BSI-DSZ-CC-0942-2015
for
Sophos UTM V9 Packet Filter Version 1.000
from
Sophos Technology GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.1
BSI-DSZ-CC-0942-2015 (*)
Packet Filter
Sophos UTM V9 Packet Filter Version 1.000
from Sophos Technology GmbH
PP Conformance: None
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.2
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and
CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence
adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
Bonn, 21 April 2015
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Thomas Gast L.S.
Head of Division
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0942-2015
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0942-2015 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0942-2015
Contents
A. Certification........................................................................................................................7
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2. Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................9
4. Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5. Publication....................................................................................................................10
B. Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1. Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2. Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3. Security Policy..............................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................14
5. Architectural Information...............................................................................................15
6. Documentation.............................................................................................................15
7. IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................15
8. Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................18
9. Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................18
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................19
11. Security Target............................................................................................................20
12. Definitions...................................................................................................................20
13. Bibliography................................................................................................................22
C. Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................23
CC Part 1:........................................................................................................................23
CC Part 3:........................................................................................................................24
D. Annexes...........................................................................................................................31
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0942-2015 Certification Report
A. Certification
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security2
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Technical information on the IT security certification, Procedural
Description (BSI 7138) [3]
● BSI certification: Requirements regarding the Evaluation Facility (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045.
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1. European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0942-2015
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For
"Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices
with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too. This Domain is linked to
a conformance claim to one of the related SOGIS Recommended Protection Profiles. In
addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom. Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found
at https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
2.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the
assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and certificates for Protection Profiles and
for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates
based on CCRA-2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition
according to the rules of CCRA-2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification
procedures and for Assurance Continuity (maintenance and re-certification) of old
certificates a transition period on the recognition of certificates according to the rules of
CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL 4 or the assurance
family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA are government representatives
from the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, The Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey,
United Kingdom, and the United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
As the product certified has been accepted into the certification process before 08
September 2014, this certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2000, i.e.
for all assurance components selected.
As this certificate is a re-certification of a certificate issued according to CCRA-2000 this
certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2000, i.e. for all assurance
components selected.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0942-2015 Certification Report
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Sophos UTM V9 Packet Filter Version 1.000, has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0696-2011. Specific
results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0696-2011 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Sophos UTM V9 Packet Filter Version 1.000, was conducted
by SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 31
March 2015. SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Sophos Technology GmbH.
The product was developed by: Sophos Technology GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods require
a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited as outlined on the certificate. The
certificate issued on 21 April 2015 is valid until 20 April 2020. The validity date can be
extended by re-assessment or re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report and the
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0942-2015
Security Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any
applicant of the product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the product's evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and
production sites or processes, occur or the confidentiality of documentation and
information related to the product or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the product or resulting from
the evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the product
deliverables according to the Certification Report part B chapter 2 to third parties,
permission of the Certification Body at BSI has to be obtained.
4. to provide latest at of half of the certificate's validity period unsolicitedly and at his
own expense current qualified evidence to the Certification Body at BSI that
demonstrates that the requirements as outlined in the Security Target are up-to-date
and remain valid in view of the respective status of technology. In general, this
evidence is provided in the form of a re-assessment report according to the rules of
the BSI Certification Scheme.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5. Publication
The product Sophos UTM V9 Packet Filter Version 1.000 has been included in the BSI list
of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Sophos Technology GmbH
Amalienstraße 41 / Bau 52
76227 Karlsruhe
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0942-2015 Certification Report
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0942-2015
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the product Sophos UTM V9 Packet Filter Version 1.000
provided by Sophos Technology GmbH which allows the integration of packet filtering
capability into a firewall or VPN components which are parts of the Sophos UTM (Unified
Threat Management) product family. The packet filter has to be delivered to an application
developer.
The application developer integrates the Sophos UTM V9 Packet Filter Version 1.000 into
an application in order to build a network component. The administrator of this application
is defined as TOE end-user.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified
Protection Profile.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ALC_FLR.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 5.1. They are all selected from Common Criteria Part 2. Thus
the TOE is CC Part 2 conformant.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionalities:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
Information Flow Protection The TSF implements the information flow control (as routers) on the
network layer (IP/ICMP) and transport layer (TCP/UDP). In order to
define packet filter rules, the TSF provides packet filter criteria and packet
filter actions.
Security Audit The TOE collects audit data and sends it to a memory buffer in order to
identify attempts to violate a policy. This allows the authorized
administrator to inspect the received audit data from the packet filter.
Management The TSF is capable of performing the following management functions:
• Modification of network traffic filter rules
• Modification of configuration data
The TOE verifies the identification information of an administrator
provided by the environment (application) before any management
function can be performed. The TOE is initialized with a strict packet filter
rule set, that is, everything is dropped.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapters 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0942-2015 Certification Report
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Sophos UTM V9 Packet Filter Version 1.000
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
Delivery item Description / Additional
Information
Type Delivery method
1 Sophos UTM V9
Packet Filter
UTMPF_1.000 SW See binary parts below
2 Applikationsentw
icklerhandbuch.p
df
Manual for
application
developers [9]
DOC b0916b540fe3f22e1b94da53
8f136af3dd17f5dcfcfb5f6984
1245038625de0e
3 ReleaseNotes.txt Release Notes DOC 61a323042ccc93fef45b103f
a04408d5eebea2e330726f6
e0f38ae5cc766ad9a
4 sophos-pf-sign.a
sc
Public verification
key
SW 6ae98004448a17d2d53400b
48380baf1b6106293357157
ae835d09e61ff7b922
5 sha256sums.asc Signed checksum file SW N/A
6 flr utm pf
v0.90.pdf
Flaw remediation
[10]
DOC 335f14bbd2ed190098f30c09
1ae672ee68e31bab28f4ea0
9c7d22d9b5233a85b
Binary parts of the TOE
7 ip_tables.ko Module configuration
IPv4
SW 115c8955d9cea3aadcc6c3b
6b059a13697d3033100470a
6c3d8f6cd4f90fa2f9
8 ip6_tables.ko Module configuration
IPv6
SW 4827ae17ba96d6a2a510b6f
cfbc2decd5d3a7e2304f5d9d
c5358ad85e8079f4f
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0942-2015
Delivery item Description / Additional
Information
Type Delivery method
9 xt_LOG.ko Module log SW e246f75dadd0255421e5a50
453c32012ceb0f5b00f9239b
c6ff5e51e8b7f6434
10 iptable_filter.ko Module filter IPv4 SW 3748898767d476066ab6be2
c1903bb09ca83c33c7919a6
4ea60324f336c8e54a
11 ip6table_filter.ko Module filter IPv6 SW 186c9ed842ae5ed338fa885
8a0461afcddc9e2728e58d4
da40a3b702a3b38b66
12 ipv6.ko Module IPv6 Kernel
Stack
SW fc7a624be2c1a317e2d83b0
21e7e05feadac168c785a42
a5cabe2857cb9ba6c1
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The software consists of eight binary files which can be uniquely identified by their hash
checksums. Table 2 lists, where applicable, the SHA-256 checksums of all TOE
components.
The TOE is personally delivered on a CD to the application developer. The project
manager describes the integrity and authentication checks to the application developer.
The application developer and the end-user can verify that the authenticity and integrity of
the TOE has not been altered. First the signed checksum file must be verified. Therefore
the user uses the public verification RSA key with the SHA-256 fingerprint described
above. After a successful verification of the checksum file the hash values of the binary
parts of the TOE stated in this file can be compared to the calculated ones. This
calculation can be done with any available SHA-256 program.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
Information Flow Protection: The TOE enforces the Packet Filter information flow policy.
Security Audit: The TOE collects audit data into a memory buffer to facilitate identification
of policy violations.
Management: The TSF is capable of performing the management functions modification of
network traffic filter rules and modification of configuration data.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. Details can be found in
the Security Target [6], chapter 3.4.
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5. Architectural Information
The TOE is a packet filter. The Sophos UTM V9 Packet Filter Version 1.000 consists of
software on machines to implement packet filter functionality for the network components;
i.e. the Sophos UTM V9 Packet Filter Version 1.000 is part of the network components.
The packet filter relies on information available at OSI layer 3 and layer 4 for policy
enforcement. The functionality for packet filtering is part of the operating system (Linux).
The Sophos UTM V9 Packet Filter Version 1.000 supports IPv4 and IPv6 protocol. This
chapter gives an overview of the subsystems of the TOE and the corresponding TSF
which were objects of this evaluation.
The security functions of the TOE are:
● SF.1 Information Flow Control
● SF.2 Security Audit
● SF.3 Management
These security functions are enforced by the following subsystems:
● IPv4 Kernel Stack (supports the TSF SF.1)
● IPv6 Kernel Stack (supports the TSF SF.1)
● Netfilter (supports the TSFs SF.1, SF.2 and SF.3)
● /proc file system (supports the TSF SF.3)
● User-Space I/O (supports the TSF SF.3)
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
7.1. Developer Testing
The developer tested all TOE Security Functions. For all commands and functionality tests,
test cases were specified in order to demonstrate its expected behaviour including error
cases. Hereby a representative sample including all boundary values of the parameter set
were tested and all functions were tested with valid and invalid input parameters.
Repetition of developer tests were performed during the independent evaluator tests.
TOE Test Configuration
The TOE was tested on a stand-alone test computer with three virtual workstations. The
TOE was running in a virtual machine which was configured according to chapter 1.2.2 of
[6].
The test environment also needed to fulfil the security objectives for the environment.
These security objectives are fulfilled by the services which were installed on the virtual
machine that match the needed components described in the application developer
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0942-2015
guidance [9]. The TOE environment and the related test equipment for the tests were
consistent with the described ones in [6].
Testing Approach
Each TOE security functional interface was covered by at least one test case. Additionally,
test cases exist for all subsystems and SFR-enforcing modules identified in the TOE
design documentation.
The virtual workstations provided two standard workstations and one with the TOE
installed. The entire developer test configuration and the test protocols were provided to
the evaluator.
Each test was conducted by the evaluators to test the full coverage of the test procedure
of the developer.
The test cases were dedicated to the demonstration of the proper implementation of all
security functions, commands and filter functionalities. Test cases were specified for all
commands and functionality in order to demonstrate the expected behaviour including
error cases. Hereby all possible parameters were tested. Furthermore, the vulnerability
tests consisted of additional tests for specified combinations and attack scenarios.
Conclusion
All test cases were executed successfully and ended up with the expected result. If
necessary the developer gave additional annotations, clarifying the test results.
7.2. Evaluator Independent Testing
TOE Test Configuration
The TOE can have only one configuration. The TOE separates two networks from another
(see chapter 1.2.1 of [6]). For testing the TOE the evaluators used three virtual
workstations. Two of these virtual machines simulate the different networks and on the
third machine the TOE is installed. The virtual host is able to start tests and is used as a
management workstation.
The following configuration
● Intel i686 compatible CPU
● Two or more Ethernet network interfaces
● 2048 MB RAM
● 20GB hard disk drive
is the configuration of the virtual machine and is consistent with the one described in [6].
Testing Approach
The independent test subset consists of six individual tests that cover the main
functionality of the TOE (the correct handling of incoming packets) and additionally the
logging functionality as well as the correct handling of access rights of the filter rules and
configuration files that were tested during the repetition of the developer tests.
The evaluators have conducted all tests of the developer using the test suites and
equipment provided by the developer. The evaluators have executed the developer tests
and therefore tested all interfaces.
Conclusion
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0942-2015 Certification Report
All tests were executed successfully., i.e. the test results fulfil the requirements of
assurance family ATE_IND.2.
7.3. Evaluator Penetration Testing
TOE Test Configuration
All configurations of the TOE to be covered by the current evaluation were tested. The
description of the required non-TOE hardware, software and firmware is described in
section 1.2.2 of [6]. The hardware configuration used for testing:
● CPU: Intel(R) Core(TM) i5 CPU, M 540, 2.53GHz
● Memory: 4 GB
● Harddisk: Disk /dev/sda: 250.1 GB
● Operating System (Host System): Ubuntu 10.04.1 LTS
● Additional Packages screen: qemu, kqemu, bridgemodules and bridge-utils
This hardware configuration has been used to virtualize the complete testing network
including the TOE. Two virtual Debian GNU/Linux systems, 'Source' (src) and 'Destination'
(dst) were installed and operated in the testing network, each with three virtual interfaces.
The TOE was mounted on a third virtual machine as the one used in the independent
evaluator functional tests. The TOE has been set up between the virtual systems src, dst
and host. The systems are connected using the bridge mode for the network of virtual
machines.
Testing Approach
For the penetration tests the differential Firewall analysis method was used. In this method
someone needs to be able to compare the traffic on the “outside” to the traffic on the
“inside” in real-time and alert when this contradicts. Therefore two monitoring points must
be placed logically in front and behind the packet filter. At the two monitoring points a
sniffer is placed at which the network traffic is analysed. These monitoring points are the
bridges “net-in” and “net-out” of the test network.
The sensor is placed on the “inside” to alert if traffic is detected and violating the firewall
rules. In the operational environment of the TOE it is also possible that malicious or
unintended traffic is coming from the inside of the network passing the TOE. It was tested
that the packet filter responds to both network interfaces in the same way. Therefore the
extensive testing of one interface was sufficient to prove if the TOE is resistant to an
attacker with attack potential enhanced-basic.
Attack Scenarios being tested
After the setup of the test environment the different attack scenarios were defined. These
attack scenarios were mapped to test cases and executed in the test environment.
The following list gives a short overview about the attack scenarios which have been
tested:
● Port scan with or without different source ports to detect open ports.
● Bypassing the packet filter with fuzzy generated TCP, UDP or ICMP packets.
● Using the publicly available change log to find vulnerabilities.
● Bypassing the packet filter with packets with an incorrect IPv4 or IPv6 header.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0942-2015
● Bypassing the packet filter with a flood attack with “syn” or fragmented packets.
● Bypassing the packet filter with packets with a spoofed source address.
● Manipulation of the log output by sending incorrect payload in packets.
● Manipulation of Neighbour Discovery Protocol (NDP) for IPv6 to cause a denial of
service
● Bypassing the access rule checks.
SFRs penetration tested
Only direct attacks against the implementation of SFRs needed to be considered. The
tested SFRs are listed in the following:
● FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
● FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
● FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
The remaining SFRs were analysed, but not tested through penetration due to
non-exploitability of the related attack scenarios in the TOEs operational environment.
Conclusion
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results; moreover, no attack scenario with the attack potential enhanced basic
was actually successful. Therefore the test results fulfil the requirements of AVA_VAN.3.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE: The TOE test
configuration is defined by “Sophos UTM V9 Packet Filter Version 1.000” with the hash
values as given in table 3 in chapter 2.
The TOE evaluated configuration is defined by the notation:
● Sophos UTM V9 Packet Filter Version 1.000
The following documents are part of the TOE:
● Applikationsentwicklerhandbuch [9],
● Flaw remediation [10]
● Release Notes
To identify the TOE the document "Applikationsentwicklerhandbuch" [9] is providing
relevant information in chapter 3.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
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As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_FLR.2 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a
re-evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0696-2011, re-use of specific
evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on changed in the
design.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: None
● for the Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.2
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The TOE does not include cryptographic mechanisms. Thus, no such mechanisms were
part of the assessment.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a
re-certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:
● The user must not load any new modules into the kernel. In case a new module is
loaded the TOE is no longer certified.
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11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol
IP Internet Protocol
IPv4 Internet Protocol Version 4
IPv6 Internet Protocol Version 6
IT Information Technology
ITSEC Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
NDP Neighbour Discovery Protocol
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer
OSI Open Systems Interconnection
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SSH Secure Shell
ST Security Target
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionalities
UDP User Datagram Protocol
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VPN Virtual Private Network
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on
well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 4, September 2012
[3] BSI certification: Technical information on the IT security certification of products,
protection profiles and sites (BSI 7138) and Requirements regarding the Evaluation
Facility for the Evaluation of Products, Protection Profiles and Sites under the CC
and ITSEC (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0942-2015, Sophos UTM V9 Packet Filter Version
1.000, Version 1.00, 25.03.2015, Sophos Technology GmbH
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.2, 30.03.2015, Evaluation Technical Report
(ETR) - Sophos UTM V9 Packet Filter Version 1.000, SRC Security Research &
Consulting GmbH (confidential document)
[8] Konfigurationsliste ALC_CMS.4, Sophos, Version 0.91, 22.12.2014 (confidential
document)
[9] Applikationsentwicklerhandbuch, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1, Version 0.92,
30.09.2014
[10] Beheben von Schwachstellen ALC_FLR.2, Version 0.90, 26.09.2014
8
specifically
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
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Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal
high-level design presentation
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
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component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL 1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL 1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL 1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that
the TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions
through security objectives.
EAL 1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL 1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL 2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL 2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL 2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL 3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL 3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
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EAL 3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL 4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL 4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL 4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL 4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL 5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter
8.7)
“Objectives
EAL 5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL 5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL 5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL 5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL 6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL 6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL 6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL 7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL 7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL 7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL 1 EAL 2 EAL 3 EAL 4 EAL 5 EAL 6 EAL 7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
“Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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