BSI-DSZ-CC-1235-2025
for
BlackBerry Unified Endpoint Management (UEM)
Server
Version 12.21.1 (40.32.0)
from
BlackBerry Ltd.
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.53
BSI-DSZ-CC-1235-2025 (*)
Mobile Device Management Server
BlackBerry Unified Endpoint Management (UEM) Server
Version 12.21.1 (40.32.0)
from BlackBerry Ltd.
PP Conformance: Protection Profile Mobile Device Management -
Trusted Server (MDM-TS). Version 1.0 as of 2021-
09-27; BSI-CC-PP-0115-2021,
PP-Configuration Mobile Device Management -
Trusted Server (MDM-TS) complemented with PP-
Module Trusted Communication Channel (TCC).
Version 1.0 as of 2021-09-27; BSI-CC-PP-0116-
2021
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.3
valid until: 7 September 2030
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), CEM:2022
extended by Scheme Interpretations for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), CC:2022. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408
and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 8 September 2025
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Fabian Hoduschek L.S.
Head of Certification
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 87 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1235-2025
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1235-2025 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification.....................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication...................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary...................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy...........................................................................................................13
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................13
5. Architectural Information............................................................................................14
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................14
7. IT Product Testing......................................................................................................14
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................16
9. Results of the Evaluation...........................................................................................16
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................17
11. Security Target.........................................................................................................18
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................18
13. Definitions................................................................................................................18
14. Bibliography.............................................................................................................19
C. Excerpts from the Criteria.............................................................................................21
D. Annexes........................................................................................................................ 22
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1235-2025
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licensing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), CC:2022 4
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz – BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung – BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs – Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) – dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1235-2025 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), CC:2022 [2] also published as
ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates – as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC – under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2 and ALC_FLR components.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesamtes für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik vom 14. April 2023 auf
https://www.bsi.bund.de
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1235-2025
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product BlackBerry Unified Endpoint Management (UEM) Server, Version 12.21.1
(40.32.0) has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product BlackBerry Unified Endpoint Management (UEM) Server,
Version 12.21.1 (40.32.0) was conducted by atsec information security GmbH. The
evaluation was completed on 28 August 2025. atsec information security GmbH is an
evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: BlackBerry Ltd.
The product was developed by: BlackBerry Ltd.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
evaluated guidance documentation [10] and in the following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment as specified in the following report and in the
Security Target [5].
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
[5]. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the certified version of the
product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed. Therefore, the sponsor
should apply for the certified product being monitored within the assurance continuity
program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis. Therefore, the BSI reserves the right to revoke the certificate, especially if an
exploitable vulnerability of the certified product gets known.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved, attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 8 September
2025 is valid until 7 September 2030. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target [5] and user guidance documentation [10] mentioned herein to any customer
of the product for the application and usage of the certified product,
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1235-2025 Certification Report
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product BlackBerry Unified Endpoint Management (UEM) Server, Version 12.21.1
(40.32.0) has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published
regularly in the listing found at the BSI Website https://www.bsi.bund.de/dok/Zertifizierung-
Gesamtlisten. Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 (0)228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
BlackBerry Ltd.
2200 University Avenue East
Waterloo, Ontario, N2K 0A7
Canada
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1235-2025
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1235-2025 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is BlackBerry Unified Endpoint Management (UEM) Server
Version 12.21.1 (40.32.0), a software for centralized management of mobile devices such
as smartphones and tablets that are used in an organization.
The Security Target [5] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Mobile Device Management - Trusted Server (MDM-TS) [7] and the PP-
Configuration complemented with the PP-Module Trusted Communication Channel (TCC)
[8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ALC_FLR.3.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [5], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some
of them are newly defined. Thus, the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF.AUDIT - Security Audit The TOE implements automated logging based on the actions
as specified in the Security Target [5], including device
enrolment/unenrolment and MDM server start-up and shutdown.
SF.CRYPTO – Cryptographic Support The TOE uses the Certicom Security Builder GSE-J Crypto Core
(version 2.9.2) for its generation and verification of RSA and
ECDSA signatures, to perform SHA-based HMAC, AES
encryption and decryption, SHA hashing as well as to establish
TLS/HTTPS connections, generate Ivs, and generate random
data. To seed its DRBG the Jitter RNG version 3.0.0 is utilized.
SF.DP - User Data Protection The TOE implements an internal PKI to support the issuance of
certificates for its own use (i.e., to identify itself to other parties)
and to be sent to mobile devices during enrolment.
Mobile devices may be grouped and assigned to different
managers by utilizing different parameters of a device, i.e. in the
TOE scope are Operating System (OS), Operating System
Version (OSV), Device Model (DM) and Manufacturer (M).
Payloads (i.e. new or updated policies and commands) are sent
to the mobile devices over-the-air using a TLS channel during
the mobile clients next check-in to the TOE. Managers can also
initiate an immediate check-in using the TOE's Management
console. Each device policy is signed by the UEM server using
an RSA certificate issued for that purpose.
SF.IA - Identification and authentication For each administrative account, the TOE stores the role
including the permissions and the mobile device users and user
groups managed by the user. For mobile devices enrolled in the
TOE, the mobile device user who activated the device and the
device group to which the mobile device has been assigned to
are stored. The TOE supports the creation of local users, but
also allows to use users maintained by an LDAP server.
Furthermore, staff members cannot perform any actions at all
(other than logging in, requesting password recover, choosing a
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TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
language and selecting the authentication provider) until they
authenticated successfully.
SF.MGMT - Security management The TOE maintains a set of pre-configured roles and allows to
create custom roles. Each role has its unique set of permissions
and actions it is allowed to take.
SF.PT - Protection of the TSF Data transmitted between the Management console (TLS client)
and the Core Server component (TLS server) is protected
against unauthorized disclosure and modification through the
use of TLS with mutual, certificate-based authentication.
Furthermore, the data channel between the staff agents and the
device agents is also protected against unauthorized disclosure
and modification using TLS.
SF.CHANNEL - Trusted path/channels The TOE implements TLS v1.2 to secure communication
channels with device agents during enrolment, with all enrolled
device agents, remote staff agents, remote database server as
well as external audit and LDAP authentication servers.
For all TLS channels, the TOE supports mutual authentication
using X509v3 certificates, however, mutual authentication is
always required for enrolled device agents, as well as external
audit and LDAP servers.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [5], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [5] and [8],
chapter 3. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Threats,
Organisational Security Policies and Assumptions. This is outlined in the Security Target
[5], chapters 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 respectively.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
BlackBerry Unified Endpoint Management (UEM) Server, Version 12.21.1 (40.32.0)
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
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No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 SW Installation package for installation of the TOE:
BlackBerry Unified Endpoint Management (UEM)
Server
Filename: UEM-12.21.1.zip
sha-256 hash:
76e9331fe24b04e0b6472dbd7df15bdffcfe28ebf80
a2ba7cc0c1c099f77ba60
12.21.1
(40.32.0)
Download
2 DOC BlackBerry UEM Administrative Guidance
Document [10]
filename: BlackBerry_UEM_AGD v1.14.pdf
Version 1.14
Date 2025-08-18
Download
3 DOC Mobile device policies sheet [11]
filename: Policy-Reference-Spreadsheet-
BlackBerry-UEM.xlsx
Version 12.20 Download
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The delivery of the TOE is electronic download in the form of an installation package. The
download is only possible after the customer logs in to the myAccount Portal, which
provides TLS-protected communication. The developer operates the download site
(myAccount Portal) and provides a SHA-256 hash for the installation package to be
downloaded that enables the customer to verify the integrity of the download.
The documentation can be downloaded via a web page operated by the developer and is
also protected via TLS.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. The TOE implements a role-based access control policy to
control administrative access to the system.
In addition, the TOE implements a security policy for device attendants grouping and
cluster of groupings for the manager attendant allowing the grouping of device attendants
and managing of the cluster.
Specific details concerning the above-mentioned security policies can be found in the
Security Target [5], chapter 6.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance: OE.PROPERSTAFF, OE.PROPERUSER, OE.PROPERMANAGEMENT,
OE.RESILIENCE, OE.DEVICELIFECYCLE, OE.SUPPORTINGSERVICES,
OE.RELIABLETIMESTAMPS and OE.AUDITTRAIL
Details can be found in the Security Target [5], chapter 4.2.
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5. Architectural Information
The Target of Evaluation is the software application BlackBerry UEM Server, developed by
BlackBerry Limited. The TOE is software-only and is accompanied by administrative
guidance documentation [10].
The hardware, the virtualization, the platform OS, the Java Runtime Environment and the
SQL database as well as additional software needed for TOE operation are considered to
be part of the TOE environment.
The TOE is accessible via network connection, administration is conducted via the Web UI
interface or automated via the Web Service API.
The TOE consists of two subsystems, namely the UEM Core and the Management
console. Both subsystems are constituted of multiple modules.
The UEM Core subsystem is designated as the central subsystem of the TOE
implementing the majority of the security functionality:
● Logging, monitoring, reporting, eventing and management functions,
● authentication, authorization, encryption services, scheduling, sending commands, IT
policies and profiles to devices,
● sending user, policy and other configuration data,
● communication with the Management Console subsystem, access to external services
like the SQL database.
The Management Console provides a web-based administrator interface to manage
system settings, users, and devices.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
Testing was conducted on Systems and in an environment conforming to the evaluated
configuration as outlined in Chapter 8.
Developer Testing
The developer performed testing against all interfaces of the TOE, including optional
interfaces, i.e. LDAP and SYSLOG testing. All tests are manual tests triggered or verified
via user-visible interfaces; this also includes manual checks of logs and database settings.
Overall, the developer executed 153 tests, including test variations based on the different
supported platforms, i.e. iOS and Samsung Knox.
The developer used a mapping between TSFI and test cases with related SFRs and
classification as well as a mapping between subsystems and test cases with related SFRs
to ensure that all security-relevant interfaces, subsystems and all SFRs have been subject
to testing.
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All developer test cases were executed successfully and showed the expected results.
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Evaluator Testing
The evaluator rerun part of the developer tests and devised several additional independent
tests regarding audit data filtering, device groups, device group permission, unsupported
TLS cipher suites (client), unsupported TLS versions (client), certificate validation, OCSP
state, OCSP certificate revocation and access of defined roles.
The tests were mainly defined to exercise TSFI specifications as well as SFR functionality
and claimed in the TOE documentation.
All tests were successfully executed without relevant deviations.
Penetration Testing
The evaluator devised tests, which intent to analyse a proper error handling of the TOE by
implementing tests using the interfaces of the TOE. Specifically, the evaluator tested the
TLS protocol as well as the access control mechanisms of the TOE. In contrast to the
automated functional testing these tests were mostly manual test cases.
All tests results were accepted by the evaluator. Thus, the evaluator concluded that the
TOE with respect to the tested functionality behaves as defined in the Security Target [5].
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
The evaluated configuration is covered in section 1.2.2 of the BlackBerry UEM
Administrative Guidance Document [10] and in section 1.5.2 of the Security Target [5].
These documents detail hardware, OS, virtualization, Java version, and database
essential for the installation as well as additional components needed for operation.
For testing the following components were used: A test system with an AMD EPYC 7702P
processor, VMware ESXi 8.0.2, Windows Server 2022, Microsoft SQL Server 2017,
OpenJDK 17 including the Java JRE 17 and Microsoft 2019 Active Directory.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [6] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_FLR.3 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Protection Profile Mobile Device Management - Trusted Server
(MDM-TS). Version 1.0 as of 2021-09-27; BSI-CC-PP-0115-
2021 [7]
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1235-2025 Certification Report
PP-Configuration Mobile Device Management - Trusted Server
(MDM-TS) complemented with PP-Module Trusted
Communication Channel (TCC). Version 1.0 as of 2021-09-27;
BSI-CC-PP-0116-2021 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.3
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 120 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The table in annex B of part D of this report gives an overview of the cryptographic
functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from
cryptographic point of view. Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column
'Security Level above 120 Bits' of the following table with 'no' achieves a security level of
lower than 120 Bits (in general context) only.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
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11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [5] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
JRE Java Runtime Environment
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
OCSP Online Certificate Status Protocol
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
UEM Unified Endpoint Management
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation – The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile – A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
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Extension – The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal – Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal – Expressed in natural language.
Object – A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon
which subjects perform operations.
Package – named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile – A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target – An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Subject – An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Syslog – A standard for message logging within computer networks.
Target of Evaluation – An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality – Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation/CC
ISO-Version:
ISO 15408:2022, Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
- Part 1: Introduction and general model
- Part 2: Security functional components
- Part 3: Security assurance components
- Part 4: Framework for the specification of evaluation methods and activities
- Part 5: Pre-defined packages of security requirements
https://www.iso.org/standard/72891.html
https://www.iso.org/standard/72892.html
https://www.iso.org/standard/72906.html
https://www.iso.org/standard/72913.html
https://www.iso.org/standard/72917.html
CCRA-Version:
CC:2022 R1, Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
- Part 1: Introduction and general model
- Part 2: Security functional components
- Part 3: Security assurance components
- Part 4: Framework for the specification of evaluation methods and activities
- Part 5: Pre-defined packages of security requirement
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Gemeinsame Evaluationsmethodologie für die Prüfung und Bewertung der
Sicherheit von Informationstechnik (Common Methodology for Information
Technology Security Evaluation (CEM), Evaluation Methodology
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ISO-Version:
ISO 18045:2022: Information technology Security techniques Methodology for IT
security evaluation
https://www.iso.org/standard/72889.html
CCRA-Version:
CEM:2022 R1, Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation
https://www.commoncriteriaportal
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licensing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1235-2025, Version 1.9, 2025-08-18, Security Target
for BlackBerry UEM Server, BlackBerry Ltd.
[6] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1, 2025-08-19, Final Evaluation Technical
Report, atsec information security GmbH, (confidential document)
[7] Protection Profile Mobile Device Management - Trusted Server (MDM-TS). Version
1.0, 2021-09-27; BSI-CC-PP-0115-2021
[8] PP-Configuration Mobile Device Management - Trusted Server (MDM-TS)
complemented with PP-Module Trusted Communication Channel (TCC). Version
1.0, 2021-09-27; BSI-CC-PP-0116-2021
[9] Configuration list for the TOE, Archive “alc/ALC_CI_List_2025-06-16.zip”, dated
2025-06-16, BSI Evaluation CI list (confidential document)
[10] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 1.14, 2025-08-18, BlackBerry UEM
Administrative Guidance Document, BlackBerry Ltd.
[11] Mobile device policies sheet, file Policy-Reference-Spreadsheet-BlackBerry-
UEM.xlsx, Version 12.20, as delivered on 2025-08-19, BlackBerry Ltd.
7
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria in its CCRA Documents can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC:2022 part 1 chapter
10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC:2022
Part 3 chapter 6.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to
CCRA CC:2022 Part 5.
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC:2022 Part 3
chapter 9
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC:2022 Part 3 chapters 7 to 15
• The table 1 in CC:2022 part 5, Chapter 4.2 summarizes the relationship between
the evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published as the CCRA Version at
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/index.cfm
The CC are published as the ISO/IEC Version at
https://standards.iso.org/ittf/PubliclyAvailableStandards/index.html
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Overview and rating of cryptographic functionalities implemented in the TOE
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1235-2025 Certification Report
Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1235-2025
Overview and rating of cryptographic functionalities implemented
in the TOE
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security
Level
above
120 Bits
Comments
1 Authentication
(Server)
X.509 certificates [RFC5280] N/A -
2 RSA signature
verification
RSASSA-PKCS1-
v1.5 using SHA-2
[RFC3447]
(PKCS#1 v2.1)
[FIPS186-4]9
(RSA)
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
Modulus
length:
>= 2048 bits
No8
Security
Level above
100 bits
3 RSA signature
verification
RSASSA-PSS
using SHA-2
[RFC3447]
(PKCS#1 v2.1)
[FIPS186-4]9
(RSA)
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
Modulus
length:
>= 3072 bits
Yes
4 Authentication
(Client)
RSA signature
verification
RSASSA-PKCS1-
v1.5 using SHA-2
[RFC3447]
(PKCS#1 v2.1)
[FIPS186-4]9
(RSA)
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
Modulus
length:
>= 3072 bits
Yes
5 RSA signature
verification
RSASSA-PSS
using SHA-2
[RFC3447]
(PKCS#1 v2.1)
[FIPS186-4]9
(RSA)
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
Modulus
length:
>= 3072 bits
Yes
6 ECDSA signature
verification using
SHA-2 with the
same size as the
selected curve
[FIPS186-4]9
(ECDSA)
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
Key size
defined by
selected curve
size:
256, 384 or
521 bits
Yes
7 ECC key
generation for
use in ECDH
ECDSA NIST
P-256, P-384,
P-521
[FIPS186-4] B.4 Key size
defined by
selected curve
size:
256, 384 or
521 bits
Yes
8
The TOE accepts RSA certificates with a modulus length below 3072 bits for external services, like push
notification, as some of this services cannot be used without this. It enforces the use of 3072 bits and higher
for keys it is controlling. This includes keys generated by it and configured for bi-directional authentication
between TOE components as well as with the remote devices. For these keys a Security Level above 120
Bits is achieved.
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security
Level
above
120 Bits
Comments
8 RSA key
generation
RSA key
generation
[FIPS186-4]9
B.4 Modulus
length:
>= 3072 bits
Yes
9 Key
establishment:
Key agreement
Ephemeral
TLS_ECDHE with
NIST P-256,
P-384, P-521
[SP800-56A-rev3]
[RFC5289]
Key size
defined by
selected curve
size:
256, 384 or
521 bits
Yes
10 Key derivation TLS v1.2 PRF:
HMAC with
SHA-256,
SHA-384
[RFC2104] (HMAC)
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
[RFC5246] (TLSv1.2)
variable -
11 Confidentiality
of user data
Cipher: AES
Modes: GCM
[FIPS197] (AES)
[SP800-38D] (GCM)
[RFC5289]
(AES GCM within TLS)
[RFC5246] (TLSv1.2)
|k| = 128, 256 Yes
12 Confidentiality
of user data
Cipher: AES
Modes: CBC
[FIPS197] (AES)
[SP800-38A] (CBC)
|k| = 256 Yes
13 Trusted
Channel
TLS v1.2 [RFC5246] -
14 Random
number
generation
Hash DRBG with
SHA-512 core, no
PR
[SP800-90A-Rev1] -
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
References for table 3
FIPS180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
Date 2015-08-04
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/180-4/upd1/final
FIPS186-49
Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
Date 2013-06-19
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/186-5/final
FIPS197 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
Date 2023-05-09
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/197/final
9
Note that FIPS 186-5 requirements are fullfilled: Albeit the PP and as a result the ST contains the claim to
implement FIPS 186-4, the CAVP testing of the asymmetric algorithms covered FIPS 186-5 as well.
Therefore, the FIPS186-5 requirements are fullfilled as well.
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RFC2104 HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication
Author(s) H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, R. Canetti
Date 1997-02-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2104.txt
RFC3447 Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1
Author(s) J. Jonsson, B. Kaliski
Date 2003-02-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt
RFC5246 The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2
Author(s) T. Dierks, E. Rescorla
Date 2008-08-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5246.txt
RFC5280 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile
Author(s) D. Cooper, S. Santesson, S. Farrell, S. Boeyen, R. Housley, W. Polk
Date 2008-05-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5280.txt
RFC5288 AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS
Author(s) J. Salowey, A. Choudhury, D. McGrew
Date 2008-08-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5288.txt
RFC5289 TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites
with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)
Author(s) E. Rescorla
Date 2008-08-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5289.txt
RFC7919 Negotiated Finite Field Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Parameters for
Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Author(s) D. Gillmor
Date 2016-08-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc7919.txt
SEC2 Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters
Date 2000
Location http://www.secg.org
SP800-38A Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
Methods and Technique
Date 2001-12-01
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/38/a/final
SP800-38D Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC
Date 2007-11-28
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/38/d/final
SP800-56A-Rev3 Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes Using
Discrete Logarithm Cryptography
Date 2018-04-16
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/56/a/r3/final
SP800-90A-Rev1 Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic
Random Bit Generators
Date 2015-06-24
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/90/a/r1/final
Note: End of report
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