Public
CC Document Please read the Important Notice and Warnings at the end of this document 1.1
www.infineon.com 2018-07-20
With firmware and software library options:
3x FW-Identifiers, Flash Loader, 2xMCS, 3xHSL, 2xACL, 2xSCL and 2xCIPURSE™ CL
Author: Hans-Ulrich Buchmüller
Revision: 1.1
Common Criteria Public Security Target
EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
IFX_CCI_000003h
IFX_CCI_000005h
IFX_CCI_000008h
IFX_CCI_00000Ch
IFX_CCI_000013h
IFX_CCI_000014h
IFX_CCI_000015h
IFX_CCI_00001Ch
IFX_CCI_00001Dh
IFX_CCI_000021h
IFX_CCI_000022h
H13
Resistance to attackers with HIGH attack potential
Public
CC Document Please read the Important Notice and Warnings at the end of this document 1.1
www.infineon.com 2018-07-20
Table of Contents
1 Security Target Introduction (ASE_INT) ................................................................................5
1.1 Security Target and Target of Evaluation Reference ..........................................................................5
1.2 Target of Evaluation overview..........................................................................................................15
2 Target of Evaluation Description.........................................................................................22
2.1 TOE Definition..................................................................................................................................22
2.2 Scope of the TOE .............................................................................................................................26
2.2.1 Hardware of the TOE...................................................................................................................27
2.2.2 Firmware and software of the TOE..............................................................................................28
2.2.3 Interfaces of the TOE...................................................................................................................33
2.2.4 Guidance documentation ............................................................................................................34
2.2.5 Forms of delivery.........................................................................................................................35
2.2.6 Production sites........................................................................................................................... 37
3 Conformance Claims (ASE_CCL) .........................................................................................38
3.1 CC Conformance Claim.....................................................................................................................38
3.2 PP Claim...........................................................................................................................................38
3.3 Package Claim..................................................................................................................................38
3.4 Conformance Rationale....................................................................................................................39
3.4.1 Security Problem Definition ........................................................................................................39
3.4.2 Conformance Rationale...............................................................................................................39
3.4.3 Adding Objectives .......................................................................................................................40
3.4.4 AES and TDES.............................................................................................................................40
3.4.5 Loader.........................................................................................................................................40
3.4.6 CIPURSE Cryptographic Library (CCL).........................................................................................41
3.4.7 Summary.....................................................................................................................................41
3.5 Application Notes.............................................................................................................................44
4 Security Problem Definition (ASE_SPD) ..............................................................................45
4.1 Threats.............................................................................................................................................45
4.1.1 Additional Threat due to TOE specific Functionality....................................................................45
4.1.2 Assets regarding the Threats.......................................................................................................46
4.2 Organizational Security Policies .......................................................................................................47
4.2.1 Augmented Organizational Security Policy .................................................................................47
4.3 Assumptions.....................................................................................................................................49
4.3.1 Augmented Assumptions............................................................................................................49
4.3.2 Note regarding CIPURSE™ CL.....................................................................................................49
5 Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)............................................................................................50
5.1 Security objectives for the TOE ........................................................................................................50
5.2 Security Objectives from PP for development and environment ......................................................53
5.3 Security Objectives for the Environment..........................................................................................53
5.3.1 Clarification of “Treatment of User Data (OE.Resp-Appl)” ..........................................................54
5.3.2 Clarification of “Protection during Composite product Manufacturing (OE.Process-Sec-IC)”......55
5.4 Security Objectives Rationale...........................................................................................................55
5.5 P.Add-Functions...............................................................................................................................56
5.6 A.Key-Function ................................................................................................................................56
5.7 T.Mem-Access..................................................................................................................................56
5.8 P.Ctrl_Loader, P.Lim_Block_Loader, T.Masquerade and T.Open_Samples_Diffusion .....................57
5.9 P.Crypto-Service ..............................................................................................................................59
6 Extended Component Definition (ASE_ECD)........................................................................60
6.1 Component Subset TOE security testing (FPT_TST.2) .....................................................................60
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6.1.1 Definition of FPT_TST.2 ..............................................................................................................60
6.1.2 TSF self-test (FPT_TST)...............................................................................................................61
7 Security Requirements (ASE_REQ) .....................................................................................62
7.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements............................................................................................62
7.1.1 Extended Components FCS_RNG.1 and FAU_SAS.1 ...................................................................66
7.1.2 Subset of TOE testing.................................................................................................................. 71
7.1.3 Memory access control................................................................................................................72
7.1.4 Support of Cipher Schemes.........................................................................................................75
7.1.5 Data Integrity FDP_SDI.2 and FDP_SDC.1................................................................................. 101
7.1.6 Application Note to FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state.................................. 101
7.2 Support by the Flash Loader...........................................................................................................102
7.3 TOE Security Assurance Requirements ..........................................................................................106
7.3.1 Refinements.............................................................................................................................. 107
7.4 Security Requirements Rationale ................................................................................................... 111
7.4.1 Rationale for the Security Functional Requirements.................................................................. 111
7.4.2 Rationale of the Assurance Requirements .................................................................................120
8 TOE Summary Specification (ASE_TSS) ............................................................................ 121
8.1 SF_DPM: Device Phase Management............................................................................................. 121
8.1.1 Listing of SFRs implemented by SF_DPM Device Phase Management......................................122
8.2 SF_PS: Protection against Snooping .............................................................................................. 123
8.2.1 SF_S Protection against Snooping ............................................................................................124
8.3 SF_PMA: Protection against Modifying Attacks.............................................................................125
8.3.1 Listing of SFRs implemented by SF_PMA Protection against Modifying Attacks ...................... 127
8.4 SF_PLA Protection against Logical Attacks.................................................................................... 127
8.4.1 Listing of SFRs implemented by SF_PLA Protection against Logical Attacks ............................128
8.5 SF_CS Cryptographic Support........................................................................................................128
8.5.1 Implementation of AES and TDES by the Symmetric Cryptographic Coprocessor SCP.............129
8.5.2 Implementation of TDES, AES and CMAC by the Symmetric Cryptographic Library SCL.......... 131
8.5.3 RSA Cryptographic Library for versions v2.07.003 and v2.06.003 .............................................. 133
8.5.4 Elliptic Curves Cryptographic Library for versions v2.07.003 and v2.06.003 ............................... 135
8.5.5 Toolbox Library for versions v2.07.003 and v2.06.003................................................................136
8.5.6 CIPURSE™ Cryptographic Library for both versions.................................................................. 137
8.5.7 Hybrid PTRNG........................................................................................................................... 137
8.5.8 Listing of SFRs implemented by SF_CS “Cryptographic Support” .............................................138
8.6 Assignment of Security Functional Requirements to TOE’s Security Functionality.........................139
8.7 Security Requirements are internally Consistent............................................................................142
9 Literature and References................................................................................................ 143
10 Annex: Consideration of additional Requirements by the GBIC Approval Scheme .................146
11 Hash Signatures of Cryptographic Libraries .......................................................................148
11.1 ACL - RSA, EC, Toolbox Version v2.07.003......................................................................................148
11.2 ACL - RSA, EC, Toolbox Version v2.06.003: ....................................................................................149
11.3 SCL– Symmetric Cryptographic Library Version v02.04.002 ..........................................................149
11.4 SCL– Symmetric Cryptographic Library Version v02.02.010...........................................................150
11.5 MCS – Mifare Compatible Software v02.02.3389............................................................................150
11.6 MCS - Mifare Compatible Software v02.03.3446 ............................................................................150
11.7 HSL - Hardware Support Library v03.11.8339 ................................................................................. 151
11.8 HSL - Hardware Support Library v02.01.6634................................................................................. 151
11.9 HSL - Hardware Support Library v01.22.4346................................................................................. 151
11.10 CIPURSE™ Cryptographic Library (CCL) in version v02.00.0004 .................................................... 151
11.11 CIPURSE™ Cryptographic Library (CCL) in version v2.0.0002 ........................................................ 151
12 List of Abbreviations........................................................................................................ 152
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13 Glossary ......................................................................................................................... 154
14 Revision History..............................................................................................................156
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1 SecurityTarget Introduction (ASE_INT)
1.1 SecurityTarget andTarget of Evaluation Reference
The title of this document is Public Security Target and it covers and describes one hardware platform
respectively one IC representing the Target of Evaluation (TOE) with following Common Criteria Identifiers
 IFX_CCI_000003h
 IFX_CCI_000005h
 IFX_CCI_000008h
 IFX_CCI_00000Ch
 IFX_CCI_000013h
 IFX_CCI_000014h
 IFX_CCI_000015h
 IFX_CCI_00001Ch
 IFX_CCI_00001Dh
 IFX_CCI_000021h
 IFX_CCI_000022h
in the design step H13 and including optional software libraries and dedicated firmware in several versions as
stated below.
In order to ease the readability of this document the bunch of Common Criteria Identifiers as listed above is
shortened and simply expressed with TOE (Target of Evaluation).
This document is formed according to Common Criteria CCv3.1 EAL6 augmented (EAL6+) and comprises the
Infineon Technologies AG Security Controller (Integrated Circuit IC) with the above listed Common Criteria
Identifiers and with specific IC dedicated firmware in three alternative versions and optional software.
The target of evaluation (TOE) is described in the following.
This confidential Security Target has the revision 1.1 and is dated 2018-07-20.
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The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Infineon Security Controller with following optional available software
packages:
 The asymmetric cryptographic libraries (ACL) in two alternative versions v2.07.003 and v2.06.003:
o Both libraries provide RSA1
2048/4096 cryptography.
The library supports also smaller key lengths, but the certification follows the national regulation
by the BSI2
.
o Both libraries provide elliptic curve cryptography EC3
 the Toolbox library in the version v2.07.003 and alternatively v2.06.003 provides basic mathematical
functions for a simplified user interface to the Crypto@2304T
 the symmetric cryptographic libraries (SCL) in the improved version v02.04.002 and the version
v02.02.010 provide simplified interfaces and utilize the full services of the SCP to the user
 the hardware support library (HSL) in the versions v02.01.6634 and v01.22.4346 provides a simplified
interface and utilizes the full services of the SOLID FLASH™ NVM to the user
 the hardware support library (HSL) in the version v03.11.8339 provides equal to the above a simplified
interface, utilizes the full services of the SOLID FLASH™ NVM to the user, and enables the use of an
additional advanced reading respectively writing method
 the CIPURSE™ Cryptographic Library (CIPURSE™ CL and CCL) in both alternative versions v02.00.0004
and v2.0.0002 provides the user OSPT4
alliance CIPURSE™ V2 conformant communication functionality
between a PICC and a PCD.
 the Mifare Compatible Software (MCS)5
and with further specific IC dedicated firmware in three alternative versions.
Note that each of the versions of the ACL, SCL, HSL, CCL and of the MCS are alternatively. This means that the
TOE comes either with one of the alternative library types– depending on the user choice - or with none. The
library types can freely be combined but not two versions of the equal type. For examples ACL with SCL with HSL
with MCS is welcome but a combination of MCS in version v02.03.3446 and at the same time with MCS in version
v02.02.3389 would not work. The library types are entirely independent from each other.
The security relevant differences in the versions - if any - are detailed in chapter 8. The claims of this Security
Target take the versions into account and thus the wording in the following refers to the library type which is
cited or else the claim includes always all named versions.
The design step of this TOE is H13.
1
Rivest-Shamir-Adleman asymmetric cryptographic algorithm
2
BSI – Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik – Federal Office for Information Security: Following the national BSI
recommendations, RSA key lengths below 1976 bits are not included in the certificate. Please note that the BSI expects this key length
as appropriate until 2022 and recommends for longer usage times key lengths of 3000 bits or higher.
3 The Elliptic Curve Cryptography is abbreviated with EC only in the further, in order to avoid conflicts with the abbreviation for the Error
Correction Code ECC.
4
Open Standard for Public Transport (OSPT™) Alliance
5
The term “Mifare” in this document is only used as an indicator of product compatibility to the corresponding established technology.
This applies to the entire document whenever the term is used.
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The Security Target is based on the Protection Profile PP-0084 Security IC Platform Protection Profile with
Augmentation Packages [9] as publicly available for download at https://www.bsi.bund.de and certified under
BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014.
The Protection Profile and the Security Target are built in compliance with Common Criteria v3.1 Revision 5.
The Security Target takes into account all relevant current final interpretations.
This TOE concept is based on the architecture, family concept and principles of the Integrity Guard implemented
in the controllers by Infineon Technologies AG deemed for high security requiring applications.
The certification body of this process is the German BSI, whereas the abbreviation stands for Federal Office for
Information Security, in German language Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
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Table 1 Identification
Version Date Registration
Security Target 1.1 2018-07-20 This document
Target of Evaluation
The hardware controller with following identifiers:
 IFX_CCI_000003h
 IFX_CCI_000005h
 IFX_CCI_000008h
 IFX_CCI_00000Ch
 IFX_CCI_000013h
 IFX_CCI_000014h
 IFX_CCI_000015h
 IFX_CCI_00001Ch
 IFX_CCI_00001Dh
 IFX_CCI_000021h
 IFX_CCI_000022h
In the Design Step H13
With FW-Identifiers 80.100.17.0 or
80.100.17.1 or
80.100.17.2
And following optional SW - libraries:
RSA2048 v2.07.003 or v2.06.003
RSA4096 v2.07.003 or v2.06.003
EC v2.07.003 or v2.06.003
Toolbox v2.07.003 or v2.06.003
HSL-1 v03.11.8339
HSL-2 v02.01.6634
HSL-3 v01.22.4346
SCL-1 v02.04.002
SCL-2 v02.02.010
MCS-1 v02.03.3446
MCS-2 v02.02.3389
CIPURSE™ CL-1 v2.0.0002
CIPURSE™ CL-2 v02.00.0004
with belonging user guidance documentation
Protection Profile 1.0 2014-01-13
Security IC Platform Protection Profile with
Augmentation Packages BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
Common Criteria
3.1
Revision 5
2017-04
Common Criteria for
Information Technology Security Evaluation
Part 1: Introduction and general model
CCMB-2017-04-001
Part 2: Security functional requirements
CCMB-2017-04-002
Part 3: Security Assurance Components
CCMB-2017-04-003
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User Guidance Documentation Set
Chapter 2.2.4 describes briefly the contents of the individual documents of the User Guidance
Documentation, while the individual documents are versioned and entitled in chapter 9 literature and
references. The in this chapter listed set of user guidance documents belongs to the TOE.
This TOE is represented by a number of various products which are all based on the equal design sources. The
TOE hardware remains entirely equal throughout all derivatives, but the usage for example in form of available
memory sizes, availability of the various interfaces, or other functions varies by means of blocking and chip
configuration. The firmware identifier on board depends on the order.
All TOE derivatives are derived from the equal hardware design results.
The TOE can be identified with the Generic Chip Identification Mode (GCIM). The TOE hardware platform is
identified by defined bytes of the GCIM as detailed in the HRM [1].
The unique hexadecimal values as stated in the title are:
 IFX_CCI_000003h
 IFX_CCI_000005h
 IFX_CCI_000008h
 IFX_CCI_00000Ch
 IFX_CCI_000013h
 IFX_CCI_000014h
 IFX_CCI_000015h
 IFX_CCI_00001Ch
 IFX_CCI_00001Dh
 IFX_CCI_000021h
 IFX_CCI_000022h
These bytes clearly identify the hardware platform, or, in other words, the therein possible values for the TOE
(without prefix IFX_CCI_) represent the equal hardware platform of this TOE. This means that the hardware
entirely equals throughout all derivatives and that the differences are achieved by configuration and blocking
means only. These values are unique for this hardware platform. This means that these values will not be used in
any other platform or product.
The interpretation of the output GCIM data is clearly explained in the user guidance, Hardware Reference Manual
HRM [1].
Although the TOE is represented by a number of various products, all based on the equal design sources, the
hardware is constituted out of few slightly different mask sets enabling to adapt to various external contactless
and contact based devices not being part of this TOE. Except this external adapt capability the TOE hardware
and firmware – depending on the order option - remains entirely equal throughout all derivatives, but the usage
for example in form of available memory sizes, availability of the various interfaces, or other functions varies by
means of blocking and chip configuration. This blocking is applied by Infineon settings during the production
only. Again, all TOE derivatives are derived from the equal hardware design results, the TOE.
The differences between the derivatives are achieved by blocking only and have no impact on the TOEs security
policies and related functions. Details are explained in the user guidance hardware reference manual HRM [1].
All product derivatives are identically from module design, layout and footprint, but are made different in their
possibilities to connect to different types of external antennas or to a contact based interface only. Therefore,
the TOE is represented and made out of different mask sets with following TOE internal and security irrelevant
differences: The mask sets implement different input capacitances in the analogue part of the radio frequency
interface (RFI). This differentiation in the input capacitances allows the connection to a wider range of various
antenna types. Note that external antennas or interfaces are not part of the TOE.
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To each of the mask sets, an individual value is assigned, which is part of the data output of a specific
identification mode. More details are explained in the user guidance hardware reference manual (HRM) and in
the errata sheet.
There are no other differences between the mask sets the TOE is produced with.
The TOE products enable for a maximum of configuration possibilities defined by the customer order following
the market needs. For example, a TOE product can come in one project with the fully available SOLID FLASH™
NVM1
or in another project with any other SOLID FLASH™ NVM -size below the physical implementation size, or
with a different RAM size. And more, the user has the free choice, whether he needs the symmetric co-processor
SCP, or the asymmetric co-processor Crypto2304T, or both, or none of them. In addition, the user decides,
whether the TOE comes with a free combination of software libraries or without any. And, to be even more
flexible, various interface options can be chosen as well. To sum up the major selections, the user defines by his
order:
 the firmware identifier in three alternatives
 the available memory sizes of the SOLID FLASH™ NVM and RAM
 the availability of the cryptographic coprocessors SCP and Crypto@2304T
 the availability and free combinations of the cryptographic libraries
ACL-1, ACL-2, SCL-1 and SCL-2
 the availability of the CIPURSE™ Cryptographic Library in two alternative versions
 the availability of the Flash Loader
 the availability of the alternative libraries HSL-1 or HL-2 or HSL-3
 the availability of the alternative libraries MCS -1 or MCS-2
 the availability of various interface options
 the possibility to tailor the product by blocking on his own premises (BPU)
 the possibility to apply the PIN letter in combination with the Flash Loader
The degree of freedom of the chip configuration is predefined by Infineon Technologies AG and made available
via the order tool.
Beside fix TOE configurations, which can be ordered as usual, this TOE implements optionally the so called
Billing-Per-Use (BPU) ability. This solution enables our customer to tailor the product on his own to the required
configuration – project by project. By that BPU allows for significant reduction of logistic cost at all participating
parties and serves for acceleration of delivery of tailored product to the end-user.
BPU enables our customers to block the chip on demand into the final configuration at his own premises, without
further delivery or involving support by Infineon Technology.
The realization of it requires the presence of the Flash Loader software, enhanced with the BPU blocking
software part. The presence of the BPU ability defines the customer with his order.
If the user decides to use the Flash Loader, regardless whether it is ordered with or without BPU, an additional
process option can be ordered which results in an additional status of the Flash Loader. This process is called PIN-
Letter and enables for simplified logistics and thereby for faster delivery of the ordered TOE products to the user.
The PIN-Letter feature enabling for the PIN-Letter process is an implemented part of the Flash Loader. The
resulting logistical acceleration is possible since the PIN-Letter enables for delivery of not user-specific
configured, not flashed and not personalized TOE products to the user warehouse.
By delivery the user warehouse gets filled and depending on market demands the user can immediate apply the
authentication means of the PIN-letter. If passing, the TOE products become user specific configured and the
Flash Loader can be used for this specific user in a second step.
1
SOLID FLASH™ is an Infineon Trade Mark and stands for the Infineon Flash NVM. The abbreviation NVM is short for Non Volatile
Memory. The information remains stored even the power has been removed.
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The following table outlines the different ways how the user can input his software on this TOE – a TOE without
user available ROM. User software comprises usually the operating system and applications, which are for
Infineon Technologies simply a user data package which is handled as a fixed data package during production.
This provides high process flexibility for the user of which an overview is given in the following table:
Table 2 Options to implement user software on the chip
Case Option Flash Loader Status
1.
The user or/and a subcontractor downloads the
software into the SOLID FLASH™ NVM on his
own. Infineon Technologies has not received user
software and there are no user data of the
Composite TOE in the ROM.
The Flash Loader can be activated or reactivated
by the user or subcontractor to download his
software in the SOLID FLASH™ NVM.
2
The user provides his complete software for the
download into the SOLID FLASH™ NVM to
Infineon Technologies AG. The software is
downloaded to the SOLID FLASH™ NVM during
chip production.
The Flash Loader is permanently disabled prior
delivery.
3
The user provides software for the download into
the SOLID FLASH™ NVM to Infineon
Technologies AG. The software is downloaded to
the SOLID FLASH™ NVM during chip
production.
When leaving the Infineon Technologies
production facility, the Flash Loader is blocked,
but can be activated or reactivated by the user or
subcontractor to complete the previously stored
software parts in the SOLID FLASH™ NVM.
Precondition is that the user has provided an own
reactivation procedure in software prior chip
production to Infineon Technologies AG.
For the cases with active Flash Loader on board and whenever the user has finalized his SW-download,
respectively the TOE is in the final state and about to be delivered to the end-user, the user is obligated to lock
the Flash Loader. This locking is the final step and results in a permanent deactivation of the Flash Loader. This
means that once being in the locked status, the Flash Loader cannot be reactivated anymore.
Note that whenever a TOE comes without active Flash Loader, BPU and PIN-Letter process are not possible.
All in all various delivery combinations are given and for example, a product can come with a fix configuration
and with Flash Loader, to enable the user to download software, but without BPU option and with PIN-Letter.
The following cases can occur:
Table 3 Options with Flash Loader, BPU and PIN-Letter
Case Order Option
1 Fix configuration,
Flash Loader is
locked (permanent)
 Infineon Technologies configures and flashes all software as
ordered.
 The entire user software must be delivered to Infineon
Technologies prior production.
2 Flash Loader
functional, BPU
feature blocked
 Infineon configures the chip as ordered and
 the user flashes his software at his own premises.
 If requested, Infineon Technologies can optionally download also
shares of the user software during production. These user
software shares must be delivered to Infineon Technologies prior
production. The user can finalize his software package at his
premises.
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Case Order Option
3 Flash Loader
functional
and active BPU
feature
The user:
 Activates the Flash Loader,
 configures the chip applying the BPU feature and
 flashes his software at his own premises.
 If requested, Infineon Technologies can optionally download also
shares of the user software during production. These user
software shares must be delivered to Infineon Technologies prior
production. The user can finalize his software package at his
premises.
4 Flash Loader
functional
and PIN-Letter
Infineon configures the chip as ordered. The user receives his PIN-letter
and fills his warehouse. As required the user:
 applies the PIN-Letter on the chips taken from his warehouse,
gets the chips user specific configured,
 activates the Flash Loader and
 the user flashes his software at his own premises.
If requested, Infineon Technologies can optionally download also shares
of the user software during production. These user software shares must
be delivered to Infineon Technologies prior production. The user can
finalize his software package at his premises.
5 Flash Loader
functional,
active BPU and
PIN-Letter
Infineon configures the chip as ordered. The user receives his PIN-letter
and fills his warehouse. As required the user:
 applies the PIN-Letter on the chips taken from his warehouse,
gets the chips user specific configured,
 activates the Flash Loader,
 applies his user specific chip configuration with the BPU feature
and
 flashes his software at his own premises.
If requested, Infineon Technologies can optionally download also shares
of the user software during production. These user software shares must
be delivered to Infineon Technologies prior production. The user can
finalize his software package at his premises.
The following listing contains the memory size ranges and other blocking options, focusing on the maximum
respectively minimum user available limitations. Within those limitations the TOE configurations can vary under
only one identical IC-hardware, regardless whether the configurations are set by Infineon or within further
limitations by the user. All configurations throughout all different mask sets the TOE is made off and all thereof
resulting derivatives have no impact on security and are covered by the certificate.
Note that this TOE has no user available ROM. The user software and data are entirely located in a dedicated and
protected part of the SOLID FLASH™ NVM. The long life storage endurance together with the means for error
detection and correction serves for excellent reliability and endurance.
In addition to the above listed flexible ranges, the user guidance contains a number of predefined configurations
for those customers not making use of the BPU option. All of these configurations belong to the TOE as well and
are of course made of the equal hardware and are inside the above declared ranges.
Today’s predefined configurations of the TOE are listed in the hardware reference manual HRM [1] and is
completed with the list of identification data of the derivatives. These predefined products come with the most
requested configurations and enables to produce volumes on stock in order to simplify logistic processes.
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Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
According to the BPU option, a non-limited number of configurations of the TOE may occur in the field. The
number of various configurations depends on the user and order contract only.
This TOE provides dedicated identification means and outputs the platform identifier, the design step and
further configuration information. The hardware reference manual HRM [1] is part of the user guidance and
enables for the clear interpretation of the read out identification data. More information is given in the
confidential Security Target [8].
These output data enable the user for clear identification of the TOE and also of one of the different mask sets
and therewith for examination of the validity of the certificate.
In addition, a dedicated RMS function allows reading out the present configuration in detail. The output RMS
data together with the hardware reference manual HRM [1] enables for clear identification of a product and its
configuration. All these steps for gathering identification and detailed configuration information can be done by
the user himself, without involving Infineon Technologies AG.
The TOE consists of the hardware part, the firmware parts in the alternative versions and the optional software
parts. The Smartcard Embedded Software, i.e. the operating system and applications are not part of the TOE.
The firmware comes with three alternative versions and consists of:
 the Boot Software (BOS) firmware conducting configuration and testing task (see chapter 2.2.2) at start-
up of the TOE
 the Resource Management System (RMS) library providing essential basis functions for the management
of the RAM, the branch table, the Memory Management Unit (MMU) and other resources
 the optional Flash Loader enabling for the download of user software to the SOLID FLASH™ NVM and
required for the optional Bill per Use (BPU) feature and the PIN-letter feature
 the Radio Frequency Application Interface (RFAPI) supporting functions located in the ROM
The BOS, MCS- and RFAPI basic routines are implemented in a separated test-ROM area not available for the
user.
The optional software parts are differentiated into following libraries:
 the asymmetric cryptographic libraries (ACL-1 and ACL-2) in two alternative versions provides RSA1
cryptography
 the asymmetric cryptographic libraries (ACL-1 and ACL-2) in two alternative versions provides EC2
cryptography
 the Toolbox library in in two alternative versions (ACL-1 and ACL-2) provides basic mathematical
functions for a simplified user interface to the Crypto@2304T
 the symmetric cryptographic libraries (SCL-1 and SCL-2) in two alternative versions for simplified user
interfaces to the symmetric cryptographic coprocessor
 the hardware support library (HSL) in three alternative versions
 the CIPURSE™ Cryptographic Library (CIPURSE™ CL) in two alternative versions and
 the Mifare Compatible Software (MCS) in two alternative versions
The RSA, EC and Toolbox libraries provide certain functionality via an API to the Smartcard Embedded Software.
The private parts of the cryptographic libraries are only used internally and have no user interface. If neither the
RSA- nor the EC library is delivered, also the belonging private parts are not on board. The Toolbox library does
not have private library parts.
1
Rivest-Shamir-Adleman asymmetric cryptographic algorithm
2 The Elliptic Curve Cryptography is abbreviated with EC only in the further, in order to avoid conflicts with the abbreviation for the Error
Correction Code ECC.
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Each of the libraries ACL, SCL, HSL and MCS is independent from the other libraries and also independent of the
alternative library version of the equal type. This means for example that the MCS-1 runs alone and does not
need parts of MCS-2.
A combination respectively mix up of the two alternative libraries of equal type has not been considered in the
design and is not allowed: The user can select either one or the other of the same library type or none of it.
If the user considers the optional software libraries, the TOE can be delivered including - in free combinations - or
not including any of the optional libraries.
If the user decides not to use any of the offered asymmetric cryptographic libraries, regardless of the version
chosen, none of the cryptographic libraries is consequently delivered and the accompanying Additional Specific
Security Functionality (O.Add-Functions) Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) and/ or EC is/are not provided by the
TOE. Else it depends of the chosen library whether the Additional Specific Security Functionality
(O.Add-Functions) Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) and/ or EC is/are supported.
The Toolbox library, regardless of the version chosen, provides the user optionally basic arithmetic and modular
arithmetic operations, in order to support user software development using long integer operations. These basic
arithmetic operations do not provide security functionality, implement no security mechanism, and do not
proved additional specific security functionality - as defined for the cryptographic libraries.
The user developed software using the Toolbox basic operations is not part of the TOE.
The symmetric cryptographic library SCL – in both versions - offers a high level interface to perform the
cryptographic operations DES, TDES and AES with different key lengths on the symmetric cryptographic
coprocessor (SCP) for this TOE. In addition, the SCL in version v02.04.002 implements computation of a CMAC
using AES and 3DES algorithms.
The SCL implements already several block cipher modes as declared in this document and covering a wide range
of applications, the SCL offers in addition the flexibility to implement additional block cipher modes defined by
the user.
This library provides a simplified interface to the hardware Symmetric Cryptographic Coprocessor (SCP) and
preserves the security and performance requirements as required by the user.
Note that the definition of the key lengths follows the national AIS32 regulation regarding the 100 bit security
level by the BSI. This excludes the single DES operation from the certification.
Beside the inclusion and support of cryptographic libraries this TOE comes with the optional Hardware Support
Library (HSL) in three versions which significantly simplifying the management of the SOLID FLASH™ NVM
functionality. The HSL constitutes an application interface (API) accessing the HSL state machine and
abstracting low level properties like special function registers and settings of specific hardware features. In short
the HSL provides a user friendly also use case oriented interface considering endurance, reliability and
performance requirements.
In certain configurations each of the HSL versions provide also functions implementing tearing safe behaviour of
the SOLID FLASH™ NVM. If applied the user has no need to care about cases where the TOE is unintentionally
removed from the power supply or the radio frequency field even during managing the SOLID FLASH™ NVM.
Anyhow, the HSL remains as an optional library, as even sudden power off situations do not lead to exploitable
conditions of the TOE. In the worse, the TOE ends operation in case of a faulty programmed SOLID FLASH™
NVM location.
In addition to the above, the HSL in version v03.11.8339 provides an advanced additional method called
Incremental Write (IWR). This method provides enhanced endurance of the SOLID FLASH NVM even beyond the
erase endurance limits for often written objects. Thus this method serves applications with a demand for high
endurance and fast writing times. On the other hand, the read times using this method are slower than the other
methods provided.
The order option CIPURSE™ Cryptographic Library (CIPURSE™ CL) - in two alternative versions - provides
cryptographic functionality to implement a CIPURSE™ V2 conformant protocol.
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This protocol provides a secure mutual authentication of two entities, namely the terminal (denoted as PCD =
Proximity Coupling Device (CIPURSE™-compliant terminal)) and a smart card or a token in other form factors
which is called PICC. PICC stands for Proximity Integrated Circuit Card (CIPURSE™-compliant card).
Beside the mutual authentication, the protocol implements measures to maintain the integrity of the transferred
data and preserves in parallel the confidentiality of the transferred data.
All claims in the following apply for both alternative versions.
By that the CIPURSE™ CL supports the user to implement systems conformant to the CIPURSE™ open standard
implementing a secured, interoperable and flexible transit fare collection solution, including ISO 7816, ISO/IEC
14443-4 communication and AES-128 bit cryptography for multiple payment types.
The Mifare Compatible Software (MCS), in two alternative versions is a further order option and implements the
routines for a Mifare compatible interface. The MCS provides an operating system handling the emulation of a
Mifare-compatible card together with the RF interface. One part of the MCS is permanently stored in the ROM
and the second part consisting of patch and API is located in the SOLID FLASH™ NVM. The second part is only
present if the MCS is part of the delivery. If the MCS is not part of the delivery the ROM part is present but not
used. The MCS implements tearing safe behaviour in context with the SOLID FLASH™ NVM management and is
therefore independent from the HSL.
Deselecting one of the optional libraries does not include the code implementing functionality, which the user
decided not to use. Not including the code of the deselected functionality has no impact of any other security
policy of the TOE; it is exactly equivalent to the situation where the user decides just not to use the functionality.
All optional software libraries are stored respectively can be loaded into the SOLID FLASH™ NVM.
All other Smartcard Embedded Software does not belong to the TOE and is not subject of the evaluation.
1.2 Target of Evaluation overview
The TOE comprises the Infineon Technologies Dual Interface Security Controller TOE with specific IC dedicated
software, optional cryptographic- and further services libraries.
The TOE is a member of the Infineon Technologies AG high security controller-family meeting the highest
requirements in terms of performance and security. A summary product description is given in this Security
Target.
This TOE is intended to be used in any application and device requiring the highest level of security, for example
as secure element in various devices with various form factors.
This member of the high security controller family features a security philosophy focusing on data integrity
instead of numerous sensors. By that two main principles combined in close synergy are utilized in the security
concept called the Integrity Guard. These main principles are the comprehensive error detection, including the
double CPU, and the full encrypted data path, leaving no plain data on the chip. These principles proved that
they provide excellent protection against invasive and non-invasive attacks known today.
The intelligent shielding algorithm finishes the upper layers, finally providing the so called intelligent implicit
active shielding I2
-shield. This provides physical protection against probing and forcing.
This TOE provides multiple contact based and contactless interface options for various applications and markets.
Due to the interface flexibility the product can be used in almost any application, within any device and almost
any form factor. Due to these multiple communication possibilities, the TOE can be seen as a stand-alone
security device being capable to maintain the various communication interfaces simultaneously. Therefore this
TOE is able to run multiple applications, using multiple interfaces independently at the same time.
Again these multiple communication and application independency capabilities enable the usage to almost
everywhere, where highly secure applications are in use and of course in any other application as well. This TOE
is deemed for governmental, corporate, transport and payment markets, or wherever a secure root of trust is
required. Various types of applications can use this TOE, for example in closed loop logical access controls,
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Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
physical access controls, secure internet access control and internet authentication, or as multi-application token
or simply as encrypted storage.
This dual interface controller is able to communicate using either the contact based or the contactless interface.
The implemented dual interface provides a maximum flexibility in using following communication protocols
respectively methods:
Contactless Interfaces Options:
 ISO 14443 Type A and Type B
These are ISO defined proximity contactless protocols using an external antenna and the TOE
implemented analogue and digital radio frequency interface.
 Advance Framing Mode (AFM)
This feature implements a frame format with means of error detection and correction applicable for ISO
14443 Type A and Type B according to the standard ISO/IEC 14443-4AMX
 ISO/IEC 18092
This is an ISO defined proximity contactless protocol using an external antenna and the TOE
implemented analogue and digital radio frequency interface.
 Mifare compatible Interface
This is implemented by the options MSC providing a proprietary proximity contactless protocol using an
external antenna and the TOE implemented analogue and digital radio frequency interface, as well as
the memory part reserved for Mifare use. This interface comprises also the ability to implement the
Advanced Mode for Mifare communication.
 And further advanced high-speed communication modes. More information is given in the confidential
Security Target [8].
Contact based Interface Options:
 ISO 7816
This is the ISO defined standard contact based communication protocol, using the UART and the pads.
 Analogue Contactless Bridge mode (ACLB)
The ACLB mode provides the possibility to leave the analogue communication to the external device.
More information is given in the confidential Security Target [8].
 Inter Integrated Circuit Interface (I2C)
The Inter-Integrated Circuit (IIC) module is able to be connected to an external multi-master-serial-bus-
system. The IIC protocol software is not part of the TOE. More information is given in the confidential
Security Target [8].
 General Purpose Input/Output (GPIO)
The GPIO module supports a number of general purpose I/O signals in parallel and independent of each
other. Each of the I/O signals can be configured. More information is given in the confidential Security
Target [8].
Further interface operational modes in contact based and contactless communication are available and outlined
in the confidential Security Target [8].
The TOE provides a real 16-bit CPU-architecture and is compatible to the MCS®251 instruction set with an
execution time faster than a standard MCS®251 microcontroller at the same clock frequency. The major
components of the core system are the two CPUs (Central Processing Units), acting as one, the MMU (Memory
Management Unit) and the MED (Memory Encryption/Decryption Unit). The Core implements also the Post
Failure Detection (PFD) covering CPU, Cache and MED. The two CPUs control each other in order to detect faults
and serve by this for data integrity. The TOE implements a full 16 MByte linear addressable memory space for
each privilege level, a simple scalable Memory Management concept and a scalable stack size. The flexible
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Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
memory concept consists of a ROM, RAM and the non-volatile memory (NVM), which we call SOLID FLASH™
NVM. The ROM is not available for the user.
The ROM is not available for the user and contains the main parts of firmware components only.
The firmware of bothcomes in three alternative versions and is composed out of the:
 Boot-up software (BOS), the Resource Management System (RMS), the Flash Loader (FL), the Mifare
compatible code part (MCS) located in the ROM and the RFI supporting functions. The BOS applies the
essential configuration, internal testing and the start-up.
 The RMS implements a low level application interface (API) to the Smartcard Embedded Software and
provides handling and managing routines for RAM, MMU, Branch table, configuration and further
functions.
 The Flash Loader allows downloading user software to the SOLID FLASH™ NVM during the
manufacturing process and also at user premises - if ordered.
 The Radio Frequency Interface Application Interface (RFAPI) functions consist of executable code in the
ROM which is part of the TOE and a SOLID FLASH™ NVM code part which is delivered separately to the
user and which is not part of the TOE.
 The Mifare compatible software (MCS) part located in the ROM. These routines are only called if the
MCS library is executed; else these routines are not sued.
With regard to the RFAI part, this means that the TOE products are delivered without the code part located in
the SOLID FLASH™ NVM. This RF-API part is a piece of software delivered separated from the chip in order to be
implemented by the user together with his software. Only the RFAPI SOLID FLASH™ NVM code part can call the
RFAPI ROM functions and optimize the contactless communication. Therefore, the RFAPI ROM functions do not
implement a user interface. In general the RFAPI implements a fast TOE startup and simplifies the user settings
for optimized contactless communication. The ROM and SOLID FLASH™ NVM areas storing the RFAPI functions
are access protected and only the SOLID FLASH™ NVM part, which is not part of the TOE, implements the user
interface.
This TOE implements a Hybrid Random Number Generator (HDRNG). This HDRNG equals to the expression
Hybrid Physical True Random Number Generator (hybrid PTRNG) as defined by the BSI. In the following, the BSI
expression hybrid PTRNG is used. The hybrid PTRNG implements a true physical random source and has
evidenced its conformance to the classes of AIS31 [13] as declared in chapter 7.1.1.1.
The produced genuine random numbers are available as a security service for the user and are also used for
internal purposes. Together with the guidelines in [6] the hybrid PTRNG operates in the following modes of
operation and is conformant to the named classes:
 True Random Number Generation, meeting AIS31 PTG.2
 Hybrid Random Number Generation, meeting AIS31 PTG.3
 Deterministic Random Number Generation (DRNG) AIS31 DRG.3
 Key Stream Generation (KSG), stream cipher generation AIS31 DRG.2
The hybrid PTRNG is deemed for any application requiring excellent physical random data entropy.
The two cryptographic coprocessors serve the need of modern cryptography:
 The symmetric co-processor (SCP) combines both AES and DES with one, two or triple-key hardware
acceleration. Please note that the single DES algorithm is not in the scope of evaluation due to national
regulation by BSI.
 And, the Asymmetric Crypto Co-processor, called Crypto@2304T, provides optimized high performance
calculations for the user software executing cryptographic operations and is also used by the optional
cryptographic libraries for Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) and Elliptic Curve (EC) cryptography.
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The optional software parts are differentiated into following libraries:
 the asymmetric cryptographic libraries (ACL-1 and ACL-2) in two alternative versions provides RSA1
cryptography
 the asymmetric cryptographic libraries (ACL-1 and ACL-2) in two alternative versions provides EC2
cryptography
 the Toolbox library in in two alternative versions (ACL-1 and ACL-2) provides basic mathematical
functions for a simplified user interface to the Crypto@2304T
 the symmetric cryptographic libraries (SCL-1 and SCL-2) in two alternative versions for simplified user
interfaces to the symmetric cryptographic coprocessor
 the hardware support library (HSL) in three alternative versions
 the CIPURSE™ Cryptographic Library (CIPURSE™ CL) in two alternative versions and
 the Mifare Compatible Software (MCS) in two alternative versions
The RSA cryptographic library, regardless of the version chosen:
 provides a high level interface to the hardware component Crypto2304T and includes countermeasures
against fault injection and side channel attacks.
 implements the generation of RSA Key Pairs (RsaKeyGen), the RSA signature verification (RsaVerify),
the RSA signature generation (RsaSign) and the RSA modulus recalculation (RsaModulus). This RSA
library can perform RSA operations from 512 to 4096 bits.
 implements the high level interface to hardware cryptographic coprocessor Crypto2304T which runs the
basic long number calculations (add, subtract, multiply, square) with high performance.
The RSA library is delivered as object code and in this way integrated in the user software.
Following the national BSI recommendations, RSA key lengths below 1976 bits are not included in the certificate.
Please note that the BSI expects this key length as appropriate until 2022 and recommends for longer usage
times key lengths of 3000 bits or higher.
The EC library, regardless of the version chosen:
 provides a high level interface to Elliptic Curve Cryptography computed on the hardware component
Crypto2304T and includes countermeasures against fault injection and side channel attacks.
 implements routines for ECDSA signature generation, for ECDSA signature verification, ECDSA key
generation and for the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman key agreement.
 In addition, the EC library provides an additional function for calculating primitive elliptic curve
operations like ECC Add and ECC Double.
 EC curves over prime field Fp, as well as over GF(2n
) finite field are supported too.
The EC library is delivered as object code and in this way integrated in the user software.
The security functional requirement covers the standard Brainpool [19] and NIST [26] Elliptic Curves with key
lengths of 160, 163, 192, 224, 233, 256, 283, 320, 384, 409, 512 and 521 Bits.
The definition of the key lengths follows the national AIS32 regulation regarding the 100 bit security level by the
BSI. The former 80 bit level is achieved by the key lengths of 160, 163, and 192 Bits.
Numerous other curve types, being also secure in terms of side channel attacks on this TOE, exist, which the user
optionally can add in the composition certification process.
If the user decides not to use any of the offered cryptographic library(s), regardless of the version, none of the
cryptographic libraries is consequently delivered and the accompanying Additional Specific Security
1
Rivest-Shamir-Adleman asymmetric cryptographic algorithm
2 The Elliptic Curve Cryptography is abbreviated with EC only in the further, in order to avoid conflicts with the abbreviation for the Error
Correction Code ECC.
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Functionality (O.Add-Functions) Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) and/ or EC is/are not provided by the TOE. Else it
depends of the chosen library whether the Additional Specific Security Functionality (O.Add-Functions) Rivest-
Shamir-Adleman (RSA) and/ or EC is/are supported.
The Toolbox library, regardless of the version chosen, does not provide cryptographic support or additional
security functionality as it provides only the following basic long integer arithmetic and modular functions in
software, supported by the cryptographic coprocessor: Addition, subtraction, division, multiplication,
comparison, reduction, modular addition, modular subtraction, modular multiplication, modular inversion and
modular exponentiation. No security relevant policy, mechanism or function is supported. The Toolbox library is
deemed for software developers as support for simplified implementation of long integer and modular
arithmetic operations.
The symmetric cryptographic library SCL – in both versions - offers a high level interface to perform the
cryptographic operations DES, TDES and AES with different key lengths on the symmetric cryptographic
coprocessor (SCP) for this TOE. In addition the SCL implements computation of a CMAC using AES or 3DES
algorithms.
The SCL implements already several block cipher modes as declared in this document and covers a wide range of
applications, but the SCL offers in addition the flexibility to implement additional user defined block cipher
modes.
Both library versions provide a simplified interface to the hardware Symmetric Cryptographic Coprocessor (SCP)
and preserve the security and performance requirements as required by the user.
Even in the basic configuration the SCL meets the targeted security level, which can be further increased by
simple means of configuration options.
The key lengths used for the AES and DES functionality follow the national AIS32 regulation regarding the 100
bit security level issued by the BSI1
. This regulation excludes the single DES operation from the certification as it
is considered to be not sufficiently secure from algorithm perspective.
For both versions, the certification covers the SCL cryptographic functionality of the AES algorithm with key
lengths of 128, 192, 256 bits and the TDEA or TripleDES (TDES) algorithm with an effective key size of 56 bits.
For the version v02.04.002 the certification covers the CMAC functionality too.
Note that this TOE can come with both cryptographic co-processors accessible, or with a blocked SCP or with a
blocked Crypto2304T, or with both cryptographic co-processors blocked. The blocking depends on the user’s
choice. No accessibility of the deselected cryptographic co-processors is without impact on any other security
policy of the TOE; it is exactly equivalent to the situation where the user decides just not to use the cryptographic
co-processors.
Beside the inclusion and support of cryptographic libraries this TOE comes with the optional Hardware Support
Library (HSL) in to alternative versions which significantly simplify the management of the SOLID FLASH™ NVM
functionality. The HSL constitutes an application interface (API) accessing the HSL state machine and
abstracting low level properties like special function registers and settings of specific hardware features. In short
the HSL provides a user friendly also use case oriented interface considering endurance, reliability and
performance. In certain configurations the HSL provides also functions implementing tearing safe behaviour of
the SOLID FLASH™ NVM. If used the user has no need to care about cases where the TOE is suddenly cut off the
power supply even during managing the SOLID FLASH™ NVM.
Anyhow, the HSL remains as an optional library as even sudden power off situations does never lead to
exploitable conditions of the TOE. In the worse the TOE ends operation in case of a faulty programmed SOLID
FLASH™ NVM location due to the Integrity Guard.
In addition to the above, the HSL in version v03.11.8339 provides an advanced additional method called
Incremental Write (IWR). This method provides enhanced endurance of the SOLID FLASH NVM even beyond the
1
German: Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, English: Federal Office for Information Security
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erase endurance limits for often written objects. Thus this method serves applications with a demand for high
endurance and fast writing times. On the other hand, the read times using this method are slower than the other
methods provided.
The order option CIPURSE™ Cryptographic Library (CIPURSE™ CL) in two alternative versions provides
cryptographic functionality to implement a CIPURSE™ V2 conformant protocol.
This protocol provides a secure mutual authentication of two entities, namely the terminal (denoted as PCD =
Proximity Coupling Device (CIPURSE™-compliant terminal)) and a smart card or a token in other form factors
which is called PICC. PICC stands for Proximity Integrated Circuit Card (CIPURSE™-compliant card).
Beside the mutual authentication, the protocol implements measures to maintain the integrity of the transferred
data and preserves in parallel the confidentiality of the transferred data.
By that the CIPURSE™ CL supports the user to implement systems conformant to the CIPURSE™ open standard
implementing a secured, interoperable and flexible transit fare collection solution, including ISO 7816, ISO/IEC
14443-4 communication and AES-128 bit cryptography for multiple payment types.
By that the CIPURSE™ CL supports the user to implement systems conformant to the CIPURSE™ open standard
implementing a secured, interoperable and flexible transit fare collection solution, including ISO 7816, ISO/IEC
14443-4 communication and AES-128 bit cryptography for multiple payment types.
The order option in two alternative versions of the CIPURSE™ CL is conformant to the CIPURSE™ open standard
[18] for both, the PICC and then PCD software parts. It implements the by the OSPT alliance standardized
application interface for the card and the terminal side.
The scope of this certification of this TOE covers all parts of the CIPURSE™ CL of both alternative versions which
are later implemented by the user on the user card respectively token based on this TOE and the functionality of
the PCD software part which is implemented in the terminal side. The PCD software operates also on the
hardware of this TOE which is implemented in the terminal.
Each of the CIPURSE™ CL versions implement the by the OSPT alliance standardized application interface for
the card and the terminal side.
The MCS, offered in two alternative versions, as a further order option implement the routines for a Mifare
compatible interface. The MCS implements an operating system handling the emulation of a Mifare-compatible
card together with the RF interface. One part of the MCS is permanently stored in the ROM and the second part
consisting of patch and API is located in the SOLID FLASH™ NVM. The second part is only present if the MCS is
part of the delivery. If the MCS is not part of the delivery the ROM part is present but not used. The MCS
implements tearing safe behaviour in context with the SOLID FLASH™ NVM management and is therefore
independent from the HSL.
To fulfill the highest security requirements for smartcards today and also in the future, this TOE implements a
progressive digital security concept, which already has been certified in various forerunner processes. This TOE
utilizes digital security features to include customer friendly security, combined with a robust design overcoming
the disadvantages on analogue protection technologies. The TOE provides full on-chip encryption covering the
complete core, busses, memories and cryptographic co-processors leaving no plain data on the chip. A further
security feature has been implemented for this TOE protecting also the involved addresses transferred over the
memory bus. Therefore the attractiveness for attackers is a step further extremely reduced as encrypted signals
are of no use for the attacker – neither for manipulation nor for eavesdropping.
In addition, the TOE is equipped with a comprehensive error detection capability for the complete data path. The
dual CPU approach allows error detection even while processing. A comparator detects whether a calculation
was performed without errors. This approach does not leave any parts of the core circuitry unprotected. The
concept allows that the relevant attack scenarios are detected, whereas other conditions that would not lead to
an error would mainly be ignored. That renders the TOE robust against environmental influences.
Subsequently, the TOE implements what we call intelligent implicit shielding (I2
). These measures constitute a
shield on sensitive and security critical signals which is not recognizable or obvious as a shield. This provides
excellent protection against invasive physical attacks, such as probing, forcing or similar.
In this Security Target the TOE is briefly described and a summary specification is given. The security
environment of the TOE during its different phases of the lifecycle is defined. The assets are identified which
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have to be protected through the security policy. The threats against these assets are described. The security
objectives and the security policy are defined, as well as the security requirements. These security requirements
are built out of the security functional requirements as part of the security policy and the security assurance
requirements. These are the formal steps applied during the evaluation and certification showing that the TOE
meets the targeted requirements. In addition, simplified functionality of the TOE matching the requirements is
described.
The assets, threats, security objectives and the security functional requirements are defined in this Security
Target and in the Security IC Platform Protection Profile [9] and are referenced here. These requirements build
up a minimal standard common for all Security ICs.
The security functions are defined here in the security target as property of this specific TOE. Here it is shown
how this specific TOE fulfills the requirements for the common standard defined in the Common Criteria
documents [10], [11], [12] and in the Security IC Platform Protection Profile [9].
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2 Target of Evaluation Description
The TOE description helps to understand the specific security environment and the security policy. In this
context the assets, threats, security objectives and security functional requirements can be employed. The
following is a more detailed description of the TOE than in the Security IC Platform Protection Profile [9] as it
belongs to the specific TOE. The Security IC Platform Protection Profile is in general often abbreviated with ‘PP’
and its version number.
2.1 TOE Definition
This TOE consists of Security Dual Interface Controllers as an integrated circuit (IC), meeting the highest
requirements in terms of performance and security. The TOE products are manufactured by Infineon
Technologies AG in 65 nm CMOS-technology. This TOE is intended to be used in smart cards and any other form
factor for particularly applications requiring highest levels of security and for its previous use as developing
platform for smart card operating systems according to the lifecycle model from [9].
The term Smartcard Embedded Software is used in the following for all operating systems and applications
stored and executed on the TOE. The TOE is the platform for the Smartcard Embedded Software. The
Smartcard Embedded Software itself is not part of the TOE.
The TOE consists of a core system, memories, coprocessors, system peripherals, a control block and the
peripherals. The following picture provides a simplified overview upon the hardware components of this TOE
which are subsequently briefly described:
Figure 1 Simplified block diagram of the TOE
Dual CPU
MMU
CACHE
ROM RAM
SOLID
FLASH™
NVM
Crypto
2304T
SCP
Sensors &
Filters
UmSLC
ITP
IMM
Clock
&
Power
Mgmt.
HDRNG
TIM &
WDT
RFI ACLB UART I2C
GPIO
Core
Memories
Coprocessors System Peripherals
Peripherals
Control
Memory Bus
Peripheral Bus
CRC
Control
MED
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Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
Introduction
The main components of the core system are the dual CPU (Central Processing Units), the MMU (Memory
Management Unit) and the MED (Memory Encryption/Decryption Unit). The coprocessor block contains the
cryptographic processors for RSA/EC and DES/AES processing, while the peripheral block contains the random
number generation, the module for the Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC), the timers and watchdogs and last but
not least the external interfaces service.
All data of the memory block is encrypted and all memory types are equipped with an error detection code
(EDC), the SOLID FLASH™ NVM in addition with an error correction code (ECC). All data and addresses
transferred over the two bus systems are encrypted respectively masked.
This dual interface controller is able to communicate using either the contact based or the contactless interface.
The implemented dual interface provides a maximum flexibility in using following communication protocols
respectively methods. More information is given in the confidential hardware reference manual HRM [1].
The Core
The dual CPU, constituted out of two CPUs and acting as one from users view, is based on a 16-bit architecture
based on the MCS® 251 instruction set with an execution time faster than a standard MCS® 251 at the same
clock frequency. The instruction set for the architecture is also largely compatible with the well-known 80251
microcontroller family. Anyhow, the CPU has a special internal architecture and timing that differs from the
standard 80251 and it provides additional powerful instructions, meeting the requirements for new operating
system generations. Despite its compatibility the CPU implementation is entirely proprietary and not standard.
The CPU accesses the memory via the integrated Memory Encryption and Decryption unit (MED). The Post
Failure Detection (PFD) covers the modules CPU, Cache and MED, automatically manages the error detection of
the individual memories and detects incorrect transfer of data between the memories by means of error code
comparison. The access rights of the application to the memories can be controlled with the memory
management unit (MMU). Errors in the memories are automatically detected (EDC) and in terms of the SOLID
FLASH™ NVM 1-Bit-errors are also corrected (ECC). The two processors of the CPU control each other in order
to detect faults and maintain by this the data integrity. A comparator detects whether a calculation was
performed without errors and allows error detection even while processing. Therefore the TOE is equipped with
a full error detection capability for the complete data path, which does not leave any parts of the circuitry
unprotected.
The Cache memory – or simply, the Cache – is a high-speed memory-buffer located between the CPU and the
(external) main memories holding a copy of some of the memory contents to enable access to the copy, which is
considerably faster than retrieving the information from the main memory. In addition to its fast access speed,
the Cache also consumes less power than the main memories. All Cache systems own their usefulness to the
principle of locality, meaning that programs are inclined to utilize a particular section of the address space for
their processing over a short period of time. By including most or all of such a specific area in the Cache, system
performance can be dramatically enhanced. The implemented post failure detection identifies and manages
errors if appeared during storage.
The Busses
The bus system comprises two separate bus entities: a memory bus and peripheral bus for high-speed
communication internally between the modules and to the outer world with the peripherals. All transfer of data
and addresses via the memory and the peripheral bus systems is protected by means of encryption respectively
masking leaving no plain contents anywhere on the chip.
The cryptographic Coprocessors
The TOE implements two cryptographic co-processors: The symmetric cryptographic co-processor (SCP)
combines both AES and DES with one, two or triple-key hardware acceleration. The Asymmetric Crypto Co-
processor, called Crypto2304T, provides optimized high performance calculations for the user software
executing cryptographic operations and is also used by the optional cryptographic libraries for RSA and Elliptic
Curve (EC) cryptography. These co-processors are especially designed for smart card applications with respect to
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Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
the security and power consumption. The SCP module computes the complete DES algorithm within a few clock
cycles and is especially designed to counter attacks like DPA, EMA and DFA.
Note that this TOE can come with both crypto co-processors accessible, or with a blocked SCP or with a blocked
Crypto2304T, or with both crypto co-processors blocked. The blocking depends on the customer demands prior
to the production of the hardware. No accessibility of the deselected cryptographic co-processors is without
impact on any other security policy of the TOE; it is exactly equivalent to the situation where the user decides
just not to use the cryptographic co-processors.
The Memories
The BOS (boot-up software), RMS (Resource Management System), basic routines for the MCS, RFAPI and the
Flash Loader together compose the TOE firmware in the alternative versions stored in the ROM and the patches
hereof in the SOLID FLASH™ NVM. All mandatory functions for internal testing, production usage and start-up
behavior (BOS), and also the RMS functions are grouped together in a common privilege level. These privilege
levels are protected by a hardwired Memory Management Unit (MMU) setting.
The controllers of this TOE store both code and data in a linear 16-MByte memory space, allowing direct access
without the need to swap memory segments in and out of memory using a memory management unit.
The user software can be implemented in various options depending on the user’s choice and described in
chapter 1.1. Thereby the user software, or parts of it, can be downloaded into the SOLID FLASH™ NVM, either
during production of the TOE or at customer side. In the latter case, the user downloads his software or the final
parts of it at his own premises, using the Flash Loader software.
All content regardless whether stored or transferred remains encrypted and EDC protected. Also the addresses
are protected by cryptographic protection means.
The TOE uses also Special Function Registers SFR. These SFR registers are used for general purposes and chip
configuration. The start-up register values are stored in the SOLID FLASH™ NVM, in the configuration page
area.
The System Peripherals
The system peripheral block serves for operation within the specified ranges and manages the alarms and self-
testing. Note that there is a small set of sensors left in order to detect excessive deviations from the specified
operational range, while not being over-sensitive. These digital features do not need adjustment or calibration
and are deemed to increase the robustness of the chip against environmental influences even more. Conditions
that would not be harmful for the operation would therefore in most cases not disturb the proper function.
By implementing the integrity guard concept, the sensors are no more required for the TOE security. The sensors
are therefore assigned to be security supporting but do not implement a security mechanism on their own. The
only sensor contributing to a security mechanism is the frequency sensor.
After the BOS has finished, the operating system or application can call the User Mode Security Life Control
(UMSLC) test. The UMSLC tests several modules, various functions and sensors for correct operation. Some of
them have a user configurable interface.
The Control
The Interface Management Module (IMM) handles all interfaces in a unified manner and simplifies by this the
variety of interfaces for the user. It provides simultaneous maintenance of a multitude of various interfaces in a
non-conflicting manner simultaneously if so configured. The Interrupt and Peripheral Event Channel Controller
(ITP) manages individual interrupt requests signaled as events by peripherals. The controller can be associated
with different interrupt events enabling to select between executing a standard interrupt service routine or a fast
data transfer between memory locations over a so-called peripheral event channel (PEC). The control-block
implements a summary of all control interfaces respectively SFRs used by various modules.
The Peripherals
This block implements the various interface options, communication protocols and operation modes as outlined
in chapter 1.2.
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Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
In addition to the interfaces it implements the Hybrid Random Number Generator (HDRNG). This HDRNG equals
to the expression Hybrid Physical True Random Number Generator (hybrid PTRNG) as defined by the BSI. In the
following, the BSI expression hybrid PTRNG is used. The hybrid PTRNG implements a true physical random
source and has evidenced its conformance to the classes of AIS31 [13] as declared in chapter 7.1.1.1.
The produced genuine random numbers are available as a security service for the user and are also used for
internal purposes. Together with the guidelines in [6] the hybrid PTRNG operates in the following modes of
operation and is conformant to the named classes:
 True Random Number Generation, meeting AIS31 PTG.2
 Hybrid Random Number Generation, meeting AIS31 PTG.3
 Deterministic Random Number Generation (DRNG) AIS31 DRG.3
 Key Stream Generation (KSG), stream cipher generation AIS31 DRG.2
The hybrid PTRNG is deemed for any application requiring excellent physical random data entropy.
Several timer modules are implemented used for example to control the communication via the UART, other
interfaces behavior, for asynchronous wake-up and similar timed events.
The timer permits easy implementation of communication protocols such as T=1 and all other time-critical
operations. The UART-controlled I/O interface allows the security controller and the terminal interface to be
operated independently. The watchdog timers implement a configurable time out for various purposes. More
information can be found in the hardware reference manual HRM [1].
The cyclic redundancy check (CRC) module is used to compute a checksum over any input data and allows by
that explicit checking integrity of a piece of data.
Feature Summary
The following is a list of central features provided by this TOE:
 24-bit linear addressing
 Up to 16 MByte of addressable memory
 Data and addresses protected against eavesdropping
 Register-based architecture
(registers can be accessed as bytes, words (2 bytes), and double words (4 bytes))
 2-stage instruction pipeline
 Based MCS® 251 instruction set and largely compatible with the well-known 80251 microcontroller
family
 Extensive additional set of powerful instructions, including 16- and 32-bit arithmetic and logic
instructions
 Cache with single-cycle access searching
 16-bit self-checking dual CPU
 Hybrid Physical True Random Number Generation for random numbers at highest entropy quality
The TOE sets a new, improved standard of integrated security features, thereby meeting the requirements of all
smart card and other related applications or form factors, such as information integrity, access control, mobile
telephone and identification, as well as use cases in electronic funds transfer and healthcare systems.
To sum up, the TOE is a powerful dual interface security controller with a large amount of memory and special
peripheral devices with improved performance, optimized power consumption, free to choose contact based or
contactless operation, at minimal chip size while implementing high security. It therefore constitutes the basis
for future smart card and other related applications in unlimited form factors.
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Target of Evaluation Description
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
2.2 Scope of theTOE
The TOE comprises:
 The silicon die, respectively the Integrated Circuit (IC) respectively the hardware of this TOE, in several
versions. The versions differ from each other by the interface capabilities: The IC comes with several
interface capacitances, enabling connections to a variety of external antennas, or to be operated contact
based only.
 The TOE is also delivered in various configurations, achieved by means of blocking by the customer
and/or depending on the customer order.
 All configurations and resulting derivatives generated out of the mask sets described as above.
 All according firmware in the alternative versions and
 Optional software in various combinations as ordered
 All configurations of any individual TOE product
All product derivatives of this TOE, including all configuration possibilities differentiated by the GCIM data and
the configuration information output, are manufactured by Infineon Technologies AG. In the following
descriptions the term “manufacturer” stands short for Infineon Technologies AG, the manufacturer of the TOE.
New configurations can occur at any time depending on the user blocking or by different configurations applied
by the manufacturer. In any case the user is able to clearly identify the TOE hardware, its configuration and proof
the validity of the certificate independently, meaning without involving the manufacturer.
The various blocking options, as well as the means used for the blocking, are done during the manufacturing
process and/or at user premises. This depends on the user order. Entirely all means of blocking and the, for the
blocking involved firmware respectively software parts, used at Infineon and/or the user premises, are subject of
the evaluation. All resulting configurations of a TOE derivative and all possible combinations with optional
software libraries are subject of the certificate. All resulting hardware configurations are either at the predefined
limits or within the predefined configuration ranges.
The firmware used for the TOE internal testing and TOE operation, the firmware and software parts exclusively
used for the blocking, and the parts of the firmware and software required for cryptographic support are part of
the TOE and therefore part of the certification. The documents as described in section 2.2.4 and listed in Table 1,
are supplied as user guidance.
Not part of the TOE and not part of the certification are:
 the Smartcard Embedded Software respectively user software, and
 the piece of software running at user premises and collecting the BPU receipts coming from the TOE.
This BPU software part is the commercially deemed part of the BPU software, not running on the TOE,
but allowing refunding the customer, based on the collected user blocking information. The receipt from
each blocked TOE is collected by this software – chip by chip.
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Target of Evaluation Description
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
2.2.1 Hardware of theTOE
The hardware part of the TOE (see Figure 1) as defined in the hardware reference manual HRM [1] comprises:
Core System
Proprietary dual CPU implementation being comparable to the 80251 microcontroller architecture from
functional perspective and with enhanced MCS® 251 instruction set
Cache with Post Failure Detection
Memory Encryption/Decryption Unit (MED)
Memory Management Unit (MMU)
Memories
Read-Only Memory (ROM), not available for the user
Random Access Memory (RAM)
SOLID FLASH™ NVM, the flash cell based nonvolatile memory
Buses
Memory Bus
Peripheral Bus
Coprocessors
Crypto2304T for asymmetric algorithms like RSA and EC (optionally blocked)
Symmetric Crypto Co-processor for DES and AES Standards (optionally blocked)
Control
Interface Management Module (IMM)
Interrupt and Peripheral Event Channel Controller (ITP)
Clock & Power Management
Control
System Peripherals
Sensors & Filters
User mode Security Life Control (UmSLC)
Peripherals
Hybrid Physical True Random Number Generator (HPTRNG) implementing also a Deterministic Random
Number Generator (DRNG)
Timers and Watchdogs
Cyclic Redundancy Check module (CRC)
Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter (UART)
Radio Frequency Interface (RF power and signal interface)
Analogue Contactless Bridge (ACLB)
Inter-Integrated Circuit module (I2C)
General Purpose Input Output (GPIO)
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Target of Evaluation Description
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
2.2.2 Firmware and software of theTOE
The entire firmware in three alternative versions of the TOE consists of different parts which are outlined in the
following. This description holds true for all three alternative versions as there is no difference on the delivered
and board of the IC located firmware parts, with the exception of the firmware identifier. is therefore regardless
for the TOE security, policy and related claims and it is regardless for the user which of the three firmware
identifiers is coming with the TOE.
The entire firmware of the TOE consists of different parts which are outlined in the following.
One part comprises the Resource Management System (RMS) with routines for managing the Cache, RAM,
MMU, the branch table, configuration and the testing functions. The RMS is the IC Dedicated Support Software
as defined in the PP [9]. The RMS routines are stored from Infineon Technologies AG in a reserved area of the
ROM but parts of it are also stored in the SOLID FLASH™ NVM.
There is no ROM space available for the user.
The second part is the Boot Software (BOS), consisting of initialization and various testing routines and providing
the different operation modes of the TOE. The BOS is the IC Dedicated Test Software as defined in the PP [9].
The BOS routines are stored in the especially protected test ROM but parts of it are also stored in the SOLID
FLASH™ NVM. The BOS is not accessible for the user software.
The third part is the Flash Loader. This piece of software enables the download of the user software or parts of it
to the SOLID FLASH™ NVM. The Flash Loader routines are stored in the especially protected test ROM but parts
of it are also stored in the SOLID FLASH™ NVM. Depending on the order the Flash Loader comes with the BPU-
software enabling for TOE configuration at user premises. After completion of the download and/or final
configuration of the TOE, and prior delivery to the end user, the user is obligated to lock the Flash Loader.
Locking is the permanent deactivation of the Flash Loader meaning that if once locked it can no more be
reactivated and used. Note that the Flash Loader routines are always present, but are deactivated in case of the
derivatives ordered without the software download option. Thus the user interface is identically in both cases –
with and without Flash Loader on board - and consequently the related interface routines can be called in each of
the derivatives. Already the MMU blocks calls of the Flash Loader software at derivatives coming without Flash
Loader. In derivatives with Flash Loader the related function is performed.
The fourth part is constituted from RFAPI functions in the ROM implementing a fast TOE startup and supporting
the user by simplification of the required RFI settings if the contactless interface is used.
The fifth part are some basic routines for the Mifare Compatible Software (MCS) which are also located in the
ROM and always on board, regardless whether the user has ordered the optional MCS library or not. If the MCS
library is not on board, these routines remain unused in the ROM.
All parts of the firmware above are - depending on the order - combined together by the TOE generation process
to a single file and stored then in the data files, the TOE is produced from. This comprises the firmware files for
the ROM, where only Infineon Technologies AG has access, as well as the data to be flashed in the SOLID
FLASH™ NVM. The alternative firmware versions can be identified by the firmware identifier.
CC Document 29 1.1
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Target of Evaluation Description
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
The optional software parts comprise following libraries:
 the asymmetric cryptographic libraries (ACL-1 and ACL-2) in two alternative versions provides RSA1
cryptography
 the asymmetric cryptographic libraries (ACL-1 and ACL-2) in two alternative versions provides EC2
cryptography
 the Toolbox library in in two alternative versions (ACL-1 and ACL-2) provides basic mathematical
functions for a simplified user interface to the Crypto@2304T
 the symmetric cryptographic libraries (SCL-1 and SCL-2) in two alternative versions for simplified user
interfaces to the symmetric cryptographic coprocessor
 the hardware support library (HSL) in three alternative versions
 the CIPURSE™ Cryptographic Library (CIPURSE™ CL) in two alternative versions and
 the Mifare Compatible Software (MCS) in two alternative versions
The RSA cryptographic library, regardless of the version chosen:
 provides a high level interface to the hardware component Crypto2304T and includes countermeasures
against fault injection and side channel attacks.
 implements the generation of RSA Key Pairs (RsaKeyGen), the RSA signature verification (RsaVerify),
the RSA signature generation (RsaSign) and the RSA modulus recalculation (RsaModulus). This RSA
library can perform RSA operations from 512 to 4096 bits.
 implements the high level interface to hardware cryptographic coprocessor Crypto2304T which runs the
basic long number calculations (add, subtract, multiply, square) with high performance.
The RSA library, regardless of the version chosen, is delivered as object code and in this way integrated in the
user software.
Depending on the customer’s choice, the TOE can be delivered with the 4096 code portion or with the 2048 code
portion only. The 2048 code portion is included in both. Part of the evaluation are the RSA straight operations
with key length from 1024 bits to 2048 bits, and the RSA CRT3
operations with key lengths of 1024 Bits to 4096
Bits.
Following the national BSI recommendations, RSA key lengths below 1976 bits are not included in the certificate.
Please note that the BSI expects this key length as appropriate until 2022 and recommends for longer usage
times key lengths of 3000 bits or higher.
The EC library regardless of the version chosen is used to:
 provide a high level interface to Elliptic Curve Cryptography computed on the hardware component
Crypto2304T and includes countermeasures against fault injection and side channel attacks.
 implement routines for ECDSA signature generation, for ECDSA signature verification, ECDSA key
generation and for the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman key agreement.
 implement additional functions for calculating primitive elliptic curve operations like ECC Add and ECC
Double interfaces, the EC library provides an .
 implement elliptic curve cryptographyprovides a high level interface to Elliptic Curve Cryptography
computed on the hardware component Crypto2304T and includes countermeasures against fault
injection and side channel attacks.
 implements routines for ECDSA signature generation, for ECDSA signature verification, ECDSA key
generation and for the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman key agreement.
1
Rivest-Shamir-Adleman asymmetric cryptographic algorithm
2 The Elliptic Curve Cryptography is abbreviated with EC only in the further, in order to avoid conflicts with the abbreviation for the Error
Correction Code ECC.
3
CRT: Chinese Remainder Theorem
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Target of Evaluation Description
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
 In addition, the EC library provides an additional function for calculating primitive elliptic curve
operations like ECC Add and ECC Double.
 over prime field Fp, as well as over GF(2n
) finite field are supported too.
The EC library is delivered as object code and in this way integrated in the user software.
The security functional requirement covers the standard Brainpool [19] and NIST [26] Elliptic Curves with key
lengths of 160, 163, 192, 224, 233, 256, 283, 320, 384, 409, 512 and 521 Bits. For one part the definition of the key
lengths follows the national AIS32 regulation regarding the 100 bit security level by the BSI. However, the former
80 bit level is achieved by the key lengths of 160, 163, and 192 Bits.
Numerous other curve types, being also secure in terms of side channel attacks on this TOE, exist, which the user
optionally can add in the composition certification process.
The Toolbox library, regardless of the version chosen, does not provide cryptographic support or additional
security functionality as it provides only the following basic long integer arithmetic and modular functions in
software, supported by the cryptographic coprocessor: Addition, subtraction, division, multiplication,
comparison, reduction, modular addition, modular subtraction, modular multiplication, modular inversion and
modular exponentiation. No security relevant policy, mechanism or function is supported. The Toolbox library is
deemed for software developers as support for simplified implementation of long integer and modular
arithmetic operations.
The symmetric cryptographic library SCL – in both versions - offers a high level interface to perform the
cryptographic operations DES, TDES and AES with different key lengths on the symmetric cryptographic
coprocessor (SCP) for this TOE. In addition the SCL implements computation of a CMAC using AES and 3DES
algorithms.
The SCL implements already several block cipher modes as declared in this document and covers a wide range of
applications, but the SCL offers in addition the flexibility to implement additional user defined block cipher
modes. The SCL is delivered as object code and in this way integrated in the user software.
Both library versions provide a simplified interface to the hardware Symmetric Cryptographic Coprocessor (SCP)
and preserve the security and performance requirements as required by the user.
Even in the basic configuration the SCL meets the targeted security level, which can be further increased by
means of configuration options.
The key lengths used for the AES and DES functionality follow the national AIS32 regulation regarding the 100
bit security level issued by the BSI1
. This regulation excludes the single DES operation from the certification as it
is considered to be not sufficiently secure from algorithm perspective.
For both versions, the certification covers the SCL cryptographic functionality of the AES algorithm with key
lengths of 128, 192, 256 bits and the TDEA or TripleDES (TDES) algorithm with an effective key size of 56 bits.
For the version v02.04.002 the certification covers the CMAC functionality too.
Beside the inclusion and support of cryptographic libraries this TOE comes with the optional Hardware Support
Library (HSL) in three alternative versions, significantly simplifying the management of the SOLID FLASH™
NVM functionality. The HSL (all versions) constitutes an application interface (API) accessing the HSM state
machine and abstracting low level properties like special function registers and settings of specific hardware
features. In short the HSL provides a user friendly also use case oriented interface considering endurance,
reliability and performance.
The HSL is delivered as object code and in this way integrated in the user software.
The HSL versions v01.22.4346 and v02.01.6634 implement beyond the “low level driver” the basic method “In-
place Update” with optional tearing safe methodology. This leverages the dedicated advantages of the new
SOLID FLASH™ NVM technology.
All HSL library versions are delivered as object code.
1 German: Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, English: Federal Office for Information Security
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Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
We define tearing as an untimed power cut off which could occur anytime and in the worse therewith could also
occur during writing to or erasing of pages in the SOLID FLASH™ NVM.
If the HSL – all versions are meant - comes with the TOE and the user implements the offered configuration and
dedicated functions tearing save behaviour of the SOLID FLASH™ NVM is provided. In these cases the user does
not need to care about tearing events since either the old data or the new data are correctly in place.
In addition to the versions v01.22.4346 and v02.01.6634, the HSL in version v03.11.8339 provides an advanced
additional method called Incremental Write (IWR). This method provides enhanced endurance of the SOLID
FLASH NVM even beyond the erase endurance limits for often written objects. Thus this method serves
applications with a demand for high endurance and fast writing times. On the other hand, the read times using
this method are slower than the other methods provided.
But, even in the cases where the user decides not to use the HSL and did also not implement own routines
preserving the consistency of the SOLID FLASH™ NVM, the hardware protection means prevent from operation
of inconsistent data. Therefore, in no cases a tearing event leads to an exploitable situation respectively
vulnerability.
Anyhow, the user should be aware and is recommended to use either the HSL or implement own routines
managing tearing events since if there would occur a faulty programmed SOLID FLASH™ NVM location the TOE
ends operation at that point.
The order option CIPURSE™ Cryptographic Library (CIPURSE™ CL) in two alternative versions provides
cryptographic functionality to implement a CIPURSE™ V2 conformant protocol.
This protocol provides a secure mutual authentication of two entities, namely the terminal (denoted as PCD =
Proximity Coupling Device (CIPURSE™-compliant terminal)) and a smart card or a token in other form factors
which is called PICC. PICC stands for Proximity Integrated Circuit Card (CIPURSE™-compliant card).
Beside the mutual authentication, the protocol implements measures to maintain the integrity of the after
passing successfully the authentication transferred data. It depends on the chosen operation mode whether the
user requires integrity protection only, for example if the exchange is used in a secure environment only, or
whether complete protection including the encrypted transfer of user data between the two authentication
entities is an issue. Both operation modes are part of the CIPURSE™ open standard and offered as integrity
protection mode and as confidential communication mode.
By that each of the CIPURSE™ CL versions supports the user to implement systems conformant to the
CIPURSE™ open standard implementing a secured, interoperable and flexible transit fare collection solution,
including ISO 7816, ISO/IEC 14443-4 communication and AES-128 bit cryptography for multiple payment types.
Each of the CIPURSE™ CL versions is conformant to the CIPURSE™ open standard [18] for both, the PICC and
then PCD software parts. . It implements the by the OSPT alliance standardized application interface for the card
and the terminal side.
The scope of this certification of this TOE covers all parts of the CIPURSE™ CL of both alternative versions which
are later implemented by the user on the user card respectively token based on this TOE and the functionality of
the PCD software part which is implemented in the terminal side. The PCD software operates also on the
hardware of this TOE which is implemented in the terminal.
Both CIPURSE™ CL versions implement the by the OSPT alliance standardized application interface for the card
and the terminal side.
The certification comprises the entire functionality of both alternative CIPURSE™ CL versions implemented and
operated on the TOE hardware. On one hand the TOE can operate the PICC side software part as a token and on
the other hand, a second TOE product operates the PCD side software part if used inside a terminal or similar
system.
The environment on the terminal, the terminal systems, their security and their interfaces to the background
systems are not in the scope of this certification. The user operating system and further applications
implemented on the TOE are also out of scope of this certification.
To summarize, if used with the PCD software the certification view equals to the case where the TOE is running
the PICC software: The TOE operates one of the optional software parts of the CIPURSE™ CL – regardless
whether PICC or PCD part - and is enabled to communicate via the selected interfaces. The surrounding
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environment is in both cases out of scope. The CIPURSE™ CL is delivered as object code and in this way
integrated in the user software.
The MCS offered in two alternative versions is a further order option and implements the routines for a Mifare
compatible interface. The MCS implements an operating system handling the emulation of a Mifare-compatible
card together with the RF interface. One part of the MCS is permanently stored in the ROM and the second part
consisting of patch and API is located in the SOLID FLASH™ NVM. The second part is only present if the MCS is
part of the delivery. If the MCS is not part of the delivery the ROM part is present but not used. The MCS
implements tearing safe behaviour in context with the SOLID FLASH™ NVM management and is therefore
independent from the HSL. The MCS NVM part is – if ordered - delivered as object code and in this way
integrated in the user software.
Note 1:
The asymmetric cryptographic libraries regardless of the version chosen are delivery options.
Therefore the TOE may come with free combinations with the other libraries of or without these libraries. In the
case of coming without one or any combination of the asymmetric libraries the TOE does not provide the
Additional Specific Security Functionality Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Cryptography (RSA) and/or Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (EC).
The cryptographic library SCL, in two alternative versions, is a delivery option.
Therefore the TOE may come with free combinations with the other libraries of or without these libraries. In the
case of coming without the SCL the TOE does not provide the specific security functionality implemented by this
software. Even in case of a TOE coming without SCL, the symmetric cryptographic functionality is unchanged
covered by the hardware symmetric cryptographic coprocessor SCP.
The presence of one of the cryptographic library CIPURSE™ CL versions is a delivery option.
Therefore the TOE may come with free combinations with the other libraries of or without these libraries. In the
case of coming without any of the CIPURSE™ CL version the TOE does not provide the specific security
functionality implemented by this software.
End of note.
The firmware and software parts of the TOE comprise:
Firmware in three alternative versions, which are entirely equal with the exception of the firmware identifier
Boot Software (BOS)
Resource Management System (RMS)
Flash Loader (FL)
RFAPI functions
MCS basic functions in the ROM
Optional Software
RSA cryptographic library in two alternative versions
EC cryptographic library in two alternative versions
Toolbox library in two alternative versions
SCL library in two alternative versions
HSL library in three alternative versions
CIPURSE™ Cryptographic Library in two alternative versions
MCS library in two alternative versions
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Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
2.2.3 Interfaces of theTOE
 The physical interface of the TOE to the external environment is the entire surface of the IC.
 The electrical interface of the TOE to the external environment is constituted by the pads of the chip,
particularly ISO pads, the CLK and power supply pads, as well as the pads used for contactless and
contact based interfacing.
A further electrical interface are the La and Lb pads used for the antenna connection and alternatively for
the ACLB communication mode connecting an external reader chip which is not part of the TOE.
 The RF interface (radio frequency power and signal interface) enables contactless communication
between a PICC (proximity integration chip card, PICC) and a PCD reader/writer (proximity coupling
device, PCD). Power supply is received and data are received or transmitted by an antenna which
consists of a coil with a few turns directly connected to the IC. Depending on customer orders the
contactless interface options are set by means of blocking either at Infineon premises or at the premises
of the user.
 The data-oriented I/O interface to the TOE is formed by the pads used for contact based or contactless
communication.
 The interface to the firmware – regardless of the version in use - is constituted by special registers used
for hardware configuration and control (Special Function Registers, SFR).
 The interface of the TOE to the operating system is constituted by the RMS and by the instruction set of
the TOE.
 The interface of the TOE to the test routines is formed by the BOS test routine call, i.e. entry to the test
modes.
 The interface to the RSA calculations is defined from the RSA library interface. This is regardless of the
version chosen.
 The interface to the EC calculations is defined from the EC library interface. This is regardless of the
version chosen.
 The interface to the Toolbox is defined by the Toolbox library interface. This is regardless of the version
chosen.
 The interface to the SCL is defined by the Symmetric Cryptographic Library interface. This is regardless
of the version chosen.
 The interface to the HSL is defined by the functions of the Hardware Support Library interface. This is
regardless of the version chosen.
 The interface to the CIPURSE™ CL is defined by the functions of the CIPURSE™ cryptographic library
(each version). This is regardless of the version chosen.
 The Mifare compatible interface is defined by the functions of the MCS interface. This is regardless of the
version chosen.
Note that the interfaces to the optional software parts are only present, if the TOE comes with the belonging
software part depending on the customer order.
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Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
2.2.4 Guidance documentation
The following provides a brief overview of the document set constituting the user guidance for this TOE. The
exact document titles and versions are given in chapter 9.
 The document Hardware Reference Manual HRM [1] is the user data book of the TOE and contains the
relevant module, function and feature description
 The document Production and Personalization User Manual [2] contains detailed information about the
usage of the Flash Loader
 The document Programmers Reference Manual [3] describes the usage and interfaces of the Resource
Management System RMS, of the Mifare Compatible Software MCS and of the RFAPI.
 The document asymmetric Cryptographic Library [4-1] for Crypto@2304T user interface for the version
v2.07.003 contains all interfaces of the RSA, EC and Toolbox library and are only delivered to the user in
case the RSA library and/or the EC library is/are part of the delivered TOE.
 The document asymmetric Cryptographic Library [4-2] for Crypto@2304T user interface for the version
v2.06.003 contains all interfaces of the RSA, EC and Toolbox library and are only delivered to the user in
case the RSA library and/or the EC library is/are part of the delivered TOE.
 The document [5] Crypto@2304T User Manual describes the architecture of cryptographic coprocessor
on register level. It also provides a functional description of the register architecture, instruction set and
gives programming guidance. This document is not required if one of Infineon’s asymmetric
cryptographic libraries ACL is used. The ACL takes properly care about the low level hardware interfaces.
 The document [6] Security Guidelines User Manual provides the guidance and recommendations to
develop secure software for and secure usage of this TOE.
 The document [7] Errata Sheet contains latest updates and corrections of the TOE relevant for the user
and it is a kind addendum to the hardware reference manual HRM [1]. The Errata Sheet can be changed
during the life cycle of the TOE. New Errata Sheet releases are reported in a monthly updated list
provided from Infineon Technologies AG to the user. This list is not part of the certification process. Part
of the TOE certification is the released version valid at the point in time the certificate was issued.
 The document reference [15-1] for the Hardware Support Library (HSL) in version v03.11.8339 provides
an application interface (API) accessing the HSM state machine and abstracting low level properties like
special function registers and settings of specific hardware features.
 The document reference [15-2] for the Hardware Support Library (HSL) in version v02.01.6634 provides
an application interface (API) accessing the HSM state machine and abstracting low level properties like
special function registers and settings of specific hardware features.
 The document reference [15-3] for the Hardware Support Library (HSL) in version v01.22.4346 provides
an application interface (API) accessing the HSM state machine and abstracting low level properties like
special function registers and settings of specific hardware features.
 Finally the certification report by BSI may contain an overview of the recommendations to the software
developer regarding the secure use of the TOE. These recommendations are also included in the ordinary
user documentation, the Security Guidelines User Manual [6].
 The user guidance of the optional libraries MCS are included in the Programmers Reference Manual [3]
and in the Security Guidelines [6].
 The user guidance for the optional Symmetric Cryptographic Library SCL [16-1] in version v02.04.002
contains all user interfaces required to have a simplified and secure use of the symmetric cryptographic
coprocessor. This user guidance is only delivered if the optional SCL is part of the delivery to the user.
 The user guidance for the optional Symmetric Cryptographic Library SCL [16-2] in version v02.02.010
contains all user interfaces required to have a simplified and secure use of the symmetric cryptographic
coprocessor. This user guidance is only delivered if the optional SCL is part of the delivery to the user.
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Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
 The user guidance for the CIPURSE™ Cryptographic Library [17-1] and [17-2] – one for each alternative
version - provides detailed information and the complete application interface for the user for
implementation of an OSPT™ compliant PCD / PICC communication solution.
2.2.5 Forms of delivery
The TOE can be delivered:
 in form of complete modules
 with or without inlay mounting
 with or without inlay antenna mounting
 in form of plain wafers
 in any IC case (for example TSSOP28, VQFN32, VQFN40, CCS-modules, etc.)
 in no IC case or package, simply as bare dies
 or in whatever type of package
The form of delivery does not affect the TOE security and it can be delivered in any type, as long as the processes
applied and sites involved have been subject of the appropriate audit.
The delivery can therefore be at the end of phase 3 or at the end of phase 4 which can also include pre-
personalization steps according to PP [9]. Nevertheless in both cases the TOE is finished and the extended test
features are removed. In this document are always both cases mentioned to avoid incorrectness but from the
security policy point of view the two cases are identical.
The delivery to the software developer (phase 2  phase 1) contains the development package and is delivered
in form of documentation as described above, data carriers and/or download from a secure server containing the
tools and emulators as development and debugging tool.
Part of the software delivery can also be the Flash Loader software running on the TOE and receiving the
transmitted information of the user software to be loaded into the SOLID FLASH™ NVM. The download is only
possible after successful mutual authentication and the user software can also be downloaded in an encrypted
way. This download can also be done at a third party acting as download service provider for the user. This
organization is subject of the user.
In any case, the user is after finalization of the download and prior delivery to the field obligated to permanently
lock further use of the Flash Loader. How the user can do this is detailed in the user guidance [2].
Note that it depends on the procurement order, whether the Flash Loader program is present or not.
The belonging user guidance documents are delivered in electronic form: Either by user downloads from a secure
server or alternatively on request as encrypted email attachment.
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Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
Table 4 TOE delivery types
TOE Component Delivered Format Delivery Method Comment
Hardware
All derivatives as stated in
chapter 1
Plain wafers, bare dies,
complete modules, IC
cases of any type (for
example TSSOP28,
VQFN32, VQFN40, CCS-
modules, etc.), with or
without antenna
mounting, with or
without inlay mounting,
or in whatever package
Postal transfer in
cages or metal boxes
All materials are delivered to
distribution centers in locked
cages or metal boxes.
Firmware
All – – Stored on the delivered
hardware.
Software
All software libraries Precompiled object
format code – L251 file
type with ending “.lib”
Secured download as
zipped-file (1)
–
Guidance Documentation
All User Guidance
documents
Personalized pdf Secured download (1)
or on demand by
encrypted email.
–
(1) Users having an account on the secure server can login and download the according document-
respectively software files
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Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
2.2.6 Production sites
The TOE may be handled in different production sites but the silicon of this TOE is produced in Tainan, Taiwan
only, as listed below. To distinguish the different production sites of various products in the field, the site is
coded into the Generic Chip Ident Mode (GCIM) data. The exact coding of the generic chip identification data is
described in the hardware reference manual HRM [1].
The delivery measures are described in the ALC_DVS aspect.
Table 5 Production Site in Chip Identification
Production Site Chip Identification
Tainan, Taiwan Byte number 13: 0AH
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Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
3 Conformance Claims (ASE_CCL)
3.1 CC Conformance Claim
This Security Target (ST) and the TOE claim conformance to Common Criteria version v3.1 and in particular,
conformance is claimed for:
Common Criteria part 2 extended [11] and Common Criteria part 3 conformant [12].
3.2 PP Claim
This Security Target is in strict conformance to the Security IC Platform Protection Profile [9].
The targeted EAL6+ level includes already the highest assurance families AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2 from
Common Criteria part 3 [12]. To achieve an additional augmentation, this Security Target is assurance package
augmented compared to the Security IC Platform Protection Profile [9].
The augmentation is achieved - with regard to CCv3.1 Part 3 [12]: Security assurance components by including:
Table 6 Augmentations of the assurance level of the TOE
Assurance Class Assurance Family Description
Life-cycle support ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
The Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages is registered and certified by the
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik1
(BSI) under the reference:
BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014, Version 1.0, dated 2014-01-13.
The security assurance requirements of the TOE are according to the Security IC Platform Protection Profile [9]
and to Part 3 of the Common Criteria version v3.1 [12].
3.3 Package Claim
This Security Target claims conformance to the following additional packages taken from the Security IC
Platform Protection Profile [9]:
 Package Authentication of the Security IC, section 7.2
 Package Loader, Package 1: Loader dedicated for usage in secured environment only, section 7.3.1.
This package is optional and fulfilled only by TOE products coming with Flash Loader.
 Package Loader, Package 2: Loader dedicated for usage by authorized users only, section 7.3.2.
This package is optional and fulfilled only by TOE products coming with Flash Loader.
 Package TDES ; section 7.4.1
 Package AES ; section 7.4.2
1 Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) is the German Federal Office for Information Security
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Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
The assurance level of this TOE is:
EAL6 augmented (EAL6+)
with the component ALC_FLR.1 and additional packages
The highest assurance component AVA_VAN.5 Vulnerability Assessment, advanced methodical vulnerability
analysis, is already standard requirement for the EAL6. Thus the augmentation is achieved by another assurance
class.
3.4 Conformance Rationale
This security target claims strict conformance only to the PP [9].
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a typical security IC as defined in PP chapter 1.2.2 comprising:
 the circuitry of the IC (hardware including the physical memories),
 configuration data, initialization data related to the IC Dedicated Software and the behaviour of the
security functionality
 the IC Dedicated Software with the parts
 the IC Dedicated Test Software,
 the IC Dedicated Support Software.
The TOE is designed, produced and/or generated by the TOE Manufacturer.
3.4.1 Security Problem Definition
Following the PP [9], the security problem definition is enhanced by adding additional threats, organization
security policies and an augmented assumption. Including these add-ons, the security problem definition of this
security target is consistent with the statement of the security problem definition in the PP [9], as the security
target claimed strict conformance to the PP [9].
3.4.2 Conformance Rationale
The augmented organizational security policy P.Add-Functions, coming from the additional security
functionality of the cryptographic libraries, the augmented assumption A.Key-Function, related to the usage of
key-depending function, and the threat memory access violation T.Mem-Access, due to specific TOE memory
access control functionality, have been added. These add-ons have no impact on the conformance statements
regarding CC [10] and PP [9], with following rational:
 The security target remains conformant to CC [10], claim 482 as the possibility to introduce additional
restrictions is given.
 The security target fulfils the strict conformance claim of the PP [9] due to the application notes 5, 6 and
7 which apply here. By those notes the addition of further security functions and security services are
covered, even without deriving particular security functionality from a threat but from a policy.
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Conformance Claims (ASE_CCL)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
3.4.3 Adding Objectives
Due to additional security functionality coming from following TOE modules the subsequently assigned
additional security objectives have been introduced:
 the cryptographic libraries
o O.Add-Functions
o O.Ctrl_Auth_CCL
o O.Prot_Integrity
o O.Prot_Confidentiality
 the memory access control
o O.Mem-Access
 and objectives related to the Flash Loader
o O.Authentication,
o O.Cap_Avail_Loader,
o O.Ctrl_Auth_Loader and
o O.Prot_TSF_Confidentiality
These add-ons have no impact on the conformance statements regarding CC [10] and PP [9] with following
rational:
 The security target remains conformant to CC [10], claim 482 as the possibility to introduce additional
restrictions is given.
 The security target fulfils the strict conformance of the PP [9] due to the application note 9 applying
here. This note allows the definition of high-level security goals due to further functions or services
provided to the Security IC Embedded Software.
3.4.4 AES andTDES
The PP [9] implements the optional policy cryptographic services P.Crypto_Service with its packages TDES and
AES. This TOE provides these optional packages requiring secure hardware based cryptographic services for the
IC Embedded Software as outlined in chapter 7.1.4.
Due to these optional additional security functionalities the security objectives O.TDES and O.AES have been
introduced. These add-ons have no impact on the conformance statements regarding CC [10] and PP [9], with
following rational:
 The security target fulfils the strict conformance claim of the PP [9] due to the application notes applying
here. By these notes the addition of further security functions and security services are covered, even
without deriving particular security functionality from a threat or a policy.
3.4.5 Loader
The PP [9] implements the optional policy for applying a Loader. The Loader is used to load data into the SOLID
FLASH™ NVM.
The Flash Loader provides the service for authentication and implements the Package for Authentication of the
Security IC containing FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity of the TOE against a user.
This means that the user clearly can identify the TOE on his external request. This fulfils the objective
O.Authentication, authentication to external entities, and obligates an objective to the environment
OE.TOE_Auth, external entities authenticating of the TOE as outlined in the PP [9].
The Loader policy defines the Package 1 with its policy P.LIM_Block_Loader where the Loader is dedicated for
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Conformance Claims (ASE_CCL)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
usage in secured environment only and the Package 2 with its policy P.Ctlr_Loader where the Loader is
dedicated for usage by authorized users only.
This TOE provides a Flash Loader complying with the optional packages:
 Package 1:
Loader dedicated for usage in secured environment only
 Package 2:
Loader dedicated for usage by authorized users only as outlined in sections 7.2 and 7.3 of the PP [9]
Due to these optional additional security functionalities the security objectives
 O.Cap_Avail_Loader, capability and availability of the Loader,
 O.Ctrl_Auth_Loader, access control and authenticity for the Loader and
 OE.Loader_Usage. secure communication and usage of the Loader
 O.Prot_TSF_Confidentiality, protection of the confidentiality of the TSF
 OE.Lim_Block_Loader, limitation of capability and blocking the Loader
have been introduced.
3.4.6 CIPURSE Cryptographic Library (CCL)
The TOE provides “Additional Specific Security Functionality (O.Add-Functions)” including the CIPURSE™
Cryptography. This cryptographic functionality implements additional cryptographic services by implementation
of a protocol providing a secure mutual authentication of two entities, namely the terminal (denoted as PCD =
Proximity Coupling Device (CIPURSE™-compliant terminal)) and a smart card or a token in other form factors
which is called PICC. PICC stands for Proximity Integrated Circuit Card (CIPURSE™-compliant card).
Beside the mutual authentication, the protocol implements measures to maintain the integrity of the transferred
data and preserves in parallel the confidentiality of the transferred data.
Due to these additional security functionalities the security objectives
 O.Ctrl_Auth_CCL
 O.Prot_Integrity
 O.Prot_Confidentiality
have been introduced.
3.4.7 Summary
All of the above add-ons have no impact on the conformance statements regarding CC [10] and PP [9], with
following rational:
The security target fulfils the strict conformance claim of the PP [9] due to the application notes 9 applying here.
By this note the addition of further security functions and security services are covered, even without deriving
particular security functionality from a threat or a policy.
Due to the above rational, the security objectives of this security target are consistent with the statement of the
security objectives in the PP [9], as the security target claims package augmentation to the PP [9].
All security functional requirements defined in the PP [9] are included and completely defined in this ST.
The following security functional requirements are taken from the Common Criteria part 2 [11] document,
respectively from the package definitions taken from the PP [9] or defined in this ST:
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Conformance Claims (ASE_CCL)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
Table 7 Security Functional Requirements
Security Functional
Requirement Description Source
By the ACLs
FCS_CKM.1/RSA-1 Cryptographic key generation – by the ACL-1 CCP2 [11]
FCS_CKM.1/RSA-2 Cryptographic key generation – by the ACL-2 CCP2 [11]
FCS_CKM.1/EC-1 Cryptographic key generation – by the ACL-1 CCP2 [11]
FCS_CKM.1/EC-2 Cryptographic key generation – by the ACL-2 CCP2 [11]
FCS_COP.1/RSA-1 Cryptographic operation – RSA by ACL-1 CCP2 [11]
FCS_COP.1/RSA-2 Cryptographic operation – RSA by ACL-2 CCP2 [11]
FCS_COP.1/ECDSA-1 Cryptographic operation – ECDSA by ACL-1 CCP2 [11]
FCS_COP.1/ECDSA-2 Cryptographic operation – ECDSA by ACL-2 CCP2 [11]
FCS_COP.1/ECDH-1 Cryptographic operation – ECDH by ACL-1 CCP2 [11]
FCS_COP.1/ECDH-2 Cryptographic operation – ECDH by ACL-2 CCP2 [11]
By the SCLs
FCS_CKM.4/AES-SCL-1 Cryptographic key destruction – AES by the SCL-1 PP [9]
FCS_CKM.4/AES-SCL-2 Cryptographic key destruction – AES by the SCL-2 PP [9]
FCS_CKM.4/TDES-SCL-1 Cryptographic key destruction – TDES by the SCL-1 PP [9]
FCS_CKM.4/TDES-SCL-2 Cryptographic key destruction – TDES by the SCL-2 PP [9]
FCS_COP.1/AES-SCL-1 Cryptographic operation – AES by the SCL-1 PP [9]
FCS_COP.1/AES-SCL-2 Cryptographic operation – AES by the SCL-2 PP [9]
FCS_COP.1/TDES-SCL-1 Cryptographic operation – TDES by the SCL-1 PP [9]
FCS_COP.1/TDES-SCL-2 Cryptographic operation – TDES by the SCL-2 PP [9]
FCS_COP.1/CMAC-SCL-1 Cryptographic operation – TDES by the SCL-1 In this ST
FCS_CKM.4/CMAC-SCL-1 Cryptographic key destruction CMAC by the SCL-1 In this ST
By the HSLs
FPT_PHP.3/HSL-1 Resistance to physical attack – by HSL-1 CCP2 [11]
FPT_FLS.1/HSL-1 Failure with preservation of secure state – by HSL-1 CCP2 [11]
FPT_PHP.3/HSL-2 Resistance to physical attack – by HSL-2 CCP2 [11]
FPT_FLS.1/HSL-2 Failure with preservation of secure state – by HSL-2 CCP2 [11]
FPT_PHP.3/HSL-3 Resistance to physical attack – by HSL-3 CCP2 [11]
FPT_FLS.1/HSL-3 Failure with preservation of secure state – by HSL-3 CCP2 [11]
By the CIPURSE™ CLs
FCS_CKM.1/CCL-1 Cryptographic key generation by CCL-1 CCP2 [11]
FCS_CKM.4/CCL-1 Cryptographic key destruction by CCL-1 PP [9]
FCS_COP.1/CCL-1 Cryptographic operation Trusted Channel by CCL-1 In this ST
FCS_CKM.1/CCL-2 Cryptographic key generation by CCL-2 CCP2 [11]
FCS_CKM.4/CCL-2 Cryptographic key destruction by CCL-2 PP [9]
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Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
Security Functional
Requirement Description Source
FCS_COP.1/CCL-2 Cryptographic operation Trusted Channel by CCL-2 In this ST
By hardware and firmware
FAU_SAS.1 Audit data storage PP [9]
FCS_CKM.4/AES Cryptographic key destruction – AES by SCP PP [9]
FCS_CKM.4/TDES Cryptographic key destruction – TDES by SCP PP [9]
FCS_COP.1/AES Cryptographic operation – AES by SCP PP [9]
FCS_COP.1/TDES Cryptographic operation – TDES by SCP PP [9]
FCS_RNG.1/HPRG Random number generation – HPRG PP [9]
FCS_RNG.1/TRNG Random number generation - TRNG PP [9]
FCS_RNG.1/DRNG Generation of Random Numbers - DRNG PP [9]
FCS_RNG.1/KSG Random number generation - KSG PP [9]
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control CCP2 [11]
FDP_ACC.1/Loader Subset access control – Loader PP [9]
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control CCP2 [11]
FDP_ACF.1/Loader Security attribute based access control - Loader PP [9]
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control PP [9]
FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection PP [9]
FDP_SDC.1 Stored data confidentiality PP [9]
FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action PP [9]
FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality PP [9]
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity PP [9]
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity PP [9]
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities PP [9]
FMT_LIM.1/Loader Limited capabilities PP [9]
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability PP [9]
FMT_LIM.2/Loader Limited availability PP [9]
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes CCP2 [11]
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization CCP2 [11]
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management functions CCP2 [11]
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state PP [9]
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel – Loader PP [9]
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection PP [9]
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack PP [9]
FRU_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance PP [9]
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Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
Note that the assignment of the in the table above selected SFRs to Flash Loader or CIPURSE™ CL do not
implement an augmentation as the extension it is just to clarify the part of the TOE claiming the corresponding
SFR.
The CIPURSE™ CL claims of the table above apply for both alternative versions.
The following security functional requirement is included and completely defined in this ST, section 6.
FPT_TST.2 Subset TOE security testing1
All assignments and selections of the security functional requirements are done in the PP [9] and in this Security
Target.
3.5 Application Notes
The functional requirements
 FCS_RNG.1/HPRG,
 FCS_RNG.1/TRNG,
 FCS_RNG.1/DRNG and
 FCS_RNG.1/KSG
are iterations of the FCS_RNG.1 as defined in the Protection Profile [9] according to “Anwendungshinweise und
Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS)” respectively “Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for physical
random number generators”, AIS31 [13].
1 Requirement from the PP [9]
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4 Security Problem Definition (ASE_SPD)
The content of the PP [9] applies to this chapter completely.
4.1 Threats
The threats are directed against the assets and/or the security functions of the TOE. For example, certain attacks
are only one step towards a disclosure of assets while others may directly lead to a compromise of the
application security. The more detailed description of specific attacks is given later on in the process of
evaluation and certification.
The threats to security are defined and described in PP [9] section 3.2, respectively for T.Masquerade_TOE in
chapter 7.2.1.
Table 8 Threats according PP [9]
Threat Name
T.Phys-Manipulation Physical Manipulation
T.Phys-Probing Physical Probing
T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
T.Leak-Inherent Inherent Information Leakage
T.Leak-Forced Forced Information Leakage
T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality
T.RND Deficiency of Random Numbers
T.Masquerade_TOE Masquerade of the TOE
4.1.1 AdditionalThreat due toTOE specific Functionality
Threat Memory Access Violation
The additional functionality of introducing sophisticated privilege levels and access control allows the secure
separation between the operation system(s) and applications, the secure downloading of applications after
personalization and enables multitasking by separating memory areas and performing access controls between
different applications. Due to this additional functionality “area based memory access control” a new threat is
introduced.
The Smartcard Embedded Software is responsible for its User data of the Composite TOE according to the
assumption “Treatment of User data of the Composite TOE (A.Resp-Appl)”. However, the Smartcard Embedded
Software may comprise different parts, for instance an operating system and one or more applications. In this
case, such parts may accidentally or deliberately access data (including code) of other parts, which may result in
a security violation.
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The TOE shall avert the threat “Memory Access Violation (T.Mem-Access)” as specified below:
T.Mem-Access Memory Access Violation
Parts of the Smartcard Embedded Software may cause security violations by accidentally or
deliberately accessing restricted data (which may include code) or privilege levels. Any
restrictions are defined by the security policy of the specific application context and must be
implemented by the Smartcard Embedded Software.
This threat is countered by the Hardware.
Threat Diffusion of Open Samples
The additional functionality of a Loader as defined in the PP [9], section 7.3 requires to address the following
threat, as defined in the document “PP0084: Interpretation” [PP0084].
The TOE shall avert the threat “Diffusion of open Samples (T.Open_Samples_Diffusion)” as specified below:
T.Open_Samples_Diffusion Diffusion of Open Samples
An attacker may get access to open samples of the TOE and use them to gain
information about the TSF (loader, memory management unit, ROM code …). He
may also use the open samples to characterize the behavior of the IC and its
security functionalities (for example: characterization of side channel profiles,
perturbation cartography …). The execution of a dedicated security features (for
example: execution of a DES computation without countermeasures or by de-
activating countermeasures) through the loading of an adequate code would
allow this kind of characterization and the execution of enhanced attacks on the
IC.
This threat is countered by the Flash Loader.
4.1.2 Assets regarding theThreats
The primary assets concern the User data which includes the user data of the Composite TOE as well as program
code (Security IC Embedded Software) stored and in operation and the provided security services. These assets
have to be protected while being executed and or processed and on the other hand, when the TOE is not in
operation.
This leads to four primary assets with its related security concerns:
 SC1 integrity of user data of the Composite TOE
 SC2 confidentiality of user data of the Composite TOE being stored in the TOE’s protected memory
areas
 SC3 correct operation of the security services provided by the TOE for the Security IC Embedded
Software
 SC4 continuous availability of random numbers
SC4 is an additional security service provided by this TOE which is the availability of random numbers. These
random numbers are generated either by a true random number or a deterministic random number generator or
by both, when a true random number is used as seed for the deterministic random number generator. Note that
the generation of random numbers is a requirement of the PP [9].
To be able to protect the listed assets the TOE shall protect its security functionality as well. Therefore critical
information about the TOE shall be protected. Critical information includes:
 logical design data, physical design data, IC Dedicated Software, and configuration data
 Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data, specific development aids, test and characterization
related data, material for software development support, and reticles.
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The information and material produced and/or processed by the TOE Manufacturer in the TOE development and
production environment (Phases 2 up to TOE Delivery) can be grouped as follows:
 logical design data,
 physical design data,
 IC Dedicated Software, Security IC Embedded Software, Initialization Data and Pre-personalization
Data,
 specific development aids,
 test and characterization related data,
 material for software development support, and
 reticles and products in any form
as long as they are generated, stored, or processed by the TOE Manufacturer.
For details see PP [9] section 3.1.
4.2 Organizational Security Policies
The TOE has to be protected during the first phases of their lifecycle (phases 2 up to TOE delivery which can be
after phase 3 or phase 4). Later on each variant of the TOE has to protect itself. The organizational security policy
according to PP [9] covers this aspect.
P.Process-TOE Identification during TOE Development and Production
An accurate identification must be established for the TOE. This requires that
each instantiation of the TOE carries this unique identification.
Due to the augmentations of PP [9] and the chosen packages additional policies are introduced and described in
the next chapter.
4.2.1 Augmented Organizational Security Policy
Due to the augmentations of the PP [9] and the chosen packages additional policies are introduced.
The TOE provides specific security functionality, which can be used by the Smartcard Embedded Software. In the
following specific security functionality is listed which is not derived from threats identified for the TOE’s
environment because it can only be decided in the context of the smartcard application, against which threats
the Smartcard Embedded Software will use the specific security functionality.
The IC Developer / Manufacturer must apply the policy “Additional Specific Security Functionality
(P.Add-Functions)” as specified below.
P.Add-Functions Additional Specific Security Functionality
The TOE shall provide the following specific security functionality to the
Smartcard Embedded Software:
 Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Cryptography (RSA)
 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (EC)
 CIPURSE™ Cryptographic Library (CCL)
 Cipher based Message Authentication Code (CMAC by SCL-1)
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Note 2:
The cryptographic libraries SCL, CCL, RSA, EC and the Toolbox library as stated in chapter 1.1 are delivery
options. Therefore the TOE may come with free combinations of or even without these libraries. In the case of
coming without one or any combination of the cryptographic libraries SCL, CCL, RSA, EC and the TOE does not
provide the Additional Specific Security Functionality Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Cryptography (RSA) and/or Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (EC) and or CIPURSE™ Cryptographic Library and or Cipher based Message Authentication
Code (CMAC by SCL-1).
The Toolbox Library is no cryptographic library and provides no additional specific security functionality.
End of note.
The IC Developer / Manufacturer must apply the organizational security policy “Cryptographic services of the
TOE (P.Crypto-Service)” as specified below:
P.Crypto-Service Cryptographic services of the TOE
The TOE provides secure hardware based cryptographic services for the IC
Embedded Software:
 Triple Data Encryption Standard (TDES)
 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
Note 3:
This TOE can come with both cryptographic coprocessors accessible, or with a blocked SCP or with a blocked
Crypto2304T, or with both crypto co-processors blocked. The blocking depends on the customer demands prior
to the production of the hardware. In case the SCP is blocked, no AES and DES respectively CMAC computation
supported by hardware or SCL is possible. In case the Crypto2304T is blocked, no RSA and EC computation – of
any version as stated in chapter 1.1 - supported by hardware is possible. No accessibility of the deselected
cryptographic co-processors is without impact on any other security policy of the TOE; it is exactly equivalent to
the situation where the user decides just not to use the cryptographic co-processors.
End of note.
The IC Developer / Manufacturer must apply the organizational security policy “Limiting and Blocking the Loader
Functionality (P.Lim_Block_Loader)” as specified below:
P.Lim_Block_Loader Limiting and Blocking the Loader Functionality
The composite manufacturer uses the Loader for loading of Security IC
Embedded Software, user data of the Composite Product or IC Dedicated
Support Software in charge of the IC Manufacturer. He limits the capability
and blocks the availability of the Loader in order to protect stored data from
disclosure and manipulation.
P.Ctrl_Loader Controlled usage to Loader Functionality
Authorized user controls the usage of the Loader functionality in order to
protect stored and loaded user data from disclosure and manipulation.
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4.3 Assumptions
The TOE assumptions on the operational environment are defined and described in PP [9] section 3.4.
The assumptions concern the phases where the TOE has left the chip manufacturer.
The support of cipher schemas requires an additional assumption.
A.Process-Sec-IC Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalization
It is assumed that security procedures are used after delivery of the TOE by
the TOE Manufacturer up to delivery to the end-consumer to maintain
confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and of its manufacturing and test
data (to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or
unauthorized use).
A.Resp-Appl Treatment of User data of the Composite TOE
All User data of the Composite TOE are owned by Security IC Embedded
Software. Therefore, it must be assumed that security relevant User data of
the Composite TOE (especially cryptographic keys) are treated by the
Security IC Embedded Software as defined for its specific application context.
4.3.1 Augmented Assumptions
The developer of the Smartcard Embedded Software must ensure the appropriate “Usage of Key-dependent
Functions (A.Key-Function)” while developing this software in Phase 1 as specified below.
A.Key-Function Usage of Key-dependent Functions
Key-dependent functions (if any) shall be implemented in the Smartcard
Embedded Software in a way that they are not susceptible to leakage attacks
(as described under T.Leak-Inherent and T.Leak-Forced).
Note that here the routines which may compromise keys when being executed are part of the Smartcard
Embedded Software. In contrast to this the threats T.Leak-Inherent and T.Leak-Forced address (i) the
cryptographic routines which are part of the TOE. For details please refer to PP [9] section 3.4.
4.3.2 Note regarding CIPURSE™ CL
The following is regardless of the version chosen:
The CIPURSE™ CL as cryptographic functionality establishes a cryptographic secured communication channel
between two identified entities. Depending on the implementation and usage, the CIPURSE™ CL can act either
in the PICC or in the PCD role. In any case the secrets applied for establishing and usage of the secured channel
must be treated in an appropriate way by both entities PICC and PCD.
This means that it is essential on user side that the critical data for establishing this cryptographic secured
communication channel is generated and stored in an appropriate way and that integrity and confidentiality is
maintained.
These preconditions are treated in the PP [9] section 3.1 claims 67 and 68, and are the reason for not placing an
assumption here.
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5 Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
This section shows the subjects and objects where are relevant to the TOE.
A short overview is given in the following.
The user has the following standard high-level security goals related to the assets:
 SG1 maintain the integrity of user data (when being executed/processed and when being stored in the
TOE´s memories)
 SG2 maintain the confidentiality of user data (when being executed/processed and when being stored in
the TOE´s memories)
 SG3 maintain the correct operation of the security services provided by the TOE for the Security IC
Embedded Software
 SG4 provision of random numbers.
5.1 Security objectives for theTOE
The security objectives of the TOE are defined and described in PP [9] section 4.1, 7.2.1, 7.3.1, 7.3.2, 7.4.1 and
7.4.2.
Table 9 Objectives for the TOE according to PP [9]
O.Phys-Manipulation Protection against Physical Manipulation
O.Phys-Probing Protection against Physical Probing
O.Malfunction Protection against Malfunction
O.Leak-Inherent Protection against Inherent Information Leakage
O.Leak-Forced Protection against Forced Information Leakage
O.Abuse-Func Protection against Abuse of Functionality
O.Identification TOE Identification
O.RND Random Numbers
O.Cap_Avail_Loader
Capability and availability of the Loader
Valid only for the TOE derivatives delivered with activated Flash
Loader.
O.Authentication
Authentication to external entities
Valid only for the TOE derivatives delivered with activated Flash
Loader
O.Ctrl_Auth_Loader
Access control and authenticity for the Loader - valid only for the TOE
derivatives delivered with activated Flash Loader
O.TDES Cryptographic service Triple-DES
O.AES Cryptographic service AES
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Note 4:
The objectives O.Cap_Avail_Loader, O. Authentication, O.Ctrl_Auth_Loader and O.Prot_TSF_Confidentiality
apply only at TOE products coming with activated Flash Loader enabled for software or data download by the
user. In other cases the Flash Loader is not available anymore and the user software or data download is
completed. Depending on the capabilities of the user software these objectives may then reoccur as subject of
the composite TOE.
End of note.
The TOE provides “Additional Specific Security Functionality (O.Add-Functions)” as specified below.
O.Add-Functions Additional Specific Security Functionality
The TOE must provide the following specific security functionality to the
Smartcard Embedded Software:
 Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Cryptography (RSA)
 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (EC)
 CIPURSE™ Cryptography
 Cipher base Message authentication code (CMAC)
Note 5:
The cryptographic libraries SCL, CCL, RSA, EC and the Toolbox library are delivery options, regardless of the
version chosen. Therefore the TOE may come with free combinations of or even without these libraries. In the
case of coming without one or any combination of the cryptographic libraries SCL, CCL, RSA, and EC the TOE
does not provide the Additional Specific Security Functionality Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Cryptography (RSA)
and/or Elliptic Curve Cryptography (EC) and/or Cipher based Message Authentication Code (CMAC by SCL)
and/or CIPURSE™ Cryptographic Library.
The Toolbox Library is no cryptographic library and provides no additional specific security functionality
End of note.
Note 6:
This TOE can come with both crypto co-processors accessible, or with a blocked SCP or with a blocked
Crypto2304T, or with both crypto co-processors blocked. The blocking depends on the customer demands prior
to the production of the hardware. In case the SCP is blocked, no AES and DES computation supported by
hardware is possible. In case the Crypto2304T is blocked, no RSA and EC computation – in any of the version
stated in chapter 1.1 - supported by hardware is possible. No accessibility of the deselected cryptographic co-
processors is without impact on any other security policy of the TOE; it is exactly equivalent to the situation
where the user decides just not to use the cryptographic co-processors.
End of note.
Note 7:
In case the SCP is blocked, no AES, no DES and no Cipher based Message Authentication Code (CMAC by SCL)
computation supported by hardware is possible and thus the CIPURSE™ CL and SCL usage is not possible. This is
regardless of the library version chosen.
End of note.
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The TOE shall provide “Area based Memory Access Control (O.Mem-Access)” as specified below.
O.Mem Access Area based Memory Access Control
The TOE must provide the Smartcard Embedded Software with the capability to
define restricted access memory areas. The TOE must then enforce the
partitioning of such memory areas so that access of software to memory areas and
privilege levels is controlled as required, for example, in a multi-application
environment.
The additional functionality of a Loader as defined in the PP [9], section 7.3 requires to address the following
objective, as defined in the document “PP0084: Interpretation” [PP0084].
The TOE shall provide “Protection of the confidentiality of the TSF (O.Prot_TSF_Confidentiality)” as specified
below:
O.Prot_TSF_Confidentiality Protection of the confidentiality of the TSF
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential operations
of the Security IC (loader, memory management unit …) through the use of a
dedicated code loaded on open samples.
If the CIPURSE™ CL is ordered the additional functionality address the following objectives as defined in this
document:
O.Ctrl_Auth_CCL Authentication of entities
The CIPURSE™ CL must implement mutual authentication to establish a ready to
use secure communication channel between two authenticated entities before
any other communication between the two entities is applied.
O.Prot_Integrity Integrity protection
The CIPURSE™ CL must implement integrity protection functionality for the user
data to be exchanged via the secure communication channel.
O.Prot_Confidentiality Confidentiality protection
The CIPURSE™ CL must protect the confidentiality of the user data to be
exchanged via the secure communication channel if the user configures
accordingly.
Table 10 Additional objectives due to TOE specific functions and augmentations
O.Add-Functions Additional specific security functionality
O.Mem-Access Area based Memory Access Control
O.Prot_TSF_Confidentiality Protection of the confidentiality of the TSF
O.Ctrl_Auth_CCL Authentication of entities
O.Prot_Integrity Integrity protection
O.Prot_Confidentiality Confidentiality protection
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5.2 Security Objectives from PP for development and environment
The security objectives for the security IC embedded software development environment and the operational
environment are defined in PP [9] section 4.2, 4.3, 7.2.1and 7.3.
For secure use of each of the version of the CIPURSE™ CL it is essential that on user side the common secret is
generated and stored in an appropriate way and that integrity and confidentiality of this user secret is
maintained. These preconditions are treated in the PP [9] section 3.1 claims 67 and 68.
The operational environment of the TOE shall provide “Limitation of capability and blocking the Loader
“OE.Lim_Block_Loader”, “External entities authentication of the TOE “OE.TOE_Auth" and “Secure
communication and usage of the Loader “OE.Loader¬Usage” as specified below:
OE.Lim_Block_Loader Limitation of capability and blocking the Loader
The Composite Product Manufacturer will protect the Loader functionality
against misuse, limit the capability of the Loader and terminate irreversibly
the Loader after intended usage of the Loader.
OE.TOE_Auth Authentication to external entities
The operational environment shall support the authentication verification
mechanism and know authentication reference data of the TOE.
OE.Loader_Usage Secure communication and usage of the Loader
The authorized user must support the trusted communication with the TOE by
confidentiality protection and authenticity proof of the data to be loaded and
fulfilling the access conditions required by the Loader.
Note 8:
The objectives OE.Lim_Block_Loader, OE.TOE_Auth and OE.Loader_Usage for the development and operation
environment apply only at TOE products coming with activated Flash Loader enabled for user data download. In
other cases the Flash Loader is not available anymore and the user data download is completed. Depending on
the capabilities of the user software this objective may then reoccur as subject of the composite TOE.
End of note.
5.3 Security Objectives for the Environment
Since the CIPURSE™ CL requires the presence of a common secret on both communication entities an additional
objective for the environment is generated:
Following objectives are defined here.
OE.Resp-Appl Treatment of User data of the Composite TOE
Please refer to chapter 5.3.1 for clarification
Note 9:
The following is regardless of the versions chosen: The CIPURSE™ CL is a delivery option. In case the user has
ordered the CIPURSE™ CL, the user is responsible to implement the CIPURSE™ CL into his user software. In
addition, the user has to generate and treat the common secret in an appropriate way. The objective common
secret is therefore similar to the OE.Resp-Appl. Anyhow, processes and treatment is exclusively subject of the
user and his logistic processes.
End of note.
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Note 10:
The following is regardless of the versions chosen: If the user decides to use the integrity protection mode of the
CIPURSE™ CL then the confidentiality of the user data to be transferred is solely subject of the user.
End of note.
Note 11:
The following is regardless of the versions chosen: The CIPURSE™ CL as cryptographic functionality establishes
a cryptographic secured communication channel between two identified entities. Depending on the
implementation and usage, the CIPURSE™ CL can act either in the PICC or in the PCD role. In any case the
secrets applied for establishing and usage of the secured channel must be treated in an appropriate way by both
entities PICC and PCD.
This means that it is essential on user side that the critical data for establishing this cryptographic secured
communication channel is generated and stored in an appropriate way and that integrity and confidentiality is
maintained.
These preconditions are treated in the PP [9] section 3.1 claims 67 and 68, and are the reason for not placing an
objective for the environment here.
End of note.
The table below lists the security objectives.
Table 11 Security Objectives for the Environment according to the PP [9]
Phase 1 OE.Resp-Appl
Treatment of User data of the Composite
TOE
Phase 5 – 6 optional Phase 4 OE.Process-Sec-IC
Protection during composite product
manufacturing
Phase 5 – 6 optional Phase 4
OE.Lim_Block_Loader (1)
Limitation of capability and blocking the
loader.
OE.TOE_Auth (1) Authentication to external entities
OE.Loader_Usage (1)
Secure communication and usage of the
Loader
(1) These objectives are only valid if the TOE is delivered with active Flash Loader.
5.3.1 Clarification of “Treatment of User Data (OE.Resp-Appl)”
Regarding the cryptographic services this objective of the environment has to be clarified.
By definition cipher or plain text data and cryptographic keys are user data of the Composite TOE. The
Smartcard Embedded Software shall treat these data appropriately, use only proper secret keys (chosen from a
large key space) as input for the cryptographic function of the TOE and use keys and functions appropriately in
order to ensure the strength of cryptographic operation.
This means that keys are treated as confidential as soon as they are generated. The keys must be unique with a
very high probability, as well as cryptographically strong. For example, it must be ensured that it is beyond
practicality to derive the private key from a public key if asymmetric algorithms are used. If keys are imported
into the TOE and/or derived from other keys, quality and confidentiality must be maintained. This implies that
appropriate key management has to be realized in the environment.
Regarding the memory, software and firmware protection and the SFR and peripheral access rights handling
these objectives of the environment has to be clarified. The treatment of user data of the Composite TOE is also
required when a multi-application operating system is implemented as part of the Smartcard Embedded
Software on the TOE. In this case the multi-application operating system should not disclose security relevant
user data of one application to another application when it is processed or stored on the TOE.
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5.3.2 Clarification of “Protection during Composite product Manufacturing
(OE.Process-Sec-IC)”
The protection during packaging, finishing and personalization includes also the personalization process (Flash
Loader) and the personalization data (TOE software components) during Phase 4, Phase 5 and Phase 6.
5.4 Security Objectives Rationale
The security objectives rationale of the TOE are defined and described in PP [9] section 4.4. For organizational
security policy P.Add-Functions, OE.Plat-Appl and OE.Resp-Appl the rationale is given in the following
description.
Table 12 Security Objectives Rationale
Assumption, Threat or Organizational Security Policy Security Objective
A.Key-Function OE.Resp-Appl
P.Add-Functions
O.Add-Functions
O.Ctrl_Auth_CCL
O.Prot_Integrity
O.Prot_Confidentiality
P.Crypto-Service O.TDES
P.Crypto-Service O.AES
P.Ctrl_Loader
O.Ctrl_Auth_Loader
O.Authentication
OE.Process-Sec-IC
P.Ctrl_Loader
OE.Loader_Usage
OE.TOE_Auth
OE.Process-Sec-IC
P.Lim_Block_Loader
O.Cap_Avail_Loader
OE.Process-Sec-IC
P.Lim_Block_Loader
OE.Lim_Block_Loader
OE.Process-Sec-IC
T.Masquerade
O.Authentication
OE.TOE_Auth
OE.Process-Sec-IC
T.Mem-Access O.Mem-Access
T.Open_Samples__Diffusion
O.Prot_TSF_Confidentiality
O.Leak-Inherent
O.Leak-Forced
OE.Process-Sec-IC
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5.5 P.Add-Functions
The justification related to the security objective “Additional Specific Security Functionality (O.Add-Functions)”
is as follows: Since O.Add-Functions requires the TOE to implement exactly the same specific security
functionality as required by P.Add-Functions; the organizational security policy is covered by the objective.
Nevertheless the security objectives O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-Probing, O.Malfunction, O.Phys-Manipulation and
O.Leak-Forced define how to implement the specific security functionality required by P.Add-Functions. (Note
that these objectives support that the specific security functionality is provided in a secure way as expected from
P.Add-Functions.) Especially O.Leak-Inherent and O.Leak-Forced refer to the protection of confidential data
(User data of the Composite TOE or TSF data) in general. User data of the Composite TOE are also processed by
the specific security functionality required by P.Add-Functions.
The policy P.Add functions includes the function CIPURSE™ Cryptographic Library (CCL). This functionality
implements the objectives O.Ctrl_Auth_CCL, O.Prot_Integrity and O.Prot_Confidentiality. The CIPURSE™
Cryptographic Library (CCL) first prepares and establishes a secure communication channel between two
authenticated entities. The mutual authentication means covers the objective O.Ctrl_Auth_CCL. The
implemented means of session key generation and integrity protection prepares for the confidential and
integrity protected exchange of user data between the two authenticated entities. Thus the objectives
O.Prot_Integrity and O.Prot_Confidentiality are covered too.
The policy P.Add functions includes the function Cipher base Message authentication code (CMAC). This
functionality is implemented by the optional software SCL and implements the option to protect the integrity of
a user data block with a message authentication code. The computing of the CMAC requires the use of either
AES or TDES, as outlined in the chapter P.Crypto-Service 5.9 and also implemented by the optional software
SCL.
5.6 A.Key-Function
Compared to the PP [9] a further clarification has been made for the security objective “Treatment of user data
of the Composite TOE (OE.Resp-Appl)”: By definition cipher or plain text data and cryptographic keys are user
data of the Composite TOE. So, the Smartcard Embedded Software will protect such data if required and use
keys and functions appropriately in order to ensure the strength of cryptographic operation. Quality and
confidentiality must be maintained for keys that are imported and/or derived from other keys. This implies that
appropriate key management has to be realized in the environment. That is expressed by the assumption
A.Key—Function which is covered from OE.Resp–Appl. These measures make sure that the assumption
A.Resp-Appl is still covered by the security objective OE.Resp-Appl although additional functions are being
supported according to P.Add-Functions.
5.7 T.Mem-Access
Compared to the PP [9] an enhancement regarding memory area protection has been established. The clear
definition of privilege levels for operated software establishes the clear separation of different restricted memory
areas for running the firmware – regardless of the version in use -, downloading and/or running the operating
system and to establish a clear separation between different applications. Nevertheless, it is also possible to
define a shared memory section where separated applications may exchange defined data. The privilege levels
clearly define by using a hierarchical model the access right from one level to the other. These measures ensure
that the threat T.Mem-Access is clearly covered by the security objective O.Mem-Access.
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Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
5.8 P.Ctrl_Loader, P.Lim_Block_Loader,T.Masquerade and
T.Open_Samples_Diffusion
The PP [9] section 7.3 considers the life cycle phases of the TOE also with the organizational policy
P.Lim_Block_Loader and P.Ctlr_Loader as the TOE must be protected against unauthorized usage and control
and against download of malicious software before, during and after the user downloads his software. This is
formalized with the objectives O.Cap_Avail_Loader, O.Authentication and O.Ctrl_Auth_Loader requiring
authentication of the TOE to external entities and a trusted communication channel. The O.Authentication
implements a mutual authentication and involves the environment therefore.
And the policies cover also the environmental objective OE.Process-Sec-IC at user premises, as it must be
regardless in which environment the Flash Loader is operated.
The implemented mutual authentication requires first to authenticate the TOE to the external user. This requires
also knowledge by the user about the sequence of the protocol, interpretation of the transferred data and how to
start the authentication of the TOE. This authentication mean counters the threat T.Masquerade_TOE as only
the genuine TOE is able to identify itself correctly to the enabled user, which covers O.Authentication.
The second step of the mutual authentications mean implements the authentication of the user to the TOE. Only
the user enabled to present the correct authentication data and knowing about the sequence, data
interpretation and signaling of the authentication to the TOE is able to proceed further on.
This enforces OE.TOE_Auth, requiring the support of the verification mechanism and known authentication
reference data by the operational environment.
The protection against the threat T.Masquerade_TOE coveres the policy P.Ctrl_Loader with the environmental
objective OE.Process-Sec-IC for the user premises, as it must be regardless in which environment the mutual
authentication of the Flash Loader is conducted. At the moment the allowed user authenticates correctly the
Flash Loader usage is in responsibility of the user.
It is normal business that products enabled for software download by the user are either on their way to the user
or are already stored at user premises. At both situations it cannot be excluded that an attacker could manage to
steal such products enabled for software downloads. The ability to download software on a chip without
operating system and/or application is defined as open sample.
This situation generates the threat T.Open_Samples_Diffusion which is defined as follows:
The download of analysis software could enable an attacker to characterize the product and to construct an
attack path out of the gained information.
This threat is countered by the Flash Loader with following rational:
As long as the Flash Loader is active, controlled usage to the Flash Loader functionality (P.Ctrl_Loader) is
enforced which protects the TOE from achieving the status of being an open sample. And more, even the
attacker could observe, meaning in the sense of measurements during, or induce faults during an authorized
download, the Flash Loader protects the user data of the download by confidentiality and integrity protection
means. The Flash Loader functionalities of mutual authentication, establishing a dedicated trusted
communication channel, the encryption and integrity protection means cover the objectives
O.Prot_TSF_Confidentiality, O.Leak-Inherent and O.Leak-Forced.
The protection against the threat T.Open_Samples_Diffusion covers the policy P.Ctrl_Loader with the
environmental objective OE.Process-Sec-IC for the user premises, as it must be regardless in which environment
the mutual authentication and operation of the Flash Loader is conducted. At the moment the allowed user
authenticates correctly the Flash Loader usage is in responsibility of the user.
The policy P.Ctrl_Loader covers also the environmental objective OE.Process-Sec-IC at user premises, as it must
be regardless in which environment the Flash Loader is operated.
Note regarding the Flash Loader:
The algorithm strength of the Flash Loader has not been cryptographic-analytically evaluated by the BSI, as
Infineon has implemented a proprietary extension.
End of note.
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Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
The objective O.Ctrl_Auth_Loader Access control and authenticity for the Loader is covered by following
rational:
The identification of the communication entities of the Flash Loader requires the presence of dedicated
identification data for passing successfully the mutual authentication. This enforces the policy P.Ctrl_Loader
comprising the aspect of the mutual authentication. After successful authentication the user is enabled to
change the keys used for authentication and downloading the user data. This first user is defined as the
administrator. The TOE can then further be operated for example by a service partner who is defined as being
the Download Operator. The equal protecting means as for the Administrator apply here again but due to the
key change different roles are established. The Download Operator downloads then the encrypted user data
with the Flash Loader into the defined and accessible SOLID FLASH™ NVM area. This area is access protected by
the MMU.
The policy O.Ctrl_Auth_Loader covers also the environmental objective OE.Process-Sec-IC at user premises, as it
must be regardless in which environment the Flash Loader is operated.
This objective O.Leak-Inherent is covered with following rational:
This false download threat is countered with the mutual authentication mean as only the correct identified user
is able to download the user intended software and data. Since it is not practical for an attacker to authenticate
correctly a threatening download of attack software is countered. By that possible confidential user data already
stored on the TOE remain protected from disclosure by this method.
If the user is the attacker, or does not follow the user guidance, or bad designed user software implements
weaknesses, the user data remain protected anyway, since even after passing the mutual authentication of the
loader the download is conducted encrypted only. And even more, a different encryption is applied to store the
data in the SOLID FLASH™ NVM. Since also the number of Flash Loader trials is limited even comprehensive
side channel analysis would not leave sufficient information to conduct a successful attack.
The implemented authentication means cover also the environmental objective OE.Process-Sec-IC at user
premises, as it must be regardless in which environment the Flash Loader is operated.
This objective O.Leak-Forced is covered with following rational:
Another method to gain information is to force information leakage of confidential data processed in the TOE.
Such forcing requires malfunction or physical manipulation. Inducing errors of any kind during data processing
will be discovered by the Integrity Guard with high probability which leads to a security reset. Failures induced
during the mutual authentication or encrypted download process of the Flash Loader will also be discovered as
the perturbation of the sequences leads to fail of the process with trial counter decrement or a fail of the integrity
check of the downloaded data will occur. It would anyway not be practical to induce targeted errors as any
process managing data is protected due to the permanent and differently data encryption and integrity
protection on the TOE.
Physical static manipulation requires the presence of a worthwhile target. This is on one hand hard to identify
and would require intensive reverse engineering due to the topological means such as synthesis of the TOE and
other means. But, on the other hand, if we assume than an attacker could identify such spot, and the physical
preparation was successful too and thus it was possible to probe the targeted signal, then, even assumed the
attacker could analyze the traffic on the signal, the results would be worthless, since the signal data is encrypted
or masked. Thus, the data remains confidentiality protected even outside the TOE, since the analyst neither has
neither the encryption algorithm nor the key.
The Integrity Guard concept and encryption of memory contents are always present and cover also the
environmental objective OE.Process-Sec-IC at user premises, as it must be regardless in which environment the
Flash Loader is operated.
All requirements are fulfilled by the Flash Loader due the strong mutual authentication means enabling only the
authorized user for the download, due to the download of encrypted data only and due to the final locking
command to be applied by the user before delivery. As a consequence the operational environment objectives
OE.Lim_Block_Loader, OE.TOE_Auth and OE.Loader_Usage obligate the composite manufacturer to protect
the authentication data (e.g. keys) against misuse and limit the capability of the Loader.
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Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
In addition, the user guidance implements the obligation to permanent disable the Flash Loader prior delivery to
the end-user.
The package 1 defines the final locking of the Flash Loader prior delivery to the end-user and the usage in secure
environment. The package 2 defines that the Flash Loader can be used also in insecure environment. By claiming
both packages the user has the choice to apply the active Flash Loader either in insecure or in secure
environment and achieves by that a maximum of flexibility. Anyhow, the user is obligated to lock the Flash
Loader prior delivery to the end-user in both cases. This is an obligation implemented by the user guidance.
The Flash Loader provides the required functionality to be applied by the composite manufacturer for covering
these objectives.
The objectives O.Cap_Avail_Loader, O.Authentication, O.Loader_Usage and O.Prot_TSF_Confidentiality and
the organizational policies P.Lim_Block_Loader and P.Ctlr_Loader as discussed in the PP [9] section 7.2 and 7.3
apply only at TOE products at the life cycle phase delivery, if these products come with activated Flash Loader
enabled for software or data download by the user. In other cases the Flash Loader is not available anymore and
the user software or data download is completed. Depending on the capabilities of the user software these
objectives may then reoccur as subject of the composite TOE.
5.9 P.Crypto-Service
The PP [9] includes the organizational security policy P.Crypto-Service Cryptographic services of the TOE in a
different extend as it formalizes the objectives O.TDES and O.AES.
For the objective O.TDES a concrete standard reference (NIST) with operational modes is given the
implementation must follow and also the cryptographic key destruction is regulated. The implementation
complies to the given security functional requirements and the objective O.TDES is met.
For the objective O.AES a concrete standard reference (NIST) with a selection of key lengths is given the
implementation must follow and also the cryptographic key destruction is regulated. The implementation
complies to the given security functional requirements and the objective O.AES is met.
For the objective O.AES a concrete standard reference with an algorithm selection is given the implementation
must follow. The implementation complies to the given security functional requirements and the objective
O.AES is met.
The justification of the additional policy and the additional assumption show that they do not contradict to the
rationale already given in the Protection Profile for the assumptions, policy and threats defined there.
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Extended Component Definition (ASE_ECD)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
6 Extended Component Definition (ASE_ECD)
There are following extended components defined and described for the TOE:
 the family FCS_RNG at the class FCS Cryptographic Support
 the family FMT_LIM at the class FMT Security Management
 the family FAU_SAS at the class FAU Security Audit
 the component FDP_SDC.1 at the class FDP User Data Protection
 the component FPT_TST.2 at the class FPT Protection of the TSF
 the component FIA_API.1 at the class FIA Identification and Authentication
The extended components FCS_RNG, FMT_LIM, FAU_SAS, FDP_SDC and FIA_API are defined and described in
PP [9] section 5 and the extended component FIA_API is defined and described in PP [9] section 7.2.
The component FPT_TST.2 is defined in the following.
6.1 Component SubsetTOE security testing (FPT_TST.2)
The security is strongly dependent on the correct operation of the security functions. Therefore, the TOE shall
support that particular security functions or mechanisms are tested in the operational phase (Phase 7). The tests
can be initiated by the Smartcard Embedded Software and/or by the TOE or is done automatically and
continuously.
Part 2 of the Common Criteria provides the security functional component “TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)”. The
component FPT_TST.1 provides the ability to test the TSF’s correct operation.
For the user it is important to know which security functions or mechanisms can be tested. The functional
component FPT_TST.1 does not mandate to explicitly specify the security functions being tested. In addition,
FPT_TST.1 requires verification of the integrity of TSF data and of the stored TSF executable code which might
violate the security policy. Therefore, the functional component ”Subset TOE security testing (FPT_TST.2)” of
the family TSF self-test has been newly created. This component allows that particular parts of the security
mechanisms and functions provided by the TOE are tested.
6.1.1 Definition of FPT_TST.2
The functional component “Subset TOE security testing (FPT_TST.2)” has been newly created (Common Criteria
Part 2 extended). This component allows that particular parts of the security mechanisms and functions provided
by the TOE can be tested after TOE Delivery or are tested automatically and continuously during normal
operation transparent for the user.
This security functional component is used instead of the functional component FPT_TST.1 from Common
Criteria Part 2. For the user it is important to know which security functions or mechanisms can be tested. The
functional component FPT_TST.1 does not mandate to explicitly specify the security functions being tested. In
addition, FPT_TST.1 requires verifying the integrity of TSF data and stored TSF executable code which might
violate the security policy.
The functional component “Subset TOE testing (FPT_TST.2)” is specified as follows (Common Criteria Part 2
extended).
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Extended Component Definition (ASE_ECD)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
6.1.2 TSF self-test (FPT_TST)
Family Behavior The Family Behavior is defined in [11] section 15.14 (442, 443).
Component
leveling
FPT_TST.1: The component FPT_TST.1 is defined in [11] section 15.14 (444, 445 and 446).
FPT_TST.2: Subset TOE security testing, provides the ability to test the correct operation of
particular security functions or mechanisms. These tests may be performed at start-up,
periodically, at the request of the authorized user, or when other conditions are met. It
also provides the ability to verify the integrity of TSF data and executable code.
Management
FPT_TST.2
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
Management of the conditions under which subset TSF self-testing occurs, such as
during initial start-up, regular interval or under specified conditions
Management of the time of the interval appropriate.
Audit: FPT_TST.2 There are no auditable events foreseen.
FPT_TST.2 Subset TOE testing
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_TST.2.1: The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests [selection: during initial start-up, periodically
during normal operation, at the request of the authorized user, and/or at the
conditions [assignment: conditions under which self-test should occur]] to
demonstrate the correct operation of [assignment: functions and/or mechanisms].
FPT_TST TSF Self Test
1
2
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Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
7 Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
For this section the PP [9] section 6 can be applied completely.
7.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements
The security functional requirements (SFR) for the TOE are defined and described in the PP [9] section 6.1 and in
the following description.
Following table provides an overview of the functional security requirements of the TOE, marks the source it is
taken from and whether it is a defined, refined or augmented.
The refinements are also valid for this ST.
In the following table the abbreviation PP stands for Protection Profile and CCx for the related Common Criteria
part which is indicated by the “x”.
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Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
Table 13 Security Functional Requirements defined / refined / augmented by source
Security Functional
Requirement Description Source
Refined/Defined/
Augmented
By the ACLs
FCS_CKM.1/RSA-1 Cryptographic key generation- RSA by ACL-1 CCP2 [11] Defined in CCP2 [11]
FCS_CKM.1/RSA-2 Cryptographic key generation- RSA by ACL-2 CCP2 [11] Defined in CCP2 [11]
FCS_CKM.1/EC-1 Cryptographic key generation- EC by ACL-1 CCP2 [11] Defined in CCP2 [11]
FCS_CKM.1/EC-2 Cryptographic key generation- EC by ACL-2 CCP2 [11] Defined in CCP2 [11]
FCS_COP.1/RSA-1 Cryptographic operation – RSA by ACL-1 CCP2 [11] Defined in CCP2 [11]
FCS_COP.1/RSA-2 Cryptographic operation – RSA by ACL-2 CCP2 [11] Defined in CCP2 [11]
FCS_COP.1/ECDSA-1 Cryptographic operation – ECDSA by ACL-1 CCP2 [11] Defined in CCP2 [11]
FCS_COP.1/ECDSA-2 Cryptographic operation – ECDSA by ACL-2 CCP2 [11] Defined in CCP2 [11]
FCS_COP.1/ECDH-1 Cryptographic operation – ECDH by ACL-1 CCP2 [11] Defined in CCP2 [11]
FCS_COP.1/ECDH-2 Cryptographic operation – ECDH by ACL-2 CCP2 [11] Defined in CCP2 [11]
By the SCLs
FCS_COP.1/TDES-SCL-1 Cryptographic operation TDES by SCL-1 PP [9] Defined in PP [9]
FCS_CKM.4/TDES-SCL-1
Cryptographic key destruction TDES by SCL-
1
PP [9] Defined in PP [9]
FCS_COP.1/AES-SCL-1 Cryptographic operation AES by SCL-1 PP [9] Defined in PP [9]
FCS_CKM.4/AES-SCL-1 Cryptographic key destruction AES by SCL-1 PP [9] Defined in PP [9]
FCS_COP.1/CMAC-SCL-1 Cryptographic operation CMAC by SCL-1 PP [9] Defined in PP [9]
FCS_CKM.4/CMAC-SCL-1
Cryptographic key destruction CMAC by SCL-
1
PP [9] Defined in PP [9]
FCS_COP.1/TDES-SCL-2 Cryptographic operation TDES by SCL-2 PP [9] Defined in PP [9]
FCS_CKM.4/TDES-SCL-2
Cryptographic key destruction TDES by SCL-
2
PP [9] Defined in PP [9]
FCS_COP.1/AES-SCL-2 Cryptographic operation AES by SCL-2 PP [9] Defined in PP [9]
FCS_CKM.4/AES-SCL-2 Cryptographic key destruction AES by SCL-2 PP [9] Defined in PP [9]
By the CIPURSE™ CLs (4)
FCS_CKM.1/CCL-1 Cryptographic key generation - CIPURSE™
CL by CCL-1
CCP2 [11] Defined in CCP2 [11]
FCS_CKM.4/CCL-1 Cryptographic key destruction - CIPURSE™
CL by CCL-1
CCP2 [11] Defined in CCP2 [11]
FCS_COP.1/CCL-1 Cryptographic operation CIPURSE™ CL
Trusted Channel by CCL-1
CCP2 [11] Defined in CCP2 [11]
FCS_CKM.1/CCL-2 Cryptographic key generation - CIPURSE™
CL by CCL-2
CCP2 [11] Defined in CCP2 [11]
FCS_CKM.4/CCL-2 Cryptographic key destruction - CIPURSE™
CL by CCL-2
CCP2 [11] Defined in CCP2 [11]
FCS_COP.1/CCL-2 Cryptographic operation CIPURSE™ CL
Trusted Channel by CCL-2
CCP2 [11] Defined in CCP2 [11]
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Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
Security Functional
Requirement Description Source
Refined/Defined/
Augmented
By the HSLs (3)
FPT_PHP.3/HSL-1 Resistance to physical attack by HSL-1 PP [9] Refined in PP [9]
FPT_FLS.1/HSL-1 Failure with preservation of secure state by
HSL-1
PP [9] Refined in PP [9]
FPT_PHP.3/HSL-2 Resistance to physical attack by HSL-2 PP [9] Refined in PP [9]
FPT_FLS.1/HSL-2 Failure with preservation of secure state by
HSL-2
PP [9] Refined in PP [9]
FPT_PHP.3/HSL-3 Resistance to physical attack by HSL-3 PP [9] Refined in PP [9]
FPT_FLS.1/HSL-3 Failure with preservation of secure state by
HSL-3
PP [9] Refined in PP [9]
By Hardware and Firmware
FCS_CKM.4/AES Cryptographic key destruction – AES by SCP PP [9] Defined in PP [9]
FCS_COP.1/AES Cryptographic operation – AES by SCP PP [9] Defined in PP [9]
FCS_CKM.4/TDES Cryptographic key destruction – TDES by
SCP
PP [9] Defined in PP [9]
FCS_COP.1/TDES Cryptographic operation – TDES by SCP PP [9] Defined in PP [9]
FAU_SAS.1 Audit data storage PP [9] Defined in PP [9]
FCS_RNG.1/DRNG Generation of Random Numbers - DRNG PP [9] Defined in PP [9]
FCS_RNG.1/HPRG Random number generation – HPRG PP [9] Defined in PP [9]
FCS_RNG.1/KSG Random number generation - KSG PP [9] Defined in PP [9]
FCS_RNG.1/TRNG Random number generation - TRNG PP [9] Defined in PP [9]
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control CCP2 [11] CCP2 [11],
augmented
FDP_ACC.1/Loader Subset access control – Loader PP [9] Refined in PP [9]
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control CCP2 [11] CCP2 [11],
augmented
FDP_ACF.1/Loader Security attribute based access control -
Loader
PP [9] Refined in PP [9]
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control PP [9] Refined in PP [9]
FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection PP [9] Refined in PP [9]
FDP_SDC.1 Stored data confidentiality PP [9] Defined in PP [9]
FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action PP [9] Defined in PP [9]
FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality PP [9] Refined in PP [9]
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity PP [9] Refined in PP [9]
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity PP [9] Defined in PP [9]
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities PP [9] Defined in PP [9]
FMT_LIM.1/Loader Limited capabilities PP [9] Defined in PP [9]
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability PP [9] Defined in PP [9]
FMT_LIM.2/Loader Limited availability PP [9] Defined in PP [9]
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Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
Security Functional
Requirement Description Source
Refined/Defined/
Augmented
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes CCP2 [11] CCP2 [11],
augmented
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization CCP2 [11] CCP2 [11],
augmented
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management functions CCP2 [11] CCP2 [11],
augmented
FPT_FLS.1 (3) Failure with preservation of secure state PP [9] Refined in PP [9]
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel – Loader PP [9] Refined in PP [9]
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection PP [9] Refined in PP [9]
FPT_PHP.3 (3) Resistance to physical attack PP [9] Refined in PP [9]
FPT_TST.2 TOE security testing ST [8] Defined in ST [8]
FRU_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance PP [9] Refined in PP [9]
(1) Applies in two alternative operation modes: one mode preserves integrity protected communication and
the second preserves integrity and confidential communication. Choosing the mode is up to the user and
his responsibility. For example, the integrity protected mode can be used at secure premises, i.e. where
eavesdropping is no issue, and the second mode can be applied where the environment is out of control
of the user.
(2) These security functional requirements SFR apply only if the SCL- meaning one of the two alternatives -
is on board of the delivered TOE products.
(3) If the HSL is on board and in the correct configuration, the TOE is protected against modification of data
to be written respectively programmed into the SOLID FLASH™ NVM by sudden power off situations.
False modified data in the SOLID FLASH™ NVM lead whenever read to termination of the chip operation
and renders thereby the chip useless. This scenario is prevented by the SFRs FPT_FLS.1/HSL and
FPT_PHP.3/HSL contributing to the objective O.Malfunction.
These claims apply regardless of the CIPURSE™ CL version chosen.
All assignments and selections of the security functional requirements of the TOE are done in PP [9] and in the
following description.
Notes:
 The security functional requirements valid for the ACL in both alternative versions are FCS_CKM.1/EC,
FCS_CKM.1/RSA, FCS_COP.1/ECDH, FCS_COP.1/ECDSA and FCS_COP.1/RSA. These SFRs apply only if
the corresponding asymmetric cryptographic library is on bard.
 The security functional requirements FMT_LIM.1/Loader, FMT_LIM.2/Loader, FIA_API.1, FTP_ITC.1,
FDP_UCT.1, FDP_UIT.1, FDP_ACC.1/Loader and FDP_ACF.1/Loader applying only at TOE products
coming with activated Flash Loader enabled for user data download. In other cases the Flash Loader is
not available anymore and the user data download is completed. Depending on the capabilities of the
user software these security functional requirements may then reoccur as subject of the composite TOE.
 The security functional requirements FCS_COP.1/CCL-1, FCS_CKM.1/CCL-1, FCS_CKM.4/CCL-1,
FCS_COP.1/CCL-2, FCS_CKM.1/CCL-2 and FCS_CKM.4/CCL-2 apply only if one of the CCL versions is on
board and if the operation mode confidential communication is chosen.
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Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
7.1.1 Extended Components FCS_RNG.1 and FAU_SAS.1
7.1.1.1 FCS_RNG
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE an additional family (FCS_RNG) of the Class FCS
(cryptographic support) is defined in the PP [9]. This family describes the functional requirements for random
number generation used for cryptographic purposes.
Please note that the national regulation are outlined in PP [9] chapter 7.5.1 and in AIS31 [13]. These regulations
apply for this TOE.
Note 12:
The functional requirements FCS_RNG.1/TRNG, FCS_RNG.1/HPRG, FCS_RNG.1/DRNG, FCS_RNG.1/KSG, are
iterations of the FCS_RNG.1 defined in the PP [9] according to “Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum
Schema (AIS)” respectively “A proposal for: Functionality classes for random number generators” [13].
End of note.
Note 13:
The Physical True Random Number Generator PTRNG implements total failure test of the random source and a
continuous RNG test according to:
National Institute of Standards and Technology, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS) 140-2, 2002-03-12, chapter 4.9.2.
End of note.
Together with the guidelines in [6] the hybrid PTRNG of this TOE provides random numbers conformant to
several quality metrics as defined in [13]. Depending on the user configuration the TOE provide the according
random number quality. For each addressed quality metric of [13] the definitions are made in the following
chapters.
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Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
7.1.1.1.1 True Random Number Generation, meeting AIS31 PTG.2
FCS_RNG.1/TRNG Random Number Generation
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FCS_RNG.1/TRNG Random numbers generation Class PTG.2 according to [13]
FCS_RNG.1.1/TRNG The TSF shall provide a physical random number generator that implements:
PTG.2.1 A total failure test detects a total failure of entropy source immediately when the RNG
has started. When a total failure is detected, no random numbers will be output.
PTG.2.2 If a total failure of the entropy source occurs while the RNG is being operated, the
RNG prevents the output of any internal random number that depends on some raw
random numbers that have been generated after the total failure of the entropy
source.
PTG.2.3 The online test shall detect non-tolerable statistical defects of the raw random
number sequence (i) immediately when the RNG has started, and (ii) while the RNG is
being operated. The TSF must not output any random numbers before the power-up
online test has finished successfully or when a defect has been detected.
PTG.2.4 The online test procedure shall be effective to detect non-tolerable weaknesses of the
random numbers soon.
PTG.2.5 The online test procedure checks the quality of the raw random number sequence. It is
triggered continuously. The online test is suitable for detecting non-tolerable
statistical defects of the statistical properties of the raw random numbers within an
acceptable period of time.
FCS_RNG.1.2/TRNG The TSF shall provide numbers in the format 8- or 16-bit that meet
PTG.2.6 Test procedure A, as defined in [13] does not distinguish the internal random numbers
from output sequences of an ideal RNG.
PTG.2.7 The average Shannon entropy per internal random bit exceeds 0.997.
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Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
7.1.1.1.2 Hybrid Random Number Generation, meeting AIS31 PTG.3
FCS_RNG.1/HPRG Random Number Generation
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FCS_RNG.1/HPRG Random numbers generation Class PTG.3 according to [13]
FCS_RNG.1.1/HPRG The TSF shall provide a hybrid physical random number generator that implements:
PTG.3.1 A total failure test detects a total failure of entropy source immediately when the RNG
has started. When a total failure has been detected no random numbers will be
output.
PTG.3.2 If a total failure of the entropy source occurs while the RNG is being operated, the
RNG prevents the output of any internal random number that depends on some raw
random numbers that have been generated after the total failure of the entropy
source.
PTG.3.3 The online test shall detect non-tolerable statistical defects of the raw random
number sequence (i) immediately when the RNG has started, and (ii) while the RNG is
being operated. The TSF must not output any random numbers before the power-up
online test and the seeding of the DRG.3 post-processing algorithm have been finished
successfully or when a defect has been detected.
PTG.3.4 The online test procedure shall be effective to detect non-tolerable weaknesses of the
random numbers soon.
PTG.3.5 The online test procedure checks the raw random number sequence. It is triggered
continuously. The online test is suitable for detecting non-tolerable statistical defects
of the statistical properties of the raw random numbers within an acceptable period of
time.
Note:
Continuously means that the raw random bits are scanned continuously.
The algorithmic post-processing belongs to Class DRG.3 with cryptographic state
transition function and cryptographic output function. The output data rate of the
post-processing algorithm shall not exceed its input data rate.
End of note.
PTG.3.6 The algorithmic post-processing algorithm belongs to Class DRG.3 with cryptographic
state transition function and cryptographic output function, and the output data rate
of the post-processing algorithm shall not exceed its input data rate.
FCS_RNG.1.2/HPRG The TSF shall provide numbers in the format 8- or 16-bit that meet
PTG.3.7 The test procedure A of AIS 31. The internal numbers were passing and the statistical
test suites cannot practically distinguish the internal random numbers from output
sequences of an ideal RNG.
PTG.3.8 The internal random numbers shall use the PTRNG of class PT.2 as random source for
the post processing.
Note:
The internal random numbers produced by the employed PTG.2-conform PTRNG are
adaptively compressed raw bits, where the compression rate is controlled by a so-
called entropy estimator. The concept ensures that the random numbers provided by
the PTRNG have high entropy, i.e., each delivered random byte will have more the
7.976 bit of entropy. In addition, the PTRNG produced random numbers have been
tested against test procedures A and B under varying environment conditions.
End of note.
CC Document 69 1.1
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Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
7.1.1.1.3 Deterministic Random Number Generation (DRNG) AIS31 DRG.3
FCS_RNG.1/DRNG Random Number Generation
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FCS_RNG.1/DRNG Random numbers generation Class DRG.3 according to [13]
FCS_RNG.1.1/DRNG The TSF shall provide a deterministic random number generator that implements:
DRG.3.1 If initialized with a random seed using a PTRNG of class PTG.2 as random source the
internal state of the RNG shall have at least 100 bit of entropy.
Note:
Furthermore, the length of the internal state shall have at least 200 bit. (For the
DRG.3 under consideration, the internal state has 351 bit.). The seed is provided by a
certified PTG.2 physical TRNG with guaranteed 7,976 bit of entropy per byte.
End of note.
DRG.3.2 The RNG provides forward secrecy.
DRG.3.3 The RNG provides backward secrecy even if the current internal state is known.
FCS_RNG.1.2/DRNG The TSF shall provide numbers in the format 8- or 16-bit that meet
DRG.3.4 The RNG, initialized with a random seed, where the seed has at least 100 bit of
entropy and is derived by a PTG.2 certified PTRNG. The RNG generates output for
which any consecutive 234
bits strings of bit length 128 are mutually different with a
probability that is greater than 1 – 2(-16)
.
DRG.3.5 Statistical test suites cannot practically distinguish the random numbers from the
output sequences of an ideal RNG. The random numbers must pass test procedure A
and the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) test suite for
RNGs used for cryptographic purposes [S17] containing following 16 tests:
Frequency (Monobit) Test, Frequency Test within a Block, Runs Tests, Test for the
Longest-Run-of-Ones in a Block, Binary Matrix Rank Test, Discrete Fourier Transform
(Spectral) Test, Non-overlapping (Aperiodic) Template Matching Test, Overlapping
(Periodic) Template Matching Test, Maurer´s “Universal Statistical” Test, Liner
Complexity Test, Serial Test, Approximate Entropy Test, Cumulative Sums (Cusums)
Test, Random Excursions Test and Random Excursions Variant Test.
CC Document 70 1.1
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Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
7.1.1.1.4 Deterministic Random Number Generation (DRNG) AIS31 DRG.2
This additional operation mode is named Key Stream Generation (KSG), which is a stream cipher generation. It is
conformant to DRG.2 and implements therefore forward and additional backward secrecy.
FCS_RNG.1/KSG Random Number Generation
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FCS_RNG.1/KSG Random numbers generation Class DRG.2 according to [13]
FCS_RNG.1.1/KSG The TSF shall provide a deterministic random number generator that implements:
DRG.2.1 If initialized with a random seed using a PTRNG of class PTG.2 as random source, the
applied seed shall have at least 100 bits of entropy, the internal state of the RNG shall
have at least the size of 200 bit - in this case the size of the internal state amounts to
351 bit, has the work factor for breaking the algorithm of 2127
due to the restriction on
the maximum amount of keystream computed from a given seed, required guess work
amounts to 2127
as well.
DRG.2.2 The RNG provides forward secrecy.
DRG.2.3 The RNG provides backward secrecy.
FCS_RNG.1.2/KSG The TSF shall provide numbers in the format 8- or 16-bit that meet
DRG.2.4 The RNG, initialized with a random seed of length at least 100 bit delivered by an
PTRNG of the class PTG.2, generates output for which any consecutive 234
strings of the
length 128 bits are mutually different with probability greater than 1-2(-16)
.
DRG.2.5 Statistical test suites cannot practically distinguish the random numbers from the
output sequences of an ideal RNG. The random numbers must pass test procedure A
and the statistical tests mentioned in item DRG4.7.
Note:
The random numbers have been shown to fulfill all statistical tests of the AIS 20/31
statistical tests of procedure A. The random numbers are in the format 8- or 16 Bit.
End of Note.
CC Document 71 1.1
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Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
7.1.1.2 FAU_SAS
During testing at the end of Phase 3 before TOE Delivery, the TOE shall be able to store some data (for instance
about the production history or identification data of the individual die or other data to be used after delivery).
Therefore, the security functional component Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1) has been added and is described in the
PP [9].
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1)” as specified below, PP [9]:
FAU_SAS.1 Audit Storage
Hierarchical to: No dependencies
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide the test process before TOE Delivery with the capability to store
the Initialization Data (GCIM) and/or Pre-personalization Data and/or supplements of
the Security IC Embedded Software in the not changeable configuration page area and
non-volatile memory.
7.1.2 Subset ofTOE testing
The security is strongly dependent on the correct operation of the security functions. Therefore, the TOE shall
support that particular security functions or mechanisms are tested in the operational phase (Phase 7). The tests
can be initiated by the Smartcard Embedded Software and/or by the TOE.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset TOE testing (FPT_TST.2)” as specified below (Common Criteria
Part 2 extended).
FPT_TST.2 Subset TOE testing
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_TST.2.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests at the request of the authorized user to demonstrate
the correct operation of the alarm lines and/or following environmental sensor
mechanisms:
 More details are given in the confidential Security Target [8].
CC Document 72 1.1
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Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
7.1.3 Memory access control
Usage of multiple applications in one Smartcard often requires code and data separation in order to prevent that
one application can access code and/or data of another application. For this reason the TOE provides Area based
Memory Access Control. The underlying memory management unit (MMU) is documented in section 4 in the
hardware reference manual HRM [1].
The security service being provided is described in the Security Function Policy (SFP) Memory Access Control
Policy. The security functional requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)” requires that this policy is in
place and defines the scope were it applies. The security functional requirement “Security attribute based
access control (FDP_ACF.1)” defines security attribute usage and characteristics of policies. It describes the
rules for the function that implements the Security Function Policy (SFP) as identified in FDP_ACC.1. The
decision whether an access is permitted or not is taken based upon attributes allocated to the software. The
Smartcard Embedded Software defines the attributes and memory areas. The corresponding permission control
information is evaluated “on-the-fly” by the hardware so that access is granted/effective or denied/inoperable.
The security functional requirement “Static attribute initialization (FMT_MSA.3)” ensures that the default
values of security attributes are appropriately either permissive or restrictive in nature. Alternative values can be
specified by any subject provided that the Memory Access Control Policy allows that. This is described by the
security functional requirement “Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1)”. The attributes are
determined during TOE manufacturing (FMT_MSA.3) or set at run-time (FMT_MSA.1).
From TOE’s point of view the different roles in the Smartcard Embedded Software can be distinguished
according to the memory based access control. However the definition of the roles belongs to the user software.
The following Security Function Policy (SFP) Memory Access Control Policy is defined for the requirement
“Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)”:
Memory Access Control Policy
The TOE shall control read, write, delete and execute accesses of software running at the privilege levels as defined
below. Any access is controlled, regardless whether the access is on code or data or a jump on any other privilege
level outside the current one.
The memory model provides distinct, independent privilege levels separated from each other in the virtual
address space. The access rights are controlled by the MMU and related to the privilege level. More information
is given in the confidential Security Target [8].
CC Document 73 1.1
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Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)” as specified below.
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Memory Access Control Policy on all subjects (software
running at the defined and assigned privilege levels), all objects (data including code
stored in memories) and all the operations defined in the Memory Access Control Policy,
i.e. privilege levels.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)” as specified below.
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Memory Access Control Policy to objects based on the
following:
Subject:
- software running at the IFX, OS1 and OS2 privilege levels required to securely operate
the chip. This includes also privilege levels running interrupt routines.
- software running at the privilege levels containing the application software
Object:
- data including code stored in memories
Attributes:
- the memory area where the access is performed to and/or
- the operation to be performed.
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
evaluate the corresponding permission control information of the relevant memory range
before and during the access so that accesses to be denied cannot be utilized by the
subject attempting to perform the operation.
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Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules:
none.
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: none.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3)” as specified below.
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the Memory Access Control Policy to provide well defined1
default
values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow any subject, provided that the Memory Access Control Policy is
enforced and the necessary access is therefore allowed2
, to specify alternative initial
values to override the default values when an object or information is created.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1)” as specified below:
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Memory Access Control Policy to restrict the ability to change
default, modify or delete the security attributes permission control information to the
software running on the privilege levels.
1
The static definition of the access rules is documented in the hardware reference manual as listed in chapter 1.1
2
The Smartcard Embedded Software is intended to set the memory access control policy
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Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Specification of management functions (FMT_SMF.1)” as specified below:
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security management functions:
access the configuration registers of the MMU.
7.1.4 Support of Cipher Schemes
The following additional specific security functionality is implemented in the TOE:
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation requires a cryptographic operation to be performed in accordance with a
specified algorithm and with a cryptographic key of specified sizes. The specified algorithm and cryptographic
key sizes can be based on an assigned standard; dependencies are discussed in chapter 7.4.1.4
The following additional specific security functionality is implemented in the TOE:
 Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA)1
 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (EC)
 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
 Triple Data Encryption Standard (TDES)
 CIPURSE™ Cryptographic Library (CCL)
 Cipher based Message Authentication Code (CMAC)
The RSA cryptographic library, regardless of the version chosen, is offered in two parts: The 2k part of the RSA
library can be used for key lengths of up to 2048 bits and the 4k part of the RSA library can be used for key
lengths of up to 4096 bits.
The additional function of the EC library in the version v2.07.003, providing the primitive elliptic curve operations,
does not add specific security functionality.
Note 14:
This TOE can come with both crypto co-processors accessible, or with a blocked SCP or with a blocked
Crypto2304T, or with both crypto co-processors blocked. The blocking depends on the customer demands prior
to the production of the hardware. In case the SCP is blocked, no AES and DES respectively CMAC computation,
as well as CCL operation supported by hardware is possible. In case the Crypto2304T is blocked, no RSA and EC
computation supported by hardware is possible. No accessibility of the deselected cryptographic co-processors is
without impact on any other security policy of the TOE; it is exactly equivalent to the situation where the user
decides just not to use the cryptographic co-processors.
End of note.
1
For the case the TOE comes without RSA and/or EC library, the TOE provides basic HW-related routines for RSA and/or EC calculations.
For a secure library implementation the user has to implement additional countermeasures himself.
CC Document 76 1.1
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Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
7.1.4.1 Preface regarding Security Level related to Cryptography
Implemented cryptography, regardless whether proprietary or following public standards is subject of ageing
due to the evolution and progress of technology, mathematics and analysis methods. For that reason,
guarantees for the absence of exploitable properties cannot be given - by anybody. But, the risk for the absence
of such properties is severely reduced if the implementation is based on a long time published and publicly
discussed standard algorithm.
If the vendor implements a proprietary algorithm, then the BSI analyses this algorithm in the course and time
frame of the certification process. It is obvious that this local, one party and short timed analysis cannot replace a
long time publicly discussed standard algorithm. Possible risk mitigation, if not an industrial secret, is the
publication of the proprietary standard and starting the public discussion. This transparency could provide on
one hand some mitigation of risk; on the other hand, the algorithm is then directly a valuable analyst target. In
that case, also no one can say, when such publication is sufficiently discussed; and again guarantees for the life
time being in the field can no one give.
As of today, using public standards is often not possible due to compromises with regard to acceptable
computing time and available energy. For that reason it is up to the user to decide. The SFR claims assign
whether an algorithm or proprietary or following a standard or implementing a standard with deviations.
The BSI states that the strength of the cryptographic algorithms is not rated in the course of the product
certification (see [25] Section 9, Para.4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a security level of lower
than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without considering the application context. Therefore, for
these functions it shall be checked whether the related cryptographic operations are appropriate for the
intended system. The assignment to the 100 Bit level by BSI can be read in the certification report issued by BSI.
Some further hints and guidelines can be derived from the Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102,
www.bsi.bund.de.
CC Document 77 1.1
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Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
7.1.4.2 Cryptography by the Symmetric Cryptographic Coprocessor SCP
7.1.4.2.1 Triple-DES Operation
The DES Operation of the SCP of the TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)”
and “Cryptographic key destruction” (FCS_CKM.4) as specified below:
FCS_COP.1/TDES Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data of the Composite TOE without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data of the Composite TOE with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key management]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction.
FCS_COP.1.1/TDES The TSF shall perform encryption and decryption in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm TDES in
 the Electronic Codebook Mode (ECB)
 the Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC)
 the Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code (CBC-MAC)
 the Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code Encrypt Last Block
(CBC-MAC-ELB)
 the Blinding Mode (BLD)
 the Recrypt Mode
and cryptographic key sizes of 168 bit that meet the following standards:
 CBC:
o National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 800-67 Rev. 1 [20]
o National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-38A [21]
o ISO/IEC 18033-3 [30]
 ECB, CBC:
o National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-38A [21]
o ISO/IEC 18033-3 [30]
 CBC_MAC
o National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 800-67 Rev. 1 [20]
o National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-38A [21]
o ISO/IEC 18033-3 [30]
o ISO/IEC 9797-1 Mac Algorithm 1 and 2 respectively [32]
 CBC-MAC-ELB:
o National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 800-67 Rev. 1 [20]
o National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-38A [21]
o ISO/IEC 18033-3 [30]
o ISO/IEC 9797-1 Mac Algorithm 1 and 2 respectively [32]
 BLD, Recrypt Mode
Proprietary, description given in the hardware reference manual HRM [1]
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Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
Note 15:
The BLD and Recrypt operation modes proprietary and are described in the hardware reference manual HRM [1]
while the implementations of the other modes follow the referenced standards. Also the BLD is compliant to the
referenced standards but is operated in a masked way. The proprietary modes offer increased protection against
failure and side channel analysis.
End of note.
Note 16:
Using the TDES algorithm with three keys of which two keys equal is a so called two key triple DES operation.
This operation can be configured and managed by the user but does not meet the national requirements issued
by BSI and achieves therefore not the 100 Bits security level. The certificate covers the TDES operation with
three different keys only.
End of note.
FCS_CKM.4/TDES Cryptographic key destruction – TDES
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4.1/TDES The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method overwriting or zeroing that meets the
following:
None
Note 17:
The key destruction can be done by overwriting the key register interfaces or by software reset of the SCP which
provides immediate zeroing of all SCP key registers.
End of note.
CC Document 79 1.1
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Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
7.1.4.2.2 AES Operation
The AES Operation the TOE shall meet the requirement Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1) and
Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4) as specified below:
FCS_COP.1/AES Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data of the Composite TOE without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data of the Composite TOE with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/AES The TSF shall perform decryption and encryption in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm AES in
 the Electronic Codebook Mode (ECB)
 the Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC)
 the Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code (CBC-MAC)
 the Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code Encrypt Last Block
(CBC-MAC-ELB)
 the Blinding Mode (BLD)
 the Recrypt Mode
and cryptographic key sizes of 128 bit or 192 bit or 256 bit that meet the following
standards:
 CBC:
o National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 800-67 Rev. 1 [20]
o National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-38A [21]
o ISO/IEC 18033-3 [30]
 ECB, CBC:
o National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-38A [21]
o ISO/IEC 18033-3 [30]
 CBC_MAC
o National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 800-67 Rev. 1 [20]
o National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-38A [21]
o ISO/IEC 18033-3 [30]
o ISO/IEC 9797-1 Mac Algorithm 1 and 2 respectively [32]
 CBC-MAC-ELB:
o National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 800-67 Rev. 1 [20]
o National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-38A [21]
o ISO/IEC 18033-3 [30]
o ISO/IEC 9797-1 Mac Algorithm 1 and 2 respectively [32]
 BLD, Recrypt Mode
Proprietary, description given in the hardware reference manual HRM [1]
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Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
Note 18:
The BLD and Recrypt operation modes are proprietary and described in the hardware reference manual HRM [1]
while the implementations of the other modes follow the referenced standards. Also the BLD is compliant to the
referenced standards but is operated in a masked way. The proprietary modes offer increased protection against
failure and side channel analysis.
End of note.
FCS_CKM.4/AES Cryptographic key destruction – AES
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM4.1/AES The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method overwriting or zeroing that meets the
following:
None
Note 19:
The key destruction can be done by overwriting the key register interfaces or by software reset of the SCP which
provides immediate zeroing of all SCP key registers.
End of Note.
CC Document 81 1.1
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Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
7.1.4.3 Cryptography by the Symmetric Cryptographic Library SCL
The following holds true for both alternative versions.
7.1.4.3.1 Triple-DES Operation for both SCL versions
The DES Operation of the SCL of the TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)”
and “Cryptographic key destruction” (FCS_CKM.4) as specified below:
FCS_COP.1/TDES-SCL-1
or
FCS_COP.1/TDES-SCL-2
Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data of the Composite TOE without security
attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data of the Composite TOE with security attributes,
or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key management]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction.
FCS_COP.1.1/TDES-SCL-1
or
FCS_COP.1.1/TDES-SCL-2
The TSF shall perform encryption and decryption in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm TDES in
 the Electronic Codebook Mode (ECB)
 the Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC)
 the Counter Mode (CTR)
 the Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB)
 the Propagating Cipher Block Chaining (PCBC)
and cryptographic key sizes of 168 bit that meet the following standards:
 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 800-67 Rev. 1
[20]
 The ECB, CBC, CTR and CFB modes refer to:
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-38A [21]
 The PCBC mode refers to:
o Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, advanced
Encryption standard (AES), [31], U.S. Department of Commerce /
National Institute of Standards and Technology, November 26, 2001
o Bruce Schneier, Applied Cryptography, Second Edition, John Wiley &
Sons, 1996, [36]. This standard should be implemented considering
the Security Guidelines only.
CC Document 82 1.1
2018-07-20
Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
FCS_CKM.4/TDES-SCL-1
or
FCS_CKM.4/TDES-SCL-2
Cryptographic key destruction – TDES
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4.1/TDES-SCL-1
Or
FCS_CKM.4.1/TDES-SCL-2
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method overwriting or zeroing that meets the
following:
None
Note 20:
The key destruction is triggered from the SCL to the SCP at every entry and exit. The key storage in the SCL is
wiped with random values.
End of note.
CC Document 83 1.1
2018-07-20
Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
7.1.4.3.2 AES Operation for both SCL versions
The AES Operation the TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” and
“Cryptographic key destruction” (FCS_CKM.4) as specified below:
FCS_COP.1/AES-SCL-1
or
FCS_COP.1/AES-SCL-2
Cryptographic operation - AES
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data of the Composite TOE without security
attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data of the Composite TOE with security
attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/AES-SCL-1
or
FCS_COP.1.1/AES-SCL-2
The TSF shall perform decryption and encryption in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm AES in
 the Electronic Codebook Mode (ECB)
 the Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC)
 the Counter Mode (CTR)
 the Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB)
 the Propagating Cipher Block Chaining (PCBC)
and cryptographic key sizes of 128 bit or 192 bit or 256 bit that meet the
following standards:
 The AES advanced encryption standard refers to:
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
FIPS PUB 197 [31]
 The ECB, CBC, CTR and CFB modes refer to:
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
SP 800-38A [21]
 The PCBC mode refers to:
o Bruce Schneier, Applied Cryptography, Second Edition, John Wiley
& Sons, 1996, [36]. This standard should be implemented
considering the Security Guidelines only.
o Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197,
advanced Encryption standard (AES), [31], U.S. Department of
Commerce / National Institute of Standards and Technology,
November 26, 2001
CC Document 84 1.1
2018-07-20
Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
FCS_CKM.4/AES-SCL-1
or
FCS_CKM.4/AES-SCL-2
Cryptographic key destruction – AES
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM4.1/AES-SCL-1
or
FCS_CKM4.1/AES-SCL-2
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method overwriting or zeroing that meets the
following:
None
Note 21:
The key destruction is triggered from the SCL to the SCP at every entry and exit. The key storage in the SCL is
wiped with random values.
End of Note.
CC Document 85 1.1
2018-07-20
Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
7.1.4.3.3 CMAC Operation on for the SCL version v02.04.002
The CMAC operation of this SCL version of the TOE shall meet the requirement Cryptographic operation
(FCS_COP.1) and Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4) as specified below:
FCS_COP.1/CMAC-SCL-1 Cryptographic operation - CMAC
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data of the Composite TOE without security
attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data of the Composite TOE with security
attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/CMAC-SCL-1 The TSF shall perform computation of a cipher based message authentication
code in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm CMAC using
 AES or
 TDES
and cryptographic key sizes of 128 bit or 192 bit or 256 bit for AES and 168 bit
for TDES that meet the following standards:
 CMAC: National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
SP 800-38B [38]
 AES
o Federal Information Standards Publication 197 [31]
o National Institute of Standards and Technology SP800-38A [21]
o ISO/IEC 18033 [30]
 TDES
o National Institute of Standards and Technology 800-67 Rev.1 [20]
o National Institute of Standards and Technology SP800-38A [21]
o ISO/IEC 18033 [30]
FCS_CKM.4/CMAC-SCL-1 Cryptographic key destruction – CMAC
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM4.1/CMAC-SCL-1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method overwriting or zeroing that meets the
following:
None
Note 22:
The key destruction is triggered from the SCL to the SCP at every entry and exit. The key storage in the SCL is
wiped with random values.
End of Note.
CC Document 86 1.1
2018-07-20
Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
7.1.4.4 Cryptography by CIPURSE™ Cryptographic Library
The CIPURSE™ CL in two alternative versions is a delivery option. If one of the alternatives is on board the
belonging security functional requirements are fulfilled else the functionality is not on board and the security
functional requirements are not covered.
The following chapter holds true for both CCL library versions.
7.1.4.4.1 CIPURSE™ CL Cryptographic Functions for both versions
Each of the two alternative CCL versions shall meet the security functional requirement FCS_CKM.4/CCL as
specified below:
FCS_CKM.1/CCL-1
or
FCS_CKM.1/CCL-2
Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS_CKM.1.1/CCL-1
or
FCS_CKM.1.1/CCL-2
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm:
 In the mode confidential communication:
session key derivation and key derivation for the exchange protocol
 In the mode integrity protection:
session key derivation
and specified cryptographic key sizes of 128 bits that meet the following:
 CIPURSE™ V2 Cryptographic Protocol [35-1] chapters 5.2 and 6.2
CC Document 87 1.1
2018-07-20
Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
Each of the two alternative CCL versions shall meet the security functional requirement FCS_CKM.4/CCL as
specified below:
FCS_CKM.4/CCL-1
or
FCS_CKM.4/CCL-2
Cryptographic key destruction
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM4.1/CCL-1
or
FCS_CKM.4/CCL-2
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method overwriting with random value that meets the
following
None
Note 23:
The key destruction is triggered by the SCP at every entry and exit. The key storage in the SCP is wiped with
random values.
End of Note.
CC Document 88 1.1
2018-07-20
Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
Each of the two alternative CCL versions shall meet the security functional requirement FCS_COP.1/CCL as
specified below:
FCS_COP.1/CCL-1
or
FCS_COP.1/CCL-2
Cryptographic Operation CCL Trusted Channel
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/CCL-1
or
FCS_COP.1.1/CCL-2
The TSF shall perform
 an authentication and cryptographic protected protocol
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
 CIPURSE™ V2 Cryptographic Protocol
and cryptographic key sizes of 128 Bit that meet the following:
 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197 [31]
 NIST Special Publication SP 800-38A, chapter 6.1 AES in ECB mode [21]
 CIPURSE™ V2 Cryptographic Protocol [35-1] chapter 5.2 Session key
Derivation
 CIPURSE™ V2 Cryptographic Protocol [35-1] chapter 6.2 Key Derivation for
the first frame
 CIPURSE™ V2 Cryptographic Protocol [35-1] chapter 6.3 Integrity Protection
 CIPURSE™ V2 Cryptographic Protocol [35-1] chapter 6.4 Confidential
Communication
 CIPURSE™ V2 Cryptographic Protocol Errata and Precision list
[35-2] chapters P.2
CC Document 89 1.1
2018-07-20
Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
7.1.4.5 The Asymmetric Cryptographic Library v2.07.003
7.1.4.5.1 Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) operation
The Modular Arithmetic Operation of the TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation
(FCS_COP.1)” as specified below.
FCS_COP.1/RSA-1 Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data of the Composite TOE without security attributes,
or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data of the Composite TOE with security attributes]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/RSA-1 The TSF shall perform encryption and decryption in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) and cryptographic key sizes
from 512 bits up to 4096+128 bits in 1 Bit stepping that meet the following:
Encryption:
1. According to section 5.1.1 RSAEP in PKCS [22]:
 Supported for n < 24096 + 128
 5.1.1(1) not supported
2. According to section 8.2.2 IFEP-RSA in IEEE [29]:
Supported for n < 24096 + 128
Decryption (with or without CRT):
1. According to section 5.1.2 RSADP in PKCS [22] for u = 2, i.e.,
without any (ri, di, ti), i > 2
 5.1.2(1) not supported
 5.1.2(2.a) supported for n < 22048 + 64
 5.1.2(2.b) supported for p  q < 24096 + 128
 5.1.2(2.b) (ii)&(v) not applicable due to u = 2
2. According to section 8.2.3 IEEE [29]:
 8.2.1(I) supported for n < 22048 + 64
 8.2.1(II) supported for p  q < 24096 + 128
 8.2.1(III) not supported
Signature Generation (with or without CRT):
1. According to section 5.2.1 RSASP1 in PKCS [22] for u = 2, i.e.,
without any (ri, di, ti), i >2
 5.2.1(1) not supported
 5.2.1(2.a) supported for n < 22048 + 64
 5.2.1(2b) supported for p  q < 24096 + 128
 5.2.1(2b) (ii)&(v) not applicable due to u = 2
2. According to section 8.2.4 IFSP-RSA1 in IEEE [29]:
 8.2.1(I) supported for n < 22048 + 64
 8.2.1(II) supported for p  q < 24096 + 128
 8.2.1(III) not supported
CC Document 90 1.1
2018-07-20
Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
Signature Verification:
1. According to section 5.2.2 RSAVP1 in PKCS [22]:
supported for n < 24096 +128
 5.2.2(1) not supported
2. According to section 8.2.5 IEEE [29]:
 Supported for n < 24096 +128
 8.2.5(1) not supported
Please consider also the statement of chapter 7.1.4.1.
7.1.4.5.2 Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) key generation
The key generation for the RSA shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)”.
The RSA cryptographic library is offered in two parts: The 2k part of the RSA library can be used for key lengths
of up to 2048 bits and the 4k part of the RSA library can be used for key lengths of up to 4096 bits.
FCS_CKM.1/RSA-1 Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS_CKM.1.1/RSA-1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm implemented by following functions:
 CryptoRSAKeyGen
 CryptoRSAKeyGenMask_CRT plus CryptoGeneratePrime or
CryptoGeneratePrimeMask
 CryptoRSAKeyGenMask_D plus CryptoGeneratePrime or
CryptoGeneratePrimeMask
 CryptoRSAKeyGenMask_N plus CryptoGeneratePrime or
CryptoGeneratePrimeMask
and specified cryptographic key sizes of 512 – 4096 bits that meet the following:
RSA key generation according to Infineon key generation methods. The generated
keys are in conformance with:
1. According to sections 3.1 and 3.2 in PKCS [22], for u = 2,
i.e. without any (ri, di, ti), i > 2:
3.1 supported for n < 24096 + 128
3.2.(1) supported for n < 22048 + 64
3.2.(2) supported for p x q < 24096 + 128
2. According to section 8.1.3.1 in IEEE [29]:
8.1.3.1(1) supported for n < 22048 + 64
8.1.3.1(2) supported for p x q < 24096 + 128
8.1.3.1(3) supported for p x q < 22048 + 64
CC Document 91 1.1
2018-07-20
Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
Note 24:
The function CryptoGeneratePrime has been assigned to the appropriate security level by BSI. The proprietary
CryptoGeneratePrimeMask function has not been cryptographic-analytically evaluated and certified by BSI.
However, the AVA_VAN.5 evaluation did not reveal any weaknesses, neither in concept nor in implementation.
The targeted AVA_VAN.5 is achieved therefore.
End of note.
Note 25:
The minimum key length follows the national recommendations by the BSI which means that RSA key lengths
below 1976 bits are not included in the certificate. The key length requirements can differ between the countries.
Please note that the BSI expects this key length as appropriate until 2022 and recommends for longer usage
times key lengths of 3000 bits or higher.
End of note.
Note 26:
For easy integration of RSA functions into the user’s operating system and/or application, the library contains
single cryptographic functions respectively primitives which are compliant to the standard. The primitives are
referenced above. Therefore, the library supports the user to develop an application representing the standard if
required.
Please consider also the statement of chapter 7.1.4.1.
End of note.
Note 27:
The TOE can be delivered with or without the RSA library. In the case of coming without the RSA library the TOE
does not provide the Additional Specific Security Functionality Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Cryptography (RSA)
realized with the security functional requirements FCS_COP.1/RSA and FCS_CKM.1/RSA. In case of a blocked
Crypto2304T the optionally delivered cryptographic and the supporting Toolbox cannot be used in that TOE
product.
End of note.
7.1.4.5.3 General Preface regarding Elliptic Curve Cryptography
The EC library is delivered as object code and in this way integrated in the user software. The security functional
requirement covers the standard Brainpool [19] and NIST [26] Elliptic Curves with key lengths of 160, 163, 192,
224, 233, 256, 283, 320, 384, 409, 512 and 521 Bits. For one part the definition of the key lengths follows the
national AIS32 regulation regarding the 100 bit security level by the BSI. However, the former 80 bit level is
achieved by the key lengths of 160, 163, and 192 Bits. Numerous other curve types, being also secure in terms of
side channel attacks on this TOE, exist, which the user optionally can add in the composition certification
process.
All curves are based on finite field GF(p) with value p є [241-1
; 2521
[ as well as curves based on a finite field GF(2n
)
with size n є [41-1; 521] are supported.
CC Document 92 1.1
2018-07-20
Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
7.1.4.5.4 Elliptic Curve DSA (ECDSA) operation
The Modular Arithmetic Operation of the TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation
(FCS_COP.1)” as specified below.
FCS_COP.1/ECDSA-1 Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data of the Composite TOE without security attributes,
or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data of the Composite TOE with security attributes]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/ECDSA-1 The TSF shall perform signature generation and signature verification in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm ECDSA and cryptographic key sizes 160,
163, 192, 224, 233, 256, 283, 320, 384, 409, 512 or 521 bits that meet the following:
ECDSA Signature Generation:
1. According to section 7.3 Signing Process in ANSI [23]
 Step d) and e) are not supported
 The output of step e) has to be provided as input to our function by the caller.
 Deviation of step c) and f):
o The jumps to step a) were substituted by a return of the function with
an error code, the jumps are emulated by another call to our function.
2. According to sections 6.4.3 Signature Process in ISO/IEC [27]
 Chapter 6.4.3.3 is not supported
 Chapter 6.4.3.5 is not supported
o the hash-code of H of the message has to be provided by the caller as
input for our function.
 Chapter 6.4.3.7 is not supported
 Chapter 6.4.3.8 is not supported
3. According to section 7.2.7 ECSP-DSA in IEEE [29]
 Deviation of step (3) and (4):
o The jumps to step 1 were substituted by a return of the function with
an error code, the jumps are emulated by another call to our function
ECDSA Signature Verification:
1. According to section 7.4.1 in ANSI [23]
 Step b) and c) are not supported.
 The output of step c) has to be provided as input to our function by the caller.
 Deviation of step d):
o Beside noted calculation, our algorithm adds a random multiple of
BasepointerOrder n to the calculated values u1 and u2.
2. According to sections 6.4.4 Signature Verification Process in ISO/IEC [27]
 Chapter 6.4.4.2 is not supported
 Chapter 6.4.4.3 is not supported:
o The hash-code H of the message has to be provided by the caller as
input to our function
3. According to section 7.2.8 ECVP-DSA in IEEE [29].
CC Document 93 1.1
2018-07-20
Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
Note 28:
For easy integration of EC functions into the user’s operating system and/or application, the library contains
single cryptographic functions respectively primitives which are compliant to the standard. The primitives are
referenced above. Therefore, the library supports the user to develop an application representing the standard if
required.
End of note.
7.1.4.5.5 Elliptic Curve (EC) key generation
The key generation for the EC shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)”.
FCS_CKM.1/EC-1 Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1/EC-1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm implemented by following functions which
can be used independently of each other:
 ECC_ECDSAKeyGen
 ECC_ECDSAKeyGenMask
specified in [23], [27] and [29] and specified cryptographic key sizes 160, 163, 192,
224, 233, 256, 283, 320, 384, 409, 512 or 521 bits that meet the following:
ECDSA Key Generation:
1. According to the appendix “A4.3 Elliptic Curve Key Pair Generation” in ANSI [23]:
The optional cofactor h is not supported.
2. According to section “6.4.2 Generation of signature key and verification key” in
ISO/IEC [27].
3. According to appendix “A.16.9 An algorithm for generating EC keys” in IEEE [29]
Note 29:
For easy integration of EC functions into the user’s operating system and/or application, the library contains
single cryptographic functions respectively primitives which are compliant to the standard. The primitives are
referenced above. Therefore, the library supports the user to develop an application representing the standard if
required.
End of note.
CC Document 94 1.1
2018-07-20
Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
7.1.4.5.6 Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement
The Modular Arithmetic Operation of the TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation
(FCS_COP.1)” as specified below.
FCS_COP.1/ECDH-1 Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data of the Composite TOE without security attributes,
or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data of the Composite TOE with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/ECDH-1 The TSF shall perform elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key agreement in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm ECDH and cryptographic key sizes 160,
163, 192, 224, 233, 256, 283, 320, 384, 409, 512 or 521 bits that meet the following:
1. According to section “5.4.1 Standard Diffie-Hellman Primitive” in ANSI [24]
Unlike section 5.4.1(3) our implementation not only returns the x-coordinate of the
shared secret, but rather the x-coordinate and the y-coordinate.
2. According to “Appendix D.6 Key agreement of Diffie-Hellman” type in ISO/IEC [28]
The function enables the operations described in appendix D.6
3. According to section “7.2.1 ECSVHDP-DH” in IEEE [29]
Unlike section 7.2.1 our implementation not only returns the x-coordinate of the
shared secret, but rather the x-coordinate and the y-coordinate.
Note 30:
The security functional requirement covers the standard Brainpool [19] and NIST [26] Elliptic Curves with key
lengths of 224, 233, 256, 283, 320, 384, 409, 512 or 521 Bits, due to national AIS32 regulations by the BSI.
Furthermore, 160, 163, 192 bits are supported. Numerous other curve types, being also secure in terms of side
channel attacks on this TOE, exist, which the user optionally can add in the composition certification process.
End of note
Note 31:
For easy integration of EC functions into the user’s operating system and/or application, the library contains
single cryptographic functions respectively primitives which are compliant to the standard. The primitives are
referenced above. Therefore, the library supports the user to develop an application representing the standard if
required.
End of note.
Note 32:
The TOE can be delivered with or without the EC library. In the case the TOE comes without, it does not provide
the Additional Specific Security Functionality Elliptic Curve Cryptography realized with the security functional
requirements FCS_COP.1/ECSA, FCS_COP.1/ECDH and FCS_CKM.1/EC. In case of a blocked Crypto2304T, the
RSA and EC cryptographic library cannot be used. In case of a blocked Crypto2304T the optionally delivered
cryptographic RSA and EC, as well as the supporting Toolbox cannot be used in that TOE product.
End of note.
Note 33:
The EC primitives allow the selection of various curves. The selection of the curves depends to the user.
End of note.
CC Document 95 1.1
2018-07-20
Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
7.1.4.6 The Asymmetric Cryptographic Library v2.06.003
7.1.4.6.1 Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) operation
The Modular Arithmetic Operation of the TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation
(FCS_COP.1)” as specified below.
FCS_COP.1/RSA-2 Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data of the Composite TOE without security attributes,
or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data of the Composite TOE with security attributes]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/RSA-2 The TSF shall perform encryption and decryption in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) and cryptographic key sizes
from 512 bits up to 4096+128 bits in 1 Bit stepping that meet the following:
Encryption:
1. According to section 5.1.1 RSAEP in PKCS [37]:
 Supported for n < 24096 + 128
 5.1.1(1) not supported
2. According to section 8.2.2 IFEP-RSA in IEEE [29]:
Supported for n < 24096 + 128
Decryption (with or without CRT):
1. According to section 5.1.2 RSADP in PKCS [37]
for u = 2, i.e., without any (ri, di, ti), i > 2
 5.1.2(1) not supported
 5.1.2(2.a) supported for n < 22048 + 64
 5.1.2(2.b) supported for p  q < 24096 + 128
 5.1.2(2.b) (ii)&(v) not applicable due to u = 2
2. According to section 8.2.3 IEEE [29]:
 8.2.1(I) supported for n < 22048 + 64
 8.2.1(II) supported for p  q < 24096 + 128
 8.2.1(III) not supported
Signature Generation (with or without CRT):
1. According to section 5.2.1 RSASP1 in PKCS [37]
for u = 2, i.e., without any (ri, di, ti), i >2
 5.2.1(1) not supported
 5.2.1(2.a) supported for n < 22048 + 64
 5.2.1(2b) supported for p  q < 24096 + 128
 5.2.1(2b) (ii)&(v) not applicable due to u = 2
2. According to section 8.2.4 IFSP-RSA1 in IEEE [29]:
 8.2.1(I) supported for n < 22048 + 64
 8.2.1(II) supported for p  q < 24096 + 128
 8.2.1(III) not supported
CC Document 96 1.1
2018-07-20
Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
Signature Verification:
1. According to section 5.2.2 RSAVP1 in PKCS [37]:
supported for n < 24096 +128
 5.2.2(1) not supported
2. According to section 8.2.5 IEEE [29]:
 Supported for n < 24096 +128
 8.2.5(1) not supported
Please consider also the statement of chapter 7.1.4.1.
7.1.4.6.2 Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) key generation
The key generation for the RSA shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)”.
The RSA cryptographic library is offered in two parts: The 2k part of the RSA library can be used for key lengths
of up to 2048 + 64 bits and the 4k part of the RSA library can be used for key lengths of up to 4096 + 128 bits.
FCS_CKM.1/RSA-2 Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS_CKM.1.1/RSA-2 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm implemented by following functions:
 CryptoRSAKeyGenMask_CRT plus CryptoGeneratePrimeMask
 CryptoRSAKeyGenMask_D plus CryptoGeneratePrimeMask
 CryptoRSAKeyGenMask_N plus CryptoGeneratePrimeMask
and specified cryptographic key sizes of 512 – 4096 bits that meet the following:
RSA key generation according to Infineon key generation methods. The generated
keys are in conformance with:
1. According to sections 3.1 and 3.2 in PKCS [37],
for u = 2, i.e. without any (ri, di, ti), i > 2:
3.1 supported for n < 24096 + 128
3.2.(1) supported for n < 22048 + 64
3.2.(2) supported for p x q < 24096 + 128
3. According to section 8.1.3.1 in IEEE [27]:
8.1.3.1(1) supported for n < 22048 + 64
8.1.3.1(2) supported for p x q < 24096 + 128
8.1.3.1(3) supported for p x q < 22048 + 64
CC Document 97 1.1
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Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
Note 34:
The minimum key length follows the national recommendations by the BSI which means that RSA key lengths
below 1976 bits are not included in the certificate. The key length requirements can differ between the countries.
Please note that the BSI expects this key length as appropriate until 2022 and recommends for longer usage
times key lengths of 3000 bits or higher.
End of note.
Note 35:
The TOE can be delivered with or without the RSA library. In the case of coming without the RSA library the TOE
does not provide the Additional Specific Security Functionality Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Cryptography (RSA)
realized with the security functional requirements FCS_COP.1/RSA and FCS_CKM.1/RSA. In case of a blocked
Crypto2304T the optionally delivered cryptographic and the supporting Toolbox cannot be used in that TOE
product.
End of note.
7.1.4.6.3 General Preface regarding Elliptic Curve Cryptography
The EC library is delivered as object code and in this way integrated in the user software. The security functional
requirement covers the standard Brainpool [19] and NIST [26] Elliptic Curves with key lengths of 160, 163, 192,
224, 233, 256, 283, 320, 384, 409, 512 and 521 Bits. For one part the definition of the key lengths follows the
national AIS32 regulation regarding the 100 bit security level by the BSI. However, the former 80 bit level is
achieved by the key lengths of 160, 163, and 192 Bits. Numerous other curve types, being also secure in terms of
side channel attacks on this TOE, exist, which the user optionally can add in the composition certification
process.
All curves are based on finite field GF(p) with value p є [241-1
; 2521
[ as well as curves based on a finite field GF(2n
)
with size n є [41-1; 521] are supported.
CC Document 98 1.1
2018-07-20
Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
7.1.4.6.4 Elliptic Curve DSA (ECDSA) operation
The Modular Arithmetic Operation of the TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation
(FCS_COP.1)” as specified below.
FCS_COP.1/ECDSA-2 Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data of the Composite TOE without security attributes,
or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data of the Composite TOE with security attributes]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/ECDSA-2 The TSF shall perform signature generation and signature verification in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm ECDSA and cryptographic key sizes 160,
163, 192, 224, 233, 256, 283, 320, 384, 409, 512 or 521 bits that meet the following:
ECDSA Signature Generation:
1. According to section 7.3 Signing Process in ANSI [23]
 Step d) and e) are not supported
 The output of step e) has to be provided as input to our function by the caller.
 Deviation of step c) and f):
The jumps to step a) were substituted by a return of the function with an error code,
the jumps are emulated by another call to our function.
2. According to sections 6.4.3 Signature Process in ISO/IEC [27]
 Chapter 6.4.3.3 is not supported
 Chapter 6.4.3.5 is not supported
o the hash-code of H of the message has to be provided by the caller as
input for our function.
 Chapter 6.4.3.7 is not supported
Chapter 6.4.3.8 is not supported
3. According to section 7.2.7 ECSP-DSA in IEEE [29]
 Deviation of step (3) and (4):
The jumps to step 1 were substituted by a return of the function with an error code,
the jumps are emulated by another call to our function
ECDSA Signature Verification:
1. According to section 7.4.1 in ANSI [23]
 Step b) and c) are not supported.
 The output of step c) has to be provided as input to our function by the caller.
 Deviation of step d):
o Beside noted calculation, our algorithm adds a random multiple of
BasepointerOrder n to the calculated values u1 and u2.
2. According to sections 6.4.4 Signature Verification Process in ISO/IEC [27]
 Chapter 6.4.4.2 is not supported
 Chapter 6.4.4.3 is not supported:
o The hash-code H of the message has to be provided by the caller as
input to our function
3. According to section 7.2.8 ECVP-DSA in IEEE [29].
CC Document 99 1.1
2018-07-20
Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
Note 36:
For easy integration of EC functions into the user’s operating system and/or application, the library contains
single cryptographic functions respectively primitives which are compliant to the standard. The primitives are
referenced above. Therefore, the library supports the user to develop an application representing the standard if
required.
End of note.
7.1.4.6.5 Elliptic Curve (EC) key generation
The key generation for the EC shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)”.
FCS_CKM.1/EC-2 Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1/EC-2 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm implemented by following functions which
can be used independently of each other:
 ECC_ECDSAKeyGen
 ECC_ECDSAKeyGenMask
specified in [23], [27] and [29] and specified cryptographic key sizes 160, 163, 192,
224, 233, 256, 283, 320, 384, 409, 512 or 521 bits that meet the following:
ECDSA Key Generation:
1. According to the appendix “A4.3 Elliptic Curve Key Pair Generation” in ANSI [23]:
The optional cofactor h is not supported.
2. According to section “6.4.2 Generation of signature key and verification key” in
ISO/IEC [27].
3. According to appendix “A.16.9 An algorithm for generating EC keys” in IEEE [29]
Note 37:
For easy integration of EC functions into the user’s operating system and/or application, the library contains
single cryptographic functions respectively primitives which are compliant to the standard. The primitives are
referenced above. Therefore, the library supports the user to develop an application representing the standard if
required.
End of note.
CC Document 100 1.1
2018-07-20
Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
7.1.4.6.6 Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement
The Modular Arithmetic Operation of the TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation
(FCS_COP.1)” as specified below.
FCS_COP.1/ECDH-2 Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data of the Composite TOE without security attributes,
or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data of the Composite TOE with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/ECDH-2 The TSF shall perform elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key agreement in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm ECDH and cryptographic key sizes 160,
163, 192, 224, 233, 256, 283, 320, 384, 409, 512 or 521 bits that meet the following:
1. According to section “5.4.1 Standard Diffie-Hellman Primitive” in ANSI [24]
Unlike section 5.4.1(3) our implementation not only returns the x-coordinate of the
shared secret, but rather the x-coordinate and the y-coordinate.
2. According to “Appendix D.6 Key agreement of Diffie-Hellman” type in ISO/IEC [28]
The function enables the operations described in appendix D.6
3. According to section “7.2.1 ECSVHDP-DH” in IEEE [29]
Unlike section 7.2.1 our implementation not only returns the x-coordinate of the
shared secret, but rather the x-coordinate and the y-coordinate.
Note 38:
The security functional requirement covers the standard Brainpool [19] and NIST [26] Elliptic Curves with key
lengths of 224, 233, 256, 283, 320, 384, 409, 512 or 521 Bits, due to national AIS32 regulations by the BSI.
Furthermore, 160, 163, 192 bits are supported. Numerous other curve types, being also secure in terms of side
channel attacks on this TOE, exist, which the user optionally can add in the composition certification process.
End of note
Note 39:
For easy integration of EC functions into the user’s operating system and/or application, the library contains
single cryptographic functions respectively primitives which are compliant to the standard. The primitives are
referenced above. Therefore, the library supports the user to develop an application representing the standard if
required.
End of note.
Note 40:
The TOE can be delivered with or without the EC library. In the case the TOE comes without, it does not provide
the Additional Specific Security Functionality Elliptic Curve Cryptography realized with the security functional
requirements FCS_COP.1/ECSA, FCS_COP.1/ECDH and FCS_CKM.1/EC. In case of a blocked Crypto2304T, the
RSA and EC cryptographic library cannot be used. In case of a blocked Crypto2304T the optionally delivered
cryptographic RSA and EC, as well as the supporting Toolbox cannot be used in that TOE product.
End of note.
Note 41:
The EC primitives allow the selection of various curves. The selection of the curves depends to the user.
End of note.
CC Document 101 1.1
2018-07-20
Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
7.1.5 Data Integrity FDP_SDI.2 and FDP_SDC.1
The TOE shall meet the requirement Stored data integrity monitoring and action (FDP_SDI.2) as specified below:
FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action
Hierarchical to: FDP_SDI.1 stored data integrity monitoring
Dependencies: No dependencies
FDP_SDI.2.1 The TSF shall monitor user data of the Composite TOE stored in containers controlled
by the TSF for data integrity and one- and/or more-bit-errors on all objects, based on
the following attributes: corresponding EDC value for RAM, ROM and SOLID FLASH™
NVM and error correction ECC for the SOLID FLASH™ NVM.
FDP_SDI.2.2 Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall correct 1 bit errors in the SOLID
FLASH™ NVM automatically and inform the user about more bit errors.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Stored data confidentiality (FDP_SDC.1)” as specified below:
FDP_SDC.1 Stored data confidentiality
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FDP_SDC.1.1 The TSF shall ensure the confidentiality of the information of the user data of the
Composite TOE while it is stored in the RAM, ROM, Cache and SOLID FLASH™ NVM.
7.1.6 Application Note to FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
The SFR FPT_FLS.1 is defined in the PP [9] but with application note 14 it is required to describe the secure state:
Where ever FPT_FLS.1 is claimed it depends on the source or affected piece of data the failure was detected.
Induced failures on other than memory contents could in the worse lead to exploitable situations if not
discovered and treated properly. This includes i.e. internal transported keys and other TSF data. For that reasons
the integrity of the transport ways and also the modules the TSF and critical data are used is protected against
failure.
Depending on the criticality where the failure occurred and in most cases a security reset is triggered. Only in
case of a peripheral bus error or an address translation mismatch, a user software action is required as described
in the user guidance.
In case of a security reset, the user cannot take any action. The chip immediately stops operation and reboots.
CC Document 102 1.1
2018-07-20
Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
7.2 Support by the Flash Loader
The TOE provides the Flash Loader to download user data into the SOLID FLASH™ NVM, either during
production of the TOE or at customer site. The Flash Loader is dedicated for usage by authorized users only in
secured and insecure environment during the production up to Phase 6 Security IC Personalisation.
The Flash Loader has to be permanently deactivated before entering Phase 7 Security IC end-usage.
For this reason the TOE shall meet the requirements as defined and described in the PP [9] section 7.3 Packages
for Loader and 7.2 Package Authentication of the Security IC:
 Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1/Loader),
 Limited availability – Loader (FMT_LIM.2/Loader),
 Authentication Proof of Identity (FIA_API.1),
 Inter-TSF trusted channel (FTP_ITC.1),
 Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1),
 Data exchange integrity (FDP_UIT.1),
 Subset access control – Loader (FDP_ACC.1/Loader) and
 Security attribute based access control – Loader (FDP_ACF.1/Loader)
as defined in the PP [9], section 7.2 and 7.3.
The Flash Loader supports the following security function policy (SFP):
 Loader SFP:
provides the mutual authentication between the TOE and the administrator user or download operator
user and the download of the user data into the memory of the TOE.
The Flash Loader supports the following two subjects:
 Administrator user:
is enabled performing mutual authentication with the keys Kc and Kd, to manage (set, exchange, delete)
the keys Kc, Kd and Kfdi and to process the download of the user data into the memory of the TOE.
 Download operator user:
is enabled performing mutual authentication with Kd, to exchange the key Kd and to perform the
download of the user data into the memory of the TOE. He can also delete Kfdi.
The Flash Loader supports the following object:
 User data:
Data loaded into the memory of the TOE.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1/Loader)” as specified below:
FMT_LIM.1/Loader Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
FMT_LIM.1.1/Loader The TSF shall be designed and implemented in a manner that limits its capabilities so
that in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is
enforced:
Deploying Loader functionality after permanent deactivation does not allow stored user
data of the Composite TOE to be disclosed or manipulated by unauthorized user.
CC Document 103 1.1
2018-07-20
Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability – Loader (FMT_LIM.2/Loader)” as specified below:
FMT_LIM.2/Loader Limited availability - Loader
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
FMT_LIM.2.1/Loader The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits its availability so that in
conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is enforced:
The TSF prevents deploying the Loader functionality after permanent deactivation.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability – Loader (FIA_API.1)” as specified below:
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide an authentication mechanism according to [34] ISO/IEC 9798-2
section 6.2.2 Mechanism 4: Three-path authentication based on the security attributes
(keys) Kc or Kd to prove the identity of the TOE to an external entity.
Additional requirement to the environment with regard to GBIC: If the GBIC process is to be applied, the keys Kc,
Kd and Kfdi shall be generated with sufficient entropy considering the requirements by GBIC as outlined in
section 0 Annex to prove the identity of the TOE to an external entity.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability – Loader (FTP_ITC.1)” as specified below:
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and the administrator
user, enabled performing mutual authentication with the keys Kc and Kd, to manage (set,
exchange, delete) the keys Kc, Kd and Kfdi and to process the download of the user data
into the memory of the TOE and the Download operator user, enabled performing mutual
authentication with Kd, to exchange the key Kd, to perform the download of the user
data into the memory of the TOE and to delete Kfdi that is logically distinct from other
communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and
protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product to initiate communication via the
trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for deploying Loader for
downloading user data.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability – Loader (FDP_UCT.1)” as specified below:
FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_UCT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Loader SFP to receive user data in a manner protected from
unauthorised disclosure.
CC Document 104 1.1
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Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability – Loader (FDP_UIT.1)” as specified below:
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control].
FDP_UIT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Loader SFP to receive user data in a manner protected from
modification, deletion or insertion errors.
FPP_UIT.1.2 The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether modification,
deletion or insertion have occurred.
Note regarding the Flash Loader:
The algorithm strength of the Flash Loader has not been cryptographic-analytically evaluated by the BSI, as
Infineon has implemented a proprietary extension.
End of note.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability – Loader (FDP_ACC.1/Loader)” as specified below:
FDP_ACC.1/Loader Subset access control - Loader
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control.
FDP_ACC.1.1/Loader The TSF shall enforce the Loader SFP on
(1) The subjects
Administrator user, enabled performing mutual authentication with the keys Kc
and Kd, to manage (set, exchange, delete) the keys Kc, Kd and Kfdi and to
process the download of the user data into the memory of the TOE and the
Download operator user, enabled performing mutual authentication with Kd, to
exchange the key Kd, to perform the download of the user data into the memory
of the TOE and to delete Kfdi,
(2) The objects
User data, data loaded into the memory of the TOE,
in SOLID FLASH™ NVM,
(3) The operation deployment of the Loader.
Additional requirement to the environment with regard to GBIC: If the GBIC process is to be applied, the keys Kc,
Kd and Kfdi shall be generated with sufficient entropy considering the requirements by GBIC as outlined in
section 0 Annex to prove the identity of the TOE to an external entity.
CC Document 105 1.1
2018-07-20
Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability – Loader (FTP_ACF.1/Loader)” as specified below:
FDP_ACF.1/Loader Security attribute based access control - Loader
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ACF.1.1/Loader The TSF shall enforce the Loader SFP to objects based on the following:
(1) the subjects Administrator user, enabled performing mutual
authentication with the keys Kc and Kd, to manage (set, exchange,
delete) the keys Kc, Kd and Kfdi and to process the download of the
user data into the memory of the TOE with security attributes key Kc
and
the Download operator user, enabled performing mutual authen-
tication with Kd, to exchange the key Kd, to perform the download of
the user data into the memory of the TOE with security attributes Key
Kd and to delete Kfdi,
(2) the objects User data, data loaded into the memory of the TOE in the
SOLID FLASH™ NVM with security attributes key Kfdi.
FDP_ACF.1.2/Loader The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
(1) evaluate the corresponding access control information of the relevant
subject, administrator user and download operator user, before the
access, so that accesses to be denied cannot be utilized by the subject
attempting to perform the operation. The subsequent download is then
protected by the key Kfdi.
FDP_ACF.1.3/Loader The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules:
None
FDP_ACF.1.4/Loader The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules:
None
Note 42:
Regarding FDP_ACF.1.4/Loader it is added in the User Guidance that the Flash Loader has to be permanently
deactivated prior delivery to the end-user.
End of note.
Note 43:
The security functional requirements FMT_LIM.1/Loader, FMT_LIM.2/Loader, FIA_API.1, FTP_ITC.1, FDP_UCT.1,
FDP_UIT.1, FDP_ACC.1/Loader and FDP_ACF.1/Loader apply only at TOE products coming with activated Flash
Loader enabled for user data download. In other cases the Flash Loader is not available anymore and the user
software or data download is completed. Depending on the capabilities of the user software these security
functional requirements may then reoccur as subject of the composite TOE.
The permanent locking of the Flash Loader after finalizing the download and prior delivery to the end-user is
added to package 2 with LIM1/Loader and FMT_LIM.2/Loader.
End of note.
CC Document 106 1.1
2018-07-20
Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
7.3 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
The evaluation assurance level is EAL6 augmented with ALC_FLR.1.
In the following table, the security assurance requirements are given. The augmentation of the assurance
components compared to the Protection Profile [9] is expressed with bold letters.
Table 14 Assurance Components
Aspect Acronym Description Refinement
Development ADV_ARC.1 Security Architecture Description In PP [9]
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional
specification with additional error
information
in ST
ADV_IMP.2 Complete mapping of the
implementation representation of the
TSF
in ST
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semi-formal modular design
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
Guidance Documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance in PP [9]
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures in PP [9]
Life-Cycle Support ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support in ST
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage in ST
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures in PP [9]
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures in PP [9]
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation
standards – all parts
ALC_FLR.1 Basic Flaw Remediation
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
Tests ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage In ST
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
Vulnerability
Assessment
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability testing in PP [9]
CC Document 107 1.1
2018-07-20
Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
7.3.1 Refinements
Some refinements are taken unchanged from the PP [9]. In some cases a clarification is necessary. In Table 17 an
overview is given where the refinement is done.
The refinements from the PP [9] have to be discussed here in the Security Target, as the assurance level is
increased. The refinements from the PP [9] are included in the chosen assurance level EAL 6 augmented with
ALC_FLR.1.
7.3.1.1 Development (ADV)
ADV_IMP Implementation Representation:
The refined assurance package ADV_IMP.1 implementation representation of the TSF requires the availability of
the entire implementation representation, a mapping of the design description to the implementation
representation with a level of detail that the TSF can be generated without further design decisions. In addition,
the correspondence of design description and implementation representation shall be demonstrated.
The covered higher assurance package ADV_IMP.2 requires a complete and not curtailed mapping of the
implementation representation of the TSF, and the mapping of the design description to the entire
implementation representation. In addition, the correspondence of design description and the implementation
representation shall be demonstrated. The ADV_IMP.1 aspect and refinement remains therefore valid. The
enhancement underlines the refinement in the PP [9] and by that the entirely complete design i.e. not curtailed
representation with according mapping was provided, demonstrated and reviewed.
ADV_INT TSF Internals:
The assurance package ADV_INT.2 well-structured internals is extended to ADV_INT.3 minimally complex
internals requiring the documentation to minimally complex internals with the intension that the entire TSF has
been designed and implemented using sound engineering principles. The ADV_INT.2 aspect remains applicable
as well structured internals are fundamental for achieving sound engineering principles. ADV_INT.2 and its
refinements in the PP [9] remain therefore valid. The assurance and evidence was provided accordingly.
ADV_FSP Functional Specification:
The ADV_FSP.4 package requires a functional description of the TSFIs and there assignment to SFR-enforcing,
SFR-supporting, SFR-non-interfering, including related error messages, the assurance package. The
enhancement of ADV_FSP.5 requires additionally a complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information. In addition the package includes a tracing from the functional specification to the
SFRs, as well as the TSFIs descriptions including error messages not resulting from an invocation of a TSFI.
These aspects from ADV_FSP.5 are independent from the ADV_FSP.4 refinements from the PP [9] but
constitute an enhancement of it. By that the aspects of ADV_FSP.4 and its refinement in the PP [9] apply also
here. The assurance and evidence was provided accordingly.
ADV_SPM Formal Security Policy Model
It is the objective of this family to provide additional assurance from the development of a formal security policy
model of the TSF, and establishing a correspondence between the functional specification and this security
policy model. Preserving internal consistency the security policy model is expected to formally establish the
security principles from its characteristics by means of a mathematical proof.
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ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: ADV_FSP.4 Complete function description
ADV_SPM.1.1D The developer shall provide a formal security policy model for the
Memory Access Control Policy and the corresponding SFRs
 FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control
 FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
 FMT_MSA.1 Management of Security Attributes
 FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialization.
Moreover, the following SFRs shall be addressed by the formal security policy model:
 FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action
 FDP_SDC.1 Stored data confidentiality
 FDP_ITT.1 Basic Internal Transfer Protection
 FDP_IFC.1 Information Flow Control
 FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
 FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
 FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
 FRU_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance
 FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
 FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
 FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Moreover, the following SFRs of the package authentication of the IC PP [9] and the
loader packages PP [9] shall be addressed by the formal security policy model:
 FIA_API.1
 FMT_LIM.1/Loader
 FMT_LIM.2/Loader
 FTP_ITC.1
 FDP_UCT.1
 FDP_UIT.1
 FDP_ACC.1/Loader
 FDP_ACF.1/Loader
ADV_SPM.1.2D For each policy covered by the formal security policy model, the model shall identify
the relevant portions of the statement of SFRs that make up that policy.
ADV_SPM.1.3D The developer shall provide a formal proof of correspondence between the model and
any formal functional specification.
ADV_SPM.1.4D The developer shall provide a demonstration of correspondence between the model
and the functional specification.
ADV_TDS TOE Design:
The assurance package ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design is extended to ADV_TDS.5 Complete
semiformal modular design requires the complete semiformal design description. As the package ADV_TDS.5 is
an enhancement of ADV_TDS.4 the package and its refinements in the PP [9] remain valid. The assurance and
evidence was provided accordingly.
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ALC_DEL Delivery Procedure
Considering the GBIC requirement as outlined in section 0 Annex this assurance class is refined with the
confirmation that the delivery process of the Flash Loader keys - as referenced in the section 0 Annex - is
separated from the chip delivery to the user.
7.3.1.2 Life-cycle Support (ALC)
ALC_CMS Configuration Management Scope:
The Security IC embedded firmware – regardless of the version in use - and the optional software are part of TOE
and delivered together with the TOE as the firmware and optional software are stored in the ROM and/or SOLID
FLASH™ NVM. The presence of the optional parts belongs to the user order. Both, the firmware and software
delivered with the TOE are controlled entirely by Infineon Technologies. In addition, the TOE offers the
possibility that the user can download his software at his own premises. These parts of the software are user
controlled only and are not part of this TOE. The download of this solely user controlled software into the SOLID
FLASH™ NVM is protected by strong authentication means. In addition, the download itself could also be
encrypted. By the augmentation of ALC_CMS.4 to ALC_CMS.5 the configuration list includes additional the
development tools. The package ALC_CMS.5 is therefore an enhancement to ACL_CMS.4 and the package with
its refinement in the PP [9] remains valid. The assurance and evidence was provided accordingly.
ALC_CMC Configuration Management Capabilities:
The PP refinement from the assurance package ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation points out that the configuration items comprise all items defined under ALC_CMS to be tracked
under configuration management. In addition a production control system is required guaranteeing the
traceability and completeness of different charges and lots. Also the number of wafers, dies and chips must be
tracked by this system as well as procedures applied for managing wafers, dies or complete chips being removed
from the production process in order to verify and to control predefined quality standards and production
parameters. It has to be controlled that these wafers, dies or assembled devices are returned to the same
production stage from which they are taken or they have to be securely stored or destroyed otherwise.
The additionally covered extended package of ALC_CMC.5 Advance Support requires advanced support
considering the automatisms configuration management systems, acceptance and documentation procedures
of changes, role separation with regard to functional roles of personnel, automatisms for tracking and version
controlling in those systems, and includes also production control systems. The additional aspects of
ADV_CMC.5 constitute an enhancement of ACL_CMC.4 and therefore the aspects and ACL_CMC.4 refinements
in the PP [9] remain valid. The assurance and evidence was provided.
ALC_DVS Development Security:
The assurance package ALC_DVS.1 identification of security measures is extended to ALC_DVS.2 requiring the
evidence of sufficiency of security measures. The evidence was given and reviewed that the design and
implementation and its development environment is protected with regard to confidentiality and integrity. The
ALC_DVS.2 package is an enhancement of ALC_DVS.1. Therefore, this package and its refinement in the PP [9]
remain valid. The assurance and evidence was provided accordingly.
Considering the GBIC requirements as outlined in section 0 this assurance class is refined with the confirmation
that the:
 keys are generated with sufficient entropy
 the keys are stored within a HSM as integral part of the vendor environment
 the keys are stored in the non-volatile memory of the chip
All these requirements were subject of an audit; assurance and evidence was provided.
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ALC_DEL Delivery Procedure:
Considering the GBIC requirements, this assurance class is refined with the confirmation that the delivery
process of the Flash Loader keys for the users - as referenced in the section 0 - is separated from the chip
respectively goods delivery to the user.
ALC_TAT Tools and Techniques:
The assurance package ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards is extended to ALC_TAT.3
Compliance with implementation standards - all parts requiring that all implemented parts are compliant to
implementation standards. The evidence has been given that all parts have been developed and implemented
according to implementation standards, processes and rules.
7.3.1.3 Tests (ATE)
ATE_COV Test Coverage:
The PP refined assurance package ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage addresses the extent to which the TSF is
tested, and whether or not the testing is sufficiently extensive to demonstrate that the TSF operates as specified.
It includes the test documentation of the TSFIs in the functional specification. In particular the refinement
requires that The TOE must be tested under different operating conditions within the specified ranges. In
addition, the existence and effectiveness of mechanisms against physical attacks should be covered by evidence
that the TOE has the particular physical characteristics. This is furthermore detailed in the PP [9].
This assurance package ATE_COV.2 has been enhanced to ATE_COV.3 to cover the rigorous analysis of
coverage. This requires the presence of evidence that exhaustive testing on rigorous entirely all interfaces as
documented in the functional specification was conducted. By that ATE_COV.2 and refinements as given in the
PP [9] are enhanced by ATE_COV.3 and remain as well. The TSFIs were completely tested according to
ATE_COV.3 and the assurance and evidence was provided.
ATE_FUN Functional Tests:
The assurance package ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing is extended to ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
requiring which means to include considerations of dependency aspects. The package ATE_FUN.2 is an
enhancement to ATE_FUN.1 in terms of describing dependencies and sequences of the functional testing
documented with ATE_FUN.1. Therefore, the refinements in the PP [9] remain valid. The testing systems,
processes and tooling have been analyzed and reviewed with regard to intrinsic dependencies.
7.3.1.4 AVA_VAN Vulnerability Analysis
The assurance package AVA_VAN remains unchanged compared to the forerunner processes and requires
advanced methodical vulnerability analysis.
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7.4 Security Requirements Rationale
7.4.1 Rationale for the Security Functional Requirements
The objectives O.Authentication and OE.TOE_Auth are discussed in the PP [9] chapter 7.2.1.
The objectives O.Cap_Avail_Loader and OE.Lim_Block_Loader and the covering security functional
requirements FMT_LIM.1/Loader and FMT_LIM.2/Loader are discussed in the PP [9] chapter 7.3.1.
The policy P.Ctrl_Loader and the objectives O.Ctrl_Auth_Loader and OE.Loader_usage are discussed in the PP
[9] chapter 7.3.2.
Additionally, the objective O.Add-Function includes the objectives implemented by each of the CIPURSE™
Cryptographic Library versions: O.Ctrl_Auth_CCL, O.Prot_Integrity and O.Prot_Confidentiality. These extended
objectives are discussed in this ST in chapter 5.5 P.Add functions.
The additional objectives O.Prot_TSF_Confidentiality is defined in chapter 5.1 and 5.8 in this document.
PP [9] chapter 6.1 includes also the definition of FDP_SDI.2 „Stored data integrity monitoring and action“.
While the above mentioned security functional requirements rationale of the TOE are defined and described in
PP [9] section 6.3.1, the additional introduced SFRs are listed and discussed below:
Table 15 Rational for additional SFR in the ST
Objective TOE Security Functional Requirements
O.Add-Functions
FCS_COP.1/RSA-1 Cryptographic operation for ACL-1
FCS_COP.1/ECDSA-1 Cryptographic operation for ACL-1
FCS_COP.1/ECDH-1 Cryptographic operation for ACL-1
FCS_CKM.1/RSA-1 Cryptographic key generation for ACL-1
FCS_CKM.1/EC-1 Cryptographic key generation for ACL-1
FCS_COP.1/RSA-2 Cryptographic operation for ACL-2
FCS_COP.1/ECDSA-2 Cryptographic operation for ACL-2
FCS_COP.1/ECDH-2 Cryptographic operation for ACL-2
FCS_CKM.1/RSA-2 Cryptographic key generation for ACL-2
FCS_CKM.1/EC-2 Cryptographic key generation for ACL-2
FCS_CKM.1/CCL-1 Cryptographic key generation for CCL-1
FCS_CKM.1/CCL-2 Cryptographic key generation for CCL-2
FCS_COP.1/CCL-1 Cryptographic Operation CCL Trusted Channel for CCL-1
FCS_COP.1/CCL-2 Cryptographic Operation CCL Trusted Channel for CCL-2
FCS_CKM.4/CCL-1 Cryptographic key destruction for CCL-1
FCS_CKM.4/CCL-2 Cryptographic key destruction CCL-2
FCS_COP.1/CMAC-SCL-1 Cryptographic operation CMAC for SCL-1
FCS_CKM.4/CMAC-SCL-1 Cryptographic key destruction CMAC for SCL-1
O.Phys-Manipulation FPT_TST.2 Subset TOE security testing
O.Mem-Access
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
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Objective TOE Security Functional Requirements
O.Malfunction FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action
O.RND
FCS_RNG.1/TRNG Generation of Random Numbers -TRNG
FCS_RNG.1/HPRG Generation of Random Numbers - HPRG
FCS_RNG.1/DRNG Generation of Random Numbers -DRNG
FCS_RNG.1/KSG Generation of Random Numbers - KSG
O.Prot_TSF_
Confidentiality
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF-trusted channel
FDP_ACC.1/Loader Subset access control –Loader
FDP_ACF.1/Loader Security attribute based access control – Loader
O.TDES
FCS_COP.1/TDES-SCL-1 Cryptographic operation – TDES by SCL-1
FCS_CKM.4/TDES-SCL-1 Cryptographic key destruction – TDES by SCL-1
FCS_COP.1/TDES-SCL-2 Cryptographic operation – TDES by SCL-2
FCS_CKM.4/TDES-SCL-2 Cryptographic key destruction – TDES by SCL-2
FCS_COP.1/TDES Cryptographic operation – TDES by SCP
FCS_CKM.4/TDES Cryptographic key destruction – TDES by SCP
O.AES
FCS_COP.1/AES-SCL-1 Cryptographic operation – AES by SCL-1
FCS_CKM.4/AES-SCL-1 Cryptographic key destruction – AES by SCL-1
FCS_COP.1/AES-SCL-2 Cryptographic operation – AES by SCL-2
FCS_CKM.4/AES-SCL-2 Cryptographic key destruction – AES by SCL-2
FCS_COP.1/AES Cryptographic operation – AES by SCP
FCS_CKM.4/AES Cryptographic key destruction – AES by SCP
The table above gives an overview, how the security functional requirements are combined to meet the security
objectives.
For clarity please find following assignment to versions:
 ACL-1 covers version v2.07.003
 ACL-2 covers version v2.06.003
 SCL-1 covers version v02.04.002
 SCL-2 covers version v02.02.010
 CCL-1 covers version v02.00.0004
 CCL-2 covers version v2.0.0002
7.4.1.1 Cryptographic Aspects
The justification related to the security objective “Additional Specific Security Functionality (O.Add-Functions)”
is as follows:
The security functional requirement(s) “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” exactly require(s) those functions
to be implemented which are demanded by O.Add-Functions:
 The ACL library – regardless of the version chosen - implements the SFRs FCS_CKM.1/RSA, supporting
the generation of RSA keys, and the FCS_CKM.1/EC, supporting the generation of EC keys, needed for
these cryptographic operations.
To sum up, the ACL versions implement the SFRs as follows:
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o FCS_COP.1/RSA-1, FCS_COP.1/ECDSA-1, FCS_COP.1/ECDH-1, FCS_CKM.1/RSA-1, and
FCS_CKM/EC-1 respectively
o FCS_COP.1/RSA-2, FCS_COP.1/ECDSA-2, FCS_COP.1/ECDH-2, FCS_CKM.1/RSA-2, and
FCS_CKM/EC-2.
 The SCL library of version v02.04.002 implements the function of cipher based message authentication
code CMAC, supporting the authenticity and integrity of data blocks for example used for messages.
 The CIPURSE™ Cryptographic Library – regardless of the versions - implements the SFRs
FCS_COP.1/CCL Cryptographic Operation CCL Trusted Channel, establishing the trusted channel
between two authenticated entities and FCS_CKM.1/CCL Cryptographic key generation, supporting the
generation of the keys used for authentication and confidentiality. The CIPURSE™ CL operation requires
the presence of the SCP.
The implementation covers the functional requirements and meets the objective O.Add-Functions.
The use of the supporting library Toolbox has no impact on any security functional requirement nor does the use
generate additional requirements.
All these requirements have to be fulfilled to support OE.Resp-Appl for the SFRs implemented by the:
 SCP:
o FCS_COP.1/TDES
o FCS_COP.1/AES
 SCL for version v02.04.002:
o FCS_COP.1/TDES-SCL-1
o FCS_COP.1/AES-SCL-1
o FCS_COP.1/CMAC-SCL-1
 SCL for version v02.02.010:
o FCS_COP.1/TDES-SCL-2
o FCS_COP.1/AES-SCL-2
 CCL for version v02.00.0004:
o FCS_COP.1/CCL Cryptographic Operation CCL Trusted Channel,
o FCS_CKM.1/CCL Cryptographic key generation
o FCS_CKM.4/CCL Cryptographic key destruction
 CCL for version v2.0.0002:
o FCS_COP.1/CCL Cryptographic Operation CCL Trusted Channel,
o FCS_CKM.1/CCL Cryptographic key generation
o FCS_CKM.4/CCL Cryptographic key destruction
Nevertheless, the developer of the Smartcard Embedded Software must ensure that the additional functions are
used as specified and that the User data of the Composite TOE processed by these functions are protected as
defined for the application context. These issues are addressed by the specific security functional requirements:
 [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data of the Composite TOE without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data of the Composite TOE with security attributes or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation],
 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
The security functional requirements required to meet the security objectives O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-Probing,
O.Malfunction, O.Phys-Manipulation and O.Leak-Forced define how to implement the specific security
functionality. However, key-dependent functions could be implemented in the Smartcard Embedded Software.
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The usage of cryptographic algorithms requires the use of appropriate keys. Otherwise these cryptographic
functions do not provide security. The keys have to be unique with a very high probability, and must have a
certain cryptographic strength etc. In case of a key import into the TOE (which is usually after TOE delivery) it
has to be ensured that quality and confidentiality are maintained. Keys for DES and AES are provided by the
environment. Keys for RSA and EC algorithms can be provided either by the TOE or the environment.
The justification of the security objective and the additional requirements (both for the TOE and its environment)
show that they do not contradict to the rationale already given in the Protection Profile for the assumptions,
policy and threats defined there.
7.4.1.2 Hardware related Aspects
The security functional component Subset TOE security testing (FPT_TST.2) has been newly created (Common
Criteria Part 2 extended). This component allows that particular parts of the security mechanisms and functions
provided by the TOE can be tested after TOE Delivery. This security functional component is used instead of the
functional component FPT_TST.1 from Common Criteria Part 2. For the user it is important to know which
security functions or mechanisms can be tested. The functional component FPT_TST.1 does not mandate to
explicitly specify the security functions being tested. In addition, FPT_TST.1 requires verification of the integrity
of TSF data and stored TSF executable code which might violate the security policy.
The tested security enforcing functions are SF_DPM Device Phase Management, SF_CS Cryptographic Support
and SF_PMA Protection against modifying attacks.
The justification related to the security objective “Protection against Physical Manipulation (O.Phys-
Manipulation)” is as follows:
The security functional requirement FPT_TST.2 will detect attempts to conduce a physical manipulation on the
monitoring functions of the TOE. The objective of FPT_TST.2 is O.Phys-Manipulation. The physical manipulation
will be tried to overcome security enforcing functions.
The security functional requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)” with the related Security Function
Policy (SFP) “Memory Access Control Policy” exactly require the implementation of an area based memory
access control as required by O.Mem-Access. The related TOE security functional requirements FDP_ACC.1,
FDP_ACF.1, FMT_MSA.3, FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_SMF.1 cover this security objective. The implementation of
these functional requirements is represented by the dedicated privilege level concept.
The justification of the security objective and the additional requirements show that they do not contradict to
the rationale already given in the Protection Profile for the assumptions, policy and threats defined there.
Moreover, these additional security functional requirements cover the requirements by the PP [9] user data of
the Composite TOE protection of chapter 1.2.5 claim 35 and 36 which are not refined by the PP [9].
Nevertheless, the developer of the Smartcard Embedded Software must ensure that the additional functions are
used as specified and that the User data of the Composite TOE processed by these functions are protected as
defined for the application context. The TOE only provides the tool to implement the policy defined in the
context of the application.
The justification related to the security objective Protection against Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
(O.Malfunction) is as follows:
The security functional requirement Stored data integrity monitoring and action (FDP_SDI.2) requires the
implementation of an integrity observation and correction which is implemented by the Error Detection (EDC)
and Error Correction (ECC) measures. The EDC is present throughout all memories of the TOE while the ECC is
realized in the SOLID FLASH™ NVM. These measures detect and inform about one and more bit errors. In case
of the SOLID FLASH™ NVM 1 bit errors of the data are corrected automatically. The ECC mechanism protects
the TOE from the use of corrupt data.. Therefore FDP_SDI.2 is suitable to meet the security objective O.Phys-
Manipulation.
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The presence of true random numbers is the security goal 4 (SG4) which is formalized in the objective O.RND
Random Numbers. This objective must be covered by fulfillment of the security functional requirement
FCS_RNG. This is defined in the PP [9] chapter 5.1. The requirement implements a quality metric which is defined
by national regulations. The implemented random number generation fulfils the definitions of AIS 31 [13] in the
quality classes as outlined in chapter 7.1.1.1. Therefore the SFR FCS_RNG and the objective O.RND are covered.
The CC part 2 defines the component FIA_SOS.2, which is similar to FCS_RNG.1, as follows:
FIA_SOS.2 TSF Generation of secrets
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_SOS.2.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate secrets that meet
[assignment: a defined quality metric].
FIA_SOS.2.2 The TSF shall be able to enforce the use of TSF generated secrets for
[assignment: list of TSF functions].
7.4.1.3 Flash Loader related Aspects
The justification related to the Flash Loader security objectives are as follows. Note that the following objectives
and related rationales apply only at TOE products coming with activated Flash Loader enabled for software or
data download by the user. In other cases the Flash Loader is not available anymore and the user data download
is completed. Depending on the capabilities of the user software these security functional requirements may
then reoccur as subject of the composite TOE.
The Flash Loader related objectives are:
The objective O.Authentication requires the presence of an authentication mechanism proving the identity of a
given security IC to an external entity. This objective is covered by the functional requirement FIA_API
Authentication Proof of Identity. The Flash Loader implements this functionality and outputs identification data
to external requesting entity. The user guidance describes in more detail how this authentication request is
applied and conducted by the external entity. As the functional requirements are met by the Flash Loader the
objective is covered.
The objective O.Cap_Avail_Loader requires limited capabilities of the Loader functionality and irreversible
termination of the Loader. First, this is covered by the functional requirement FMT_LIM.1/Loader which
implements protection against data manipulation and disclosure by unauthorized users after permanent
deactivation of the Flash Loader. Second, the functional requirement FMT_LIM.2/Loader limits the Flash Loader
availability after the download has been finished by the user. The Flash Loader provides a final locking command
which irreversibly terminates the Flash Loader availability. This command execution must be applied after user
has finalized his download. As the functional requirements are met by the Flash Loader the objective is covered.
The objectives O.Ctrl_Auth_Loader and O.Prot_TSF_Confidentiality require that a trusted communication
channel with an authorized user, a confidentiality protection during the download and authentication of the user
data and access control for the usage of the Loader functionality are provided by the Loader.
Without successfully passing the authentication functionality of the Flash Loader no usage of the Flash Loader is
possible. Passing the authentication successfully assigns also a user role to the current user.
The Flash Loader implements mutual authentication functionality and if successfully passing this mutual
authentication, the TOE and the external user are established as trusted entities. Furthermore, the Flash Loader
enforces the exchange of the download key by the user which provides clear separation from the hardware
vendor and preserves confidentiality of the user data download. In addition, the Flash Loader preserves the
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integrity of the downloaded data against for example induced errors by hashing functionality.
As the functional requirements are met by the Flash Loader the objective is covered.
Note regarding the Flash Loader:
The algorithm strength of the Flash Loader has not been cryptographic-analytically evaluated by the BSI, as
Infineon has implemented a proprietary extension.
End of note.
7.4.1.4 Dependencies of Security Functional Requirements
The dependencies of the security functional requirements are defined and described in PP [9] section 6.3.2, with
FDP_SDI.2, and with regard to the Flash Loader related security functional requirements, the description is given
at the individual package chapters 7.2.3, 7.3.1 and 7.3.2.
FDP_ITT.1 FDP_IFC.1 FPT_ITT.1 FPT_PHP.3 FPT_FLS.1
FRU_FLT.2 FMT_LIM.1 FMT_LIM.2 FCS_RNG.1 FAU_SAS.1
FDP_SDI.2 FDP_SDC.1 FMT_LIM.1/Loader FMT_LIM.2/Loader FDP_ACC.1/Loader
FDP_ACF.1/Loader
The security functional requirements FIA_API.1 and FTP_ITC.1 have no dependencies.
The security functional requirements FIA_API.1, FMT_LIM.1/Loader, FMT_LIM.2/Loader, FTP_ITC.1, FDP_UCT.1,
FDP_UIT.1, FDP_ACC.1/Loader and FDP_ACF.1/Loader apply only at TOE products which are delivered with
activated Flash Loader.
Further dependencies of security functional requirements are given in following table:
Table 16 Dependency for cryptographic operation requirement
Security Functional
Requirement Dependencies
Fulfilled by Security
Requirements
FCS_COP.1/RSA-1 and
FCS_COP.1/RSA-2
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 (if not FCS_CKM.1) Yes, see comment 2
FCS_CKM.4 Yes, see comment 2
FCS_CKM.1/RSA-1 and
FCS_CKM.1/RSA-2
FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1 Yes
FCS_CKM.4 Yes, see comment 2
FCS_COP.1/ECDSA-1 and
FCS_COP.1/ECDSA-2
[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM1] Yes, see comment 2
FCS_CKM.4 Yes, see comment 2
FCS_CKM.1/EC-1 and
FCS_CKM.1/EC-2
FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1 Yes
FCS_CKM.4 Yes, see comment 2
FCS_COP.1/ECDH-1 and
FCS_COP.1/ECDH-2
[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM1] Yes, see comment 2
FCS_CKM.4 Yes, see comment 2
FCS_COP.1/TDES [FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM1] Yes, see comment 2
(by SCP) FCS_CKM.4 Yes, see comment 2
FCS_CKM.4/TDES [FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1] Yes, see comment 2
(by SCP)
FCS_COP.1/AES [FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM1] Yes, see comment 2
(by SCP) FCS_CKM.4 Yes, see comment 2
FCS_CKM.4/AES [FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1] Yes, see comment 2
CC Document 117 1.1
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Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
Security Functional
Requirement Dependencies
Fulfilled by Security
Requirements
(by (SCP)
FCS_COP.1/TDES-SCL-1 and
FCS_COP.1/TDES-SCL-2
[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM1] Yes, see comment 2
FCS_CKM.4 Yes, see comment 2
FCS_CKM.4/TDES-SCL-1 and
FCS_CKM.4/TDES-SCL-2
[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1] Yes, see comment 2
FCS_COP.1/AES-SCL-1 and
FCS_COP.1/AES-SCL-2
[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM1] Yes, see comment 2
FCS_CKM.4 Yes, see comment 2
FCS_CKM.4/TDES-SCL-1 and
FCS_CKM.4/TDES-SCL-2
[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1] Yes, see comment 2
FCS_COP.1/CMAC-SCL-1 [FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM1] Yes, see comment 2
(by SCL-1 only, v02.04.002) FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4/CMAC-SCL
(by SCL-1 only, v02.04.002)
[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1] Yes, see comment 2
FCS_COP.1/CCL-1 and
FCS_COP.1/CCL-2
[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1] Yes, see comment 4
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/CCL-1 and
FCS_CKM.1/CCL-2
None Yes, see comment 4
FCS_CKM.4/CCL-1 and
FCS_CKM.4/CCL-2
FCS_CKM.1 Yes, see comment 4
FPT_TST.2 No dependencies Yes
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 Yes
FDP_ACF.1
FMT_MSA.3 Yes
FDP_ACC.1 Yes
FMT_MSA.3
FMT_MSA.1 Yes
FMT_SMR.1 Not required, see comment 1
FMT_MSA.1
FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1 Yes
FMT_SMR.1 Not required, see comment 1
FMT_SMF.1 Yes
FMT_SMF.1 None N/A
FMT_LIM.1/Loader FMT_LIM.2/Loader Yes
FMT_LIM.2/Loader FMT_LIM.1/Loader Yes
FTP_ITC.1 None Yes, see comment 3
FDP_UCT.1
[FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1] Yes
[FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1] Yes
FDP_UIT.1
[FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1] Yes
[FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1] Yes
FDP_ACC.1/Loader FDP_ACF.1/Loader Yes
FDP_ACF.1/Loader
FMT_MSA.3 Yes, see comment 3
FDP_ACC.1/Loader Yes, see comment 3
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Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
Comment 1:
The dependency FMT_SMR.1 introduced by the two components FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3 is considered to
be satisfied because the access control specified for the intended TOE is not role-based but enforced for each
subject. Therefore, there is no need to identify roles in form of a security functional requirement FMT_SMR.1.
End of comment.
Comment 2:
These requirements all address the appropriate management of cryptographic keys used by the specified
cryptographic function and are not part of the PP [9]. Most requirements concerning key management shall be
fulfilled by the environment since the Smartcard Embedded Software is designed for a specific application
context and uses the cryptographic functions provided by the TOE.
For the security functional requirements:
 SCP:
o FCS_COP.1/TDES and
o FCS_COP.1/AES
 SCL-1:
o FCS_COP.1/TDES-SCL-1
o FCS_COP.1/AES-SCL-1
o FCS_COP.1/CMAC-SCL-1
 SCL-2:
o FCS_COP.1/TDES-SCL-2
o FCS_COP.1/AES-SCL-2
the respective dependencies FCS_CKM.1, FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 have to be fulfilled by the environment,
because the TOE does not provide the accompanying functionality; i.e. generate and import keys.
That means that the environment shall meet the requirements FCS_CKM.1, FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 as defined
in Common Criteria Part 2 [11], section 10.1 and 11.7.
The cryptographic key destruction can be done by overwriting the key register interfaces or by software reset of
the SCP which provides immediate zeroing of all SCP key registers. Please refer also to the application notes 41
and 42 in the PP [9].
These requirements all address the appropriate management of cryptographic keys used by the specified
cryptographic function and are not part of the PP [9]. Most requirements concerning key management shall be
fulfilled by the environment since the Smartcard Embedded Software is designed for a specific application
context and uses the cryptographic functions provided by the TOE.
For the security functional requirements:
 ACL-1:
o FCS_COP.1/RSA-1
o FCS_COP.1/ECDSA-1
o FCS_COP.1/ECDH-1
 ACL-2:
o FCS_COP.1/RSA-2
o FCS_COP.1/ECDSA-2
o FCS_COP.1/ECDH-2
and the respective dependency FCS_CKM.1 has to be fulfilled by the TOE with the security functional
requirements:
 FCS_CKM.1/RSA-1 (for FCS_COP.1/RSA-1),
 FCS_CKM.1/RSA-2 (for FCS_COP.1/RSA-2),
CC Document 119 1.1
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Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
 FCS_CKM.1/EC-1 (for FCS_COP.1/ECDSA-1 and
 FCS_COP.1/ECDH-1) and
 FCS_CKM.1/EC-2 (for FCS_COP.1/ECDSA-2 and FCS_COP.1/ECDH-2)
as defined in section 7.1.4.
The respective dependency FCS_CKM.4 has to be fulfilled by the environment because the TOE does not provide
the functionality to delete keys. That mean, that the environment shall meet the requirement FCS_CKM.4 as
defined in Common Criteria Part 2 [11], section 10.1.
Additionally, the requirement FCS_CKM.1 can be fulfilled by the environment as defined in Common Criteria
Part 2 [11], section 10.1.
For the security functional requirements FCS_CKM.1/RSA-1, FCS_CKM.1/RSA-2, FCS_CKM.1/EC-1 and
FCS_CKM.1/EC-2 the respective dependency FCS_COP.1/RSA-1 respectively FCS_COP.1/RSA-2 is fulfilled by the
TOE.
Again, the respective dependency FCS_CKM.4 has to be fulfilled by the environment because the TOE does not
provide this functionality. Therefore, the environment shall meet the requirement FCS_CKM.4 as defined in
Common Criteria Part 2 [11], section 10.1.
The cryptographic libraries RSA, EC and the Toolbox library are delivery options, regardless of the version
chosen. Therefore the TOE may come with free combinations of or even without these libraries. In the case of
coming without one or any combination of the cryptographic libraries RSA and EC, the TOE does not provide the
Additional Specific Security Functionality Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Cryptography (RSA) and/or Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (EC). The Toolbox is no cryptographic library and provides no additional specific security
functionality.
The IT environment has to fulfill the requirements of this section depending if the TOE comes with or without
a/the library/ies.
End of comment.
Comment 3:
The inter-TSF trusted channel SFR FTP_ITC.1 has no dependency and is provided as main purpose by the Flash
Loader. The Flash Loader provides a distinct and independent communication channel with authenticated end
points and protection from modification or disclosure.
The dependency FMT_MSA.3 introduced by the component FDP_ACF.1/Loader is considered to be not required,
because the security attributes enforcing the Loader SFP are fixed by the IC manufacturer and no new objects
under the control of the Loader SFP are created. Claim 371 of PP [9] applies.
End of comment.
Comment 4:
The security of the cryptographic functions FCS_CKM.1/CCL, FCS_CKM.4/CCL and FCS_COP.1/CCL relies on the
secure use of each of the CIPURSE™ CL versions: This means that it is essential on user side that the common
secret is generated and stored in an appropriate way and that integrity and confidentiality of this user secret is
maintained. These preconditions are treated in the PP [9] section 3.1 claims 67 and 68.
The key destruction FCS_CKM.4/CCL applies only for the keys generated during and for a session and not for the
common secret.
End of comment.
CC Document 120 1.1
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Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
7.4.2 Rationale of the Assurance Requirements
The chosen assurance level EAL6 is augmentation with the requirements coming from ALC_FLR.1. In Table 17
the different assurance levels are shown as well as the augmentations. The augmentations are in compliance
with the Protection Profile [9].
An assurance level EAL6 with the augmentations ALC_FLR.1 is required for this type of TOE since it is intended
to defend against highly sophisticated attacks without protective environment over a targeted long life time.
Thereby, the TOE must withstand attackers with high attack potential, which is achieved by fulfilling the
assurance class AVA_VAN.5.
In order to provide a meaningful level of assurance and that the TOE provides an adequate level of defense
against such high potential attacks, the evaluators have access to all information regarding the TOE including
the TSF internals, the low level design and source code including the testing of the modular design. Additionally
the mandatory technical document “Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards” [14] shall be taken as a basis
for the vulnerability analysis of the TOE.
Due to the targeted long life time of the Infineon Technologies products, a comprehensive flaw remediation
process and database is in place to maintain the TOE also in future. Reported flaws of any kind, meaning,
regardless whether the flaws reported have a more directed towards quality, functional or security, are tracked
by a dedicated database and related processes.
And more, in order to continuously improve also future products reported flaws are analyzed whether they could
affect also future products. Due to its overall importance for future development, the assurance class ALC_FLR.1
is included in this certification process.
This evaluation assurance package was selected to permit a developer gaining maximum assurance from positive
security engineering based on good commercial practices as well as the assurance that the TOE is maintained
during its targeted life time. The evaluation assurance package follows the EAL6 assurance classes as given in
Common Criteria Part 3 [12].
7.4.2.1 ALC_FLR.1 Basic Flaw Remediation
Flaws of any kind are entered into a dedicated database with related processes to solve those.
At the point in time where a flaw is entered, it is automatically logged who entered a flaw and who is responsible
for solving it. In addition, it is also documented if, when and how an individual flaw has been solved.
Flaws are prioritized and assigned to a responsibility.
The assurance class ALC_FLR.1 has no dependencies.
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TOE Summary Specification (ASE_TSS)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
8 TOE Summary Specification (ASE_TSS)
The product overview is given in section 2.1. In the following the Security Features are described and the relation
to the security functional requirements is shown.
The TOE is equipped with following Security Features to meet the security functional requirements:
 SF_DPM Device Phase Management
 SF_PS Protection against Snooping
 SF_PMA Protection against Modification Attacks
 SF_PLA Protection against Logical Attacks
 SF_CS Cryptographic Support
The following description of the Security Features is a complete representation of the TSF.
8.1 SF_DPM: Device Phase Management
The life cycle of the TOE is split-up in several phases: Chip development and production (covering phases 2, 3 and
4) and the final use (phase 4 to 7). This is a rough split-up from TOE point of view. These phases are implemented
in the TOE as test mode (phase 3) and user mode (phase 4-7).
In addition, chip identification modes are implemented being active in all TOE life cycle phases. The chip
identification data (O.Identification) is stored in a in the not changeable and access protected configuration page
area of the SOLID FLASH™ NVM. In the same area further TOE configuration data is stored. In addition, user
initialization data can be stored in the SOLID FLASH™ NVM during the production phase as well. During this first
data programming, the TOE is still in the secure environment and in Test Mode.
The covered security functional requirement is FAU_SAS.1 “Audit storage”.
During start-up of the TOE the decision for one of the various operation modes is taken in dependency of the
corresponding phase identifiers. The decision of accessing a certain mode is defined as phase entry protection as
defined conditions have to be met. The phases follow also a defined and flow protected sequence. The sequence
of the phases is protected by means of authentication.
The covered security functional requirements are FMT_LIM.1”Limited Capabilities” and FMT_LIM.2 “Limited
availability”.
During the production phase (phase 3 and 4) or after the delivery to the user (phase 5 or phase 6), the TOE
provides the possibility to download and finalize the user data. Using the download functionality of the Flash
Loader requires passing a successful authentication process and a key exchange. The key exchange ensures that
only the user defines the encryption key which is used during the download. If the conditions are met, user code
and data can be flashed into the SOLID FLASH™ NVM area as specified by the associated control information of
the Flash Loader software. The download into the chip is done in an encrypted way only.
The usage of the Flash Loader is only possible after a successful mutual authentication process of the external
entity and the TOE itself.
In case the user has ordered TOE derivatives without Flash Loader, the software download by the user (phase 5
or phase 6) is disabled and all user data of the Composite TOE has been flashed on the TOE at Infineon premises.
In both cases the integrity of the loaded data is checked with a hashing process. The data to be loaded is
transferred always in encrypted form.
After finalizing the load operation and prior delivery to the end-user, the Flash Loader shall be permanently
deactivated. The permanent deactivation is named locking and is a user obligation documented in the user
guidance. This locking removes any possibility to use or reactivate the Flash Loader and provides a clear
separation between the firmware-domain – regardless of the version in use - and the user software domain
regarding downloads: Software updates after delivery to the end user are exclusively in the responsibility of the
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Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
user software.
The covered security functional requirement are FMT_LIM.1/Loader “Limited capabilities”, FMT_LIM.2/Loader
“Limited availability-Loader”, FIA_API.1 “Authentication Proof of Identity”, FTP_ITC.1 “Inter-TSF trusted
channel”, FDP_UCT.1 “Basic data exchange confidentiality”, FDP_UIT.1 ”Data exchange integrity,
FDP_ACC.1/Loader “Subset Access Control – Loader” and FDP_ACF.1/Loader “Security Attribute based Access
Control – Loader”.
These Flash Loader related security functional requirements apply only at TOE products coming with activated
Flash Loader enabled for user data download by the user. In other cases the Flash Loader is not available
anymore and the user data download is completed.
During operation within a selected life cycle phase the accesses to memories are granted by the MMU controlled
access rights and related privilege levels. The TOE operates always in a dedicated life cycle phase.
The covered security functional requirements are FDP_ACC.1 “Subset Access Control, FDP_ACF.1 “Security
Attribute based Access Control and FMT_MSA.1 “Management of Security Attributes.
In addition, during each start-up of the TOE the address ranges, belonging memory keys and access rights are
initialized by the BOS with predefined values. The covered security functional requirement is FMT_MSA.3 “Static
Attribute Initialization”.
The TOE clearly defines access rights and privilege levels in conjunction with the appropriate key management in
dependency of the firmware – regardless of the version in use - or software to be executed. By this clearly
defined management functions are implemented, enforced by the MMU, and the covered security functional
requirement is FMT_SMF.1 “Specification of Management Functions”.
During the testing phase in production within the secure environment the entire SOLID FLASH™ NVM is
deleted. The covered security functional requirement is FPT_PHP.3 “Resistance to physical attack”.
Each operation phase is protected by means of authentication and encryption. The covered security functional
requirements are FDP_ITT.1 “Basic internal Transfer Protection” and FPT_ITT.1 “Basic internal TSF Data Transfer
Protection”.
8.1.1 Listing of SFRs implemented by SF_DPM Device Phase Management
Table 17 Security Functional Requirements covered by SF_DPM Device Phase Management
1. FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
2. FMT_LIM.1 Limited Capabilities
3. FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
4. FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
5. FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
6. FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
7. FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
8. FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
9. FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
10. FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection
11. FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
12. FMT_LIM.1/Loader Limited capabilities
13. FMT_LIM.2/Loader Limited availability-Loader
14. FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
15. FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
16. FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality
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Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
17. FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity
18. FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
19. FDP_ACC.1/Loader Subset access control – Loader
20. FDP_ACF.1/Loader Security attribute based access control – Loader
8.2 SF_PS: Protection against Snooping
Memories
All contents of all memories of the TOE are encrypted on chip to protect against data analysis on stored data as
well as on internally transmitted data. There is no plain data on the chip and the encryption of the memories
cover also the stored error detection values, and with regard to the SOLID FLASH™ NVM, also the error
correction values. Induced errors will lead with very high probability to an encryption and/or decryption fail in the
MED and to the appropriate action.
In contrast to the linear virtual address range, the physical SOLID FLASH™ NVM pages are transparently
mapped to different physical address ranges and controlled by the MMU. Thus the data is continuously
protected during transfer and storage by encryption and the mapping means of the address ranges. On top this,
the address scrambling provides a completely user transparent chip-individual physical memory layout of the
SOLID FLASH™ NVM. By that even in the unlike event of two equal TOE derivatives coming with equal software,
equal MMU settings and equal MMU mapping, finding an equal piece of data – for example a previously
identified target - at the equal physical location in the SOLID FLASH™ NVM on the second chip is extremely
unlikely and from attackers perspective not practical. This address scrambling is entirely independent from the
user software and the MMU.
MED
The encryption of the memories is performed by the MED with a proprietary cryptographic algorithm and with a
complex and dynamic key management providing protection against cryptographic analysis attacks. This
includes also the possibility of user chosen keys for SOLID FLASH™ NVM areas. The only key remaining static
over the product life cycle is the specific ROM key, changing in case of a mask change only. The few keys which
have to be stored on the chip, for example the user chosen key and the chip specific ROM key, are protected
against read out. Note that the ROM contains the firmware, but exclusively only one of the two alternative
versions and no user data of the Composite TOE.
The covered security functional requirements are FPT_PHP.3 “Resistance to physical attack”, FDP_IFC.1 “Subset
information flow control”, FPT_ITT.1 “Basic internal TSF data transfer protection”, FDP_ITT.1 “Basic internal
transfer protection”FPT_FLS.1, “Failure with preservation of secure state” and FDP_SDC.1 “Stored data
confidentiality”.
Peripheral Bus
In addition the data transferred over the memory bus to and from (bi-directional encryption) the CPU, Co-
processors, the special SFRs and selected peripheral devices connected to the peripheral bus are encrypted
automatically with a dynamic key change. More information is given in the confidential Security Target [8].
The covered security functional requirements are FPT_PHP.3 “Resistance to physical attack”, FDP_IFC.1 “Subset
information flow control”, FPT_ITT.1 “Basic internal TSF data transfer protection”, FDP_ITT.1 “Basic internal
transfer protection and FPT_FLS.1 “Failure with preservation of secure state”.
CPU
The TOE computes and handles data even in the core only encrypted respectively masked. At no time plain data
is processed – except when communicating to the outer world. By this plain data is only available at the interface
modules. The dual CPU computes entirely masked. More information is given in the confidential Security Target
[8].
The covered security functional requirements are FPT_PHP.3 “Resistance to physical attack”, FDP_IFC.1 “Subset
information flow control”, FPT_ITT.1 “Basic internal TSF data transfer protection”, FDP_ITT.1 “Basic internal
transfer protection and FPT_FLS.1 “Failure with preservation of secure state”.
SCP/Cache
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Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
The symmetric cryptographic co-processor (SCP) is also entirely masked. The Cache being in ongoing use during
core operation is also entirely encrypted. More information is given in the confidential Security Target [8]. The
encryption covers the data processing policy and FDP_IFC.1 “Subset information flow control“. The covered
security functional requirements are FPT_PHP.3, FDP_IFC.1, FPT_ITT.1 and FDP_ITT.1.
MMU
In addition to their protection during processing of code and data, their storage in the SOLID FLASH™ NVM is
protected with a further mean too: Even if users operate with direct and static addressing for storing their
secrets, the addresses are always translated to virtual addresses. More information is given in the confidential
Security Target [8].
The covered security functional requirements are FPT_PHP.3 “Resistance to physical attacks”, FPT_ITT.1 “Basic
internal TSF data transfer protection”, FDP_ITT.1 “Basic internal transfer protection” and FPT_FLS.1 “Failure
with preservation of secure state”.
Proprietary CPU
A proprietary dual CPU implementation with a non-public bus protocol renders analysis very complicated and
time consuming. Besides the proprietary structures also the internal timing behavior is proprietary and by this
aggravating significantly the analysis in addition. Important parts of the chip are especially designed to counter
leakage or side channel attacks like DPA/SPA or EMA/DEMA. Therefore, even the physical data gaining is
difficult to perform, since timing and current consumption is almost independent of the dynamically encrypted,
respectively masked and/or randomized data.
Important parts of the chip are especially designed to counter leakage or side channel attacks like DPA/SPA or
EMA/DEMA. Therefore, even identifying and collecting physical data is difficult to perform, since timing and
current consumption are almost independent of the processed data, as those are protected by a bunch of other
internal protecting means.
Synthesis
In the design a number of components are automatically synthesized and mixed up to disguise and complicate
analysis. The covered security functional requirement is FPT_PHP.3 “Resistance to physical attack”.
Secure Wiring/I2
shield
A further protective design method used is secure wiring. All security critical wires have been identified and
protected by special routing measures against probing. Additionally, artificial shield lines are implemented and
mixed up with normal signal lines required for chip operation, rendering probing attacks with high feasibility to
not practical. This provides the so called intelligent implicit active shielding “I2
-shield”.
The covered security functional requirements are FPT_PHP.3 “Resistance to physical attack”, FPT_ITT.1 “Basic
internal TSF data transfer protection” and FDP_ITT.1”Basic internal transfer protection”.
FSE
A low system frequency sensor FSE is implemented to prevent the TOE from single stepping.
The covered security functional requirements are FPT_PHP.3 “Resistance to physical attack” and FPT_FLS.1
“Failure with preservation of secure state”.
8.2.1 SF_S Protection against Snooping
Table 18 Security Functional Requirements covered by SF_PLA Protection against Snooping
1. FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
2. FDP_SDC.1 Stored data confidentiality
3. FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
4. FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
5. FDP_ITT.1 Resistance to physical attack
6. FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
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Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
8.3 SF_PMA: Protection against ModifyingAttacks
First of all we can say that all security mechanisms effective against snooping SF_PS apply also here since a
reasonable modification of data is almost impossible on dynamically encrypted, masked, scrambled,
transparently relocated, randomized and topologically protected hardware. Due to this the covered security
functional requirements are FPT_PHP.3, FDP_SDC.1, FDP_IFC.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_ITT.1 and FPT_FLS.1.
The TOE is equipped with an error detection code (EDC) which covers the memory system of RAM, ROM and
SOLID FLASH™ NVM and includes also the MED and MMU. Thus introduced failures could be detected and the
appropriate action is taken. In terms of single bit errors in the SOLID FLASH™ NVM, the errors are also
automatically corrected. This contributes to FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action and
FRU_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance. In order to prevent accidental bit faults during production in the ROM an EDC
value is calculated and stored as well.
The error detection and partly correction means protect against physical and provide the appropriate reaction in
terms of induced errors and faults. The covered security functional requirements are FRU_FLT.2 Limited fault
tolerance, FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack, and FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action.
The Cache integrity is protected by a different method as the other memories and provides also error detection
and appropriate reaction in case of induced errors. This contributes to FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity
monitoring and action.
The TOE is protected against fault and modifying attacks. The core provides the functionality of double-
computing and result comparison of all tasks to detect incorrect calculations. The detection of an incorrect
calculation is stored and the TOE enters a defined secure state which causes the chip internal reset process.
The implementation of the dual CPU computing on the same data is by this one of the most important security
features of this platform. As also the results of both CPU parts are compared at the end, a fault induction of
modifying attacks would have to be done on both CPU parts at the correct place with the correct timing – despite
all other countermeasures like dynamic masking, encryption and others. The comparison and the register files
are also protected by various measures. The covered security functional requirements are FPT_FLS.1 Failure with
preservation of secure state, FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack, FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer
protection and FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection.
During start up, the BOS performs various configurations and subsystem tests. After the BOS has finished, the
operating system or application can call the RMS function User Mode Security Life Control (UMSLC) test. This
function provides the testing of the security features enabled to generate an alarm and can be released actively
by the user software during normal chip operation any time. Attempts to modify the security features will be
detected from this test and lead to the appropriate reaction. The covered security functional requirement is
FPT_TST.2 Subset TOE security testing.
In the case that a physical manipulation or a physical probing attack is detected, for example by the intelligent
intrinsic shield (I2
), the processing of the TOE is immediately stopped and the TOE enters a secure state called
security reset. The covered security functional requirements are Failure with preservation of secure state,
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state, FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack and FPT_TST.2
Subset TOE security testing.
As physical effects or manipulative attacks may also address the program flow of the user software, a watchdog
timer and a check point register are implemented. These features allow the user to check the correct processing
time and the integrity of the program flow of the user software.
Another measure against modifying and perturbation respectively differential fault attacks (DFA) is the
implementation of backward calculation in the SCP. By this induced errors are discovered.
The covered security functional requirements are FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state, FDP_IFC.1
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Subset information flow control, FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection, FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal
transfer protection and FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack.
All communication via the busses is in addition protected by a monitored hardware handshake. If the handshake
was not successful an alarm is generated.
The covered security functional requirements are FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure stateand
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack.
The virtual memory system and privilege level model are enforced by the MMU. This controls the access rights
throughout the TOE. There is a clear differentiation within the defined privilege levels. Addresses and privilege
level must match and induced errors and/or manipulation lead to appropriate error message and action. The
covered security functional requirements are FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute
based access control, FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes, FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
and FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions.
All the measures of controlling the access rights, checking the integrity of data and code, the coverage of the
integrity protecting values by means of encryption, the continuously masked calculation and operation stands
for the Integrity Guard. The implemented measures interact like a gearing mechanism and by that an induced
error will be discovered with very high feasibility followed by the appropriate reaction. While single bit faults may
be corrected automatically, other faults which cannot be corrected lead to an alarm, and in case of security
critical detections a security alarm and reset is generated. The covered security functional requirement is
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state.
If the hardware support library HSL – in all versions - comes with the TOE and the Low Level Driver (LLD) and/or
the In-Place-Update (IPU) functionality are used in certain configurations as outlined in the version specific user
guidance document HSL [15], the TOE behavior is protected against sudden power off events and its behavior is
tearing safe. This protection is additionally claimed for the IWR method as offered in the version v03.11.8339.
This means in detail that the SFRs Failure with preservation of secure state FPT_FLS.1/HSL-1, FPT_FLS.1/HSL-2
and Resistance to physical attacks FPT_PHP.3/HSL-1, FPT_PHP.3/HSL-2 are covered for the methods LLD and
IPU for the HSL versions v02.01.6634 and v01.22.4346 if the user follows the recommendation and configuration
of the user guidance.
In addition, the equal SFRs Failure with preservation of secure state and Resistance to physical attacks
FPT_FLS.1/HSL-3 and FPT_PHP.3/HSL-3 are claimed for version v03.11.8339. The version v03.11.8339 claims the
SFRs for the methods LLD, IPU and also IWR if the user follows the recommendation and configuration of the
user guidance.
In this case, tearing safe implements an atomicity in the concerned operations resulting that if the process of
writing to the SOLID FLASH™ NVM is interrupted by an accidental or intentional power loss or reset, the SOLID
FLASH™ NVM data will be either the original data or will be in the new data. The interruption possibly involves
some recovery steps that have to be taken before the data is accessed. After successful completion of the
concerned operations the relevant data are always in a defined status. If errors are detected during the
processing a secure state is entered.
The covered security functional requirements are FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state and
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attacks.
If the Mifare Compatible Software MCS comes with the TOE its behavior is protected against sudden power off
events and tearing safe. The implemented tearing safe behavior is an additional do-not-need-to-care-about-
service for the user, but is not assigned to contribute to a SFR.
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Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
8.3.1 Listing of SFRs implemented by SF_PMA Protection against Modifying
Attacks
Table 19 Security Functional Requirements covered by SF_PMA Protection against Modifying Attacks
1. FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
2. FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
3. FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
4. FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection
5. FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
6. FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
7. FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
8. FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
9. FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
10. FRU_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance
11. FPT_TST.2 Subset TOE security testing
12. FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action
13. FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
14. FPT_FLS.1/HSL-1 Failure with preservation of secure state by HSL-1
15. FPT_FLS.1/HSL-2 Failure with preservation of secure state by HSL-2
16. FPT_FLS.1/HSL-3 Failure with preservation of secure state by HSL-3
17. FPT_PHP.3/HSL-1 Resistance to physical attack by HSL-1
18. FPT_PHP.3/HSL-2 Resistance to physical attack by HSL-2
19. FPT_PHP.3/HSL-3 Resistance to physical attack by HSL-3
8.4 SF_PLA Protection against Logical Attacks
The memory access control of the TOE uses a memory management unit (MMU) to control the access to the
available physical memory by using virtual memory addresses and to segregate the code and data to a privilege
level model. The MMU controls the address permissions of up to seven privileged levels and gives the software
the possibility to define different access rights for the user available privileged levels. The address permissions of
the privilege levels are controlled by the MMU. In case of an access violation the MMU will trigger a reset and
then a trap service routine can react on the access violation. The policy of setting up the MMU and specifying the
memory ranges for the privilege levels – with the exception of the IFX level - is defined from the user software
(OS). More information is given in the confidential Security Target [8].
Therefore, the TOE provides support for secure separation of memory areas covering the security functional
requirements FPT_PHP.3 “Resistance to physical attack”, FDP_ACC.1 “Subset access control”, FDP_ACF.1
“Security attribute based access control”, FMT_MSA.1 “Management of security attributes”, FMT_MSA.3 “Static
attribute initialisation” and FMT_SMF.1 “Specification of Management functions”.
The TOE provides the possibility to protect the property rights of user code and data by the encryption of the
SOLID FLASH™ NVM areas with a specific key defined by the user. Due to this key management FDP_ACF.1 is
fulfilled. In addition, each memory present on the TOE is encrypted using either mask specific or chip individual
or even session keys, assigned by a complex key management. Induced errors are recognized by the Integrity
Guard concept and lead to an alarm with high feasibility. In case of security critical errors a security alarm is
generated and the TOE ends up in a secure state. The covered security functional requirements are FPT_PHP.3
“Resistance to physical attack”, FPT_ITT.1 “Basic internal transfer protection”, FDP_IFC.1 “Subset information
flow control” and FPT_FLS.1 “Failure with preservation of secure state”.
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Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
Beside the access protection and key management, also the use of illegal operation code is detected and will
release a security reset. The covered security functional requirements FDP_ITT.1 “Basic internal transfer
protection” and FPT_FLS.1 “Failure with preservation of secure state”.
8.4.1 Listing of SFRs implemented by SF_PLA Protection against Logical
Attacks
Table 20 Security Functional Requirements covered by SF_PLA Protection against Logical Attacks
1. FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
2. FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
3. FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
4. FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
5. FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
6. FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection
7. FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
8. FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
9. FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management functions
8.5 SF_CS Cryptographic Support
The TOE is equipped with several hardware accelerators and software modules to support the standard
symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic operations. This security function is introduced to include the
cryptographic operation in the scope of the evaluation as the cryptographic function respectively mathematic
algorithm itself is not used from the TOE security policy. On the other hand these functions are of special interest
for the use of the hardware as platform for the software. The components are a cryptographic co-processor
supporting the DES and AES algorithms and a combination of a co-processor and software library modules to
support RSA cryptography, RSA key generation, ECDSA signature generation and verification, ECDH key
agreement and EC public key calculation and public key testing.
Note that the additional function of the EC library, ECC_ADD, providing the primitive elliptic curve operations,
does not add specific security functionality and that the according user guidance abbreviates the Elliptic Curve
cryptographic functions with ECC.
Note 44:
The symmetric cryptographic library SCL in two alternative versions is a delivery option. Therefore the TOE may
come with or without one of the SCLs. In the case of coming without any of the alternative SCLs, the TOE does
not provide the related AES and TDES security functional requirements. The equal case applies if the symmetric
cryptographic coprocessor is blocked. Then neither the SCL versions nor the SCP implement the related AES and
TDES security functional requirements. The SCL requires the presence of the SCP.
End of note.
Note 45:
The cryptographic libraries RSA, EC and the Toolbox library are delivery options, regardless of the version
chosen. Therefore the TOE may come with free combinations of or even without these libraries. In the case of
coming without one or any combination of the cryptographic libraries RSA and EC, the TOE does not provide the
Additional Specific Security Functionality Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Cryptography (RSA) and/or Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (EC). The Toolbox Library is no cryptographic library and provides no additional specific security
functionality.
End of note.
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Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
Note 46:
This TOE can come with both crypto co-processors accessible, or with a blocked SCP or with a blocked
Crypto2304T, or with both crypto co-processors blocked. The blocking depends on the customer demands prior
to the production of the hardware. In case the SCP is blocked, no AES and DES computation supported by
hardware is possible. In case the Crypto2304T is blocked, no RSA and EC computation supported by hardware is
possible. No accessibility of the deselected cryptographic co-processors is without impact on any other security
policy of the TOE; it is exactly equivalent to the situation where the user decides just not to use the cryptographic
co-processors.
End of note.
Note 47:
The presence of one of the alternative cryptographic library CIPURSE™ CL version is a delivery option.
Therefore the TOE may come with free combinations with the other libraries of or without these libraries.
In the case of coming with none of the CIPURSE™ CL versions the TOE does not provide the specific security
functionality implemented by this software.
End of note.
8.5.1 Implementation of AES and TDES by the Symmetric Cryptographic
Coprocessor SCP
8.5.1.1 Triple DES
The TOE supports the encryption and decryption in accordance with the specified cryptographic algorithm Triple
Data Encryption Standard (TDES) with cryptographic key sizes of 168 bit meeting the standard:
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), SP 800-67 [20]
ISO/IEC 18033-3 [30]
The TOE implements the following alternative block cipher modes for the user:
 the Electronic Codebook Mode (ECB),
 the Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC),
 the Blinding Feedback Mode (BLD),
 the Cipher Block Chaining Mode Message Authentication Code (CBC-MAC),
 the CBC-MAC- encrypt-last-block (CBC-MAC-ELB) and
 the Recrypt Mode.
The CBC-MAC and CBC-MAC-ELB complies with the standard:
ISO/IEC 9797-1 Mac Algorithm 1 [32]
The Recrypt Mode and the BLD are described in the hardware reference manual HRM [1], while the
implementation of ECB, CBC and CFB follow the standard:
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), SP 800-38A [21]
Note that the BLD follows also the standard, but in a masked way.
The key destruction as required by FCS_CKM.4 can be done by overwriting the key register interfaces or by
software reset of the SCP which provides immediate zeroing of all SCP key registers.
Please consider also the statement of chapter 7.1.4.1.
The covered security functional requirements are FCS_COP.1/TDES and FCS_CKM.4/TDES.
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Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
8.5.1.2 AES
The TOE supports the encryption and decryption in accordance with the specified cryptographic algorithm
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and cryptographic key sizes of 128 bit or 192 bit or 256 bit that meet the
standard:
ISO/IEC 18033-3 [30]
FIPS 197 [31]
The TOE implements the following alternative block cipher modes for the user:
 the Electronic Codebook Mode (ECB),
 the Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC),
 the Blinding Feedback Mode (BLD),
 the Cipher Block Chaining Mode Message Authentication Code (CBC-MAC),
 the CBC-MAC- encrypt-last-block (CBC-MAC-ELB) and
 the Recrypt Mode.
The CBC-MAC and CBC-MAC-ELB complies with the standard:
ISO/IEC 9797-1 Mac Algorithm 1 and 2 respectively [32]
The Recrypt Mode and the BLD are described in the hardware reference manual HRM [1], while the
implementation of ECB and CBC follow the standard:
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-38A [21]
The key destruction as required by FCS_CKM.4 can be done by overwriting the key register interfaces or by
software reset of the SCP which provides immediate zeroing of all SCP key registers.
Please consider also the statement of chapter 7.1.4.1.
The covered security functional requirement is FCS_COP.1/AES and FCS_CKM.4/AES.
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Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
8.5.2 Implementation of TDES, AES and CMAC by the Symmetric
Cryptographic Library SCL
8.5.2.1 Triple DES for both versions
The SCL of the TOE supports the encryption and decryption in accordance with the specified cryptographic
algorithm Triple Data Encryption Standard (TDES) with cryptographic key sizes of 128 or 192 bit meeting the
standard:
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), SP 800-67 [20]
The TOE implements the following alternative block cipher modes for the user:
 The Electronic Codebook Mode (ECB),
 the Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC),
 the Counter Mode (CTR),
 the Cipher Block -Feedback Mode (CFB) and the
 Propagating Cipher Block Chaining (PCBC) mode.
ECB, CBC, CTR and CFB modes refer to the standard:
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-38A [21]
The PCBC mode refers to the standard:
Bruce Schneier, Applied Cryptography, Second Edition, John Wiley & Sons,1996 [36].
This standard should be implemented considering the Security Guidelines only.
The covered security functional requirement is FCS_COP.1/TDES-SCL-1, FCS_COP.1/TDES-SCL-2,
FCS_CKM.4/TDES-SCL-1 and FCS_CKM.4/TDES-SCL-2.
8.5.2.2 AES for both versions
The SCL of the TOE supports the encryption and decryption in accordance with the specified cryptographic
algorithm Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and cryptographic key sizes of 128 bit or 192 bit or 256 bit that
meet the standard:
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-38A [21]
The TOE implements the following alternative block cipher modes for the user:
 The Electronic Codebook Mode (ECB),
 the Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC),
 the Counter Mode (CTR),
 the Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB) and
 the Propagating Cipher Block Chaining (PCBC) mode.
The AES advanced encryption standard refers to:
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
FIPS PUB 197 [31]
ECB, CBC, CTR and CFB modes refer to the standard
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-38A [21]
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Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
The PCBC mode refers to the standard:
Bruce Schneier, Applied Cryptography, Second Edition, John Wiley & Sons,1996 [36].
This standard should be implemented considering the Security Guidelines only.
The covered security functional requirement is FCS_COP.1/AES-SCL-1, FCS_COP.1/AES-SCL-2,
FCS_CKM.4/AES-SCL-1 and FCS_CKM.4/AES-SCL-2.
8.5.2.1 CMAC only for version v02.04.002
The SCL of the TOE supports the computation of cipher based message authentication codes CMAC hat meet
the standard:
CMAC: National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-38B [38]
The CMAC algorithm uses for the computation either the AES or TDES algorithms according to following
standards:
 AES
o Federal Information Standards Publication 197 [31]
o National Institute of Standards and Technology SP800-38A [21]
o ISO/IEC 18033 [30]
 TDES
o National Institute of Standards and Technology 800-67 Rev.1 [20]
o National Institute of Standards and Technology SP800-38A [21]
o ISO/IEC 18033 [30]
The covered security functional requirement is FCS_COP.1/CMAC-SCL-1 and FCS_CKM.4/CMAC-SCL-1.
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Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
8.5.3 RSA Cryptographic Library for versions v2.07.003 and v2.06.003
Encryption, Decryption, Signature Generation and Verification
The TSF shall perform encryption and decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Rivest-
Shamir-Adleman (RSA) and cryptographic key sizes 1024 - 4096 bits that meet the following standards:
Encryption:
1. According to section 5.1.1 RSAEP in PKCS [22]:
 Supported for n < 24096 + 128
 5.1.1(1) not supported
2. According to section 8.2.2 IFEP-RSA in IEEE [29]:
Supported for n < 24096 + 128
Decryption (with or without CRT):
1. According to section 5.1.2 RSADP in PKCS [22] for u = 2, i.e., without any (ri, di, ti), i > 2
 5.1.2(1) not supported
 5.1.2(2.a) supported for n < 22048 + 64
 5.1.2(2.b) supported for p  q < 24096 + 128
 5.1.2(2.b) (ii)&(v) not applicable due to u = 2
2. According to section 8.2.3 IEEE [29]:
 8.2.1(I) supported for n < 22048 + 64
 8.2.1(II) supported for p  q < 24096 + 128
 8.2.1(III) not supported
Signature Generation (with or without CRT):
1. According to section 5.2.1 RSASP1 in PKCS [22] for u = 2, i.e., without any (ri, di, ti), i >2
 5.2.1(1) not supported
 5.2.1(2.a) supported for n < 22048 + 64
 5.2.1(2b) supported for p  q < 24096 + 128
 5.2.1(2b) (ii)&(v) not applicable due to u = 2
2. According to section 8.2.4 IFSP-RSA1 in IEEE [29]:
 8.2.1(I) supported for n < 22048 + 64
 8.2.1(II) supported for p  q < 24096 + 128
 8.2.1(III) not supported
Signature Verification:
1. According to section 5.2.2 RSAVP1 in PKCS [22]:
supported for n < 24096 +128
 5.2.2(1) not supported
2. According to section 8.2.5 IEEE [29]:
 Supported for n < 24096 +128
 8.2.5(1) not supported
Please consider also the statement of chapter 7.1.4.1.
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Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
Asymmetric Key Generation
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation
algorithm RSA specified in PKCS#1 [22] and specified cryptographic key sizes of 65 – 4096 bits that meet the
following standard:
RSA key generation:
1. According to sections 3.1 and 3.2 in PKCS [22], for u = 2, i.e. without any (ri, di, ti), i > 2:
3.1 supported for n < 24096 + 128
3.2.(1) supported for n < 22048 + 64
3.2.(2) supported for p x q < 24096 + 128
According to section 8.1.3.1 in IEEE [29]:
8.1.3.1(1) supported for n < 22048 + 64
8.1.3.1(2) supported for p x q < 24096 + 128
8.1.3.1(3) supported for p x q < 22048 + 128
FCS_CKM.1/RSA is covered by the standards as stated above.
Note 48:
Following the national BSI recommendations, RSA key lengths below 1976 bits are not included in the certificate.
Please note that the BSI expects this key length as appropriate until 2022 and recommends for longer usage
times key lengths of 3000 bits or higher.
End of note.
The covered security functional requirements are FCS_COP.1/RSA and FCS_CKM.1/RSA.
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Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
8.5.4 Elliptic Curves Cryptographic Library for versions v2.07.003 and v2.06.003
The security functional requirement covers the standard Brainpool [19] and NIST [26] Elliptic Curves with key
lengths of 233, 256, 283, 320, 384, 409, 512 or 521 Bits, due to national AIS32 regulations by the BSI. Note that
numerous other side channel attack resistant curve types exist, which the user optionally can add in the
composition certification process.
All curves are based on finite field GF(p) with value p є [241-1
; 2521
[ as well as curves based on a finite field GF(2n
)
with size n є [41-1; 521] are supported.
Signature Generation and Verification
The TSF shall perform signature generation and signature verification in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm ECDSA and cryptographic key sizes 192 - 521 bits that meet the following standard:
ECDSA Signature Generation:
1. According to section 7.3 Signing Process in ANSI [23]
 Step d) and e) are not supported
 The output of step e) has to be provided as input to our function by the caller.
 Deviation of step c) and f):
o The jumps to step a) were substituted by a return of the function with an error
code, the jumps are emulated by another call to our function.
2. According to sections 6.4.3 Signature Process in ISO/IEC [27]
 Chapter 6.4.3.3 is not supported
 Chapter 6.4.3.5 is not supported
o The hash-code of H of the message has to be provided by the caller as input for
our function.
 Chapter 6.4.3.7 is not supported
 Chapter 6.4.3.8 is not supported
3. According to section 7.2.7 ECSP-DSA in IEEE [29]
 Deviation of step (3) and (4):
o The jumps to step 1 were substituted by a return of the function with an error
code, the jumps are emulated by another call to our function
Signature Verification:
1. According to section 7.4.1 in ANSI [23]
 Step b) and c) are not supported.
 The output of step c) has to be provided as input to our function by the caller.
 Deviation of step d):
o Beside noted calculation, our algorithm adds a random multiple of
BasepointerOrder n to the calculated values u1 and u2.
2. According to sections 6.4.4 Signature Verification Process in ISO/IEC [27]
 Chapter 6.4.4.2 is not supported
 Chapter 6.4.4.3 is not supported:
o The hash-code H of the message has to be provided by the caller as input to our
function
3. According to section 7.2.8 ECVP-DSA in IEEE [29].
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Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
Asymmetric Key Generation
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation
algorithm Elliptic Curve EC specified in [23], [27] and [29] and specified cryptographic key sizes 224, 233, 256,
283, 320, 384, 409, 512 or 521 bits that meet the following standard:
ECDSA Key Generation:
1. According to the appendix “A4.3 Elliptic Curve Key Pair Generation” in ANSI [23]:
 The optional cofactor h is not supported.
2. According to section “6.4.2 Generation of signature key and verification key” in ISO/IEC [27].
3. According to appendix “A.16.9 An algorithm for generating EC keys” in IEEE [29]
Asymmetric Key Agreement
The TSF shall perform elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key agreement in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm ECDH and cryptographic key sizes 160, 163, 192, 224, 233, 256, 283, 320, 384, 409, 512 or 521 bits that
meet the following standard:
1. According to section “5.4.1 Standard Diffie-Hellman Primitive” in ANSI [24]
 Unlike section 5.4.1(3) our implementation not only returns the x-coordinate of the shared
secret, but rather the x-coordinate and the y-coordinate.
2. According to “Appendix D.6 Key agreement of Diffie-Hellman” type in ISO/IEC [28]
 The function enables the operations described in appendix D.6
3. According to section “7.2.1 ECSVHDP-DH” in IEEE [29]
 Unlike section 7.2.1 our implementation not only returns the x-coordinate of the shared
secret, but rather the x-coordinate and the y-coordinate.
The covered security functional requirements are FCS_COP.1/ECDSA, FCS_CKM.1/EC and FCS_COP.1/ECDH.
8.5.5 Toolbox Library for versions v2.07.003 and v2.06.003
The Toolbox provides the following basic long integer arithmetic and modular functions in software, supported
by the cryptographic coprocessor: Addition, subtraction, division, multiplication, comparison, reduction,
modular addition, modular subtraction, modular multiplication, modular inversion and modular exponentiation.
No security relevant policy, mechanism or function is supported. The Toolbox library is deemed for software
developers as support for simplified implementation of long integer and modular arithmetic operations.
The Toolbox does not cover security functional requirements.
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Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
8.5.6 CIPURSE™ Cryptographic Library for both versions
The order option CIPURSE™ Cryptographic Library (CCL) provides cryptographic functionality to implement a
CIPURSE™ V2 conformant protocol [35-1].
This protocol provides a secure mutual authentication of two entities, namely the terminal (denoted as PCD =
Proximity Coupling Device (CIPURSE™-compliant terminal)) and a smart card or a token in other form factors
which is called PICC. PICC stands for Proximity Integrated Circuit Card (CIPURSE™-compliant card).
Beside the mutual authentication, the protocol implements cryptographic measures to maintain the integrity of
the transferred data and preserves in parallel the confidentiality of the transferred data.
The alternative versions of the CIPURSE™ CL cover the following cryptographic security functional requirements
as follows:
CCL in version v02.00.0004
 FCS_CKM.1/CCL-1 Cryptographic key generation,
 FCS_CKM.4/CCL-1 Cryptographic key destruction - AES
 FCS_COP.1/CCL-1 Cryptographic Operation - CCL Trusted Channel
CCL in version v2.0.0002
 FCS_CKM.1/CCL-2 Cryptographic key generation,
 FCS_CKM.4/CCL-2 Cryptographic key destruction - AES
 FCS_COP.1/CCL-2 Cryptographic Operation - CCL Trusted Channel
The implemented cryptographic operation is applies following standards:
 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197 [31]
 NIST Special Publication SP 800-38A [21]
 CIPURSE™ V2 Cryptographic Protocol [35-1] chapter 5.2 Session key Derivation
 CIPURSE™ V2 Cryptographic Protocol [35-1] chapter 6.2 Key Derivation for the first frame
 CIPURSE™ V2 Cryptographic Protocol [35-1] chapter 6.3 Integrity Protection
 CIPURSE™ V2 Cryptographic Protocol [35-1] chapter 6.4 Confidential Communication
8.5.7 Hybrid PTRNG
Random data is essential for cryptography as well as for security mechanisms. The TOE is equipped with a Hybrid
Physical True Random Number Generator (HPTRNG, FCS_RNG.1). The random data can be used from the
Smartcard Embedded Software and is also used from the security features of the TOE, i.e. masking. The
HPTRNG implements various topological means, masked bus interface and is self-checking.
The produced genuine random numbers are available as a security service for the user and are also used for
internal purposes. Together with the security guidelines in [6] the hybrid PTRNG operates in the following modes
of operation and is conformant to the named classes:
 True Random Number Generation, meeting AIS31 PTG.2
 Hybrid Random Number Generation, meeting AIS31 PTG.3
 Deterministic Random Number Generation (DRNG) AIS31 DRG.3
 Key Stream Generation (KSG), stream cipher generation AIS31 DRG.2
The details of AIS31 are given in [13].
The Hybrid PTRNG implements protected a protected peripheral bus interface is a synthesized module and
covers therefore FPT_PHP.3 “Resistance to physical attack”. The transferred random data are masked as well as
other configuration data transferred over the peripheral bus. This covers FDP_ITT.1 “Basic internal transfer
CC Document 138 1.1
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Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
protection” and FPT_ITT.1 “Basic internal TSF data transfer protection”. The correct function of the Hybrid
PTRNG is subject of internal self-testing and in case of errors a secure state is achieved to protect the user from
random data with bad entropy. Therefore, the output of the Hybrid PTRNG is conformant to the above claimed
classes or there is no random data output. This covers FPT_FLS.1 “Failure with preservation of secure state”.
The hybrid PTRNG covers the security functional requirements FCS_RNG.1 “Random Number Generation”,
FPT_PHP.3 “Resistance to physical attack”, FDP_ITT.1 “Basic internal transfer protection”, FPT_ITT.1 “Basic
internal TSF data transfer protection” and FPT_FLS.1 “Failure with preservation of secure state”.
8.5.8 Listing of SFRs implemented by SF_CS “Cryptographic Support”
Table 21 Security Functional Requirements covered by SF_CS “Cryptographic Support”
1. FCS_COP.1/TDES Cryptographic Operation
2. FCS_CKM.4/TDES Cryptographic key destruction TDES
3. FCS_COP.1/AES Cryptographic Operation
4. FCS_CKM.4/AES Cryptographic key destruction AES
5. FCS_COP.1/TDES-SCL-1 Cryptographic Operation by SCL-1
6. FCS_COP.1/TDES-SCL-2 Cryptographic Operation by SCL-2
7. FCS_CKM.4/TDES-SCL-1 Cryptographic key destruction TDES by SCL-1
8. FCS_CKM.4/TDES-SCL-2 Cryptographic key destruction TDES by SCL-2
9. FCS_COP.1/AES-SCL-1 Cryptographic Operation by SCL-1
10. FCS_COP.1/AES-SCL-2 Cryptographic Operation by SCL-2
11. FCS_CKM.4/AES-SCL-1 Cryptographic key destruction AES by SCL-1
12. FCS_CKM.4/AES-SCL-2 Cryptographic key destruction AES by SCL-2
13. FCS_COP.1/CMAC-SCL-1 Cryptographic Operation by SCL-1
14. FCS_CKM.4/CMAC-SCL-1 Cryptographic key destruction by SCL-1
15. FCS_COP.1/RSA-1 Cryptographic Operation RSA the ACL version v2.07.003
16. FCS_CKM.1/RSA-1 Cryptographic key generation RSA for ACL version v2.07.003
17. FCS_COP.1/ECDSA-1 Cryptographic Operation ECDSA for ACL version v2.07.003
18. FCS_CKM.1/EC-1 Cryptographic key generation Elliptic Curve for ACL version v2.07.003
19. FCS_COP.1/ECDH-1 Cryptographic Operation ECDH for ACL version v2.07.003
20. FCS_COP.1/RSA-2 Cryptographic Operation RSA the ACL version v2.06.003
21. FCS_CKM.1/RSA-2 Cryptographic key generation RSA for ACL version v2.06.003
22. FCS_COP.1/ECDSA-2 Cryptographic Operation ECDSA for ACL version v2.06.003
23. FCS_CKM.1/EC-2 Cryptographic key generation Elliptic Curve for ACL version v2.06.003
24. FCS_COP.1/ECDH-2 Cryptographic Operation ECDH for ACL version v2.06.003
25. FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
26. FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection
27. FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
28. FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
29. FCS_RNG.1/TRNG True Random Number Generation
30. FCS_RNG.1/HPRG Hybrid Random Number Generation
31. FCS_RNG.1/DRNG Deterministic Random Number Generation
32. FCS_RNG.1/KSG Key Stream Generation
33. FCS_CKM.1/CCL-1 Cryptographic key generation for version v02.04.002
34. FCS_CKM.4/CCL-1 Cryptographic key destruction – AES for version v02.04.002
CC Document 139 1.1
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TOE Summary Specification (ASE_TSS)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
35. FCS_COP.1/CCL-1 Cryptographic operation CCL Trusted Channel for version v02.04.002
36. FCS_CKM.1/CCL-2 Cryptographic key generation for version v2.0.0002
37. FCS_CKM.4/CCL-2 Cryptographic key destruction – AES for version v2.0.0002
38. FCS_COP.1/CCL-2 Cryptographic operation CCL Trusted Channel for version v2.0.0002
8.6 Assignment of Security Functional Requirements to TOE’s Security
Functionality
The justification and overview of the mapping between security functional requirements (SFR) and the TOE’s
security functionality (SF) is given in sections the sections above. The results are shown in Table 20. The security
functional requirements are addressed by at least one relating security feature.
The various functional requirements are often covered manifold. As described above the requirements ensure
that the TOE is checked for correct operating conditions and if a not correctable failure occurs that a stored
secure state is achieved, accompanied by data integrity monitoring and actions to maintain the integrity
although failures occurred. An overview is given in the table below.
Table 22 Mapping of SFR and SF
Security Functional Requirement SF_DPM SF_PS SF_PMA SF_PLA SF_CS
By the ACLs
FCS_CKM.1/EC-1 X
FCS_CKM.1/EC-2 X
FCS_CKM.1/RSA-1 X
FCS_CKM.1/RSA-2 X
FCS_COP.1/ECDH-1 X
FCS_COP.1/ECDH-2 X
FCS_COP.1/ECDSA-1 X
FCS_COP.1/ECDSA-2 X
FCS_COP.1/RSA-1 X
FCS_COP.1/RSA-2 X
By the SCLs
FCS_CKM.4/AES-SCL-1 X
FCS_CKM.4/AES-SCL-2 X
FCS_CKM.4/TDES-SCL-1 X
FCS_CKM.4/TDES-SCL-2 X
FCS_COP.1/AES-SCL-1 X
FCS_COP.1/AES-SCL-2 X
FCS_COP.1/TDES-SCL-1 X
FCS_COP.1/TDES-SCL-2 X
FCS_COP.1/CMAC-SCL-1 X
FCS_CKM.4/CMAC-SCL-1 X
CC Document 140 1.1
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TOE Summary Specification (ASE_TSS)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
Security Functional Requirement SF_DPM SF_PS SF_PMA SF_PLA SF_CS
By the CIPURSE™ CLs
FCS_CKM.1/CCL-1 X
FCS_COP.1/CCL-1 X
FCS_CKM.4/CCL-1 X
FCS_CKM.1/CCL-2 X
FCS_COP.1/CCL-2 X
FCS_CKM.4/CCL-2 X
By the HSL versions
FPT_PHP.3/HSL-1 X
FPT_FLS.1/HSL-1 X
FPT_PHP.3/HSL-2 X
FPT_FLS.1/HSL-2 X
FPT_PHP.3/HSL-3 X
FPT_FLS.1/HSL-3 X
By the hardware and firmware
FCS_CKM.4/AES (by SCP) X
FCS_CKM.4/TDES (by SCP) X
FCS_COP.1/AES (by SCP) X
FCS_COP.1/TDES (by SCP) X
FAU_SAS.1 X
FCS_RNG.1/TRNG X
FCS_RNG.1/HPRG X
FCS_RNG.1/DRNG X
FCS_RNG.1/KSG X
FDP_ACC.1 X X X
FDP_ACC.1/Loader X
FDP_ACF.1 X X X
FDP_ACF.1/Loader X
FDP_IFC.1 X X X
FDP_ITT.1 X X X X X
FDP_SDC.1 X X
FDP_SDI.2 X
FDP_UCT.1 X
FDP_UIT.1 X
CC Document 141 1.1
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TOE Summary Specification (ASE_TSS)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
Security Functional Requirement SF_DPM SF_PS SF_PMA SF_PLA SF_CS
FIA_API.1 X
FMT_LIM.1 X
FMT_LIM.1/Loader X
FMT_LIM.2 X
FMT_LIM.2/Loader X
FMT_MSA.1 X X X
FMT_MSA.3 X X X
FMT_SMF.1 X X X
FPT_FLS.1 X X X X
FPT_ITT.1 X X X X
FPT_PHP.3 X X X X X
FPT_TST.2 X X
FRU_FLT.2 X X
FTP_ITC.1 X X
CC Document 142 1.1
2018-07-20
TOE Summary Specification (ASE_TSS)
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
8.7 Security Requirements are internally Consistent
For this chapter the PP [9] section 6.3.4 can be applied completely.
In addition to the discussion in section 6.3 of PP [9] the security functional requirement FCS_COP.1 is introduced.
The security functional requirements required to meet the security objectives O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-Probing,
O.Malfunction, O.Phys-Manipulation and O.Leak-Forced also protect the cryptographic algorithms
implemented according to the security functional requirement FCS_COP.1. Therefore, these security functional
requirements support the secure implementation and operation of FCS_COP.1.
As disturbing, manipulating during or forcing the results of the test checking the security functions after TOE
delivery, this security functional requirement FPT_TST.2 has to be protected. An attacker could aim to switch off
or disturb certain sensors or filters and preserve the detection of his manipulation by blocking the correct
operation of FPT_TST.2. The security functional requirements required to meet the security objectives O.Leak-
Inherent, O.Phys-Probing, O.Malfunction, O.Phys-Manipulation and O.Leak-Forced also protect the security
functional requirement FPT_TST.2. Therefore, the related security functional requirements support the secure
implementation and operation of FPT_TST.2.
The requirement FPT_TST.2 allows testing of some security mechanisms by the Smartcard Embedded Software
after delivery. In addition, the TOE provides an automated continuous user transparent testing of certain
functions.
The implemented privilege level concept represents the area based memory access protection enforced by the
MMU. As an attacker could attempt to manipulate the privilege level definition as defined and present in the
TOE, the functional requirement FDP_ACC.1 and the related other requirements have to be protected
themselves. The security functional requirements required to meet the security objectives O.Leak-Inherent,
O.Phys-Probing, O.Malfunction, O.Phys-Manipulation and O.Leak-Forced also protect the area based memory
access control function implemented according to the security functional requirement described in the security
functional requirement FDP_ACC.1 with reference to the Memory Access Control Policy and details given in
FDP_ACF.1. Therefore, those security functional requirements support the secure implementation and operation
of FDP_ACF.1 with its dependent security functional requirements.
The requirement FDP_SDI.2 enables for detection of integrity errors of data stored in memory and for the
correction of one bit errors and/or taking further action. This meets the security objective O.Malfunction. The
requirements FRU_FLT.2, FPT_FLS.1, and FDP_ACC.1 which also meet this objective are independent from
FDP_SDI.2 since they deal with the observation of the correct operation of the TOE and not with the memory
content directly.
CC Document 143 1.1
2018-07-20
Literature and References
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
9 Literature and References
Note that the final versions of these documents are defined at the end of the evaluation process and that the
documents are listed in the certification report as well.
No. Vers. As of Document Title
1 Rev. 5.1 2017-04-13 16-bit Security Controller Family -V01, Hardware Reference Manual (HRM)
2 Rev. 3.3 2018-03-23 Production and Personalization, 16-bit Security Controller in 65nm
3 Rev. 9.7 2017-09-14
16-bit Security Controller, 65-nm Technology, Programmer’s Reference Manual
(PRM)
4-1 v2.07.003 2018-05-24
CL52 Asymmetric Crypto Library for Crypto@2304T, RSA/ECC/Toolbox, 16-bit
Security Controller, User Interface
2016-12-12
CL52 Asymmetric Crypto Library for Crypto@2304T, RSA/ECC/Toolbox, 16-bit
Security Controller, User Interface with additional errata section
2017-05-10 Additional errata section
5 Rev. 1.4.1 2014-11-10 16-bit Security Controller, Crypto@2304T V3, User Manual (CUM)
6 1.00-1854 2018-06-15 16-bit Security Controller - V01, Security Guidelines (SG)
7 Rev. 5.0 2017-08-17 16-bit Security Controller - V01, Errata Sheet
8 The confidential Security Target for this TOE.
9 1.0 2014-01-13
Security IC Protection Profile PP-0084 “Security IC Platform Protection Profile with
Augmentation Packages”, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014, available at
https://www.bund.bsi.de
10
3.1
Rev 5
2017-04
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1:
Introduction and General Model; Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017,
CCMB-2017-04-001
11
3.1
Rev 5
2017-04
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
Functional Requirements; Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017,
CCMB-2017-04-002
12
3.1
Rev 5
2017-04
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
Assurance Requirements; Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017,
CCMB-2017-04-003
13 3.0 2013-05-15
Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for physical random number
generators AIS31, Version 3.0, 2013-05-15, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik and belonging “A proposal for: Functionality classes for
random number generators”, Version 2.0, 2011-09-18, Wolfgang Killmann, T-
Systems GEI GmbH, Werner Schindler, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik
14 2.9 2013-01
Application of Attack Potential to Smartcard, mandatory technical document, CCDB-
2013-05-002, http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
15-1 v03.11.8339 2018-07-12 Hardware Support Library for SLCx2 (HSL) latest version, User Guidance
15-2 v02.01.6634 2017 Hardware Support Library for SLCx2 (HSL), User Guidance
15-3 v01.22.4346 2016 Hardware Support Library for SLCx2 (HSL), User Guidance
This document
4-2 v2.06.003
CC Document 144 1.1
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Literature and References
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
No. Vers. As of Document Title
16-1 v2.04.002 2018-01-15
SCL52-SCP-v4-C65 Symmetric Crypto Library for SCP-v4 DES / AES, 16-bit Security
Controller, User Interface
16-2 v2.02.010 2016-12-09
SCL52 Symmetric Cryptographic Library for DES / AES, 16-bit Security Controller
User Interface
17-1 Rev. 1.4 2017-06-16
CIPURSE™ Crypto Library, CCL52_SCP_v4 v2.0.0002, CIPURSE™ V2, Compliant to
OSPT™ Alliance CIPURSE™ V2 Cryptographic Protocol, User Interface
17-2 Rev.1.6 2018-02-02
CIPURSE™ Crypto Library, CCLX2xCIP v02.00.0004, CIPURSE™ V2, Compliant to
OSPT™ Alliance CIPURSE™ V2 Cryptographic Protocol, User Interface
18 2.0 n.a.
The CIPURSE™ V2 Revision 2.0 standard issued by the OSPT™ alliance. The standard
consists of a set of documents as given in the CIPURSE™V2 Revision 2.0
Documentation Overview. Http://www.osptalliance.org/resources/documentation
19 RFC 5639 2010-03
RFC 5639, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Standard Curves and Curve
Generation, IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors, March
2010, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5639.txt
20
800-67
Rev. 1
2012-01
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Special Publication 800-67,
Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher,
Revised January 2012, Technology Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce
21 SP800-38A 2001-12
National Institute of Standards and Technology(NIST), Technology Administration,
US Department of Commerce, NIST Special Publication SP 800-38A (for AES and DES)
22
PKCS #1
v2.2
2012-10-27 PKCS #1 v2.2: RSA Cryptography Standard, RSA Laboratories
23
ANSI
X.9.62
2005-11-16
American National Standard for Financial Services ANSI X9.62-2005, Public Key
Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry, The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA), American National Standards Institute
24
ANSI
X.9.63
2011-12-21
American National Standard for Financial Services X9.63-2011, Public Key
Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: Key Agreement and Key Transport
Using Elliptic Curve Cryptography, American National Standards Institute
25 German law 2009-08-14
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG),
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821; BSIG Section 9, Para.4, Clause 2
26 FIPS Pub 186-4 2013-07
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication, FIPS PUB 186-4, Digital
Signature Standard (DSS), U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST)
27
ISO/IEC
14888-3
2006,
published
2009-02-15
INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ISO/IEC 14888-3:2006, TECHNICAL CORRIGENDUM 2,
Published 2009-02-15, Information technology — Security techniques — Digital
signatures with appendix — Part 3: Discrete logarithm based mechanisms
28
ISO/IEC
11770-3
2008,
published
2009-09-15
INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ISO/IEC 11770-3:2008, TECHNICAL CORRIGENDUM 1,
Published 2009-09-15, Information technology — Security techniques —Key
management — Part 3: Mechanisms using asymmetric techniques
29 IEEE 1363
2000-01-30
(approved)
IEEE Standard Specification for Public key Crytography, IEEE Standards Board. The
standard covers specification for public key cryptography including mathematical
primitives for secret value deviation, public key encryption and digital signatures
and cryptographic schemes based on those primitives.
30 ISO/IEC 18033 2005
ISO/IEC 18033-3: 2005, Information technology – Security techniques - Encryption
algorithms - Part 3: Block ciphers [18033]
CC Document 145 1.1
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Literature and References
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
No. Vers. As of Document Title
31
FIPS
197
2001-11-26
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, ADVANCED
ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE / National Institute
of Standards and Technology, November 26, 2001
32
ISO/IEC
9797-1
2011-03-01
ISO/IEC 9797-1: 2011, Information technology – Security techniques - Message
Authentication Codes (MACs) Part 1 Mechanisms using a block cipher
33 1.0 2015-02-13
Nachweis der Einhaltung der Sicherheitsanforderungen für Chipkarten im
Zulassungsverfahren der Deutschen Kreditwirtschaft (DK) (German only)
34
ISO/IEC
9798-2
2015-02-14
Information Technologies - Security Techniques - Entity Authentication, part 2:
Mechanisms using symmetric encipherment algorithms, 3rd edition 2008-12-15
35-1 1.0 2012-09-28 CIPURSE™ V2 Cryptographic Protocol issued by the OSPT™ Alliance
35-2 1.1 2014-09-19
CIPURSE™ V2 Cryptographic Protocol issued by the OSPT™ Alliance with
Errata and Precision List
36 PCBC mode 1996 Bruce SCHNEIER, Applied Cryptography, Second Edition, John Wiley & Sons,1996
37
PKCS #1
v2.2
2010-10-27 PKCS #1 v2.2: RSA Cryptography Standard, RSA Laboratories
38 SP 800-38B
2005 with
updates
2016-10-06
National Institute of Standards and Technology(NIST), Technology Administration,
US Department of Commerce, NIST Special Publication SP 800-38B (the CMAC Mode
for Authentication)
CC Document 146 1.1
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Annex: Consideration of additional Requirements by the GBIC Approval Scheme
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
10 Annex: Consideration of additional Requirements by the GBIC
Approval Scheme
After an alignment and harmonization phase between BSI and the German Banking Industry Committee (GBIC)1
in 2014/2015, the Common Criteria certificates are accepted also by GBIC, if the certification process considers
additional specific process requirements. These additional GBIC requirements are defined in the GBIC document
[33] chapter 7 (in German language only) which are considered in the following.
Translation:
1. The hardware vendor has to support confidentiality and integrity protected processes that
a. Generate keys with sufficient entropy
b. Store those keys in a HSM within the vendor environment
c. Store those keys in the non-volatile memory of the chip
d. Deliver these keys separated from the chip delivery to the user
2. The loading of software and data into the chip memories is only possible after passing a secure
authentication
These security requirements are especially affective for the security functionality of the key Kchip respectively Kc
coming from the personalization concept of the Publishing Houses (Verlage). For the complete coverage
following the Common Criteria requirements it is essential that already the firmware of the TOE provides the
security functionality for Kchip.
In the course of migration to Common Criteria these security requirements must be modelled in the Security
Target.
End of translation.
Regarding requirement 1:
GBIC issues therewith an additional requirement for sufficient entropy of the used keys. This requires the
presence of a dedicated device and process in order to provide evidence that the keys used have been
generated appropriately. The keys used in this context are generated by a dedicated hardware security
module (HSM) with related certification according to FIPS 140-2. This covers requirement 1.a.
The requirement 1.b is sufficiently addressed by the refinements regarding development security (ALC_DVS)
taken from PP [9].
All data loaded into the chip is encrypted and integrity protected stored in the SOLID FLASH ™ NVM. This
covers the requirement 1.c.
The requirement 1.d implies the presence of a dedicated GBIC process with additional protection means for
the key handling and management after its generation in the HSM. Infineon Technologies has implemented
a dedicated process with role separation, access protection, transport protection during the internal different
instances and implements a separate specific process for protected delivery of the used keys to the user.
Therefore, the requirement 1.d. is sufficiently addressed by refinements regarding delivery procedure
(ALC_DEL) if the security functionality of the corresponding key is part of the TOE.
On request at Infineon Technologies, the user can receive under NDA information about the flow
implemented with the document “DK-SECCOSv7 Flow for Kchip Injection by Infineon, Customer Information”
in version 1.0, 2017-09-26.
1 In German: Die Deutsche Kreditwirtschaft
CC Document 147 1.1
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Annex: Consideration of additional Requirements by the GBIC Approval Scheme
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
Regarding requirement 2:
This requirement implements the authentication aspects of the chip against the external world and vice
versa, which is covered by following packages taken from the PP [9]:
 FIA_API “Authentication of the Security IC“,
 “Package 2: Loader dedicated for usage by authorized users only” and additionally the TOE implements
the
 “Package 1: Loader dedicated for usage in secured environment only” of the PP [9].
The rational shows that all GBIC specific requirements are met by the TOE.
Note for the additional objectives for GBIC respectively DK
 The requirement for sufficient entropy requires the presence of dedicated device and process in order to
provide evidence that the key Kchip has been generated appropriately. As the key Kchip is generated by a
dedicated hardware security module (HSM) with appropriate certification this requirement is fulfilled.
 The used HSM is certified by:
FIPS 140-2 Consolidated Validation Certificate, consolidated certificate No. 0006. 2011/06/30, by the
National Institute of Standards and Technology of the United States of America and the
Communications Security Establishment of the Government of Canada.
 The additional requirements imply the presence of a dedicated GBIC process with additional protection
means for the key handling and management after its generation in the HSM. Infineon Technologies has
implemented a dedicated process with role separation, access protection, transport protection during the
internal different instances and implements a separate specific process for protected delivery of the key Kchip
to the user.
 The GBIC requirement 2 is covered by the flash loader package 1 of PP [9] as justified in section 5.3.
Additional requirements issued by the general GBIC directive in September 2016
The related directive with file number 80-11 affects the software vendors respectively personalization step and
implements specific requirements. The rational is given by the fact that it can occur that an exclusively contact
based product, deemed for LCCS of MF for SECCOS ICC and ICC products referring to SECCOS 7, is based on a
dual interface controller. Since not all contact-based-only applications block the access to the contactless
interface, specific requirements are set immediately effective.
These requirements affect user software developers and the product personalization only and thus they are not
repeated here.
Anyhow, the given requirements target the complete disabling of the contactless interfaces if the product is used
contact based only and define the specific configuration of the LCCS-Byte of the MF with the hexadecimal value
“35” for those contact based products, referring on SECCOS ICC and ICC products for SECCOS 7.
When using this TOE, the user can easily follow these requirements since this dual interface controller can
permanently block the contactless interface by user applicable configuration means. And, in addition, dedicated
product derivatives are available by order option coming with the contact based interface only.
CC Document 148 1.1
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Hash Signatures of Cryptographic Libraries
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
11 Hash Signatures of Cryptographic Libraries
Following listings document the hash signatures of the respective optional cryptographic library software
version. For convenience purpose several hash algorithms were used.
11.1 ACL - RSA, EC,ToolboxVersion v2.07.003
Cl52-LIB-base-XSMALL-HUGE.lib:
MD5 fe199c3d6b8e01e9300f691acf9e0075
SHA-1 f07c984adbb384398ccab1978b0f1668d63e68e7
SHA-256 44772e8c9c3b48b6bde447dae82c2c0edfb77290e20197dd5e0ffc2e3f8e2986
Cl52-LIB-ecc-XSMALL-HUGE.lib:
MD5 a03744bc9fdd2fc4dd539c596a819e19
SHA-1 a9d8caaa001e997fafa2db6f19a3ba7e711b2f0f
SHA-256 afdabf071d78e9050a66d36001aaf419aeba43fa9a1d0ea6d3808b16172a2ed2
Cl52-LIB-2k-XSMALL-HUGE.lib:
MD5 20dbb4ae6aa7a6d71325934a80844ca2
SHA-1 9aebb94a560ea9bf1e1598382922ca2419932492
SHA-256 245ba379f76c89257c8a513e66d5c717e35f53333f904b43ee9a8a69d76c0fc0
Cl52-LIB-4k-XSMALL-HUGE.lib:
MD5 92eca33b51b33728383e1fe92d3d279e
SHA-1 56438e742cff29345271fe9c91b572c30cf9fbeb
SHA-256 046847acf2c766290df8f8b176d163521205e50f8f3ea704f745991cf8c4f0af
Cl52-LIB-toolbox-XSMALL-HUGE.lib:
MD5 cc6f403b6654458ff9f9b69f9dd0243c
SHA-1 8a07735b9c5570dbcab1f151e6f28a48b7a3957b
SHA-256 2d376496eed7afe19a0289a487d20b0d8621a1b1f820bda5842cdb3f51d5b067
CC Document 149 1.1
2018-07-20
Hash Signatures of Cryptographic Libraries
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
11.2 ACL - RSA, EC,ToolboxVersion v2.06.003:
Cl52-LIB-base-XSMALL-HUGE.lib:
MD5 165554e1b2c2a3918fedd4ccaf4756ef
SHA-1 6a47aeba0840a29b9dcf8e09b1662d9e110767c4
SHA-256 e172936204dc4d2a3b79bb27a915017f7b5c49366b8333a7b19d0345aff3c9d8
Cl52-LIB-ecc-XSMALL-HUGE.lib:
MD5 23f70c52fe712ff9f71d1ed7d31e338a
SHA-1 5f52a8802dff6e29c754f71f62b55915efcd293e
SHA-256 3bf8e9d79578c94163dfe7f751e2ebd917adcbadea45338b1cd48f9417907584
Cl52-LIB-2k-XSMALL-HUGE.lib:
MD5 df1e79efd5a8d8c05f70c68f165e0606
SHA-1 e939a32b841edf991d69e97373afb3ea541f7b09
SHA-256 6d85ee8b56118602a9803cd7d829c55af080f4d96c2c4b014c7df64173f4c564
Cl52-LIB-4k-XSMALL-HUGE.lib:
MD5 747955e3945069be053f001f0c4071cd
SHA-1 e4cbb3ab4371df6de99d21fd5c5a95dd217456bc
SHA-256 cc928ac2c86d342098961a6cb4c74bf229de317ccf73994df719f6d91ad69042
Cl52-LIB-toolbox-XSMALL-HUGE.lib:
MD5 efdf2ced3d3a5e0ed729d6284276ccd0
SHA-1 61995654bdebc4d4a72b80e1ea5729ab437acc1f
SHA-256 0db886bac26b47927e1966d4394fdbb4e72fbd74d1ea1738d7cb7470b7463b96
11.3 SCL– Symmetric Cryptographic LibraryVersion v02.04.002
Cipher.lib:
MD5 869a4fae95080e50cb134b5c1b34ab39
SHA-1 1b575581e0cbdaaa086fb4b282fae30666fc9ab8
SHA-256 c58aa197b7bb6985af4b9e5bbcae0a54abe561b4583e866e504596aa9a99dbe5
MAC.lib:
MD5 f2c4679d135d6d0360c4ba41df61a7bb
SHA-1 dab06d56c47aad509b4e8a20a5f86d779705482a
SHA-256 505c8282ef006ae5963f1a8e5b657c086a9c94176eb3f0b863aa4f857d5c3321
DES.lib:
MD5 d29c627d53cfe0018a13914d4521b015
SHA-1 ed08a9a84b14eeeb3cade8f28c8422981a419d35
SHA-256 cc752a94ccb975a33d22767809e6843edf815a009c3a971161754da62ee9113f
AES.lib:
MD5 835ea07f2c0fc1cdeeae4b0813048d77
SHA-1 48a26e897cf4a6d65379f7db93f2910a7ee8d549
SHA-256 874988aa92fb136fed01e837d2cd14c94f872ebb1d456e7d043c9cecb590dfa3
CC Document 150 1.1
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Hash Signatures of Cryptographic Libraries
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
11.4 SCL– Symmetric Cryptographic LibraryVersion v02.02.010
Scl52-SCP-v4-LIB-cipher-XSMALL-HUGE.lib:
MD5 12e51ffacb08931712c117f57968bde6
SHA-1 83a686cb6c764f28b1b0e40e79ba06653f37ffde
SHA-256 9fabbcc0f4489ecf29f1c911ee942e705c1b5ae957134d0b36ea6ec41fd1608a
Scl52-SCP-v4-LIB-des-XSMALL-HUGE.lib:
MD5 5e91ba71c0508fbfa6c4d22cec6f45b8
SHA-1 6b9e5baa4abb473c284d5b7e778c3127ab57e410
SHA-256 5fe552d6ba052021b4a5ab270e36e4b8d2936e85f049cf26ba8b1fa44a05fcf6
Scl52-SCP-v4-LIB-aes-XSMALL-HUGE.lib:
MD5 8ce6d5a11d0d8825d4ce5a6be58e3d40
SHA-1 4dce11074db7368dab85526586f56ed9fcd12fbb
SHA-256 dbd4011f0282616d33b1df23b39bba278587708ad747a473ee515dca2cdd4ac0
11.5 MCS – Mifare Compatible Software v02.02.3389
MifareOS.LIB:
MD5 23cb0c3341c565e23cdd64bb4134a744
SHA-1 c51972006517d19ac0b943c03a9f9283401acea1
SHA-256 19e93f8fb5f55b6f813c41a26ba3a350203ea339e76af4c0e8f83d5fa7d53672
MifareManagement.LIB:
MD5 aa7516b2659aacda5bd1e9b084e72170
SHA-1 cc1385a92adf0c029c4d2e2c6fd0d099a8d310b4
SHA-256 10738c7d53f4905c4ec5917ebbaa7d330d774dfd04c20eb1a24bf99bed217680
11.6 MCS - Mifare Compatible Software v02.03.3446
MifareOS.LIB:
MD5 d1738ccf4f00a45974f417e19145c11c
SHA-1 6f80254400a98759adf4c7f571fc6fcf4bd1ec0d
SHA-256 df2280daea7d80277a989a4573c8d21fa4aeabf38607abad16e2f9d6f0231055
MifareManagement.LIB:
MD5 d24e7530798c3178b173de6fa72bba46
SHA-1 4b84ea194f4bf9120202b07a0cfe0b6b964f7c23
SHA-256 c6bffee4ae94a1018dcc6985eba84a0cab143fb787148525dc5f9fae4d4bc265
CC Document 151 1.1
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Hash Signatures of Cryptographic Libraries
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
11.7 HSL - Hardware Support Library v03.11.8339
MD5 39183d4e35a7a87006a90ab1d962c65e
SHA-1 623b62fc003acdb0765a3f524bbc055e72e0760a
SHA-256 d54e43f6c977d17a1b4af1bf6fada7325891a31e5a73f124dc0116a90e84ec40
11.8 HSL - Hardware Support Library v02.01.6634
MD5 fce6789dea3d49c0df32c05930ed3ff7
SHA-1 c6d2d3be94fdd539835cf2fb229a4e478a144b8e
SHA-256 12bf22478b88acf16344a970e4a42f5ebc2fe71d85c36a2be4895a1318862114
11.9 HSL - Hardware Support Library v01.22.4346
MD5 57b0eb1f5e54922be46218431da53e4d
SHA-1 3cb599186885e3e167295bf7db583652d9e143b9
SHA-256 f898ac7ad4ba43732ec05e9ab7de752811c2a9553c078b5187ccba8b2a67843b
11.10 CIPURSE™ Cryptographic Library (CCL) in version v02.00.0004
Dual mode library files hash details:
MD5 hash value 30CDE00190AF243ACFE19E6D7BDA0907
SHA1 hash value A74A592FA5EC162C3CA01B038AB77ABD316123AF
SHA256 hash value 921DA4663A0A231152704A46FAB5F567309791585E1C06D6517162F7E45D7742
11.11 CIPURSE™ Cryptographic Library (CCL) in version v2.0.0002
Dual mode library files hash details:
MD5 hash value 80B511A866E9F90D506FC9E0DCB40DE8
SHA1 hash value 071068EE0489CE7B266D4ACF23C71413EA4ECEE7
SHA256 hash value 830A128A050DE6616C496BA353F347196CE0281C4AB4146E251EE9A2E3DA5356
CC Document 152 1.1
2018-07-20
List of Abbreviations
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
12 List of Abbreviations
ACL Asymmetric Cryptographic Library
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS31 Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zu ITSEC und CC: Funktionalitätsklassen
und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
API Application Programming Interface
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
BOS Boot-up Software
BSI German: Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
English: Federal Office for Information Security
CC Common Criteria
CI Chip Identification Mode (BOS-CI)
CIM Chip Identification Mode (BOS-CI), same as CI
CPU Central Processing Unit
CMAC Cipher-bases Message Authentication Code
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
Crypto2304T Asymmetric Cryptographic Processor
CRT Chinese Remainder Theorem
DES Data Encryption Standard
DPA Differential Power Analysis
DFA Differential Failure Analysis
DTRNG Deterministic Random Number Generator
EC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECC Error Correction Code and Elliptic Curve Cryptography depending on the context
EDC Error Detection Code
SOLID FLASH™ NVM Nonvolatile memory based on flash cell technology
EMA Electromagnetic analysis
FL Flash Loader
Flash SOLID FLASH™ Memory
HW Hardware
HSL Hardware Support Library
IC Integrated Circuit
ICO Internal Clock Oscillator
ID Identification
IMM Interface Management Module
ITP Interrupt and Peripheral Event Channel Controller
I/O Input/Output
IRAM Internal Random Access Memory
ITSEC Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
M Mechanism
MCS Mifare compatible software
CC Document 153 1.1
2018-07-20
List of Abbreviations
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
MED Memory Encryption and Decryption
MMU Memory Management Unit
NVM Non Volatile Memory
O Object
OS Operating system
PEC Peripheral Event Channel
PFD Post Failure Detection Unit
PICC Proximity Integrated Circuit Card (can be of any form factor)
PCD Proximity Coupling Device
PRNG Pseudo Random Number Generator
PROM Programmable Read Only Memory
PTRNG Physical Random Number Generator
RAM Random Access Memory
RFI Radio Frequency Interface
RMS Resource Management System
RNG Random Number Generator
ROM Read Only Memory
RSA Rives-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
SCP Symmetric Cryptographic Processor
SCL Symmetric Cryptographic Library
SF Security Feature
SFR Special Function Register, as well as Security Functional Requirement.
The specific meaning is given in the context
SPA Simple power analysis
SW Software
SO Security objective
T Threat
TM Test Mode (STS)
TOE Target of Evaluation
TRNG True Random Number Generator
TSC TOE Security Functions Control
TSF TOE Security Functionality
UART Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter
UM User Mode (STS)
UMSLC User mode Security Life Control
WDT Watch Dog Timer
XRAM eXtended Random Access Memory
TDES Triple DES Encryption Standard also known as 3DES
CC Document 154 1.1
2018-07-20
Glossary
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
13 Glossary
Application Program/Data Software which implements the actual TOE functionality provided for the
user or the data required for that purpose
Bill-Per-Use Bill-Per-Use concept allowing the user to configure the chips
Central Processing Unit Logic circuitry for digital information processing
Chip Integrated Circuit]
Chip Identification Data Data stored in the SOLID FLASH™ NVM containing the chip type, lot
number (including the production site), die position on wafer and production
week and data stored in the ROM containing the STS version number
Chip Identification Mode Operational status phase of the TOE, in which actions for identifying the
individual chip by transmitting the Chip Identification Data take place
Controller IC with integrated memory, CPU and peripheral devices
Crypto2304T Cryptographic coprocessor for asymmetric cryptographic operations (RSA,
Elliptic Curves)
Cyclic Redundancy Check Process for calculating checksums for error detection
End User Person in contact with a TOE who makes use of its operational capability
Firmware Is software essential to put the chip into operation. The firmware is located
in the ROM and parts of it in the SOLID FLASH™ NVM
Flash Loader Software enabling to download software after delivery
Hardware Physically present part of a functional system (item)
Integrated Circuit Component comprising several electronic circuits implemented in a highly
miniaturized device using semiconductor technology
Internal Random Access Memory RAM integrated in the CPU
Mechanism Logic or algorithm which implements a specific security function in
hardware or software
Memory Encryption and Decryption
Method of encoding/decoding data transfer between CPU and memory
Memory Hardware part containing digital information (binary data)
Microprocessor CPU with peripherals
Object Physical or non-physical part of a system which contains information and is
acted upon by subjects
Operating System Software which implements the basic TOE actions necessary to run the user
application
Programmable Read Only Memory
Non-volatile memory which can be written once and then only permits read
operations
Random Access Memory Volatile memory which permits write and read operations
Random Number Generator Hardware part for generating random numbers
Read Only Memory Non-volatile memory which permits read operations only
Resource Management System Part of the firmware containing SOLID FLASH™ NVM programming
routines, AIS31 test bench etc.
SCP Is the symmetric cryptographic coprocessor for symmetric cryptographic
operations (TDES, AES).
CC Document 155 1.1
2018-07-20
Glossary
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
Security Function Part(s) of the TOE used to implement part(s) of the security objectives
Security Target Description of the intended state for countering threats
Smart Card Is a plastic card in credit card format with built-in chip. Other form factors
are also possible, i.e. if integrated into mobile devices
Software Information (non-physical part of the system) which is required to
implement functionality in conjunction with the hardware (program code)
Subject Entity, generally in the form of a person, who performs actions
Target of Evaluation Product or system which is being subjected to an evaluation
Test Mode Operational status phase of the TOE in which actions to test the TOE
hardware take place
Threat Action or event that might prejudice security
User Mode Operational status phase of the TOE in which actions intended for the user
takes place
CC Document 156 1.1
2018-07-20
Revision History
Confidential Security Target
Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL6 augmented / EAL6+
14 Revision History
Version Description of change
0.1 Initial Version
0.2 Inclusion of comments on GBIC requirements issued to vendors end of September 2016
0.3 Update of asymmetric cryptographic library, update of ANSI X9.63 standard reference, removal of
unused standards
0.4 Update of the MCS version
0.5 Update of the ACL user guidance document
0.6 Assurance Continuity Maintenance to include second firmware identifier as alternative, correction in
table 7.1.4.1
0.7 Inclusion of further optional and alternative software packages HSL, SCL, ACL and CIPURSE™
Cryptographic Library, update of standard reference [38], update of lower border RSA key length,
update wording in chapter 10 (GBIC annex); update of user guidance reference (CCL), update of
cryptographic table and declaration with footnotes in chapter 7.1.4.
0.8 Inclusion of further library alternatives, additional CMAC functionality of the SCL, user guidance
documents and standard reference update, removal of summarizing cryptographic table from
chapter 7.1.4.1 as this is now part of the certification report by BSI, typo correction; update of ACL
user guidance in chapter 9, literature and references
0.9 Updated reference [6]
1.0 Corrected FW ID, new HSL version
1.1 Hash value correction, update of user guidance chapter 9, editorial changes, additional wording at
FCS_CKM.1/RSA on BSI request, wording changed, update of HSL user guidance reference, added
additional Flash Loader information at chapters 5.8, 7.2 and 7.4.1.3
All referenced product or service names and trademarks are the property of their respective owners.
Edition 2018-07-20
Published by
Infineon Technologies AG
81726 Munich, Germany
© 2018 Infineon Technologies AG.
All Rights Reserved.
Do you have a question about this
document?
Email: erratum@infineon.com
Document reference
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