the VM and its configurations.
 .vmdk – The virtual disk characteristics file includes the VM’s file system.
 .vmsd – The virtual machine snapshot metadata includes all information on snapshots that have been
taken of the VM’s .vmdk file.
 .vswp – The VM swap file is created when the VM is powered on and serves as a backup for the VM’s
RAM15
contents.
 .vmss – The VM suspend file contains metadata on a VM’s state at the time the VM was suspended.
The Virtual Disk Access SFP ensures that only the VMs are able to discover the virtual disk (.vdmk file) that is
assigned to them. VMs cannot discover or access a different VM’s virtual disk. ESXi processes must also have
access to these files to rename and move the files according to the VM’s assigned storage policy.
ESXi processes will use the VM’s storage policy to determine which storage resources should be used to store the
VM’s data and if the data requires mirroring or replication. If a VM is renamed or moved to another cluster, the
ESXi process, vMotion, will rename and move all VM files as well.
The TSF monitors data for integrity errors using an end-to-end checksum that is verified during read and write
operations. If an error is detected, the TOE will automatically attempt to repair the data. The disk statistics in the
VxRail Manager GUI are updated and an event is recorded with the error count.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FDP_ACC.1, FCP_ACF.1, and FDP_SDI.2.
7.1.3 Identification and Authentication
Administrators of the TOE are required to enter a username and password on the VxRail Manager GUI prior to
gaining access to the GUI. VxRail sends the username and password to the vCenter SSO service in the TOE
environment. The vCenter VM resides on the VxRail appliance but is outside the TOE boundary. The vCenter PSC
VM verifies the password and returns the Administrator’s role if the verification is a success. If the password
verification is a failure, the vCenter PSC VM returns a failure to the TOE. The Administrator is only allowed access
to the REST API prior to the TOE receiving verification of the password from vCenter. The Administrator’s account
ID is then used by the TOE, along with the Administrator’s role, to determine access to TSF functionality.
15
RAM – Random Access Memory
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Access to the Linux Shell interface can only be obtained through vCenter. When an administrator opens a console
interface they are directed to the Linux Shell login page. No access to the shell is allowed prior to login. Lastly, the
individual ESXi hosts offer a UI that administrator must authenticate to prior to access. This interface also relies
on the vCenter PSC for verification.
TOE interfaces VxRail Manager GUI, ESXI UI, and vSphere API show dots () while the Administrator is typing the
password instead of the characters. The password is obscured using space character on the Linux Shell Interface.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UAU.7, and FIA_UID.2.
7.1.4 Security Management
The TOE provides the following roles:
 Administrator role – The Administrator role is part of the Administrator group in vCenter and has access
to the VxRail Manager GUI and can perform administrative tasks on the VxRail Manager GUI including
deploying and powering down VMs.. All commands available on the VxRail GUI are available to this role.
 vCenter System role – The vCenter System role is used by vCenter PSC to communicate storage policies
and VM configurations within ESXi. This system role sends commands entered by administrators on
vCenter to the TOE. This role has access to the vSphere API to manage VMs and their related storage
policies. No additional administrators can be added to this role. Commands entered on the vSphere Web
Client by any vCenter user or administrator are translated by the vCenter VM into vSphere API calls and
sent to the TOE.
 CLI Root role – The CLI Root role is used to access the authenticated Linux shell interface where the
Administrator can browse the various menus and buttons available to view information and submit
commands.
 ESXi Root role – The ESXi Root role is used to access individual ESXi hosts for maintenance purposes and
troubleshooting. This role can only manage the individual host on which it has authenticated.
The default storage policies are restrictive ensuring that VMs can only access data that is associated with their VM.
The hypervisor applies a default storage policy to all VMs unless a specific storage policy is created. The
Administrator must assign a VM name when creating the VM. If the VM is created using the vCenter VM, then the
VM name, its associated virtual disk name, and any VM-specific storage policies must be sent to the ESXi host
using the vCenter System account. Once the VM is created, data associated with the VM is automatically saved in
the VM’s assigned virtual disk. The vCenter System account can change the VM name or virtual disk name. The
Administrator assigns the host IP address when expanding storage.
The storage policy contains the following defaults that can only be changed by the vCenter System role:
 Number of disk stripes per object: 1
 Flash read cache reservation: 0%
 Number of failures to tolerate: 1
 Force provisioning: No
 Object space reservation: 0%
 Disable object checksum: No
 IOPS: 0
 Failure tolerance method: RAID-1 (Mirroring) - Performance
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The VxRail Manager GUI provides the Administrator with extension data on system health to include statistics and
health on disks, nodes, power supplies, storage IOPS, CPU usage, and memory usage. The Administrator can also
install VMs assigning a VM name, management IP address, and the time zone for the VM. The Administrator can
also delete virtual disk files from the data store, and unregister VMs.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MSA.3, FMT_SMF.1, and FMT_SMR.1.
7.1.5 Protection of the TSF
Storage can be defined with different fault tolerance policies. The fault tolerance policy is set in vCenter and sent
to ESXi for enforcement as part of a storage policy. The TOE is capable of preserving a secure state in case of a
failure of a disk on a node, multiple disks on a node, or all disk on a node. The TOE uses vSAN mirroring to ensure
that it maintains a secure state in the event of a node failure, or multiple disk failures on a single node. vSAN
mirroring takes all data stored on one node, and creates a duplicate copy of that data onto another node. This
prevents the loss of any data when any of these types of failures occur, which allows the TOE to remain fully
operational and secure in the event of these failures.
ESXi sends availability of CPU, storage, and networks to vCenter to ensure it does not allocate unavailable
resources. Storage policies and VM configurations are created and modified in the vCenter VM. These policies and
configurations are sent to ESXi to enforce using a vCenter System role called vpxuser. This account is a system
account that is only used between the vCenter VM and the ESXi hypervisor. The hypervisor receives updated
policies and configurations and confirms resource availability before replacing the currently stored policies or
configurations. The TOE applies the storage policies and VM configurations to all VMs installed on the VxRail
appliance. The VMs installed on the VxRail appliance are the subjects of the quota. However, if the requested
configurations are not available when verified for resource availability, the TOE does not apply these storage
policies and VM configurations.
The TOE receives time from a networked NTP server. The host operating system uses the NTP provided time to
provide a reliable timestamp for the TOE to use in auditing.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FPT_FLS.1, FPT_TDC.1, and FPT_STM.1.
7.1.6 Resource Utilization
As described in Section 7.1.5, the TOE is designed to allow all disks on a node, multiple disks on a node, or one
disk on a node to fail from disk read errors while maintaining stored data and the access control to that data.
The TSF enforces maximum quotas on the VMs. Each VM includes a .VMDK file, which is a file that stores all the
VM’s data. These VMDKs can have size restrictions placed on them so that they do not consume too much of the
available resources. If a VM exceeds the defined size for their .VMDK file, it will not be allowed to perform anymore
write operations. These restrictions are also part of a defined VM storage policy that is created in vCenter and
sent to ESXi for enforcement.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FRU_FLT.2 and FRU_RSA.1.
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7.1.7 TOE Access
All interfaces to the TOE allow the Administrator to log out and end the session. The VxRail Manager GUI has a
Signout button that allows the Administrator to end their session. The Linux Shell Interface allows the
Administrator to type exit to close the session on a terminal window, or select Logout button on IceWM, which
presents a minimal graphical environment. Access to vSphere API is presented through the vSphere GUI of
vCenter, which includes a Logout button that allows the Administrator to end their session. The VMware Host
Client allows administrators to use the Log out button to end their session.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FTA_SSL.4
7.1.8 High Availability
The TOE monitors nodes for the percent of compute resources in use, SATA16
DOM17
, and NIC status. These
statistics are reported on the VxRail Manager GUI Logical Health page. The TOE uses its auto-discovery tools to
determine node health. An Administrator can drill down into the diagram on the Physical Health page to pull
additional information on the node. When the appliance is first setup and when any additional storage is added,
the TOE performs a set of network tests to ensure the storage network is functioning properly. Removing a disk
from the appliance without using the disk replacement workflow can result in damage to the disk and lost data.
The VxRail Manager GUI detects the removal of a physical disk and displays an alert if a disk is removed without
initiating the hardware removal process on the VxRail Manager GUI.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FHA_TST.1.
16
SATA – Serial AT Attachment
17 DOM – Disk on a Module
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8. Rationale
8.1 Conformance Claims Rationale
This Security Target extends Part 2 and conforms to Part 3 of the Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Release 4.
8.2 Security Objectives Rationale
This section provides a rationale for the existence of each threat, policy statement, and assumption that compose
the Security Target. Sections 8.2.1, 8.2.2, and 8.2.3 demonstrate the mappings between the threats, policies, and
assumptions to the security objectives are complete. The following discussion provides detailed evidence of
coverage for each threat, policy, and assumption.
8.2.1 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Threats
Table 16 below provides a mapping of the objectives to the threats they counter.
Table 16 – Threats: Objectives Mapping
Threats Objectives Rationale
T.AUDIT_COMPROMISE
An attacker may cause audit records to
be lost or modified or prevent future
records from being recorded, thus
masking an Administrator’s actions.
O.AUDIT
The TOE will provide the capability to detect
security relevant events and create records of
those events in the audit trail. These events
must be protected from unauthorized
modification and overwrite the oldest stored
audit records once the log is full.
O.AUDIT mitigates this threat by ensuring that
unauthorized attempts to access the TOE are
recorded.
O.TSF_PROTECT
The TOE must protect its functions and TSF
data to ensure its data and capabilities are
intact when a disk read error causes a drive or
node to fail. It also must provide the ability to
check that its nodes, disks, and storage
network are operating correctly.
O.TSF_PROTECT mitigates this threat by
ensuring that TSF data, such as audit data, is
protected by the TOE.
T.DATA_CORRUPTION
An attacker may cause data to become
corrupt or compromise TOE security
due to hardware failure.
O.TSF_PROTECT
The TOE must protect its functions and TSF
data to ensure its data and capabilities are
intact when a disk read error causes a drive or
node to fail. It also must provide the ability to
check that its nodes, disks, and storage
network are operating correctly.
O.TSF_PROTECT mitigates this threat by
providing mechanisms to protect the TSF data
and disks from corruption.
OE.PROTECT
The TOE environment must protect itself and
the TOE from external interference or
tampering.
OE.PROTECT mitigates this threat by ensuring
that the TOE is protected from external
interference or tampering.
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Threats Objectives Rationale
O.USER_DATA_PROTECT
The TOE must ensure the integrity of stored
user data by monitoring for errors and
automatically correcting the errors. The TOE
must also ensure that denial of service will not
occur because of unauthorized monopolization
of resources.
O.USER_DATA_PROTECT mitigates this threat
by monitoring user data for errors and
rebuilding data if errors are found.
T.EXPLOIT
An attacker may attempt to gain
unauthorized access to the resources of
the managed devices by exploiting
vulnerabilities on a managed device.
O.ACCESS
The TOE must enforce an access control policy
in order to prevent unauthorized Users from
gaining access to user data stored on the TOE.
The TOE must also provide accessing
Administrators with the ability to manage the
TOE and its security attributes. Any
Administrator accessing the TOE will be
associated to a role.
O.ACCESS mitigates this threat by ensuring only
authorized Users can obtain access to TOE
storage.
O.AUDIT
The TOE will provide the capability to detect
security relevant events and create records of
those events in the audit trail. These events
must be protected from unauthorized
modification and overwrite the oldest stored
audit records once the log is full.
O.AUDIT mitigates this threat by ensuring that
security relevant events that may indicate
attempts to tamper with the TOE are recorded.
O.AUTHENTICATE
The TOE must be able to identify and
authenticate Administrators prior to allowing
any access to TOE administrative functions and
TSF data. The TOE must also provide
mechanisms to visually protect passwords
during authentication, verify that passwords
meet the complexity requirements, and to end
the current session while logged into the TOE.
O.AUTHENTICATE mitigates this threat by
ensuring that all Administrators are
authenticated and identified before allowing
access to TOE.
O.TSF_PROTECT
The TOE must protect its functions and TSF
data to ensure its data and capabilities are
intact when a disk read error causes a drive or
node to fail. It also must provide the ability to
check that its nodes, disks, and storage
network are operating correctly.
O.TSF_PROTECT mitigates this threat by
ensuring continued operation of the TOE in a
secure state in the event of disk failures.
T.UNAUTHORIZED _ACCESS
An Administrator or User may gain
unauthorized access (view, modify, or
delete) to user data.
O.ACCESS
The TOE must enforce an access control policy
in order to prevent unauthorized Users from
gaining access to user data stored on the TOE.
The TOE must also provide accessing
Administrators with the ability to manage the
TOE and its security attributes. Any
Administrator accessing the TOE will be
associated to a role.
O.ACCESS mitigates this threat by ensuring that
access to the data stored on the TOE is limited
to Users with the appropriate access to the
stored data.
OE.AUTH
The TOE environment must provide a secure
repository of Administrator accounts used to
manage the TOE.
OE.AUTH mitigates this threat by ensuring that
the TOE environment provides a secure
repository of Administrators authorized to
manage the TOE.
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Threats Objectives Rationale
O.AUTHENTICATE
The TOE must be able to identify and
authenticate Administrators prior to allowing
any access to TOE administrative functions and
TSF data. The TOE must also provide
mechanisms to visually protect passwords
during authentication, verify that passwords
meet the complexity requirements, and to end
the current session while logged into the TOE.
O.AUTHENTICATE mitigates this threat by
ensuring that Administrators are authenticated
and identified prior to gaining access to TOE
security data.
O.TSF_PROTECT
The TOE must protect its functions and TSF
data to ensure its data and capabilities are
intact when a disk read error causes a drive or
node to fail. It also must provide the ability to
check that its nodes, disks, and storage
network are operating correctly.
O.TSF_PROTECT mitigates this threat by
ensuring continued operation of the TOE in a
secure state in the event of disk failures.
Every threat is mapped to one or more objectives in the table above. This complete mapping demonstrates that
the defined security objectives counter all defined threats.
8.2.2 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Policies
There are no Organizational Security Policies defined for this Security Target.
8.2.3 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Assumptions
Table 17 below gives a mapping of assumptions and the environmental objectives that uphold them.
Table 17 – Assumptions: Objectives Mapping
Assumptions Objectives Rationale
A.ADMIN_AUTH
The TOE environment provides a secure
repository of Administrators that are
authorized to manage the TOE.
OE.AUTH
The TOE environment must provide a secure
repository of Administrator accounts used to
manage the TOE.
OE.AUTH upholds this assumption by ensuring
that the vCenter virtual machine provides a
repository of Administrators.
A.ADMIN_PROTECT
The TOE environment provides the
workstation used to manage the TOE
that is free of malicious software.
OE.ADMIN_PROTECT
The Administrator workstation must be
protected from any external interference or
tampering.
OE.ADMIN_PROTECT upholds this assumption
by ensuring that the Administrator workstation
is protected from external interference or
tampering.
A.NETWORK
The TOE environment provides the
routers, switches, cabling, connectors,
and firewalls required for its operation
and to ensure the TOE is secured and
protected from interference or
tampering.
OE.NETWORK
The routers, switches, cabling, connectors, and
firewalls on which the TOE is attached must be
properly implemented such that the TOE is
secured and protected from interference or
tampering.
OE.NETWORK upholds this assumption by
ensuring that the TOE environment will provide
the appropriate connectivity to allow the TOE
to perform its function in a secure manner.
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Assumptions Objectives Rationale
A.NOEVIL
The Administrators who manage the
TOE are non-hostile, appropriately
trained, and follow all guidance.
NOE.TRUSTED_ADMIN
Administrators are trusted to follow and apply
all administrative guidance in a trusted
manner.
NOE.TRUSTED_ADMIN upholds this
assumption by ensuring that the
Administrators who manage the TOE are non-
hostile, appropriately trained, and follow all
guidance.
A.PHYSICAL
The TOE hardware, data it contains,
firewalls, and 10 GbE switch are
assumed to be located in a physically
secure facility.
NOE.PHYSICAL
A secure access facility must protect the
physical security of the TOE, the data it
contains, firewalls, 10GbE, and the TOE
environment.
NOE.PHYSICAL upholds this assumption by
ensuring that a secure access facility is used to
physically security of the TOE, the data it
contains, and the TOE environment.
OE.NETWORK
The routers, switches, cabling, connectors, and
firewalls on which the TOE is attached must be
properly implemented such that the TOE is
secured and protected from interference or
tampering.
OE.NETWORK upholds this assumption by
ensuring that the TOE environment will provide
the appropriate connectivity to allow the TOE
to perform its function in a secure manner.
A.PROTECT
The TOE software will be protected
from unauthorized modification.
OE.PROTECT
The TOE environment must protect itself and
the TOE from external interference or
tampering.
OE.PROTECT satisfies the assumption that the
TOE environment provides protection from
external interference and tampering.
Every assumption is mapped to one or more objectives in the table above. This complete mapping demonstrates
that the defined security objectives uphold all defined assumptions.
8.3 Rationale for Extended Security Functional Requirements
A family of FHA requirements was created to specifically address the high availability self-tests performed by the
TOE. The purpose of this family of requirements is to call out high availability functionality provided by the TOE.
These requirements have no dependencies since the stated requirements embody all the necessary security
functions. These requirements exhibit functionality that can be easily documented in the ADV assurance evidence
and thus do not require any additional Assurance Documentation.
8.4 Rationale for Extended TOE Security Assurance
Requirements
There are no extended TOE security assurance requirements.
8.5 Security Requirements Rationale
The following discussion provides detailed evidence of coverage for each security objective.
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8.5.1 Rationale for Security Functional Requirements of the TOE
Objectives
Table 18 below shows a mapping of the objectives and the SFRs that support them.
Table 18 – Objectives: SFRs Mapping
Objective Requirements Addressing the Objective Rationale
O.ACCESS
The TOE must enforce an access control
policy in order to prevent unauthorized
Users from gaining access to user data
stored on the TOE. The TOE must also
provide accessing Administrators with
the ability to manage the TOE and its
security attributes. Any Administrator
accessing the TOE will be associated to
a role.
FDP_ACC.1
Subset access control
The requirement meets the objective by
enforcing the Virtual Disk Access policy on all
subjects and all named objects and all
operations among them. The Virtual Disk
Access policy specifies the access rules
between all subjects and all named objects
controlled by the TOE. While authorized
Administrators are trusted to some extent, this
requirement ensures only authorized access is
allowed to named objects.
FDP_ACF.1
Security attribute based access control
The requirement meets the objective by
specifying the Virtual Disk Access policy rules
that will be enforced by the TSF and
determines if an operation among subjects and
named objects is allowed. Furthermore, it
specifies the rules to explicitly authorize or
deny access to a named object based upon
security attributes.
FMT_MSA.1
Management of security attributes
The requirement meets the objective by
ensuring Administrators with the ability to
manage security attributes for the TOE.
FMT_MSA.3
Static attribute initialisation
The requirement meets the objective by
ensuring that the TOE provides restrictive
default values for security attributes, and
specifies alternative initial values to override
the default values when an object or
information is created.
FMT_SMF.1
Specification of management functions
The requirement meets the objective by
ensuring that the TOE includes administrative
functions to facilitate the management of the
TSF.
FMT_SMR.1
Security roles
The requirement meets the objective by
ensuring that the TOE associates
Administrators with roles to provide access to
TSF management functions, security attributes,
and TSF data.
O.AUDIT
The TOE will provide the capability to
detect security relevant events and
create records of those events in the
audit trail. These events must be
protected from unauthorized
FAU_GEN.1
Audit data generation
The requirement meets the objective by
ensuring that the TOE maintains a record of
defined security related events, including
relevant details about the event.
FAU_STG.1
Protected audit trail
The requirement meets the objective by
ensuring that only authorized Administrators
are able to modify and delete logs.
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Objective Requirements Addressing the Objective Rationale
modification and overwrite the oldest
stored audit records once the log is full.
FAU_STG.4
Prevention of audit data loss
The requirement meets the objective by
preventing the loss of audit data by overwriting
oldest log files if audit trail becomes full.
FPT_STM.1
Reliable time stamps
This requirement meets the objective by
providing reliable time stamps for audit
records, preserving the order of events.
O.AUTHENTICATE
The TOE must be able to identify and
authenticate Administrators prior to
allowing any access to TOE
administrative functions and TSF data.
The TOE must also provide mechanisms
to visually protect passwords during
authentication, verify that passwords
meet the complexity requirements, and
to end the current session while logged
into the TOE.
FIA_UAU.2
User authentication before any action
The requirement meets the objective by
ensuring that every Administrator is
authenticated before the TOE performs any
TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that
Administrator.
FIA_UAU.7
Protected authentication feedback
The requirement meets the objective by
ensuring that an attacker cannot read an
Administrator’s password during
authentication because they are visually
obscured.
FIA_UID.2
User identification before any action
The requirement meets the objective by
ensuring that every Administrator is identified
before the TOE performs any TSF-mediated
actions on behalf of that Administrator.
FTA_SSL.4
User-initiated termination
The requirement meets the objective by
ensuring that Administrators have a method of
closing their current session and keeping
unauthorized Administrators from gaining
control of an open session.
O.TSF_PROTECT
The TOE must protect its functions and
TSF data to ensure its data and
capabilities are intact when a disk read
error causes a drive or node to fail. It
also must provide the ability to check
that its nodes, disks, and storage
network are operating correctly.
FPT_FLS.1
Failure with preservation of secure state
The requirement meets the objective by
ensuring that the TOE preserves a secure state
upon the detection of a disk read error that
causes a disk or node failure.
FPT_TDC.1
Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency
The requirement meets the objective by
ensuring that TSF data received from the
vCenter server is consistently interpreted.
FRU_FLT.2
Limited fault tolerance
The requirement meets the objective by
ensuring the continued operation of the TOE in
the event that a disk read error causes a drive
or node to fail.
FHA_TST.1
TSF health testing
The requirement meets the objective by
ensuring that the TOE performs self-tests on
node, disks, and storage network.
O.USER_DATA_PROTECT
The TOE must ensure the integrity of
stored user data by monitoring for
errors and automatically correcting the
errors. The TOE must also ensure that
denial of service will not occur because
of unauthorized monopolization of
resources.
FDP_SDI.2
Stored data integrity
The requirement meets the objective by
ensuring that the TOE monitors user data for
integrity errors and corrects errors when
possible.
FRU_RSA.1
Maximum quotas
The requirement meets the objective by
ensuring that the TSF assigns maximum quotas
on subjects. This ensures that denial of service
to subjects is not possible.
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8.5.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
EAL 2+ was chosen to provide a low to moderate level of assurance that is consistent with good commercial
practices. As such, minimal additional tasks are placed upon the vendor assuming the vendor follows reasonable
software engineering practices and can provide support to the evaluation for design and testing efforts. The
chosen assurance level is appropriate with the threats defined for the environment. The System is expected to be
in a non-hostile position and embedded in or protected by other products designed to address threats that
correspond with the intended environment. At EAL 2+, the System will have incurred a search for obvious flaws
to support its introduction into the non-hostile environment.
The augmentation of ALC_FLR.2 was chosen to give greater assurance of the developer’s on-going flaw
remediation processes.
8.5.3 Dependency Rationale
The SFRs in this ST satisfy all of the required dependencies listed in the Common Criteria, applicable PPs, and SFRs
explicitly stated in this ST. Table 19 lists each requirement to which the TOE claims conformance and indicates
whether the dependent requirements are included. As the table indicates, all dependencies have been met.
Table 19 – Functional Requirements Dependencies
SFR ID Dependencies Dependency Met Rationale
FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 
FAU_STG.1 FAU_GEN.1 
FAU_STG.4 FAU_STG.1 
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 
FDP_ACF.1 FMT_MSA.3 
FDP_ACC.1 
FDP_SDI.2 No dependencies 
FIA_UAU.2 FIA_UID.1  Although FIA_UID.1 is not included, FIA_UID.2, which is hierarchical to FIA_UID.1,
is included. This satisfies this dependency.
FIA_UAU.7 FIA_UAU.1  Although FIA_UUA.1 is not included, FIA_UAU.2, which is hierarchical to
FIA_UAU.1, is included. This satisfies this dependency.
FIA_UID.2 No dependencies 
FMT_MSA.1 FMT_SMR.1 
FDP_ACC.1 
FMT_SMF.1 
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_SMR.1 
FMT_MSA.1 
FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies 
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1  Although FIA_UID.1 is not included, FIA_UID.2, which is hierarchical to FIA_UID.1,
is included. This satisfies this dependency.
FPT_FLS.1 No dependencies 
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SFR ID Dependencies Dependency Met Rationale
FPT_STM.1 No dependencies 
FPT_TDC.1 No dependencies 
FRU_FLT.2 FPT_FLS.1 
FRU_RSA.1 No dependencies 
FTA_SSL.4 No dependencies 
FHA_TST.1 No dependencies 
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9. Acronyms
Table 20 defines the acronyms used throughout this document.
Table 20 – Acronyms
Acronym Definition
API Application Programming Interface
CC Common Criteria
CLI Command Line Interface
CM Configuration Management
CPU Central Processing Unit
DNS Domain Name Service
DOM Disk on a Module
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
GbE Gigabit Ethernet
GUI Graphical User Interface
HDD Hard Disk Drive
ID Identification
IOPS Input/Output Operations per Second
IP Internet Protocol
IT Information Technology
Mbps Megabits per second
NIC Network Interface Cards
OS Operating System
PP Protection Profile
PSC Platform Services Controller
QoS Quality of Service
RAID Redundant Array of Independent Disks
RAM Random Access Memory
REST Representational State Transfer
SAN Storage Attached Network
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SATA Serial AT Attachment
SDDC Software-Defined Data Center
SFP+ Enhanced Small Form-factor Pluggable
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Acronym Definition
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SSD Solid State Drives
SSO Single Sign-On
ST Security Target
TB Terabyte
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSP TOE Security Policy
2U Two rack Units
UI User Interface
VM Virtual Machine
vSAN Virtual Storage Attached Network
Prepared by:
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Phone: +1 703 267 6050
Email: info@corsec.com
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