HUAWEI NE20E series Router V800R010C10 & NE08E series Router V300R003C10 Security Target
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Public Page 1
HUAWEI NE20E series Router
V800R010C10
& NE08E series Router
V300R003C10
Security Target
Version: 3.0
Last Update: 2019-04-08
Author: HUAWEI Technologies Co., Ltd.
HUAWEI NE20E series Router V800R010C10 & NE08E series Router V300R003C10 Security Target
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Public Page 2
Table of Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS............................................................................................................................. 2
1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................. 4
1.1 Security Target Identification........................................................................................ 4
1.2 TOE Identification.......................................................................................................... 4
1.3 Target of Evaluation (TOE) Overview ............................................................................ 4
1.4 TOE Description.............................................................................................................. 5
1.4.1 Architectural overview............................................................................................ 5
1.4.2 Physical scope............................................................................................................ 8
1.4.3 Logical scope.......................................................................................................... 22
1.4.4 TSF and Non-TSF data.............................................................................................. 25
2 CC CONFORMANCE CLAIM .....................................................................................................27
3 TOE SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION...............................................................................28
3.1 Threats.......................................................................................................................... 28
3.2 Assumptions................................................................................................................. 28
3.2.1 Environment of use of the TOE ............................................................................. 28
4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES ............................................................................................................29
4.1 Objectives for the TOE.................................................................................................. 29
4.2 Objectives for the Operational Environment............................................................... 30
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale....................................................................................... 30
5 EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION ..............................................................................32
6 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.....................................................................................................33
6.1 Conventions...................................................................................................................... 33
6.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements........................................................................ 33
6.2.1 Security Audit (FAU) .................................................................................................... 33
6.2.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS) ........................................................................................ 34
6.2.3 User Data Protection (FDP) ....................................................................................... 37
6.2.4 Identification and Authentication (FIA)..................................................................... 40
6.2.5 Security Management (FMT)........................................................................................ 42
6.2.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)........................................................................................... 44
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6.2.7 TOE access (FTA)........................................................................................................... 44
6.2.8 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)........................................................................................ 44
6.3 Security Functional Requirements Rationale................................................................... 45
6.3.1 Security Requirements Dependency Rationale............................................................ 45
6.3.2 Sufficiency and coverage.............................................................................................. 48
6.4 Security Assurance Requirements....................................................................................... 49
6.5 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale....................................................................... 49
7 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION............................................................................................49
7.1 TOE Security Functional Specification.......................................................................... 49
7.1.1 Authentication....................................................................................................... 49
7.1.2 Access Control ....................................................................................................... 50
7.1.3 Traffic Forwarding ................................................................................................. 50
7.1.4 Auditing ................................................................................................................. 51
7.1.5 Communication Security ....................................................................................... 52
7.1.6 ACL......................................................................................................................... 52
7.1.7 Security Management ........................................................................................... 53
7.1.8 Denial-of-Service Protection ................................................................................. 54
7.1.9 Cryptographic functions........................................................................................ 54
7.1.10 Time....................................................................................................................... 55
7.1.11 SNMP Trap............................................................................................................. 55
8 ABBREVIATIONS, TERMINOLOGY AND REFERENCES ...................................................56
8.1 Abbreviations ............................................................................................................... 56
8.2 Terminology.................................................................................................................. 57
8.3 References.................................................................................................................... 57
HUAWEI NE20E series Router V800R010C10 & NE08E series Router V300R003C10 Security Target
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1 Introduction
This Security Target is for the evaluation of HUAWEI NE20E series Router
V800R010C10 and NE08E series Router V300R003C10.
1.1 Security Target Identification
Name: HUAWEI NE20E series Router V800R010C10 & NE08E series Router
V300R003C10 Security Target
Version: 3.0
Publication Date: 2019-04-08
Author: HUAWEI Technologies Co., Ltd.
1.2 TOE Identification
Name: Huawei NE20E series Router V800R010C10 and NE08E series Router
V300R003C10
Version: V800R010C10 and V300R003C10
Revision: SPC500
Developer: HUAWEI Technologies Co., Ltd.
Keywords: HUAWEI, VRP, Versatile Routing Platform, Service Routers
1.3 Target of Evaluation (TOE) Overview
Huawei NetEngine20E-S Universal Service Router (NE20E) series is medium- or
high-end network product developed by Huawei for transportation, finance, energy,
government, education, enterprise, and Internet service provider (ISP) networks. The
NE20E series routers mainly serve as aggregation nodes on wide area networks
(WANs) and egress nodes on enterprise or campus networks.
An NE08E device is generally located at the intersection between an enterprise's
internal network and an external network. An NE08E is the only entrance and exit of
data flows between the internal and external networks. An NE08E can bear multiple
types of services, greatly reducing network construction investment and long-term
operation and maintenance costs of an enterprise network. As a part of the all-IP
solution for a Huawei power network, NE08E devices are deployed between
substations/power plants and IP aggregation routers and provide data access services
for the substations/power plants.
The NE20E Series Routers can be flexibly deployed at the access and aggregation
layer of IP/MPLS networks and work with other NE routers to provide an all-around
network solution for enterprise users, satisfying diversified service requirements in the
future.
The NE08E adopts an advanced routing architecture and a uniform platform to receive,
transmit, and bear multiple types of services on an all-IP network. This improves
network flexibility and transmission efficiency, helps construct reliable carrier-class
packet transport networks (PTNs), and reduces the total cost of ownership (TCO).
The NE20E-S series and NE08E series routers run on the Versatile Routing Platform
(VRP) operating system and use Huawei-developed NP chips and hardware-based
forwarding and non-blocking switching technologies. VRP provides extensive security
features. These features include assigning different privileges to administration users
HUAWEI NE20E series Router V800R010C10 & NE08E series Router V300R003C10 Security Target
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with different privilege levels; enforcing authentications prior to establishment of
administrative sessions with the TOE; auditing of security-relevant management
activities; as well as the correct enforcement of routing decisions to ensure that
network traffic gets forwarded to the correct interfaces.
The types of boards on the NE20E and NE08E are MPU, NSP and PIC. The Main
Processing Units (MPU) integrate the main control unit and the system maintenance
unit. The MPU controls and manages the system in a centralized way and is
responsible for data exchange. The Network Service Processor (NSP) and Physical
Interface Card (PIC) are the actual hardware providing network traffic processing
capacity. Network traffic is processed and forwarded according to routing decisions
downloaded from VRP. Besides the MPUs, NSPs and PICs, there are other type of
boards on TOE, such as Power Boards and FAN Boards. Only MPU is security
relevant.
The environment for TOE comprises the following components:
 An optional Radius or TACACS+ server providing authentication and authorization
decisions to the TOE.
 Peer routers providing routing information to the TOE via dynamic protocols, such
as BGP, OSPF and IS-IS.
 Peer routers providing LSP information to the TOE via dynamic protocols, such as
LDP
 Local PCs used by administrators to connect to the TOE for access of the
command line interface through TOE’s ETH interface via a secure channel
enforcing SSH.
 Remote PCs used by administrators to connect to the TOE for access to the
command line interface through interfaces on Interface boards within the TOE via a
secure channel enforcing SSH.
 Physical networks, such as Ethernet subnets, interconnecting various networking
devices.
1.4 TOE Description
1.4.1 Architectural overview
This section will introduce the HUAWEI NE20E series Router V800R010C10SPC500
and NE08E series Router V300R003C10SPC500 from a physical architectural view
and a software architectural view.
1.4.1.1 Physical Architecture
A system consists of the following systems:
 Power distribution system
 Heat dissipation system
 Functional host system
The functional host system is composed of the system
backplane, MPUs, NSPs, and PICs. It connects to the NMS through NMS
interfaces. The functional host system processes data and monitors and manages the
power distribution system and heat dissipation system. The functional host system
consists of the system backplane, MPUs, NSPs, and PICs as depicted in Figure 1
HUAWEI NE20E series Router V800R010C10 & NE08E series Router V300R003C10 Security Target
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Public Page 6
Functional host system.
Figure 1 Functional host system
1.4.1.2 Software Architecture
The NE20E and NE08E series routers provide a multi-process and full-service
software architecture that is reliable, scalable, and flexible.
HUAWEI NE20E series Router V800R010C10 & NE08E series Router V300R003C10 Security Target
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Figure 2: TOE Software architecture
The TOE’s software architecture consists of three logical planes to support centralized
forwarding and control and distributed forwarding mechanism.
 Data plane
 Control and management plane
 Monitoring plane
Note that the monitoring plane is to monitor the system environment by detecting the
voltage, controlling power-on and power-off of the system, and monitoring the
temperature and controlling the fan. The monitoring plane is not considered to be
security-related.
The control and management plane is the core of the entire system. It controls and
manages the system. The control and management unit processes protocols and
signals, configures and maintains the system status, and reports and controls the
system status.
The data plane is responsible for high speed processing and non-blocking switching of
data packets. It encapsulates or decapsulates packets, forwards IPv4/IPv6 packets,
performs Quality of Service (QoS) and scheduling, completes inner high-speed
switching, and collects statistics.
The VRP is the control and management platform that runs on the router. The VRP
supports IPv4/IPv6, and routing protocols such as Border Gateway Protocol (BGP),
HUAWEI NE20E series Router V800R010C10 & NE08E series Router V300R003C10 Security Target
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Public Page 8
Open Shortest Path First (OSPF), calculates routes, generates forwarding tables, and
delivers routing information to the Data Plane (DP). The VRP includes Service Control
Plane (SCP), System Management Plane (SMP), General Control Plane (GCP) and
other TSF and non-TSF sub-systems.
1.4.2 Physical scope
This section will define the physical scope (table 1) of the HUAWEI NE20E series
Router V800R010C10 and NE08E series Router V300R003C10 to be evaluated.
The physical boundary of the TOE is the actual router system itself -- in particular, the
functional host system. The power distribution system and heat dissipation system are
part of the TOE but not to be evaluated because they are security irrelevant.
There are two types of chassis of NE20E as shown in Table 2.
There are one type of chassis of NE08E as shown in Table 4.
TYPE Delivery Item Version
Hardware There are two types of chassis of NE20E as shown
in Table 2.
There are one type of chassis of NE08E as shown in
Table 4.
Info:
We cooperate with world class logistics service
providers such as DHL, KN, Schenker, Panalpina
and so on to ensure the security of product in
international transportation and regional
warehousing, so as to deliver products to customers
efficiently and securely
NA
Software NE20E series Router V800R010C10SPC500
Format:
V800R010C10SPC500-NE20E-NSP-50-120-A-B.cc
Info:
Users can login the HUAWEI support website to
download the software packet in accordance to the
version of the TOE.
Users can verify the software by digital
signature(The digital signature is also published on
HUAWEI support website)
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux)
iQEcBAABCAAGBQJbjRF8AAoJEJmtgd8np0gkPW
sH/RUyJMZNTscQYMN3HNRyxXHi
cGwYgJPZoz1rugw58UiIDsA50UCURhhmfOG98xZ
V800R010C10
SPC500
HUAWEI NE20E series Router V800R010C10 & NE08E series Router V300R003C10 Security Target
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Public Page 9
DdoUaAXYWy1WU8/hNfYFs6/S5
pf81RaC4PTL8vb1i0RfZ8S1D0dO5S6bLH/zzWg01
ciMoH6ZcRjTWtxPCVPHuMNxQ
vIUkv6+UQjhL2jgcmTJAThwWwyFg2T+5vxeV8m9
HNSnA93acbouaLTeMGc7VVzT2
hpkpxPyL5Eg8ayRbWQsKCCSMkLIe6PsLEGpSG+
mLwLnIr3JFNZPTZYBGWBQ60SJz
/kcdN/0RbF3Fpfckot8Xl+8rdkC9Z3i6ZAi6tqlM/cZ+A
H+yHaFesHEaWJmvRgk=
=//SI
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
NE08E series Router V300R003C10SPC500
Format:
V300R003C10SPC500-NE-08E-S6E.cc
Info:
Users can login the HUAWEI support website to
download the software packet in accordance to the
version of the TOE.
Users can verify the software by digital
signature(The digital signature is also published on
HUAWEI support website)
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2.0.19 (GNU/Linux)
iQEcBAABCAAGBQJbihZcAAoJEJmtgd8np0gkiEsH
/1SUZgMqTjo/15iqAM2cWPpf
rsVS2MIyhsHkvmn33kUe/M2LvLS0M1QUPgGto81
YJzAIPSy5P1hLQRWRK3+OZqp1
OVFziPBh15ZzGkmgEy7eUK1S0lBX2jWrHLDlmN/g
US/gx12RSwkqZg9ZywWqb7tZ
EiYIGzuIFZIh65j2q2EvYfkTTJiAMrwiJjJN7tySSZa8
wsaZ7ulNSwjWnbS75GP4
a3WrRfsT2YlbMj3u61V8MGohRTskGcPFh/lckaEm
MiK8TsA0oeqasrCsuVRLGXUw
KcsAZVMKH3Xz6/kJDCkf+zn8XJTGVGIo5+KLJKLI
dAKnf3GCC23HCMWly8M+aXE=
=kMzE
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
V300R003C10
SPC500
Product
guidance
Huawei NE20E&NE08E Common Criteria Security
Evaluation - Certified Configuration
Info:
The documentation is delivered as PDF on a
2.1
HUAWEI NE20E series Router V800R010C10 & NE08E series Router V300R003C10 Security Target
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Public Page 10
CD-ROM if the customer requests it.
SHA256 checksum:
342f734d94af1819a183c28278bd3c4a071a027af70
b454fb89798be838eafe6
NE20E V800R010C10 Product Documentation 01
Info:
Users can login the HUAWEI support website to
read the document directly or download the product
documentation in accordance to the version of the
TOE. The download file format is *.hdx, user can
download the *.hdx reader from the same website.
V800R010C10
NE08E V300R003C10 Product Documentation 01
Info:
Users can login the HUAWEI support website to
read the document directly or download the product
documentation in accordance to the version of the
TOE. The download file format is *.hdx, user can
download the *.hdx reader from the same website.
V300R003C10
Table 1 Physical scope
The following boards will be covered during this evaluation (● means related):
Model Description NE20E-S8A NE20E-S16A
CR2D0MPUE110 Main Processing Unit E1 ● ●
CR2D0NSP5010 Network Service Processor (NSP-50) ● ●
CR2DNSPE5010 Network Service Processor (NSP-50-E) ● ●
CR2DNSP12010 Network Service Processor (NSP-120) ● ●
CR2DNSP1201E Network Service Processor (NSP-120-E) ● ●
CR2DNSPA0010 Network Service Processor(NSP-A) ● ●
CR2DNSPB0010 Network Service Processor(NSP-B) ● ●
CR2DNSPC0010 Network Service Processor(NSP-C) ● ●
CR2DNSPD0010 Network Service Processor(NSP-D) ● ●
CR2D00E1NC10 1-Port 100GBase-CFP2 Physical Interface
Card(PIC)
● ●
CR2D00LAXF10 10-Port 10GBase LAN/WAN-SFP+ Physical
Interface Card
● ●
CR2D00E1MF70 1-Port 40GBase-CFP Physical Interface
Card(PIC)
● ●
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Model Description NE20E-S8A NE20E-S16A
CR2D00L4XF11 4-Port 10GBase LAN/WAN-SFP+ Physical Interface
Card
● ●
CR2DL1XE8G11 1-Port 10GBase LAN/WAN-SFP+ + 8-Port
100/1000Base-X-SFP Physical Interface Card
● ●
CR2D00L2XF12 2-Port 10GBase LAN/WAN-SFP+ Physical Interface
Card
● ●
CR2D00L4XF10 4-Port 10GBase LAN-SFP+ Physical Interface
Card
● -
CR2DL1XE8G10 1-Port 10GBase LAN/WAN-SFP+ + 8-Port
100/1000Base-X-SFP Physical Interface Card
● ●
CR2D00L2XF11 2-Port 10GBase LAN/WAN-SFP+ Physical Interface
Card
● ●
CR2D0L2XFH10 2-Port 10GBase LAN/WAN-SFP+ Physical Interface
Card H
● ●
CR2D0L2XFH11 2-Port 10GBase LAN/WAN-SFP+ Physical Interface
Card H (PIC-H)
● ●
CR2D00E8GE12 8-Port 100/1000Base-RJ45 Physical Interface
Card
● ●
CR2D00EAGF10 10-Port 100/1000Base-X-SFP Physical Interface
Card
● ●
CR2D00E8GF11 8-Port 100/1000Base-X-SFP Physical Interface
Card
● ●
CR2D00E8GE11 8-Port 100/1000Base-RJ45 Physical Interface
Card
● ●
CR2D0EAGFH10 10-Port 100/1000Base-X-SFP Physical Interface
Card H
● ●
CR2D0E8GFH10 8-Port 100/1000Base-X-SFP Physical Interface
Card H (PIC-H)
● ●
CR2D00EEGF10 20-Port 100/1000Base-X-SFP Physical Interface
Card(PIC)
- ●
CR5D08CWDM70 8-Channel CWDM Multiplexing & Demultiplexing
(1471/1491/1511/1531/1551/1571/1591/1611nm)
Physical Interface Card(PIC)
● ●
CR5D1DMD1M01 Bidirectional 1-Channel CWDM Optical Add/Drop
Multiplexing (1471nm) Physical Interface
Card(PIC)
● ●
CR5D1DMD1M02 Bidirectional 1-Channel CWDM Optical Add/Drop ● ●
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Model Description NE20E-S8A NE20E-S16A
Multiplexing (1491nm) Physical Interface
Card(PIC)
CR5D1DMD1M03 Bidirectional 1-Channel CWDM Optical Add/Drop
Multiplexing (1511nm) Physical Interface
Card(PIC)
● ●
CR5D1DMD1M04 Bidirectional 1-Channel CWDM Optical Add/Drop
Multiplexing (1531nm) Physical Interface
Card(PIC)
● ●
CR5D1DMD1M05 Bidirectional 1-Channel CWDM Optical Add/Drop
Multiplexing (1551nm) Physical Interface
Card(PIC)
● ●
CR5D1DMD1M06 Bidirectional 1-Channel CWDM Optical Add/Drop
Multiplexing (1571nm) Physical Interface
Card(PIC)
● ●
CR5D1DMD1M07 Bidirectional 1-Channel CWDM Optical Add/Drop
Multiplexing (1591nm) Physical Interface
Card(PIC)
● ●
CR5D1DMD1M08 Bidirectional 1-Channel CWDM Optical Add/Drop
Multiplexing (1611nm) Physical Interface
Card(PIC)
● ●
CR5D2DMD2M01 Bidirectional 2-Channel CWDM Optical Add/Drop
Multiplexing (1471/1491nm) Physical Interface
Card(PIC)
● ●
CR5D2DMD2M02 Bidirectional 2-Channel CWDM Optical Add/Drop
Multiplexing (1511/1531nm) Physical Interface
Card(PIC)
● ●
CR5D2DMD2M03 Bidirectional 2-Channel CWDM Optical Add/Drop
Multiplexing (1551/1571nm) Physical Interface
Card(PIC)
● ●
CR5D2DMD2M04 Bidirectional 2-Channel CWDM Optical Add/Drop
Multiplexing (1591/1611nm) Physical Interface
Card(PIC)
● ●
CR2D000IE110 32-Port E1 Physical Interface Card(75ohm) ● ●
CR2D000IE111 32-Port E1 Physical Interface Card(120ohm) ● ●
CR2D000DE110 16-Port E1 Physical Interface
Card(PIC,75ohm) ,High anti-corrosion
● ●
CR2D000DE111 16-Port E1 Physical Interface Card(120ohm) ● ●
CR2D00A2CF10 2-Port OC-3c/STM-1c ATM-SFP Physical Interface ● ●
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Model Description NE20E-S8A NE20E-S16A
Card(PIC)
CR2D00C4CF11 4-Port Channelized STM-1c POS-SFP Physical
Interface Card
● ●
CR2D00P4CF11 4-Port OC-3c/STM-1c POS-SFP Physical Interface
Card
● ●
CR2DP2C1HF11 2-Port OC-3c/STM-1c (or 1-Port OC12c/STM-4C)
POS-SFP Physical Interface Card
● ●
CR2D00C1CF11 1-Port Channelized STM-1c POS-SFP Physical
Interface Card
● ●
CR5D3DMR4M01 4-Channel CWDM Optical Add/Drop Multiplexing
(1471/1491/1511/1531nm) Physical Interface
Card(PIC)
● ●
CR5D3DMR4M02 4-Channel CWDM Optical Add/Drop Multiplexing
(1551/1571/1591/1611nm) Physical Interface
Card(PIC)
● ●
CR2D00EEGF11 20-Port 100/1000Base-X-CSFP Physical
Interface Card(PIC)
● ●
CR2D0EAGFE10 10-Port 100/1000Base-X-SFP Physical Interface
Card E(PIC-E)
● ●
CR2D0L2XFE10 2-Port 10GBase LAN/WAN-SFP+ Physical Interface
Card E(PIC-E)
● ●
CR5D00AUXQ10 Auxiliary Flexible Interface Card with 4-Port
100Base-RJ45 (FIC,Supporting 1588v2)
● ●
CR2D00MPAA90 4-Channel FXS/FXO+2-Channel E&M+2-Channel
RS232+2-Channel RS485 Board
● ●
CR2D00MP8A90 4 Channels C37.94 Optical Interface and 4
Channels CoDir64K Electric Interface Board
● ●
CR2D000SA890 8-Channel V.35/X.21/V.24 Board ● ●
CR2D0E5XMF10 2-Port 50GBase/1-Port 100GBase-QSFP28
Physical Interface Card(PIC)
● ●
CR2D00E2NF10 2-Port 100GBase-QSFP28 Physical Interface
Card(PIC)
● -
CR2D00E1NC11 1-Port 100GBase-CFP2Physical Interface
Card(PIC)
● ●
CR2D00LAXF11 10-Port 10GBase LAN/WAN-SFP+ Physical
Interface Card(PIC)
● ●
CR5D00E4XF20 4-Port 10GBase-SFP+MACsec Interface Card ● ●
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Model Description NE20E-S8A NE20E-S16A
CR5D00E1NB20 1-Port 100GBase-QSFP28+MACsec Interface Card ● ●
CR5DE2NE4X10 2-Port
100GBase-QSFP28/1-Port100GBase-QSFP28+4-Port
10GBase-SFP+MACsec Interface Card
● ●
CR2D0EM4TP10 4 Channels GE/FE PoE Electrical Interface Board ● ●
CR2D000EM890 6 Channels E&M Interface Board ● ●
CR2D000DE110 16-Port E1 Physical Interface
Card(PIC,75ohm) ,High anti-corrosion
● ●
Table 2 List of boards of NE20E
The following subcards on the NSP will be covered during this evaluation (● means related):
Model Description NSP
-50
NSP-
50-E
NSP
-12
0
NSP-1
20-E
NS
P-
A
NS
P-
B
NS
P-
C
NS
P-
D
CR2D00
E1NC10
1-Port 100GBase-CFP2
Physical Interface
Card(PIC)
- - - - - - ● -
CR2D00
LAXF10
10-Port 10GBase
LAN/WAN-SFP+ Physical
Interface Card
- - - - - - ● -
CR2D00
E1MF70
1-Port 40GBase-CFP
Physical Interface
Card(PIC)
- - ● ● ● ● ● ●
CR2D00
L4XF11
4-Port 10GBase
LAN/WAN-SFP+ Physical
Interface Card
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
CR2DL1
XE8G11
1-Port 10GBase
LAN/WAN-SFP+ + 8-Port
100/1000Base-X-SFP
Physical Interface Card
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
CR2D00
L2XF12
2-Port 10GBase
LAN/WAN-SFP+ Physical
Interface Card
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
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Model Description NSP
-50
NSP-
50-E
NSP
-12
0
NSP-1
20-E
NS
P-
A
NS
P-
B
NS
P-
C
NS
P-
D
CR2D00
L4XF10
4-Port 10GBase LAN-SFP+
Physical Interface Card
- - ● ● ● ● ● ●
CR2DL1
XE8G10
1-Port 10GBase
LAN/WAN-SFP+ + 8-Port
100/1000Base-X-SFP
Physical Interface Card
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
CR2D00
L2XF11
2-Port 10GBase
LAN/WAN-SFP+ Physical
Interface Card
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
CR2D0L
2XFH10
2-Port 10GBase
LAN/WAN-SFP+ Physical
Interface Card H
● ● ● ● ● ● - -
CR2D0L
2XFH11
2-Port 10GBase
LAN/WAN-SFP+ Physical
Interface Card H (PIC-H)
- - - - ● ● ● ●
CR2D00
E8GE12
8-Port 100/1000Base-RJ45
Physical Interface Card
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
CR2D00
EAGF10
10-Port
100/1000Base-X-SFP
Physical Interface Card
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
CR2D00
E8GF11
8-Port 100/1000Base-X-SFP
Physical Interface Card
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
CR2D00
E8GE11
8-Port 100/1000Base-RJ45
Physical Interface Card
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
CR2D0E
AGFH10
10-Port
100/1000Base-X-SFP
Physical Interface Card H
● ● ● ● ● ● - -
CR2D0E
8GFH10
8-Port 100/1000Base-X-SFP
Physical Interface Card H
(PIC-H)
- - - - ● ● ● ●
CR2D00
EEGF10
20-Port
100/1000Base-X-SFP
- - ● ● ● ● ● ●
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Model Description NSP
-50
NSP-
50-E
NSP
-12
0
NSP-1
20-E
NS
P-
A
NS
P-
B
NS
P-
C
NS
P-
D
Physical Interface
Card(PIC)
CR5D08
CWDM70
8-Channel CWDM
Multiplexing &
Demultiplexing
(1471/1491/1511/1531/1551
/1571/1591/1611nm)
Physical Interface
Card(PIC)
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
CR5D1D
MD1M01
Bidirectional 1-Channel
CWDM Optical Add/Drop
Multiplexing (1471nm)
Physical Interface
Card(PIC)
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
CR5D1D
MD1M02
Bidirectional 1-Channel
CWDM Optical Add/Drop
Multiplexing (1491nm)
Physical Interface
Card(PIC)
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
CR5D1D
MD1M03
Bidirectional 1-Channel
CWDM Optical Add/Drop
Multiplexing (1511nm)
Physical Interface
Card(PIC)
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
CR5D1D
MD1M04
Bidirectional 1-Channel
CWDM Optical Add/Drop
Multiplexing (1531nm)
Physical Interface
Card(PIC)
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
CR5D1D
MD1M05
Bidirectional 1-Channel
CWDM Optical Add/Drop
Multiplexing (1551nm)
Physical Interface
Card(PIC)
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
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Model Description NSP
-50
NSP-
50-E
NSP
-12
0
NSP-1
20-E
NS
P-
A
NS
P-
B
NS
P-
C
NS
P-
D
CR5D1D
MD1M06
Bidirectional 1-Channel
CWDM Optical Add/Drop
Multiplexing (1571nm)
Physical Interface
Card(PIC)
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
CR5D1D
MD1M07
Bidirectional 1-Channel
CWDM Optical Add/Drop
Multiplexing (1591nm)
Physical Interface
Card(PIC)
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
CR5D1D
MD1M08
Bidirectional 1-Channel
CWDM Optical Add/Drop
Multiplexing (1611nm)
Physical Interface
Card(PIC)
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
CR5D2D
MD2M01
Bidirectional 2-Channel
CWDM Optical Add/Drop
Multiplexing
(1471/1491nm) Physical
Interface Card(PIC)
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
CR5D2D
MD2M02
Bidirectional 2-Channel
CWDM Optical Add/Drop
Multiplexing
(1511/1531nm) Physical
Interface Card(PIC)
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
CR5D2D
MD2M03
Bidirectional 2-Channel
CWDM Optical Add/Drop
Multiplexing
(1551/1571nm) Physical
Interface Card(PIC)
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
CR5D2D
MD2M04
Bidirectional 2-Channel
CWDM Optical Add/Drop
Multiplexing
(1591/1611nm) Physical
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
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Model Description NSP
-50
NSP-
50-E
NSP
-12
0
NSP-1
20-E
NS
P-
A
NS
P-
B
NS
P-
C
NS
P-
D
Interface Card(PIC)
CR2D00
0IE110
32-Port E1 Physical
Interface Card(75ohm)
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
CR2D00
0IE111
32-Port E1 Physical
Interface Card(120ohm)
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
CR2D00
0DE110
16-Port E1 Physical
Interface
Card(PIC,75ohm) ,High
anti-corrosion
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
CR2D00
0DE111
16-Port E1 Physical
Interface Card(120ohm)
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
CR2D00
A2CF10
2-Port OC-3c/STM-1c
ATM-SFP Physical Interface
Card(PIC)
● ● ● ● ● ● - -
CR2D00
C4CF11
4-Port Channelized STM-1c
POS-SFP Physical Interface
Card
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
CR2D00
P4CF11
4-Port OC-3c/STM-1c
POS-SFP Physical Interface
Card
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
CR2DP2
C1HF11
2-Port OC-3c/STM-1c (or
1-Port OC12c/STM-4C)
POS-SFP Physical Interface
Card
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
CR2D00
C1CF11
1-Port Channelized STM-1c
POS-SFP Physical Interface
Card
● ● ● ● ● ● - ●
CR5D3D
MR4M01
4-Channel CWDM Optical
Add/Drop Multiplexing
(1471/1491/1511/1531nm)
Physical Interface
Card(PIC)
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
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Model Description NSP
-50
NSP-
50-E
NSP
-12
0
NSP-1
20-E
NS
P-
A
NS
P-
B
NS
P-
C
NS
P-
D
CR5D3D
MR4M02
4-Channel CWDM Optical
Add/Drop Multiplexing
(1551/1571/1591/1611nm)
Physical Interface
Card(PIC)
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
CR2D00
EEGF11
20-Port
100/1000Base-X-CSFP
Physical Interface
Card(PIC)
- - - - ● ● ● ●
CR2D0E
AGFE10
10-Port
100/1000Base-X-SFP
Physical Interface Card
E(PIC-E)
- - - - ● ● ● ●
CR2D0L
2XFE10
2-Port 10GBase
LAN/WAN-SFP+ Physical
Interface Card E(PIC-E)
- - - - ● ● ● ●
CR5D00
AUXQ10
Auxiliary Flexible
Interface Card with 4-Port
100Base-RJ45
(FIC,Supporting 1588v2)
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
CR2D00
MPAA90
4-Channel
FXS/FXO+2-Channel
E&M+2-Channel
RS232+2-Channel RS485
Board
● ● ● ● ● ● - -
CR2D00
MP8A90
4 Channels C37.94 Optical
Interface and 4 Channels
CoDir64K Electric
Interface Board
● ● ● ● ● ● - -
CR2D00
0SA890
8-Channel V.35/X.21/V.24
Board
● ● ● ● ● ● - -
CR2D0E
5XMF10
2-Port 50GBase/1-Port
100GBase-QSFP28 Physical
- - - - - - ● ●
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Model Description NSP
-50
NSP-
50-E
NSP
-12
0
NSP-1
20-E
NS
P-
A
NS
P-
B
NS
P-
C
NS
P-
D
Interface Card(PIC)
CR2D00
E2NF10
2-Port 100GBase-QSFP28
Physical Interface
Card(PIC)
- - - - - - - ●
CR2D00
E1NC11
1-Port
100GBase-CFP2Physical
Interface Card(PIC)
- - - - - - ● ●
CR2D00
LAXF11
10-Port 10GBase
LAN/WAN-SFP+ Physical
Interface Card(PIC)
- - - - - - ● ●
CR5D00
E4XF20
4-Port 10GBase-SFP+MACsec
Interface Card
- - - - ● ● - ●
CR5D00
E1NB20
1-Port
100GBase-QSFP28+MACsec
Interface Card
- - - - - - - ●
CR5DE2
NE4X10
2-Port
100GBase-QSFP28/1-Port100
GBase-QSFP28+4-Port
10GBase-SFP+MACsec
Interface Card
- - - - - - - ●
CR2D0E
M4TP10
4 Channels GE/FE PoE
Electrical Interface Board
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
CR2D00
0EM890
6 Channels E&M Interface
Board
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
CR2D00
0DE110
16-Port E1 Physical
Interface
Card(PIC,75ohm) ,High
anti-corrosion
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
Table 3 List of subcards on the NSP
The following boards will be covered during this evaluation (● means related):
Module Description NE08E-S6E
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Module Description NE08E-S6E
NEDD00CXPA00 System Control,Cross-connect and
Multi-protocol Process Unit A
●
NEDD00CXPB00 System Control, Cross-connect and
Multi-protocol Process Unit with 160G
●
NEJD00CXPA00 System Control,Cross-connect and
Multi-protocol Process Unit
-
NEKD00EX4S00 4 Channels 10GE Optical Interface Board(SFP+) ●
NEDD00EX2S00 2 Channel 10GE Optical Interface Board(SFP+) ●
NEDD000EX1S0 1 Channel 10GE Optical Interface Board(SFP+) ●
NEDD00EM8F01 8 Channels GE/FE Optical Interface Board ●
NEDD00EM4F01 4 Channels GE/FE Optical Interface Board ●
NEDD00EM4T01 4 Channels GE/FE Electrical Interface Board ●
NEDD00EM8T01 8 Channels GE/FE Electrical Interface Board ●
NEDD00CQ1B00 4 Channels Channelized OC-3c/STM-1c POS
Optical Interface Board
●
NEDD16E17502 16 Channels E1 Interface Board(75ohm) ●
NEDD32E17501 32 Channels E1 Interface Board(75ohm) ●
NEDD16E11202 16 Channels E1 Interface Board(120ohm) ●
NEDD32E11201 32 Channels E1 Interface Board(120ohm) ●
NEDD01MPAA00 4-Channel FXS/FXO+2-Channel E&M+2-Channel
RS232+2-Channel RS485 Board
●
NEDD001SA800 8-Channel V.35/X.21/V.24 Board ●
NEDD01MP8A00 4 Channels C37.94 Optical Interface and 4
Channels CoDir64K Electric Interface Board
●
NEDD0EM4TP00 4 Channels GE/FE PoE Electrical Interface
Board
●
NEDD001EM600 6 Channels E&M Interface Board ●
CR5D00E4XF20 4-Port 10GBase-SFP+MACsec Interface Card ●
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Table 4 List of boards of NE08E
1.4.3 Logical scope
The TOE is comprised of several security features. Each of the security features
identified above consists of several security functionalities, as identified below.
1. Authentication
2. Access Control
3. Traffic Forwarding
4. Auditing
5. Communication Security
6. IP-based ACL
7. Security functionality management
8. Cryptographic functions
9. SNMP Trap
These features are described in more detail in the subsections below.
1.4.3.1 Authentication
The TOE can authenticate administrative users by user name and password.
VRP provides a local authentication scheme for this, or can optionally enforce
authentication decisions obtained from a Radius or TACACS+ server in the IT
environment.
Authentication is always enforced for virtual terminal sessions via SSH, and SFTP
(Secured FTP).
1.4.3.2 Access Control
The TOE controls access by levels. Four hierarchical access control levels are offered
that can be assigned to individual user accounts:
User
level
Level
name
Purpose Commands for
access
0 Visit Network diagnosis and
establishment of remote
connections.
ping, tracert,
language-mode,
super, quit, display
1 Monitoring System maintenance and
fault diagnosis.
Level 0 and display,
debugging, reset,
refresh, terminal, send
2 Configurat
ion
Service configuration. Level 0, 1 and all
configuration
commands.
3 Managem
ent
System management (file
system, user management,
All commands.
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User
level
Level
name
Purpose Commands for
access
internal parameters).
Table 5 Access Levels
To implement refined right management, the user can extend the command level range
to levels 0 to 15. If the user does not adjust the level of any command, the levels of the
registered commands are automatically adjusted as follows after the command level
range is extended to levels 0 to 15:
 The user access level 0 maps to the command level 0
 The user access level 1 maps to the command level 1
 The user access level 2 maps to the command level 10.
 The user access level 3 maps to the command level 15.
 For the command levels 2 to 9 and 11 to 14, no command line exists. The user can
add command lines to these command levels to implement refined right
management.
The TOE can either decide the authorization level of a user based on its local database,
or make use of Radius or TACACS+ servers to obtain the decision whether a specific
user is granted a specific level.
1.4.3.3 Traffic Forwarding
The TOE handles forwarding policy at their core. The forwarding engine controls the
flow of network packets by making (and enforcing) a decision with regard to the
network interface that a packet gets forwarded to.
These decisions are made based on a routing table that is either maintained by
administrators (static routing) or gets updated dynamically by the TOE when
exchanging routing information with peer routers.
1.4.3.4 Auditing
VRP generates audit records for security-relevant management actions and stores the
audit records in storage device inserted into TOE.
 By default all correctly input and executed commands along with a timestamp when
they are executed are logged.
 Attempts to access is logged, no matter whether it is succeeded access or failed
access, along with user id, source IP address, timestamp.
 For security management purpose, the administrators can select which events are
being audited by enabling auditing for individual modules (enabling audit record
generation for related to functional areas), and by selecting a severity level. Based
on the hard-coded association of audit records with modules and severity levels,
this allows control over the types of audit events being recorded.
 Output logs to various channels such as monitor, log buffer, trap buffer, file.
 Review functionality is provided via the command line interface, which allows
administrators to inspect the audit log.
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1.4.3.5 Communication Security
The TOE provides communication security by implementing SSH protocol. SSH2
(SSH2.0) is implemented. SSH2 is used for all cases by providing more secure and
effectiveness in terms of functionality and performance,
To protect the TOE from eavesdrop and to ensure data transmission security and
confidentiality, SSH provides:
 authentication by password, by RSA or by password with RSA;
 AES encryption algorithms
 Secure cryptographic key exchange by DH-exchange-group-sha1, DH-group14-sha1
 HMAC-SHA256 is used as verification algorithm for SSH
Besides default TCP port 22, manually specifying a listening port is also implemented
since it can effectively reduce attack.
STelnet and SFTP are provided to implement secure Telnet and FTP, as alternatives to
Telnet and FTP which are deemed to have known security issues. The S-Telnet is
implemented by SSH.
1.4.3.6 IP-based ACL
VRP offers a feature Access Control List (ACL) for filtering incoming and outgoing
information flow to and from interfaces on Interface boards. Information flow that is
processed with ACL and to be forwarded to other network interfaces is not within the
scope of the evaluated configuration. Outgoing information flow processed with ACL
towards other network interfaces is not within the scope of the evaluated configuration.
The administrator can create, delete, and modify rules for ACL configuration to filter,
prioritize, rate-limit the information flow destined to TOE through interfaces on Interface
boards by matching information contained in the headers of IP packets against ACL
rules specified. Source IP address, destination IP address, IP protocol number, source
port number of TCP/UDP protocol, destination port number of TCP/UDP protocol, TCP
flag of TCP protocol, type and code of ICMP protocol, fragment flag, can be used for
ACL rule configuration.
1.4.3.7 Security functionality management
Security functionality management includes not only authentication, access level, but
also managing security related data consisting of configuration profile and runtime
parameters. According to security functionality management, customized security is
provided.
More functionalities include:
 Setup to enable SSH
 Setup to enable authentication for BGP, OSPF, IS-IS, LDP
 Setup to enable audit, as well as suppression of repeated log records
 Setup to change default rate limit plan
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1.4.3.8 Cryptographic functions
Cryptographic functions are required by security features as dependencies, where:
 Supports encryption algorithms, such as AES encryption, for SSH;
 RSA is used in user authentication when user tries to authenticate and gain access
to the TOE;
 HMAC-SHA256 is used as verification algorithm for SSH;
 MD5 is used as verification algorithm for packets of OSPF,BGP, IS-IS and LDP
protocols;
1.4.3.9 SNMP Trap
The Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) is a network management protocol
widely used in the TCP/IP network. SNMP is a method of managing network elements
through a network console workstation which runs network management software.
A trap is a type of message used to report an alert or important event about a managed
device to the NM Station.
The TOE uses SNMP traps to notify a fault occurs or the system does not operate
properly.
1.4.4 TSF and Non-TSF data
All data from and to the interfaces available on the TOE is categorized into TSF data
and non-TSF data. The following is an enumeration of the subjects and objects
participating in the policy.
TSF data:
 User account data, including the following security attributes:
o User identities.
o Locally managed passwords.
o Locally managed access levels.
 Audit configuration data.
 Audit records.
 Configuration data of security feature and functions
 Routing and other network forwarding-related tables, including the following
security attributes:
o Network layer routing tables.
o Link layer address resolution tables.
o BGP, OSPF and IS-IS databases.
 Network traffic destined to the TOE processed by security feature and functions.
Non-TSF data:
 Network traffic to be forwarded to other network interfaces.
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 Network traffic destined to the TOE processed by non-security feature and
functions.
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2 CC Conformance Claim
This ST is CC Part 2 conformant [CC] and CC Part 3 conformant [CC]. The CC version
of [CC] is 3.1R5.
The TOE claims EAL2 augmented with ALC_FLR.2.
No conformance to a Protection Profile is claimed.
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3 TOE Security problem definition
3.1 Threats
The assumed security threats are listed below.
The information assets to be protected are the information stored, processed or
generated by the TOE. Configuration data for the TOE, TSF data (such as user
account information and passwords, audit records) and other information that the TOE
facilitates access to (such as system software, patches and network traffic routed by
the TOE) are all considered part of information assets.
The threats to the TOE are identified and detailed in the following Table.
Threat Name Threat Definition
T.UnwantedNetworkTraffic Unwanted/malicious network traffic designated to the
TOE or pass through the TOE jeopardizes the integrity
or the availability of the TOE, causing:
1. Denial of service of the TOE and may further cause
the TOE fails to respond to system control and security
management operations
2. the traffic flows to unauthorized destinations
T.UnauthenticatedAccess A user who is not a user of the TOE gains access to the
TOE.
T.UnauthorizedAccess A user of the TOE authorized to perform certain actions
and access certain information gains access to
commands or information he is not authorized for. This
threat also includes data leakage to non-intended
person or device
T.Eavesdrop An eavesdropper (remote attacker) in the management
network served by the TOE is able to intercept, and
potentially modify or re-use information assets that are
exchanged between TOE and LMT/RMT.
Table 6 List of identified threats
3.2 Assumptions
3.2.1 Environment of use of the TOE
3.2.1.1 Physical
A.PhysicalProtection It is assumed that the TOE (including console interface
used for initial configuration, access of storage device)
is protected against unauthorized physical access.
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3.2.1.2 Network Elements
A.NetworkElements The environment is supposed to provide supporting
mechanism to the TOE:
Peer router(s) for the exchange of dynamic routing
information;
A remote entities (PCs) used for administration of the
TOE.
(optional) RADIUS/TACACS+ used to provide remote
authentication
(optional) NMS, logging server, and SNMP trap server
used for administration of the TOE
These entities are considered trusted and will not attack
the TOE.
The administrator shall ensure the session between the
TOE and the RADIUS/TACACS+/Logging server is
secured when these servers are used.
3.2.1.3 Network Segregation
A.NetworkSegregation It is assumed that the ETH interface on MPU in the TOE
will be accessed only through sub-network where the
TOE hosts. The sub-network is separate from the
application (or, public) networks where the interfaces on
Interface boards in the TOE are accessible.
3.2.1.4 Personnel Assumptions
A.NOEVIL The authorized users will be competent, and not
careless or willfully negligent or hostile, and will follow
and abide by the instructions provided by the TOE
documentation.
4 Security Objectives
4.1 Objectives for the TOE
The following objectives must be met by the TOE:
 O. DeviceAvail The TOE shall ensure its own availability.
 O.UserAvail The TOE shall ensure only authorized users can access network
resources through the TOE.
 O. DataFilter The TOE shall ensure that only allowed traffic goes through the TOE.
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 O.Communication The TOE must implement logical protection measures for
network communication between the TOE and LMT/RMT from the operational
environment.
 O.Authorization The TOE shall implement different authorization levels that can
be assigned to administrators in order to restrict the functionality that is available to
individual administrators.
 O.Authentication The TOE shall authenticate its users before the users can
assess the TSF functions.
 O.Audit The TOE shall provide functionality to generate audit records for
security-relevant administrator actions.
4.2 Objectives for the Operational Environment
 OE.NetworkElements The operational environment shall provide securely
and correctly working network devices as resources that the TOE needs to
cooperate with. Behaviors of such network devices provided by operational
environment shall be also secure and correct. For example, other routers for the
exchange of routing information, PCs used for TOE administration, and Radius and
TACACS+ servers for obtaining authentication and authorization decisions. The
operational environments shall provide secure communication for the
RADIUS/TACACS+/Logging server if these servers are used.
 OE.Physical The TOE (i.e., the complete system including attached
peripherals, such as a console, and storage device inserted in the MPU) shall be
protected against unauthorized physical access.
 OE.NetworkSegregation The operational environment shall provide segregation
by deploying the Ethernet interface on MPU in TOE into a local sub-network,
compared to the interfaces on Interface boards in TOE serving the application (or
public) network.
 OE. Person Personnel working as authorized administrators shall be carefully
selected for trustworthiness and trained for proper operation of the TOE.
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale
The following table provides a mapping of TOE objectives to threats and policies,
showing that each objective is at least covered by one threat or policy.
Threat Rationale for security objectives to remove
threats
T.UnwantedTraffic This threat is countered by O.DeviceAvail, ensuring
the TOE remain available, O.UserAvail ensuring the
network remains available and O.DataFilter ensuring
that unwanted data is filtered and cannot
access/jeopardize the network resources.
T.UnauthenticatedAccess The threat of unauthenticated access to the TOE is
countered by requiring the TOE to implement an
authentication mechanism for its users
(O.Authentication).
In addition, login attempts are logged allowing
detection of attempts and possibly tracing of culprits
(O.Audit)
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T.UnauthorizedAccess The threat of unauthorized access is countered by
requiring the TOE to implement an access control
mechanism (O.Authorization).
In addition, actions are logged allowing detection of
attempts and possibly tracing of culprits (O.Audit)
T.Eavesdrop The threat of eavesdropping is countered by requiring
communications security via SSHv2 for
communication between LMT/RMT and the TOE and
SNMPv3 for communication between the TOE and
the SNMP Trap Server. (O.Communication).
Table 7 Mapping Objectives to Threats
The following table provides a mapping of the objectives for the operational
environment to assumptions, threats and policies, showing that each objective is
covered by at least one assumption, threat or policy.
Environmental Objective Assumption
OE.NetworkElements A.NetworkElements
OE.Physical A.PhysicalProtection
OE.NetworkSegregation A.NetworkSegregation
OE. Person A.NOEVIL
Table 8 Mapping Objectives for the Environment toAssumptions
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5 Extended Components Definition
No extended components have been defined for this ST.
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6 Security Requirements
6.1 Conventions
The following conventions are used for the completion of operations:
 Strikethrough indicates text removed as a refinement
 (underlined text in parentheses) indicates additional text provided as a refinement.
 Bold text indicates the completion of an assignment.
 Italicised and bold text indicates the completion of a selection.
 Iteration: indicated by adding a string starting with “/” (e.g. “FCS_COP.1/AES”), or
by appending the iteration number in parenthesis, e.g. (1), (2), (3).
6.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements
6.2.1 Security Audit (FAU)
6.2.1.1 FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the [not specified] level of audit; and
c) [The following auditable events:
i. user activity
1. login, logout
2. operation requests
ii. User management
1. add, delete, modify
2. password change
3. operation authority change
4. online user query
5. session termination
iii. command level management
1. add, delete, modify
iv. authentication policy modification
v. system management
1. reset to factory settings
vi. log management
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1. log policy modification]
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the
outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional
components included in the PP/ST, [interface (if applicable), workstation IP (if
applicable), User ID (if applicable), and CLI command name (if applicable)]
6.2.1.2 FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to
associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.
6.2.1.3 FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide [the users of user level 3 with command-privilege level 15] with
the capability to read [all information] from the audit records.
FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret
the information.
6.2.1.4 FAU_SAR.3 Selectable audit review
FAU_SAR.3.1 The TSF shall provide the ability to apply [selection] of audit data based on [filename].
6.2.1.5 FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG.1.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorized
deletion.
FAU_STG.1.2 The TSF shall be able to [prevent] unauthorised modifications to the stored audit
records in the audit trail.
6.2.1.6 FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
FAU_STG.3.1 The TSF shall [delete the oldest files] if the audit trail exceeds [the size of the storage
device].
6.2.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)
6.2.2.1 FCS_COP.1/AES Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [symmetric de- and encryption] in accordance with a specified
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cryptographic algorithm [AES CTR Mode] and cryptographic key sizes [128bits, 256bits] that meet
the following: [FIPS 197]
6.2.2.2 FCS_COP.1/RSA Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [asymmetric authentication] in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5 with SHA1] and cryptographic key sizes [configured
(2048bits)] that meet the following: [RSA Cryptography Standard (PKCS#1 v2.1 (RFC3447) )]
6.2.2.3 FCS_COP.1/MD5 Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [authentication] in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm [MD5] and cryptographic key sizes [none] that meet the following: [RFC 1321]
6.2.2.4 FCS_COP.1/HMAC-SHA256 Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [authentication] in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm [HMAC-SHA256] and cryptographic key sizes [256 bits] that meet the following: [RFC
2104]
6.2.2.5 FCS_COP.1/DHKeyExchange Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [Diffie-Hellman key agreement] in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 and diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1]
and cryptographic key sizes [diffie-hellman-group14-sha1: 2048 bits,
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1: 1024bits to 8192bits] that meet the following: [RFC
4253/RFC4419]
6.2.2.6 FCS_CKM.1/AES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key generation algorithm [SSH key derivation] and specified cryptographic key sizes [128bits,
256bits] that meet the following:[RFC 4253]
6.2.2.7 FCS_CKM.1/RSA Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key generation algorithm [RSA] and specified cryptographic key sizes [configured (2048bits)] that
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meet the following: [RSA Cryptography Standard (PKCS#1)]
6.2.2.8 FCS_CKM.1/HMAC_SHA256 Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key generation algorithm [SSH key derivation] and specified cryptographic key sizes [256 bits] that
meet the following:[RFC 4253]
6.2.2.9 FCS_CKM.1/DHKey Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key generation algorithm [DH Group Generation] and specified cryptographic key sizes [1024bits to
8192 bits] that meet the following: [RFC4419]
6.2.2.10 FCS_CKM.4/AES Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key destruction method [releasing memory so that it is eventually overwritten] that meets the
following: [none]
6.2.2.11 FCS_CKM.4/RSA Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key destruction method [overwriting with 0] that meets the following: [none]
6.2.2.12 FCS_CKM.4/HMAC_SHA256 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key destruction method [Releasing Memory] that meets the following: [none]
6.2.2.13 FCS_CKM.4/DHKey Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key destruction method [Releasing Memory] that meets the following: [none]
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6.2.3 User Data Protection (FDP)
6.2.3.1 FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [ access control policy] on
[Subject: users;
Objects: commands /features provided by TOE;
Operation: Read access / write access /Deny access]
6.2.3.2 FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [access control policy] to objects based on the following:
[Subject security attributes
a) users and their following security attributes:
o user Identity
o user level assignment
Objects security attributes:
a) commands and their following security attributes:
o Commands and command level]
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled
subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [
a) Only authorized users are permitted access to commands and feature.
b) Users can be configured with different user levels to control the device
access permission.
c) There are 4 user access levels numbered from 0-3 and 16 command levels
numbered from 0 to 15, in ascending order of privileges.
d) User access levels map to command levels according to
• The user level 0 maps to the command level 0
• The user level 1 maps to the command level 1
• The user level 2 maps to the command level 10.
• The user level 3 maps to the command level 15.
• For the command levels 2 to 9 and 11 to 14, no command line exists. The
user can add command lines to these command levels to implement refined
right management.]
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: [
a) the user has been granted authorization for the relevant level commands]
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
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additional rules: [
a) the user has not been granted authorization for the commands targeted by
the request, or
b) the user is not granted authorization with a Command beyond user relevant
level].
6.2.3.3 FDP_DAU.1 Basic Data Authentication
FDP_DAU.1.1 The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence that can be used as a guarantee
of the validity of [the authentication information of BGP, OSPF, SSH, SNMP, ISIS, LDP]
FDP_DAU.1.2 The TSF shall provide [BGP, OSPF, SSH, SNMP, ISIS, LDP] with the ability to verify
evidence of the validity of the indicated information.
6.2.3.4 FDP_IFC.1(1) Subset information flow control- CPU-defend
FDP_IFC.1.1(1) The TSF shall enforce [Control Plane Committed Access Rate (CPCAR)/Blacklist] on
[Subjects:
TOE interface through which traffic goes
Information:
Ingress Control Plane Traffic (all different types of packets can reach the control plane,
such as routing protocol or exception packets (ip options), control traffic);
Operations:
Transmit Control Plane Traffic Flow;
Drop Control Plane Traffic Flow;
CAR(QoS) the Control Plane Traffic Flow;]
6.2.3.5 FDP_IFC.1(2) Subset information flow control- Data plane traffic
control
FDP_IFC.1.1(2) The TSF shall enforce [ACLs] on
[Subjects:
TOE interface through which traffic goes
Information:
Traffic flows;
Operations:
Permit, Deny, CAR]
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6.2.3.6 FDP_IFF.1(1) Simple security attributes - CPU-defend
FDP_IFF.1.1(1) The TSF shall enforce the [Control Plane Committed Access Rate (CPCAR)/Blacklist]
based on the following types of subject and information security attributes[
Subject: TOE logic CPU- interface through which traffic goes.
Subject security attributes:
 Configured Rate Limit per traffic type
 Packets per second permitted to control plane
 filtering traffic destined to CPU by blacklist
Information security attributes:
 Receive packets: Packets destined to device. such as OSPF.
 Packets which need further process: such as ARP miss packets.
 filtering traffic destined to CPU by blacklist]
FDP_IFF.1.2(1) The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject
and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: [
 If the ingress Control Plane Traffic with security attributes that
match the configured Control Plane packets type does not exceed the configured
rate limits, the traffic is permitted to flow
 If the ingress Control Plane Traffic with security attributes that
match the configured Control Plane packets type exceed the configured rate limits,
the traffic is not permitted to flow and will be dropped.]
FDP_IFF.1.3(1) The TSF shall enforce the [traffic statistic].
FDP_IFF.1.4(1) The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the following rules:
[none]
FDP_IFF.1.5(1) The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules:[none]
6.2.3.7 FDP_IFF.1(2) Simple security attributes – Data plane traffic control
FDP_IFF.1.1(2) The TSF shall enforce the [ACLs] based on the following types of subject and
information security attributes [
Subject: TOE interface through which traffic goes
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Information security attributes:
Packet characteristic: such as Source IP address / Destination IP address / protocol type
/Source port / Destination port]
FDP_IFF.1.2(2) The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled
information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: [Network traffic is match TOE
according to administratively configured policies
The specific information flow control rules associated with each policy are as follows:
ACL
Ingress or egress IP traffic with security attributes that match configured ACL policy rule
will be processed according to that rule.]
FDP_IFF.1.3(2) The TSF shall enforce the [none].
FDP_IFF.1.4(2) The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the
following rules: [none]
FDP_IFF.1.5(2) The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules:[
 For ACL feature, packets that match configured ACL with
action “deny” are dropped]
6.2.4 Identification and Authentication (FIA)
6.2.4.1 FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when [3 ] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur (since the last
successful authentication of the indicated user identity) related to [user logging in ].
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been [met], the
TSF shall [terminate the session of the authentication user].
6.2.4.2 FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual
users:
[
a) user ID
b) user level
c) password]
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6.2.4.3 FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
FIA_SOS.1.1/a The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet [for text string used as
seeds for MD5 authentication for OSPF, they are case sensitive and contain no whitespace, no
question mark. A cipher text mode should be used and the length of text string should be 32 to 392
characters]
FIA_SOS.1.1/b The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet [for password used
as seeds for MD5 authentication for BGP, they are case sensitive and contain no whitespace, no
question mark. A cipher password mode should be used and the length of password should be 32
to 392 characters]
FIA_SOS.1.1/c The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet [for password used
as seeds for MD5 authentication for ISIS, they are case sensitive and contain no whitespace, no
question mark. A cipher password mode should be used and the length of password should be 32
to 392 characters]
FIA_SOS.1.1/d The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet [for password used
as seeds for MD5 authentication for LDP, they are case sensitive and contain no whitespace, no
question mark. A cipher password mode should be used and the length of password should be 32
to 392 characters]
FIA_SOS.1.1/e The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet [for password used as
seeds for user authentication for SNMP and they are case sensitive. A cipher password mode
should be used and the length of password should be at least 8 characters long]
FIA_SOS.1.1/f The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet [for password used as
seeds for user authentication for SSH and they are case sensitive. A cipher password mode should
be used and the length of password should be at least 8 characters long]
Application Note: The password must contain at least eight characters; The password must
consist of digits, upper- and lowercase letters, and special characters (not including spaces
and question marks); The password cannot be the same as the user name, nor can it be the
reverse of the user name; When a local administrator modifies its password, the new password
cannot be the same as any of the previous 10 passwords
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6.2.4.3 FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication –Administrator Authentication
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow [establishment of a secure remote session between the
administrative user and the TOE component] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user
is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
6.2.4.6 FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1 The TSF shall provide [the following authentication mechanisms:
a) Remote authentication (by RADIUS or TACACS+);
b) Local Authentication by local database local of TOE]
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2 The TSF shall authenticate any user's identity according to the following: [
a) For Remote authentication by RADIUS or TACACS+
b) For local Authentication, the TSF will authenticate the administrator based on the
configured Identification and Authentication scheme].
6.2.4.7 FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification – Administrator Identification
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow [establishment of a secure remote session between the
administrative user and TOE component] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is
identified.
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other
TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
6.2.5 Security Management (FMT)
6.2.5.1 FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior
FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [determine the behavior of] all the functions
[defined in FMT_SMF.1] to [the administrator-defined roles].
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6.2.5.2 FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.1.1/1 The TSF shall enforce the [access control policy] to restrict the ability to [query,
modify] the security attributes [identified in FDP_ACF.1 and FIA_ATD.1] to the
[administrator-defined roles].
FMT_MSA.1.1/2 The TSF shall enforce the [Control Plane Committed Access Rate (CPCAR)/Blacklist]
to restrict the ability to [query, modify, delete] the security attributes [identified in FDP_IFF.1(1) ] to
[the roles which can match the Control Plane Committed Access Rate (CPCAR)/Blacklist and the
policy action is permit].
FMT_MSA.1.1/3 The TSF shall enforce the [ACLs] to restrict the ability to [query, modify, delete] the
security attributes [identified in FDP_IFF.1(2) ] to [the roles which can match the Control Plane
Committed Access Rate (CPCAR)/Blacklist and the policy action is permit].
6.2.5.3 FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FMT_MSA.3.1/1 The TSF shall enforce the [access control policy] to provide [restrictive] default
values for security attributes (Command Group associations) that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.1/2 The TSF shall enforce the [Control Plane Committed Access Rate (CPCAR)/Blacklist]
to provide [restrictive] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.1/3 The TSF shall enforce the [ACLs] to provide [restrictive] default values for security
attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow [administrator-defined roles] to specify alternative initial values to
override the default values when an object or information is created.
6.2.5.4 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [
a) authentication, authorization, encryption
1
policy
b) ACL policy
c) user management
d) definition of Managed Object Groups and Command Groups
e) port security / cpcar]
6.2.5.5 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles [administrator-defined roles] (refer to Table 5).
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
1
The encryption policy dictates which cryptographic algorithm / key length is used in which situation
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6.2.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
6.2.6.1 FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
FPT_STM.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.
6.2.7 TOE access (FTA)
6.2.7.1 FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination
FTA_SSL.3.1 The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after [a time interval of user inactivity
which can be configured.
SSH session will be terminated after a period which can be configured]
6.2.7.2 FTA_TSE.1 TOE session establishment
FTA_TSE.1.1 The TSF shall be able to deny session establishment based on [
a) authentication failure
b) Source IP address doesn’t match IP address configured in ACL for user
management.]
6.2.8 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)
6.2.8.1 FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path
FTP_TRP.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and [remote] users that is
logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end
points and protection of the communicated data from [modification, disclosure].
FTP_TRP.1.2 The TSF shall permit [remote users] to initiate communication via the trusted path.
FTP_TRP.1.3 The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for [remote management].
6.2.8.2 FTP_ITC.1 Trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and (SNMP Trap Server)
that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its
end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit [the TSF] to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [sending SNMP traps].
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6.3 Security Functional Requirements Rationale
6.3.1 Security Requirements Dependency Rationale
Dependencies within the EAL2 package selected for the security assurance requirements have been
considered by the authors of CC Part 3 and are not analyzed here again.
The security functional requirements in this Security Target do not introduce dependencies on any
security assurance requirement; neither do the security assurance requirements in this Security
Target introduce dependencies on any security functional requirement.
The following table demonstrates the dependencies of SFRs modeled in CC Part 2 and how the SFRs
for the TOE resolve those dependencies:
Security
Functional
Requirement
Dependencies Resolution
FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 FPT_STM.1
FAU_GEN.2
FAU_GEN.1
FIA_UID.1
FAU_GEN.1
FIA_UID.1
FAU_SAR.1 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1
FAU_SAR.3 FAU_SAR.1 FAU_SAR.1
FAU_STG.1 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1
FAU_STG.3 FAU_STG.1 FAU_STG.1
FCS_COP.1/AES Cryptographic
operation
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/AES Cryptographic
key generation
FCS_CKM.4/AES Cryptographic
key destruction
FCS_COP.1/RSA Cryptographic
operation
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/RSA Cryptographic
key generation
FCS_CKM.4/RSA Cryptographic
key destruction
FCS_COP.1/MD5
Cryptographic operation
No Dependencies
MD5 uses no key, so the key
generation is unnecessary
here.
FCS_COP.1/HMAC-SHA256
Cryptographic operation
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/HMAC_SHA256
Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.4/HMAC_SHA256
Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1/DHKeyExchange
Cryptographic operation
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/DHKey
Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.4/DHKey
Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1/AES
Cryptographic key generation
[FCS_CKM.2, or
FCS_COP.1]
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/AES Cryptographic
operation
FCS_CKM.4/AES Cryptographic
key destruction
FCS_CKM.1/RSA
Cryptographic key generation
[FCS_CKM.2, or
FCS_COP.1]
FCS_CKM.4FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/RSA Cryptographic
operation
FCS_CKM.4/RSA Cryptographic
key destruction
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FCS_CKM.1/DHKey
Cryptographic key generation
[FCS_CKM.2, or
FCS_COP.1]
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/DHKeyExchange
Cryptographic operation
FCS_CKM.4/DHKey
Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1/HMAC_SHA256
Cryptographic key generation
[FCS_CKM.2, or
FCS_COP.1]
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/HMAC_SHA256
Cryptographic operation
FCS_CKM.4/HMAC_SHA256
Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.4/RSA
Cryptographic key
destruction
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.1/RSA Cryptographic
key generation
FCS_CKM.4/AES
Cryptographic key
destruction
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.1/AES Cryptographic
key generation
FCS_CKM.4/DHKey
Cryptographic key
destruction
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.1/DHKey
Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.4/HMAC_SHA256
Cryptographic key
destruction
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.1/HMAC_SHA256
Cryptographic key generation
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_DAU.1 No Dependencies None
FDP_IFC.1(1) FDP_IFF.1(1) FDP_IFF.1(1)
FDP_IFC.1(2) FDP_IFF.1(2) FDP_IFF.1(2)
FDP_IFF.1(1)
FDP_IFC.1(1)
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_IFC.1(1)
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_IFF.1(2)
FDP_IFC.1(2)
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_IFC.1(2)
FMT_MSA.3
FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1
FIA_ATD.1 No Dependencies None
FIA_SOS.1 No Dependencies
FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.5 No Dependencies None
FIA_UID.1 No Dependencies None
FMT_MOF.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.1
[FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1(1)
FDP_IFC.1(2)]
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_IFC.1(1)
FDP_IFC.1(2)
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
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FMT_MSA.3
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1 No Dependencies None
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1
FPT_STM.1 No Dependencies None
FTA_SSL.3 No Dependencies None
FTA_TSE.1 No Dependencies None
FTP_TRP.1 No Dependencies None
FTP_ITC.1 No Dependencies None
Table 9 : Dependencies between TOE Security Functional Requirements
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6.3.2 Sufficiency and coverage
Objective SFRs Rationale
O.DeviceAvail
O.UserAvail
FDP_IFC.1(1)
FDP_IFF.1(1)
These SFRs apply CPCAR and Blacklist features to
process packets sent to the CPU, ensuring device security
and uninterrupted services when attacks occur.
FDP_IFC.1(2)
FDP_IFF.1(2)
These SFRs also apply ACL to limit both packets
going to the Control/Management Plane and through
the TOE further ensuring availability of TOE and
network resources.
O.Communication
FTP_TRP.1
This SFR provides the secure communication between
users and management interface of the TOE
FTP_ITC.1
This SFR provides the secure communication between
TOE and SNMP Trap Server
FDP_DAU.1
FIA_SOS.1
These SFRs provide the secure communication between
TOE and LMT/RMT and ensure that the secrets for this are
long enough.
FCS_COP.1/*
FCS_CKM.1/*
FCS_CKM.4/*
These SFRS provide the cryptographic services for the
secure communication above.
O.DataFilter
FDP_DAU.1
FIA_SOS.1
These SFRs ensures only traffics from authenticated
switches/routers can send to the TOE, and ensure that the
secrets for this are long enough.
FDP_IFC.1(2)
FDP_IFF.1(2)
These SFRs apply ACL to limit both packets going to the
Control/Management Plane and through the TOE and
thereby ensure that only protected traffic goes through.
O.Authentication FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU.5
These SFRs ensure that a user must identify and
authenticate himself, either by local password or through
RADIUS/TACACS servers.
FTA_TSE.1
FIA_AFL.1
FTA_SSL.3
FIA_SOS.1
The SFRs support authentication by:
 Refusing logins from certain IP addresses
 Not allowing unlimited login attempts
 Logging out users after an inactivity period
 Ensuring password quality
O.Authorisation FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACF.1
These SFRs ensure that only properly authorized admins
can access certain functions
FMT_SMR.1
FIA_ATD.1
These SFRs defines authorization levels and ensure that
upon login an administrator gets the proper authorization
level.
FMT_MOF.1
FMT_SMF.1
These SFR lists certain management functions and restricts
them to the proper authorization level.
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FMT_MSA.1
FMT_MSA.3
These SFRs ensure that new admins only get limited access
rights and specifies who can modify these access rights.
O.Audit FAU_GEN.1,
FAU_GEN.2
FPT_STM.1
These SFRs ensure that audit records can be generated of
significant events and that these contain useful information,
including the correct time of the events.
FAU_SAR.1,
FAU_SAR.3
These SFRs ensure that the correct users can read the
correct information from the audit records.
FAU_STG.1,
FAU_STG.3
These SFRs ensure the audit data is protected against
unauthorized modification and deletion, and what happens
when audit storage fills up.
Table 10 Objectives to SFR mapping rationale
6.4 Security Assurance Requirements
The security assurance requirements for the TOE are the Evaluation Assurance Level 2+ components
augmented with ALC_FLR.2, as specified in [CC] Part 3. No operations are applied to the assurance
components.
6.5 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
The evaluation assurance level 2+ augmented with ALC_FLR.2, has been chosen commensurate with
the threat environment that is experienced by typical consumers of the TOE.
7 TOE Summary Specification
7.1 TOE Security Functional Specification
This chapter identifies and describes how the Security Functional Requirements identified
above are met by the TOE.
7.1.1 Authentication
The TOE can identify administrators by a unique ID and enforces their authentication
before granting them access to any TSF management interfaces. Detailed functions
include:
1) Support authentication via local password. This function is achieved by comparing
user information input with pre-defined user information stored in memory.
2) Support authentication via remote RADIUS/TACACS+ authentication server. This
function is achieved by performing pass/fail action based on result from remote
authentication server.
3) Support authenticate user login using SSH, by password authentication, RSA
authentication, or combination. This function is achieved by performing
authentication for SSH user based on method mentioned in 1).
4) Support logout when no operation is performed on the user session within a given
interval. This function is achieved by performing count-down through timing related
to clock function.
5) Support max attempts due to authentication failure within certain period of
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time(default 5 minutes - configurable). This function is achieved by providing
counts on authentication failure.
6) Support limiting access by IP address. This function is achieved by comparing IP
address of requesting session with configured value stored in memory.
7) Support for user individual attributes in order to achieve all the enumerated features:
user ID, user level, and password.
(FCS_COP.1/RSA, FDP_DAU.1, FIA_AFL.1, FIA_ATD.1, FIA_SOS.1, FIA_UAU.1,
FIA_UAU.5, FIA_UID.1, FTA_SSL.3, FTA_TSE.1, FTP_TRP.1),
7.1.2 Access Control
The TOE enforces an access control by supporting following functionalities:
1) Support 4 user access levels. This function is achieved by storing number as level
in memory.
2) Support 16 command levels. This function is achieved by storing number as level in
memory.
3) Support assigning access level to commands. This function is achieved by
associating access level number with commands registered.
4) Support assigning access level to user ID. This function is achieved by associating
access level number with user ID.
5) Support limiting executing commands of which the access level is less or equal to
the level of user. This function is achieved by performing an evaluation that level of
commands is less or equal to level of user. This limitation of access also prevents
users from accessing or deleting log files if they have insufficient rights.
(FDP_ACC.1, FIA_ATD.1, FDP_ACF.1, FMT_MOF.1, FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MSA.3,
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1)
7.1.3 Traffic Forwarding
The TOE forwards network traffic, enforcing decisions about the correct forwarding
interface and assembling the outgoing network packets using correct MAC addresses:
1) Support ARP/BGP/OSPF/IS-IS /LDP protocol. This function is achieved by
providing implementation of ARP/BGP/OSPF/IS-IS /LDP protocol.
2) Support routing information generation via OSPF protocol. This function is provided
by implementation of OSPF protocol.
3) Support routing information generation via BGP protocol. This function is provided
by implementation of BGP protocol.
4) Support routing information generation via IS-IS protocol. This function is provided
by implementation of IS-IS protocol.
5) Support routing information generation via manual configuration. This function is
achieved by storing static routes in memory.
6) Support LSP information generation via LDP configuration. This function is provided
by implementation of LDP protocol.
7) Support importing BGP/static routing information for OSPF. This function is
provided by implementation of OSPF protocol.
8) Support importing OSPF/static routing information for BGP. This function is
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provided by implementation of BGP protocol.
9) Support importing OSPF/static routing information for IS-IS. This function is
provided by implementation of IS-IS protocol.
10) BGP support cryptographic algorithm MD5. This function is achieved by performing
verification for incoming BGP packets using MD5 algorithm.
11) OSPF support cryptographic algorithm MD5. This function is achieved by
performing verification for incoming OSPF packets using MD5 algorithm.
12) IS-IS support cryptographic algorithm MD5. This function is achieved by
performing verification for incoming IS-IS packets using MD5 algorithm.
13) LDP support cryptographic algorithm MD5. This function is achieved by performing
verification for incoming LDP packets using MD5 algorithm.
14) Support disconnection session with neighbor network devices. This function is
achieved by locating and cleaning session information.
15) OSPF support routing information aggregation. This function is achieved by
manipulating routes stored in memory.
16) OSPF support routing information filtering. This function is achieved by
manipulating routes stored in memory.
17) IS-IS support routing information filtering. This function is achieved by manipulating
routes stored in memory.
18) Support ARP strict learning. This function is achieved by regulating ARP feature to
accept entry generated by own ARP requests.
19) Support IPv4 traffic forwarding via physical interface. This function is achieved by
making routing decision based on routes generated by BGP/OSPF/IS-IS/static
configuration.
20) Support LSP traffic forwarding via physical interface. This function is achieved by
making label decision based on routes generated by LDP configuration.
21) Support sending network traffic to VRP for centralized processing where
destination IP address is one of the interfaces’ IP addresses of the TOE. This is
achieved by checking whether the traffic’s destination IP address is within the
configured interfaces’ IP addresses in the Interface boards in the TOE. If it is, the
traffic will be sent to VRP in MPU for centralized processing.
22) Supporting Traffic Statistics. This function is achieved by matching traffic by ACL
and collecting statistics on the number of packets and bytes of matched traffic.
(FDP_IFC.1(2), FDP_IFF.1(2), FIA_SOS.1, FDP_DAU.1)
7.1.4 Auditing
The TOE can provide auditing ability by receiving all types of logs and processing them
according to user’s configuration:
1) Support classification based on severity level. This function is achieved where
logging messages are encoded with severity level and output to log buffer.
2) Support enabling, disabling log output. This function is achieved by interpreting
enable/disable commands and storing results in memory. Log output is performed
based on this result.
3) Support redirecting logs to various output channels: monitor, log buffer, trap buffer,
log file. This function is achieved by interpreting commands and storing results in
memory or in log files in storage device. Log channel for output is selected prior to
execution of redirecting.
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4) Support log output screening, based on filename. This function is performed by
providing filtering on output.
5) Support querying log buffer. This function is achieved by performing querying
operation with conditions input.
6) Support cleaning log buffer. This function is achieved by cleaning log buffer in
memory.
7) Support to automatically remove the oldest log file if the space of the storage device
storing the log files is full.
8) Only the authorized administrators can monitor the logfile record,and operate the
log files.The unauthorized users have no access to do those actions. And the
actions of the authorized administrators will be logged.
(FAU_GEN.1, FAU_GEN.2, FPT_STM.1, FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.3, FAU_STG.1,
FAU_STG.3)
7.1.5 Communication Security
The TOE provides communication security by implementing SSH protocol. SSHv2
(SSH2.0) is implemented. SSH2 is used for all cases by providing more secure and
effectiveness in terms of functionality and performance.
1) Devices that can function as the S-Telnet client and server support SSHv2. Secure
Telnet (S-Telnet) enables users to remotely and securely log in to the device, and
provides the interactive configuration interface. The S-Telnet is implemented by
SSH.
2) Support diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 as key
exchange algorithm of SSH. This function is achieved by providing implementation
of diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 algorithm.
3) Support AES encryption algorithm. This function is achieved by providing
implementation of AES algorithm.
4) Support MD5 verification algorithm. This function is achieved by providing
implementation of MD5 algorithm.
5) Support HMAC-SHA256 verification algorithm. This function is achieved by
providing implementation of HMAC-SHA256 algorithm.
6) Support using different encryption algorithm for client-to-server encryption and
server-to-client encryption. This function is achieved by interpreting related
commands and storing the result in memory.
7) Support Secure-FTP. This function is achieved by providing implementation of
Secure-FTP. SFTP is short for SSH FTP that is a secure FTP protocol
8) Support for RSA key construction and destruction by overwriting it with 0.
(FCS_COP.1/*, FCS_CKM.1/*, FCS_CKM.4/*, FMT_SMF.1, FDP_DAU.1)
8) Support for AES/HMAC_SHA256/DHKey construction and destruction by Releasing
Memory.
(FCS_COP.1/*, FCS_CKM.1/*, FCS_CKM.4/*)
7.1.6 ACL
TOE use ACL to deny unwanted network traffic to pass through itself.
IP-based ACL is provided for this situation to identify traffic flow by matching all or
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part of IP source address, IP destination address, IP protocol number, TCP/UDP
source port number, TCP/UDP destination, and port number, then to proceed with
certain actions like rate limit, prioritization or discard.
(FDP_IFC.1(2), FDP_IFF.1(2))
7.1.7 Security Management
The TOE offers management functionality for its security functions, where appropriate.
This is partially already addressed in more detail in the previous sections of the TSS,
but includes:
• User management, including user name, passwords.
• Access control management, including the association of users and
corresponding privileged functionalities.
• Enabling/disabling of SSH for the communication between management
workstation and the TOE.
• Defining IP addresses and address ranges for clients that are allowed to
connect to the TOE.
All of these management options are typically available via the management
workstation.
Detailed function specification include following:
1) Support remotely managing the TOE using SSH.
2) Support enabling, disabling S-FTP;
3) Support configuration on service port for SSH;
4) Support configuration on RSA key for SSH;
5) Support configuration on authentication type, encryption algorithm for SSH;
6) Support authenticate user logged in using SSH, by password authentication, RSA
authentication;
7) Support configuration on logout when no operation is performed on the user session
within a given interval;
8) Support configuration on max attempts due to authentication failure within certain
period of time(default 5 minutes - configurable);
9) Support configuration on limiting access by IP address;
10) Support configuration on commands’ access level;
11) Support management on OSPF by enabling, disabling OSPF;
12) Support configuration on area, IP address range, authentication type of OSPF;
13) Support management on BGP by enabling, disabling BGP;
14) Support configuration on peer address, authentication type of BGP;
15) Support management on ISIS by enabling, disabling ISIS;
16) Support configuration on peer address, authentication type of ISIS;
17) Support management on LDP by enabling, disabling LDP;
18) Support configuration on peer address, authentication type of LDP;
19) Support management on ARP by specifying static ARP entry, aging time and
frequency of dynamical ARP entry. This function is achieved by interpreting
commands input and storing value in memory.
20) Support management on log by enabling, disabling log output;
21) Support configuration on log output channel, output host;
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22) Support configuration ACLs based on IP protocol number, source and/or
destination IP address, source and/or destination port number if TCP/UDP;
23) Support enabling, disabling SNMP Agent and Trap message sending function;
24) Support enabling, disabling the switch to Send an Alarm Message of a Specified
Feature to the NM Station ;
25) Support setting the Source Interface, Queue Length and Lifetime of Trap message;
Above functions are achieved by providing interpreting input commands and storing
result of interpreting in memory. Some results like routes generated, ACLs will be
downloaded into hardware to assist forwarding and other TSF functions.
(FMT_SMF.1)
7.1.8 Denial-of-Service Protection
The TOE uses three specific mechanisms to prevent Denial of Service against itself or
the network it protects:
•CPCAR (Control Plane Committed Access Rate) limits the rate of protocol
packets sent to the control plane and schedules the packets to protect the
control plane. The switch identifies service packets based on ACLs and applies
the default CAR value to protocol packets so that a limited number of protocol
packets are sent to the control plane. Security of the control plane is ensured.
CPCAR can be used to set the rate at which classes of packets are sent to the
CPU, or the total rate of packets sent to the CPU. When the rate exceeds the
upper limit, the system discards excess packets to prevent CPU overload
•TCP/IP Attack Defense Defense against TCP/IP attacks protects the CPU
of the router against malformed packets, fragmented packets, TCP SYN
packets, and UDP packets, ensuring that normal services can be processed.
•Application Layer Association There are various application protocols on
the router, but not all of them are used in actual networking. To save CPU
resources and defend against attacks, unnecessary application protocol
packets are not sent to the CPU for processing.
To save the resources of the router, you can apply application layer association.
In this case, if a protocol is enabled, the protocol packets are sent; if a protocol
is disabled, the protocol packets are discarded.
When application layer association is enabled, if the upper layer protocol is
enabled, packets are sent to the CPU based on the configured bandwidth; if
the upper layer protocol is disabled, packets are sent to the CPU at the lowest
rate or are discarded. When application layer association is disabled, packets
are sent to the CPU based on the configured bandwidth, regardless of whether
the upper layer protocol is enabled.
(FDP_IFC.1(1), FDP_IFF.1(1))
7.1.9 Cryptographic functions
Cryptographic functions are required by security features as dependencies. The
following cryptographic algorithms are supported:
1) Support AES /RSA algorithms. This is achieved by providing implementations of
AES /RSA algorithms.
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2) Support MD5/HMAC-SHA256 algorithms. This is achieved by providing
implementations of MD5/HMAC-SHA256 algorithms.
3) Support for RSA key construction and destruction overwriting it with 0
(FCS_COP.1/*, FCS_CKM.1/*, FCS_CKM.4/*)
4) Support for AES/HMAC_SHA256/DHKey construction and destruction by
Releasing Memory
5) Support diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 as key
exchange algorithm of SSH
7.1.10 Time
The TOE supports its own clock, to support logging and timed log-outs.
(FPT_STM.1, FTA_SSL.3)
7.1.11 SNMP Trap
The TOE uses SNMP traps to notify a fault occurs or the system does not operate
properly.
1) Support management on trap by enabling, disabling trap output;
2) Support configuration on trap output interface, output host;
3) Support configuration on trap based on fault categories, fault functionality, or
modules where the faults occur.
4) Support SNMPv3 which provides:
a) Encrypted communication using AES algorithm.
b) Packet authentication using SHA algorithms
(FTP_ITC.1, FDP_DAU.1)
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8 Abbreviations, Terminology and References
8.1 Abbreviations
CC Common Criteria
CLI Command Line Interface
IS-IS Intermediate System to
Intermediate System
LMT Local Maintenance Terminal
LPU Line Process Unit
NE NetEngine
NMS Network Management System
NSP Network Service Processor
OFC Optical Flexible Card
PIC Physical Interface Card
PP Protection Profile
RMT Remote Maintenance Terminal
SFE Switch Fabric Extend unit
SFR Security Functional
Requirement
SFU Switch Fabric Unit
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm 5
AES
RSA
Advanced Encryption Standard
Rivest Shamir Adleman
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8.2 Terminology
This section contains definitions of technical terms that are used with a meaning
specific to this document. Terms defined in the [CC] are not reiterated here, unless
stated otherwise.
Administrator: An administrator is a user of the TOE who may have been
assigned specific administrative privileges within the TOE. This
ST may use the term administrator occasionally in an informal
context, and not in order to refer to a specific role definition –
from the TOE’s point of view, an administrator is simply a user
who is authorized to perform certain administrative actions on
the TOE and the objects managed by the TOE.
Operator See User.
User: A user is a human or a product/application using the TOE.
8.3 References
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1-3, .
Version 3.1 Revision 5, September 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Evaluation methodology, Version 3.1 Revision 5, September 2017