National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for the
CACI Archon OS v3.0.0.2
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11429-2024
Dated: July 12, 2024
Version: 0.2
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, SUITE: 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6982
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Chris Thorpe
Clare Parran
Linda Morrison
Lisa Mitchell
Lori Sarem
Randy Heimann
The MITRE Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Fathi Nasraoui
Chaitanya Muzumdar
Snehal Gaonkar
Theo Ajibade
Intertek Acumen Security, LLC
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary .......................................................................................................... 5
2 Identification.................................................................................................................... 6
3 Architectural Information................................................................................................. 7
3.1 TOE overview ........................................................................................................................................ 7
3.2 Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................................................ 7
3.3 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................................................... 7
3.4 TOE’s Excluded Functionality ................................................................................................................. 8
4 Security Policy .................................................................................................................. 9
4.1 Security Audit........................................................................................................................................ 9
4.2 Cryptographic Support........................................................................................................................... 9
4.3 User Data Protection ............................................................................................................................. 9
4.4 Identification and Authentication .......................................................................................................... 9
4.5 Security Management...........................................................................................................................10
4.6 TOE Access ...........................................................................................................................................10
4.7 Protection of the TSF ............................................................................................................................10
4.8 Trusted Path/Channels .........................................................................................................................10
5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope................................................................ 11
5.1 Assumptions.........................................................................................................................................11
5.2 Threats.................................................................................................................................................11
5.3 Clarification of Scope............................................................................................................................12
6 Documentation .............................................................................................................. 13
7 Conformance Claims....................................................................................................... 14
7.1 CC Conformance Claims ........................................................................................................................14
7.2 Protection Profile Conformance............................................................................................................14
7.3 Conformance Rationale ........................................................................................................................14
7.3.1 Technical Decisions ....................................................................................................................................14
8 IT Product Testing........................................................................................................... 17
8.1 Developer Testing.................................................................................................................................17
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ..................................................................................................17
9 Results of the Evaluation................................................................................................ 18
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target ................................................................................................................18
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation..........................................................................................18
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents.......................................................................................................18
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities.............................................................................................19
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity........................................................................19
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity .........................................................................................................19
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results.............................................................................................................21
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10 Validator Comments & Recommendations..................................................................... 22
11 Annexes.......................................................................................................................... 23
12 Security Target ............................................................................................................... 24
13 Glossary.......................................................................................................................... 25
14 Bibliography ................................................................................................................... 26
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1 Executive Summary
This Validation Report (VR) is intended to assist the end user of this product and any security certification
Agent for that end user in determining the suitability of this Information Technology (IT) product for their
environment. End users should review the Security Target (ST), which is where specific security claims are
made, in conjunction with this VR, which describes how those security claims were tested and evaluated
and any restrictions on the evaluated configuration. Prospective users should carefully read the
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope in Section 5 and the Validator Comments in Section 10, where any
restrictions on the evaluated configuration are highlighted.
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of the
evaluation of the CACI Archon OS v3.0.0.2 Target of Evaluation (TOE). It presents the evaluation results,
their justifications, and the conformance results. This VR is not an endorsement of the TOE by any agency
of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the TOE is either expressed or implied. This VR applies only
to the specific version and configuration of the product as evaluated and documented in the ST.
The evaluation was completed by Acumen Security in July 2024. The information in this report is largely
derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test report, all written by Acumen
Security. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part
3 Extended and meets the assurance requirements of the Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating
Systems, Version 4.3, 27 September 2022 and Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS),
Version 1.1, 01 March 2019.
The TOE identified in this VR has been evaluated at a NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5) for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5), as interpreted by the Assurance Activities
contained in the Protection Profile (PP). This VR applies only to the specific version of the TOE as
evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common
Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the ETR are
consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes and reviewed the
individual work units documented in the ETR and the Assurance Activities Report (AAR). The validation
team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all the functional requirements and
assurance requirements stated in the ST. Based on these findings, the validation team concludes that the
testing laboratory's findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are
correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the evidence produced.
6
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations.
Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories called
Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs). CCTLs evaluate products against PPs containing Assurance
Activities, which are interpretations of Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM) work units specific to the
technology described by the PP.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and consistency across
evaluations. Developers of IT products desiring a security evaluation contract with CCTL and pay a fee for
their product's evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP's
Product Compliant List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile(s) to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Archon OS v3.0.0.2
Protection Profile Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems, Version 4.3, 27
September 2022.
Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 01 March 2019.
Security Target CACI Archon OS v3.0.0.2 Security Target v1.5
Evaluation
Technical Report
Evaluation Technical Report for CACI Archon OS v3.0.0.2
CC Version Version 3.1, Revision 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 Extended and CC Part 3 Extended
Sponsor CACI
Developer CACI
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Intertek Acumen Security
Rockville, MD
CCEVS Validators Randy Heimann: Lead Validator
Clare Parran: Lead Validator
Chris Thorpe: Senior Validator
Linda Morrison: Validator
Lisa Mitchell: Validator
Lori Sarem: Validator
7
3 Architectural Information
3.1 TOE overview
Archon OS is an operating system (OS) based on Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) v8.10 that supports
multiple users, user permissions, access controls, and cryptographic functionality.
Archon OS is an ostree-based packaging of Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL), tailored for deployment on
End User Devices (EUDs) specifically designed for Commercial Solutions for Classified (CSfC) solutions.
The Archon OS ostree incorporates unmodified versions of the RHEL RPMs. Archon OS is curated to
incorporate solely the essential OS options and applications pertinent to EUD functionality, with non-
applicable components deliberately excluded.
3.2 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is a software TOE and has been evaluated on the following host platforms.
Table 2 – Archon OS v3.0.0.2 Hardware Platforms (EUDs)
Vendor Model CPU
CPU
Microarchitecture
CPU Family
Dell Inc.
Latitude 5400 Intel® Core™ i5-8365U Skylake Whiskey Lake
Latitude 5410 Intel® Core™ i7-10810U Skylake Comet Lake
Latitude 5430 Intel® Core™ i7-1255U Golden Cove Alder Lake
Precision 3260 Intel® Core™ i7-12700 Golden Cove Alder Lake
Precision 3570 Intel® Core™ i7-1255U Golden Cove Alder Lake
Latitude 5440 Intel® Core™ i5-1335U Raptor Cove Raptor Lake
Latitude 5540 Intel® Core™ i5-1335U Raptor Cove Raptor Lake
Precision 3580 Intel® Core™ i5-1350P Raptor Cove Raptor Lake
3.3 Physical Boundaries
The diagram below depicts a representative TOE deployment.
Figure 1: Representative TOE Deployment
The following items are required for the operational environment.
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Table 3: Hardware and Software Environmental Components
Components
Mandatory/
Optional
Description
End User Device
(EUD)
Mandatory The hardware runs the TOE (software). The evaluated systems
are identified in Table 2 above.
Update Server Mandatory Provides the ability to check for TOE software updates TOE as
well as providing signed updates. The TOE communicates with
the Update Server using HTTPS over TLS.
Remote Servers Mandatory Servers that support multiple applications and provide
multiple services.
3.4 TOE’s Excluded Functionality
The following product functionality is not included in the CC evaluation:
• SELinux Mandatory Access Control System
• OS Virtualization Infrastructure
• Containerization infrastructure
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4 Security Policy
The TOE provides the security functions required by Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating
Systems, Version 4.3 (PP_OS_V4.3) and Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version
1.1 (PKG_TLS_V1.1).
4.1 Security Audit
The TOE generates and stores audit events using the Lightweight Audit Framework (LAF). The LAF is
designed to be an audit system making Linux compliant with the requirements from Common Criteria by
intercepting all system calls and retrieving audit log entries from privileged user space applications. The
framework allows configuring the events to be recorded from the set of all events that are possible to
be audited. Each audit record contains the date and time of event, type of event, subject identity, user
identity, and result (success/fail) of the action if applicable.
4.2 Cryptographic Support
The TOE provides a broad range of cryptographic support, providing TLSv1.2 protocol implementation in
addition to individual cryptographic algorithms. The cryptographic services provided by the TOE are
described below and in full detail in Section 6.2 of this document.
The TOE includes the OpenSSL v1.1.1k and the Linux Cryptographic API libraries, and each cryptographic
algorithm has been validated for conformance to the requirements specified in their respective
standards and awarded a CAVP certificate as identified in ST.
The OpenSSL library provides the TLS Client function. The OpenSSL library also provides cryptographic
algorithms for the trusted update and secure boot security functions.
The TOE provides two SP800-90A-compliant DRBG for creation of key components of asymmetric keys
and random number generation. One CTR_DRBG is provided by the OpenSSL cryptographic module in
application space and one HMAC_DRBG is provided by a Cryptographic Kernel API module located in the
Kernel space.
4.3 User Data Protection
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) allows the TOE to assign owners to file system objects and Inter-
Process Communication (IPC) objects. The owners are allowed to modify Unix-type permission bits for
these objects to permit or deny access for other users or groups. The DAC mechanism also ensures that
untrusted users cannot tamper with the TOE mechanisms.
The TOE also implements Portable Operating System Interface (POSIX) Access Control Lists (ACLs) that
allow the specification of the access to individual file system objects down to the granularity of a single
user.
4.4 Identification and Authentication
User identification and authentication in the TOE includes all forms of interactive login (e.g., log in at the
local console) as well as identity changes through the su or sudo commands. These all rely on explicit
authentication information provided interactively by a user.
10
The authentication security function allows password-based authentication.
Password quality enforcement mechanisms are offered by the TOE which are enforced at the time when
the password is changed.
4.5 Security Management
The security management facilities provided by the TOE are usable by authorized users and/or
authorized administrators to modify the configuration of TSF.
4.6 TOE Access
The TOE displays informative banners before users are allowed to establish a session.
4.7 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements self-protection mechanisms that protect the security mechanisms of the TOE as
well as software executed by the TOE. The following kernel-space isolation and TSF self-protection
mechanisms are implemented and enforced (full details are provided in the TSS):
• Address Space Layout Randomization for user space code.
• Kernel and user-space ring-based separation of processes.
• Stack buffer overflow protection using stack canaries.
• Secure Boot ensures that the boot chain up to and including the kernel together with the boot
image (initramfs) is not tampered with.
• Updates to the operating system are only installed after their signatures have been successfully
validated.
• Application Whitelisting restricts execution to known/trusted applications.
4.8 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE supports TLSv1.2 to secure remote communications.
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5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope
5.1 Assumptions
The specific conditions listed in the following subsections are assumed to exist in the TOE’s environment.
These assumptions include both practical realities in the development of the TOE security requirements
and the essential environmental conditions on the use of the TOE.
Table 4: Assumptions
ID Description
A.PLATFORM The OS relies upon a trustworthy computing platform for its
execution. This underlying platform is out of scope of this PP.
A.PROPER_USER The user of the OS is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses the
software in compliance with the applied enterprise security policy.
At the same time, malicious software could act as the user, so
requirements which confine malicious subjects are still in scope.
A.PROPER_ADMIN The administrator of the OS is not careless, willfully negligent or
hostile, and administers the OS within compliance of the applied
enterprise security policy.
5.2 Threats
The following table lists the threats addressed by the TOE and the IT Environment. The assumed level of
expertise of the attacker for all the threats identified below is Enhanced-Basic.
Table 5: Threats
ID Description
T.NETWORK_ATTACK An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or
elsewhere on the network infrastructure. Attackers may engage in
communications with applications and services running on or part
of the OS with the intent of compromise. Engagement may consist
of altering existing legitimate communications.
T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or
elsewhere on the network infrastructure. Attackers may monitor
and gain access to data exchanged between applications and
services that are running on or part of the OS.
T.LOCAL_ATTACK An attacker may compromise applications running on the OS. The
compromised application may provide maliciously formatted input
to the OS through a variety of channels including unprivileged
system calls and messaging via the file system.
T.LIMITED_PHYSICAL_ACCESS An attacker may attempt to access data on the OS while having a
limited amount of time with the physical device.
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5.3 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need clarifying.
This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets the
security claims made, with a certain level of assurance. The level of assurance for this evaluation
is defined within the Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems, Version 4.3, 27
September 2022 and Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 01 March
2019.
• Consistent with the expectations of the PP, this evaluation did not specifically search for, nor
seriously attempt to counter, vulnerabilities that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to
objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily
exploited with a minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
• The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality specified
in the claimed PPs. Any additional security related functional capabilities included in the product
were not covered by this evaluation.
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6 Documentation
The following documents were provided by the vendor with the TOE for evaluation:
• [ST] CACI Archon OS v3.0.0.2 Security Target, Version 1.5, July 4, 2024
• [CCSupl] CACI Archon OS v3.0.0.2 Common Criteria User Guidance v1.2
14
7 Conformance Claims
7.1 CC Conformance Claims
The TOE is conformant to the following:
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluations Part 2, Version 3.1, Revision 5,
April 2017 extended.
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluations Part 3, Version 3.1, Revision 5,
April 2017 extended.
7.2 Protection Profile Conformance
This ST claims exact conformance to the following CC specifications:
• Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems, Version 4.3, 27 September 2022 with
the Strictly Optional SFR, FTA_TAB.1 and the Objective SFR, FPT_SRP_EXT.1 included.
• Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 01 March 2019 with the
following selection based SFRs included.
o FCS_TLSC_EXT.1
o FCS_TLSC_EXT.2
o FCS_TLSC_EXT.4
o FCS_TLSC_EXT.5
7.3 Conformance Rationale
The security requirements in this Security Target are all taken from the Protection Profile and Functional
Package performing only operations defined there. All mandatory SFRs are claimed. The PP_OS_V4.3 and
PKG_TLS_V1.1 Selection-Based SFRs are claimed and are consistent with the selections made in the
mandatory SFRs that prompt their inclusion. The additional SFRs claimed in the ST are identified in section
7.2 above.
7.3.1 Technical Decisions
The following table identifies the NIAP Technical Decisions that apply to the TOE and have been accounted
for in the ST development and the conduct of the evaluation or were considered to be non-applicable.
Table 6: Relevant Technical Decisions
Technical Decision Applicable
(Y/N)
Exclusion Rationale (if applicable) and
Notes
GPOS PP v4.3
TD0839: Clarification for Local Administration in
FTP_TRP.1.3
Yes Modifies FTP_TRP.1.3 SFR, Application
Note, TSS, AGD, and Test.
TD0821: Corrections to ECD for PP_OS_V4.3 Yes
TD0812: Updated CC Conformance Claims in
PP_OS_V4.3
Yes
TD0809: Update to FCS_COP.1/SIGN for CNSA
1.0 compliance with secure Boot Exception
Yes Modifies FCS_COP.1/SIGN SFR, TSS, and
AGD.
Archives TD0727
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Technical Decision Applicable
(Y/N)
Exclusion Rationale (if applicable) and
Notes
TD0789: Correction to TLS Selection in
FIA_X509_EXT.2.1
Yes Modifies FIA_X509_EXT.2.1 SFR and
Test.
Modifies FTP_ITC_EXT.1.1 SFR,
Application Note, and Test.
TD0773: Updates to FIA_X509_EXT.1 for
Exception Processing and Test Conditions
Yes Modifies FIA_X509_EXT.1.1 Application
Note, TSS, and Test.
Archives TD0692
TD0713: Functional Package SFR mappings to
objectives
Yes
TD0712: Support for Bluetooth Standard 5.3 Yes Modifies FCS_CKM.1 SFR, Application
Note, TSS, AGD, and Test.
Modifies FCS_COP.1/ENCRYPT SFR,
Application Note, TSS, and Test.
TD0701: Incomplete selection reference in
FCS_CM_EXT.4 TSS activities
Yes Applies to FCS_CKM_EXT.4 TSS AA.
TD0696: Removal of 160-bit selection from
FCS_COP.1/HASH & FCS_COP.1/KEYMAC
Yes Modifies FCS_COP.1/HASH and
FCS_COP.1.1/KEYHMAC SFRs.
TD0693: Typos in OSPP 4.3 Yes Applies to FMT_MOF_EXT.1 Application
Note, FMT_SMF_EXT.1 Application
Note, and FMT_SMF_EXT.1 Application
Note.
Applies to FAU_GEN.1 Test.
TD0691: OSPP 4.3 Conditional authentication
testing
Yes Applies to FIA_AFL.1 Application Note
and Test.
TD0675: Make FPT_W^X_EXT.1 Optional Yes
TLS Pkg v1.1
TD0779: Updated Session Resumption Support in
TLS package V1.1
Yes The ST does not claim TLS server,
however the TD Archives TD0588 and
therefore applies to this evaluation.
TD0770: TLSS.2 connection with no client cert No The ST does not claim TLS server.
TD0739: PKG_TLS_V1.1 has 2 different
publication dates
Yes The TD modifies FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.3 Test
which doesn’t apply to this evaluation,
but also mentions the two different
dates for PKG_TLS_V1.1 (https and pdf)
and that 03.01.2019 should be used
and therefore the TD applies to this
evaluation.
TD0726: Correction to (D) TLSS SFRs in TLS 1.1
FP
No The ST does not claim TLS or DTLS
server.
TD0513: CA Certificate loading Yes Applies to FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.3 Test.
TD0499: Testing with pinned certificates Yes Applies to FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.2 Test.
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Technical Decision Applicable
(Y/N)
Exclusion Rationale (if applicable) and
Notes
TD0469: Modification of test activity for
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1 test 4.1
No The ST does not claim TLS server.
TD0442: Updated TLS Ciphersuites for TLS
Package
Yes Modifies FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1 SFR.
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8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the evaluation team. It is derived from
information contained in ETR for Archon OS, which is not publicly available. The AAR provides an
overview of testing and the prescribed assurance activities.
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the Assurance Activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according to the vendor-provided guidance documentation
and ran the tests specified in the Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems, Version 4.3,
27 September 2022 and Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 01 March
2019. The Independent Testing activity is documented in the AAR, which is publicly available, and is not
duplicated here.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are presented in
detail in the proprietary documents: the Detailed Test Report (DTR) and the ETR. The reader of this
document can assume that all activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version 3.1 Rev.
(5) and CEM version 3.1 Rev. (5). The evaluation determined the TOE Name to be Part 2 extended, and
meets the SARs contained in the PP. Additionally, the evaluator performed the Assurance Activities
specified in the claimed PP.
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST contains a
description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of security
requirements claimed to be met by the Archon OS that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and
product security function descriptions that support the requirements. Additionally, the evaluator
performed an assessment of the Assurance Activities specified in the Protection Profile for General
Purpose Operating Systems, Version 4.3, 27 September 2022 and Functional Package for Transport
Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 01 March 2019.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team
was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the design
documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the security
functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained in the ST's TOE
Summary Specification. Additionally, the evaluator performed the Assurance Activities specified in the
Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems, Version 4.3, 27 September 2022 and
Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 01 March 2019 related to the
examination of the information contained in the TOE Summary Specification.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was
justified.
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the adequacy
of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the evaluation team
ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to securely administer the TOE.
The guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of the evaluation to ensure they were
19
complete. Additionally, the evaluator performed the Assurance Activities specified in the Protection
Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems, Version 4.3, 27 September 2022 and Functional Package
for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 01 March 2019 related to the examination of the
information contained in the operational guidance documents.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was
justified.
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the TOE was
identified.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team
was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of tests
specified by the Assurance Activities in the Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems,
Version 4.3, 27 September 2022 and Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1,
01 March 2019 and recorded the results in a Test Report, summarized in the ETR and AAR.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence was
provided by the evaluation team to show that the evaluation activities addressed the test activities in the
Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems, Version 4.3, 27 September 2022 and Functional
Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 01 March 2019, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 AVA CEM work unit. The evaluation team performed a public
search for vulnerabilities, performed vulnerability testing and did not discover any issues with the TOE.
• The evaluator examined sources of publicly available information to identify potential
vulnerabilities in the TOE. The sources examined are as follows:
• https://nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln.search
• http://cve.mitre.org/cve
• https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-search.php
• https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/search/
• www.exploitsearch.net
• www.securiteam.com
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• http://nessus.org/plugins/index.php?view=search
• http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories
• https://www.exploit-db.com
• https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities
The evaluator examined public domain vulnerability searches by performing a keyword
search. The terms used for this search were based on the vendor’s name, product name, and
key platform features leveraged by the product. As a result, the evaluator performed a search
using the following keywords:
• CACI
• archon-os
• archon
• Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.10
• aide-0.16-14.el8_5.1s
• TLSV1.2
• audit-libs-3.1.2-1.el8
• chrony-4.5-1.el8
• cryptsetup-libs-2.3.7-7.el8
• curl-7.61.1-34.el8
• dnf-4.7.0-20.el8
• fapolicyd-1.3.2-1.el8
• firewalld-0.9.11-4.el8
• gpgme-1.13.1-12.el8
• grub2-common-2.02-156.el8
• gnutls-3.6.16-8.el8_9.3
• gzip-1.9-13.el8_5
• iptables-1.8.5-11.el8_9
• kernel-4.18.0-533.el8_10
• libcap-2.48-6.el8_9.
• libcap-ng-0.7.11-1.el8
• libpcap-1.9.1-5.el8
• openldap-2.4.46-18.el8
• openssh-8.0p1-24.el8.
• openssl-1.1.1k-12.el8_9.
• ostree-libs-2022.2-8.el8.
• pam-1.3.1-33.el8.x86_64
• polkit-0.115-15.el8_10.2.
• rpm-4.14.3-31.el8.x86_64
• rsyslog-8.2102.0-15.el8.
• sudo-1.9.5p2-1.el8_9.
• tar-1.30-9.el8
• xz-5.2.4-4.el8_6
• zlib-1.2.11-25.el8
21
The vulnerability search was performed on 06/17/2024.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation addressed the
vulnerability analysis Assurance Activities in the Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems,
Version 4.3, 27 September 2022 and Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1,
01 March 2019, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in the ST are
met. Additionally, the evaluation team's test activities also demonstrated the accuracy of the claims in the
ST.
The validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it demonstrates
that the evaluation team performed the Assurance Activities in the Protection Profile for General Purpose
Operating Systems, Version 4.3, 27 September 2022 and Functional Package for Transport Layer Security
(TLS), Version 1.1, 01 March 2019, and correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
22
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations
The Validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE
being configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in the documentation referenced in
Section 6 of this report. Consumers are encouraged to download the configuration guide from the NIAP
website to ensure the device is configured as evaluated. Any additional customer documentation
provided with the product, or that is available online, was not included in the scope of the evaluation
and should not be relied upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements specified in the
ST. Other functionality included with the product, or within the operational environment, was not
assessed as part of this evaluation and no further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
This functionality and its impact on the product when deployed in the operational environment needs to
be assessed separately in the context of the larger architecture that the product is a part of. No versions
of the TOE models or Firmware versions, either earlier or later, were evaluated.
23
11 Annexes
Not applicable.
24
12 Security Target
[ST] CACI Archon OS v3.0.0.2 Security Target, Version 1.5, July 4, 2024.
25
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility accredited by the
National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the CCEVS
Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given implementation is
correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the Common
Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made are justified; or
the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using the Common Evaluation
Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent, technically sound and hence
suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or developer
by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an IT product,
and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation under the CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue of a
Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation and for
overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme.
26
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
1. CACI Archon OS v3.0.0.2 Common Criteria User Guidance, Version 1.2.
2. CACI Archon OS v3.0.0.2 Security Target, Version 1.5.
3. Assurance Activity Report for CACI Archon OS v3.0.0.2, v1.6.
4. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 1: Introduction and
general model, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
5. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 2: Security functional
requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
6. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 3: Security assurance
requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
7. Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5.
8. Equivalency Analysis for CACI Archon OS v3.0.0.2, v2.2.
9. Evaluation Technical Report for CACI Archon OS v3.0.0.2, v1.4.
10. Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 01 March 2019.
11. Product Compliant List Entry, CACI Archon OS v3.0.0.2
12. Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems, Version 4.3, 27 September 2022.
13. Test Report for CACI Archon OS v3.0.0.2 running on Dell Latitude 5410, Version 1.5
14. Test Report for CACI Archon OS v3.0.0.2 running on Dell Latitude 5430, Version 1.5
15. Validation Report for CACI Archon OS v3.0.0.2
16. Vulnerability Assessment for CACI Archon OS v3.0.0.2, v1.5