BSI-DSZ-CC-1233-2025
for
Y7 4.3.1:1.2.9 with eHealth Application 1.1.20
from
JDM Payment Solutions SAS
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.49
BSI-DSZ-CC-1233-2025 (*)
eHealth: Smart Card Readers
Y7 4.3.1:1.2.9 with eHealth Application 1.1.20
from JDM Payment Solutions SAS
PP Conformance: Common Criteria Protection Profile Electronic
Health Card Terminal (eHCT), BSI-CC-PP-0032-V3-
2023, 15.12.2022
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 3 augmented by ADV_FSP.4, ADV_IMP.1,
ADV_TDS.3, ALC_TAT.1 and AVA_VAN.4
valid until: 07 July 2030
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408
and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Common Criteria
Bonn, 8 July 2025
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Director-General
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
for components up to
EAL 4
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 87 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1233-2025
This page is intentionally left blank.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1233-2025 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification.....................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication...................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary...................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE............................................................................................13
3. Security Policy...........................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................15
5. Architectural Information............................................................................................15
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................15
7. IT Product Testing......................................................................................................16
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................17
9. Results of the Evaluation...........................................................................................17
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................19
11. Security Target.........................................................................................................20
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................20
13. Definitions................................................................................................................20
14. Bibliography.............................................................................................................22
C. Excerpts from the Criteria.............................................................................................24
D. Annexes........................................................................................................................ 25
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1233-2025
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs 3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat (Federal
Ministry of the Interior and Community)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1233-2025 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of SOGIS-MRA, i.e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 4 components. The evaluation contained the component AVA_VAN.4 that is
not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the SOGIS MRA. For mutual
recognition the EAL 4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat of 12 February 2007 in the
Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1233-2025
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2 and ALC_FLR components.
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Y7 4.3.1:1.2.9 with eHealth Application 1.1.20
has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product Y7 4.3.1:1.2.9 with eHealth Application 1.1.20 was
conducted by SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed
on 25 April 2025. SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: JDM Payment Solutions SAS.
The product was developed by: JDM Payment Solutions SAS.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 8 July 2025
is valid until 7 July 2030. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1233-2025 Certification Report
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product Y7 4.3.1:1.2.9 with eHealth Application 1.1.20 has been included in the BSI
list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
JDM Payment Solutions SAS
2 rue Gallien
F-93400 Saint Ouen-sur-Seine
France
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1233-2025
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1233-2025 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a smart card terminal which fulfils the requirements to
be used with the German electronic Health Card (eHC) and the German Health
Professional Card (HPC) based on the regulations of the German healthcare system. The
terminal is based on a two-chip architecture in which the security processor is used for the
eHealth application.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Common Criteria Protection Profile Electronic Health Card Terminal
(eHCT), BSI-CC-PP-0032-V3-2023, 15.12.2022 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 3
augmented by ADV_FSP.4, ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.3, ALC_TAT.1 and AVA_VAN.4.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of
them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
Cryptographic Support TLS 1.2 is used to authenticate the connection between TOE and all
external systems (Connector, Terminal Management System (TMS), Factory
Key Loading (HSM)).
Cryptographic functionality complies with PKCS#1.
For signature verification for the connection between the TOE and the
Connector, the TOE stores a list of trusted CAs (TSP CA List). This list can
be managed by the TOE administrator.
Firmware, Key and Configuration updates are encrypted using AES-GCM
256.
The SM-KT (Secure Module Kartenterminal) is used for the following
functions:
● Key generation and protection
● Cryptographic functions based on RSA and ECSA for
encryption/decryption and signature creation
● Random number generation
● A function to read out the public key
Zeroisation is used to destroy keys.
A logically distinct communication path is used to connect the TOE to the
TMS. The connection has sole use of its TLS interface.
The firmware is encrypted by AES256 GCM.
User Data Protection (FDP) Administrative access to the TOE is controlled by roles for Direct Access.
Roles are Administrator, Reset Administrator & User. Access is password
controlled with a numeric pass-word that must be a minimum of 8
characters in length and may be up to 12 characters.
Using the Direct Management module, the administrator can perform the
initial pairing process with the connector.
Access to firmware, cryptographic key and CA list management is controlled
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1233-2025
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
through the Direct Management module. The Administrator Role is required.
The TOE checks the authenticity and integrity of all updates. If a firmware,
key or CA list update fails then the update is discarded and the previous
state restored.
There is no read access to PIN, shared secret, management credentials or
secret cryptographic keys via any of the Management Roles including
password and keys.
There is no unauthorized reset to factory defaults implemented by the TOE.
On first start-up and after reset to factory settings the TOE forces the
administrator to specify a password for direct management.
The TOE also ensures that the TOE administrator’s credentials for local
management are set before access to other TOE functionality is possible.
The PIN is stored in the non-volatile memory of the secure processor and
never leaves the TOE in clear text except to smart cards in local card slots.
The Memory Protection Unit access control permission ensures that no
other applications including the payment application can access the PIN.
The PIN digits are never displayed and are replaced by asterisks.
When the application processor is using the display, blue banners are
displayed indicating that it is not safe to enter PIN. When the eHealth
application is running and PIN entry is requested, green banners are
displayed indicating that it is safe to enter PIN.
Connections for the flow of information between the Connector and the TOE
as well as TMS and the TOE are controlled through TLS 1.2.
Exceptionally, the TOE accepts specific SICCT commands at the network
interface even if the pairing process has not been established and no valid
connector certificate is presented.
All sensitive data (keys, PIN) received from cards or the connector are
deleted immediately after use.
Identification and Authenti-
cation (FIA)
Administrator access to the Direct Management module is controlled by an
error counter of incorrect password entries. The TOE blocks Administrator
access from the third consecutive invalid password entry. This functionality
is an authentication mechanism provided by the eHealth application sub-
system.
User access is defined by role: User, Administrator, Reset Administrator.
Passwords are numeric with a length of at least 8 characters.
There are separate authentication mechanisms for the Direct Management
and SICCT modules. Each have their own error counter. PIN is displayed by
asterisks only. SICCT module access requires TLS mutual authentication.
The Administrator can reset or change a password.
Security Management (FMT) Factory reset and the management of security attributes can only be
handled by authorised administrators via the Direct Management module.
The Direct & User Management modules have three roles – User,
Administrator & Reset Administrator (with different access rights).
Protection of the TSF (FPT) If a firmware, key, TSP CA List or configuration update fails then the update
is discarded and the previous state restored.
All parts of the TOE lie within the same device and do not comprise
physically separated parts.
The TSF uses active detection to determine whether physical tampering
with the TSF's devices or TSF's elements has occurred. For this purpose,
opening switches, pogo pins and wire mesh layers are used. Drilling
through the casing, opening the casing and removing the display will all
trigger a tamper event. All card readers are also covered by wire mesh and
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1233-2025 Certification Report
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
is enclosed in the physical security zone.
In the event of physical or logical tampering, the TOE is set into tamper
mode. This renders the terminal inoperable and is immediately made
evident to the user on the secure display. Tampered terminals are returned
to the manufacturing facility where they are taken out of service and the
security processor is destroyed.
The TSF runs a suite of self-tests during initial start-up, every 24 hours and
on user request. The integrity of the Firmware is checked and if it does not
pass then the TOE will go into Tamper mode and become inoperable.
TOE Access (FTA) The secure state of the TOE is indicated by the use of banners and pop ups
on the display. When not in a secure state, blue banners and pop ups
display the message “Do not enter your PIN”. Green banners and pop ups
indicate when the TOE is in a secure state.
Trusted path/channels (FTP) The TOE follows the specification detailed in PP-0032-V3-2023, Version
3.8, 15.12.2022 for the authentication of the connector by the TOE. This
includes certificate / signature verification and TLS authentication.
The TOE establishes a Trusted Channel from the secure processor to the
connector. The SICCT protocol over TLS 1.2 with mutual authentication is
used to secure the channel.
A logically distinct communication path is used to connect the TOE to the
TMS for update management. The connection has sole use of its TLS
interface.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapters 3.5, 3.3 and 3.4.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Y7 4.3.1:1.2.9 with eHealth Application 1.1.20
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1233-2025
No Type Identifier Form of Delivery
1. HW/
SW
Y7 4.3.1:1.2.9 with eHealth Application 1.1.20
The Y7 card terminal consists of:
● HW Rev. 4.3.1
● yOS 1.2.9
● eHealth Application 1.1.20
● FPGA 1.1.12
The Y7 card terminal (based on the
regulations of the German healthcare
system) is delivered in a tamper
evident sealed box.
2. DOC Y7 Operational User Guidance and Preparative
Procedures, Version 0.0.2, 09.08.2024
SHA256-value:
7896ff06dde1e2e1c82a26302192105f5ca99108faa
0f1f14b43358930c7337f
The User Guide is sent by email in
PDF format. The sending email uses
an S/MIME certificate signed by a
trusted CA.
3. DOC Y7 User Guidance, Version 1.12, 04.03.2025
SHA256-value:
a9b587644777f2eb29976a650d0e3680e5521eb9ed
188493cfa1c67fe586d436
4. DOC Y7 Sealing Guide, AA-001606 Y7 – Siegelaufkleber
v1 (ID 6849).docx
SHA256-value:
36bcf425f30d6c5143fec8144a23cec94c1b7626a1fd
f4efa66b2c49fae7f010
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
On the back of the terminal an identification label for hardware identification can be found.
The identification is structured as follows:
● Model: This is the model identifier. It should always be Y7.
● REV: This is the version number of the terminal.
● P/N: This is the part number of the terminal. This is used internally by JDM to manage
the production of terminals.
● S/N: This is the serial number of the terminal. Every terminal has a unique serial
number. This number must match the number on the delivery note. If not then the
terminal must be returned to JDM.
Identification of hardware and firmware version of the Y7 is provided in Android / Settings /
About Tablet. At the end of the list Board Part Number and Board Serial Numbers can be
found. These numbers must be identical to the P/N and S/N on the identification label.
Identification of the eHealth application is found in the eHealth App in the menu item
“Selbstauskunft” (Self-Information).
Further details about identification of the TOE and the non-TOE-parts are provided in [10]
[a], chapters 3.1 and 3.2.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
● Cryptographic Support
● User Data Protection
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1233-2025 Certification Report
● Identification and Authentication
● Security Management
● Protection of the TSF
● TOE Access
● Trusted path/channels
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance: OE.ENV, OE.ADMIN, OE.CONNECTOR, OE.SM, OE.PUSH_SERVER and
OE.ID000_CARDS. Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) described in this report is a smart card terminal which
fulfils the requirements to be used with the German electronic Health Card (eHC) and the
German Health Professional Card (HPC) based on the regulations of the German
healthcare system. Please refer to [11] for further information about card compatibility. The
TOE fulfils the requirements to be used as a secure PIN pad entry device for applications
according to [11], which specifically means that a PIN, which has been entered by a user
at the TOE, never leaves the TOE in clear text, except to smart cards in local card slots.
This chapter gives an overview of the subsystems of the TOE and the corresponding TSF
which were objects of this evaluation. The security functions of the TOE are:
● Access to one or more slots for smart cards,
● Secure network connectivity,
● Secure PIN entry functionality,
● Enforcement of the encryption of communication,
● User authentication,
● Management including update of Firmware, and
● Active physical protection.
According to the TOE Design these security functions are enforced by the following four
subsystems: Secure Hardware, OS Layer, OS Extension Layer and eHealth Application.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1233-2025
7. IT Product Testing
All TOE Security Functions have been tested on a real TOE and the TOE test configuration
has been consistent with the ST. Following methods have been used to confirm
functionality of TSFs:
● automatic tests of all TSFI
● manual tests of all TSFI
● Sourcecode-Reviews
● TLS – and SICCT- Tests
● RPC- Fuzzing
● Additional manual independent tests by the evaluator
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results
Note that the TOE under evaluation used the eHealth Application version 1.1.19. The final
TOE has eHealth Application version 1.1.20. Both versions are identical expect that
version 1.1.20 uses production keys. Therefore, all evaluation results are also valid for
eHealth Application version 1.1.20.
7.1. Developer Tests
Tests are performed on a TOE configuration that resembles a real device as it would be
deployed in the field, but productive keys are replaced by test keys.
In the test environment such real TOE is used and connected to card emulators that are
controlled by the test environment. Since a real TOE is tested interactions with the Display
or the touch screen have to be done manually by the tester.
Some test cases can be performed fully automatically with execution in the test suite and
some test cases need manual performance by the tester. Requirements that are not
directly testable are tested by source code review.
The testing approach of the developer is to test all TSFIs by testing directly all assigned
SFRs. This allows directly addressing the security relevant behaviour of TSFIs as well as
subsystems. For each SFR in the ST [6] one or more dedicated test cases are given, if
applicable. All TSFI are mapped to one or more SFR, and thereby transitively to one or
more test cases, as explained above. Additionally, the developer implemented further test
cases, which are directly derived from the gematik requirements in [11]. This ensures that
beside testing SFR relevant security functionality also a great coverage of general TSFIs
functionality is given. In particular the SICCT interface, interfaces for user interaction
(display, touch screen) as well as card interfaces are addressed by this approach.
Underlying protocols are tested implicitly with each test case. With the SFR approach also
a mapping of test cases to subsystems identified in the TOE design and its interactions is
given.
All test cases were executed successfully and ended up with the expected result or a
reasonable justification for failed test execution was given.
7.2. Independent ITSEF Tests
The independent tests were performed on a TOE as defined in the ST [6].
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The developer provided two test case sets which includes a full coverage of all security
functionality of the TOE. There are test cases checking the appropriate behaviour using
specification compliant parameters for every TSFI defined in the functional specification.
These tests cover each SFR of the TOE the “AFOs” described in the gematik-
specifications. Additional tests developed by the evaluators were executed.
All test cases were executed successfully and ended up with the expected result or a
reasonable justification for failed test execution was given.
The evaluators determined that all tests were executed successfully.
7.3. Penetration Tests
All configurations of the TOE being intended to be covered by the current evaluation were
tested.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential Moderate was actually
successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in the ST [6], provided that all
measures required by the developer are applied.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the configuration of the TOE as described in Table 2 of this report.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 3 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ADV_FSP.4, ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.3, ALC_TAT.1 and AVA_VAN.4
augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Common Criteria Protection Profile Electronic Health Card
Terminal (eHCT), BSI-CC-PP-0032-V3-2023, 15.12.2022 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 3 augmented by ADV_FSP.4, ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.3,
ALC_TAT.1 and AVA_VAN.4
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
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9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The following table gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to
enforce the security policy and outlines the standard of application where its specific
appropriateness is stated.
No. Purpose Cryptographic Mechanism Standard of
Implementation
Keylength in
Bits
Standard
of
Applicati
on
Remarks
1. Authentic
ity
Signature verification for TLS
with support of the gSMC-K
RSA signature verification
with encoding RSASSA-PSS
(PKCS#1) using SHA-256
or
ECDSA using the curves
P-256, P-384,
brainpoolP256r1 and
brainpoolP384r1
[RFC 8017]
(PKCS#1)
[FIPS 180-4]
(SHA-256)
[TR-03111]
(ECDSA)
[FIPS-186-4]
(P-256, P-384)
[RFC-7027]
(brainpoolP256r1,
brainpoolP384r1)
For RSA:
2048 bit
For ECDSA:
Key length
according to
the used
curve
[12] Kap.
3.3.2
FCS_COP.1.
1/SIG
2. Authentic
ation
Signature generation with
and verification for TLS with
support of the gSMC-K
RSA signature verification
with encoding RSASSA-PSS
(PKCS#1) using SHA-256
or
ECDSA using the curves
P-256, P-384, brain-
poolP256r1 and
brainpoolP384r1
RFC 8017]
(PKCS#1)
[FIPS 180-4]
(SHA-256)
[TR-03111]
(ECDSA)
[FIPS-186-4]
(P-256, P-384)
[RFC-7027]
(brainpoolP256r1,
brainpoolP384r1
For RSA:
2048 bit
For ECDSA:
Key length
according to
the used
curve
[12] Kap.
3.3.2
FCS_COP.1.
1/SIG
3. Key
Agreeme
nt
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
Key Agreement (ECDH) for
TLS
[SEC1] (ECDH),
[RFC 5246] (TLS
v1.2)
Key length
accordinbg to
the used
curves P-
{256,384}
([FIPS 186-
4])
[12] Kap.
3.3.2
FCS_CKM.1
.1/Connector
4. Authentic
ated
Encryptio
n
AES-128 and AES-256 in
GCM Mode for TLS v1.2
[FIPS 197] (AES)
[RFC 3268] (AES-
TLS)
[SP 800-38D]
(GCM)
[RFC 5289] (AES-
GCM-TLS)
[RFC 5116] (AEAD)
128 bit and
256 bit
[12] Kap.
3.3.2
FCS_COP.1.
1/Con_Sym
5. Trusted TLS v1.2 with Cipher Suites [RFC 5246] (TLS - [12] Kap. FCS_CKM.1
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No. Purpose Cryptographic Mechanism Standard of
Implementation
Keylength in
Bits
Standard
of
Applicati
on
Remarks
Channel TLS_ECDHE_RSA_
WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA
256
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_
WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA
384
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WIT
H_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WIT
H_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
v1.2) 3.3.2 .1/Connector
6. Integrity Integrity of Update Packets
ECDSA using the curve
secp384r1
[TR-03111]
(ECDSA)
[FIPS-186-4]
(secp384r1)
Keylength
according to
the used
curve
[11] FCS_COP.1.
1/SIG_FW
(1)
FCS_COP.1.
1/SIG_FW
(2)
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
The strength of the these cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this
certification procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
According to the application standards in the table above, especially the standards issued
by gematik, the algorithms are suitable for the intended purposes listed above. An explicit
validity period is not given.]
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
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11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
ADV Development
AGD Guidance Documents
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
ALC Life-Cycle Support
ARC Security Architecture
ASE Security Target Evaluation
ATE Tests
AVA Vulnerability Assessment
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
eGK Elektronische Gesundheitskarte
eHC Electronic Health Card
eHCT Electronic Health Card Terminal
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
KVK Krankenversichertenkarte
LAN Local Area Network
OSP Organisational Security Policy
PIN Personal Identification Number
PP Protection Profile
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SAC Signature Application Component
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SICCT Secure Interoperable Chip Card Terminal
SMC Security Module Card
SM-KT Security Module Kartenterminal
ST Security Target
TMS Terminal Management System
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
VAN Vulnerability analysis
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1233-2025, Version 0.0.16 11.04.2025, ASE_ST Y7
Security Target for the Evaluation of the Product JDM Y7 of JDM Payment Solutions
SAS according to the Common Criteria 3.1 Level EAL3+ Certification Id: BSI-DSZ-
CC-1233, JDM Payment Solutions SAS
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.4, 17.04.2025, Evaluation Report -
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) -, SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH
[8] Common Criteria Protection Profile Electronic Health Card Terminal (eHCT), BSI-
CC-PP-0032-V3-2023, 15.12.2022, Version 3.8, Federal Office for Information
Security (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik - BSI)
[9] Configuration list for the TOE, CC Configuration Items List, Version 0.0.8, JDM
Payment Solutions SAS (confidential document)
[10] Guidance documentation for the TOE
[a] Y7 Operational User Guidance and Preparative Procedures, Version 0.0.2,
09.08.2024, JDM Payment Solutions SAS
[b] Y7 User Guidance, Version 1.12, 04.03.2025, JDM Payment Solutions SAS
[c] Y7 Sealing Guide, AA-001606 Y7 – Siegelaufkleber v1 (ID 6849).docx, JDM
Payment Solutions SAS
7
specifically
• AIS 1, Version 14, Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema, AIS 1: Durchführung der
Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers
• AIS 14, Version 7, Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema, AIS 14: Anforde-rungen
an Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical Report) für Evaluationen nach CC
(Common Criteria)
• AIS 19, Version 9, Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema, AIS 19: Anforde-rungen
an Aufbau und Inhalt der Zusammenfassung des ETR (Evaluation Technical Report) für
Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria) und ITSEC
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 45, Version 2, Erstellung und Pflege von Meilensteinplänen
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[11] Elektronische Gesundheitskarte und Telematikinfrastruktur, Spezifikation eHealth-
Kartenterminal, Version 3.16.0, Stand 07.07.2023
[12] Elektronische Gesundheitskarte und Telematikinfrastruktur, Übergreifende
Spezifikation, Verwendung kryptographischer Algorithmen in der
Telematikinfrastruktur, Version 2.28.0, 09.06.2023, gematik GmbH
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1233-2025
C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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Note: End of report
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