TÃœV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
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NL-6827 AV Arnhem
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info@nl.tuv.com
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TÃœV Rheinland Nederland B.V. is a
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Version
2022-01
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Certification Report
MediaTek Trusted Execution Environment (M-TEE)
hypervisor isolation platform v.1.0
Sponsor and developer: MediaTek Inc.
No.1, Dusing 1
st
Rd., Hsinchu Science Park
Hsinchu, 30078
Taiwan
Evaluation facility: Riscure B.V.
Delftechpark 49
2628 XJ Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-0486650-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: 0486650
Author(s): Jordi Mujal
Date: 02 January 2023
Number of pages: 12
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 7
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 7
2.3.1 Assumptions 7
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 7
2.4 Architectural Information 7
2.5 Documentation 8
2.6 IT Product Testing 8
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 8
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 8
2.6.3 Test configuration 9
2.6.4 Test results 9
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 9
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 9
2.9 Evaluation Results 9
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 9
3 Security Target 11
4 Definitions 11
5 Bibliography 12
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÃœV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÃœV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÃœV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÃœV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
The presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the
MediaTek Trusted Execution Environment (M-TEE) hypervisor isolation platform v.1.0. The developer
of the MediaTek Trusted Execution Environment (M-TEE) hypervisor isolation platform v.1.0 is
MediaTek Inc. located in Hsinchu, Taiwan and they also act as the sponsor of the evaluation and
certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the
suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The TOE is the MediaTek Trusted Execution Environment (M-TEE) Hypervisor isolation platform. It
supports the execution of MediaTek hypervisor applications (HAs) in Trusty VM, in a secured manner
isolated from any applications running in REE, between them (isolating different HAs in Trusty) and
isolated from the REE operating system. The TOE is integrated into a system-on-chip (SoC) and
utilizes the underlying hardware platform of the SoC.
The TOE allows HAs to be loaded and installed post-issuance (in the OEM phase of the M-TEE-
enabled device, not in the scope) and offers isolation between virtual domains (between REE and
Trusty VM, between REE and Nebula VM, and between Trusty VM and Nebula VM) and access
control between the components between Trusty HAs and those elements they attempt to access,
according to the isolation mechanism.
This TOE is critically dependent on the operational environment to provide countermeasures against
specific attacks, as described in the objectives for the environment specified in [ST] section 4.2 and
the related guidance Mediatek Trusted Execution Environment (M-TEE) AGD_PRE section 3. As such
it is vital that meticulous adherence to the user guidance of both the software and the hardware
portions of the TOE environment are maintained.
The TOE has been evaluated by Riscure B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands. The evaluation was
completed on 02 January 2023 with the approval of the ETR. The certification procedure has been
conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of
IT Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the MediaTek Trusted Execution Environment (M-
TEE) hypervisor isolation platform v.1.0, the security requirements, and the level of confidence
(evaluation assurance level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements.
Consumers of the MediaTek Trusted Execution Environment (M-TEE) hypervisor isolation platform
v.1.0 are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the security target, and to give
due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR]
1
for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL3 augmented (EAL3+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_FLR.1 (Basic Flaw Remediation).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TÃœV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets
all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will
be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the
specific version of the product as evaluated.
1
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the MediaTek Trusted Execution Environment
(M-TEE) hypervisor isolation platform v.1.0 from MediaTek Inc. located in Hsinchu, Taiwan.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Identifier and version Build date
Software
M-TEE Framework mTEE_SDK: 2.2.2.003.S0MP1_GZ
18:07:19
Mar 10 2022
M-TEE Services HA KERNEL_SRV_HA:2.0.001.S0MP1_GZ 18:07:24
Mar 10 2022
Echo HA ECHO_HA:2.0.002.S0MP1_GZ 18:07:28
Mar 10 2022
Testing HA GZ-TEST_HA:2.0.000.S0MP1_GZ 18:07:37
Mar 10 2022
Hardware
Stage 2 MMU in GenieZone
hypervisor
The Stage 2 MMU is identified by the
following SoC models in which it is
integrated:
MT67XX:
ï‚· 6771
ï‚· 6765
ï‚· 6779
ï‚· 6768
ï‚· 6785
ï‚· 6781
ï‚· 6789
MT68XX:
ï‚· 6885
ï‚· 6889
ï‚· 6893
ï‚· 6873
ï‚· 6853
ï‚· 6833
ï‚· 6877
ï‚· 6879
ï‚· 6895
ï‚· 6855
ï‚· 6886
ï‚· 6835
MT69XX:
ï‚· 6983
ï‚· 6985
MT81XX:
ï‚· 8195
MT86XX:
ï‚· 8675
MT87XX:
ï‚· 8768
ï‚· 8771
ï‚· 8781
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ï‚· 8786
ï‚· 8788
ï‚· 8791
ï‚· 8795
ï‚· 8797
ï‚· 8798
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the MediaTek Trusted
Execution Environment (M-TEE) hypervisor isolation platform v.1.0. For details, see section 2.5
“Documentation” of this report.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE security functionalities in the scope of the evaluation that are available in the end user phase
are:
ï‚· Isolation: the TOE ensures the isolation between components in the TOE and:
o Between REE VM and Trusty VM or HAs running in Trusty VM.
o Between REE VM and Nebula VM.
o Between different HAs running in Trusty VM
o Between Nebula VM and Trusty VM
ï‚· Access control to memory and resources: the TOE provides sharing memory mechanisms and
communication between components in a controlled and secure way.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 4.2 of the [ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
Note that the TOE scope and functionality is only related to the Normal World and non-TEE part as it
is defined in the [ST], and it can be seen in the Security Policy in Section 2.2 and the TOE architecture
in section 2.4. The TOE is not involved or has security role in the isolation and security of the TEE.
There are three HAs that are part of the TOE identified in Section 2.1 “Identification of Target of
Evaluation” above. Although they are part of the TOE, in the [ST] there is no security claim on them. In
the same way, although the TOE provides means to load new HAs into the TOE, there is no security
claim regarding this loading mechanism.
2.4 Architectural Information
The following figure depicts the TOE boundary and the main TOE architecture.
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2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version Date
Mediatek Trusted Execution Environment (M-TEE) AGD_OPE v1.1 -
Mediatek Trusted Execution Environment (M-TEE) AGD_PRE v1.1 -
[MTEE] Feature Enabling Quick Guide v1.0 -
Platform Security Solution Manual v2.7a 08/07/2022
M-TEE Development Guide v1.3 12/03/2021
KREE API of M-TEE v1.0 04/10/2021
M-TEE Dynamic Loading HA User Guide v1.0 18/03/2021
Meditatek API Specification v0.1 -
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer has performed extensive testing on functional specification and TSFIs. The testing was
largely automated using industry standard and proprietary test suites. Test scripts were extensively
used to verify that the functions return the expected values.
All the developer ATE tests were repeated by the evaluator. The evaluator did not identify any gaps in
the developer test campaign and no additional tests were performed.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
Considering the security assurance requirements for the AVA_VAN.2 level, the following approach
was considered by the Lab:
ï‚· Collect and review information available in the public domain.
ï‚· Collect and review information and prior work on the security evaluation evidences.
ï‚· Determine viable attack scenarios based on available information.
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ï‚· Select attacks for the penetration testing phase.
The total test effort expended by the evaluators was 4 weeks. During that test campaign, 100% of the
total time was spent on logical tests.
2.6.3 Test configuration
The configuration of the sample used for independent evaluator testing and penetration testing was
the same as described in the [ST]. Specifically, the tests were carried out in one of the SoC versions
described in Section 2.1 “Identification of Target of Evaluation” above (MT6983). The Lab concluded
that the tests and results are equally applicable to the rest of the SoC models with which the TOE is
integrated.
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
There is no reuse of evaluation results in this certification.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number MediaTek Trusted Execution
Environment (M-TEE) hypervisor isolation platform v.1.0.
2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the MediaTek Trusted Execution
Environment (M-TEE) hypervisor isolation platform v.1.0, to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3
conformant, and to meet the requirements of EAL 3 augmented with ALC_FLR.1. This implies that
the product satisfies the security requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE.
This TOE is critically dependent on the operational environment to provide countermeasures against
specific attacks, as described in the objectives for the environment specified in [ST] section 4.2 and
the related guidance Mediatek Trusted Execution Environment (M-TEE) AGD_PRE section 3. As such
it is vital that meticulous adherence to the user guidance of both the software and the hardware
portions of the TOE environment are maintained.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
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The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: none.
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3 Security Target
The Mediatek Trusted Execution Environment (M-TEE) hypervisor isolation platform security target,
version 1.91, 22 December 2022 [ST] is included here by reference.
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
CA Client Application
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
HA Hypervisor Application
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
MMU Memory Management Unit
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer
PP Protection Profile
REE Rich Execution Environment
SoC System on Chip
TEE Trusted Execution Environment
TOE Target of Evaluation
VM Virtual Machine
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and
III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[ETR] ETR for MediaTek Trusted Execution Environment (M-TEE) hypervisor
isolation platform v.1.0, 20210018-D3, version 1.4, 22 December 2022
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.5,
28 March 2019
[ST] Mediatek Trusted Execution Environment (M-TEE) hypervisor isolation platform
security target, version 1.91, 22 December 2022
(This is the end of this report.)