TASKalfa 7054ci, TASKalfa 6054ci, TASKalfa 5054ci, TASKalfa 4054ci Series with Hard Disk, FAX System
and Data Security Kit
Security Target
© 2021 KYOCERA Document Solutions Inc.
October 13, 2021
KYOCERA Document Solutions Inc.
TASKalfa 7054ci, TASKalfa 6054ci, TASKalfa
5054ci, TASKalfa 4054ci Series with Hard Disk,
FAX System and Data Security Kit
Security Target
Version 1.00
TASKalfa 7054ci, TASKalfa 6054ci, TASKalfa 5054ci, TASKalfa 4054ci Series with Hard Disk, FAX System
and Data Security Kit
Security Target
© 2021 KYOCERA Document Solutions Inc.
- History of Revisions-
Date Version Detail
2020-05-29 0.30 First release
2020-06-02 0.40 Update chapter 7
2020-10-12 0.50 Modified for corresponding ORs.
2021-02-05 0.60 Update chapter 7
2021-03-03 0.70 Modified for corresponding ORs.
2021-03-31 0.71 Modified for corresponding ORs.
2021-04-01 0.72 Correction of errors
2021-04-09 0.73 Modified for corresponding ORs.
2021-04-14 0.74 Modified for corresponding ORs.
2021-08-24 0.75 Modified for corresponding ORs.
2021-10-04 1.00 Update the version.
TASKalfa 7054ci, TASKalfa 6054ci, TASKalfa 5054ci, TASKalfa 4054ci Series with Hard Disk, FAX System
and Data Security Kit
Security Target
© 2021 KYOCERA Document Solutions Inc.
Table of Contents
1. ST Introduction........................................................................1
1.1. ST Reference........................................................................................................................1
1.2. TOE Reference.....................................................................................................................1
1.3. TOE Overview......................................................................................................................2
1.3.1. TOE Type.....................................................................................................................2
1.3.2. TOE Usage...................................................................................................................2
1.3.3. Required Non-TOE Hardware, Software and Firmware .............................................3
1.3.4. Major Security Features of TOE..................................................................................4
1.4. TOE Description...................................................................................................................4
1.4.1. Physical Configuration of TOE.....................................................................................4
1.4.2. Logical Configuration of TOE ......................................................................................7
1.4.3. Functionality Excluded from the Evaluated Configuration.......................................10
1.4.4. Guidance...................................................................................................................11
2. Conformance Claim...............................................................12
2.1. CC Conformance Claim .....................................................................................................12
2.2. PP Conformance Claims....................................................................................................12
2.3. Package Conformance Claims...........................................................................................12
2.4. Conformance Rationale ....................................................................................................12
3. Security Problem Definitions.................................................14
3.1. TOE user............................................................................................................................14
3.2. Assets ................................................................................................................................14
3.2.1. User Data..................................................................................................................14
3.2.2. TSF Data....................................................................................................................14
3.3. Threats to TOE Assets .......................................................................................................16
3.4. Organizational Security Policies for the TOE.....................................................................17
3.5. Assumptions......................................................................................................................18
4. Security Objectives................................................................19
4.1. Security Objectives for the TOE ........................................................................................19
4.2. Security Objectives for the Operation Environment.........................................................20
TASKalfa 7054ci, TASKalfa 6054ci, TASKalfa 5054ci, TASKalfa 4054ci Series with Hard Disk, FAX System
and Data Security Kit
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4.3. Security Objectives rationale ............................................................................................21
5. Extended Components Definition .........................................24
5.1. FAU_STG_EXT Extended: External Audit Trail Storages ....................................................24
5.2. FCS_CKM_EXT Extended: Cryptographic Key Management.............................................25
5.3. FCS_IPSEC_EXT Extended: IPsec selected.........................................................................26
5.4. FCS_KDF_EXT Extended: Cryptographic Key Derivation...................................................28
5.5. FCS_KYC_EXT Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Key Chaining) ..................................29
5.6. FCS_RBG_EXT Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation) ................30
5.7. FDP_DSK_EXT Extended: Protection of Data on Disk .......................................................31
5.8. FDP_FXS_EXT Extended: Fax Separation...........................................................................32
5.9. FIA_PMG_EXT Extended: Password Management ...........................................................33
5.10. FIA_PSK_EXT Extended: Pre-Shared Key Composition.....................................................34
5.11. FPT_KYP_EXT Extended: Protection of Key and Key Material ..........................................35
5.12. FPT_SKP_EXT Extended: Protection of TSF Data ..............................................................36
5.13. FPT_TST_EXT Extended: TSF testing .................................................................................37
5.14. FPT_TUD_EXT Extended: Trusted Update.........................................................................38
6. Security Requirements ..........................................................40
6.1. TOE Security Functional Requirements. ...........................................................................40
6.1.1. Class FAU: Security Audit..........................................................................................40
6.1.2. Class FCS: Cryptographic Support.............................................................................41
6.1.3. Class FDP: User Data Protection...............................................................................47
6.1.4. Class FIA: Identification and Authentication ............................................................51
6.1.5. Class FMT: Security Management ............................................................................55
6.1.6. Class FPT: TSF Protection..........................................................................................59
6.1.7. Class FTA: TOE Access...............................................................................................61
6.1.8. Class FTP: High Trusted Path/Channel......................................................................61
6.1.9. Class FPT: Protection of the TSF ...............................................................................64
6.1.10. Class FCS: Cryptographic support.............................................................................64
6.1.11. Class FDP: User data protection ...............................................................................65
6.1.12. Class FCS: Cryptographic support.............................................................................66
6.1.13. Class FCS: Cryptographic support.............................................................................67
6.1.14. Class FCS: Cryptographic support.............................................................................70
6.1.15. Class FIA: Identification and authentication.............................................................71
6.1.16. Class FCS: Cryptographic support.............................................................................72
TASKalfa 7054ci, TASKalfa 6054ci, TASKalfa 5054ci, TASKalfa 4054ci Series with Hard Disk, FAX System
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6.1.17. Class FCS: Cryptographic support.............................................................................72
6.2. TOE Security Assurance Requirement...............................................................................74
6.3. Security Requirements Rationale......................................................................................74
6.3.1. Dependency Relationship of the TOE Security Functional Requirements ...............75
6.3.2. Security Assurance Requirements Rationale............................................................77
7. TOE Summary Specification...................................................78
7.1. User Management Function .............................................................................................79
7.2. Data Access Control Function ...........................................................................................81
7.3. Job Authorization Function...............................................................................................83
7.4. HDD Encryption Function..................................................................................................84
7.5. Overwrite-Erase Function .................................................................................................86
7.6. Audit Log Function............................................................................................................86
7.7. Security Management Function........................................................................................88
7.8. Trusted operation..............................................................................................................90
7.9. Network Protection Function ...........................................................................................91
7.10. PSTN Fax-Network Separation ..........................................................................................93
7.11. Deviations From Allowed Cryptographic Standards .........................................................94
8. Acronyms and Terminology ...................................................95
8.1. Definition of terms............................................................................................................95
8.2. Definition of acronyms......................................................................................................97
TASKalfa 7054ci, TASKalfa 6054ci, TASKalfa 5054ci, TASKalfa 4054ci Series with Hard Disk, FAX System
and Data Security Kit
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© 2021 KYOCERA Document Solutions Inc.
List of Figures
Figure 1-1 Common usage in the offices..........................................................................................3
Figure 1-2 Physical Configuration of TOE .........................................................................................5
Figure 1-3 Logical Configuration of TOE...........................................................................................7
TASKalfa 7054ci, TASKalfa 6054ci, TASKalfa 5054ci, TASKalfa 4054ci Series with Hard Disk, FAX System
and Data Security Kit
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© 2021 KYOCERA Document Solutions Inc.
List of Tables
Table 1-1 MFP products and their HDD configurations....................................................................6
Table 1-2 Delivery method for each TOE components.....................................................................6
Table 1-3 Guidance that comprises TOE.........................................................................................11
Table 3-1 TOE User .........................................................................................................................14
Table 3-2 User Data ........................................................................................................................14
Table 3-3 TSF Data ..........................................................................................................................15
Table 3-4 TSF Data to be targeted by the TOE................................................................................15
Table 3-5 Threats............................................................................................................................17
Table 3-6 Organizational Security Policies for the TOE...................................................................17
Table 3-7 Assumptions for the TOE ................................................................................................18
Table 4-1 Security objectives for the operational environment.....................................................19
Table 4-2 Security objectives for the operational environment.....................................................20
Table 4-3 Security objectives rationale ..........................................................................................21
Table 6-1 Auditable data requirements..........................................................................................40
Table 6-2 D.USER.DOC Access Control SFP.....................................................................................48
Table 6-3 D.USER.JOB Access Control SFP......................................................................................49
Table 6-4 Management of security attributes................................................................................56
Table 6-5 Operation of TSF data.....................................................................................................58
Table 6-6 Operation of TSF data.....................................................................................................58
Table 6-7 Cryptographic hashing setvices ......................................................................................72
Table 6-8 TOE Security Assurance Requirements...........................................................................74
Table 6-9 The dependency of the TOE Security Functional Requirements....................................75
Table 7-1 TOE security functions and security functional requirements .......................................78
Table 7-2 Access Control Rules for Data Access Control Functions................................................81
Table 7-3 Access Control Rules for Job Authorization Function.....................................................83
Table 7-4 Encryption Algorithm for Key Derivation........................................................................84
Table 7-5 Auditable Events and Audit Data....................................................................................86
Table 7-6 Trusted channel communications provided by the TOE.................................................88
Table 7-6 Operation of TSF Data by Device Administrators ...........................................................89
Table 7-7 Operaion of TSF Data by Normal Users ..........................................................................89
Table 7-8 Trusted channel communications provided by the TOE.................................................92
Table 7-9 Trusted channel communications provided by the TOE.................................................92
Table 8-1 Definitions of terms used in this ST................................................................................95
Table 8-2 Definitions of acronyms used in this ST..........................................................................97
TASKalfa 7054ci, TASKalfa 6054ci, TASKalfa 5054ci, TASKalfa 4054ci Series with Hard Disk, FAX System
and Data Security Kit
Security Target
© 2021 KYOCERA Document Solutions Inc.
TASKalfa 7054ci, TASKalfa 6054ci, TASKalfa 5054ci, TASKalfa 4054ci Series with Hard Disk, FAX System
and Data Security Kit
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© 2021 KYOCERA Document Solutions Inc.
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1. ST Introduction
1.1. ST Reference
ST Title TASKalfa 7054ci, TASKalfa 6054ci, TASKalfa 5054ci, TASKalfa 4054ci Series
with Hard Disk, FAX System and Data Security Kit
Security Target
ST Version 1.00
Date October 13, 2021
Author KYOCERA Document Solutions Inc.
1.2. TOE Reference
TOE Title : TASKalfa 7054ci, TASKalfa 6054ci, TASKalfa 5054ci, TASKalfa 4054ci,
TASKalfa 7054ciG, TASKalfa 6054ciG, TASKalfa 5054ciG, TASKalfa 4054ciG
(KYOCERA), CS 7054ci, CS 6054ci, CS 5054ci, CS 4054ci(Copystar), 7008ci,
6008ci, 5008ci, 4008ci (TA Triumph-Adler/UTAX), with Hard Disk, FAX
System and Data Security Kit
Remarks :
The models with Hard Disk, FAX System and Data Security Kit are the
products that comprise the models such as TASKalfa 7054ci, TASKalfa
6054ci, TASKalfa 5054ci, TASKalfa 4054ci, TASKalfa 7054ciG, TASKalfa
6054ciG, TASKalfa 5054ciG, TASKalfa 4054ciG, CS 7054ci, CS 6054ci, CS
5054ci, CS 4054ci, 7008ci, 6008ci, 5008ci, 4008ci and the following
additional options:
- Data Security Kit Option (Data Security Kit 10)
- Hard Disk Option (HD-15)
- FAX Option (FAX System 12)
TOE Version： System : 2XC_S000.002.333
FAX : 3R2_5100.003.012
Developer : KYOCERA Document Solutions Inc.
Applicable MFP : KYOCERA TASKalfa 7054ci, KYOCERA TASKalfa 6054ci,
KYOCERA TASKalfa 5054ci, KYOCERA TASKalfa 4054ci,
KYOCERA TASKalfa 7054ciG, KYOCERA TASKalfa 6054ciG,
TASKalfa 7054ci, TASKalfa 6054ci, TASKalfa 5054ci, TASKalfa 4054ci Series with Hard Disk, FAX System
and Data Security Kit
Security Target
© 2021 KYOCERA Document Solutions Inc.
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KYOCERA TASKalfa 5054ciG, KYOCERA TASKalfa 4054ciG
Copystar CS 7054ci, Copystar CS 6054ci,
Copystar CS 5054ci, Copystar CS 4054ci,
TA Triumph-Adler 7008ci, TA Triumph-Adler 6008ci,
TA Triumph-Adler 5008ci, TA Triumph-Adler 4008ci,
UTAX 7008ci, UTAX 6008ci, UTAX 5008ci, UTAX 4008ci
This TOE is identified by a combination of the respective MFP titles as listed in the TOE title and
each version of the two kinds of firmwares, which is installed on the above-described TOE. There
are multiple MFP titles as listed above, however the MFP components are all the same. The
only differences are print speed and sales destinations.
1.3. TOE Overview
1.3.1. TOE Type
The TOE defined in this ST is a Multi-Function Printer (MFP) manufactured by KYOCERA
Document Solutions Inc., namely, “TASKalfa 7054ci, TASKalfa 6054ci, TASKalfa 5054ci, TASKalfa
4054ci, TASKalfa 7054ciG, TASKalfa 6054ciG, TASKalfa 5054ciG, TASKalfa 4054ciG, CS 7054ci, CS
6054ci, CS 5054ci, CS 4054ci, 7008ci, 6008ci, 5008ci, 4008ci”, each of which includes mainly Copy
function, Scan function, Print function, FAX function and Box function. As for the HDD, there
are two HDD configurations depending on the sales area. One is equiped with HDD as standard
and the other does is not equipped with an HDD. In the case the device is not equipped with an
HDD, the optional HD-15 must be installed on the device to be available (Refer Section 1.4.1). As
for the FAX function, optional FAX System 12 must be installed on the device to be available. As
for the IPsec, optional Data Security Kit 10 must be installed on the device to be available.
1.3.2. TOE Usage
This TOE can perform copying (duplication), printing (paper output), sending (electronization)
and storing (accumulation) of various documents handled by users. The TOE is located in a
common office environment and is not only used as a standalone but also connected to LAN for
the use in the network environment. In the network environment, the TOE is assumed to be
used by connecting to a server and a client PC on the internal network protected from
unauthorized access on the external network by firewall. In this user environment, the above-
mentioned operational functions can be performed through operations on the operation panel
or from the client PCs on the network connection.
Figure 1-1 shows a normal user environment.
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The environment to use the common functions of the TOE is illustrated as follows.
 Internal Network :
The network environment inside the office protected from unauthorized access on the
external network by firewall.
 Client PC:
It is connected to the MFP via the internal network. The common functions of the MFP can
be available upon receipt of a user instruction.
Client PC needs the following:
 Printer Driver
 TWAIN Driver
 Web Browser
 Server:
It is used when sending the documents in the MFP. The following servers are needed.
 Mail Server
 FTP Server
 Audit Log Server
 Public Line(PSTN):
A public line is needed when sending and receiving the documents in the MFP by the FAX.
1.3.3. Required Non-TOE Hardware, Software and Firmware
Required Non-TOE Hardware, Software and Firmware name is as follows.
Figure 1-1 Common usage in the offices
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 Client PCs : IPsec(IKEv1) should be available.
 Printer Driver : KX Driver
 TWAIN Driver : Kyocera TWAIN Driver
 Web Browser : Microsoft Internet Explorer 11.0
 Mail Server : IPsec(IKEv1) should be available.
 FTP Server : IPsec(IKEv1) should be available.
 Audit Log Server(syslog server) : IPsec(IKEv1) should be available.
 Cryptographic module : Kyocera MFP Cryptographic Module(A) should be available.
 Hardware version : 2.1.10
 CAVP Validation Number : C1892
 Cryptographic module for FDE : Kyocera MFP Cryptographic Module(A) – FDE should be
available.
 Hardware version : 2.3
 CAVP Validation Number : C1933
1.3.4. Major Security Features of TOE
The TOE can perform copying, printing, sending scanned data, FAX (send/receive) and Box
storage of various documents handled by users. To prevent alteration and leaks of these
documents, the TOE has functions to identify and to authenticate users, to control access to
image data or functions, to encrypt image data, to overwrite-erase the residual image data, to
generate and to refer audit logs, to allow only authorized users to make security function related
settings, to perform the TOE self-test, and to protect the network.
1.4. TOE Description
1.4.1. Physical Configuration of TOE
The conceptual figure of physical configuration of the TOE is shown in Figure 1-2.
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The TOE consists of an Operation Panel, a Scanner Unit, a Printer Unit, a Main Board, a FAX
Board, HDD and SSD hardware, and firmwares.
The Operation Panel is the hardware that displays status and results upon receipt of input
by the TOE user. The Scanner Unit and the Printer Unit are the hardware that input document
into MFP and output as printed material.
A Main Board is the circuit board to control entire TOE. A system firmware is installed on a SSD,
which is positioned on the Main Board. The Main Board has a Network Interface and a USB
Interface.
The ASIC on the Main Board is installed with a cryptographic module to perform the HDD
encryption function and Overwrite-Erase function(See below). A FIPS 140-2 certified
cryptographic module, key derivation and entropy are provided by this cryptographic module in
TOE environment.
A FAX control firmware that controls FAX communication is installed on the PROM, which is
positioned on the FAX Board. Additionally, a FAX Board has a NCU as an interface.
As for memory mediums, a NAND that stores device settings, a Volatile Memory that is used as
working area and a SSD for the system firmware installation are positioned on the Main Board. A
Figure 1-2 Physical Configuration of TOE
TASKalfa 7054ci, TASKalfa 6054ci, TASKalfa 5054ci, TASKalfa 4054ci Series with Hard Disk, FAX System
and Data Security Kit
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Flash Memory that stores FAX receive/send image, and a PROM for the FAX control firmware
installation are positioned on the FAX Board. A HDD that stores image data and job data, is
connected to the Main Board. Any of the above memory mediums are not removable. Only the
FAX receive/send image is stored in the Flash Memory. Image data handled by other basic
functions is stored in the HDD. However, image data is not stored in the SSD.
There are two kinds of HDD configurations on the MFP products depending on the sales area.
One is equipped with HDD as standard and the other is not equipped with an HDD.
Table 1-1 MFP products and their HDD configurations
MFP product name Sales Area HDD Configuration
CS 7054ci, CS 6054ci, CS 5054ci, CS
4054ci
- Installed as standard
TASKalfa 7054ci, TASKalfa 6054ci,
TASKalfa 5054ci, TASKalfa 4054ci
North America Installed as standard
Other Area Not installed
TASKalfa 7054ciG, TASKalfa 6054ciG,
TASKalfa 5054ciG, TASKalfa 4054ciG,
7008ci, 6008ci, 5008ci, 4008ci
- Not installed
The delivery method for each TOE components is as follows. Guidance is also a part of TOE.
Table 1-2 Delivery method for each TOE components
TOE Configuration Form Delivery Method Identification Information
MFP Device (with HDD
installed as standard)
MFP Device Courier MFP product name described
in Table 1-1 MFP products
and their HDD configurations
and firmware version
information described in TOE
Reference + Mass storage
device: HDD 320GB
MFP Device (without
HDD)
MFP Device Courier MFP product name described
in Table 1-1 MFP products
and their HDD configurations
and firmware version
information described in TOE
Reference + Mass storage
device: Not installed
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Hard Disk
* If option installation is
required.
HDD hardware Courier HD-15
Fax FAX Board Courier FAX System 12
Guidance Paper document,
PDF format file in
DVD
Included in the
box of the MFP
device.
Name and version described in
Table 1-3.
* Firmware is preinstalled in the MFP
1.4.2. Logical Configuration of TOE
The conceptual figure of logical configuration of the TOE is shown in Figure 1-3.
Basic Functions provided by TOE
The TOE provides the following basic functions.
Figure 1-3 Logical Configuration of TOE
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and Data Security Kit
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 Copy Function
A function that reads image data from the Scanner of the TOE and outputs from the Printer
Unit of the TOE by inputting or operating from the Operation Panel by normal users.
(Execute a Copy job)
 Scan to Send Function
A function that sends image data to client PCs or servers connected via LAN by inputting or
operating from the Operation Panel and the TWAIN Driver of Client PCs by general users.
The following types of send functions are available. (Execute a Scan to Send job)
 FTP send (FTP Server)
 E-mail send (Mail Server)
 TWAIN send (TWAIN Driver)
 Print Function
A function that outputs received image data from the Printer Unit of the TOE by printing
instructions from Client PCs connected over LAN or a local port to MFP by normal users. The
printing instructions are given from the printer driver installed on Client PCs. The function
also supports printing from a USB Memory connected to the local port. (Execute a Print job)
 Fax Function
A function that sends and receives documents by FAX via public line. As for FAX Send, the
scanned image data will be sent by FAX to outside. Whereas for FAX Reception, the received
image data will be outputted from the Print Unit of the TOE, and then forwarded to outside.
(Execute a FAX Send job)
 Box Function
A function that stores image data in the HDD, reads image data from the HDD and then
sends it or print it by normal users. Image data can also be moved or joined inside the box.
However, image data sent or received by the FAX function can be stored in a Flash Memory.
(Execute a Box Storage job, a Box Send job and a Box Print job)
Inputted image data is stored in the HDD by inputting/operating by normal users from the
Operation Panel or the Client PCs connected over LAN or directly connected with MFP. In
addition, image data transmitted/received by using the FAX function is stored in the Flash
Memory. Stored image data can be outputted from the Print Unit of the TOE or sent to a
server such as a Client PC, a mail server and other faxes over public line. Stored image data
can also be deleted. When inputting from Client PCs, printer driver is used, and when
operating from Client PCs, web browser is used. The following types of send functions are
available.
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 FTP send (FTP Server)
 E-mail send (Mail Server)
 TWAIN send (TWAIN Driver)
 FAX send (Other faxes)
 USB Memory send (USB Memory)
Security Functions provided by TOE
TOE provides the following security functions. However, cryptographical primitives and entropy
in HDD Encryption function and Network Protection Function(entropy only) are provided by the
FIPS 140-2 Certified Cryptographic Module in TOE environment.
 User Management Function
A function that identifies and authenticates users so that only authorized users can use the
TOE. When using the TOE from the Operation Panel and Client PCs, a user will be required
to enter his/her login user name and login user password for identification and
authentication. The User Management Function includes a User Account Lockout Function,
which prohibits the users access for a certain period of time if the number of identification
and authentication attempts consecutively result in failure, a function, which protects
feedback on input of login user password when performing identification and authentication
and a function, which automatically logouts in case no operation has been done for a certain
period of time.
 Data Access Control Function
A function that restricts access to protected assets so that only authorized users can access
to the protected assets inside the TOE.
The following types of Access Control Functions are available.
 Access Control Function to control access to image data
 Access Control Function to control access to job data
 Job Authorization Function
A function that restricts usage of the function so that only authorized persons can use basic
functions of the TOE .
The following types of Job Authorization are available.
 Copy Job (Copy Function)
 Print Job (Print Function)
 Send Job (Scan to Send Function)
 FAX Send Job (FAX Function)
 FAX Reception Job (FAX Function)
 Storing Job (Box Function)
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 HDD Encryption Function
A function that encrypts information assets stored in the HDD in order to prevent leakage of
data stored in the HDD inside the TOE.
 Overwrite-Erase Function
A function that does not only logically delete the management information of the image
data, but also entirely overwrites and erases the actual data area so that it disables re-usage
of the data where image data that was created on the HDD or the Flash Memory during
usage of the basic functions of the TOE.
 Audit Log Function
A function that records and send to Audit Log server the audit logs of user operations and
security-relevant events on the HDD. This function provides the audit trails of TOE use and
security-relevant events. Stored audit logs can be accessed only by a device administrator.
 Security Management Function
A function that sets security functions of the TOE. This function can be used only by
authorized users. This function can be utilized from an Operation Panel and a Client PC.
Operations from a Client PC use a web browser.
 Trusted operation
A function that verifies the authenticity of the firmware when updating the firmware of TOE.
And a function that verifies the integrity of TSF executable code and TSF data to detect
unauthorized alteration of the executable code of the TOE security functions.
 Network Protection Function
A function that protects communication paths to prevent leaking and altering of data by
eavesdropping of data in transition over the internal network connected to TOE.
This function verifies the propriety of the destination to connect to and protects targeted
information assets by encryption, when using a Scan to Send Function, a Print Function, a
Box Function and a BOX Function from a Client PC (web browser), or a Security Management
Function from a Client PC (web browser).
 PSTN Fax-Network Separation
TOE ensure separation between the PSTN fax line and the Internal Network.
1.4.3. Functionality Excluded from the Evaluated Configuration
The following features are excluded from this evaluation:
 Maintenance Interface
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1.4.4. Guidance
The guidance comprising the TOE is shown below.
Table 1-3 Guidance that comprises TOE
Name Version
Notice (KYOCERA) 302XC5641002
Notice (Copystar) 302XC5642002
Notice (TA Triumph-Adler/UTAX) 302XC5643002
TASKalfa 7054ci / TASKalfa 6054ci / TASKalfa 5054ci /
TASKalfa 4054ci / TASKalfa 3554ci / TASKalfa 2554ci First
Steps Quick Guide
302XC5602002
TASKalfa 2554ci / TASKalfa 3554ci / TASKalfa 4054ci /
TASKalfa 5054ci / TASKalfa 6054ci / TASKalfa 7054ci
Operation Guide
2XCKDEN000
TASKalfa 2554ci / TASKalfa 3554ci / TASKalfa 4054ci /
TASKalfa 5054ci / TASKalfa 5004i / TASKalfa 6054ci /
TASKalfa6004i / TASKalfa 7054ci / TASKalfa 7004i Safety
Guide
302XC5622001
FAX System 12 Operation Guide 3RKKDEN300
Data Encryption/Overwrite Operation Guide 3MS2XCKDEN1
Command Center RX User Guide CCRXKDEN23
TASKalfa 7054ci / TASKalfa 6054ci / TASKalfa 5054ci /
TASKalfa 4054ci / TASKalfa 3554ci / TASKalfa 2554ci
Printer Driver User Guide
2XCCLKTEN750.2020.02
KYOCERA Net Direct Print User Guide DirectPrintKDEN2.2019.2
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2. Conformance Claim
2.1. CC Conformance Claim
The CC conformance claim of this ST and TOE is as follows.
CC version for which this ST and TOE claim conformance:
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Part1: Introduction and general model Version 3.1 Revision 5
Part2: Security functional components Version 3.1 Revision 5
Part3: Security assurance components Version 3.1 Revision 5
Conformance of ST to CC part2: CC part2 Extended
Conformance of ST to CC part3: CC part3 Conformant
2.2. PP Conformance Claims
The PP to which this ST and TOE are conformant is as follows.
PP Name/Identification : Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices
PP Version : 1.0 dated September 10, 2015
Errata : Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices – v1.0 Errata #1, June 2017
2.3. Package Conformance Claims
The ST and TOE does not conform to the packages.
2.4. Conformance Rationale
The ST and TOE satisfy the following conditions required by PP and are "Exact Conformance" as
required by PP. Therefore the TOE type is consistent with PP.
・ Required Uses :
Printing, Scanning, Copying, Network communications, Administration
・ Conditionally Mandatory Uses :
Storage and retrieval, Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage
・ Optional Uses :
Image Overwrite, Purge Data
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3. Security Problem Definitions
This section describes TOE users, Assets, Threats, Organizational Security Policies and
Assumptions.
3.1. TOE user
User roles related to the use of the TOE are defined as follows.
Table 3-1 TOE User
Designation Explanation
U.USER
User
A person who is authorized to use the TOE.
U.NORMAL
Normal User
A User who is identified and authenticated and do not have
an administrative role.
U.ADMIN
Administrator
An Administrator who is identified and authenticated and
have an administrative role.
3.2. Assets
Protected Assets of TOE are User Data, TSF Data.
3.2.1. User Data
User Data is created by and for Users that do not affect the operation of the TSF. The User Data is
composed of two types.
Table 3-2 User Data
Designation User Data type Definition
D.USER.DOC User Document
Data
Information contained in a User’s Document, in electronic or
hardcopy form.
D.USER.JOB User Job Data Information related to a User’s Document or Document Processing
Job.
3.2.2. TSF Data
TSF Data is created by and for the TOE that might affect the operation of the TSF. The TSF Data is
composed of two types.
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Table 3-3 TSF Data
Designation TSF Data type Definition
D.TSF.PROT Protected TSF
Data
TSF Data for which alteration by a User who is neither the data
owner nor in an Administrator role might affect the security of the
TOE, but for which disclosure is acceptable.
D.TSF.CONF Confidential TSF
Data
TSF Data for which either disclosure or alteration by a User who is
neither the data owner nor in an Administrator role might affect
the security of the TOE.
TSF Data to be targeted by the TOE is shown in Table 3-4.
Table 3-4 TSF Data to be targeted by the TOE
Designation TSF Data Explanation
D.TSF.PROT Login User Name User’s identification information that is used for the
User Management Function.
User Authorization User’s authorization information that is used for the
User Management Function. There are authorization
such as U. ADMINISTRATOR and U.NORMAL with
respect to the TOE.
Job Authorization
Settings
This is to set whether or not the TOE attribute-based
execution is authorized. Job authorization settings for
the user management function are assigned to each
user.
Executable
Attributes
Attributes that show Copy Function, Print Function,
Scan to Send Function, FAX Function and Box Function
of the TOE are excutable.
Owner Information Owner Information that targeted assets hold. Login
user
name is assigned to the owner information.
Number of Retries
until Locked
(User Account
Lockout Policy
Settings )
Number of retries until user account is locked out. This
information is used for the user management function.
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Lockout Duration
(User Account
Lockout Policy
Settings)
Time duration of rejection before user account is
unlocked. This information is used for the user
management function.
Lockout List User list that shows users with their user names who
are locked out for user management function.
Release of lockout on per user account basis from the
list can be instructed by a device administrator.
Auto Logout Time
Setting
Time information about automatic termination of login
session.
Password Policy
Settings
Information that is used for setting Password Policy
such as password length, complexity and validity
period.
Box Owner Setting for showing the box owner. Login user name is
assigned to the owner information.
Box Permission Setting for sharing documents inside a box with all
users. When box permission is enabled , all the users
can access to the box.
Date and Time
Settings
Setting information for date and time
Network
Encryption Setting
Setting information for and IPsec encryption
communication, which is used for Network Protection
function.
FAX Forward
Setting
Setting for forwarding of received fax data.
Send destination
information for
forwarding Audit
Log Report
Destination information when sending audit log report
to an administrator.
D.TSF.CONF Login User
Password
Authentication information of users that is required for
user management function.
Audit Log Log data that are generated by an audit log function.
Encryption Key Encryption key that is used for HDD encryption
function.
3.3. Threats to TOE Assets
This section describes threats to assets described in clause 3.2.
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Table 3-5 Threats
Threat Description
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS An attacker may access (read, modify, or delete) User
Document Data or change (modify or delete) User Job Data
in the TOE through one of the TOE’s interfaces.
T.TSF_COMPROMISE An attacker may gain Unauthorized Access to TSF Data in
the TOE through one of the TOE’s interfaces.
T.TSF_FAILURE A malfunction of the TSF may cause loss of security if the
TOE is permitted to operate.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_UPDATE An attacker may cause the installation of unauthorized
software on the TOE.
T.NET_COMPROMISE An attacker may access data in transit or otherwise
compromise the security of the TOE by monitoring or
manipulating network communication.
3.4. Organizational Security Policies for the TOE
Table 3-6 Organizational Security Policies for the TOE
Name Definition
P.AUTHORIZATION Users must be authorized before performing
Document Processing and administrative
functions.
P.AUDIT Security-relevant activities must be audited and
the log of such actions must be protected and
transmitted to an External IT Entity.
P.COMMS_PROTECTION The TOE must be able to identify itself to other
devices on the LAN.
P.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION If the TOE stores User Document Data or
Confidential TSF Data on Field-Replaceable
Nonvolatile Storage Devices, it will encrypt such
data on those devices.
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P.KEY_MATERIAL Cleartext keys, submasks, random numbers, or
any other values that contribute to the creation of
encryption keys for Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile
Storage of User Document Data or Confidential
TSF Data must be protected from unauthorized
access and must not be stored on that storage
device.
P.FAX_FLOW If the TOE provides a PSTN fax function, it will
ensure separation between the PSTN fax line and
the LAN.
P.IMAGE_OVERWRITE Upon completion or cancellation of a Document
Processing job, the TOE shall overwrite residual
image data from its Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile
Storage Devices.
P.PURGE_DATA The TOE shall provide a function that an
authorized administrator can invoke to make all
customer-supplied User Data and TSF Data
permanently irretrievable from Nonvolatile
Storage Devices.
3.5. Assumptions
Table 3-7 Assumptions for the TOE
Assumption Definition
A.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the
TOE and the data it stores or processes, is assumed to be
provided by the environment.
A.NETWORK The Operational Environment is assumed to protect the
TOE from direct, public access to its LAN interface.
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN TOE Administrators are trusted to administer the TOE
according to site security policies.
A.TRAINED_USERS Authorized Users are trained to use the TOE according to
site security policies.
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4. Security Objectives
This section describes Security Objectives for TOE, Security Objectives of Operational
Environment and Security Objectives Rationale.
4.1. Security Objectives for the TOE
Security Objectives for the TOE is shown in .
Table 4-1 Security objectives for the operational environment
Designation Definition
O.USER_I&A The TOE shall perform identification and authentication
of Users for operations that require access control,
User authorization, or Administrator roles.
O.ACCESS_CONTROL The TOE shall enforce access controls to protect User
Data and TSF Data in accordance with security policies.
O.USER_AUTHORIZATION The TOE shall perform authorization of Users in
accordance with security policies.
O.ADMIN_ROLES The TOE shall ensure that only authorized
Administrators are permitted to perform administrator
functions.
O.UPDATE_VERIFICATION The TOE shall provide mechanisms to verify the
authenticity of software updates.
O.TSF_SELF_TEST The TOE shall test some subset of its security
functionality to help ensure that subset is operating
properly.
O.COMMS_PROTECTION The TOE shall have the capability to protect LAN
communications of User Data and TSF Data from
Unauthorized Access, replay, and source/destination
spoofing.
O.AUDIT The TOE shall generate audit data, and be capable of
sending it to a trusted External IT Entity. Optionally, it
may store audit data in the TOE.
O.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION
(conditionally mandatory)
If the TOE stores User Document Data or Confidential
TSF Data in Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage
devices, then the TOE shall encrypt such data on those
devices.
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Designation Definition
O.KEY_MATERIAL
(conditionally mandatory)
The TOE shall protect from unauthorized access any
cleartext keys, submasks, random numbers, or other
values that contribute to the creation of encryption
keys for storage of User Document Data or Confidential
TSF Data in Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage
Devices; The TOE shall ensure that such key material is
not stored in cleartext on the storage device that uses
that material.
O.FAX_NET_SEPARATION
(conditionally mandatory)
If the TOE provides a PSTN fax function, then the TOE
shall ensure separation of the PSTN fax telephone line
and the LAN, by system design or active security
function.
O.IMAGE_OVERWRITE
(optional)
Upon completion or cancellation of a Document
Processing job, the TOE shall overwrite residual image
data in its Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage
Devices.
4.2. Security Objectives for the Operation Environment
Security Objectives for the operational environment is shown in .
Table 4-2 Security objectives for the operational environment
Designation Definition
OE.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION The Operational Environment shall provide physical
security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and
the data it stores or processes.
OE.NETWORK_PROTECTION The Operational Environment shall provide network
security to protect the TOE from direct, public access to
its LAN interface.
OE.ADMIN_TRUST The TOE Owner shall establish trust that Administrators
will not use their privileges for malicious purposes.
OE.USER_TRAINING The TOE Owner shall ensure that Users are aware of
site security policies and have the competence to
follow them.
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Designation Definition
OE.ADMIN_TRAINING The TOE Owner shall ensure that Administrators are
aware of site security policies and have the competence
to use manufacturer's guidance to correctly configure
the TOE and protect passwords and keys accordingly.
4.3. Security Objectives rationale
The relation among assumption, threat, and organizational security policy is shown in the table
below.
Table 4-3 Security objectives rationale
Threat/Policy/Assumption Rationale
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS
An attacker may access (read, modify, or
delete) User Document Data or change
(modify or delete) User Job Data in the
TOE through one of the TOE’s interfaces.
O.ACCESS_CONTROL restricts access to User Data in
the TOE to authorized Users.
O.USER_I&A provides the basis for access control.
O.ADMIN_ROLES restricts the ability to authorize
Users and set access controls to authorized
Administrators.
T.TSF_COMPROMISE
An attacker may gain Unauthorized
Access to TSF Data in the TOE through one
of the TOE’s interfaces.
O.ACCESS_ CONTROL restricts access to TSF Data in
the TOE to authorized Users.
O.USER_I&A provides the basis for access control.
O.ADMIN_ROLES restricts the ability to authorize
Users and set access controls to authorized
Administrators.
T.TSF_FAILURE
A malfunction of the TSF may cause loss
of security if the TOE is permitted to
operate.
O.TSF_SELF_TEST prevents the TOE from operating if
a malfunction is detected.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_UPDATE
An attacker may cause the installation of
unauthorized software on the TOE.
O.UPDATE_VERIFICATION verifies the authenticity of
software updates.
T.NET_COMPROMISE
An attacker may access data in transit or
otherwise compromise the security of the
TOE by monitoring or manipulating
network communication.
O.COMMS_PROTECTION protects LAN
communications from sniffing, replay, and man-in-
the-middle attacks.
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Threat/Policy/Assumption Rationale
P.AUTHORIZATION
Users must be authorized before
performing Document Processing and
administrative functions.
O.USER_AUTHORIZATION restricts the ability to
perform Document Processing and administrative
functions to authorized Users.
O.USER_I&A provides the basis for authorization.
O.ADMIN_ROLES restricts the ability to authorize
Users to authorized Administrators.
P.AUDIT
Security-relevant activities must be
audited and the log of such actions must
be protected and transmitted to an
External IT Entity.
O.AUDIT requires the generation of audit data.
O.ACCESS_CONTROL restricts access to audit data in
the TOE to authorized Users.
O.USER_AUTHORIZATION provides the basis for
authorization.
P.COMMS_PROTECTION
The TOE must be able to identify itself to
other devices on the LAN.
O.COMMS_PROTECTION protects LAN
communications from man-in-the-middle attacks.
P.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION
(conditionally mandatory)
If the TOE stores User Document Data or
Confidential TSF Data on Field-
Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage Devices,
it will encrypt such data on those devices.
O.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION protects User Document
Data and Confidential TSF Data stored in Field-
Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage Devices from
exposure if a device has been removed from the TOE
and its Operational Environment.
P.KEY_MATERIAL
(conditionally mandatory)
Cleartext keys, submasks, random
numbers, or any other values that
contribute to the creation of encryption
keys for Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile
Storage of User Document Data or
Confidential TSF Data must be protected
from unauthorized access and must not
be stored on that storage device.
O.KEY_MATERIAL protects keys and key materials
from unauthorized access and ensures that they any
key materials are not stored in cleartext on the
device that uses those materials for its own
encryption.
P.FAX_FLOW (conditionally mandatory)
If the TOE provides a PSTN fax function, it
will ensure separation between the PSTN
fax line and the LAN.
O.FAX_NET_SEPARATION requires a separation
between the PSTN fax line and the LAN.
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Threat/Policy/Assumption Rationale
P.IMAGE_OVERWRITE (optional)
Upon completion or cancellation of a
Document Processing job, the TOE shall
overwrite residual image data from its
Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage
Device.
O.IMAGE_OVERWRITE overwrites residual image
data from Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage
Devices after Document Processing jobs are
completed or cancelled.
A.PHYSICAL
Physical security, commensurate with the
value of the TOE and the data it stores or
processes, is assumed to be provided by
the environment.
OE.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION establishes a protected
physical environment for the TOE.
A.NETWORK
The Operational Environment is assumed
to protect the TOE from direct, public
access to its LAN interface.
OE.NETWORK_PROTECTION establishes a protected
LAN environment for the TOE.
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN
TOE Administrators are trusted to
administer the TOE according to site
security policies.
OE.ADMIN_TRUST establishes responsibility of the
TOE Owner to have a trusted relationship with
Administrators.
A.TRAINED_USERS
Authorized Users are trained to use the
TOE according to site security policies.
OE.ADMIN_TRAINING establishes responsibility of
the TOE Owner to provide appropriate training for
Administrators.
OE.USER_TRAINING establishes responsibility of the
TOE Owner to provide appropriate training for
Users.
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5. Extended Components Definition
This ST defines components that are extensions to Common Criteria 3.1 Release 3, Part 2. These
extended components are defined in the ST but are used in SFR Packages, and therefore, are
employed only in TOEs whose STs conform to those SFR Packages.
5.1. FAU_STG_EXT Extended: External Audit Trail Storages
Family behaviour:
This family defines requirements for the TSF to ensure that secure transmission of audit data
from TOE to an External IT Entity.
Component leveling:
FAU_STG_EXT.1 External Audit Trail Storage requires the TSF to use a trusted channel
implementing a secure protocol.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
・ The TSF shall have the ability to configure the cryptographic functionality.
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included
in the PP/ST:
・ There are no auditable events foreseen.
FAU_STG_EXT.1 Extended: Protected Audit Trail Storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation,
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
FAU_STG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to transmit the generated audit data to an External IT
Entity using a trusted channel according to FTP_ITC.1.
Rationale:
FAU_STG_EXT.1: Extended: External Audit Trail Storage 1
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The TSF is required that the transmission of generated audit data to an External IT Entity which
relies on a non-TOE audit server for storage and review of audit records. The storage of these audit
records and the ability to allow the administrator to review these audit records is provided by the
Operational Environment in that case. The Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for
the transmission of audit data to an External IT Entity.
This extended component protects the audit records, and it is therefore placed in the FAU class
with a single component.
5.2. FCS_CKM_EXT Extended: Cryptographic Key Management
Family behaviour:
This family addresses the management aspects of cryptographic keys. Especially, this extended
component is intended for cryptographic key destruction.
Component leveling:
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key Material Destruction ensures not only keys but also key
materials that are no longer needed are destroyed by using an approved method.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
・ There are no management actions foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included
in the PP/ST:
・ There are no auditable events foreseen.
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material Destruction
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.1(a) Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys), or
FCS_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic key generation (Symmetric Keys)],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM_EXT.4: Extended: Cryptographic Key Material Destruction 4
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FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1 The TSF shall destroy all plaintext secret and private cryptographic keys and
cryptographic critical security parameters when no longer needed.
Rationale:
Cryptographic Key Material Destruction is to ensure the keys and key materials that are no longer
needed are destroyed by using an approved method, and the Common Criteria does not provide
a suitable SFR for the Cryptographic Key Material Destruction.
This extended component protects the cryptographic key and key materials against exposure, and
it is therefore placed in the FCS class with a single component.
5.3. FCS_IPSEC_EXT Extended: IPsec selected
Family behaviour:
This family addresses requirements for protecting communications using IPsec.
Component leveling:
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 IPsec requires that IPsec be implemented as specified.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
・ There are no management actions foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included
in the PP/ST:
・ Failure to establish an IPsec SA.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 Extended: IPsec selected
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_PSK_EXT.1 Extended: Pre-Shared Key Composition
FCS_COP.1(g) Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message
authentication)
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the IPsec architecture as specified in RFC 4301.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 Extended: IPsec selected 1
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FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall implement [selection: tunnel mode, transport mode].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall have a nominal, final entry in the SPD that matches anything that
is otherwise unmatched, and discards it.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall implement the IPsec protocol ESP as defined by RFC 4303 using
[selection: the cryptographic algorithms AES-CBC-128 (as specified by RFC
3602) together with a Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-based HMAC, AES-CBC-
256 (as specified by RFC 3602) together with a Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-
based HMAC, AES-GCM-128 as specified in RFC 4106, AES-GCM-256 as
specified in RFC 4106].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall implement the protocol: [selection: IKEv1 as defined in RFCs
2407, 2408, 2409, RFC 4109, [selection: no other RFCs for extended sequence
numbers, RFC 4304 for extended sequence numbers], and [selection: no other
RFCs for hash functions, RFC 4868 for hash functions]; IKEv2 as defined in RFCs
5996 (with mandatory support for NAT traversal as specified in section 2.23),
4307, and [selection: no other RFCs for hash functions, RFC 4868 for hash
functions]].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall ensure the encrypted payload in the [selection: IKEv1, IKEv2]
protocol uses the cryptographic algorithms AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256 as
specified in RFC 3602 and [selection: AES-GCM-128, AES-GCM-256 as specified
in RFC 5282, no other algorithm].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall ensure that IKEv1 Phase 1 exchanges use only main mode.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.8 The TSF shall ensure that [selection: IKEv2 SA lifetimes can be established
based on [selection: number of packets/number of bytes; length of time,
where the time values can be limited to: 24 hours for Phase 1 SAs and 8 hours
for Phase 2 SAs]; IKEv1 SA lifetimes can be established based on [selection:
number of packets/number of bytes ; length of time, where the time values
can be limited to: 24 hours for Phase 1 SAs and 8 hours for Phase 2 SAs]].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.9 The TSF shall ensure that all IKE protocols implement DH Groups 14 (2048-bit
MODP), and [selection: 24 (2048-bit MODP with 256-bit POS), 19 (256-bit
Random ECP), 20 (384-bit Random ECP, 5 (1536-bit MODP)), [assignment:
other DH groups that are implemented by the TOE], no other DH groups].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.10 The TSF shall ensure that all IKE protocols perform Peer Authentication using
the [selection: RSA, ECDSA] algorithm and Pre-shared Keys.
Rationale:
IPsec is one of the secure communication protocols, and the Common Criteria does not provide a
suitable SFR for the communication protocols using cryptographic algorithms.
This extended component protects the communication data using cryptographic algorithms, and
it is therefore placed in the FCS class with a single component.
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5.4. FCS_KDF_EXT Extended: Cryptographic Key Derivation
Family behaviour:
This family specifies the means by which an intermediate key is derived from a specified set of
submasks.
Component leveling:
FCS_KDF_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Derivation requires the TSF to derive intermediate keys
from submasks using the specified hash functions.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
・ There are no management actions foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included
in the PP/ST:
・ There are no auditable events foreseen.
FCS_KDF_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Key Derivation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FCS_COP.1(h) Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message
authentication),
[if selected: FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit
Generation)]
FCS_KDF_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall accept [selection: a RNG generated submask as specified in
FCS_RBG_EXT.1, a conditioned password submask, imported submask] to
derive an intermediate key, as defined in [selection: NIST SP 800-108
[selection: KDF in Counter Mode, KDF in Feedback Mode, KDF in Double-
Pipeline Iteration Mode], NIST SP 800-132], using the keyed-hash functions
specified in FCS_COP.1(h), such that the output is at least of equivalent
security strength (in number of bits) to the BEV.
FCS_KDF_EXT Cryptographic Key Derivation 1
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Rationale:
The TSF is required to specify the means by which an intermediate key is derived from a specified
set of submasks using the specified hash functions.
This extended component protects the Data Encryption Keys using cryptographic algorithms in the
maintained key chains, and it is therefore placed in the FCS class with a single component.
5.5. FCS_KYC_EXT Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Key Chaining)
Family behaviour:
This family specifies the means by which an intermediate key is derived from a specified set of
submasks.
Component leveling:
FCS_KYC_EXT Key Chaining, requires the TSF to maintain a key chain and specifies the
characteristics of that chain.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
・ There are no management actions foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included
in the PP/ST:
・ There are no auditable events foreseen.
FCS_KYC_EXT.1 Extended: Key Chaining
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_COP.1(e) Cryptographic operation (Key Wrapping),
FCS_SMC_EXT.1 Extended: Submask Combining,
FCS_COP.1(i) Cryptographic operation (Key Transport),
FCS_KDF_EXT.1 Cryptographic Operation (Key Derivation), and/or
FCS_COP.1(f) Cryptographic operation (Key Encryption)].
FCS_KYC_EXT Key Chaining 1
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FCS_KYC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall maintain a key chain of: [selection: one, using a submask as the
BEVor DEK; intermediate keys originating from one or more submask(s) to the
BEV or DEK using the following method(s): [selection: key wrapping as
specified in FCS_COP.1(e), key combining as specified in FCS_SMC_EXT.1, key
encryption as specified in FCS_COP.1(f), key derivation as specified in
FCS_KDF_EXT.1, key transport as specified in FCS_COP.1(i)]] while maintaining
an effective strength of [selection: 128 bits, 256 bits].
Rationale:
Key Chaining ensures that the TSF maintains the key chain, and also specifies the characteristics of
that chain. However, the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the management of
multiple layers of encryption key to protect encrypted data.
This extended component protects the TSF data using cryptographic algorithms, and it is therefore
placed in the FCS class with a single component.
5.6. FCS_RBG_EXT Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)
Family behaviour:
This family defines requirements for random bit generation to ensure that it is performed in
accordance with selected standards and seeded by an entropy source.
Component leveling:
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation requires random bit generation to be performed in
accordance with selected standards and seeded by an entropy source.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
・ There are no management actions foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included
in the PP/ST:
・ There are no auditable events foreseen.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Random Bit Generation 1
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FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Random Bit Generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in
accordance with [selection: ISO/IEC 18031:2011, NIST SP 800-90A] using
[selection: Hash_DRBG (any), HMAC_DRBG (any), CTR_DRBG (AES)].
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2 The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by an entropy source that accumulates
entropy from [selection: [assignment: number of software-based sources]
software-based noise source(s), [assignment: number of hardware-based
sources] hardware-based noise source(s)] with a minimum of [selection: 128
bits, 256 bits] of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength,
according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 “Security strength table for hash
functions”, of the keys and hashes that it will generate.
Rationale:
Random bits/number will be used by the SFRs for key generation and destruction, and the
Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the random bit generation.
This extended component ensures the strength of encryption keys, and it is therefore placed in
the FCS class with a single component.
5.7. FDP_DSK_EXT Extended: Protection of Data on Disk
Family behaviour:
This family is to mandate the encryption of all protected data written to the storage.
Component leveling:
FDP_DSK_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Data on Disk, requires the TSF to encrypt all the
Confidential TSF and User Data stored on the Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage Devices in
order to avoid storing these data in plaintext on the devices.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
・ There are no management actions foreseen.
FDP_DSK_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Data on Disk 1
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Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included
in the PP/ST:
・ There are no auditable events foreseen.
FDP_DSK_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Data on Disk
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FCS_COP.1(d) Cryptographic operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)
FDP_DSK_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall [selection: perform encryption in accordance with FCS_COP.1(d),
use a self-encrypting Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage Device that is
separately CC certified to conform to the FDE EE cPP] such that any Field-
Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage Device contains no plaintext User Document
Data and no plaintext confidential TSF Data.
FDP_DSK_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall encrypt all protected data without user intervention.
Rationale:
Extended: Protection of Data on Disk is to specify that encryption of any confidential data without
user intervention, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the Protection of
Data on Disk.
This extended component protects the Data on Disk, and it is therefore placed in the FDP class
with a single component.
5.8. FDP_FXS_EXT Extended: Fax Separation
Family behaviour:
This family is to mandate the encryption of all protected data written to the storage.
Component leveling:
FDP_FXS_EXT.1 Fax Separation, requires the fax interface cannot be used to create a network
bridge between a PSTN and a LAN to which TOE is connected.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
FDP_FXS_EXT.1 Extended: Fax Separation 1
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・ There are no management actions foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included
in the PP/ST:
・ There are no auditable events foreseen.
FDP_FXS_EXT.1 Extended: Fax Separation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_FXS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall prohibit communication via the fax interface, except
transmitting or receiving User Data using fax protocols.
Rationale:
Fax Separation is to protect a LAN against attack from PSTN line, and the Common Criteria does
not provide a suitable SFR for the Protection of TSF or User Data.
This extended component protects the TSF Data or User Data, and it is therefore placed in the FDP
class with a single component.
5.9. FIA_PMG_EXT Extended: Password Management
Family behaviour:
This family defines requirements for the attributes of passwords used by administrative users to
ensure that strong passwords and passphrases can be chosen and maintained.
Component leveling:
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Password management requires the TSF to support passwords with varying
composition requirements, minimum lengths, maximum lifetime, and similarity constraints.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
・ There are no management actions foreseen.
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Extended: Password Management 1
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Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included
in the PP/ST:
・ There are no auditable events foreseen.
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Extended: Password management
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities for
User passwords:
 Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of upper and
lower case letters, numbers, and the following special characters:
[selection: “!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(“, “)”, [assignment:
other characters]];
 Minimum password length shall be settable by an Administrator, and
have the capability to require passwords of 15 characters or greater.
Rationale:
Password Management is to ensure the strong authentication between the endpoints of
communication, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the Password
Management.
This extended component protects the TOE by means of password management, and it is therefore
placed in the FIA class with a single component.
5.10. FIA_PSK_EXT Extended: Pre-Shared Key Composition
Family behaviour:
This family defines requirements for the TSF to ensure the ability to use pre-shared keys for
IPsec.
Component leveling:
FIA_PSK_EXT.1 Pre-Shared Key Composition, ensures authenticity and access control for
updates.
FIA_PSK_EXT.1 Extended: Pre-Shared Key Composition 1
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Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
・ There are no management actions foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included
in the PP/ST:
・ There are no auditable events foreseen.
FIA_PSK_EXT.1 Extended: Pre-Shared Key Composition
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit
Generation)..
FIA_PSK_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to use pre-shared keys for IPsec.
FIA_PSK_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall be able to accept text-based pre-shared keys that are:
 22 characters in length and [selection: [assignment: other supported
lengths], no other lengths];
 composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers,
and special characters (that include: “!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”,
“(“, and “)”).
FIA_PSK_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall condition the text-based pre-shared keys by using [selection:
SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512, [assignment: method of conditioning text string]]
and be able to [selection: use no other pre-shared keys; accept bit-based pre-
shared keys; generate bit-based pre-shared keys using the random bit
generator specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1].
Rationale:
Pre-shared Key Composition is to ensure the strong authentication between the endpoints of
communications, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the Pre-shared Key
Composition.
This extended component protects the TOE by means of strong authentication, and it is therefore
placed in the FIA class with a single component.
5.11. FPT_KYP_EXT Extended: Protection of Key and Key Material
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Family behaviour:
This family addresses the requirements for keys and key materials to be protected if and when
written to nonvolatile storage.
Component leveling:
FPT_KYP_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of key and key material, requires the TSF to ensure that
no plaintext key or key materials are written to nonvolatile storage.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
・ There are no management actions foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included
in the PP/ST:
・ There are no auditable events foreseen.
FPT_KYP_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Key and Key Material
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_KYP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall not store plaintext keys that are part of the keychain specified
by FCS_KYC_EXT.1 in any Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage Device, and
not store any such plaintext key on a device that uses the key for its encryption.
Rationale:
Protection of Key and Key Material is to ensure that no plaintext key or key material are written to
nonvolatile storage, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the protection
of key and key material.
This extended component protects the TSF data, and it is therefore placed in the FPT class with a
single component.
5.12. FPT_SKP_EXT Extended: Protection of TSF Data
FPT_KYP_EXT.1 Protection of Key and Key Material 1
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Family behaviour:
This family addresses the requirements for managing and protecting the TSF data, such as
cryptographic keys. This is a new family modelled as the FPT Class.
Component leveling:
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Protection of TSF Data (for reading all symmetric keys), requires preventing
symmetric keys from being read by any user or subject. It is the only component of this family.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
・ There are no management actions foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included
in the PP/ST:
・ There are no auditable events foreseen.
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of TSF Data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_SKP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and
private keys.
Rationale:
Protection of TSF Data is to ensure the pre-shared keys, symmetric keys and private keys are
protected securely, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the protection of
such TSF data.
This extended component protects the TOE by means of strong authentication using Pre-shared
Key, and it is therefore placed in the FPT class with a single component.
5.13. FPT_TST_EXT Extended: TSF testing
Family behaviour:
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of TSF Data 1
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This family addresses the requirements for self-testing the TSF for selected correct operation.
Component leveling:
FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF testing requires a suite of self-testing to be run during initial start-up in
order to demonstrate correct operation of the TSF.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
・ There are no management actions foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included
in the PP/ST:
・ There are no auditable events foreseen.
FPT_TST_EXT.1 Extended: TSF testing
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests during initial start-up (and power on) to
demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
Rationale:
TSF testing is to ensure the TSF can be operated correctly, and the Common Criteria does not
provide a suitable SFR for the TSF testing. In particular, there is no SFR defined for TSF testing.
This extended component protects the TOE, and it is therefore placed in the FPT class with a single
component.
5.14. FPT_TUD_EXT Extended: Trusted Update
Family behaviour:
This family defines requirements for the TSF to ensure that only administrators can update the
TOE firmware/software, and that such firmware/software is authentic.
FPT_TST_EXT.1 Extended: TSF testing 1
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Component leveling:
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update, ensures authenticity and access control for updates.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
・ There are no management actions foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included
in the PP/ST:
・ There are no auditable events foreseen.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_COP.1(b) Cryptographic Operation (for signature
generation/verification), or
FCS_COP.1(c) Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm)].
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide authorized administrators the ability to query the
current version of the TOE firmware/software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorized administrators the ability to initiate updates
to TOE firmware/software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall provide a means to verify firmware/software updates to the TOE
using a digital signature mechanism and [selection: published hash, no other
functions] prior to installing those updates.
Rationale:
Firmware/software is a form of TSF Data, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR
for the management of firmware/software. In particular, there is no SFR defined for importing TSF
Data.
This extended component protects the TOE, and it is therefore placed in the FPT class with a single
component.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Extended: Trusted Update 1
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6. Security Requirements
This section describes the TOE Security Functional Requirements.
6.1. TOE Security Functional Requirements.
6.1.1. Class FAU: Security Audit
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
(for O.AUDIT)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and
c) All auditable events specified in Table 6.1, [assignment: other specifically defined
auditable events].
[assignment: other specifically defined auditable events]
 None
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the
outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the
functional components included in the PP/ST, additional information specified in
Table 6-1, [assignment: other audit relevant information].
[assignment: other audit relevant information]
 None
Table 6-1 Auditable data requirements
Auditable event Relevant SFR Additional
information
Job completion FDP_ACF.1 Type of job
Unsuccessful User authentication FIA_UAU.1 None
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Unsuccessful User identification FIA_UID.1 None
Use of management functions FMT_SMF.1 None
Modification to the group of Users that
are part of a role
FMT_SMR.1 None
Changes to the time FPT_STM.1 None
Failure to establish session FTP_ITC.1
FTP_TRP.1(a)
FTP_TRP.1(b)
Reason for failure
FAU_GEN.2 User identify association
(for O.AUDIT)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to
associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.
FAU_STG_EXT.1 Extended: External Audi Trail Storage
(for O.AUDIT)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation,
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
FAU_STG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to transmit the generated audit data to an External IT Entity
using a trusted channel according to FTP_ITC.1.
6.1.2. Class FCS: Cryptographic Support
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FCS_CKM.1(a) Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys)
(for O.COMMS_PROTECTION)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1(b) Cryptographic operation (for signature
generation/verification)]
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material Destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1(a) Refinement: The TSF shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys used for key
establishment in accordance with [selection:
･ NIST Special Publication 800-56A, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography” for finite
fieldbased key establishment schemes;
･ NIST Special Publication 800-56A, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography” for elliptic
curvebased key establishment schemes and implementing “NIST curves” P-256,
P-384 and [selection: P-521, no other curves] (as defined in FIPS PUB 186-4,
“Digital Signature Standard”)
･ NIST Special Publication 800-56B, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography” for RSA-
based key establishment schemes
] and specified cryptographic key sizes equivalent to, or greater than, a symmetric key
strength of 112 bits.
[selection: NIST Special …]
･ NIST Special Publication 800-56B, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography” for RSA-based
key establishment schemes;
FCS_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic key generation (Symmetric Keys)
(for O.COMMS_PROTECTION, O.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
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Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1(f) Cryptographic operation (Key Encyption)]
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material Destruction
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit
Generation)
FCS_CKM.1.1(b) Refinement: The TSF shall generate symmetric cryptographic keys using a Random
Bit Generator as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1 and specified cryptographic key sizes
[selection: 128 bit, 256 bit] that meet the following: No Standard.
[selection: 128 bit, 256 bit]
 128bit
 256bit
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material Destruction
(for O.COMMS_PROTECTION, O.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION, O.PURGE_DATA)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.1(a) Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys),
or
FCS_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic key generation (Symmetric Keys)],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1 The TSF shall destroy all plaintext secret and private cryptographic keys and
cryptographic critical security parameters when no longer needed.
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction
(for O.COMMS_PROTECTION, O.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION, O.PURGE_DATA)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.1(a) Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys),
or
FCS_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic key generation (Symmetric Keys)]
FCS_CKM.4.1 Refinement: The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method [selection:
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･ For volatile memory, the destruction shall be executed by [selection: powering
off a device, [assignment: other mechanism that ensures keys are destroyed]].
･ For nonvolatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by a [selection: single,
three or more times] overwrite of key data storage location consisting of
[selection: a pseudo random pattern using the TSF’s RBG (as specified in
FCS_RBG_EXT.1), a static pattern], followed by a [selection: read-verify, none]. If
read-verification of the overwritten data fails, the process shall be repeated
again;.
] that meets the following: [selection: NIST SP800-88, no standard].
[selection: For volatile memory…]
･ For volatile memory, the destruction shall be executed by [selection: powering
off a device, [assignment: other mechanism that ensures keys are destroyed]].
･ For nonvolatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by a [selection: single,
three or more times] overwrite of key data storage location consisting of
[selection: a pseudo random pattern using the TSF’s RBG (as specified in
FCS_RBG_EXT.1), a static pattern], followed by a [selection: read-verify, none]. If
read-verification of the overwritten data fails, the process shall be repeated
again;.
[selection: powering off a device, [assignment: other mechanism that ensures keys
are destroyed]]
･ powering off a device
[selection: single, three or more times]
･ single
[selection: a pseudo random pattern using the TSF’s RBG (as specified in
FCS_RBG_EXT.1), a static pattern]
･ a static pattern
[selection: read-verify, none]
･ none
[selection: NIST SP800-88, no standard]
･ no standard
FCS_COP.1(a) Cryptographic operation (Symmetric encryption/decryption)
(for O.COMMS_PROTECTION)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
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FCS_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic key generation (Symmetric Keys)]
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material Destruction
FCS_COP.1.1(a) Refinement: The TSF shall perform encryption and decryption in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm AES operating in [assignment: one or more modes]
and cryptographic key sizes 128-bits and 256-bits that meets the following:
･ FIPS PUB 197, “Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)”
･ [Selection: NIST SP 800-38A, NIST SP 800-38B, NIST SP 800-38C, NIST SP 800-38D]
[assignment: one or more modes]
･ CBC
[selection: NIST SP 800-38A, NIST SP 800-38B, NIST SP 800-38C, NIST SP 800-38D]
･ NIST SP 800-38A
FCS_COP.1(b) Cryptographic operation (for signature gerenation/verification)
(for O.UPDATE_VERIFICATION, O.COMMS_PROTECTION)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1(a) Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys)]
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material Destruction
FCS_COP.1.1(b) Refinement: The TSF shall perform cryptographic signature services in accordance
with a [selection:
･ Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) with key sizes (modulus) of [assignment: 2048
bits or greater],
･ RSA Digital Signature Algorithm (rDSA) with key sizes (modulus) of [assignment:
2048 bits or greater], or
･ Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with key sizes of [assignment:
256 bits or greater]]
that meets the following: [selection:
Case: Digital Signature Algorithm
･ FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard”
Case: RSA Digital Signature Algorithm
･ FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard”
Case: Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
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FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard”
･ The TSF shall implement “NIST curves” P-256, P384 and [selection: P521, no other
curves] (as defined in FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard”).
].
[selection: Digital Signature …]
･ RSA Digital Signature Algorithm (rDSA) with key sizes (modulus) of [assignment:
2048 bits or greater], or
[assignment: 2048 bits or greater]
･ 2048 bits
[selection: Case: Digital …]
･ FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard”
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)
(for O.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION, O.COMMS_PROTECTION)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependenceies.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance
with [selection: ISO/IEC 18031:2011, NIST SP 800-90A] using [selection: Hash_DRBG
(any), HMAC_DRBG (any), CTR_DRBG (AES)].
[selection: ISO/IEC 18031:2011, NIST SP 800-90A]
･ NIST SP 800-90A
[selection: Hash_DRBG (any), HMAC_DRBG (any), CTR_DRBG (AES)]
･ CTR_DRBG (AES)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2 The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by an entropy source that accumulates
entropy from [selection: [assignment: number of software-based sources] software-
based noise source(s), [assignment: number of hardware-based sources] hardware-
based noise source(s)] with a minimum of [selection: 128 bits, 256 bits] of entropy at
least equal to the greatest security strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table
C.1 “Security strength table for hash functions”, of the keys and hashes that it will
generate.
[selection: [assignment: number of software-based sources] software-based noise
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source(s), [assignment: number of hardware-based sources] hardware-based noise
source(s)] with a minimum of [selection: 128 bits, 256 bits]
･ [assignment: number of hardware-based sources] hardware-based noise
source(s)] with a minimum of [selection: 128 bits, 256 bits]
[assignment: number of hardware-based sources]
･ 8
[selection: 128 bits, 256 bits]
･ 256 bit
6.1.3. Class FDP: User Data Protection
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
(for O.ACCESS_CONTROL and O.USER_AUTHORIZATION)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall enforce the User Data Access Control SFP on subjects,
objects, and operations among subjects and objects specified in Table 6-2 and Table
6-3.
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
(for O.ACCESS_CONTROL and O.USER_AUTHORIZATION)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ ACF.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall enforce the User Data Access Control SFP to objects based
on the following: subjects, objects, and attributes specified in Table 6-2 and Table 6-
3.
FDP_ ACF.1.2 Refinement: The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: rules governing access
among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on
controlled objects specified in Table 6-2 and Table 6-3.
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FDP_ ACF.1.3 Refinement: The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on
the following additional rules: [assignment: rules that do not conflict with the User
Data Access Control SFP, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access
of subjects to objects].
[assignment: rules that do not conflict with the User Data Access Control SFP, based
on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects]
 None
FDP_ ACF.1.4 Refinement: The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: [assignment: rules that do not conflict with the User Data
Access Control SFP, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects
to objects].
[assignment: rules that do not conflict with the User Data Access Control SFP, based
on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects]
 None
Table 6-2 D.USER.DOC Access Control SFP
Create Read Modify Delete
Print
Operation:
Submit a
document to
be printed
View image or
Release
printed output
Modify stored
document
Delete stored
document
Job owner (note 1) denied
U.ADMIN denied denied
U.NORMAL denied denied Denied
Unauthenticated denied denied denied Denied
Scan
Operation:
Submit a
document for
scanning
View scanned
image
Modify stored
image
Delete stored
image
Job owner (note 2) denied denied
U.ADMIN denied denied denied
U.NORMAL denied denied Denied
Unauthenticated denied denied denied Denied
Copy Operation:
Submit a
document for
View scanned
image or
Modify stored
image
Delete stored
image
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copying Release
printed copy
output
Job owner (note 2) denied
U.ADMIN denied denied
U.NORMAL denied denied Denied
Unauthenticated denied denied denied Denied
Fax send
Operation:
Submit a
document to
send as a fax
View scanned
image
Modify stored
image
Delete stored
image
Job owner (note 2) denied denied
U.ADMIN denied denied denied
U.NORMAL denied denied Denied
Unauthenticated denied denied denied Denied
Fax receive
Operation:
Receive a fax
and store it
View fax
image or
Release
printed fax
output
Modify image
of received fax
Delete image
of received fax
Job owner (note 3) denied
U.ADMIN (note 4) denied
U.NORMAL (note 4) denied denied Denied
Unauthenticated denied denied Denied
Storage /
retrieval
Operation:
Store
document
Retrieve
stored
document
Modify stored
document
Delete stored
document
Job owner (note 1)
U.ADMIN denied
U.NORMAL denied denied Denied
Unauthenticated denied denied denied Denied
Table 6-3 D.USER.JOB Access Control SFP
Create Read Modify Delete
Print
Operation:
Create print
job
View print
queue / log
Modify print
job
Cancel print
job
Job owner (note 1) denied
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U.ADMIN denied denied
U.NORMAL denied denied Denied
Unauthenticated denied denied denied Denied
Scan
Operation:
Create scan
job
View scan
status / log
Modify scan
job
Cancel scan
job
Job owner (note 2) denied
U.ADMIN denied denied
U.NORMAL denied denied Denied
Unauthenticated denied denied denied Denied
Copy
Operation:
Create copy
job
View copy
status / log
Modify copy
job
Cancel copy
job
Job owner (note 2) denied
U.ADMIN denied denied
U.NORMAL denied denied Denied
Unauthenticated denied denied denied Denied
Fax send
Operation:
Create fax
send job
View fax job
queue / log
Modify fax
send job
Cancel fax
send job
Job owner (note 2) denied
U.ADMIN denied denied
U.NORMAL denied denied Denied
Unauthenticated denied denied denied Denied
Fax receive
Operation:
Create fax
receive job
View fax
receive status
/ log
Modify fax
receive job
Cancel fax
receive job
Job owner (note 3) denied
U.ADMIN (note 4) denied
U.NORMAL (note 4) denied denied Denied
Unauthenticated denied denied Denied
Storage /
retrieval
Operation:
Create storage
/ retrieval job
View storage /
retrieval log
Modify
storage /
retrieval job
Cancel storage
/ retrieval job
Job owner (note 1)
U.ADMIN denied
U.NORMAL denied denied Denied
Unauthenticated denied denied denied Denied
Note 1: Job Owner is identified by a credential or assigned to an authorized User as
part of the process of submitting a print or storage Job.
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Note 2: Job Owner is assigned to an authorized User as part of the process of initiating
a scan, copy, fax send, or retrieval Job.
Note 3: Job Owner of received faxes is assigned by default or configuration. Minimally,
ownership of received faxes is assigned to a specific user or U.ADMIN role.
Note 4: PSTN faxes are received from outside of the TOE, they are not initiated by
Users of the TOE.
6.1.4. Class FIA: Identification and Authentication
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
(for O.USER_I&A)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when [selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an
administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable
values]] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [assignment: list of
authentication events].
[selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable
positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values]]
 an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of
acceptable values]
[assignment: range of acceptable values]
 1 to 10
[assignment: list of authentication events]
 Consecutive unsuccessful authentication attempts since the last successful
authentication occur related to login user name designated by login from an
operational panel.
 Consecutive unsuccessful authentication attempts since the last successful
authentication occur related to login user name designated by login from a client PC.
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been
[selection: met, surpassed], the TSF shall [assignment: list of actions].
[selection: met, surpassed]
 met
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[assignment: list of actions]
 Login from the account is locked out between 1 and 60 minutes and until the
time designated by a device administrator that elapse, or until a device administrator
releases lock status.
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
(for O.USER_AUTHORIZATION)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual
users: [assignment: list of security attributes].
[assignment: list of security attributes]
 Login User Name, User Authorization, Job Authorization Setting
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Extended: Password Management
(for O.USER_I&A)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities for User
passwords:
･ Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of upper and lower
case letters, numbers, and the following special characters: [selection: “!”, “@”,
“#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(“, “)”, [assignment: other characters]];
･ Minimum password length shall be settable by an Administrator, and have the
capability to require passwords of 15 characters or greater;
[selection: “!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(“, “)”, [assignment: other characters]]
 “!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(“, “)” and [assignment: other characters]
[assignment: other characters]
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 “-”, “¥”, “[”, “]”, “:”, “;”, “,”, “.”, “/“, “"”, “'”, “=”, “~”, “|”, “`”, “{”, “}”, “+”, “<”, “>“, “?”,
“_”
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
(for O.USER_I&A)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall allow [assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions that do not
conflict with the User Data Access Control SFP, and do not provide access to
D.TSF.CONF, and do not change any TSF data] on behalf of the user to be performed
before the user is authenticated.
[assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions that do not conflict with the User Data
Access Control SFP, and do not provide access to D.TSF.CONF, and do not change any
TSF data]
 Obtain a device status
 Display a list of job information
 Display counter information
 Receive FAX data
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback
(for O.USER_I&A)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only [assignment: list of feedback] to the user while the
authentication is in progress.
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[assignment: list of feedback]
 dummy characters（*：asterisk）
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
(for O.USER_I&A and O.ADMIN_ROLES)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall allow [assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions that do not
conflict with the User Data Access Control SFP, and do not provide access to
D.TSF.CONF, and do not change any TSF data] on behalf of the user to be performed
before the user is identified.
[assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions thatdo not conflict with the User Data Access
Control SFP, and do not provide access to D.TSF.CONF, and do not change any TSF
data]
 Obtain a device status
 Display a list of job information
 Display counter information
 Receive FAX data
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other
TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding
(for O.USER_I&A)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_USB.1.1 The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with subjects acting on
the behalf of that user: [assignment: list of user security attributes].
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[assignment: list of user security attributes]
 Login User Name, User Authorization, Job Authorization Setting
FIA_USB.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user security
attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of users: [assignment: rules for the initial
association of attributes].
[assignment: rules for the initial association of attributes]
 None
FIA_USB.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user security
attributes associated with subjects acting on the behalf of users: [assignment: rules
for the changing of attributes].
[assignment: rules for the changing of attributes]
 None
6.1.5. Class FMT: Security Management
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior
(for O.ADMIN_ROLES)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MOF.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: determine the behaviour of,
disable, enable, modify the behaviour of] the functions [assignment: list of functions]
to U.ADMIN.
[selection: determine the behaviour of, disable, enable, modify the behaviour of]
 modify the behaviour of
[assignment: list of functions]
 Auditing
 User Authentication
 Storage Data Encryption
 Firmware update
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 Trusted Commnunication
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
(for O.ACCESS_CONTROL and O.USER_AUTHORIZATION)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall enforce the User Data Access Control SFP in Table 6-2 to
restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment:
other operations]] the security attributes [assignment: list of security attributes] to
[assignment: the authorised identified roles].
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]
 Operation(s) as listed in Table 6-4
[assignment: list of security attributes]
 Security Attributes as listed in Table 6-4
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
 Role as listed in Table 6-4
Table 6-4 Management of security attributes
Security Attributes Operation(s) Authorised Roles
Box Owner query, modify U.ADMINISTRATOR
Box Permission query, modify U.ADMINISTRATOR
U.NORMAL that
matches a Box
Owner.
Owner Information query, modify U.ADMINISTRATOR
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FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
(for O.ACCESS_CONTROL and O.USER_AUTHORIZATION)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1 Refinement: The TSF shall enforce the User Data Access Control SFP in Table 6-2 to
provide [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other
property]] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
[selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]]
 restrictive
FMT_MSA.3.2 Refinement: The TSF shall allow the [selection: U.ADMIN, no role] to specify alternative
initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.
[selection: U.ADMIN, no role]
 no role
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
(for O.ACCESS_CONTROL)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MTD.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall restrict the ability to perform the specified operations on the
specified TSF Data to the roles specified in Table 6-5, Table 6-6.
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Table 6-5 Operation of TSF data
TSF data Authorized Roles Operation
Login User Name U.ADMIN modify, delete, create
Login User Password U.ADMIN modify, delete, create
User Authorization U.ADMIN modify, delete, create
Job Authorization Settings U.ADMIN modify, delete, create
Number of Retries until locked
(User Account Lockout Policy Settings)
U.ADMIN modify
Lockout Duration
(User Account Lockout Policy Settings)
U.ADMIN modify
Lockout List U.ADMIN modify
Auto Logout Time Setting U.ADMIN modify
Password Policy Settings U.ADMIN modify
Date and Time Settings U.ADMIN modify
Network Encryption Setting U.ADMIN modify
FAX Forward Setting U.ADMIN modify
External Audit Log Server transmitting
setting
U.ADMIN modify
Encryption Key
Nobody [assignment: other
operations]
・Any Operations
Table 6-6 Operation of TSF data
TSF data Authorized Roles Operation
Login User Password associated with
U.NORMAL
U.NORMAL modify
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
(for O.USER_AUTHORIZATION, O.ACCESS_CONTROL, and O.ADMIN_ROLES)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
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FMT_SMF.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management
functions: [assignment: list of management functions provided by the TSF].
[assignment: list of management functions to be provided by the TSF]
 Functions that manage security attributes (i.e. Box Owner, Box Permission and
Owner Information) related to a Box function.
 Functions that manage TSF Data (i.e. Login User Name, Login User Password, User
Authorization, Job Authorization Settings, Number of Retries until Locked, Lockout
Duration, Auto Logout Time Setting, Password Policy Settings, Date and Time
Settings, Network encryption Setting, Fax Forward Setting, Send Destination
Information for forwarding Audit Log Report)
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
(for O.ACCESS_CONTROL, O.USER_AUTHORIZATION, and O.ADMIN_ROLES)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_SMR.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall maintain the roles U.ADMIN, U.NORMAL.
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
6.1.6. Class FPT: TSF Protection
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of TSF Data
(for O.COMMS_PROTECTION)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_SKP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private
keys.
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FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
(for O.AUDIT)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_STM.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.
FPT_TST_EXT.1 Extended: TSF testing
(for O.TSF_SELF_TEST)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests during initial start-up (and power on) to
demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
FPT_TUD_EXP.1 Extended: Trusted Update
(for O. UPDATE_VERIFICATION)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FCS_COP.1(b) Cryptographic Operation (for signature
generation/verification)
FCS_COP.1(c) Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm).
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide authorized administrators the ability to query the current
version of the TOE firmware/software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorized administrators the ability to initiate updates to TOE
firmware/software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall provide a means to verify firmware/software updates to the TOE using
a digital signature mechanism and [selection: published hash, no other functions]
prior to installing those updates.
[selection: published hash, no other functions]
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 no other functions
6.1.7. Class FTA: TOE Access
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination
(for O. USER_I&A)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FTA_SSL.3.1 The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after a [assignment: time interval of
user inactivity].
[assignment: time interval of user inactivity]
 Operation Panel ： No operation after time set by a device administrator
elapsed (between 5 seconds and 495 seconds)
 Web browser ： No operation after 10 minutes elapsed.
*There are no interactive session exists with the exception of a operation panel and a
web browser.
6.1.8. Class FTP: High Trusted Path/Channel
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
(for O.COMMS_PROTECTION, O.AUDIT)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 Extended: IPsec selected, or
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 Extended: TLS selected, or
FCS_SSH_EXT.1 Extended: SSH selected, or
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 Extended: HTTPS selected].
FTP_ITC.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall use [selection: IPsec, SSH, TLS, TLS/HTTPS] to provide a trusted
communication channel between itself and authorized IT entities supporting the
following capabilities: [selection: authentication server, [assignment: other
capabilities]] that is logically distinct from other communication channels and
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provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data
from disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data.
[selection: IPsec, SSH, TLS, TLS/HTTPS]
 IPsec
[selection: authentication server, [assignment: other capabilities]]
 [assignment: other capabilities]
[assignment: other capabilities]
 FTP Servr
 SMTP Server
 Audi Log Server
FTP_ITC.1.2 Refinement: The TSF shall permit the TSF, or the authorized IT entities, to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3 Refinement: The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [assignment:
list of services for which the TSF is able to initiate communications].
[assignment: list of services for which the TSF is able to initiate communications]
 FTP Service
 E-mail Service
 Audit Log Service
FTP_TRP.1(a) Trusted path (for Administrators)
(for O.COMMS_PROTECTION)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 Extended: IPsec selected, or
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 Extended: TLS selected, or
FCS_SSH_EXT.1 Extended: SSH selected, or
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 Extended: HTTPS selected].
FTP_TRP.1.1(a) Refinement: The TSF shall use [selection, choose at least one of: IPsec, SSH, TLS,
TLS/HTTPS] to provide a trusted communication path between itself and remote
administrators that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides
assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from
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disclosure and detection of modification of the communicated data.
[selection, choose at least one of: IPsec, SSH, TLS, TLS/HTTPS]
 IPsec
FTP_TRP.1.2(a) Refinement: The TSF shall permit remote administrators to initiate communication via
the trusted path.
FTP_TRP.1.3(a) Refinement: The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for initial administrator
authentication and all remote administration actions.
FTP_TRP.1(b) Trusted path (for Non-administrators)
(for O.COMMS_PROTECTION)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 Extended: IPsec selected, or
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 Extended: TLS selected, or
FCS_SSH_EXT.1 Extended: SSH selected, or
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 Extended: HTTPS selected].
FTP_TRP.1.1(b) Refinement: The TSF shall use [selection, choose at least one of: IPsec, SSH, TLS,
TLS/HTTPS] to provide a trusted communication path between itself and remote
users that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured
identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from
disclosure and detection of modification of the communicated data.
[selection, choose at least one of: IPsec, SSH, TLS, TLS/HTTPS]
 IPsec
FTP_TRP.1.2(b) Refinement: The TSF shall permit [selection: the TSF, remote users] to initiate
communication via the trusted path.
[selection: the TSF, remote users]
 remote users
FTP_TRP.1.3(b) Refinement: The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for initial user
authentication and all remote user actions.
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< Appendix B.1: Conditionally Mandatory Requirements (Confidential Data on Field-Replaceable
Nonvolatile Storage Devices) >
6.1.9. Class FPT: Protection of the TSF
FPT_KYP_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Key and Key Material
(for O.KEY_MATERIAL)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_KYP_EXT.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall not store plaintext keys that are part of the keychain
specified by FCS_KYC_EXT.1 in any Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage Device.
6.1.10. Class FCS: Cryptographic support
FCS_KYC_EXT.1 Extended: Key Chaining
(for O.STORAGE_EXCRYPTION)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_COP.1(e) Cryptographic operation (Key Wrapping),
FCS_SMC_EXT.1 Extended: Submask Combining,
FCS_COP.1(f) Cryptographic operation (Key Encryption),
FCS_KDF_EXT.1 Cryptographic Operation (Key Derivation),
and/or
FCS_COP.1(i) Cryptographic operation (Key Transport)]
FCS_KYC_EXT.1.1: The TSF shall maintain a key chain of: [selection: one, using a submask as the BEV or
DEK; intermediate keys originating from one or more submask(s) to the BEV or DEK
using the following method(s): [selection: key wrapping as specified in FCS_COP.1(e),
key combining as specified in FCS_SMC_EXT.1, key encryption as specified in
FCS_COP.1(f), key derivation as specified in FCS_KDF_EXT.1, key transport as specified
in FCS_COP.1(i)]] while maintaining an effective strength of [selection: 128 bits, 256
bits].
[selection: one, using a submask as the BEV or DEK; intermediate …]
 intermediate keys originating from one or more submask(s) to the BEV or DEK using
the following method(s): [selection: key wrapping as specified in FCS_COP.1(e), key
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combining as specified in FCS_SMC_EXT.1, key encryption as specified in
FCS_COP.1(f), key derivation as specified in FCS_KDF_EXT.1, key transport as
specified in FCS_COP.1(i)]
[selection: key wrapping as specified in FCS_COP.1(e), key combining as specified in
FCS_SMC_EXT.1, key encryption as specified in FCS_COP.1(f), key derivation as
specified in FCS_KDF_EXT.1, key transport as specified in FCS_COP.1(i)]
 key derivation as specified in FCS_KDF_EXT.1
[selection: 128 bits, 256 bits]
 256bit
6.1.11. Class FDP: User data protection
FDP_DSK_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Data on Disk
(for O.STORAGE_EXCRYPTION)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FCS_COP.1(d) Cryptographic operation (AES Data
Encryption/Decryption).
FDP_DSK_EXT.1.1: The TSF shall [selection: perform encryption in accordance with FCS_COP.1(d) , use a
self-encrypting Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage Device that is separately CC
certified to conform to the FDE EE cPP], such that any Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile
Storage Device contains no plaintext User Document Data and no plaintext
Confidential TSF Data.
[selection: perform encryption in accordance with FCS_COP.1(d) , use a self-encrypting
Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage Device that is separately CC certified to
conform to the FDE EE cPP]
 perform encryption in accordance with FCS_COP.1(d)
FDP_DSK_EXT.1.2: The TSF shall encrypt all protected data without user intervention.
FDP_FXS_EXT.1 Extended: Fax separation
(for O.FAX_NET_SEPARATION)
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Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_FXS_EXT.1.1: The TSF shall prohibit communication via the fax interface, except transmitting or
receiving User Data using fax protocols.
< Appendix C: Optional Requirements (C.2 Image Overwrite) >
FDP_RIP.1(a) Subset residual information protection
(for O.IMAGE_OVERWRITE)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_RIP.1.1(a) Refinement: The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is
made unavailable by overwriting data upon the deallocation of the resource from the
following objects: D.USER.DOC.
< Appendix D: Selection-based Requirements (D.1 Confidential Data on Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile
Storage Devices) >
6.1.12. Class FCS: Cryptographic support
FCS_COP.1(d) Cryptographic operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)
(for O.STORAGE_EXCRYPTION)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic key generation (Symmetric Keys)]
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material
Destruction
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FCS_COP.1.1(d): The TSF shall perform data encryption and decryption in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm AES used in [selection: CBC, GCM, XTS] mode and
cryptographic key sizes [selection: 128 bits, 256 bits] that meet the following: AES as
specified in ISO/IEC 18033-3, [selection: CBC as specified in ISO/IEC 10116, GCM as
specified in ISO/IEC 19772, and XTS as specified in IEEE 1619].
[selection: CBC, GCM, XTS]
 XTS
[selection: 128 bits, 256 bits]
 256bit
[selection: CBC as specified in ISO/IEC 10116, GCM as specified in ISO/IEC 19772, and
XTS as specified in IEEE 1619]
 XTS as specified in IEEE 1619
< Appendix D: Selection-based Requirements (D.2 Protected Communications) >
6.1.13. Class FCS: Cryptographic support
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 Extended: IPsec selected
(selected in FTP_ITC.1.1, FTP_TRP.1.1)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection,
FIA_PSK_EXT.1 Extended: Pre-Shared Key Composition
FCS_COP.1(g) Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message
authentication)
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.1: The TSF shall implement the IPsec architecture as specified in RFC 4301.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.2: The TSF shall implement [selection: tunnel mode, transport mode].
[selection: tunnel mode, transport mode]
 Transport mode
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.3: The TSF shall have a nominal, final entry in the SPD that matches anything that is
otherwise unmatched, and discards it.
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FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.4: The TSF shall implement the IPsec protocol ESP as defined by RFC 4303 using
[selection: the cryptographic algorithms AES-CBC-128 (as specified by RFC 3602)
together with a Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-based HMAC, AES-CBC-256 (as specified
by RFC 3602) together with a Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-based HMAC, AES-GCM-
128 as specified in RFC 4106, AES-GCM-256 as specified in RFC 4106].
[selection: the cryptographic algorithms AES-CBC-128 (as specified by RFC 3602)
together with a Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-based HMAC, AES-CBC-256 (as specified
by RFC 3602) together with a Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-based HMAC, AES-GCM-
128 as specified in RFC 4106, AES-GCM-256 as specified in RFC 4106]
 the cryptographic algorithms AES-CBC-128 (as specified by RFC 3602) together with
a Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-based HMAC
 AES-CBC-256 (as specified by RFC 3602) together with a Secure Hash Algorithm
(SHA)-based HMAC
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.5: The TSF shall implement the protocol: [selection: IKEv1, using Main Mode for
Phase 1 exchanges, as defined in RFCs 2407, 2408, 2409, RFC 4109, [selection: no
other RFCs for extended sequence numbers, RFC 4304 for extended sequence
numbers], and [selection: no other RFCs for hash functions, RFC 4868 for hash
functions]; IKEv2 as defined in RFCs 5996, [selection: with no support for NAT
traversal, with mandatory support for NAT traversal as specified in section 2.23], and
[selection: no other RFCs for hash functions, RFC 4868 for hash functions]].
[selection: IKEv1 as defined…; IKEv2 as defined…]
 IKEv1 as defined in RFCs 2407, 2408, 2409, RFC 4109, [selection: no other RFCs for
extended sequence numbers, RFC 4304 for extended sequence numbers], and
[selection: no other RFCs for hash functions, RFC 4868 for hash functions]
[selection: no other RFCs for extended sequence numbers, RFC 4304 for extended
sequence numbers]
 no other RFCs for extended sequence numbers
[selection: no other RFCs for hash functions, RFC 4868 for hash functions]
 RFC 4868 for hash functions
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.6: The TSF shall ensure the encrypted payload in the [selection: IKEv1, IKEv2] protocol
uses the cryptographic algorithms AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256 as specified in RFC
3602 and [selection: AES-GCM-128, AES-GCM-256 as specified in RFC 5282, no other
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algorithm].
[selection: IKEv1, IKEv2]
 IKEv1
[selection: AES-GCM-128, AES-GCM-256 as specified in RFC 5282, no other algorithm]
 no other algorithm
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.7: The TSF shall ensure that IKEv1 Phase 1 exchanges use only main mode.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.8: The TSF shall ensure that [selection: IKEv2 SA lifetimes can be established based on
[selection: number of packets/number of bytes; length of time, where the time values
can be limited to: 24 hours for Phase 1 SAs and 8 hours for Phase 2 SAs]; IKEv1 SA
lifetimes can be established based on [selection: number of packets/number of bytes ;
length of time, where the time values can be limited to: 24 hours for Phase 1 SAs and
8 hours for Phase 2 SAs]].
[selection: IKEv2 SA lifetimes can be established based on [selection: number of
packets/number of bytes; length of time, where the time values can be limited to: 24
hours for Phase 1 SAs and 8 hours for Phase 2 SAs]; IKEv1 SA lifetimes can be
established based on [selection: number of packets/number of bytes ; length of time,
where the time values can be limited to: 24 hours for Phase 1 SAs and 8 hours for
Phase 2 SAs]]
 IKEv1 SA lifetimes can be established based on [selection: number of
packets/number of bytes ; length of time, where the time values can be limited to:
24 hours for Phase 1 SAs and 8 hours for Phase 2 SAs]
[selection: number of packets/number of bytes ; length of time, where the time values
can be limited to: 24 hours for Phase 1 SAs and 8 hours for Phase 2 SAs]
 length of time, where the time values can be limited to: 24 hours for Phase 1 SAs
and 8 hours for Phase 2 SAs
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.9: The TSF shall ensure that all IKE protocols implement DH Groups 14 (2048-bit
MODP), and [selection: 24 (2048-bit MODP with 256-bit POS), 19 (256-bit Random
ECP), 20 (384-bit Random ECP, 5 (1536-bit MODP)), [assignment: other DH groups that
are implemented by the TOE], no other DH groups].
[selection: 24 (2048-bit MODP with 256-bit POS), 19 (256-bit Random ECP), 20 (384-
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bit Random ECP, 5 (1536-bit MODP)), [assignment: other DH groups that are
implemented by the TOE], no other DH groups]
 no other DH groups
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.10: The TSF shall ensure that all IKE protocols perform Peer Authentication using the
[selection: RSA, ECDSA] algorithm and Pre-shared Keys.
[selection: RSA, ECDSA]
 RSA
6.1.14. Class FCS: Cryptographic support
FCS_COP.1(g) Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message authentication)
(selected with FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.4)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic key generation (Symmetric Keys)]
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material Destruction
FCS_COP.1.1(g) Refinement: The TSF shall perform keyed-hash message authentication in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm HMAC-[selection: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-512], key size [assignment: key size (in bits) used in HMAC], and
message digest sizes [selection: 160, 224, 256, 384, 512] bits that meet the following:
FIPS PUB 198-1, "The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code, and FIPS PUB 180-3,
“Secure Hash Standard.”
[selection: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512]
 SHA-1, SHA-256
[assignment: key size (in bits) used in HMAC]
 160, 256 bit
[selection: 160, 224, 256, 384, 512]
 160, 256
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6.1.15. Class FIA: Identification and authentication
FIA_PSK_EXT.1 Extended: Pre-Shared Key Composition
(selected with FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.4)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit
Generation)
FIA_PSK_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to use pre-shared keys for IPsec.
FIA_PSK_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall be able to accept text-based pre-shared keys that are:
･ 22 characters in length and [selection: [assignment: other supported lengths], no
other lengths];
･ composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and
special characters (that include: “!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(“, and “)”).
[selection: [assignment: other supported lengths], no other lengths]
 [assignment: other supported lengths]
[assignment: other supported lengths]
 1-128
FIA_PSK_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall condition the text-based pre-shared keys by using [selection: SHA-1,
SHA-256, SHA-512, [assignment: method of conditioning text string]] and be able to
[selection: use no other pre-shared keys; accept bit-based pre-shared keys; generate
bit-based pre-shared keys using the random bit generator specified in
FCS_RBG_EXT.1].
[selection: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512, [assignment: method of conditioning text
string]]
 SHA-1, SHA-256
[assignment: method of conditioning text string]]
 none
[selection: use no other pre-shared keys; accept bit-based pre-shared keys; generate
bit-based pre-shared keys using the random bit generator specified in
FCS_RBG_EXT.1]
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 use no other pre-shared keys
< Appendix D: Selection-based Requirements (D.3 Trusted Update) >
6.1.16. Class FCS: Cryptographic support
FCS_COP.1(c) Cryptgraphic operation (Hash Algorithm)
(selected in FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3, or with FCS_SNI_EXT.1.1)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_COP.1.1(c) Refinement: The TSF shall perform cryptographic hashing services in accordance with
[selection: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512] that meet the following: [ISO/IEC
10118-3:2004].
[selection: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512]
 Listed in Table 6-7
Table 6-7 Cryptographic hashing setvices
Usage Hashing services
IPsec IKEv1 Authentication algorithm SHA-1, SHA-256
Key Derivation SHA-256
Signature verification of firmware SHA-256
< Appendix D: Selection-based Requirements (D.4 Passphrase-based Key Entry) >
6.1.17. Class FCS: Cryptographic support
FCS_KDF_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Key Derivation
(for O. STORAGE_ENCRYPTION)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
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Dependencies: FCS_COP.1(h) Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message
authentication),
[if selected: FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Operation
(Random Bit Generation)]
FCS_KDF_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall accept [selection: a RNG generated submask as specified in
FCS_RBG_EXT.1, a conditioned password submask, imported submask] to derive an
intermediate key, as defined in [selection: NIST SP 800-108 [selection: KDF in Counter
Mode, KDF in Feedback Mode, KDF in Double-Pipeline Iteration Mode], NIST SP 800-
132], using the keyed-hash functions specified in FCS_COP.1(h), such that the output
is at least of equivalent security strength (in number of bits) to the BEV.
[selection: a RNG generated submask as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1, a conditioned
password submask, imported submask]
 a RNG generated submask as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1
[selection: NIST SP 800-108 [selection: KDF in Counter Mode, KDF in Feedback Mode,
KDF in Double-Pipeline Iteration Mode], NIST SP 800-132]
 NIST SP 800-108 [selection: KDF in Counter Mode, KDF in Feedback Mode, KDF in
Double-Pipeline Iteration Mode]
[selection: KDF in Counter Mode, KDF in Feedback Mode, KDF in Double-Pipeline
Iteration Mode]
 KDF in Feedback Mode
FCS_COP.1(h) Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message authentication)
(selected with FCS_PCC_EXT.1, FCS_KDF_EXT.1.1)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic key generation (Symmetric Keys)]
FCS_COP.1(c) Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm),
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material Destruction
FCS_COP.1.1(h) Refinement: The TSF shall perform [keyed-hash message authentication] in
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accordance with [selection: HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-512] and
cryptographic key sizes [assignment: key size (in bits) used in HMAC] that meet the
following: [ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 “MAC Algorithm 2”; ISO/IEC 10118].
[selection: HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-512]
 HMAC-SHA-256
[assignment: key size (in bits) used in HMAC]
 256bit
6.2. TOE Security Assurance Requirement
Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) are described in Table 6-8 TOE Security Assurance
Requirements.
Table 6-8 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
AGD: Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ASE: Security Target evaluation ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ATE: Tests ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – Conformance
AVA: Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
6.3. Security Requirements Rationale
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6.3.1. Dependency Relationship of the TOE Security Functional Requirements
Table 6-9 shows the dependency relationship of the TOE security functional requirements.
Table 6-9 The dependency of the TOE Security Functional Requirements
Functional
Requirements
Dependency
Relationship by PP
Dependency
Relationship by ST
Dependencies Not
Satisfied
FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 FPT_STM.1 N/A
FAU_GEN.2 FAU_GEN.1
FIA_UID.1
FAU_GEN.1
FIA_UID.1
N/A
FAU_STG_EXT.1 FAU_GEN.1
FTP_ITC.1
FAU_GEN.1
FTP_ITC.1
N/A
FCS_CKM.1(a) [FCS_COP.1(b)],
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
[FCS_COP.1(b)],
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
N/A
FCS_CKM.1(b) [FCS_COP.1(f)],
FCS_CKM_EXT.4,
FCS_RBG_EXT.1
FCS_CKM_EXT.4,
FCS_RBG_EXT.1
N/A
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 [FCS_CKM.1(a), or
FCS_CKM.1(b)],
FCS_CKM.4
[FCS_CKM.1(a), or
FCS_CKM.1(b)],
FCS_CKM.4
N/A
FCS_CKM.4 [FCS_CKM.1(a), or
FCS_CKM.1(b)]
[FCS_CKM.1(a), or
FCS_CKM.1(b)]
N/A
FCS_COP.1(a) [FCS_CKM.1(b)],
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
[FCS_CKM.1(b)],
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
N/A
FCS_COP.1(b) FCS_CKM_EXT.4 FCS_CKM_EXT.4 N/A
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 No dependenceies No dependenceies N/A
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1 N/A
FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACC.1,
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACC.1,
FMT_MSA.3
N/A
FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1 N/A
FIA_ATD.1 No dependencies. No dependencies. N/A
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 No dependencies. No dependencies. N/A
FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1 N/A
FIA_UAU.7 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1 N/A
FIA_UID.1 No dependencies. No dependencies. N/A
FIA_USB.1 FIA_ATD.1. FIA_ATD.1. N/A
FMT_MOF.1 FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
N/A
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FMT_MSA.1 [FDP_ACC.1]
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
[FDP_ACC.1]
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
N/A
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1
N/A
FMT_MTD.1 FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
N/A
FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies. No dependencies. N/A
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1 N/A
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 No dependencies. No dependencies. N/A
FPT_STM.1 No dependencies. No dependencies. N/A
FPT_TST_EXT.1 No dependencies. No dependencies. N/A
FPT_TUD_EXP.1 FCS_COP.1(b)
FCS_COP.1(c)
FCS_COP.1(b)
FCS_COP.1(c)
N/A
FTA_SSL.3 No dependencies. No dependencies. N/A
FTP_ITC.1 [FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1, or
FCS_TLS_EXT.1, or
FCS_SSH_EXT.1, or
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 N/A
FTP_TRP.1(a) [FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1, or
FCS_TLS_EXT.1, or
FCS_SSH_EXT.1, or
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 N/A
FTP_TRP.1(b) [FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1, or
FCS_TLS_EXT.1, or
FCS_SSH_EXT.1, or
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 N/A
FPT_KYP_EXT.1 No dependencies. No dependencies. N/A
FCS_KYC_EXT.1 [ FCS_COP.1(e),
FCS_SMC_EXT.1,
FCS_COP.1(f),
FCS_KDF_EXT.1,
FCS_COP.1(i)]
FCS_KDF_EXT.1 N/A
FDP_DSK_EXT.1 FCS_COP.1(d) FCS_COP.1(d) N/A
FDP_FXS_EXT.1 No dependencies. No dependencies. N/A
FDP_RIP.1(a) No dependencies. No dependencies. N/A
FCS_COP.1(d) [FCS_CKM.1(b)]
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
[FCS_CKM.1(b)]
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
N/A
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 FIA_PSK_EXT.1 FIA_PSK_EXT.1 N/A
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FCS_COP.1(g) FCS_COP.1(g)
FCS_COP.1(g) [FCS_CKM.1(b)]
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
[FCS_CKM.1(b)]
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
N/A
FIA_PSK_EXT.1 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 N/A
FCS_COP.1(c) No dependencies. No dependencies. N/A
FCS_KDF_EXT.1 FCS_COP.1(h)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1
FCS_COP.1(h)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1
N/A
FCS_COP.1(h) [FCS_CKM.1(b)]
FCS_COP.1(c)
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
[FCS_CKM.1(b)]
FCS_COP.1(c)
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
N/A
6.3.2. Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
The SAR that this ST insists on completely corresponds with the SAR that PP prescribes.
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7. TOE Summary Specification
This section describes the summary specification for the security functions that are provided by
the TOE.
Table 7-1 shows the relations between the TOE security functions and security functional
requirements
Table 7-1 TOE security functions and security functional requirements
Security
Functions
Functional Requirements
User
Management
Function
Data
Access
Control
Function
Job
Authorization
Function
HDD
Encryption
Function
Overwrite-Erase
Function
Audit
Log
Function
Security
Management
Function
Trusted
operation
Network
Protection
Function
PSTN
Fax-Network
Separation
FAU_GEN.1          
FAU_GEN.2          
FAU_STG_EXT.1          
FCS_CKM.1(a)          
FCS_CKM.1(b)          
FCS_CKM_EXT.4          
FCS_CKM.4          
FCS_COP.1(a)          
FCS_COP.1(b)          
FCS_RBG_EXT.1          
FDP_ACC.1          
FDP_ACF.1          
FIA_AFL.1          
FIA_ATD.1          
FIA_PMG_EXT.1          
FIA_UAU.1          
FIA_UAU.7          
FIA_UID.1          
FIA_USB.1          
FMT_MOF.1          
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FMT_MSA.1          
FMT_MSA.3          
FMT_MTD.1          
FMT_SMF.1          
FMT_SMR.1          
FPT_SKP_EXT.1          
FPT_STM.1          
FPT_TST_EXT.1          
FPT_TUD_EXP.1          
FTA_SSL.3          
FTP_ITC.1          
FTP_TRP.1(a)          
FTP_TRP.1(b)          
FPT_KYP_EXT.1          
FCS_KYC_EXT.1          
FDP_DSK_EXT.1          
FDP_FXS_EXT.1          
FDP_RIP.1(a)          
FCS_COP.1(d)          
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1          
FCS_COP.1(g)          
FIA_PSK_EXT.1          
FCS_COP.1(c)          
FCS_KDF_EXT.1          
FCS_COP.1(h)          
         
7.1. User Management Function
User management function is a function that identifies and authenticates whether persons are
authorized users when users intend to operate the TOE from the operation panel or the client
PCs. For identification authentication, TOE obtains the login user name and login password from
the user, performs identification authentication using the local authentication method, and
permits the operation of TOE only to users who are determined to be authorized users as a
result of verification.
When the TOE is used from the Operation Panel or a Web browser, the login screen is displayed
and a user is required to enter his or her login user name and login password.
When the TOE is accessed from the printer driver or TWAIN driver, the TOE identifies and
authenticates if the person is authorized by referring to the login user name and login user
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password obtained from a user job.
(1) FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
When the number of consecutive unsuccessful login attempts from the operation panel or a
client PC since the last successful authentication, reaches the threshold, the TOE does not
allow the users to access to the accounts (i.e. state changes to lockout condition).
The number of unsuccessful authentication attempts set by the device administrator can be
within 1 to 10 times.
After changing to lockout state, If time between 1 and 60 minutes and until the lockout time
designated by a device administrator that elapse, or until a device administrator releases
lockout state, the TOE is then back to the normal state.
(2) FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
The TOE defines and maintains user attributes such as login user name, user authorization and
job authorization setting.
(3) FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Password Management
The TOE can set the password of U.USER to a string that is a combination of uppercase and
lowercase letters, numbers, and the following special characters:
“!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(“, “)”, “-”, “¥”, “[”, “]”, “:”, “;”, “,”, “.”, “/“, “"”, “'”, “=”, “~”,
“|”, “`”, “{”, “}”, “+”, “<”, “>“, “?”, “_”
The U.ADMIN can also set a minimum password length of 0 ~ 64 characters. Therefore, the
TOE can be limited to more than 15 characters by this setting.
(4) FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
When a user intends to login to the TOE, the TOE verifies if the entered login user name exists
in the user information pre-registered in the TOE.
With reception of the device status, the TOE provides information before the user is identified.
With a list of user jobs and counter information, the TOE displays the information before the
user is identified. With fax data reception, the TOE receives fax data before the user is
identified.
(5) FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
When the user is successfully identified by FIA_UID.1, the TOE verifies if the entered login user
password matches with one pre-registered in the TOE.
With reception of the device status, the TOE provides information before the user is
authenticated. With a list of user jobs and counter information, the TOE displays the
information before the user is authenticated. With fax data reception, the TOE receives fax
data, before the user is authenticated.
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(6) FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback
The TOE displays login user password entered from the operation panel or a client PC on the
login screen, which is masked by dummy characters (*: asterisk).
(7) FIA_USB.1 User-subject biding
The TOE associates user attributes such as login user name, user authorization and job
authorization setting with subjects.
(8) FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination
The auto-logout is activated if no operation is performed from the operation panel or a web
browser for certain period of time.
※There are no interactive session exists with the exception of a operation panel and a web
browser.
 Operation Panel
After the user logs on to the TOE and if no operation is performed while the auto-logout
time set by the device administrator elapses, the auto-logout is activated.
The time can be set to 5 to 495 seconds by the device administrator.
 Web browser
After the user logs on to the TOE and if no operation is performed for 10 minutes, the
auto-logout is activated.
7.2. Data Access Control Function
The data access control function is a function that allows authorized users only to access to image
data and job data stored in the TOE using each of the TOE basic function such as copy, scan to send,
print, fax and box function.
(1) FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1 Secuirty attribute based access control
The TOE allows authorized users only to access to image data and job data handled by
respective basic functions in accordance with the access control rules for users as shown in
Table 7-2.
In Table 7-2 Access Control Rules, login user names and owner information of targeted assets
need to be matched in order to determine if the jobs are executed by themselves.
Table 7-2 Access Control Rules for Data Access Control Functions
Targeted Assets Operations Users Access Control Rules
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Image Data
(Print Function)
Box Print (Job after print
request from a printer
driver), Print from a USB
memory, Delete
Normal User It is allowed for a normal user to
access to job image data executed
by themselves.
Delete Device
Administrator
It is allowed for a device
administrator to access to all job
image data.
Image Data
(Scan to Send
Function)
FTP Send, E-mail Send,
TWAIN Send, Preview
send image, Delete
Normal User It is allowed for a normal user to
access to job image data executed
by themselves.
Delete Device
Administrator
It is allowed for a device
administrator to access to all job
image data.
Image Data
(Copy Function)
Copy Print, Copy preview
image, Delete
Normal User It is allowed for a normal user to
access to job image data executed
by themselves.
Delete Device
Administrator
It is allowed for a device
administrator to access to all job
image data.
Image Data
(Fax Send Function)
FAX Send, Send preview
image, Delete
Normal User It is allowed for a normal user to
access to job image data executed
by themselves.
Delete Device
Administrator
It is allowed for a device
administrator to access to all job
image data.
Image Data
(Box Function)
Box print,
Box preview,
Box Send,
Move,Join and Delete
documens inside a box
Normal User It is allowed for a normal user to
access to image data stored in their
own box set as an owner or a box
permission to be enabled.
Device
Administrator
It is allowed for a device
administrator to access to all job
image data.
Image Data
(Fax Reception
Function)
Print FAX reception, FAX
forward, Delete
Device
Administrator
It is allowed for a device
administrator to access to image
data stored in FAX box.
Job Data Job status confirmation,
Edit, Delete
Normal User It is allowed for a normal user to
access to job image data executed
by themselves.
Device It is allowed for a device
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Administrator administrator to access to all job
image data.
(2) FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
The TOE sets default values for image data that is initially generated, and a box. Owner
information is created using a login user name of the user who initially creates the image data.
Box owner is a device administrator who initially creates the box, and the box permission is
disabled.
7.3. Job Authorization Function
The job authorization function is a function that allows authorized users only to use the TOE basic
function such as copy, scan to send, print, fax and box function.
(1) FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute-based access control
Table 7-3 shows that the TOE confirms job authorization setting included in user information
of a user who is identified and authenticated by user management function, and allows the
user to execute a job by using the authorized basic functions only.
Table 7-3 Access Control Rules for Job Authorization Function
Targeted
Function
Users Access Control Rules
Copy
Function
Normal User
Device
Administrator
When executable attributes of targeted functions
are included in job authorization setting of a user,
TOE allows the user to execute a job.
Print
Function
Normal User
Device
Administrator
When executable attributes of targeted functions
are included in job authorization setting of a user,
TOE allows the user to execute a job.
Scan to
Send
Function
Normal User
Device
Administrator
When executable attributes of targeted functions
are included in job authorization setting of a user,
TOE allows the user to execute a job.
FAX
Function
Normal User
Device
Administrator
When executable attributes of targeted functions
are included in job authorization setting of a user,
TOE allows the user to execute a job.
Box
Function
Normal User
Device
When executable attributes of targeted functions
are included in job authorization setting of a user,
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Administrator TOE allows the user to execute a job.
(2) FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
Table 7-3 shows that the TOE sets default values for job executable attributes that are targeted
functions of job authorization setting on a per user basis. When a user is newly added,
default values for executable attributes that are included in job authorization setting, have
been set for all jobs.
7.4. HDD Encryption Function
Once the basic function of the TOE is executed, image data, job data and TSF data is stored on the
HDD. The HDD encryption function is a function that encrypts data and then stores the data on
the HDD when storing these data on the HDD.
(1) FCS_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic key generation (Symmetric Keys)
FCS_KYC_EXT.1 Extended: Key Chaining
FCS_KDF_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Key Derivation
FCS_COP.1(c) Cryptgraphic operation (Hash Algorithm)
FCS_COP.1(h) Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message authentication)
FPT_KYP_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Key and Key Material
The TOE generates an encryption key for use in encrypting HDD by key derivation
function(KDF) in accordance with NIST SP800-108 by using Cryptographic Module. The
encryption key size is 256bits. Encryption key is derived from the Salt and IV and KDK. Salt is
obtained a RNG generated submask as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1 using Cryptographic
Module, and KDK uses a unique value for each Hardware. A unique value for each Hardware is
stored within Cryptographic Module and cannot be retrieved or rewritten. KDF uses feedback
mode and PRF is HMAC-SHA-256(Use SHA-256 in accordance with FCS_COP.1(c)). The block
size is 64 bytes, and the output MAC length is 256 bits.
Encryption algorithms used in KDF are shown in Table 7-4.
Note that key generation is provided by the FIPS 140-2 Certified Cryptographic Module in TOE environment.(CAVP
Validation Number : C1892)
Table 7-4 Encryption Algorithm for Key Derivation
Algorithm Standard SFR Reference
SHA-256 ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004 FCS_COP.1(c)
HMAC-
SHA-256
ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 “MAC
Algorithm 2”; ISO/IEC 10118
FCS_COP.1(h)
CTR_DRBG NIST SP800-90A FCS_RBG_EXT.1
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(AES)
This encryption key is generated based on a unique value on a per device basis, every time
each TOE is powered on, and this encryption key is stored in a volatile memory. Information
for encryption key is set only at the start of operation, and is not changed during the operation.
(2) FDP_DSK_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Data on Disk
FCS_COP.1(d) Cryptographic operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)
When storing data on the HDD, the TOE encrypts the data, using the 256 bits encryption key
generated at the time of booting and the AES-XTS encryption algorithm based on ISO/IEC
18033-3, XTS as specified in IEEE 1619, and write into the HDD. When reading out the stored
data from the HDD, the TOE decrypts the data, similarly using the 256 bits encryption key
generated at the time of booting and the AES-XTS encryption algorithm.
Note that data encryption is provided by the FIPS 140 -2 Certified Cryptographic Module in TOE environment.(CAVP
Validation Number : C1933)
(3) FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)
The random number used in this TOE can collect more than 256bits of entropy by inputting
Token to Cryptographic Module.
The random number generation of Cryptographic Module performs processing using
CTR_DRBG in accordance with SP800-90A, and includes 1bit of entropy per 1 bit for random
number output.
For DRGB random number generation, use the NRGB engine in the Cryptographic Module to
set the seed. As the NRBG is configured to generate 1 bit of entropy per 8 ‘noise’ bits and the
Conditioning function requires two bits of entropy at its input for each bit of entropy at its
output, generating one 256 bits ‘full entropy’ result requires 256*8*2=4K ‘noise’ bits. Also, in
order to avoid the use of values generated from the same seed, after 256 times 64Kbytes of
DRGB random number generation, the automatic generation of random number data by NRGB
is executed, and a new value is seeded to the DRGB random number generator by using the
random number data.
(4) FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction
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FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material Destruction
The encryption key generated to encrypting HDD is stored in the volatile memory. Therefore,
this key is deleted when the TOE is turned off. Also, the key material for generating the
encryption key is stored on the main board, but is deleted by performing Data Sanitization
function upon TOE disposal.
7.5. Overwrite-Erase Function
After process of the respective basic functions is complete, the TOE instructs to delete used image
data on the HDD or flash memory. The overwrite-erase function is a function that overwrites the
actual image data with meaningless character strings so that it disables re-usage of the data when
receiving an instruction for deletion of the stored image data on the HDD.
(1) FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
The TOE stores the used image data to be overwritten and erased in the specific area on the
HDD and flash memory, and then conducts to overwrite and erase by the process of auditing
of the specific area. When receiving an instruction for operation of another basic function
and so when waiting for the overwrite-erase function to be performed, or when the existence
of the used image data is found because of turning off the power during overwrite-erase
processing, the overwrite-erase is conducted by the audit process at the time of coming out
of the waiting status or at the time of turning on the power.
7.6. Audit Log Function
The audit log function is a function that generates, records and sends to Audit Log server the audit
logs when occurring auditable events.
(1) FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
The TOE records audit data as listed in Table 7-5, and generates audit logs when auditable
events shown in Table 7-5 occur.
Table 7-5 Auditable Events and Audit Data
Auditable Events Event name Outcome
Start-up of the audit functions Power-on*1
－
Shutdown of the audit functions Power-off*1
－
Job completion Completion of print job Success or Failure
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Completion of scan job Success or Failure
Completion of copy job Success or Failure
Completion of fax send job Success or Failure
Completion of fax receive job Success or Failure
Completion of storage /
retrieval job
Success or Failure
Unsuccessful User authentication
Unsuccessful User identification
Failure of the user
identification and
authentication
Success or Failure
Use of management functions Add user Success or Failure
Change password Success or Failure
Change login user name Success
Delete user Success
Change security setting Success
Modification to the group of Users
that are part of a role
Modifying user roles Success
Changes to the time Changing the Date and Time Success
Failure to establish session IPsec Session Establishment
Failure
Success or Failure
*1 Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions synchronize power-on and power-off of the TOE,
and thus power-on and power-off of the TOE of the event can be substituted.
TOE records the following data in audit events:
･ Date and time of the event, Type of event, Identification information of the user (Including
the identification information of the user who attempted to login), The outcome of the
event (success or failure)
(2) FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
For each auditable event, the TOE associates the user identity information that is a cause, with
the audit log.
(3) FAU_STG_EXT.1 Extended: External Audit Trail Storage
After the recorded audit log data is temporarily held in the TOE, the log file is transmitted
according to the external Audit Log Server set by the U.ADMIN.
The maximum number of audit log data temporarily stored in the TOE is 2300 logs. When the
maximum number of recorded audit log data becomes full, the oldest audit log data is deleted
and new audit log data can be stored.
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(4) FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
When the TOE communicates with each type of servers that are trusted IT products,
communication starts between them via a trusted channel. This communication can start from
the TOE. The following functions are provided.
 Send to audit log function
The TOE provides trusted channel communications listed below.
Table 7-6 Trusted channel communications provided by the TOE
Destination Protocols Encryption algorithm
Audit log Server IPsec with ESP 3DES(168 bits), AES(128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits)
(5) FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
The TOE has a system clock inside itself and allows device administrators only to change the
time setting of the TOE. The TOE records a date and time of the event with the system clock
when auditable events occur. The TOE provides a highly reliable time stamp by recording the
time stamps on audit records without delay when the time is recorded by the system clock
inside the TOE.
7.7. Security Management Function
Security management function is a function that allows authorized users only to edit user
information, set the TOE security functions and manage. The Security management function can
be performed from the Operation Panel and Client PCs. Web browser is used for operation from
Client PCs.
(1) FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior
TOE allows device administrators only to change setting the following management functions:
 Auditing
 User Management
 Storage Data Encrypiton
 Firmware update
 Trusted Commnication
(2) FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
The TOE allows device administrators only to use box functions for all boxes as shown below.
 Read and modify a box owner
 Read and modify a box permission
Whereas, the TOE allows device administrators only to use box functions for documents as
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shown below.
 Read and modify document owner information
Normal users are allowed to perform the following operation on the self owner boxes.
 Read and modify a box permission
(3) FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF Data
The TOE provides device administrators only with the operation listed in Table 7-7 on TSF data
listed in Table 7-7.
Table 7-7 Operation of TSF Data by Device Administrators
TSF Data Authorized Operation
Register user information
(Login user name, login user password, user
authorization, job authorization settings)
Edit,
Delete,
Newly create
User account lockout policy settings
(number of retries until locked, lockout duration)
Modify
Lockout list Modify
Auto logout time setting Modify
Password policy settings Modify
Date and time settings Modify
Network Encryption Setting Modify
FAX forward setting Modify
External Audit Log Server transmitting setting Modify
The TOE provides normal users with the operation listed in Table 7-8 on TSF data listed in
Table 7-8.
Table 7-8 Operaion of TSF Data by Normal Users
TSF Data Authorized Operation
Edit user information
(Login user password associated to the users)
Edit
(4) FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
The TOE maintains the user authorizations of device administrators and normal users, and
associates users to the user authorizations.
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(5) FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management function
The TOE provides management function of security attributes for box functions as mentioned
in (1), and security management function shown in Table 7-7 and Table 7-8 on TSF data shown
in Table 7-7 and Table 7-8.
7.8. Trusted operation
In Trusted operation, a firmware version check function and a function for permitting firmware
update are provided to the administrators, and a function for executing the following self-test at
the start-up of TOE is provided.
(1) FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Extended: Trusted Update
FCS_COP.1(b) Cryptographic operation (for signature generation/verification)
FCS_COP.1(c) Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm)
TOE provides administrators with the ability to check firmware versions. The administrator can
confirm the firmware version on the device information screen of the operation panel or the
web browser.
TOE also provides the ability to allow administrators to update firmware. Firmware updates
are only possible when the administrator has successfully authenticated the identity and is
logged in. When executing the firmware update, TOE verifies firmware data by using signature
verification according to FCS_COP.1(b) and hash calculation according to FCS_COP.1(c) from
digital signature attached to firmware data. It conforms to the RSA Digital Signature Algorithm
(rDSA) 2048bit, FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard" for signature verification and uses
SHA-256 for the hash algorithm. The firmware update processing is executed only when it is
determined that there is no problem as a result of the verification. If the verification of the
digital signature fails, the TOE displays an error on the operation panel and aborts the update
process.
(2) FPT_TST_EXT.1 Extended: TSF Testing
The TOE performs the following self-test at the TOE start-up.
 Execution the cryptgrachic module selftest
 Check the integrity of executable module of the security function
At the TOE start-up, the TOE performs a self-test of the cryptographic module. In this self-test,
a health test of the DRBG and a normal operation test of the encryption function are
performed. Also, the TOE also checks the integrity of the executable module of the security
function.
In case abnormal operation is found by check at the TOE start-up, the users are notified of
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this abnormal status by displaying it on the Operation Panel of the TOE. If no abnormal item
is found on the Operation Panel, the users assume the TOE correctly operates and so the users
can use the TOE.
7.9. Network Protection Function
The network protection function is a function that encrypts all data in transit over the network
between the TOE and trusted IT product and prevents unauthorized alteration and disclosure.
(6) FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of TSF Data
TOE stores all pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private keys used in the network protection function in NAND or
volatile memory. NAND and volatile memory are soldered to the main board, are not removable, and do not provide an
interface for all users. In addition, data in the volatile memory is erased when the power supply is turned off.
(7) FCS_CKM.1(a) Cryptographic key generation (for asymmetric keys)
TOE generates RSA-based keys in a manner compliance with NIST SP800-56B in generating asymmetric keys for use
in network protection functions.
(8) FCS_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic key generation (Symmetric Keys)
FCS_COP.1(a) Cryptographic operation (Symmetric encryption/decryption)
TOE encrypts communication using 128bit and 256bit AES-CBC as the encryption algorithm used in the network
protection function. To generate 128bit and 256bit target encryption keys, random number generation processing
according to FCS_RBG_EXT.1 is performed.
(9) FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material Destruction
The TOE stores the session key used by the network protection function in the volatile memory. The data of the volatile
memory is erased when the power supply is turned off.
(10)FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
When the TOE communicates with each type of servers that are trusted IT products,
communication starts between them via a trusted channel. This communication can start from
the TOE. The following functions are provided.
 Scan to send function
 Box function (Send Function)
The TOE provides trusted channel communications listed below.
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Table 7-9 Trusted channel communications provided by the TOE
Destination Protocols Encryption algorithm
Mail Server IPsec with ESP 3DES(168 bits), AES(128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits)
FTP Server IPsec with ESP 3DES(168 bits), AES(128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits)
(11)FTP_TRP.1(a) Trusted path (for Administrators)
FTP_TRP.1(b) Trusted path (for Non-administrators)
When the TOE communicates with each type of Client PC that are trusted IT products,
communication starts between them via a trusted channel. This communication can start from
either of the TOE or the trusted IT product. The following functions are provided.
 Print function
 Operation of a box function from a client PC (web browser)
 Operation of security management function from a client PC (web browser)
However, use of print function for a direct connection with the TOE is exception.
The TOE provides trusted channel communications listed below.
Table 7-10 Trusted channel communications provided by the TOE
Destination Protocols Encryption algorithm
Client PC IPsec with ESP 3DES(168 bits), AES(128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits)
(12)FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 Extended: IPsec selected
FIA_PSK_EXT.1 Extended: Pre-Shared Key Composition
FCS_COP.1(g) Cryptographic operation (for keyed-hash messege authetication)
FCS_COP.1(b) Cryptographic operation (for signature generation/verification)
FCS_COP.1(c) Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm)
IPSec with ESP is required for network datagram exchanges with Mail Server/FTP Server/Audit
log server and Client PC. IPSec provide confidentiality, integrity and authentication of the
endpoints. Supported encryption options for is AES. SHA-2 is supported for MACs.
ISAKMP and IKEv1 are used to establish the Security Association (SA) and keys for the IPSec
exchanges. Diffie-Hellman is used for IKEv1 Key Derivation Function as specified in RFC2409,
using Oakley Groups 14. In the ISAKMP exchange, a pre-shared keys is configured by
administrators and validated between endpoints.
The key size specified in the SA exchange is 128 or 256 bits and the encryption algorithm is
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AES-CBC and the Hash Authentication Algorithm may be SHA-1, SHA-256 (as configured by
administrators).
Keys generated for the IKEv1 exchanges are performed per RFC2409. If an incoming IP
datagram does not use IPSec with ESP, the datagram is discarded. All keys are held in memory
and is only valid with the corresponding SA. Once the SA is terminated the key cannot be used.
The TOE can be configured as IPsec security policy database(SPD) to accept or not(Allowed or
Denied) communications from networks other than those specified in the IPsec policy. Allowed
is set, communication from networks other than those specified in the IPsec rule settings is
also accepted. Denied is set, the packet is discarded without accepting communications from
networks other than those specified in the IPsec rule settings.
Note that random number generation based on FCS_RBG_EXT.1 in key generation is provided
by FIPS 140-2 certified cryptographic modules in TOE environment. (CAVP Validation Number :
C1892)
The IPsec protocol used by TOE is as follows. Note that device administrators can select an
item having multiple selections, and only the administrator can set or change this selection.
 Encapsulation Settings: Transport mode
 Security Protocol: ESP
- Cryptographic algorithms: AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256
- Authentication algorithms: HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256
 Key exchange: IKEv1
- IKEv1 algorithms: AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256
- IKEv1 mode: Main Mode
- IKEv1 SA lifetimes(phase1): 1,800 – 86,400 seconds
- IKEv1 SA lifetimes(phase2): 1,800 – 86,400 seconds
- Diffie-Hellman Group: DH Group 14
 Peer Authentication: RSA, Pre-shared Keys
 Authentication method: Pre-shared Keys
- Pre-shared Keys: 1-128 length and ASCII charactoers
- Authentication algorithms: SHA-1, SHA-256
7.10. PSTN Fax-Network Separation
TOE ensure separation between the PSTN fax line and the Internal Network.
(1) FDP_FXS_EXT.1 Extended: Fax separation
The TOE has a fax modem function, but provides only fax transmission and fax reception
functions over the PSTN.
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Since only the ITU-T G3 protocol is supported as a fax interface, only transmission and
reception using the fax protocol are accepted. Since a data modem function is not provided,
data communication commands from the outside are not accepted. Thus, the TOE cannot be
illegally accessed from the PSTN, and the TOE cannot be bridge-connected to the internal
network.
7.11. Deviations From Allowed Cryptographic Standards
The following deviations from the Allowed Cryptographic Standards in 188 Scheme Crypto Policy
are noted:
1. Hashing: SHA-1 is supported for backward compatibility with remote systems.
2. Block cipher: AES-XTS is supported for storage encryption.
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8. Acronyms and Terminology
8.1. Definition of terms
The definitions of the terms used in this ST are indicated in Table 8-1.
Table 8-1 Definitions of terms used in this ST
Terms Definitions
FAX System 12 This is provided as an optional product of MFP to use fax
function. FAX function can be used by installing FAX board
separately on MFP.
TWAIN This function is to read image from scanner and send the image
to a client PC. The term, “TWAIN” indicates the API
specification.
FAX Data Reception It indicates an action that includes reception of incoming FAX
data to TOE. (the process such as printing and forwarding of data
is not included.)
Job This is the operation processing unit to perform copy function,
print function, scan to send function, fax function and document
box function of TOE.
Job Data This data is generated when normal users use copy function,
scan to send function, print function, FAX function and box
function to execute jobs.
The job data is waiting in a job queue for execution. This data
is deleted, once job is complete.
Job Information It indicates information that job holds. It mainly indicates jobs
in operation. However, it also indicates histories of execution
results.
A list of Job
Information
One that list job information.
Job Status
Confirmation
This is to confirm on detailed information about job data.
Box Information Information that is stored in an area, called “box” when using
box function. For example, box name, box number, box size etc.
Security attributes such as box owner and box permission are
also included in this information.
Edit An operation that modifies data registered by users, such as user
information and box information.
Move It is to move document stored in a box to another box.
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Join It is to join multiple documents stored in a box, and create a new
joined document. Original documents remain.
Preview Send Image This is one of scan to send function and FAX function operation.
A function that displays image preview read from a scanner of
TOE for sending on the operation panel.
Preview Copy Image This is one of copy function operation.
A function that displays image preview read from a scanner of
TOE for copying on the operation panel .
Box Preview This is one of box function operation.
It is to display the preview of the document stored in a box on
the operation screen.
Device Status Information that shows TOE status. Remaining toner volume,
papers and mechanical errors are displayed.
Counter Information Information about counting jobs performed by TOE. When print
function performs, print counter increases. When scan to send
function performs, send counter increases.
Image Data It indicates the image information that is processed inside the
MFP when TOE normal users use copy function, scan to send
function, print function, FAX function and box function.
Client PC It indicates the computers that connect to the network, and
utilize the TOE services (functions) of the TOEs that are
connected to the network.
FIPS PUB 180-4 This is an algorithm about a hash function, which is
standardized by the NIST, U.S.(National Institute of Standards
and Technology).
FIPS PUB 197 This is an algorithm about the common cryptographic key,
which is standardized by the NIST, U.S. (National Institute of
Standards and Technology). Also, this is called “AES”.
Management Area An area within the image data where management information
for that data is recorded. A logical deletion of image data
means making this area unrecognizable.
Actual Data Area An area within the image data where data composing the
actual image is recorded. When image data is logically
deleted, this area will remain. This remaining area will be
called “residue area”.
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Overwrite-Erase This is to overwrite on the actual image data area with
meaningless character strings when receiving an instruction for
deletion of the stored image data in the HDD, and to delete the
management information of the image data after the actual data
area is completely erased. Thus it disables re-usage of the
data.
Operation Panel This is installed on the uppermost part of the MFP, and is
constituted by a liquid crystal panel.
It is an external interface, and users can utilize the TOE via this
operation panel.
Submask A submask is a sequence of bits generated and stored in
several ways.
8.2. Definition of acronyms
The definitions of the acronyms used in this ST are indicated in Table 8-2.
Table 8-2 Definitions of acronyms used in this ST
Acronyms Definitions
A. assumption (when used in hierarchical naming)
ADMIN. administrator (when used in hierarchical naming)
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
ALT alteration
BEV Border Encryption Value
CC Common Criteria
CONF. confidential (when used in hierarchical naming)
CPY copy
D. data (when used in hierarchical naming)
DIS disclosure
DOC. document (when used in hierarchical naming)
DSR document storage and retrieval
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
F. Function (when used in hierarchical naming)
FAX facsimile
FUNC. function (when used in hierarchical naming)
HCD Hardcopy Device
HDD Hard Disk Drive
IT information technology
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MFP Multi Functional Printer
NCU Network Control Unit
NVS nonvolatile storage
O.
Security Objective (of the TOE) (when used in hierarchical
naming)
OE.
Security Objective (of the operational environment) (when
used in hierarchical naming)
OSP organizational security policy
P.
organizational security policy (when used in hierarchical
naming)
PP Protection Profile
PROT. protected (when used in hierarchical naming)
PRT print
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SCN scan
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SMI Shared-medium Interface
SSD Solid State Drive
ST Security target
T. threat (when used in hierarchical naming)
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE security functionality
U. user (when used in hierarchical naming)
USB Universal Serial Bus
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