National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for the
Senetas
Distributed by Thales
CN Series Encryptors 5.5.0
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11485-2024
Dated: December 31, 2024
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, SUITE: 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
®
TM
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CN Series Encryptors 5.5.0
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Jerome Myers, Ph.D.
Patrick Mallett, Ph.D.
Seada Mohammed
The Aerospace Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Joon Sim
Lightship Security USA, Inc.
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Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2. Identification............................................................................................................... 2
3. Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 4
3.1. TOE Evaluated Configuration.......................................................................... 4
3.2. Physical Boundary............................................................................................ 4
3.3. Required Non-TOE Hardware, Software, and Firmware................................. 6
4. Security Policy............................................................................................................ 7
4.1. Security Audit................................................................................................... 7
4.2. Cryptographic Support ..................................................................................... 7
4.3. Identification and Authentication..................................................................... 7
4.4. Security Management....................................................................................... 7
4.5. Protection of the TSF........................................................................................ 7
4.6. TOE Access...................................................................................................... 7
4.7. Trusted Path/Channels...................................................................................... 8
5. Assumptions................................................................................................................ 9
6. Clarification of Scope ............................................................................................... 11
7. Documentation.......................................................................................................... 12
8. IT Product Testing .................................................................................................... 13
8.1. Developer Testing........................................................................................... 13
8.2. Evaluation Team Independent Testing........................................................... 13
8.3. Evaluated Configuration................................................................................. 13
9. Results of the Evaluation .......................................................................................... 15
9.1. Evaluation of Security Target (ASE).............................................................. 15
9.2. Evaluation of Development Documentation (ADV)...................................... 15
9.3. Evaluation of Guidance Documents (AGD)................................................... 15
9.4. Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)....................................... 16
9.5. Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)................... 16
9.6. Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)..................................................... 16
9.7. Summary of Evaluation Results ..................................................................... 17
10. Validator Comments................................................................................................. 18
11. Annexes..................................................................................................................... 19
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12. Security Target.......................................................................................................... 20
13. Glossary .................................................................................................................... 21
14. Acronym List ............................................................................................................ 22
15. Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 23
List of Tables
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers............................................................................................ 2
Table 2:TOE Models......................................................................................................... 14
Table 3: Tools Used for Testing ....................................................................................... 14
Senetas Distributed by Thales Validation Report Version 1.0, December 31, 2024
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1. Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Senetas Distributed by Thales CN Series
Encryptors 5.5.0 provided by Senetas Corporation Ltd, Distributed by Thales SA
(SafeNet). It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance
results. This Validation Report (VR) is not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation
(TOE) by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either expressed or
implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Lightship Security USA Common Criteria
Laboratory (CCTL) in Baltimore, MD, United States of America, and was completed in
December 2024. The information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation
Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Lightship Security (LS).
The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and
Part 3 Conformant and meets the assurance requirements of the collaborative Protection
Profile for Network Devices, Version: 3.0e, Functional Package for Secure Shell (SSH),
Version: 1.0.
The TOE is Senetas Distributed by Thales CN Series Encryptors 5.5.0. The TOE identified
in this VR has been evaluated at a NIAP approved CCTL using the Common Methodology
for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria
for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5). This VR applies only to the specific
version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with
the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS)
and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the evidence
provided.
The Validation team monitored the activities of the Evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The Validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated
in the Security Target (ST). Therefore, the Validation team concludes that the testing
laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results
are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the
evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Security Target
and analysis performed by the Validation Team.
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2. Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products
List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The TOE: the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The ST, describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme
United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme
Evaluated Product Senetas Distributed by Thales CN Series Encryptors 5.5.0
Sponsor and Developer
Senetas Corporation Ltd, Distributed by Thales SA (SafeNet)
312 Kings Way, South Melbourne, Victoria 3205, Australia
CCTL
Lightship Security USA, Inc.
3600 O’Donnell St., Suite 2
Baltimore, MD 21224
CC Version
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
CEM
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation: Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 5,
April 2017.
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Item Identifier
Protection Profile
collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version:
3.0e, Date: 06-December-2023 [NDcPP]
Functional Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version: 1.0, Date
13-May-2021 [PKG_SSH]
ST
Senetas Distributed by Thales CN Series Encryptors 5.5.0
Security Target, v1.7, December 2024
Evaluation Technical
Report
Senetas Distributed by Thales CN Series Encryptors v5.5.0
Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.2, December 2024
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Evaluation Personnel Joon Sim
CCEVS Validators Jerome Myers, Patrick Mallett, Seada Mohammed
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3. Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The CN Series Encryptors are typically installed between an operator’s private network
equipment and public network connection and are used to secure data transiting over
Ethernet networks. When operating at full bandwidth, the Ethernet Encryptor will not
discard any valid Ethernet frame in all modes of operation.
3.1. TOE Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is the encryptor hardware and firmware (Build: 31224). Table 2 shows the TOE
models. All TOE models use the same embedded software and share the same hardware
architecture.
The TOE interfaces are as follows:
a) CLI. Local management via serial access to the CLI.
b) SSH. Remote management via SSH / SSHS access to the CLI.
c) Syslog. Remote syslog server via SSH / SSHS.
3.2. Physical Boundary
The physical boundary of the TOE is the encryptor hardware and firmware. Table 2
shows the TOE models. All TOE models use the same embedded software (version
shown in Section 3.1) and share the same hardware architecture. Table 2 columns are as
follows:
a) Model. The TOE model number.
b) CPU & ASIC. The CPU and ASIC for the TOE model.
c) Hardware. The part numbers associated with the hardware enclosure and supported
power supply.
d) Power. Type of power supply for each hardware part number for a given model.
e) Protocol / FPGA Bitstream. The supported protocols and related FPGA bitstream,
including whether TIM is supported.
f) AES Modes. The supported AES Modes.
g) I/F. The supported local/network port interfaces.
h) LCD/Keypad. Whether the model includes an LCD and Keypad.
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Table 2: TOE models
Model CPU & ASIC Hardware Power
Protocol /
FPGA
Bitstream
AES
Modes
I/F
LCD/
Keypad
CN4010
ARM Cortex
A9
A4010B
DC (Plug
Pack)
1G Ethernet
CTR
RJ45 No
1G Ethernet TIM
CN4020
ARM Cortex
A9
A4020B
DC (Plug
Pack)
1G Ethernet
SFP No
1G Ethernet TIM
CN6010
ARM Cortex
A9
A6010B
AC/AC
Dual
1G Ethernet
RJ45
SFP
Yes
A6011B
DC/DC
Dual
1G Ethernet TIM
A6012B
AC/DC
Dual
CN6110
ARM Cortex
A9
A6110B
AC/AC
Dual
1G Ethernet
RJ45
SFP+
Yes
A6111B
DC/DC
Dual
1G Ethernet TIM
A6112B
AC/DC
Dual
10G Ethernet
10G Ethernet
TIM
CN6140
ARM Cortex
A9
A6140B
AC/AC
Dual
1Gx1 Ethernet
Single Port
1Gx4 Ethernet
Multi Port
SFP+ Yes
A6141B
DC/DC
Dual
1Gx1 Ethernet
TIM Single
Port
1Gx4 Ethernet
TIM
Multi Port
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Model CPU & ASIC Hardware Power
Protocol /
FPGA
Bitstream
AES
Modes
I/F
LCD/
Keypad
10Gx1
Ethernet
Single Port
10Gx2 Ethernet
Multi Port
A6142B
AC/DC
Dual
10Gx1
Ethernet TIM
Single Port
10Gx4 Ethernet
TIM Multi Port
10Gx4 Ethernet
Multi Port
CN9120
ARM Cortex
A9
A9120B
AC/AC
Dual
100G Ethernet
QSFP
28
Yes
A9121B
DC/DC
Dual
A9122B
AC/DC
Dual
3.3. Required Non-TOE Hardware, Software, and Firmware
The TOE operates with the following components in the environment:
a) Audit Server. Remote syslog server.
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4. Security Policy
This section summarizes the security functionality of the TOE:
4.1. Security Audit
The TOE generates audit records of user and administrator actions. The TOE includes the
user identity in audit events resulting from actions of identified users. The Security
Administrator can configure the TOE to send logs in real-time to a syslog server via SSH.
4.2. Cryptographic Support
The TOE implements a cryptographic module. The cryptographic module has the ability
to generate, destroy cryptographic keys, authenticate keys, perform key exchanges in
protected communications and validate signatures in image upgrades. Cryptographic
functions are primarily used with the SSH protocol. Relevant Cryptographic Algorithm
Validation Program (CAVP) certificates are shown in Table 4 of the ST.
4.3. Identification and Authentication
The TOE ensures that all users must be authenticated before accessing its functions and
data. The TOE uses public keys for authentication for SSH.
4.4. Security Management
The TOE enables secure management of its security functions, including:
i) Administrator authentication with passwords
ii) Configurable password policies
iii) Role Based Access Control
iv) Access banners
v) Management of critical security functions and data
vi) Protection of cryptographic keys and passwords
4.5. Protection of the TSF
The TOE performs a suite of self-tests to ensure the correct operation and enforcement of
its security functions. The TOE performs diagnostic self-tests and cryptographic module
self-tests during start-up and generates audit records to record a failure. Self-tests comply
with the FIPS 140-2 requirements for self-testing.
4.6. TOE Access
TOE can be accessed directly via serial connection or remotely via SSH connection. When
a user account has sequentially failed authentication the configured number of times, the
account will not be locked.
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4.7. Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE protects the integrity and confidentiality of communications using cryptographic
algorithms as described in Table 4 of the ST.
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5. Assumptions
Identifier Description
A.PHYSICAL_
PROTECTION
The Network Device is assumed to be physically protected in its
operational environment and not subject to physical attacks that
compromise the security or interfere with the device’s physical
interconnections and correct operation. This protection is assumed to
be sufficient to protect the device and the data it contains. As a result,
the cPP does not include any requirements on physical tamper
protection or other physical attack mitigations. The cPP does not
expect the product to defend against physical access to the device
that allows unauthorized entities to extract data, bypass other controls,
or otherwise manipulate the device. For vNDs, this assumption applies
to the physical platform on which the VM runs.
A.LIMITED_
FUNCTIONALITY
The device is assumed to provide networking functionality as its core
function and not provide functionality/services that could be deemed
as general purpose computing. For example, the device should not
provide a computing platform for general purpose applications
(unrelated to networking functionality).
If a virtual TOE evaluated as a pND, following Case 2 vNDs as
specified in Section 1.2 of the ST, the VS is considered part of the
TOE with only one vND instance for each physical hardware platform.
The exception being where components of a distributed TOE run
inside more than one virtual machine (VM) on a single VS. In Case 2
vND, no non-TOE guest VMs are allowed on the platform.
A.NO_THRU_
TRAFFIC_
PROTECTION
A standard/generic Network Device does not provide any assurance
regarding the protection of traffic that traverses it. The intent is for the
Network Device to protect data that originates on or is destined to the
device itself, to include administrative data and audit data. Traffic that
is traversing the Network Device, destined for another network entity,
is not covered by the ND cPP. It is assumed that this protection will be
covered by cPPs and PP-Modules for particular types of Network
Devices (e.g., firewall).
A.TRUSTED_
ADMINISTRATOR
The Security Administrator(s) for the Network Device are assumed to
be trusted and to act in the best interest of security for the
organization. This includes appropriately trained, following policy, and
adhering to guidance documentation. Administrators are trusted to
ensure passwords/credentials have sufficient strength and entropy and
to lack malicious intent when administering the device. The Network
Device is not expected to be capable of defending against a malicious
Administrator that actively works to bypass or compromise the security
of the device.
For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based authentication, the
Security Administrator(s) are expected to fully validate (e.g. offline
verification) any CA certificate (root CA certificate or intermediate CA
certificate) loaded into the TOE’s trust store (aka 'root store', ' trusted
CA Key Store', or similar) as a trust anchor prior to use (e.g. offline
verification).
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Identifier Description
A.REGULAR_
UPDATES
The Network Device firmware and software is assumed to be updated
by an Administrator on a regular basis in response to the release of
product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
A.ADMIN_
CREDENTIALS_
SECURE
The Administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access the
Network Device are protected by the platform on which they reside.
A.RESIDUAL_
INFORMATION
The Administrator must ensure that there is no unauthorized access
possible for sensitive residual information (e.g. cryptographic keys,
keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on networking equipment when
the equipment is discarded or removed from its operational
environment.
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6. Clarification of Scope
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in
CPP_ND_V3.0E/PKG_SSH_V1.0 as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other
functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other
functionality provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further
conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarifying. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications
of this evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made in accordance with the evaluation activities
specified in cPP_ND_v3.0e-SD/ PKG_SSH_V1.0 and performed by the Evaluation
team
• This evaluation covers only the specific software version identified in this
document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
• This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
• The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the CPP_ND_V3.0E/PKG_SSH_V1.0 and applicable
Technical Decisions. Any additional security related functional capabilities of the
TOE were not covered by this evaluation.
Functions not included in the TOE Evaluation:
• Point-to-point and Point-to-Multipoint Layer2 Encryption
• CM7
• RESTful SNMP MIB Interface
• Keypad Hardware panel
• SNMPv3
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7. Documentation
The following guidance documents were made available with the TOE for evaluation.
They are provided with the TOE upon delivery.
a) Senetas Distributed by Thales CN4000/CN6000/CN9000 Series Ethernet
Encryptors Firmware Version 5.5.0 Operational User Guidance (AGD_OPE.1),
v1.1, 16 December 2024
b) Senetas Corporation CN4010 Encryptor All Operational Modes, Rev 55-24-010,
October 2024
c) Senetas Corporation CN4020 Encryptor All Operational Modes, Rev 55-24-010,
October 2024
d) Senetas Corporation CN6010 Encryptor All Operational Modes, Rev 55-24-010,
October 2024
e) Senetas Corporation CN6110 Encryptor All Operational Modes, Rev 55-24-010,
October 2024
f) Senetas Corporation CN6140 Encryptor All Operational Modes, Rev 55-24-010,
October 2024
g) Senetas Corporation CN9120 Encryptor Ethernet Mode, Rev 55-24-010, October
2024
All documentation delivered with the product is relevant to and within the scope of the
TOE. Only the Administrator Guides listed above, and the specific sections of the other
documents referenced by the guides should be trusted for the installation, administration,
and use of this product in its evaluated configuration.
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8. IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the evaluation team. It is derived from
information contained in Senetas Distributed by Thales CN Series Encryptors v5.5.0
Assurance Activity Report, v1.2 provides an overview of testing and the prescribed
evaluation activities.
8.1. Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the SARs or Evaluation Activities.
8.2. Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The Evaluation team conducted independent testing at Lightship Security USA in
Baltimore, MD from June 2024 until December 2024. The Evaluation team configured the
TOE according to vendor installation instructions and as identified in the Security Target.
The Evaluation team confirmed the technical accuracy of the setup and installation guide
during installation of the TOE. The Evaluation team confirmed that the TOE version
delivered for testing was identical to the version identified in the ST.
The Evaluation team used the Protection Profile test procedures as a basis for creating each
of the independent tests as required by the Evaluation Activities.
Each Evaluation Activity was tested as required by the conformant Protection Profile and
the evaluation team verified that each test passed.
The specific test configurations and test tools utilized may be found in the AAR section
9.5.
8.3. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE testing environment components are identified in Figure 1 and Table 3 below.
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Figure 1: Testing Environment Overview
Table 3: Tools Used for Testing
Tool name Version Description
Lightship Greenlight 3.0.35 Tool used for TLS and SSH handshake
modification
OpenSSL 1.1.1m OpenSSL was used for simple TLS
server or TLS client connections
Wireshark 4.0.8 (Linux) &
3.6.16 (Windows)
Used for packet capture and analysis
Tcpdump 4.99.1 Used for packet capture and analysis
Python 3.11.4 (GL VM)
2.7.16 (Services VM)
HTTP server
OpenSSH OpenSSH 8.8p1 SSH client for accessing the Remote
CLI
Syslog-ng 3.19.1 Syslog server
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9. Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary documents: the Detailed Test Report (DTR) and the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR). The reader of this document can assume that all
activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to
the corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon
CC Version 3.1 Revision 5 and CEM Version 3.1 Revision 5. The evaluation determined
Senetas Distributed by Thales CN Series Encryptors 5.5.0 to be Part 2 extended, and meets
the SARs contained in the PP. Additionally, the evaluator performed the Evaluation
Activities specified in cPP_ND_v3.0e-SD/ PKG_SSH_V1.0.
9.1. Evaluation of Security Target (ASE)
The Evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
of security requirements claimed to be met by the Senetas Distributed by Thales CN Series
Encryptors 5.5.0 that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security
function descriptions that support the requirements.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the Evaluation team was justified.
9.2. Evaluation of Development Documentation (ADV)
The Evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The Evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification
contained in the ST and Guidance documents. Additionally, the evaluator performed the
Evaluation Activities related to the examination of the information contained in the TSS.
The Validation reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the Evaluation team was justified.
9.3. Evaluation of Guidance Documents (AGD)
The Evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The Evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,
the Evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how
to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and
testing phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the
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evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the Evaluation team was justified.
9.4. Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The Evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The Evaluation team found that
the TOE was appropriately labeled with a unique identifier consistent with the TOE
identification in the evaluation evidence and that the TOE references used are consistent.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the Evaluation team was justified.
9.5. Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The Evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The Evaluation team ran the set
of tests specified by the Test Evaluation Activities and recorded the results in a Test Report,
summarized in the AAR.
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the Evaluation team was justified.
9.6. Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in
the Senetas Distributed by Thales CN Series Encryptors v5.5.0 Vulnerability Assessment,
v1.1 report prepared by the Evaluation team. The vulnerability analysis includes a public
search for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities conducted on October 24
and December 12, 2024, did not uncover any residual vulnerability.
The Evaluation team searched:
• NIST National Vulnerabilities Database (can be used to access CVE and US-
CERT databases identified below): https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search
• US-CERT: http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/html/search
• Tenable Network Security: https://www.tenable.com/cve
• Tipping Point Zero Day Initiative: https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories
• Offensive Security Exploit Database: https://www.exploit-db.com/
• Rapid7 Vulnerability Database: https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities
The Evaluation team performed a search using the following keywords:
• Senetas CN Series Encryptors v5.5.0
• CN4010
• CN4020
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• CN6010
• CN6110
• CN6140
• CN9120
• ARM Cortex A9
• OpenSSL 1.1.1n
• OpenSSH 8.4p1
• Common Crypto Library
• Coreutils v.8.3.2
• Bash v. 5.1-2+deb11u1
• Curl v.7.74.0
• Net-snmp v.5.9
• Microhttpd v.0.9.59
• Ulfius v.2.1
• Pamtacplus v.1.3.8
• Keysecure v.8.4.2cd
• Busybox v. 1:1.30.1-6+b3
• ppp v.2.4.7-1+4
• lcd4linux v. 0.11.0-SVN-1092
• Liboqs v.0.7.0
• Liboqse v.0.7.0
• Lxc v.4.0.6
• Serdisplib v.1.98.0
The Validation team reviewed the work of the Evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the Evaluation team to confirm that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the
conclusion reached by the Evaluation team was justified.
9.7. Summary of Evaluation Results
The Evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims
in the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team's test activities also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The Validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that
it demonstrates that the Evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM and
performed the Evaluation Activities in cPP_ND_v3.0e-SD/ PKG_SSH_V1.0, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
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10. Validator Comments
The Validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE
being configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in the documentation
referenced in Section 7 of this Validation Report. Consumers are encouraged to download
the configuration guide from the NIAP website to ensure the device is configured as
evaluated. Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is
available online was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not
be relied upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements
specified in the ST. Other functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of
this evaluation. Other functionality provided by devices in the operational environment
needs to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about their
effectiveness. No versions of the TOE and software, either earlier or later, were evaluated.
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11. Annexes
Not applicable.
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12. Security Target
Senetas Distributed by Thales CN Series Encryptors 5.5.0 Security Target, v1.7,
December 2024.
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13. GLOSSARY
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL): An IT security evaluation
facility accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program
(NVLAP) and approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common
Criteria-based evaluations.
• Conformance: The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation: The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using
the Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the
claims made are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the
Common Criteria using the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the
Profile is complete, consistent, technically sound and hence suitable for use as a
statement of requirements for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence: Any tangible resource (information) required from the
sponsor or developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature: Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE): A group of IT products configured as an IT system,
or an IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security
evaluation under the CC.
• Threat: Means through which the ability or intent of a threat agent to adversely
affect the primary functionality of the TOE, facility that contains the TOE, or
malicious operation directed towards the TOE. A potential violation of security.
• Validation: The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the
issue of a Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body: A governmental organization responsible for carrying out
validation and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common
Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme.
• Vulnerabilities: A vulnerability is a hardware, firmware, or software flaw that
leaves an Automated Information System (AIS) open for potential exploitation. A
weakness in automated system security procedures, administrative controls,
physical layout, internal controls, and so forth, which could be exploited by a threat
to gain unauthorized access to information or disrupt critical processing.
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14. Acronym List
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP)
CCEVS Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
CCIMB Common Criteria Interpretations Management Board
CCTL Common Criteria Testing Laboratories
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
LS Lightship Security USA CCTL
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
MFD Multi-Function Device
NIAP National Information Assurance Partnership
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NSA National Security Agency
NVLAP National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program
OS Operating System
OSP Organizational Security Policies
PCL Products Compliant List
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
VR Validation Report
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15. Bibliography
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, CCMB-2017-04-001, Version 3.1 Revision 5,
April 2017
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2:
Security ffunctional requirements, CCMB-2017-04-002, Version 3.1 Revision 5,
April 2017
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3:
Security aassurance requirements, CCMB-2017-04-003, Version 3.1 Revision
5, April 2017
4. Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Evaluation Methodology, CCMB-2017-04-004, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April
2017
5. Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version: 3.0e, Date: 06-
December-2023
6. Functional Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version: 1.0, Date: 13-May-2021
7. Senetas Distributed by Thales CN Series Encryptors 5.5.0 Security Target, v1.7,
December 2024
8. Senetas Distributed by Thales CN4000/CN6000/CN9000 Series Ethernet
Encryptors Firmware Version 5.5.0 Operational User Guidance (AGD_OPE.1),
v1.1, 16 December 2024
9. Senetas Corporation CN4010 Encryptor All Operational Modes, Rev 55-24-010,
October 2024
10. Senetas Corporation CN4020 Encryptor All Operational Modes, Rev 55-24-010,
October 2024
11. Senetas Corporation CN6010 Encryptor All Operational Modes, Rev 55-24-010,
October 2024
12. Senetas Corporation CN6110 Encryptor All Operational Modes, Rev 55-24-010,
October 2024
13. Senetas Corporation CN6140 Encryptor All Operational Modes, Rev 55-24-010,
October 2024
14. Senetas Corporation CN9120 Encryptor Ethernet Mode, Rev 55-24-010,
October 2024
15. Senetas Distributed by Thales CN Series Encryptors v5.5.0 Assurance Activity
Report, v1.2, Date: December 2024