Date of Issue: 2023/08/23
Copyright Canon Inc. 2022
1
Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX
49945KG/49935KG/49925KG/
4945F/4945i/4945/
4935F/4935i/4935/
4925F/4925i/4925
with Fax & PDL
Security Target
Version 1.07
2023/08/23
Canon Inc.
This document is a translation of the evaluated and certified security target
written in Japanese.
Date of Issue: 2023/08/23
Copyright Canon Inc. 2022
2
Table of Contents
1. ST introduction............................................................................................................................. 5
1.1 ST reference.............................................................................................................................. 5
1.2 TOE reference........................................................................................................................... 5
1.3 TOE overview........................................................................................................................... 6
1.3.1 TOE Type ............................................................................................................................. 6
1.3.2 Usage and Major Security Features of the TOE ................................................................... 6
1.3.3 Required Non-TOE Hardware and Software........................................................................ 6
1.4 TOE description........................................................................................................................ 7
1.4.1 Physical scope of the TOE.................................................................................................... 7
1.4.2 Logical scope of the TOE ................................................................................................... 10
1.5 Terms and Abbreviations........................................................................................................ 12
2. Conformance claims................................................................................................................... 15
2.1 CC Conformance claims......................................................................................................... 15
2.2 PP claim, Package claim......................................................................................................... 15
2.3 SFR Packages ......................................................................................................................... 15
2.4 Conformance rationale............................................................................................................ 15
3. Security Problem Definition....................................................................................................... 16
3.1 TOE Users .............................................................................................................................. 16
3.2 Assets...................................................................................................................................... 16
3.2.1 User Data ............................................................................................................................ 16
3.2.2 TSF Data............................................................................................................................. 16
3.3 Threats .................................................................................................................................... 18
3.4 Organizational Security Policies............................................................................................. 18
3.5 Assumptions ........................................................................................................................... 18
4. Security Objectives..................................................................................................................... 20
4.1 Security Objectives for the Operational environment ............................................................ 20
5. Extended components definition ................................................................................................ 21
5.1 FAU_STG_EXT Extended: External Audit Trail Storage ..................................................... 21
5.2 FCS_CKM_EXT Extended: Cryptographic Key Management.............................................. 21
5.3 FCS_HTTPS_EXT Extended: HTTPS selected..................................................................... 22
5.4 FCS_IPSEC_EXT Extended: IPsec selected.......................................................................... 23
5.5 FCS_KYC_EXT Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Key Chaining)................................. 25
5.6 FCS_RBG_EXT Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation) ................. 25
5.7 FCS_SMC_EXT Extended: Submask Combining ................................................................. 26
5.8 FCS_TLS_EXT Extended: TLS selected ............................................................................... 27
5.9 FDP_DSK_EXT Extended: Protection of Data on Disk ........................................................ 29
5.10 FDP_FXS_EXT Extended: Fax Separation............................................................................ 29
5.11 FIA_PMG_EXT Extended: Password Management .............................................................. 30
5.12 FIA_PSK_EXT Extended: Pre-Shared Key Composition...................................................... 31
5.13 FPT_KYP_EXT Extended: Protection of Key and Key Material .......................................... 32
5.14 FPT_SKP_EXT Extended: Protection of TSF Data............................................................... 33
5.15 FPT_TST_EXT Extended: TSF testing.................................................................................. 33
5.16 FPT_TUD_EXT Extended: Trusted Update........................................................................... 34
6. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS................................................................................................. 36
Date of Issue: 2023/08/23
Copyright Canon Inc. 2022
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6.1 Notation .................................................................................................................................. 36
6.2 Security functional requirements............................................................................................ 36
6.2.1 Class FAU: Security Audit ................................................................................................. 36
6.2.2 Class FCO: Communication ............................................................................................... 38
6.2.3 Class FCS: Cryptographic Support..................................................................................... 38
6.2.4 Class FDP: User Data Protection........................................................................................ 53
6.2.5 Class FIA: Identification and Authentication ..................................................................... 57
6.2.6 Class FMT: Security Management ..................................................................................... 60
6.2.7 Class FPR: Privacy ............................................................................................................. 63
6.2.8 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF ....................................................................................... 63
6.2.9 Class FRU: Resource Utilization........................................................................................ 64
6.2.10 Class FTA: TOE Access..................................................................................................... 64
6.2.11 Class FTP: Trusted Paths/Channels.................................................................................... 65
6.3 Security Assurance Requirements .......................................................................................... 66
6.4 Security functional requirements rationale............................................................................. 67
6.4.1 The dependencies of security requirements........................................................................ 67
7. TOE Summary specification ...................................................................................................... 71
7.1 User Authentication Function................................................................................................. 71
7.2 Access Control Function......................................................................................................... 72
7.2.1 Print process control function............................................................................................. 72
7.2.2 Scan process control function............................................................................................. 74
7.2.3 Copy process control function ............................................................................................ 76
7.2.4 Fax transmission process control........................................................................................ 78
7.2.5 Fax reception process control ............................................................................................. 80
7.2.6 Document store and retrieve process control function........................................................ 82
7.3 PSTN Fax-Network Separation Function............................................................................... 85
7.4 SSD Encryption Function....................................................................................................... 85
7.4.1 Encryption/Decryption Function ........................................................................................ 85
7.4.2 Cryptographic key management function........................................................................... 86
7.5 LAN Data Protection Function............................................................................................... 87
7.5.1 IPSec Encription Function.................................................................................................. 87
7.5.2 IPSec Cryptographic key management Function................................................................ 89
7.5.3 TLS Encription Function .................................................................................................... 91
7.5.4 TLS Cryptographic key management Function.................................................................. 92
7.5.5 DRBG Function.................................................................................................................. 93
7.6 Signature Verification and Generation Function.................................................................... 94
7.6.1 TLS Signature Generation Function................................................................................... 94
7.6.2 IPSec Signature Verification/Generation Function............................................................. 94
7.7 Self-Testing Function ............................................................................................................. 95
7.8 Audit Log Function................................................................................................................. 95
7.9 Trusted Update Function ........................................................................................................ 97
7.10 Management Function ............................................................................................................ 97
7.10.1 User Management Function................................................................................................ 97
7.10.2 Device Management Function............................................................................................ 99
8. References ................................................................................................................................ 102
Date of Issue: 2023/08/23
Copyright Canon Inc. 2022
4
Trademark Notice
- Canon, the Canon logo, imageRUNNER, imageRUNNER ADVANCE, imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX,
imagePRESS, imagePRESSLite are trademarks or registered trademarks of Canon Inc.
- Microsoft, Windows, Windows Server 2022, Windows 10, Microsoft Edge are trademarks or registered
trademarks of Microsoft Corporation in the U.S. and other countries.
- All names of companies and products contained herein are trademarks or registered trademarks of the
respective companies.
Date of Issue: 2023/08/23
Copyright Canon Inc. 2022
5
1. ST introduction
1.1 ST reference
This section provides the Security Target (ST) identification information.
ST name: Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX
49945KG/49935KG/49925KG/4945F/4945i/4945/4935F/4935i/4935/4925F/4925i/4925
with Fax & PDL Security Target
Version: 1.07
Issued by: Canon Inc.
Date of Issue: 2023/08/23
1.2 TOE reference
This section provides the TOE identification information.
TOE name: Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX
49945KG/49935KG/49925KG/4945F/4945i/4945/4935F/4935i/4935/4925F/4925i/4925
with Fax & PDL
Version: 310
This TOE consists of the MFP body, firmware, fax, and page description language processing (see Table 3).
The TOE can be confirmed by the identification information of the manufacturer name, the identification
information of the MFP body, the identification information of the firmware, the identification information
of the fax, and the identification information of the page description language processing shown in Table 1
below.
Table 1 - The identification information of the TOE
Type of identification
information
Identification information
manufacturer name [Canon]
MFP body Any of the following
[imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 49945KG]
[imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 49935KG]
[imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 49925KG]
[imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 4945F]
[imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 4945i]
[imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 4945]
[imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 4935F]
[imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 4935i]
[imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 4935]
[imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 4925F]
[imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 4925i]
[imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 4925]
firmware [310]
fax [Super G3 FAX Board-BH]
Date of Issue: 2023/08/23
Copyright Canon Inc. 2022
6
page description
language processing
[PCL] and [PS]
1.3 TOE overview
1.3.1 TOE Type
The TOE is an MFP having a print function, a scan function, a copy function, a fax function, and a Storage
and retrieval function.
1.3.2 Usage and Major Security Features of the TOE
The TOE is an MFP having a print function, a scan function, a copy function, a fax function, and a Storage
and retrieval function. In order to protect these documents from unauthorized alteration and disclosure, the
TOE has a user authentication function that identifies and authenticates the user, an access control function for
document data and functions based on authority, a PSTN fax-network separation function, an SSD encryption
function of the TOE embedded SSD, a LAN data protection function and a signature verification/generation
function that protect network communications, a self-test function that checks the integrity of TSF execution
codes at startup, an audit log function that monitors the use of the TOE security function and sends the
monitoring results (audit logs) to an audit log server, and stores audit logs internally in the TOE, a reliable
update function that update execution code while confirming authenticity of TOE's upugrade execution code,
and a management function that limits security settings to administrators.
Figure 1 shows the assumed operational environment when using the functions of the TOE.
Figure 1 Operational environment of the TOE
1.3.3 Required Non-TOE Hardware and Software
Date of Issue: 2023/08/23
Copyright Canon Inc. 2022
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The non-TOE hardware and software configurations in Figure 1 are shown below.
1) Time Server
The TOE communicates with SNTP-enabled servers (This operation assumes Windows Server 2022
Standard) to obtain accurate time.
2) Audit Log Server
An external audit log server (This operation assumes SMB servers using Windows Server 2022 Standard) for
storing TOE-generated audit logs. The audit log server obtains the audit log in SMB.
3) Client PC
Generic PC running Windows 10. A user having an account in TOE can send a print job to TOE by installing
and setting a printer driver (In this operation, the printer driver described in Table 2 is assumed.)
corresponding to this TOE. In addition to printing, administrators can access TOE through a web browser
(Microsoft Edge is assumed in this case) to use management capabilities of the TOE.
Table 2 - Printer Driver
Printer Driver
Generic Plus UFRII Printer Driver V2.80
(Japanese name: Generic Plus LIPSLX Printer Driver V2.80)
Generic Plus PS3 Printer Driver V2.80
Generic Plus PCL6 Printer Driver V2.80
4) File Server
Storage space when sending scanned documents with TOE. This operation assumes an SMB server using
Windows Server 2022 Standard.
5) Firewall
A device that protects the internal network to which a TOE connects from unauthorized access from the
Internet environment. This indicates that the environment satisfies the Usage Assumptions A. NETWORK of
this TOE and does not assume any specific product.
6) Fax
To transmit and receive a fax image via TOE and PSTN. Faxes compatible with the G3 standard are
expected.
1.4 TOE description
1.4.1 Physical scope of the TOE
TOE is a digital multifunction device and guidance.
The digital multifunction peripheral constituting the TOE is an MFP body in which the firmware of the
designated Controller Version operates, and has a fax function (in the case of an option, a fax board is
installed) and page description language processing (If optional, purchase PCL option, PS option to enable
PCL/PS feature). As Table 3- Product Line-up , fax board, PCL option, and PS option need to procure the
appropriate options to match the selling name in the selling area.
Table 3 - Product Line-up
Date of Issue: 2023/08/23
Copyright Canon Inc. 2022
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MFP Body
(Controller Version 310)
Sales area fax board
PCL
option1 PS option1
- imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 49945KG
- imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 49935KG
- imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 49925KG
Korea
Super G3
FAX
Board-BH1
PCL
Printer Kit-
CC1
PS Printer
Kit-BG1
- imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 4945F
- imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 4935F
- imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 4925F
Japan
Not
required
(standard
equipment)
ＰＣＬエミュ
レーション
拡張キッ
ト・ＡＳ１
ＰＳ拡張キ
ット・ＢＦ１
- imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 4945i
- imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 4935i
- imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 4925i
Americas
Super G3
FAX
Board-BH1
Not
required
(standard
equipment)
Not
required
(standard
equipment)
Europe/Oceani
a(except
4935i)/Asia/Ta
iwan(except
4925i)
Super G3
FAX
Board-BH1
Not
required
(standard
equipment)
PS Printer
Kit-BG1
- imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 4945
- imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 4935
- imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 4925
Asia/India/
Korea
Super G3
FAX
Board-BH1
PCL
Printer Kit-
CC1
PS Printer
Kit-BG1
*The Korean government model differs from other models in terms of the name of the product. The difference
from similar model names is that there is a "9" in the middle of the four-digit number and KG is added after the
number.
*F: FAX (with fax board/F model). Only F models are sold in Japan.
*i: PDL (optional PDL enabled/i model). The effective PDL depends on the sales area.
A service engineer dispatched from a sales company attaches a fax board to the MFP body, installs firmware
(not directly distributed to consumers) of a designated controller version brought by the service engineer, sets
page description language processing (PCL, PS) to a valid state according to purchased license information
(not directly distributed to consumers), and provides the MFP body to consumers.
Therefore, the delivered item is an MFP body delivered after the above operation, and is identified by each
identification information (MFP front panel [manufacturer name], [MFP Body] and MFP operation panel
[firmware], [page description language processing] and [FAX]) described in Table 4.
Table 4 - The Software/Hardware constituting the TOE
manufacturer
name
MFP Body Firmware
page
description
language
processing
FAX
Canon
imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 49945KG 310 PCL
PS
Super G3 FAX
Board-BH
imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 49935KG
imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 49925KG
imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 4945F
imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 4935F
imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 4925F
1
The purchase of the PCL option/PS option provides an MFP with the PCL/PS processing function of the
firmware enabled. There are no shipments for this option.
Date of Issue: 2023/08/23
Copyright Canon Inc. 2022
9
imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 4945i
imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 4935i
imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 4925i
imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 4945
imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 4935
imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 4925
The following guidance, provided as part of the TOE, is available at the direction of the service engineer.
The guidance will be distributed to TOE consumers in a PDF file via the website (https://oip.manual.canon/).
When accessing the website, select your region of purchase and select the appropriate model of CC certified
product to obtain the guidance below.
(Japanese name)
- imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 4900 シリーズ用 Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices 対応
セキュリティー設定 アドミニストレーターガイド [USRMA-8938-00 20230629]
- imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 4945F / 4935F / 4925F ユーザーズガイド（CC 認証参照用）
[USRMA-8939-00 ]
- imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 4900 シリーズ用 ACCESS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM アドミニ
ストレーターガイド（CC 認証参照用） [USRMA-8940-00 ]
(English name)
- imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 4900 Series Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices adaptive
Security Settings Administrator Guide [USRMA-8941-00 20230629]
- imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 4945i / 4935i / 4925i User’s Guide (for CC certification
reference) [USRMA-8943-00 ] *USE Version
- imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 4900 series ACCESS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM Administrator
Guide (for CC certification reference) [USRMA-8945-00 ] *USE Version
- imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 4945i / 4945 / 4935i / 4935 / 4925i / 4925 User’s Guide (for CC
certification reference) [USRMA-8947-00 ] *APE Version
- imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 4900 series ACCESS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM Administrator
Guide (for CC certification reference) [USRMA-8948-00 ] *:APE Version
Date of Issue: 2023/08/23
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1.4.2 Logical scope of the TOE
The logical scope of the TOE is shown in Figure 2 TOE Logical Boundary (Excluding users, file servers,
audit log servers, client PCs, faxes, and time servers). The security functions of the TOE are shown in color.
Figure 2 TOE Logical Boundary
LAN Data Protection Function
SSD
UI Func
User
Audit Log Server
LAN Data Protection
File Management
Function
File Server
LAN Data Protection
File Share Function
Client PC
LAN Data Protection
Web
Browser
DocData
DocData
Audit Log
Hardcopy
document
Time Server
Time Function
TimeInfo
Output Func
Input Func
Print
Scan Fax
Copy
Storage /
Retrieval
User Authentication Function
Self-Testing Function
Access Control Function PSTN Fax-Network
Separation
SSD Encryption Function
Management Function
Audit Log Function
Signature Verification and
Generation Function
LAN Data Protection
Flow of data
Operate/
Display
Hardcopy
document
Trusted Update
TOE
FAX
Docdata
PSTN
Printer
Driver
TOE has the following digital multifunction machine functions.
– Print function
This function prints an electronic document in a digital composite machine or an electronic document
transmitted from a client PC on paper.
– Scan function
This function transmits an electronic document generated by scanning a paper document to a file server
in TIFF or PDF file format.
– Copy function
This function duplicates a paper document by scanning and printing the paper document.
– Fax function
Fax Transmission function
This function faxes an electronic document generated by scanning a paper document through the PSTN.
Fax Reception function
This function receives an electronic document via the PSTN. When receiving a fax, the file is saved in the
Inbox (system box) without being printed.
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– Document Storage and Retrieval function
Document management function of the advanced box and the system box. A document loaded by a
scanner can be saved as an image in the personal space of the advanced box. You can rename, retrieve
(Print, send (system box documents only)), or delete an electronic document stored in your personal
space or system box.
The TOE has the following general functions.
– UI Function
The ability for the user to operate the TOE using the operation panel, and the ability for the TOE to display
a screen on the operation panel.
It also has a remote UI function for performing TOE operation and management through a network by
browser operation of a client PC.
– Output Function
The ability of the TOE to print paper documents.
– Input Function
The ability of TOE to scan paper documents.
The TOE has the following security functions.
- User Authentication Function
Performs authentication on the user, to prevent any unauthorized access to the TOE. User authentication
requires the user to enter a user name and password when operating from the operation panel or the
remote UI, and confirms that the user is an authenticated user. The user name is authenticated through
the printer driver before accepting a job from the printer driver. Verification of user information supports
internal authentication to authenticate within the TOE. Give the authenticated user the privileges
previously assigned to the user. When authentication is performed, the inputted password character is
displayed by a specific character. It has a function of restricting access by a defined rule when
authentication fails, and a function of automatically logging out when no operation state continues after
authentication.
- Access Control Function
Restrict access to jobs, electronic documents, and features based on role.
- PSTN Fax-Network Separation
To prevent the intrusion into a LAN by limiting the use of a PSTN to a fax function.
- SSD Encryption Function
A TOE built-in SSD is taken away and connected to another body or a PC, and all data stored in the TOE
built-in SSD is encrypted by an encryption chip built in the digital multifunction device body to cope with
the threat of reading data recorded in the SSD. The key used for encryption is generated in the RAM area
of the encryption chip when the power of the TOE is turned on, and is used only in the encryption chip,
and is managed so as not to be taken out to the outside. The encryption key becomes unnecessary and
erased when the power of the TOE is turned off.
- LAN Data Protection Function
To encrypt LAN data by IPSec or TLS as a sniffing countermeasure. IPsec is used when connecting to an
external device and a remote UI, and TLS is also available when an administrator connects to the remote
UI. The pre-shared key and the server private key are encrypted and stored on the TOE embedded SSD
and protected. The key generated during communication is generated in the RAM area of the TOE and is
erased when the power of the TOE is turned off.
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- Signature Verification and Generation Function
It has a function of verifying/generating a digital signature for verifying the integrity of encrypted
communication of LAN data.
- Self-Testing Function
At boot time, verify firmware integrity with signature verification.
- Audit Log Function
An audit log is generated with the user name of the operated user and the set time so that the operation of
the unit and the operation of the user can be audited, and is stored in the TOE built-in SSD. The time is
recorded using the management function or the exact date and time synchronized with the time server.
All saved audit logs can only be browsed by the administrator via the remote UI. However, even an
administrator cannot change the audit log. The audit log is stored in an audit log server using protected
communication. There is a limit on the number of audit logs in the TOE embedded SSD, and if the number
of audit logs exceeds the maximum number of retention, the oldest audit log is deleted and a new audit
log is retained.
- Trusted Update Function
When updating the TOE firmware, it has a function of verifying the firmware by version display or digital
signature in order to confirm that the correct firmware is used.
- Management Function
User management functions for registering and deleting users and roles and device management functions
for properly operating various security functions, both of which are restricted to administrators only
1.5 Terms and Abbreviations
For terms used in this ST that are defined in CC and PP that are claimed to be compliant in Section 2,
Follow the definition. Definitions of other terms are given in Table 5.
Table 5 - Terms and Abbreviations
Terms /
Abbreviations
Description
Multi-Function
Product (MFP)
A machine which incorporates the functionality of multiple devices in one, such
as copier, fax, printer, and Universal Send, and containing a large capacity SSD to
facilitate such capabilities.
Control software Software that runs on the hardware of the device, and controls security functions.
PDL It is a page description language expressing print contents, and there are various
types. The print function converts print data expressed in the corresponding page
description language and prints the generated image on paper.
Control panel One of the hardware elements of the MFP, consisting of a touch panel and
operation keys, which provides the interface for operation of the MFP.
Remote UI An interface that provides access to the MFP from a Web browser via the LAN, to
allow the acquisition of operating status, perform job operations or BOX
operations, and making various settings. This interface is only available to
administrators.
SSD A nonvolatile storage device built into a digital multifunction device. Firmware
and protected assets are stored.
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Terms /
Abbreviations
Description
Roles A user's permission used by the access control function and each user is
associated with one role.
In addition to the predefined default roles, it is possible to create new roles as
custom roles that modify the access restrictions determined by the default roles.
The default role has the following roles
Administrator/Power User/General User/Limited User/Guest User
The Administrator role indicates the permission to use management functions
(administrative permission).
In this ST, a custom role is defined based on the Administrator role to which the
U.ADMIN with the administrative permission and the General User to which the
U.NORMAL without the administrative permission.
Administrator User assigned the Administrator role and has administrative privileges.
Equivalent to U.ADMINISTRATOR defined in the PP.
General user
U.NORMAL as defined in PP. Belong to a custom role that is created from a
General User role and that does not have administrative privileges.
Fax owner
A user who is authorized by the administrator to access the Fax/I-Fax Inbox
among the U.NORMAL defined in PP. Belong to a custom role that is created
from a General User role and that does not have administrative privileges.
Authenticated users
All TOE-authenticated users, including administrators
Jobs When a user uses the functions of the TOE to execute an operation on a
document, a Job is the intended document data combined with the user
instructions for processing those data.
The operations that can be performed on a document are: Scan, Print, Copy, Fax
TX, Store, and Delete. The processing phases for a Job issued by the user are:
generation, execution, and completion.
Image file Image data generated in the MFP by reading, printing, receiving, etc.
Temporaly image file An image file that is generated during a job, such as copy/print, and becomes
unnecessary when the job is completed.
Document data User data processed within the MFP, consisting of image files and print setting.
Mail Box Whether a general user feeds data to the MFP directly, or specifies a document for
printing from a PC, data can be stored here to be printed later.
Advancesd Box To provide an area for storing an electronic document read from a scanner in a
digital multifunction device and capable of printing the stored electronic
document.
There is a private space for each user and a shared space for all users to access.
*This TOE does not use shared space.
Firewall Device or system designed to protect the internal LAN against threats from the
Internet.
Time server Server that uses the Network Time Protocol to provide the accurate time over the
Internet.
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14
Terms /
Abbreviations
Description
File server A file server that uses the SMB protocol to share folders over the LAN and
control file storage and access
Audit log server A server that stores audit log files that TOE outputs over a LAN using the SMB
protocol.
[Print] A button on the control panel that activates the function to operate on-hold print
jobs.
[Copy] A button on the control panel that activates the Copy function.
[Fax] A button on the control panel that activates the Fax function.
[Scan and Send] A button on an operation panel that loads a paper document and activates the
function to send the loaded electronic document to a file server.
[Scan and Store] A button on the control panel that activates the ability to import paper documents
and save them to an advanced box.
[Access Stored Files] A button on the control panel that allows the user to access files stored in a Mail
Box/Inbox.
[Fax/I-Fax Inbox] A button on the operation panel that activates the function for operating electronic
documents saved in the system box where received fax documents are saved.
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2. Conformance claims
2.1 CC Conformance claims
This ST and TOE claim CC compliance with below.
This ST conforms to the following Common Criteria (CC).
- Common Criteria version: Version 3.1 Release 5
- Common Criteria conformance: Part 2 extended and Part 3 conformant
2.2 PP claim, Package claim
This ST and TOE claim exact conformance to the following PP.
- Title: Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices
Version: 1.0 dated September 10, 2015
- Errata: Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices - v1.0 Errata #1, June 2017
2.3 SFR Packages
In this ST, no package claims compliance.
2.4 Conformance rationale
The TOE conforms the following requirements defined in PP and is Exact Conformance as required by PP.
Therefore, the TOE type is consistent with PP.
- Required Uses
Printing, Scanning, Copying, Network communications, Administration
- Conditionally Mandatory Uses
PSTN faxing, Storage and retrieval, Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage
- Optional Uses
Internal Audit Log Storage
Date of Issue: 2023/08/23
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3. Security Problem Definition
3.1 TOE Users
TOE users are defined in the following two user categories.
Table 6 -TOE Users
Designation Category name Definition
U.NORMAL Normal User A User who has been identified and authenticated and does not have
an administrative role
U.ADMIN Administrator A User who has been identified and authenticated and has an
administrative role
3.2 Assets
Two asset classifications are defined for assets.
Table 7 - Assets
Designation Asset category Definition
D.USER User Data Data created by and for Users that do not affect the operation of
the TSF
D.TSF TSF Data Data created by and for the TOE that might affect the operation of
the TSF
3.2.1 User Data
User data are classified into the following two types.
Table 8 - User Data
Designation User Data type Definition
D.USER.DOC User Document Data Information contained in a User's Document, in electronic or
hardcopy form
D.USER.JOB User Job Data Information related to a User's Document or Document
Processing Job
3.2.2 TSF Data
TSF data are classified into the following two types.
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Table 9 - TSF Data
Designation TSF Data type Definition
D.TSF.PROT Protected TSF Data TSF Data for which alteration by a User who is neither the
data owner nor in an Administrator role might affect the
security of the TOE, but for which disclosure is acceptable
D.TSF.CONF Confidential TSF Data TSF Data for which either disclosure or alteration by a User
who is neither the data owner nor in an Administrator role
might affect the security of the TOE
TSF Data handled in this TOE are shown below.
Table 10 - Realization of TSF Data
Type TSF Data Description Stored in
D.TSF.PROT User name User identification information used by the user
identification and authentication function.
SSD
Role Used by access restriction functions to restrict the
functions that each user can use.
SSD
Lockout policy
settings
Settings for the lockout function, such as number
of attempts before lockout and the lockout time.
SSD
Password
policy settings
Policy for the password for user authentication,
such as minimum password length, allowed
characters, and combination of character types.
SSD
Auto Reset
Time setting
Timeout period before a user logged in from the
operation panel or the remote UI is automatically
logged out when the user is idle.
SSD
Date/Time
setting
Specifies the date and time that is set. RTC
IPSec settings Settings for the LAN Data Protection function. SSD
TLS settings Settings for the LAN Data Protection function,
including the settings to enable or disable the LAN
Data Protection function.
SSD
Audit log
export settings
Configuration information for sending audit logs
to external IT equipment
SSD
Time server
setting
for synchronizing TOE time and date with external
IT equipment
SSD
D.TSF.CONF Password Password used to authenticate the user in the User
Identification and Authentication function.
SSD
SSD encryption
key
Encryption key used for SSD encryption function RAM in the
encryption chip
Key Seed The internal state of DRBG and the seed value
used for AES encryption key generation.
FLASH memory
in the encryption
chip
LAN Data
Protection
Encryption Key
Encryption key used for LAN data protection
function.
SSD
Audit log An operational record generated by the audit
logging facility. It includes the date and time, user
name, result, operation contents, etc.
SSD
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3.3 Threats
Show threats in Table 11.
Table 11 - Threats
Designation Definition
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS An attacker may access (read, modify, or delete) User Document Data
or change (modify or delete) User Job Data in the TOE through one
of the TOE's interfaces.
T.TSF_COMPROMISE An attacker may gain Unauthorized Access to TSF Data in the TOE
through one of the TOE's interfaces.
T.TSF_FAILURE A malfunction of the TSF may cause loss of security if the TOE is
permitted to operate.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_UPDATE An attacker may cause the installation of unauthorized software on
the TOE.
T.NET_COMPROMISE An attacker may access data in transit or otherwise compromise the
security of the TOE by monitoring or manipulating
3.4 Organizational Security Policies
Show Organizational Security Policies in Table 12.
Table 12 - Organizational Security Policies
Designation Definition
P.AUTHORIZATION Users must be authorized before performing Document Processing and
administrative functions.
P.AUDIT Security-relevant activities must be audited and the log of such actions
must be protected and transmitted to an External IT Entity.
P.COMMS_PROTECTION The TOE must be able to identify itself to other devices on the LAN.
P.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION If the TOE stores User Document Data or Confidential TSF Data on
Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage Devices, it will encrypt such
data on those devices.
P.KEY_MATERIAL Cleartext keys, submasks, random numbers, or any other values that
contribute to the creation of encryption keys for Field-Replaceable
Nonvolatile Storage of User Document Data or Confidential TSF Data
must be protected from unauthorized access and must not be stored on
that storage device.
P.FAX_FLOW If the TOE provides a PSTN fax function, it will ensure separation
between the PSTN fax line and the LAN.
3.5 Assumptions
Show Assumptions in Table 13.
Table 13 - Assumptions
Assumption Definition
A.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it
stores or processes, is assumed to be provided by the environment.
A.NETWORK The Operational Environment is assumed to protect the TOE from direct,
public access to its LAN interface.
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A.TRUSTED_ADMIN TOE Administrators are trusted to administer the TOE according to site
security policies.
A.TRAINED_USERS Authorized Users are trained to use the TOE according to site security
policies.
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4. Security Objectives
4.1 Security Objectives for the Operational environment
Show Security Objectives for the Operational environment in Table 14.
Table 14 - Security Objectives for the Operational environmenｔ
Designation Definition
OE.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION The Operational Environment shall provide physical security,
commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it stores
or processes.
OE.NETWORK_PROTECTION The Operational Environment shall provide network security to
protect the TOE from direct, public access to its LAN interface.
OE.ADMIN_TRUST The TOE Owner shall establish trust that Administrators will
not use their privileges for malicious purposes.
OE.USER_TRAINING The TOE Owner shall ensure that Users are aware of site
security policies and have the competence to follow them.
OE.ADMIN_TRAINING The TOE Owner shall ensure that Administrators are aware of
site security policies and have the competence to use
manufacturer's guidance to correctly configure the TOE and
protect passwords and keys accordingly.
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5. Extended components definition
This ST defines the following security function requirements. All of these extension components are defined
in the PP specified in Section 2.2.
5.1 FAU_STG_EXT Extended: External Audit Trail Storage
Family behaviour:
This family defines requirements for the TSF to ensure that secure transmission of audit data from TOE to an
External IT Entity.
Component leveling:
FAU_STG_EXT.1External Audit Trail Storage requires the TSF to use a trusted channel implementing a
secure protocol.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
 The TSF shall have the ability to configure the cryptographic functionality.
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included in the
PP/ST:
 There are no auditable events foreseen.
FAU_STG_EXT.1Extended: Protected Audit Trail Storage
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation,
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
FAU_STG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to transmit the generated audit data to an External IT Entity
using a trusted channel according to FTP_ITC.1.
Rationale:
The TSF is required that the transmission of generated audit data to an External IT Entity which relies on a
non-TOE audit server for storage and review of audit records. The storage of these audit records and the
ability to allow the administrator to review these audit records is provided by the Operational Environment in
that case. The Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the transmission of audit data to an
External IT Entity.
This extended component protects the audit records, and it is therefore placed in the FAU class with a single
component.
5.2 FCS_CKM_EXT Extended: Cryptographic Key Management
Family behaviour:
FAU_STG_EXT.1: Extended: External Audit Trail Storage 1
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This family addresses the management aspects of cryptographic keys. Especially, this extended component is
intended for cryptographic key destruction.
Component leveling:
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key Material Destruction ensures not only keys but also key
materials that are no longer needed are destroyed by using an approved method.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
 There are no management actions foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included in the
PP/ST:
 There are no auditable events foreseen.
Rationale:
Cryptographic Key Material Destruction is to ensure the keys and key materials that are no longer needed are
destroyed by using an approved method, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the
Cryptographic Key Material Destruction.
This extended component protects the cryptographic key and key materials against exposure, and it is
therefore placed in the FCS class with a single component.
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material Destruction
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.1(a) Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys), or
FCS_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic key generation (Symmetric Keys)],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1 The TSF shall destroy all plaintext secret and private cryptographic keys and
cryptographic critical security parameters when no longer needed.
Rationale:
Cryptographic Key Material Destruction is to ensure the keys and key materials that are no longer needed are
destroyed by using an approved method, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the
Cryptographic Key Material Destruction.
This extended component protects the cryptographic key and key materials against exposure, and it is therefore
placed in the FCS class with a single component.
5.3 FCS_HTTPS_EXT Extended: HTTPS selected
Family behaviour:
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material Destruction 4
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Components in this family define requirements for protecting remote management sessions between the TOE
and a Security Administrator. This family describes how HTTPS will be implemented. This is a new family
defined for the FCS Class.
Component leveling:
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 HTTPS selected, requires that HTTPS be implemented according to RFC 2818
and supports TLS.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
 There are no management actions foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included in the
PP/ST:
 Failure of HTTPS session establishment
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 Extended: HTTPS selected
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FCS_TLS_EXT.1 Extended: TLS selected
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the HTTPS protocol that complies with RFC 2818.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall implement HTTPS using TLS as specified in FCS_TLS_EXT.1.
Rationale:
HTTPS is one of the secure communication protocols, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable
SFR for the communication protocols using cryptographic algorithms.
This extended component protects the communication data using cryptographic algorithms, and it is
therefore placed in the FCS class with a single component.
5.4 FCS_IPSEC_EXT Extended: IPsec selected
Family behaviour:
This family addresses requirements for protecting communications using IPsec.
Component leveling:
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 IPsec requires that IPsec be implemented as specified.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
 There are no management actions foreseen.
Audit:
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 Extended: HTTPS selected 1
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 Extended: IPsec selected 1
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The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included in the
PP/ST:
 Failure to establish an IPsec SA
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 Extended: IPsec selected
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FIA_PSK_EXT.1 Extended: Pre-Shared Key Composition
FCS_CKM.1(a) Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys)
FCS_COP.1(a) Cryptographic Operation (Symmetric encryption/decryption)
FCS_COP.1(b) Cryptographic Operation (for signature generation/verification)
FCS_COP.1(c) Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)
FCS_COP.1(g) Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message
authentication)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit
Generation)
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the IPsec architecture as specified in RFC 4301.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall implement [selection: tunnel mode, transport mode].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall have a nominal, final entry in the SPD that matches anything that
is otherwise unmatched, and discards it.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall implement the IPsec protocol ESP as defined by RFC 4303 using
[selection: the cryptographic algorithms AES-CBC-128 (as specified by RFC 3602) together with a Secure
Hash Algorithm (SHA)-based HMAC, AES-CBC-256 (as specified by RFC 3602) together with a Secure Hash
Algorithm (SHA)-based HMAC, AES-GCM-128 as specified in RFC 4106, AES-GCM-256 as specified in RFC
4106].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall implement the protocol: [selection: IKEv1, using Main Mode for
Phase 1 exchanges,as defined in RFCs 2407, 2408, 2409, RFC 4109, [selection: no other RFCs for extended
sequence numbers, RFC 4304 for extended sequence numbers], and [selection: no other RFCs for hash
functions, RFC 4868 for hash functions]; IKEv2 as defined in RFCs 5996[selection: with no support for NAT
traversal, with mandatory support for NAT traversal as specified in section 2.23], and [selection: no other
RFCs for hash functions, RFC 4868 for hash functions]].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall ensure the encrypted payload in the [selection: IKEv1, IKEv2]
protocol uses the cryptographic algorithms AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256 as specified in RFC 3602 and
[selection: AES-GCM-128, AES-GCM-256 as specified in RFC 5282, no other algorithm].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall ensure that IKEv1 Phase 1 exchanges use only main mode.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.8 The TSF shall ensure that [selection: IKEv2 SA lifetimes can be established
based on [selection: number of packets/number of bytes; length of time, where the time values can be limited
to: 24 hours for Phase 1 SAs and 8 hours for Phase 2 SAs]; IKEv1 SA lifetimes can be established based on
[selection: number of packets/number of bytes ; length of time, where the time values can be limited to: 24
hours for Phase 1 SAs and 8 hours for Phase 2 SAs]].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.9 The TSF shall ensure that all IKE protocols implement DH Groups 14 (2048-bit
MODP), and [selection: 24 (2048-bit MODP with 256-bit POS), 19 (256-bit Random ECP), 20 (384-bit
Random ECP, 5 (1536-bit MODP)), [assignment: other DH groups that are implemented by the TOE], no
other DH groups].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.10 The TSF shall ensure that all IKE protocols perform Peer Authentication using
the [selection: RSA, ECDSA] algorithm and Pre-shared Keys.
Rationale:
IPsec is one of the secure communication protocols, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable
SFR for the communication protocols using cryptographic algorithms.
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This extended component protects the communication data using cryptographic algorithms, and it is
therefore placed in the FCS class with a single component.
5.5 FCS_KYC_EXT Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Key Chaining)
Family behaviour:
This family provides the specification to be used for using multiple layers of encryption keys to ultimately
secure the protected data encrypted on the storage.
Component leveling:
FCS_KYC_EXT Key Chaining, requires the TSF to maintain a key chain and specifies the characteristics
of that chain.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
 There are no management actions foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included in the
PP/ST:
 There are no auditable events foreseen.
FCS_KYC_EXT.1 Extended: Key Chaining
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FCS_COP.1(e) Cryptographic operation (Key Wrapping),
FCS_SMC_EXT.1 Extended: Submask Combining,
FCS_COP.1(i) Cryptographic operation (Key Transport),
FCS_KDF_EXT.1 Cryptographic Operation (Key Derivation),
and/or
FCS_COP.1(f) Cryptographic operation (Key Encryption)].
FCS_KYC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall maintain a key chain of: [selection: one, using a submask as the
BEVor DEK; intermediate keys originating from one or more submask(s) to the BEV or DEK using the
following method(s): [selection: key wrapping as specified in FCS_COP.1(e), key combining as specified in
FCS_SMC_EXT.1, key encryption as specified in FCS_COP.1(f), key derivation as specified in
FCS_KDF_EXT.1, key transport as specified in FCS_COP.1(i)]] while maintaining an effective strength of
[selection: 128 bits, 256 bits].
Rationale:
Key Chaining ensures that the TSF maintains the key chain, and also specifies the characteristics of that
chain. However, the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the management of multiple
layers of encryption key to protect encrypted data.
This extended component protects the TSF data using cryptographic algorithms, and it is therefore placed in
the FCS class with a single component.
5.6 FCS_RBG_EXT Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)
FCS_KYC_EXT Key Chaining 1
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Family behaviour:
This family defines requirements for random bit generation to ensure that it is performed in accordance with
selected standards and seeded by an entropy source.
Component leveling:
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation requires random bit generation to be performed in accordance
with selected standards and seeded by an entropy source.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
 There are no management actions foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included in the
PP/ST:
 Failure of HTTPS session establishment
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Random Bit Generation
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in
accordance with [selection: ISO/IEC 18031:2011, NIST SP 800-90A] using [selection: Hash_DRBG (any),
HMAC_DRBG (any), CTR_DRBG (AES)].
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2 The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by an entropy source that accumulates
entropy from [selection: [assignment: number of software-based sources] software-based noise source(s),
[assignment: number of hardware-based sources] hardware-based noise source(s)] with a minimum of
[selection: 128 bits, 256 bits] of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength, according to ISO/IEC
18031:2011 Table C.1 "Security strength table for hash functions", of the keys and hashes that it will generate.
Rationale:
Random bits/number will be used by the SFRs for key generation and destruction, and the Common Criteria
does not provide a suitable SFR for the random bit generation.
This extended component ensures the strength of encryption keys, and it is therefore placed in the FCS class
with a single component.
5.7 FCS_SMC_EXT Extended: Submask Combining
Family behaviour:
This family defines the means by which submasks are combined, if the TOE supports more than one
submask being used to derive or protect the BEV.
Component leveling:
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Random Bit Generation 1
FCS_SMC_EXT.1 Extended: Submask Combining 1
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FCS_SMC_EXT.1Submask combining requires the TSF to combine the submasks in a predictable fashion.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
 There are no management actions foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included in the
PP/ST:
 There are no auditable events foreseen.
FCS_SMC_EXT.1Extended: Submask Combining
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FCS_COP.1(c) Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm) dependencies.
FCS_SMC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall combine submasks using the following method [selection:
exclusive OR (XOR), SHA-256, SHA-512] to generate an intermediary key or BEV.
Rationale:
Submask Combining is to ensure the TSF combine the submasks in order to derive or protect the BEV.
This extended component protects the TSF data using cryptographic algorithms, and it is therefore placed in
the FCS class with a single component.
5.8 FCS_TLS_EXT Extended: TLS selected
Family behaviour:
This family addresses the ability for a server and/or a client to use TLS to protect data between a client and
the server using the TLS protocol.
Component leveling:
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 TLS selected, requires the TLS protocol implemented as specified.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
 There are no management actions foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included in the
PP/ST:
 Failure of TLS session establishment
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 Extended: TLS selected
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FCS_CKM.1(a) Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys)
FCS_COP.1(a) Cryptographic Operation (Symmetric encryption/decryption)
FCS_COP.1(b) Cryptographic Operation (for signature generation/verification)
FCS_COP.1(c) Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 Extended: TLS selected 1
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FCS_COP.1(g) Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message
authentication)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit
Generation)
FCS_TLS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement one or more of the following protocols [selection:
TLS 1.0 (RFC 2246), TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346), TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246)] supporting the following ciphersuites:
Mandatory Ciphersuites:
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
Optional Ciphersuites:
[selection:
• None
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_ SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_ SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_ SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
].
Rationale:
TLS is one of the secure communication protocols, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable
SFR for the communication protocols using cryptographic algorithms.
This extended component protects the communication data using cryptographic algorithms, and it is therefore
placed in the FCS class with a single component.
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5.9 FDP_DSK_EXT Extended: Protection of Data on Disk
Family behaviour:
This family is to mandate the encryption of all protected data written to the storage.
Component leveling:
FDP_DSK_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Data on Disk, requires the TSF to encrypt all the Confidential
TSF and User Data stored on the Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage Devices in order to avoid storing
these data in plaintext on the devices.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
 There are no management actions foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included in the
PP/ST:
 There are no auditable events foreseen.
FDP_DSK_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Data on Disk
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FCS_COP.1(d) Cryptographic operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)
FDP_DSK_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall [selection: perform encryption in accordance with
FCS_COP.1(d), use a self-encrypting Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage Device that is separately CC
certified to conform to the FDE EE cPP] such that any Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage Device
contains no plaintext User Document Data and no plaintext confidential TSF Data.
FDP_DSK_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall encrypt all protected data without user intervention.
Rationale:
Extended: Protection of Data on Disk is to specify that encryption of any confidential data without user
intervention, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the Protection of Data on Disk.
This extended component protects the Data on Disk, and it is therefore placed in the FDP class with a single
component.
5.10 FDP_FXS_EXT Extended: Fax Separation
Family behaviour:
This family addresses the requirements for separation between Fax PSTN line and the LAN to which TOE is
connected.
Component leveling:
FDP_DSK_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Data on Disk 1
FDP_FXS_EXT.1 Extended: Fax Separation 1
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FDP_FXS_EXT.1 Fax Separation, requires the fax interface cannot be used to create a network bridge
between a PSTN and a LAN to which TOE is connected.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
 There are no management actions foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included in the
PP/ST:
 There are no auditable events foreseen.
FDP_FXS_EXT.1 Extended: Fax separation
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_FXS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall prohibit communication via the fax interface, except transmitting or
receiving User Data using fax protocols.
Rationale:
Fax Separation is to protect a LAN against attack from PSTN line, and the Common Criteria does not
provide a suitable SFR for the Protection of TSF or User Data.
This extended component protects the TSF Data or User Data, and it is therefore placed in the FDP class with
a single component.
5.11 FIA_PMG_EXT Extended: Password Management
Family behaviour:
This family defines requirements for the attributes of passwords used by administrative users to ensure that
strong passwords and passphrases can be chosen and maintained.
Component leveling:
FIA_PMG _EXT.1 Password management requires the TSF to support passwords with varying composition
requirements, minimum lengths, maximum lifetime, and similarity constraints.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
 There are no management actions foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included in the
PP/ST:
 There are no auditable events foreseen.
FIA_PMG _EXT.1 Extended: Password management
FIA_PMG _EXT.1 Extended: Password Management 1
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Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_PMG _EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities for User
passwords:
 Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters,
numbers, and the following special characters: [selection: "!", "@", "#", "$", "%", "^", "&", "*",
"(", ")", [assignment: other characters]];
 Minimum password length shall be settable by an Administrator, and have the capability to require
passwords of 15 characters or greater.
Rationale:
Password Management is to ensure the strong authentication between the endpoints of communication, and
the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the Password Management.
This extended component protects the TOE by means of password management, and it is therefore placed in
the FIA class with a single component.
5.12 FIA_PSK_EXT Extended: Pre-Shared Key Composition
Family behaviour:
This family defines requirements for the TSF to ensure the ability to use pre-shared keys for IPsec.
Component leveling:
FIA_PSK_EXT.1 Pre-Shared Key Composition, ensures authenticity and access control for updates.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
 There are no management actions foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included in the
PP/ST:
 There are no auditable events foreseen.
FIA_PSK_EXT.1 Extended: Pre-Shared Key Composition
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit
Generation).
FIA_PSK_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to use pre-shared keys for IPsec.
FIA_PSK_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall be able to accept text-based pre-shared keys that are.
 22 characters in length and [selection: [assignment: other supported lengths], no other lengths];
 composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and special characters
(that include: "!", "@", "#", "$", "%", "^", "&", "*", "(", and ")").
FIA_PSK_EXT.1 Extended: Pre-Shared Key Composition 1
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FIA_PSK_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall condition the text-based pre-shared keys by using [selection: SHA-1,
SHA-256, SHA-512, [assignment: method of conditioning text string]] and be able to [selection: use no other
pre-shared keys; accept bit-based pre-shared keys; generate bit-based pre-shared keys using the random bit
generator specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1].
Rationale:
Pre-shared Key Composition is to ensure the strong authentication between the endpoints of
communications, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the Pre-shared Key
Composition.
This extended component protects the TOE by means of strong authentication, and it is therefore placed in the
FIA class with a single component.
5.13 FPT_KYP_EXT Extended: Protection of Key and Key Material
Family behaviour:
This family addresses the requirements for keys and key materials to be protected if and when written to
nonvolatile storage.
Component leveling:
FPT_ KYP _EXT.1 Extended: Protection of key and key material, requires the TSF to ensure that no
plaintext key or key materials are written to nonvolatile storage.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
 There are no management actions foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included in the
PP/ST:
 There are no auditable events foreseen.
FPT_ KYP _EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Key and Key Material
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_ KYP _EXT.1.1 The TSF shall not store plaintext keys that are part of the keychain specified by
FCS_KYC_EXT.1 in any Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage Device, and not store any such plaintext
key on a device that uses the key for its encryption.
Rationale:
Protection of Key and Key Material is to ensure that no plaintext key or key material are written to
nonvolatile storage, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the protection of key and
key material.
This extended component protects the TSF data, and it is therefore placed in the FPT class with a single
component.
FPT_ KYP _EXT.1 Protection of key and key material 1
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5.14 FPT_SKP_EXT Extended: Protection of TSF Data
Family behaviour:
This family addresses the requirements for managing and protecting the TSF data, such as cryptographic
keys. This is a new family modelled as the FPT Class.
Component leveling:
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Protection of TSF Data (for reading all symmetric keys), requires preventing symmetric
keys from being read by any user or subject. It is the only component of this family.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
 There are no management actions foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included in the
PP/ST:
 There are no auditable events foreseen.
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Extended: Extended: Protection of TSF Data
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_SKP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private
keys.
Rationale:
Protection of TSF Data is to ensure the pre-shared keys, symmetric keys and private keys are protected
securely, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the protection of such TSF data.
This extended component protects the TOE by means of strong authentication using Pre-shared Key, and it is
therefore placed in the FPT class with a single component.
5.15 FPT_TST_EXT Extended: TSF testing
Family behaviour:
This family addresses the requirements for self-testing the TSF for selected correct operation.
Component leveling:
FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF testing requires a suite of self-testing to be run during initial start-up in order to
demonstrate correct operation of the TSF.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
 There are no management actions foreseen.
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of TSF Data 1
FPT_TST_EXT.1 Extended: TSF testing 1
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Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included in the
PP/ST:
 There are no auditable events foreseen.
FPT_TST_EXT.1 Extended: TSF testing
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests during initial start-up (and power on) to
demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
Rationale:
TSF testing is to ensure the TSF can be operated correctly, and the Common Criteria does not provide a
suitable SFR for the TSF testing. In particular, there is no SFR defined for TSF testing.
This extended component protects the TOE, and it is therefore placed in the FPT class with a single component.
5.16 FPT_TUD_EXT Extended: Trusted Update
Family behaviour:
This family defines requirements for the TSF to ensure that only administrators can update the TOE
firmware/software, and that such firmware/software is authentic.
Component leveling:
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update, ensures authenticity and access control for updates.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
 There are no management actions foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included in the
PP/ST:
 There are no auditable events foreseen.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FCS_COP.1(b) Cryptographic Operation (for signature
generation/verification),
FCS_COP.1(c) Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm).
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FCS_COP.1(b) Cryptographic Operation (for signature generation/verification),
FCS_COP.1(c) Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm).
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Extended: Trusted Update 1
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FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide authorized administrators the ability to query the current
version of the TOE firmware/software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorized administrators the ability to initiate updates to
TOE firmware/software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall provide a means to verify firmware/software updates to the TOE
using a digital signature mechanism and [selection: published hash, no other functions] prior to installing
those updates.
Rationale:
Firmware/software is a form of TSF Data, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the
management of firmware/software. In particular, there is no SFR defined for importing TSF Data.
This extended component protects the TOE, and it is therefore placed in the FPT class with a single component.
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6. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
6.1 Notation
- Bold typeface indicates the portion of an SFR that has been "completed" or "refined" in HCD PP, relative to
the original SFR definition in Common Criteria Part 2 or to its Extended Component Definition.
- Italic typeface indicates the text within an SFR that must be selected and/or completed in this ST.
- Bold italic typeface indicates the portion of an SFR that has been partially "completed" or "refined" in HCD
PP and indicates the text within an SFR that must be selected and/or completed in this ST.
- [] indicates the portion indicating "Assignment" or "Selection". The result of "Assignment" or "Selection" in
this ST is shown after the [] part is extracted after the text.
- A character in (), for example, an SFR component followed by (a) and (b), indicates that repetition was
defined in HCD PP. To repeat further in ST, define as (a) (ssd).
6.2 Security functional requirements
6.2.1 Class FAU: Security Audit
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and
c) All auditable events specified in Table 15, [assignment: other specifically defined
auditable events].
[assignment: other specifically defined auditable events].
– None
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome
(success or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional
components included in the PP/ST, additional information specified in Table 15,
[assignment: other audit relevant information].
[assignment: other audit relevant information]
– None
Table 15 - Auditable Events
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Auditable event Relevant SFR Additional
information
Job completion FDP_ACF.1 Type of job
Unsuccessful User authentication FIA_UAU.1 None
Unsuccessful User identification FIA_UID.1 None
Use of management functions FMT_SMF.1 None
Modification to the group of Users that
are part of a role
FMT_SMR.1 None
Changes to the time FPT_STM.1 None
Failure to establish session FTP_ITC.1,
FTP_TRP.1(a),
FTP_TRP.1(b)
Reason for failure
FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate each
auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: an Administrator] with the capability to read all records
from the audit records.
[assignment: an Administrator]
– U. ADMIN
FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the
information.
FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
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FAU_SAR.2.1 The TSF shall prohibit all users read access to the audit records, except those users that have
been granted explicit read-access.
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_STG.1.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorised deletion.
FAU_STG.1.2 The TSF shall be able to prevent unauthorised modifications to the stored audit records in the
audit trail.
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss
Hierarchical to: FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
Dependencies: FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG.4.1 Refinement: The TSF shall [selection, choose one of: "prevent audited events, except those
taken by the authorised user with special rights", "overwrite the oldest stored audit records"]
and [assignment: other actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure] if the audit trail is
full.
[selection, choose one of: "prevent audited events, except those taken by the authorised user
with special rights", "overwrite the oldest stored audit records"]
– "overwrite the oldest stored audit records"
[assignment: other actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure]
– None
FAU_STG_EXT.1 Extended: External Audit Trail Storage
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation,
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel.
FAU_STG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to transmit the generated audit data to an External IT Entity
using a trusted channel according to FTP_ITC.1.
6.2.2 Class FCO: Communication
There are no class FCO requirements.
6.2.3 Class FCS: Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.1(a) Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1(b) Cryptographic Operation (for signature generation/
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verification),
FCS_COP.1(i) Cryptographic operation (Key Transport)]
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material
Destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1(a) Refinement: The TSF shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys used for key
establishment in accordance with [selection:
 NIST Special Publication 800-56A, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography" for finite field-based
key establishment schemes;
 NIST Special Publication 800-56A, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography" for elliptic curve-
based key establishment schemes and implementing "NIST curves" P-256, P-384 and
[selection: P-521, no other curves] (as defined in FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature
Standard")
 NIST Special Publication 800-56B, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography" for RSA-based key
establishment schemes
] and specified cryptographic key sizes equivalent to, or greater than, a symmetric key
strength of 112 bits.
[selection:
 NIST Special Publication 800-56A, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography" for finite field-based
key establishment schemes;
 NIST Special Publication 800-56A, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography" for elliptic curve-
based key establishment schemes and implementing "NIST curves" P-256, P-384 and
[selection: P-521, no other curves] (as defined in FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature
Standard")
 NIST Special Publication 800-56B, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography" for RSA-based key
establishment schemes
]
 NIST Special Publication 800-56A, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography" for finite field-
based key establishment schemes;
 NIST Special Publication 800-56A, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography" for elliptic curve-
based key establishment schemes and implementing "NIST curves" P-256, P-384 and
[selection: P-521, no other curves] (as defined in FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature
Standard")
 NIST Special Publication 800-56B, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography" for RSA-based
key establishment schemes
[selection: P-521, no other curves]
– no other curves
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FCS_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic key generation (Symmetric Keys)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1(a) Cryptographic Operation (Symmetric
encryption/decryption)
FCS_COP.1(d) Cryptographic Operation (AES Data
Encryption/Decryption)
FCS_COP.1(e) Cryptographic Operation (Key Wrapping)
FCS_COP.1(f) Cryptographic operation (Key Encryption)
FCS_COP.1(g) Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message
authentication)
FCS_COP.1(h) Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message
authentication)]
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material
Destruction
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit
Generation)
FCS_CKM.1.1(b) Refinement: The TSF shall generate symmetric cryptographic keys using a Random
Bit Generator as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1 and specified cryptographic key sizes
[selection: 128 bit, 256 bit] that meet the following: No Standard.
[selection: 128 bit, 256 bit]
– 128 bit, 256 bit
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material Destruction
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.1(a) Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric
keys), or
FCS_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic key generation (Symmetric Keys)],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1 The TSF shall destroy all plaintext secret and private cryptographic keys and
cryptographic critical security parameters when no longer needed.
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.1(a) Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric
keys), or
FCS_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic key generation (Symmetric Keys)]
FCS_CKM.4.1 Refinement: The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method [selection:
For volatile memory, the destruction shall be executed by [selection: powering off a device,
[assignment: other mechanism that ensures keys are destroyed]].
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For nonvolatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by a [selection: single, three or
more times] overwrite of key data storage location consisting of [selection: a pseudo random
pattern using the TSF's RBG (as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1), a static pattern], followed
by a [selection: read-verify, none]. If read-verification of the overwritten data fails, the
process shall be repeated again;
] that meets the following: [selection: NIST SP800-88, no standard].
[selection:
For volatile memory, the destruction shall be executed by [selection: powering off a device,
[assignment: other mechanism that ensures keys are destroyed]].
For nonvolatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by a [selection: single, three or
more times] overwrite of key data storage location consisting of [selection: a pseudo
random pattern using the TSF's RBG (as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1), a static pattern],
followed by a [selection: read-verify, none]. If read-verification of the overwritten data
fails, the process shall be repeated again;
]
– For volatile memory, the destruction shall be executed by [selection: powering off a
device, [assignment: other mechanism that ensures keys are destroyed]].
– For nonvolatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by a [selection: single, three
or more times] overwrite of key data storage location consisting of [selection: a
pseudo random pattern using the TSF's RBG (as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1), a
static pattern], followed by a [selection: read-verify, none]. If read-verification of the
overwritten data fails, the process shall be repeated again;
[selection: powering off a device, [assignment: other mechanism that ensures keys are
destroyed]]
– powering off a device
[selection: single, three or more times]
– single
[selection: a pseudo random pattern using the TSF's RBG (as specified in
FCS_RBG_EXT.1), a static pattern]
– a static pattern
[selection: read-verify, none]
– none
[selection: NIST SP800-88, no standard]
– no standard
FCS_COP.1(a) Cryptographic Operation (Symmetric encryption/decryption)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic key generation (Symmetric Keys)]
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material
Destruction
FCS_COP.1.1(a) Refinement: The TSF shall perform encryption and decryption in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm AES operating in [assignment: one or more modes] and
cryptographic key sizes 128-bits and 256-bits that meets the following:
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 FIPS PUB 197, "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)"
 [Selection: NIST SP 800-38A, NIST SP 800-38B, NIST SP 800-38C, NIST SP 800-
38D]
[assignment: one or more modes]
– CBC, GCM
[Selection: NIST SP 800-38A, NIST SP 800-38B, NIST SP 800-38C, NIST SP 800-38D]
– NIST SP 800-38A, NIST SP 800-38D
FCS_COP.1(b) (update) Cryptographic Operation (for signature
generation/verification)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1(a) Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric
keys)]
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material
Destruction
FCS_COP.1.1(b) (update) Refinement: The TSF shall perform cryptographic signature services in accordance
with a [selection:
 Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) with key sizes (modulus) of [assignment: 2048 bits
or greater],
 RSA Digital Signature Algorithm (rDSA) with key sizes (modulus) of [assignment:
2048 bits or greater], or
 Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with key sizes of [assignment: 256
bits or greater]]
that meets the following [selection:
Case: Digital Signature Algorithm
 FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard"
Case: RSA Digital Signature Algorithm
 FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard"
Case: Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
 FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard"
 The TSF shall implement "NIST curves" P-256, P384 and [selection: P521,
no other curves] (as defined in FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature
Standard").
]
[selection:
 Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) with key sizes (modulus) of [assignment: 2048 bits
or greater],
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 RSA Digital Signature Algorithm (rDSA) with key sizes (modulus) of [assignment:
2048 bits or greater], or
 Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with key sizes of [assignment: 256
bits or greater]]
– RSA Digital Signature Algorithm (rDSA) with key sizes (modulus) of [assignment:
2048 bits or greater]
[assignment: 2048 bits or greater]
– 2048 bits
[selection:
Case: Digital Signature Algorithm
 FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard"
Case: RSA Digital Signature Algorithm
 FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard"
Case: Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
 FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard"
 The TSF shall implement "NIST curves" P-256, P384 and [selection: P521,
no other curves] (as defined in FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature
Standard").
]
– Case: RSA Digital Signature Algorithm
 FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard"
FCS_COP.1(b)(tls) Cryptographic Operation (for signature
generation/verification)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1(a) Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric
keys)]
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material
Destruction
FCS_COP.1.1(b)(tls) Refinement: The TSF shall perform cryptographic signature services in accordance
with a [selection:
 Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) with key sizes (modulus) of [assignment: 2048 bits
or greater],
 RSA Digital Signature Algorithm (rDSA) with key sizes (modulus) of [assignment:
2048 bits or greater], or
 Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with key sizes of [assignment: 256
bits or greater]]
that meets the following [selection:
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Case: Digital Signature Algorithm
 FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard"
Case: RSA Digital Signature Algorithm
 FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard"
Case: Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
 FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard"
 The TSF shall implement "NIST curves" P-256, P384 and [selection: P521,
no other curves] (as defined in FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature
Standard").
]
[selection:
 Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) with key sizes (modulus) of [assignment: 2048 bits
or greater],
 RSA Digital Signature Algorithm (rDSA) with key sizes (modulus) of [assignment:
2048 bits or greater], or
 Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with key sizes of [assignment: 256
bits or greater]]
– RSA Digital Signature Algorithm (rDSA) with key sizes (modulus) of [assignment:
2048 bits or greater]
– Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with key sizes of [assignment:
256 bits or greater]
[assignment: 2048 bits or greater]
– 2048 bits
[assignment: 256 bits or greater]
– 256 bits, 384 bits
[selection:
Case: Digital Signature Algorithm
 FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard"
Case: RSA Digital Signature Algorithm
 FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard"
Case: Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
 FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard"
 The TSF shall implement "NIST curves" P-256, P384 and [selection: P521,
no other curves] (as defined in FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature
Standard").
]
– Case: RSA Digital Signature Algorithm
 FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard"
– Case: Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
 FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard”
 The TSF shall implement “NIST curves” P-256, P384 and [selection: P521, no
other curves] (as defined in FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard”).
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[selection: P521, no other curves]
– no other curves
FCS_COP.1(b)(ipsec) Cryptographic Operation (for signature
generation/verification)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1(a) Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric
keys)]
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material
Destruction
FCS_COP.1.1(b)(ipsec) Refinement: The TSF shall perform cryptographic signature services in accordance
with a [selection:
 Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) with key sizes (modulus) of [assignment: 2048 bits
or greater],
 RSA Digital Signature Algorithm (rDSA) with key sizes (modulus) of [assignment:
2048 bits or greater], or
 Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with key sizes of [assignment: 256
bits or greater]]
that meets the following [selection:
Case: Digital Signature Algorithm
 FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard"
Case: RSA Digital Signature Algorithm
 FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard"
Case: Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
 FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard"
 The TSF shall implement "NIST curves" P-256, P384 and [selection: P521,
no other curves] (as defined in FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature
Standard").
]
[selection:
 Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) with key sizes (modulus) of [assignment: 2048 bits
or greater],
 RSA Digital Signature Algorithm (rDSA) with key sizes (modulus) of [assignment:
2048 bits or greater], or
 Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with key sizes of [assignment: 256
bits or greater]]
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– RSA Digital Signature Algorithm (rDSA) with key sizes (modulus) of [assignment:
2048 bits or greater]
– Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with key sizes of [assignment:
256 bits or greater]
[assignment: 2048 bits or greater]
– 2048 bits
[assignment: 256 bits or greater]
– 256 bits, 384 bits
[selection:
Case: Digital Signature Algorithm
 FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard"
Case: RSA Digital Signature Algorithm
 FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard"
Case: Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
 FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard"
 The TSF shall implement "NIST curves" P-256, P384 and [selection: P521,
no other curves] (as defined in FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature
Standard").
]
– Case: RSA Digital Signature Algorithm
 FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard"
– Case: Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
 FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard"
 The TSF shall implement "NIST curves" P-256, P384 and [selection: P521, no
other curves] (as defined in FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard").
[selection: P521, no other curves]
– no other curves
FCS_COP.1(c) Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FCS_COP.1.1(c) Refinement: The TSF shall perform cryptographic hashing services in accordance
with [selection: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512] that meet the following: [ISO/IEC
10118-3:2004].
[selection: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512]
– SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
FCS_COP.1(d) Cryptographic operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FCS_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic key generation (Symmetric Keys)
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material
Destruction
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FCS_COP.1.1(d) The TSF shall perform data encryption and decryption in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm AES used in [selection: CBC, GCM, XTS] mode and cryptographic
key sizes [selection: 128 bits, 256 bits] that meet the following: AES as specified in ISO/IEC
18033-3, [selection: CBC as specified in ISO/IEC 10116, GCM as specified in ISO/IEC
19772, and XTS as specified in IEEE 1619].
[selection: CBC, GCM, XTS]
– XTS
[selection: 128 bits, 256 bits]
– 256 bits
[selection: CBC as specified in ISO/IEC 10116, GCM as specified in ISO/IEC 19772, and
XTS as specified in IEEE 1619]
– XTS as specified in IEEE 1619
FCS_COP.1(g) Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message authentication)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FCS_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic key generation (Symmetric Keys)
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material
Destruction
FCS_COP.1.1(g) Refinement: The TSF shall perform keyed-hash message authentication in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm HMAC-[selection: SHA-1, SHA-224,
SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512], key size [assignment: key size (in bits) used in HMAC], and
message digest sizes [selection: 160, 224, 256, 384, 512] bits that meet the following: FIPS
PUB 198-1, "The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code, and FIPS PUB 180-3,
"Secure Hash Standard."
[selection: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512]
– SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384
[assignment: key size (in bits) used in HMAC]
– 160, 256, 384 bits
[selection: 160, 224, 256, 384, 512]
– 160, 256, 384
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 Extended: HTTPS selected
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FCS_TLS_EXT.1 Extended: TLS selected
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the HTTPS protocol that complies with RFC 2818.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall implement HTTPS using TLS as specified in FCS_TLS_EXT.1.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 Extended: IPsec selected
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_PSK_EXT.1 Extended: Pre-Shared Key Composition
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FCS_CKM.1(a) Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric
keys)
FCS_COP.1(a) Cryptographic Operation (Symmetric
encryption/decryption)
FCS_COP.1(b) Cryptographic Operation (for signature
generation/verification)
FCS_COP.1(c) Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)
FCS_COP.1(g) Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message
authentication)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit
Generation)
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the IPsec architecture as specified in RFC 4301.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall implement [selection: tunnel mode, transport mode].
[selection: tunnel mode, transport mode]
– transport mode
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall have a nominal, final entry in the SPD that matches anything that is
otherwise unmatched, and discards it.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall implement the IPsec protocol ESP as defined by RFC 4303 using
[selection: the cryptographic algorithms AES-CBC-128 (as specified by RFC 3602) together
with a Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-based HMAC, AES-CBC-256 (as specified by RFC 3602)
together with a Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-based HMAC, AES-GCM-128 as specified in
RFC 4106, AES-GCM-256 as specified in RFC 4106].
[selection: the cryptographic algorithms AES-CBC-128 (as specified by RFC 3602) together
with a Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-based HMAC, AES-CBC-256 (as specified by RFC
3602) together with a Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-based HMAC, AES-GCM-128 as
specified in RFC 4106, AES-GCM-256 as specified in RFC 4106]
– the cryptographic algorithms AES-CBC-128 (as specified by RFC 3602) together
with a Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-based HMAC, AES-CBC-256 (as specified by
RFC 3602) together with a Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-based HMAC, AES-
GCM-128 as specified in RFC 4106, AES-GCM-256 as specified in RFC 4106
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall implement the protocol: [selection: IKEv1, using Main Mode for
Phase 1 exchanges, as defined in RFCs 2407, 2408, 2409, RFC 4109, [selection: no other RFCs
for extended sequence numbers, RFC 4304 for extended sequence numbers], and [selection: no
other RFCs for hash functions, RFC 4868 for hash functions]; IKEv2 as defined in RFCs 5996,
[selection: with no support for NAT traversal, with mandatory support for NAT traversal as
specified in section 2.23], and [selection: no other RFCs for hash functions, RFC 4868 for hash
functions]].
[selection: IKEv1, using Main Mode for Phase 1 exchanges, as defined in RFCs 2407, 2408,
2409, RFC 4109, [selection: no other RFCs for extended sequence numbers, RFC 4304 for
extended sequence numbers], and [selection: no other RFCs for hash functions, RFC 4868 for
hash functions]; IKEv2 as defined in RFCs 5996, [selection: with no support for NAT
traversal, with mandatory support for NAT traversal as specified in section 2.23], and
[selection: no other RFCs for hash functions, RFC 4868 for hash functions]]
– IKEv1, using Main Mode for Phase 1 exchanges, as defined in RFCs 2407, 2408,
2409, RFC 4109, [selection: no other RFCs for extended sequence numbers, RFC
4304 for extended sequence numbers], and [selection: no other RFCs for hash
functions, RFC 4868 for hash functions]
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[selection: no other RFCs for extended sequence numbers, RFC 4304 for extended sequence
numbers]
– RFC 4304 for extended sequence numbers
[selection: no other RFCs for hash functions, RFC 4868 for hash functions]
– RFC 4868 for hash functions
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall ensure the encrypted payload in the [selection: IKEv1, IKEv2]
protocol uses the cryptographic algorithms AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256 as specified in RFC
3602 and [selection: AES-GCM-128, AES-GCM-256 as specified in RFC 5282, no other
algorithm].
[selection: IKEv1, IKEv2]
– IKEv1
[selection: AES-GCM-128, AES-GCM-256 as specified in RFC 5282, no other algorithm]
– no other algorithm
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall ensure that IKEv1 Phase 1 exchanges use only main mode.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.8 The TSF shall ensure that [selection: IKEv2 SA lifetimes can be established based
on [selection: number of packets/number of bytes; length of time, where the time values can be
limited to: 24 hours for Phase 1 SAs and 8 hours for Phase 2 SAs]; IKEv1 SA lifetimes can be
established based on [selection: number of packets/number of bytes ; length of time, where the
time values can be limited to: 24 hours for Phase 1 SAs and 8 hours for Phase 2 SAs]].
[selection: IKEv2 SA lifetimes can be established based on [selection: number of
packets/number of bytes; length of time, where the time values can be limited to: 24 hours for
Phase 1 SAs and 8 hours for Phase 2 SAs]; IKEv1 SA lifetimes can be established based on
[selection: number of packets/number of bytes ; length of time, where the time values can be
limited to: 24 hours for Phase 1 SAs and 8 hours for Phase 2 SAs]]
– IKEv1 SA lifetimes can be established based on [selection: number of
packets/number of bytes ; length of time, where the time values can be limited to: 24
hours for Phase 1 SAs and 8 hours for Phase 2 SAs]
[selection: number of packets/number of bytes; length of time, where the time values can be
limited to: 24 hours for Phase 1 SAs and 8 hours for Phase 2 SAs]
– length of time, where the time values can be limited to: 24 hours for Phase 1 SAs and
8 hours for Phase 2 SAs
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.9 The TSF shall ensure that all IKE protocols implement DH Groups 14 (2048-bit
MODP), and [selection: 24 (2048-bit MODP with 256-bit POS), 19 (256-bit Random ECP), 20
(384-bit Random ECP, 5 (1536-bit MODP)), [assignment: other DH groups that are
implemented by the TOE], no other DH groups].
[selection: 24 (2048-bit MODP with 256-bit POS), 19 (256-bit Random ECP), 20 (384-bit
Random ECP, 5 (1536-bit MODP)), [assignment: other DH groups that are implemented by
the TOE], no other DH groups]
– 19 (256-bit Random ECP), 20 (384-bit Random ECP)
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.10 The TSF shall ensure that all IKE protocols perform Peer Authentication using the
[selection: RSA, ECDSA] algorithm and Pre-shared Keys.
[selection: RSA, ECDSA]
– RSA, ECDSA
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FCS_KYC_EXT.1 Extended: Key Chaining
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_COP.1(e) Cryptographic operation (Key Wrapping),
FCS_SMC_EXT.1 Extended: Submask Combining,
FCS_COP.1(f) Cryptographic operation (Key Encryption),
FCS_KDF_EXT.1 Cryptographic Operation (Key Derivation), and/or
FCS_COP.1(i) Cryptographic operation (Key Transport)]
FCS_KYC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall maintain a key chain of: [selection: one, using a submask as the
BEV or DEK; intermediate keys originating from one or more submask(s) to the BEV or DEK
using the following method(s): [selection: key wrapping as specified in FCS_COP.1(e), key
combining as specified in FCS_SMC_EXT.1, key encryption as specified in FCS_COP.1(f), key
derivation as specified in FCS_KDF_EXT.1, key transport as specified in FCS_COP.1(i)]] while
maintaining an effective strength of [selection: 128 bits, 256 bits].
[selection: one, using a submask as the BEV or DEK; intermediate keys originating from one or
more submask(s) to the BEV or DEK using the following method(s): [selection: key wrapping
as specified in FCS_COP.1(e), key combining as specified in FCS_SMC_EXT.1, key
encryption as specified in FCS_COP.1(f), key derivation as specified in FCS_KDF_EXT.1,
key transport as specified in FCS_COP.1(i)]]
– intermediate keys originating from one or more submask(s) to the BEV or DEK using
the following method(s): [selection: key wrapping as specified in FCS_COP.1(e),
key combining as specified in FCS_SMC_EXT.1, key encryption as specified in
FCS_COP.1(f), key derivation as specified in FCS_KDF_EXT.1, key transport as
specified in FCS_COP.1(i)]
[selection: key wrapping as specified in FCS_COP.1(e), key combining as specified in
FCS_SMC_EXT.1, key encryption as specified in FCS_COP.1(f), key derivation as specified
in FCS_KDF_EXT.1, key transport as specified in FCS_COP.1(i)]
– key combining as specified in FCS_SMC_EXT.1
[selection: 128 bits, 256 bits]
– 256 bits
FCS_RBG_EXT.1(network) Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit
Generation)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1(network): The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services
in accordance with [selection: ISO/IEC 18031:2011, NIST SP 800-90A] using [selection:
Hash_DRBG (any), HMAC_DRBG (any), CTR_DRBG (AES)].
[selection: ISO/IEC 18031:2011, NIST SP 800-90A]
– NIST SP 800-90A
[selection: Hash_DRBG (any), HMAC_DRBG (any), CTR_DRBG (AES)]
– CTR_DRBG (AES)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2(network): The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source
that accumulates entropy from [selection: [assignment: number of software-based sources]
software-based noise source(s), [assignment: number of hardware-based sources] hardware-
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based noise source(s)] with a minimum of [selection: 128 bits, 256 bits] of entropy at least equal
to the greatest security strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 "Security Strength
Table for Hash Functions", of the keys and hashes that it will generate.
[selection: [assignment: number of software-based sources] software-based noise source(s),
[assignment: number of hardware-based sources] hardware-based noise source(s)]
– [assignment: number of hardware-based sources] hardware-based noise source(s)
[assignment: number of hardware-based sources]
– 1
[selection: 128 bits, 256 bits]
– 256 bits
FCS_RBG_EXT.1(ssd) Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1(ssd): The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in
accordance with [selection: ISO/IEC 18031:2011, NIST SP 800-90A] using [selection:
Hash_DRBG (any), HMAC_DRBG (any), CTR_DRBG (AES)].
[selection: ISO/IEC 18031:2011, NIST SP 800-90A]
– NIST SP 800-90A
[selection: Hash_DRBG (any), HMAC_DRBG (any), CTR_DRBG (AES)]
– Hash_DRBG (SHA-256)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2(ssd): The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source that
accumulates entropy from [selection: [assignment: number of software-based sources] software-
based noise source(s), [assignment: number of hardware-based sources] hardware-based noise
source(s)] with a minimum of [selection: 128 bits, 256 bits] of entropy at least equal to the
greatest security strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 "Security Strength Table
for Hash Functions", of the keys and hashes that it will generate.
[selection: [assignment: number of software-based sources] software-based noise source(s),
[assignment: number of hardware-based sources] hardware-based noise source(s)]
– [assignment: number of hardware-based sources] hardware-based noise
source(s)
[assignment: number of hardware-based sources]
– 1
[selection: 128 bits, 256 bits]
– 256 bits
FCS_SMC_EXT.1 Extended: Submask Combining
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FCS_COP.1(c) Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm)
FCS_SMC_EXT.1.1: The TSF shall combine submasks using the following method [selection: exclusive
OR (XOR), SHA-256, SHA-512] to generate an intermediary key or BEV.
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[selection: exclusive OR (XOR), SHA-256, SHA-512 ]
– SHA-256
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 Extended: TLS selected
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FCS_CKM.1(a) Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys)
FCS_COP.1(a) Cryptographic Operation (Symmetric
encryption/decryption)
FCS_COP.1(b) Cryptographic Operation (for signature
generation/verification)
FCS_COP.1(c) Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)
FCS_COP.1(g) Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message
authentication)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit
Generation)
FCS_TLS_EXT.1.1The TSF shall implement one or more of the following protocols [selection: TLS 1.0 (RFC
2246), TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346), TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246)] supporting the following ciphersuites:
Mandatory Ciphersuites:
 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
Optional Ciphersuites:
[selection:
None
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_ SHA256
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_ SHA256
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_ SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
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].
[selection: TLS 1.0 (RFC 2246), TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346), TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246)]
– TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246)
[selection:
None
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_ SHA256
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_ SHA256
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_ SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
].
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
6.2.4 Class FDP: User Data Protection
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall enforce the User Data Access Control SFP on subjects, objects,
and operations among subjects and objects specified in Table 16 and Table 17.
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FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_ACF.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall enforce the User Data Access Control SFP to objects based on the
following: subjects, objects, and attributes specified in Table 16 and Table 17.
FDP_ACF.1.2 Refinement: The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: rules governing access among controlled
subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects specified in
Table 16 and Table 17.
FDP_ACF.1.3 Refinement: The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: [assignment: rules that do not conflict with the User Data Access
Control SFP, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to
objects].
[assignment: rules that do not conflict with the User Data Access Control SFP, based on
security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects]
– None
FDP_ACF.1.4 Refinement: The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: [assignment: rules that do not conflict with the User Data Access Control
SFP, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects].
[assignment: rules that do not conflict with the User Data Access Control SFP, based on
security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects]
– None
Table 16 - D.USER.DOC Access Control SFP
"Create" "Read" "Modify" "Delete"
Print
Operation:
Submit a
document to be
printed
View image
or Release
printed
output
Modify stored
document
Delete stored
document
Job owner
(note 1)
allowed
allowed allowed allowed
U.ADMIN allowed denied denied allowed
U.NORMAL allowed denied denied denied
Unauthenticated denied denied denied denied
Scan
Operation:
Submit a
document for
scanning
View scanned
image
Modify stored
image
Delete stored
image
Job owner
(note 2)
allowed
allowed allowed allowed
U.ADMIN allowed denied denied allowed
U.NORMAL allowed denied denied denied
Unauthenticated denied denied denied denied
Copy Operation: Submit a
document for
View scanned
image or
Modify stored Delete stored
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copying Release
printed copy
output
image image
Job owner
(note 2)
allowed
allowed allowed allowed
U.ADMIN allowed denied denied allowed
U.NORMAL allowed denied denied denied
Unauthenticated denied denied denied denied
Fax send
Operation:
Submit a
document to
send as a fax
View scanned
image
Modify stored
image
Delete stored
image
Job owner
(note 2)
allowed
allowed allowed allowed
U.ADMIN allowed denied denied allowed
U.NORMAL allowed denied denied denied
Unauthenticated denied denied denied denied
Fax
receive
Operation:
Receive a fax
and store it
View fax
image or
Release
printed fax
output
Modify image
of received
fax
Delete image
of received
fax
Fax owner
(note 3)
allowed
allowed allowed allowed
U.ADMIN
(note 4)
allowed
allowed allowed allowed
U.NORMAL
(note 4)
allowed
denied denied denied
Unauthenticated allowed denied denied denied
Storage /
retrieval
Operation:
Store
document
Retrieve
stored
document
Modify stored
document
Delete stored
document
Job owner
(note 1)
allowed
allowed allowed allowed
U.ADMIN allowed allowed denied allowed
U.NORMAL allowed denied denied denied
Unauthenticated denied denied denied denied
Table 17 - D.USER.JOB Access Control SFP
"Create" * "Read" "Modify" "Delete"
Print
Operation:
Create print
job
View print
queue / log
Modify print
job
Cancel print
job
Job owner
(note 1)
allowed
allowed allowed allowed
U.ADMIN allowed allowed denied allowed
U.NORMAL allowed denied denied denied
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Unauthenticated denied denied denied denied
Scan
Operation:
Create scan
job
View scan
status / log
Modify scan
job
Cancel scan
job
Job owner
(note 2)
allowed
allowed allowed allowed
U.ADMIN allowed allowed allowed allowed
U.NORMAL allowed allowed denied denied
Unauthenticated denied denied denied denied
Copy
Operation:
Create copy
job
View copy
status / log
Modify copy
job
Cancel copy
job
Job owner
(note 2)
allowed
allowed denied allowed
U.ADMIN allowed allowed denied allowed
U.NORMAL allowed denied denied denied
Unauthenticated denied denied denied denied
Fax send
Operation:
Create fax
send job
View fax job
queue / log
Modify fax
send job
Cancel fax
send job
Job owner
(note 2)
allowed
allowed allowed allowed
U.ADMIN allowed allowed allowed allowed
U.NORMAL allowed allowed denied denied
Unauthenticated denied denied denied denied
Fax
receive
Operation:
Create fax
receive job
View fax
receive status
/ log
Modify fax
receive job
Cancel fax
receive job
Fax owner
(note 3)
allowed
allowed denied denied
U.ADMIN
(note 4)
allowed
allowed denied allowed
U.NORMAL
(note 4)
allowed
allowed denied denied
Unauthenticated allowed denied denied denied
Storage /
retrieval
Operation:
Create storage
/ retrieval job
View storage /
retrieval log
Modify
storage /
retrieval job
Cancel
storage /
retrieval job
Job owner
(note 2)
allowed
allowed denied allowed
U.ADMIN allowed allowed denied allowed
U.NORMAL allowed allowed denied denied
Unauthenticated denied denied denied denied
Application notes:
The following Notes that are referenced in Table 16 and Table 17:
Note 1: Job Owner is identified by a credential or assigned to an authorized User as part of the process of
submitting a print or storage Job.
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Note 2: Job Owner is assigned to an authorized User as part of the process of initiating a scan, copy, fax send,
or retrieval Job.
Note 3: Job Owner of received faxes is assigned by default or configuration. Minimally, ownership of received
faxes is assigned to a specific user or U.ADMIN role.
Note 4: PSTN faxes are received from outside of the TOE, they are not initiated by Users of the TOE.
FDP_DSK_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Data on Disk
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FCS_COP.1(d) Cryptographic operation (AES Data
Encryption/Decryption).
FDP_DSK_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall [selection: perform encryption in accordance with FCS_COP.1(d),
use a self-encrypting Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage Device that is separately CC
certified to conform to the FDE EE cPP], such that any Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage
Device contains no plaintext User Document Data and no plaintext Confidential TSF Data.
[selection: perform encryption in accordance with FCS_COP.1(d), use a self-encrypting Field-
Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage Device that is separately CC certified to conform to the FDE
EE cPP]
– perform encryption in accordance with FCS_COP.1(d)
FDP_DSK_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall encrypt all protected data without user intervention.
FDP_FXS_EXT.1 Extended: Fax separation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_FXS_EXT.1.1The TSF shall prohibit communication via the fax interface, except transmitting or receiving
User Data using fax protocols.
6.2.5 Class FIA: Identification and Authentication
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when [selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator
configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values]] unsuccessful
authentication attempts occur related to [assignment: list of authentication events].
[selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer
within [assignment: range of acceptable values]]
– an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of
acceptable values]
[assignment: range of acceptable values]
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– positive integer within 1 to 10
[assignment: list of authentication events]
– Login attempts from the control panel or remote UIs or Printer Driver.
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been [selection: met,
surpassed], the TSF shall [assignment: list of actions].
[selection: met, surpassed]
– met
[assignment: list of actions]
– lock out until preset time has passed that can set in 1 - 60 minutes
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual users:
[assignment: list of security attributes].
[assignment: list of security attributes]
– User Name, Role
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Extended: Password Management
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities for User
passwords:
 Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of upper and lower case
letters, numbers, and the following special characters: [selection: "!", "@", "#", "$", "%",
"^", "&", "*", "(", ")", [assignment: other characters]];
 Minimum password length shall be settable by an Administrator, and have the capability
to require passwords of 15 characters or greater;
[selection: "!", "@", "#", "$", "%", "^", "&", "*", "(", ")", [assignment: other characters]]
– "!", "@", "#", "$", "%", "^", "&", "*", "(", ")", [assignment: other characters]
[assignment: other characters]
– "(space)", """, "'", "+", ",", "-", "/", ":", ";", "<", "=", ">", "?", "[", "¥", "]", "_", "`",
"{", "|", "}", "~"
FIA_PSK_EXT.1 Extended: Pre-Shared Key Composition
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit
Generation)
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FIA_PSK_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to use pre-shared keys for IPsec.
FIA_PSK_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall be able to accept text-based pre-shared keys that are:
 22 characters in length and [selection: [assignment: other supported lengths], no other
lengths];
 composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and special
characters (that include: "!", "@", "#", "$", "%", "^", "&", "*", "(", and ")").
[selection: [assignment: other supported lengths], no other lengths]
– [assignment: other supported lengths]
[assignment: other supported lengths]
– Up to 24 characters
FIA_PSK_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall condition the text-based pre-shared keys by using [selection: SHA-1, SHA-256,
SHA-512, [assignment: method of conditioning text string]] and be able to [selection: use no
other pre-shared keys; accept bit-based pre-shared keys; generate bit-based pre-shared keys
using the random bit generator specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1].
[selection: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512, [assignment: method of conditioning text string]]
– SHA-1, SHA-256, [assignment: method of conditioning text string]
[assignment: method of conditioning text string]
– SHA-384
[selection: use no other pre-shared keys; accept bit-based pre-shared keys; generate bit-based
pre-shared keys using the random bit generator specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1]
– use no other pre-shared keys
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall allow [assignment: list of TSF mediated actions that do not conflict
with the User Data Access Control SFP, and do not provide access to D.TSF.CONF, and do
not change any TSF data] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
[assignment: list of TSF mediated actions that do not conflict with the User Data Access Control
SFP, and do not provide access to D.TSF.CONF, and do not change any TSF data]
– Submit Fax receive job
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-
mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only [assignment: list of feedback] to the user while the authentication is
in progress.
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[assignment: list of feedback]
– *, ●
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall allow [assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions that do not conflict
with the User Data Access Control SFP, and do not provide access to D.TSF.CONF, and do
not change any TSF data] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
[assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions that do not conflict with the User Data Access
Control SFP, and do not provide access to D.TSF.CONF, and do not change any TSF data]
– Submit Fax receive job
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-
mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_USB.1.1 The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf
of that user: [assignment: list of user security attributes].
[assignment: list of user security attributes]
– User Name, Role
FIA_USB.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user security attributes
with subjects acting on the behalf of users: [assignment: rules for the initial association of
attributes].
[assignment: rules for the initial association of attributes]
– None
FIA_USB.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user security attributes
associated with subjects acting on the behalf of users: [assignment: rules for the changing of
attributes].
[assignment: rules for the changing of attributes]
– None
6.2.6 Class FMT: Security Management
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
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FMT_MOF.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: determine the behaviour of, disable,
enable, modify the behaviour of] the functions [assignment: list of functions] to U.ADMIN.
[selection: determine the behaviour of, disable, enable, modify the behaviour of]
– disable, enable
[assignment: list of functions]
– TLS
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall enforce the User Data Access Control SFP to restrict the ability to
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]] the security
attributes [assignment: list of security attributes] to [assignment: the authorised identified roles].
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]
– query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]
[assignment: other operations]
– create
[assignment: list of security attributes]
– Refer to " Security attributes " in Table 18 - Management security attributes
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
– Refer to " Authorised role(s)" in Table 18 - Management security attributes
Table 18 - Management of security attributes
Security attributes Operation Authorised role(s)
User Name
query
U.ADMIN,
the owning U.NORMAL
create,delete U.ADMIN
Role
query U.ADMIN
create,modify,delete U.ADMIN
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1 Refinement: The TSF shall enforce the User Data Access Control SFP to provide [selection,
choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]] default values for security
attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
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[selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]]
– restrictive
FMT_MSA.3.2 Refinement: The TSF shall allow the [selection: U.ADMIN, no role] to specify alternative
initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.
[selection: U.ADMIN, no role]
– no role
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MTD.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall restrict the ability to perform the specified operations on the
specified TSF Data to the roles specified in Table 19.
Table 19 - Device management Function
Data Operation Authorised role(s)
User password
create, delete U.ADMIN
modify
U.ADMIN,
the owning U.NORMAL
Audit log query U.ADMIN
Date/Time setting modify U.ADMIN
IPSec settings query, modify U.ADMIN
TLS settings query, modify U.ADMIN
Auto Reset Time setting query, modify U.ADMIN
Lockout policy settings query, modify U.ADMIN
Password policy settings query, modify U.ADMIN
Audit log export settings query, modify U.ADMIN
Firmware modify U.ADMIN
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1: The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [assignment:
list of management functions provided by the TSF].
[assignment: list of management functions provided by the TSF]
– Refer to Table 20.
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Table 20 – Management Functions
Management Functions
User Manegement Function
Date/Time setting Manegement Function
IPSec settings Manegement Function
TLS settings Manegement Function
Auto Reset Time setting Manegement Function
Lockout policy settings Manegement Function
Password policy settings Manegement Function
Audit log Manegement Function
Trusted Update Manegement Function
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_SMR.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall maintain the roles U.ADMIN, U.NORMAL
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
6.2.7 Class FPR: Privacy
There are no class FPR requirements.
6.2.8 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF
FPT_KYP_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Key and Key Material
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_KYP_EXT.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall not store plaintext keys that are part of the keychain
specified by FCS_KYC_EXT.1 in any Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage Device.
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of TSF Data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_SKP_EXT.1.1The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private keys.
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
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FPT_STM.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.
FPT_TST_EXT.1 Extended: TSF testing
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests during initial start-up (and power on) to demonstrate
the correct operation of the TSF.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Extended: Trusted Update
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FCS_COP.1(b) Cryptographic Operation (for signature
generation/verification),
FCS_COP.1(c) Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm).
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide authorized administrators the ability to query the current
version of the TOE firmware/software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorized administrators the ability to initiate updates to
TOE firmware/software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall provide a means to verify firmware/software updates to the TOE
using a digital signature mechanism and [selection: published hash, no other functions] prior to
installing those updates.
[selection: published hash, no other functions]
– no other functions
6.2.9 Class FRU: Resource Utilization
There are no class FRU requirements.
6.2.10 Class FTA: TOE Access
FTA_SSL.3 (LUI) TSF-initiated termination
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FTA_SSL.3.1 (LUI) The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after a [assignment: time interval of
user inactivity].
[assignment: time interval of user inactivity]
– User inactivity at the control panel lasting for the specified period of time
FTA_SSL.3 (RUI) TSF-initiated termination
Hierarchical to: No other components.
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Dependencies: No dependencies.
FTA_SSL.3.1 (RUI) The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after a [assignment: time interval of
user inactivity].
[assignment: time interval of user inactivity]
– User inactivity at the Remote UI lasting for the specified period of time
6.2.11 Class FTP: Trusted Paths/Channels
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 Extended: IPsec selected, or
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 Extended: TLS selected, or
FCS_SSH_EXT.1 Extended: SSH selected, or
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 Extended: HTTPS selected].
FTP_ITC.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall use [selection: IPsec, SSH, TLS, TLS/HTTPS] to provide a
trusted communication channel between itself and authorized IT entities supporting the
following capabilities: [selection: authentication server, [assignment: other capabilities]] that
is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its
end points and protection of the channel data from disclosure and detection of modification of
the channel data.
[selection: IPsec, SSH, TLS, TLS/HTTPS]
– IPsec
[selection: authentication server, [assignment: other capabilities]]
– [assignment: other capabilities]
[assignment: other capabilities]
– File server, Audio log server, Time server
FTP_ITC.1.2 Refinement: The TSF shall permit the TSF, or the authorized IT entities, to initiate
communication via the trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.3 Refinement: The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [assignment: list
of services for which the TSF is able to initiate communications].
[assignment: list of services for which the TSF is able to initiate communications]
– Send service, Audit log service, Time service
FTP_TRP.1(a) Trusted path (for Administrators)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 Extended: IPsec selected, or
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 Extended: TLS selected, or
FCS_SSH_EXT.1 Extended: SSH selected, or
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 Extended: HTTPS selected].
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FTP_TRP.1.1(a) Refinement:The TSF shall use [selection, choose at least one of: IPsec, SSH, TLS,
TLS/HTTPS] to provide a trusted communication path between itself and remote
administrators that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured
identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from disclosure and
detection of modification of the communicated data.
[selection, choose at least one of: IPsec, SSH, TLS, TLS/HTTPS]
– IPsec, TLS/HTTPS
FTP_TRP.1.2(a) Refinement:The TSF shall permit remote administrators to initiate communication via the
trusted path
FTP_TRP.1.3(a) Refinement:The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for initial administrator
authentication and all remote administration actions.
FTP_TRP.1(b) Trusted path (for Non-administrators)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 Extended: IPsec selected, or
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 Extended: TLS selected, or
FCS_SSH_EXT.1 Extended: SSH selected, or
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 Extended: HTTPS selected].
FTP_TRP.1.1(b) Refinement: The TSF shall use [selection, choose at least one of: IPsec, SSH, TLS,
TLS/HTTPS] to provide a trusted communication path between itself and remote users that is
logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end
points and protection of the communicated data from disclosure and detection of modification
of the communicated data.
[selection, choose at least one of: IPsec, SSH, TLS, TLS/HTTPS]
– IPsec
FTP_TRP.1.2(b) Refinement: The TSF shall permit [selection: the TSF, remote users] to
initiate communication via the trusted path
[selection: the TSF, remote users]
– remote users
FTP_TRP.1.3(b) Refinement: The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for initial
user authentication and all remote user actions.
6.3 Security Assurance Requirements
Table 21 lists the Security Assurance Requirements for Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices, and related
EAL1 augmented by ASE_SPD.1.
Table 21 -TOE Security Assurance Requirements
Assurance class Assurance components
ADV: Development ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
AGD: Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
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Assurance class Assurance components
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ASE: Security Target evaluation ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational
environment
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ATE: Tests ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – Conformance
AVA: Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
6.4 Security functional requirements rationale
6.4.1 The dependencies of security requirements
This section provides the justification for any dependencies not met
Table 22 - The dependencies of security requirements
Functional
Requirement
Dependencies required
by CC
Dependencies satisfied
by ST
Reason for not meeting
dependencies
FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 FPT_STM.1 N/A (dependencies are
satisfied)
FAU_GEN.2 FAU_GEN.1
FIA_UID.1
FAU_GEN.1
FIA_UID.1
N/A (dependencies are
satisfied)
FAU_SAR.1 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1 N/A (dependencies are
satisfied)
FAU_SAR.2 FAU_SAR.1 FAU_SAR.1 N/A (dependencies are
satisfied)
FAU_STG.1 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1 N/A (dependencies are
satisfied)
FAU_STG.4 FAU_STG.1 FAU_STG.1 N/A (dependencies are
satisfied)
FAU_STG_EXT.1 FAU_GEN.1
FTP_ITC.1
FAU_GEN.1
FTP_ITC.1
N/A (dependencies are
satisfied)
FCS_CKM.1(a) FCS_COP.1(b)
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
FCS_COP.1(b)
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
N/A (dependencies are
satisfied)
FCS_CKM.1(b) [FCS_COP.1(a),
or FCS_COP.1(d),
or FCS_COP.1(e),
or FCS_COP.1(f),
or FCS_COP.1(g),
or FCS_COP.1(h)]
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
FCS_RBG_EXT.1
FCS_COP.1(a)
FCS_COP.1(d)
FCS_COP.1(g)
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
FCS_RBG_EXT.1(network)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1(ssd)
N/A (dependencies are
satisfied)
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 [FCS_CKM.1(a)
or FCS_CKM.1(b)]
FCS_CKM.1(a)
FCS_CKM.1(b)
N/A (dependencies are
satisfied)
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Functional
Requirement
Dependencies required
by CC
Dependencies satisfied
by ST
Reason for not meeting
dependencies
FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4 [FCS_CKM.1(a)
or FCS_CKM.1(b)]
FCS_CKM.1(a)
FCS_CKM.1(b)
N/A (dependencies are
satisfied)
FCS_COP.1(a) FCS_CKM.1(b)
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
FCS_CKM.1(b)
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
N/A (dependencies are
satisfied)
FCS_COP.1(b)(update) FCS_CKM.1(a)
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
No dependencies Since only the verification is
performed with the public key
embedded in advance,
generation and destruction of
the encryption key are
unnecessary.
FCS_COP.1(b)(tls) FCS_CKM.1(a)
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
FCS_CKM.1(a)
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
N/A (dependencies are
satisfied)
FCS_COP.1(b)(ipsec) FCS_CKM.1(a)
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
FCS_CKM.1(a)
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
N/A (dependencies are
satisfied)
FCS_COP.1(c) No dependencies No dependencies N/A (no dependencies)
FCS_COP.1(d) FCS_CKM.1(b)
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
FCS_CKM.1(b)
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
N/A (dependencies are
satisfied)
FCS_COP.1(g) FCS_CKM.1(b)
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
FCS_CKM.1(b)
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
N/A (dependencies are
satisfied)
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 FCS_TLS_EXT.1 FCS_TLS_EXT.1 N/A (dependencies are
satisfied)
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 FIA_PSK_EXT.1
FCS_CKM.1(a)
FCS_COP.1(a)
FCS_COP.1(b)
FCS_COP.1(c)
FCS_COP.1(g)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1
FIA_PSK_EXT.1
FCS_CKM.1(a)
FCS_COP.1(a)
FCS_COP.1(b) (ipsec)
FCS_COP.1(c)
FCS_COP.1(g)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1(networ
k)
N/A (dependencies are
satisfied)
FCS_KYC_EXT.1 [FCS_COP.1(e),
or FCS_SMC_EXT.1,
or FCS_COP.1(f),
or FCS_KDF_EXT.1,
and/or FCS_COP.1(i)]
FCS_SMC_EXT.1 N/A (dependencies are
satisfied)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1
(network)
No dependencies No dependencies N/A (no dependencies)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1(ssd) No dependencies No dependencies N/A (no dependencies)
FCS_SMC_EXT.1 FCS_COP.1(c) FCS_COP.1(c) N/A (dependencies are
satisfied)
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 FCS_CKM.1(a)
FCS_COP.1(a)
FCS_COP.1(b)
FCS_COP.1(c)
FCS_COP.1(g)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1
FCS_CKM.1(a)
FCS_COP.1(a)
FCS_COP.1(b)(tls)
FCS_COP.1(c)
FCS_COP.1(g)
N/A (dependencies are
satisfied)
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Functional
Requirement
Dependencies required
by CC
Dependencies satisfied
by ST
Reason for not meeting
dependencies
FCS_RBG_EXT.1(networ
k)
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1 N/A (dependencies are
satisfied)
FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.3
N/A (dependencies are
satisfied)
FDP_DSK_EXT.1 FCS_COP.1(d) FCS_COP.1(d) N/A (dependencies are
satisfied)
FDP_FXS_EXT.1 No dependencies No dependencies N/A (no dependencies)
FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1 N/A (dependencies are
satisfied)
FIA_ATD.1 No dependencies No dependencies N/A (no dependencies)
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 No dependencies No dependencies N/A (no dependencies)
FIA_PSK_EXT.1 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 No dependencies FCS_RBG_EXT.1 is not
claimed because:
Not required because it is not
selected in SFR.
FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1 N/A (dependencies are
satisfied)
FIA_UAU.7 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1 N/A (dependencies are
satisfied)
FIA_UID.1 No dependencies No dependencies N/A (no dependencies)
FIA_USB.1 FIA_ATD.1 FIA_ATD.1 N/A (dependencies are
satisfied)
FMT_MOF.1 FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
N/A (dependencies are
satisfied)
FMT_MSA.1 FDP_ACC.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
N/A (dependencies are
satisfied)
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1
N/A (dependencies are
satisfied)
FMT_MTD.1 FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
N/A (dependencies are
satisfied)
FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies No dependencies N/A (no dependencies)
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1 N/A (dependencies are
satisfied)
FPT_KYP_EXT.1 No dependencies No dependencies N/A (no dependencies)
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 No dependencies No dependencies N/A (no dependencies)
FPT_STM.1 No dependencies No dependencies N/A (no dependencies)
FPT_TST_EXT.1 No dependencies No dependencies N/A (no dependencies)
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 FCS_COP.1(b)
FCS_COP.1(c)
FCS_COP.1(b) (update)
FCS_COP.1(c)
N/A (dependencies are
satisfied)
FTA_SSL.3(LUI) No dependencies No dependencies N/A (no dependencies)
FTA_SSL.3(RUI) No dependencies No dependencies N/A (no dependencies)
FTP_ITC.1 [FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1,
or FCS_TLS_EXT.1,
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 N/A (dependencies are
satisfied)
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Functional
Requirement
Dependencies required
by CC
Dependencies satisfied
by ST
Reason for not meeting
dependencies
or FCS_SSH_EXT.1,
or FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1]
FTP_TRP.1(a) [FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1,
or FCS_TLS_EXT.1,
or FCS_SSH_EXT.1,
or FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1]
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1
FCS_TLS_EXT.1
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1
N/A (dependencies are
satisfied)
FTP_TRP.1(b) [FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1,
or FCS_TLS_EXT.1,
or FCS_SSH_EXT.1,
or FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1]
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 N/A (dependencies are
satisfied)
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7. TOE Summary specification
7.1 User Authentication Function
– Supported functional requirements: FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.7, FIA_ATD.1,
FIA_USB.1, FIA_AFL.1, FTA_SSL.3(LUI), FTA_SSL.3(RUI)
To identify and authenticate a legitimate user, the TOE requires identification and authentication of the user
before the user operates the digital multifunction device in an operation panel or a remote UI. When a print
job is input, identification authentication of a user requested through a printer driver on a client PC is
performed. However, submission of a fax receiving job is permitted. [FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UID.1]
User authentication supports the following authentication methods:
– Internal Authentication
Authentication is based on user information registered in the device.
For user authentication, the TOE prompts input of the user name, password, and the login destination. User
authentication succeeds only if the user name and password matches the one at the specified destination. The
password text area at the time of password input is displayed as "*" in the operation panel and "●" in the
remote UI. [FIA_UAU.7]
The TOE maintains user names and roles as attributes for the user. If the user's identity is successfully
authenticated, the attribute is allocated by issuing an access control token (ACT) for each user.[FIA_ATD.1,
FIA_USB.1]
The TOE provides a lockout function in order to minimize invalid login attempts. [FIA_AFL.1]
The lockout function can be set only by U.ADMIN. The operation is as follows
The following conditions can be set for the lockout function. If the conditions are met, the account is locked
out.
– Accumulate the number of failed login attempts from the operation panel/remote UI/printer driver,
and lock out the account that failed to log in and deny login when the set number of allowable login
attempts is reached. The allowable number of login attempts is set to 3 or less out of 1 - 10.
– The lockout time is set to 3 or grater out of 1 - 60. The user is not allowed to log in during the
configured lockout time.
TOE has an automatic logout function that automatically logs out a logged-in user after a specified period of
inactivity. The administrator can set the automatic logout time by setting the Auto Reset Time when logging
in from the operation panel or by session settings when logging in from the remote UI. [FTA_SSL.3(LUI)]
[FTA_SSL.3(RUI)]
Operation
panel:
– Settings/Registration > Device Settings > Management Settings > User
Management > Authentication Management > Use User Authentication >
Register/Edit Authentication User
Remote UI: – Settings/Registration > Management Settings > User Management >
Authentication Management
Operation
panel:
– Settings/Registration > Device Settings > Management Settings > Security
Settings > Authentication/Password Settings > Authentication Function Settings>
Remote UI: – Settings/Registration > Management Settings > Security Settings >
Authentication/Password Settings > Authentication Function Settings>
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The automatic logout time settings can be set only by U.ADMIN. The operation is as follows
The following conditions can be set for the automatic logout function. If the conditions are met, the account
is logged out.
– At the control panel, session timeout occurs after a specified period of user inactivity. A value from
10 seconds to 9 minutes can be specified (Initial value: 2 minutes).
The session settings can be set only by U.ADMIN. The operation is as follows
The following conditions can be set for the session management function. If the conditions are met, the
account is logged out.
– When the timeout period set by the session management setting function has elapsed without
operating the Remote UI. Choose from 15 to 150 minutes (Initial value: 15 minutes).
7.2 Access Control Function
The TOE has the following access control functions for jobs and documents in jobs processed by the print
function, scan function, copy function, fax function, and document storage and retrieval function of the TOE.
– print function: print process control function
– scanning function: scan process control function
– copy function: copy process control function
– fax function: Fax transmission process control function and fax reception process control function
– document store and retrieve function: document store and retrieve process control function
The TOE performs these access control functions by identifying the user name and identifying the role
assigned to the user according to the contents of the ACT issued to the user who is identified and
authenticated.
7.2.1 Print process control function
– Supported functional requirements: FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FMT_MSA.3
TOE provides the following access control function for the print process. The user name assigned to print
jobs is initialized with the name of the user that generated the job when the job is generated. No users can
change the user name assigned to jobs.
When a print job is executed, TOE temporarily saves it without printing immediately. Furthermore, TOE
determines the owner of a print job via the user name assigned to the print job, and performs the following
access control.
Operation
panel:
– Settings/Registration > Device Settings > Preferences > Timer/Energy Settings >
Auto Reset Time
– Settings/Registration > Device Settings > Preferences> Timer/Energy Settings >
Restrict Auto Reset Time
Remote UI: – Settings/Registration > Preferences > Timer/Energy Settings > Power Save
Settings > Auto Reset Time
– Settings/Registration > Preferences > Timer/Energy Settings > Restrict Auto Reset
Time
Remote UI: – Settings/Registration > Preferences > Network Settings > Session Settings
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[Submit a document to be printed, Create print job]
TOE allow all authenticated users (Job owner, U.ADMIN or U.NORMAL) to submit a document to be
printed and to create print job. TOE does not allow Unauthenticated users.
The method for inputting print documents and creating print jobs is indicated below. The data for printing is
held by the print function.
- The user executes printing via a printer driver from a client PC. User authentication is performed when a
user uses the user authentication function of the printer driver to log in to the machine when printing. If
user authentication is successful, the print job is sent with the user name assigned. The print job is not
sent if user authentication fails.
[View image or Release printed output]
TOE allow Job owner (a user whom user name is same as use name of the print job) to view image or release
printed output the images of digital documents for print jobs that are temporarily saved.
The method for viewing image or release printed output is indicated below.
- If a user logs in to the machine and selects <Print>, the list of data held for the logged in user is
displayed.
- The print function can display images for the held data.
- The data held by the print function can be printed.
TOE does not allow U,ADMIN, U.NORMAL or Unauthenticated users to view image or to release printed
output.
[View print queue / log]
TOE allow Job owner or U.ADMIN to view print queue / log.
The method for viewing the print queue / log is indicated below.
- Job owner and U.ADMIN can log in to the control panel and use the <Status Monitor/Cancel> screen to
check the list of jobs that are printing/waiting to be printed or check the job log. However, for Job
owner, the job log only displays the jobs that the user owns (when the name of the user matches the user
name of the print job). For jobs owned by other users, information such as job names and user names are
masked and cannot be viewed in the print queue / log.
- If a Job owner logs in to the machine and selects <Print>, the list of data held for the logged in user is
displayed.
- U.ADMIN can log in to the Remote UI and use the [Status Monitor/Cancel] screen to check the list of
jobs that are printing/waiting to be printed or check the job log.
TOE does not allow U.NORMAL or Unauthenticated users to view print queue / log.
[Modify stored document, Modify print job]
TTOE allow Job owner to modify stored document and modify print job.
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The method for modifying print document and modifying print job is indicated below.
- If a user logs in to the machine and selects <Print>, the list of data held for the logged in user is
displayed. The image view function of the print function can be used to modify (delete) individual pages.
- If a user logs in to the machine and selects <Print>, the list of data held for the logged in user is
displayed. If you select a job, you can change the job conditions (number of copies, print range, etc.)
TOE does not allow U,ADMIN, U.NORMAL or Unauthenticated users to Modify stored document and
Modify print job.
[Delete stored document, Cancel print job]
TOE allow Job owner or U.ADMIN to delete stored document and cancel print job.
The method for deleting stored document and canceling print job is indicated below.
- If a Job owner logs in to the machine and accesses <Print>, the list of data held for the job owner is
displayed. The job deletion function of the print function can be used to delete all print jobs and print
documents.
- You can log in to the machine and select and cancel print jobs from the Status Monitor screen to delete
print documents. Job owner can delete the print jobs they own and U.ADMIN can delete the print jobs
and print documents of all users.
- U.ADMIN can log in to the Remote UI to delete the print jobs and print documents of all users from the
[Status Monitor/Cancel] screen.
TOE does not allow U.NORMAL or Unauthenticated users to delete stored document and cancel print job.
7.2.2 Scan process control function
– Supported functional requirements: FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FMT_MSA.3
TOE provides the following access control functions for the scan process. The user name assigned to scan
jobs is initialized with the name of the user that generated the job when the scan job is generated. Also, no
user can change the user name assigned to the scan document and the scan job.
Scan job has a function for temporarily saving scan jobs, which are [Delayed scan] and [Preview],
respectively.
[Delayed scan]
When a scan job with the Delayed scan mode is executed, the machine temporarily saves the job without
sending it until the specified time.
[Preview]
The TOE can be transmitted after the job contents are previewed and confirmed without transmitting
immediately after reading the original when the scan job with the preview setting is inputted.
[Submit a document for scanning, Create scan job]
TOE allow Job owner, U.ADMIN or U.NORMAL to submit a document for scanning and create scan job.
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The method for submitting a document for scanning and creating scan job is indicated below.
- Place the document on the scanner, log in to the operation panel, select <Scan and Send>, select the
destination and press <START> button. The destination can be a file server. A scan job is generated, the
document is read, and image data are stored. After that, it is transmitted to the file server from the LAN
connected to the TOE.
- Place the document on the scanner, log in to the operation panel, select <Fax>, select the recipient and
press <START> button. When the fax transmission document is previously set to be backed up, a scan
job is generated, the document is read, and image data is stored. After that, it is transmitted to the
specified file server from the LAN connected to the TOE.
TOE does not allow Unauthenticated users to submit a document for scanning and create scan job.
[View scanned image]
TOE allow Job owner to view scanned image.
The method for viewing scanned image is indicated below.
- Place the document on the scanner, log in to the operation panel, select <Scan and Send>, select the
destination. Enable the <Preview> mode in the <Options> settings and press <START> button. The
document is scanned and the scanned image is displayed on the touch panel display.
TOE does not allow U,ADMIN, U.NORMAL or Unauthenticated users to view scanned image.
[View scan status / log]
TOE allow Job owner, U.ADMIN or U.NORMAL to view scan status / log.
The method for viewing scan status / log is indicated below.
- Log in to the operation panel and check the job status and job history by "Send" on the "Status Monitor".
However, in the case of U.NORMAL, a job list containing another user's job can be displayed in the job
status, but details such as the destination of another user's job are not displayed. Also, only log in user's
job is displayed in the job history.
- U.ADMIN logs in to the remote UI, and the job status and job history can be checked by "Send" on the
"Status Monitor/Cancel".
TOE does not allow Unauthenticated users to view scan status / log.
[Modify stored image]
TOE allow Job owner to modify stored image.
The method for modifying stored image is indicated below.
- Place the document on the scanner, log in to the operation panel, select <Scan and Send>, select the
destination. Enable the <Preview> mode in the <Options> settings and press <START> button. The
document is scanned and pages can be deleted or moved while the scanned image is displayed on the
touch panel display.
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TOE does not allow U,ADMIN, U.NORMAL or Unauthenticated users to modify stored image.
[Modify scan job]
TOE allow Job owner or U.ADMIN to modify scan job.
The method for modifying scan job is indicated below.
- Select a job from the screen displayed by logging in to the machine and pressing <Status Monitor>
<Send> <Job Status>. The destination can be changed by displaying <Details>.
TOE does not allow U.NORMAL or Unauthenticated users to modify scan job.
[Delete stored image, Cancel scan job]
TOE allow Job owner or U.ADMIN to delete stored image or cancel scan job.
The method for deleting stored image or canceling scan job is indicated below.
- Place the originals on the scanner, log in to the machine, select <Scan and Send>, select the destination,
and press <START>. Press <Cancel> on the scanning screen to delete the scanned send image and delete
the send job.
- Place the originals on the scanner, log in to the machine, select [Scan and Send], and select the
destination. Then enable the <Preview> mode in <Options> and press <START>. Stop the send job with
the send document displayed on the touch panel display after the originals are scanned to delete the send
document and the send job.
- Place the originals on the scanner, log in to the machine, select <Scan and Send>, and select the
destination. Then enable the <Delayed Send> mode in <Options> and press <START>. Display the send
job status on the <Status Monitor> screen after the originals are scanned. Select a send job and press
<Cancel> to delete the send document and send job. When the machine is set to back up sent fax
documents, if you select a send job in <Status Monitor> and press <Cancel>, the scan document and scan
job sent to the backup destination are deleted. However, a job owner can only delete send jobs when the
name of the user matches the user name of the send job.
- U.ADMIN can log in to the Remote UI, select and cancel send jobs from the [Status Monitor/Cancel]
screen to delete send documents and send jobs.
TOE does not allow U.NORMAL or Unauthenticated users to delete stored image or cancel scan job.
7.2.3 Copy process control function
– Supported functional requirements: FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FMT_MSA.3
TOE provides the following access control function for the copy process. The user name assigned to copy
jobs is initialized with the name of the user that generated the job when the copy job is generated. No users
can change the user name assigned to jobs.
[Submit a document for copying, Create copy job]
TOE allow Job owner, U.ADMIN or U.NORMAL to submit a document for copying or create copy job.
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The method for submitting a document for copying or creating copy job is indicated below.
- Place the originals on the scanner, log in to the machine, and select <Copy>. Specify the required settings
and press <START> button. A copy job is created and the originals are scanned.
TOE does not allow Unauthenticated users to submit a document for copying or create copy job.
[View scanned image or Release printed copy output]
TOE allow Job owner to view scanned image or release printed copy output.
The method for viewing scanned image or releasing printed copy output is indicated below.
- Place the originals on the scanner, log in to the machine, press <Copy>, and select <Merge Job Blocks>
from <Options>. The image can be displayed by selecting a job that has been scanned by pressing
<START> button and selecting <Display Image> from <Edit & Adjust>.
TOE does not allow U,ADMIN, U.NORMAL or Unauthenticated users to view scanned image or release
printed copy output.
[View copy status / log]
TOE allow Job owner or U.ADMIN to view copy status / log.
The method for view copy status / log is indicated below.
- You can check the job status and job log from the screen displayed by logging in to the machine and
pressing <Status Monitor> > <Copy/Print>. However, for job owners, only their own jobs are displayed
in the job log.
- U.ADMIN can check the job status and job log from the screen displayed by logging in to the Remote UI
and clicking [Status Monitor/Cancel] > [Copy/Print].
TOE does not allow U.NORMAL or Unauthenticated users to view copy status / log.
[Modify stored image]
TOE allow Job owner to modify stored image.
The method for modifying stored image is indicated below.
- Place the originals on the scanner, log in to the machine, press <Copy>, and select <Merge Job Blocks>
from <Options>. Press <START> and specify the page of a scanned job to delete that page.
TOE does not allow U,ADMIN, U.NORMAL or Unauthenticated users to modify stored image.
[Modify copy job]
TOE does not have a function for modifying copy jobs.
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Therefore, TOE does not allow job owner, U.ADMIN, U.NORMAL, or Unauthenticated users to modify
copy jobs.
[Delete stored image, Cancel copy job]
TOE allow Job owner or U.ADMIN to delete stored image and cancel copy job.
The method for deleting stored image and canceling copy job is indicated below.
- Place the originals on the scanner, log in to the machine, select <Copy>, and press <START>. Job
owners can press <Cancel> on the original scanning screen to cancel the copy job and delete the scanned
image data.
- Place the originals on the scanner, log in to the machine, select <Copy>, and press <START>. The
originals are scanned and copying is executed. Cancel a copy job that is executing on the Status Monitor
screen to cancel the copy job and delete the scanned image data.
- U.ADNIN can log in to the Remote UI and select and cancel jobs from the [Status Monitor/Cancel]
screen to cancel copy jobs and delete scanned image data.
TOE does not allow U.NORMAL or Unauthenticated users to delete stored image and cancel copy job.
7.2.4 Fax transmission process control
– Supported functional requirements: FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FMT_MSA.3
TOE provides the following access control functions for the fax tarnsmission process. The user name
assigned to fax send job is initialized with the name of the user that generated the job when the fax send job
is generated. Also, no user can change the user name assigned to the fax send document and the fax send job.
Fax send job has a function for temporarily saving fax send jobs, which are [Delayed scan] and [Preview],
respectively.
[Delayed scan]
When a fax send job with the Delayed scan mode is executed, TOE temporarily saves the job without
sending it until the specified time.
[Preview]
TOE can be transmitted after the job contents are previewed and confirmed without transmitting immediately
after reading the original when the fax send job with the preview setting is inputted.
[Submit a document to send as a fax, Create fax send job]
TOE allow Job owner, U.ADMIN or U.NORMAL to submit a document to send as a fax, create fax send
job.
The method for submitting a document for submitting a document to send as a fax, creating fax send job is
indicated below.
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- Place the document on the scanner, log in to the operation panel, select <Fax>, select the destination and
press <START> button. A fax send job is generated, the document is read, and image data are stored.
After that, it is faxed throuth the PSTN connected to the TOE.
TOE does not allow Unauthenticated users to submit a document to send as a fax, create fax send job.
[View scanned image]
TOE allow Job owner to view scanned image.
The method for viewing scanned image is indicated below.
- Place the document on the scanner, log in to the operation panel, select <Fax>, select the destination.
Enable the <Preview> mode in the <Options> settings and press <START> button. The document is
scanned and the scanned image is displayed on the touch panel display.
However, when faxing a received fax document in the Memory RX Inbox from the <Fax/I-Fax Inbox>, you
cannot preview the fax send image.
TOE does not allow U,ADMIN, U.NORMAL or Unauthenticated users to view scanned image.
[View fax job queue / log]
TOE allow Job owner, U.ADMIN or U.NORMAL to view fax job queue / log.
The method for viewingfax job queue / log is indicated below.
- Log in to the operation panel and check the job status and job history by "Send" on the "Status Monitor".
However, in the case of U.NORMAL, a job list containing another user's job can be displayed in the job
status, but details such as the destination of another user's job are not displayed. Also, only log in user's
job is displayed in the job history.
- U.ADMIN logs in to the remote UI, and the job status and job history can be checked by "Send" on the
"Status Monitor/Cancel".
TOE does not allow Unauthenticated users to view fax job queue / log.
[Modify stored image]
TOE allow Job owner to modify stored fax send image.
The method for modifying fax send image is indicated below.
- Place the document on the scanner, log in to the operation panel, select <Fax>, select the destination.
Enable the <Preview> mode in the <Options> settings and press <START> button. The document is
scanned and pages can be deleted or moved while the scanned image is displayed on the touch panel
display.
However, when faxing a received fax document in the Memory RX Inbox from the <Fax/I-Fax Inbox>, you
cannot modify stored fax send image.
TOE does not allow U,ADMIN, U.NORMAL or Unauthenticated users to modify fax send image.
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[Modify fax send job]
TOE allow Job owner or U.ADMIN to modify fax send job.
The method for modifying fax send job is indicated below.
- Select a job from the screen displayed by logging in to the machine and pressing <Status Monitor>
<Send> <Job Status>. The destination can be changed by displaying <Details>.
TOE does not allow U.NORMAL or Unauthenticated users to modify fax send job.
[Delete stored image, Cancel fax send job]
TOE allow Job owner or U.ADMIN to delete stored image or cancel fax send job.
The method for deleting stored image or canceling fax send job is indicated below.
- Place the originals on the scanner, log in to the machine, select <Fax>, select the destination, and press
<START>. Press <Cancel> on the scanning screen to delete the scanned fax send image and delete the
fax send job.
- Place the originals on the scanner, log in to the machine, select [Fax], and select the destination. Then
enable the <Preview> mode in <Options> and press <START>. Stop the fax send job with the fax send
image displayed on the touch panel display after the originals are scanned to delete the stored image and
the fax send job.
- Place the originals on the scanner, log in to the machine, select <Fax>, and select the destination. Then
enable the <Delayed Send> mode in <Options> and press <START>. Display the send job status on the
<Status Monitor> screen after the originals are scanned. Select a fax send job and press <Cancel> to
delete the stored image and fax send job. However, a job owner can only delete fax send jobs when the
name of the user matches the user name of the fax send job.
- U.ADMIN can log in to the Remote UI, select and cancel send jobs from the [Status Monitor/Cancel]
screen to delete stored image and fax send jobs.
TOE does not allow U.NORMAL or Unauthenticated users to delete stored image or cancel fax send job.
7.2.5 Fax reception process control
– Supported functional requirements: FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FMT_MSA.3
TOE provides the following access control function for the fax reception process. Since fax reception is
performed by the system, users are not set for received images or received jobs. Access to the Memory RX
Inbox where received faxes are saved is controlled via access privileges to the <Fax/I-Fax Inbox> button.
When printing a received fax job, the print job access privileges are initialized with the user name that
operated the received job. User names assigned to documents and jobs cannot be changed by any user.
TOE does not immediately print digital documents of fax receive job and instead saves them to the Memory
RX Inbox. Access to the inbox is limited to Fax owner (U. ADMIN Allows Access to Inbox U. NORMAL)
and U.ADMIN, and provides the following access control.
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[Receive a fax and store it, Create fax receive job]
When TOE receives a fax document sent from outside, it saves the received fax images to the Memory RX
Inbox and creates a received fax job. Therefore, all users can be considered allowed to save received fax
images and create fax receive job.
[View fax image or Release printed fax output]
TOE allow Fax owner and U.ADMIN to view fax image or release printed fax output.
The method for viewing received fax images is indicated below.
- Log in to the machine, press <Fax/I-Fax Inbox> <Memory RX Inbox>, and open <Memory RX Inbox>.
A list of the held fax data is displayed. You can select data and select <Display Image> to display the
received fax images.
- An U.ADMIN can also display images by logging in to the Remote UI, clicking [Access
Received/Stored Files] [Memory RX Inbox] [Memory RX Inbox], and selecting held received fax data.
The method for releasing printed fax output is performed as indicated below, and the fax data is erased after
printing.
- Log in to the machine, press <Fax/I-Fax Inbox> <Memory RX Inbox>, and open the Memory RX Inbox.
A list of the held fax data is displayed. Select the data, and press <Print> to print the fax image.
TOE does not allow U.NORMAL (other than Faxowner) and Unauthenticated users to view fax image or
release printed fax output.
[View fax receive log]
TOE allow Fax owner, U.ADMIN or U.NORMAL to view fax receive log.
The method for viewing fax receive log is indicated below.
- You can display the received fax job status by logging into the machine and displaying the <Job Status>
screen in <Status Monitor> <Receive>. You can also switch to the <Job Log> screen to display the list of
received faxes.
- U.Admin can also log in to the Remote UI and check [Job Status] and [Job Log] under [Receive] on the
[Status Monitor/Cancel] screen.
TOE does not allow Unauthenticated users to View fax receive log.
[Modify image of received fax]
TOE allow Fax owner or U.ADMIN to Modify image of received fax.
The method for Modifying image of received fax is indicated below.
- Log in to the machine, press <Fax/I-Fax Inbox> <Memory RX Inbox>, and open <Memory RX Inbox>.
A list of the held fax data is displayed. You can select data and select <Display Image> to display the
received fax images. Pages can be deleted while the image data is displayed on the touch panel display.
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TOE does not allow U.NORMAL (other than Faxowner) or Unauthenticated users to Modify image of
received fax.
[Modify fax receive job]
TOE does not have a function for modifying fax receive job.
Therefore, TOE does not allow Fax owner, U,ADMIN, U.NORMAL, or unauthenticated users to modify fax
receive job.
[Delete image of received fax]
TOE allow Fax owner or U.ADMIN to delete image of received fax.
The method for deleting image of received fax is indicated below.
- Log in to the machine, press <Fax/I-Fax Inbox> <Memory RX Inbox>, and open <Memory RX Inbox>.
A list of the held fax jobs is displayed. Select the data and press <Delete> to delete the received fax
image.
- An administrator can log in to the Remote UI, click [Access Received/Stored Files] [Memory RX Inbox]
[Memory RX Inbox], select the held received fax job, and click [Delete] to delete the received fax image.
TOE does not allow U.NORMAL(other than Faxowner) or Unauthenticated users to delete image of received
fax.
[Cancel fax receive job]
TOE allow U.ADMIN to cancel fax receive job.
The method for canceling fax receive job is indicated below.
- You can log in to the machine, press <Status Monitor> <Receive> <Job Status>, select the held fax
receive job, and press <Cancel> to delete the fax receive job.
- You can also log in to the Remote UI, click [Status Monitor/Cancel] [Job Status] under [Receive]
[Cancel] to delete the fax receive job.
TOE does not allow Fax owner, U.NORMAL or Unauthenticated users to cancel fax receive job.
7.2.6 Document store and retrieve process control function
– Supported functional requirements: FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FMT_MSA.3
TOE provides the following access control function for the document store and retrieve process.The user
name assigned to document store and retrieve process jobs is initialized with the name of the user that
generated the job when the document store and retrieve process job is generated. No users can change the
user name assigned to jobs.
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TOE has a function for saving digital documents scanned from a scanner to the Advanced Box (Advanced
Space). The destination to store the documents is a personal space inside the Advanced Box (Advanced
Space) that only the logged in user can access.
[Store document, Create retrieval job]
TOE allow Job owner, U.ADMIN or U.NORMAL to store document and create retrieval job.
The method for store document and create retrieval job is indicated below.
- For a store job, place the original on the scanner, log in to the control panel, press <Scan and Store>
<Advanced Box> <Personal Space>, and select the personal space of the user. When the Start button is
pressed, the store job is generated, the original is scanned, and an image data file is generated and stored in
the personal space.
TOE does not allow Unauthenticated users to store document and create retrieval job.
[Retrieve stored document, Create retrieval job]
TOE allow Job owner or U.ADMIN to retrieve stored document and create retrieval job.
The method for retrieving stored document and creating retrieval job is indicated below.
- For a retrieve job, log in to the control panel, press <Access Stored Files> <Advanced Box> <Personal
Space>, and select the stored file. You can press <Print> to create a print job for retrieving a document.
- In <Fax/I-Fax Inbox>, U.ADMIN can send received fax documents in the Memory RX Inbox to a file
server in the TIFF or PDF file formats. They can also send them via a fax line.
TOE does not allow U.NORMAL or Unauthenticated users to retrieve stored document and create retrieval
job.
[View storage / retrieval log]
TOE allow Job owner, U.ADMIN or U.NORMAL to view storage / retrieval log.
The method for viewing storage / retrieval log is indicated below.
- To display a store log, log in to the control panel, press <Store> <Job Log> on the <Status Monitor>
screen.
- U.ADMIN can also log in to the Remote UI, click [Status Monitor/Cancel] [Job Log] under [Store], and
select [Local Print] to display the job log for printing stored documents.
- To display a retrieve log, log in to the control panel, press <Status Monitor> <Copy/Print> <Job Log>
<Local Print> or press <Send> <Job Log> on the <Status Monitor> screen.
- U.ADMIN can also log in to the Remote UI, click [Status Monitor/Cancel] [Job Log] under [Copy/Print],
and select [Local Print] to display the retrieve log or click [Status Monitor/Cancel] [Job Log] under
[Send] to display the retrieve log
TOE does not allow Unauthenticated users to view storage / retrieval log.
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[Modify stored document]
TOE allow Job owner to modify stored document.
The method for modifying stored document is indicated below.
- Log in to the control panel, press <Access Stored Files> <Advanced Box> <Personal Space>, select the
file, and press <Edit File> <Change File Name> to change the file name.
TOE does not allow U.ADMIN, U.NORMAL or Unauthenticated users to modify stored document.
[Modify storage / retrieval job]
TOE does not have a function for modifying storage / retrieval job.
Therefore, TOE does not allow Job owner, U.ADMIN or U.NORMAL or unauthenticated users to modify
storage / retrieval job.
[Delete stored document]
TOE allow Job owner or U.ADMIN to delete stored document.
The method for deleting stored document is indicated below.
- The job owner can log in to the control panel, press <Access Stored Files> <Advanced Box> <Personal
Space>, select the file, and press <Edit File> <Delete> to delete the store document.
- U.ADMIN can log in to the control panel and press <Settings/Registration> <Function Settings>
<Store/Access Files> <Advanced Box Settings> <Delete All Personal Spaces> to delete the store
document.
- U.ADMIN can log in to the Remote UI to delete saved documents in [Settings/Registration]
[Store/Access Files] [Advanced Box Settings] [Delete Personal Space].
TOE does not allow U.NORMAL or Unauthenticated users to delete stored document.
[Cancel storage / retrieval job]
TOE allow Job owner or U.ADMIN to cancel storage / retrieval job.
The method for canceling storage / retrieval job is indicated below.
- The job owner can press <Cancel> or <STOP> displayed on the control panel after generating a store job
to delete the store job. They can also press <Cancel> in <Job Status> for <Copy/Print> or <Store> on the
<Status Monitor> screen to delete the store job.
- U.ADMIN can log in to the Remote UI, click [Status Monitor/Cancel] [Job Status] under [Store], and
click the cancel button to delete the store job.
- A job owner or U.ADMIN select the received fax document in the Memory RX Inbox from the <Fax/I-
Fax Inbox> and select the destination. Then enable the <Delayed Send> mode in <Options> and press
<START>. Display the send job status on the <Status Monitor> screen. To display a transmission job
status of a status confirmation screen. Select a send job and press <Cancel> to delete the send document
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and send job. However, a job owner can only delete a scan job when the name of the user matches the
user name of the send job.
TOE does not allow U.NORMAL and Unauthenticated users to cancel storage / retrieval job.
7.3 PSTN Fax-Network Separation Function
– Supported functional requirements:FDP_FXS_EXT.1
The TSF prohibits communication via the fax I/F except for transmission and reception of user data using the
SuperG3 protocol and the G3 protocol. Thus, the PSTN is controlled so as not to be able to intrude into the
network. [FDP_FXS_EXT.1]
The TOE fax I/F is used only for sending and receiving faxes, not for other purposes.
The following measures are taken against unauthorized fax jobs and communications using fax I/Fs. When
sending or receiving a job using a fax I/F, first, negotiation of the SuperG3 protocol and the G3 protocol is
performed with the opposite side, and if the negotiation is not successful, the line is disconnected. In this
way, attempts to communicate with protocols other than the SuperG3 protocol and the G3 protocol are
blocked to prevent unauthorized transmission and reception.
This function is always enabled and there is no interface to control the operation.
7.4 SSD Encryption Function
– Supported functional requirements:FDP_DSK_EXT.1
All access to the TOE embedded SSD is via an SSD encryption chip mounted on the TOE controller board.
Thus, all data including user data and TSF data input/output between the controller board and the TOE built-
in SSD are encrypted, and the encrypted data are stored in the TOE built-in SSD. [FDP_DSK_EXT.1.1]
The SSD encryption function is automatically enabled when an SSD is connected to the TOE and started for
the first time, and since there is no interface to control the operation, there is no need for U.ADMIN or the
user to set anything for the SSD encryption function of the TOE. [FDP_DSK_EXT.1.2]
When data including user data and TSF data is written to the TOE built-in SSD, encryption is performed via
the SSD encryption chip before writing to the TOE built-in SSD. Also, when reading from the TOE built-in
SSD, all reading is performed through the SSD encryption chip. To secure confidentiality of all data
including user data and TSF data stored in a TOE built-in SSD by an encryption/decryption function.
7.4.1 Encryption/Decryption Function
– Supported functional requirements:FCS_COP.1(d)
To ensure the confidentiality of user data and TSF data stored in the TOE built-in SSD from all interfaces,
the TOE performs the following encryption operations to encrypt all data stored in the TOE built-in SSD.
[FCS_COP.1(d)]
– To encrypt data written to a TOE built-in SSD.
– To decrypt data read from a TOE built-in SSD.
The encryption algorithm and key used for encryption operation are as follows.
– AES as specified in ISO/IEC 18033-3
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– XTS as specified in IEEE 1619
– Cryptographic key size: 256 bits
7.4.2 Cryptographic key management function
– Supported functional requirements:FCS_CKM.1(b), FCS_CKM.4, FCS_CKM.1(c),
FCS_CKM_EXT.4, FCS_RBG_EXT.1(ssd), FCS_KYC_EXT.1, FCS_SMC_EXT.1,
FPT_KYP_EXT.1, FPT_SKP_EXT.1
The CSP (Critical Security Parameter) handled by the SSD encryption function is explained.
CSP
identification
Description Storage State Method of
destruction
cryptographic
key
A key for encryption RAM in
the
encryption
chip
plaintext Lost due to
TOE power loss
key seed The internal state V and C of the
DRBG and the seed value used for
AES encryption key generation.
FLASH
memory
in the
encryption
chip
plaintext Overwrite once
with fixed value
(0xFF)
Next, the life cycle (How to generate, manage, and destroy) of the encryption key is described.
[How to Generate Cryptographic Keys]
The TOE generates a key seed to be used in the SSD encryption function based on the following
specifications when an administrator instructs the destruction/regeneration of the key seed at the time of the
first connection (That is, at the time of TOE production) or at the time of TOE disposal between the
encryption chip and the TOE controller.
The encryption chip generates Entropy Input (640 bits) and Nonce (256 bits) input to the DRBG using an
entropy generation function using a random number generator using a ring oscillator as one hardware-based
noise source. Entropy Input, generated by the entropy generator, has a minimum entropy of 400 bits, and
Nonce has a minimum entropy of 160 bits. By inputting these values into DRBG, internal states V and C of
DRBG are initialized. Then, the DRBG internal states V and C are stored in the FLASH memory in the
encryption chip as a key seed as a source of the encryption key. [FCS_RBG_EXT.1(ssd)]
The TOE inputs a key seed (DRBG internal state V, C) to the DRBG, discards the random number generated
at the first time, and computes 2 cipher keys of 256 bits by performing submask coupling using SHA -256
with internal states V and C as submasks at the second and third random number generation.
[FCS_SMC_EXT.1, FCS_COP.1(c), FCS_CKM.1(b)]
After that, TOE encrypts all data stored in the TOE built-in SSD.
When the power is turned on next time, the encryption chip automatically reconstructs the encryption key
based on the key seed and stores it in the RAM.
[How to Manage Cryptographic Keys]
Entropy generation functions are used to supply sufficient entropy to the DRBG internal states V and C
which are submasks. Since a cipher key of 256 bit length is constituted by performing submask combination
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(internal processing by Hash DRBG based on SP 800 -90 A) to this submask, the strength (256 bits) of the
cipher key is maintained at each stage of the key chain. [FCS_KYC_EXT.1]
The TOE stores the key seed from which the encryption key originates in clear text in FLASH memory in the
encryption chip. The encryption key is stored only on the RAM in the encryption chip and not in the FLASH
memory.
Since the encryption chip is mounted on the TOE controller board and the FLASH memory in the encryption
chip is not a "Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage Device", a portion of the key chain is not stored in a
plaintext, "Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage Device". [FPT_KYP_EXT.1]
There is no TOE interface to read the key seed from FLASH memory in the encryption chip out of the
encryption chip. Since there is no interface for reading the encryption key from the RAM in the encryption
chip outside the encryption chip, the key seed and the encryption key are protected from exposure.
[FPT_SKP_EXT.1]
[How to Destroy the Cryptographic Key]
The encryption key exists only on the RAM in the encryption chip. Since the encryption key becomes
unnecessary when the power is turned off, it is lost when the power is turned off.
[FCS_CKM_EXT.4/FCS_CKM.4]
The key seed becomes unnecessary when the administrator determines that the encryption key needs to be
changed, such as when the TOE is discarded. The key seed is destroyed by an instruction from the operation
panel. Destroy the key seed by overwriting it once with a fixed value (0xFF).
[FCS_CKM_EXT.4/FCS_CKM.4]
7.5 LAN Data Protection Function
7.5.1 IPSec Encription Function
– Supported functional requirements:FCS_COP.1(a), FCS_COP.1(c), FTP_ITC.1, FTP_TRP.1(a),
FTP_TRP.1(b), FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1, FIA_PSK_EXT.1, FCS_COP.1(g)
To ensure the confidentiality and integrity of user data and TSF data transmitted between the TOE and the
file server/audit log server/time server, the TOE encrypts and decrypts all IP packets using IPSec as defined
in RFC 4301 as follows. [FTP_ITC.1, FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.1]
– Encrypting operation for IP packets sent to the LAN
– Decryption operation for IP packets received from the LAN
In order to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of user data and TSF data transmitted from the client PC to
the TOE when a general user performs printing using the printer driver from the client PC, the TOE
encrypts/decrypts all IP packets using IPSec specified in RFC 4301 as follows. [FTP_TRP.1(b),
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.1]
– Encrypting operation for IP packets sent to the LAN
– Decryption operation for IP packets received from the LAN
In order to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of user data and TSF data sent and received from the client
PC to the TOE, the TOE encrypts and decrypts all IP packets using IPSec specified in RFC 4301 as follows
when an administrator performs page operation of the remote UI using a web browser from the client PC. For
the protection of the remote UI operation, not only the IPSec encryption function but also the TLS encryption
function described in 7.5.3may be used. [FTP_TRP.1(a), FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.1]
– Encrypting operation for IP packets sent to the LAN
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– Decryption operation for IP packets received from the LAN
The following cryptographic algorithms and keys are used to implement the IPSec protocol ESP as specified
in RFC 4303. [FCS_COP.1(a), FCS_COP.1(c)]
Cryptographic algorithm Cryptographic key sizes List of Standards
AES-CBC+HMAC 128 bit, 256 bit
FIPS PUB 197(AES)
NIST SP 800-38A(CBC)
FIPS PUB198-1(HMAC)
AES-GCM 128 bit, 256 bit
FIPS PUB 197(AES)
NIST SP800-38D(GCM)
– The Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) used by the above HMAC is SHA-1. SHA-1 satisfies the Keyed-
Hash Message Authentication Code specified in FIPS PUB 198-1 and the Secure Hash Standard
specified in FIPS PUB 180-3. The message digest length is 160 bits. The key length used by HMAC
is 160 bits. [FCS_COP.1(g)]
IPSec connection mode supports transport mode only. [FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.2]
IPSec connection settings define multiple, prioritized rules as the Security Policy Database (SPD).
SPD defines the peer condition (IP address, port number) to which the rule applies, the method of
communication with the peer (IKE and IPSec settings), and whether the rule itself is enabled or disabled.
When sending and receiving IP packets, it attempts to negotiate IKE from valid rules according to the SPD
priority. If IKE is not established, the packet is dropped.
When IKE is established, the communication partner condition of the rule valid from the top of the SPD
priority order is confirmed to be matched while maintaining the established IKE, and communication is
performed by IPSec setting of the first matched rule. IP packets that do not meet the communication partner
conditions of all SPDs are discarded.
If the communication cannot be performed by the first matching rule, the packet is discarded and the
matching of the communication partner condition with the lower priority rule is not confirmed.
[FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.3]
The specifications of the corresponding protocols in IPSec are as follows. [FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.4-7,9]
– IKEv1 IKEv1 as defined in RFCs 2407, 2408, 2409, and 4109, RFC4304 for extended sequence
numbers, and RFC4868 for hash functions
– IKEv1 payload cipher: AES-CBC-128/AES-CBC-256 as specified in RFC3602
– Payload ciphers fo IPSec ESP: AES-CBC-128/AES-CBC-256 specified in RFC 3602 and AES-
GCM-128/AES-GCM-256 specified in RFC 4106
– IKEv1 Phase 1 Key Exchange Uses Main Mode Only (No Aggressive Mode)
– The supported DH groups are Group 14 (2048 bit), ECDH 256 bit, and ECDH 384 bit, and
U.ADMIN sets which one to use. It is then determined by performing key exchange and key
establishment during communication.
The SA lifetime of IKEv1 can be limited by specifying a time of no more than 24 hours for Phase 1 SAs and
8 hours for Phase 2 SAs. [FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.8]
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All IKE protocols perform peer authentication using either the RSA algorithm, the ECDSA algorithm, or a
pre-shared key.[FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.10]
IPSec pre-shared keys can be configured per SPD rule. [FIA_PSK_EXT.1.1]
The number of characters of the pre-shared key can be set from 22 to 24. Available characters can be any
combination of uppercase or lowercase letters, numbers, or special characters ( "!" , "@", "#", "$", "%", "^",
"&", "*", "(", ")" ). [FIA_PSK_EXT.1.2]
Only text-based pre-shared keys are used, subject to SHA-1, SHA-256, and SHA-384. As the hash algorithm
used for the conditioning, one of SHA-1, SHA-256, and SHA-384 is selected and used by the negotiation of
IKE phase 1. [FIA_PSK_EXT.1.3]
The settings of the IPsec encryption function are set from the management function from operation panel or
the remote UI by U.ADMIN.
7.5.2 IPSec Cryptographic key management Function
– Supported functional requirements:FCS_CKM.1(a), FCS_CKM.1(b), FCS_CKM_EXT.4,
FCS_CKM.4, FPT_SKP_EXT.1
The CSP handled by the IPSec cryptographic key management function is described below.
CSP
identification
Description Storage State Method of
destruction
pre-shared key Shared key used for pre-shared
key authentication in IKEv1
SSD encripted None
MFP key pair Key pair of TOE used for
authentication by digital signature
method (RSA, ECDSA) in IKEv1
SSD encripted None
IKE cryptographic
key
Cryptographic key for encryption
used with IKEv1
RAM plain text Lost due to
TOE power loss
DH key pair
ECDH key pair
Public/private key generated
during DH/ECDH key exchange
RAM plain text Lost due to
TOE power loss
IPSec
cryptographic key
Encryption key for cryptographic
used with IPSec ESP
RAM plain text Lost due to
TOE power loss
IPSec
authentication key
Key for authentication used with
IPSec ESP
RAM plain text Lost due to
TOE power loss
DRBG internal
state
DRBG internal state for generating
random numbers
RAM plain text Lost due to
TOE power loss
The life cycle of the CSP is described below.
[How to Generate Cryptographic Keys]
Operation
panel:
– Settings/Registration > Device Settings > Preferences > Network > TCP/IP
Settings > IPSec Settings
Remote UI: – Settings/Registration > Preferences > Network Settings > IPSec Settings
– Settings/Registration > Preferences > Network Settings > IPSec Policy List
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The TOE generates encryption keys for use with the IPSec encryption feature based on the following
specifications:.
CSP identification Cryptographic Algorithm/
Key Establishment Algorithm
List of Standards
MFP key pair RSA(2048 bits) NIST SP800-56B Rev1:6.3.1.1
rsakpg1-basic
ECDSA(P-256, P-384)
FIPS PUB 186-4
NIST SP800-56A Rev3: 5.6.1.2.2
IKE cryptographic
key
AES-CBC
FIPS PUB 197(AES)
NIST SP800-38A(CBC)
DH key pair DH(Group14) NIST SP800-56A Rev3: 5.6.1.1
Approved Safe-Prime Groups
ECDH key pair ECDH(P-256, P-384) NIST SP800-56A Rev3: 5.7.1.2
IPSec cryptographic
key
AES-CBC FIPS PUB 197(AES)
NIST SP800-38A(CBC)
AES_GCM FIPS PUB 197(AES)
NIST SP800-38D(GCM)
IPSec authentication
key
HMAC FIPS PUB 198-1
The pre-shared key is set (registered/changed/deleted) by U.ADMIN using the management function of TOE
from the operation panel or the remote UI. The pre-shared key text area is displayed as "*" in the operation
panel and "●" in the remote UI. [FPT_SKP_EXT.1]
The IPSec authentication/DH/ECDH key pair is generated by negotiation during IPSec communication. For
the MFP key pair, U.ADMIN can be generated using the management function of the TOE from the
operation panel or the remote UI. [FCS_CKM.1(a)]
The TOE generates 128 bit or 256 bit AES-CBC encryption keys as IKE encryption keys using the 7.5.5
random number generation function when negotiating IPSec communications. The TOE generates an AES-
CBC or AES-GCM encryption key with a key length of 128 or 256 bits using the 7.5.5 random number
generation function when negotiating IPSec communications as an IPSec encryption key. [FCS_CKM.1(b)]
[Encryption key management method]
CSP identification Management method
pre-shared key
MFP key pair
It is encrypted by the SSD encryption function and stored in the
TOE built-in SSD.
IKE cryptographic key /
IPSec cryptographic key /
IPSec authentication key /
DH key pair/
DRBG internal state
Store in RAM in plain text.
The pre-shared key, MFP key pair, IKE encryption key, IPSec encryption key, IPSec authentication key, DH
key pair, and ECDH key pair are not read or browsed by using the management function of the TOE from the
operation panel or the remote UI. [FPT_SKP_EXT.1]
[How to destroy the encryption key]
The pre-shared key and MFP key pair are encrypted and stored in the TOE built-in SSD. Therefore, it is not
necessary to destroy it.
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The IKE encryption key/IPSec encryption key/IPSec authentication key/DH key pair/ECDH key pair/DRBG
internal state becomes unnecessary when the TOE is powered down after the IPSec communication ends, and
is lost when the TOE is powered down. [FCS_CKM_EXT.4/FCS_CKM.4]
7.5.3 TLS Encription Function
– Supported functional requirements:FCS_COP.1(a), FCS_COP.1(c), FCS_COP.1(g),
FTP_TRP.1(a), FCS_TLS_EXT.1, FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1
The TOE is encrypted/decrypted by TLS in order to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of user data and
TSF data to be transmitted/received when U.ADMIN uses the TOE for the following purposes.
Perpose User Protocol
Management with the Remote
UI using a Web Browser
U.ADMIN TLS/HTTPS
TSF negotiates TLS communication between the TOE and the client PC when a connection request is made
from a Web browser on the client PC to a Web page of the TOE by U.ADMIN, performs server
authentication using the TLS protocol, establishes a session using TLS, and starts HTTPS communication
(RFC 2818 compliant). [FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1]
However, IPSec encryption is always used for remote UI operations, and TLS encryption is not required for
protection. [FTP_TRP.1(a)]
The encryption algorithm and key used for encryption operation are as follows. The AES encryption
algorithm conforms to FIPS PUB 197. [FCS_COP.1(a)]
cryptographic algorithm cryptographic key sizes list of standards
AES-CBC 128 bit, 256 bit NIST SP800-38A
AES-GCM 128 bit, 256 bit NIST SP800-38D
TLS supports the following protocols. [FCS_TLS_EXT.1]
– TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246)
TLS supports the following ciphersuites. [FCS_COP.1(a), FCS_COP.1(c), FCS_COP.1(g),
FCS_TLS_EXT.1]
– TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
– TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
– TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
– TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
– TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
– TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
– TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
– TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
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The settings of the TLS encryption function are set from the management function from operation panel or
the remote UI by U.ADMIN.
7.5.4 TLS Cryptographic key management Function
– Supported functional requirements:FCS_CKM.1(a), FCS_CKM.1(b), FCS_CKM.4,
FCS_CKM_EXT.4, FPT_SKP_EXT.1
The CSP handled by the TLS cryptographic key management function is described below.
CSP
identification
Description Storage State Method of
destruction
MFP key pair Key pair of the TOE used for
authentication with digital
signature method (RSA or
ECDSA).
SSD encripted None
ECDH key pair Public/private key generated during
ECDH
RAM plain text Lost due to
TOE power
loss
TLS premaster
secret
Pre-master secret used for TLS
communication
RAM plain text Lost due to
TOE power
loss
TLS session key Cryptographic key for
communication Encryption
RAM plain text Lost due to
TOE power
loss
DRBG internal
state
DRBG internal state for generating
random numbers
RAM plain text Lost due to
TOE power
loss
The life cycle of the CSP is described below.
[How to Generate Cryptographic Keys]
The TOE generates encryption keys for use with the TLS encryption feature based on the following
specifications:.
CSP
identification
Cryptographic Algorithm/
Key Establishment Algorithm
List of Standards
MFP key pair
RSA(2048 bits) NIST SP800-56B Rev1:6.3.1.1
rsakpg1-basic
ECDSA(P-256, P-384) FIPS PUB 186-4
NIST SP800-56A Rev3: 5.6.1.2.2
ECDH key pair
ECDH(P-256, P-384) NIST SP800-56A Rev3: 5.7.1.2
Operation
panel:
– Settings/Registration > Device Settings > Preferences > Network > TCP/IP
Settings > TLS Settings
Remote UI: – Settings/Registration > Preferences > Network Settings > TLS Settings
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TLS session key
AES-CBC(128 bits, 256 bits) FIPS PUB 197(AES)
NIST SP800-38A(CBC)
AES-GCM(128 bits, 256 bits) FIPS PUB 197(AES)
NIST SP800-38D(GCM)
For the MFP key pair, U.ADMIN can be generated using the management function of the TOE from the
operation panel or the remote UI. [FCS_CKM.1(a)]
The TOE generates a TLS session key/TLS pre-master secret/ECDH key pair using the 7.5.5 DRBG
Function at the start of TLS communication.[FCS_CKM.1(a), FCS_CKM.1(b)]
[How to manage encryption keys]
CSP identification Cryptographic Algorithm/
Key Establishment Algorithm
MFP key pair
Encrypt by SSD encryption function and store on TOE
built-in SSD
TLS session key/TLS premaster
secret /ECDH key pair/DRBG
internal state
Store in plain text in RAM.
Even if the TOE management function is used from the operation panel or the remote UI, there is no function
to read or browse the TLS session key/TLS pre-master secret/ECDH key pair or the MFP key pair stored in
the TOE built-in SSD. [FPT_SKP_EXT.1]
[How to destroy the encryption key]
The MFP key pair is encrypted and stored on the TOE embedded SSD. Therefore, it is not necessary to
destroy it.
The TLS session key/TLS pre-master secret/ECDH key pair/DRBG internal state is no longer needed when
the TOE is powered down and is lost when the TOE is powered down. [FCS_CKM_EXT.4/FCS_CKM.4]
7.5.5 DRBG Function
– Supported functional requirements:FCS_RBG_EXT.1(network), FCS_COP.1(c)
The TOE performs random number generation based on the following specifications. The random numbers
generated by the random number generation function are used by the IPSec encryption function and the TLS
encryption function.
DRBG algolithm List of Standards
CTR_DRBG(AES) NIST SP800-90A
TOE performs random number generation by inputting an entropy sequence to CTR_DRBG according to
NIST SP 800-90A. [FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1(network)]
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As a noise source, a hardware random number generator built in the processor of TOE (Intel Atom processor
E3930) is used as a noise source by 1 hardware base. When the RDSEED instruction is executed, a 32 bit bit
string is extracted from the hardware random number generator.
When the TOE is started, the RDSEED instruction is executed 128 times, and the acquired 4096 bit bit string
is input to the Linux PRNG, which is the entropy source. It is known from [Rambus 2012] that a bit string
output from a hardware random number generator, which is a noise source, contains a minimum entropy of
more than 0.5 bits per bit, and Linux PRNG contains entropy of at least 2048 bits.
When the TOE is requested to generate a random number, an entropy sequence having a minimum entropy
of 384 bits is collected from the Linux PRNG, which is an entropy source, and input as a seed value into
CTR_DRBG to generate a random number of 256 bits. [FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2(network)]
7.6 Signature Verification and Generation Function
7.6.1 TLS Signature Generation Function
– Supported functional requirements:FCS_COP.1(b)(tls) , FCS_COP.1(c)
When a TLS session is established, a signature is generated using the following algorithm based on FIPS
PUB 186-4. [FCS_COP.1(b)(tls)]
– RSA Digital Signature Algorithm (rDSA) with key sizes of 2048 bits
– Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with key lengths of 256 and 384 bits
SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 are used for signature generation. [FCS_COP.1(c)]
Here are the possible signature algorithms and hash combinations.
– RSA2048:SHA-256, RSA2048:SHA-384, RSA2048:SHA-512
– ECDSA-256：SHA-256
– ECDSA-384：SHA-384
7.6.2 IPSec Signature Verification/Generation Function
– Supported functional requirements:FCS_COP.1(b)(ipsec), FCS_COP.1(c)
In the authentication using the certificate in IKEv1 of IPSec, signature verification/generation is performed
by the following algorithm based on FIPS PUB 186-4. [FCS_COP.1(b)(ipsec)]
– RSA Digital Signature Algorithm (rDSA) with key sizes (modulus) of 2048 bits
– Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with key sizes of 256 bits or 384 bits
A hash value calculated by SHA-256 or SHA-384 is used for signature verification/generation.
[FCS_COP.1(c)]
Here are the possible signature algorithms and hash combinations.
– RSA2048:SHA-256, RSA2048:SHA-384
– ECDSA-256:SHA-256
– ECDSA-384:SHA-384
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7.7 Self-Testing Function
– Supported functional requirements:FPT_TST_EXT.1, FCS_COP.1(b)(update), FCS_COP.1(c)
The TOE performs the following self-tests at start-up. [FPT_TST_EXT.1]
If an error is detected in the following self-test, the TOE displays an error code on the operation panel and
stops starting the TOE.
Firmware Integrity Check
– The firmware is previously signed using RSA (key length 2048 bits) and SHA-256 based on FIPS
PUB 186-4, and the integrity is verified by comparing a hash value obtained by decrypting the
signature using a public key held in advance with a hash value calculated from the firmware itself.
[FCS_COP.1(b)(update), FCS_COP.1(c)]
7.8 Audit Log Function
– Supported functional requirements:FAU_GEN.1, FAU_GEN.2, FPT_STM.1, FAU_SAR.1,
FAU_SAR.2, FAU_STG.1, FAU_STG.4, FAU_STG_EXT.1, FMT_MTD.1
The TOE generates an audit log when the following events occur. [FAU_GEN.1]
The items in the audit log are as follows. [FAU_GEN.2]
– Date and time of the event, subject identity, type of event, and the outcome (success or failure) of
the event
the following items are also added for the following events.
– job completion: Type of job
– Unsuccessful User authentication/ identification: the user name of the authentication attempt
– Failure to establish session: Reason for failure
Auditable event Details and Interfaces
Start-up of the audit functions TOE power ON
(Main Unit Power Switch, Operation Panel, Remote UI)
Shutdown of the audit functions TOE power OFF
(Main Unit Power Switch, Operation Panel, Remote UI)
Job completion End of Print Job
End of Scan Job
End of Copy Job
End of the fax transmission job
End of the fax reception job
End of the document store and retrieve Job
*All of the above are interfaces related to
FDP_ ACC.1/FDP_ACF.1
Unsuccessful User
authentication/ identification
Attempting to log in from the operation panel
Attempting to log in from the remote UI
Authentication attempts from the printer driver
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Use of Device management
functions
Interface Usage Related to FMT_SMF.1
Use of User management
functions
Interface Usage Related to FMT_SMF.1
Modification to the group of
Users that are part of a role
Interface usage related to role
registration/modification/deletion
Changes to the time Interface usage related to the ability to manage date/time
settings
Failure to establish session IPSec session establishment failure for network
communication
Failure to establish TLS session for network
communication
The date and time information recorded in the audit log is provided by the TOE. The date and time
information of the TOE is set manually by using the following management function or by acquiring an
accurate date and time from a time server and synchronizing the time. The time server is built in the user's
office environment, and communication between the TOE and the time server is performed for all IP packets
by encryption/decryption using IPSec by the LAN data protection function. In addition, the setting for using
the time server for the time management of the TOE can be set only by the U.ADMIN from the operation
panel or the remote UI. [FPT_STM.1]
The TOE provides the following functions for exporting audit logs to the audit log server.
Only U.ADMIN can set the setting of the audit log exporting function from the remote UI through the
management function.
The audit log is exported to the audit log server as a csv file using the SMB protocol. The audit log is
exported at the specified time, but when the audit log reaches 95% of the storage capacity (40,000 items), it
is sent to the audit log server regardless of the specified time. If the transmission succeeds, the exported audit
log is automatically deleted. If transmission fails, retry is performed multiple times. If it still fails, it is
exported at the next specified time. All communication between the TOE and the audit log server is
encrypted/decrypted by the IPSec encryption function. [FAU_STG_EXT.1]
TOE provides the following as an internal audit log storage function.
The administrator can view the audit log by exporting it as a CSV file from the following operations in the
remote UI. This feature is only available to U.ADMIN. [FAU_SAR.1][FAU_SAR.2] [FMT_MTD.1]
Operation
panel:
– Settings/Registration > Device Settings > Preferences > Timer/Energy Settings >
Date/Time Settings
– Settings/Registration > Device Settings > Preferences > Network > TCP/IP
Settings > SNTP Settings
Remote UI: – Settings/Registration > Preferences > Timer/Energy Settings > Date/Time Settings
– Settings/Registration > Preferences > Network Settings > SNTP Settings
Remote UI: – Settings/Registration > Management Settings > Device Management >
Export/Clear Audit Log > Settings for Auto Export Audit Logs
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The internal audit log data is stored in the TOE built-in SSD, and the confidentiality is protected by the SSD
encryption function. This TOE has no function or interface to modify the contents of the audit log. Audit logs
cannot be manually deleted because the automatic export feature is enabled. [FAU_STG.1]
Up to 40,000 audit logs are maintained. When the maximum number of audit logs to record is reached, the
oldest stored audit log is deleted and a new audit log is saved. [FAU_STG.4]
7.9 Trusted Update Function
– Supported functional requirements:FPT_TUD_EXT.1, FCS_COP.1(b)(update), FCS_COP.1(c)
[Checking the Firmware Version]
The TSF shall provide U.ADMIN the ability to query the current version of the TOE firmware/software.
U.ADMIN can check the current version of the firmware from the Remote UI and the operation panel by the
following operations. [FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1]
[Ability to Initiate Updates]
The TSF shall provide U.ADMIN the ability to initiate updates to TOE firmware/software. U.ADMIN can
manually update the firmware by specifying the firmware to be updated by the following operations in the
remote UI. [FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2]
[Verify Firmware Updates]
The TSF shall provide a means to verify firmware/software updates to the TOE using a digital signature
mechanism (Signature Verification by RSA Digital Signature Algorithm (rDSA) with key sizes of 2048 bits
based on FIPS PUB 186-4 and SHA-256) prior to installing those updates. If firmware validation fails, the
remote UI displays an error message and the update aborts. The firmware remains in the state it was in before
the update started. [FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3, FCS_COP.1(b)(update), FCS_COP.1(c)]
7.10 Management Function
7.10.1 User Management Function
– Supported functional requirements:FIA_PMG_EXT.1 , FMT_MTD.1, FMT_MSA.1,
FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SMF.1
Remote UI: – Settings/Registration > Management Settings > Device Management >
Export/Clear Audit Log > Export Audit Logs
Operation
panel:
– Counter/Device Information Key > Device Info./Other > Check Device
Configuration
Remote UI: – Status Monitor/Cancel > Device Information
Remote UI: – Settings/Registration > Management Settings > License/Other > Register/Update
Software > Manual Update
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The TOE limits operations on the following security attributes to the respective authorized roles. The
following operations can be performed from the remote UI or the operation panel. [FMT_MSA.1,
FMT_SMF.1]
Security attributes Operation Authorised role(s)
User Name
query
U.ADMIN,
the owning U.NORMAL
create,delete U.ADMIN
Role
query U.ADMIN
create,modify,delete U.ADMIN
The TOE limits operations on the following data to the respective authorized roles. The following operations
can be performed from the remote UI or the operation panel. [FMT_MTD.1, FMT_SMF.1]
Data Operation Authorised role(s)
User password
modify the owning U.NORMAL
create,modify,delete U.ADMIN
[User Password]
User passwords can contain uppercase, lowercase, numeric, and special characters ("!" , "@" , "#" , "$" ,
"%" , "^" , "&" , "*" , "(" , ")" , "(space)" , """ , "'" , "+" , "," , "-" , "/" , ":" , ";" , "<" , "=" , ">" , "?", "[", "¥",
"]", "_", "`", "{", "|", "}", "~"). The minimum number of characters can be set to 15 or more by U.ADMIN.
[FIA_PMG_EXT.1]
[Roles]
There are five types of roles called base roles: "Administrator", "Power User", "General User", "Limited
User", and "Guest User". "Administrator" is an administrator base role, and other base roles are consumer
roles.
If you want to create a new Custom Role , you can duplicate and edit from four types of Base Roles except
"Guest User". However, custom roles based on the "Administrator" role and the "DeviceAdmin" and
Operation
panel:
– The user name is displayed in the upper right of the operation panel after login.
– Settings/Registration > Device Settings > Management Settings > User
Management > Authentication Management > Register/Edit Authentication User
(U.ADMIN Only)
Remote UI: – Settings/Registration > Management Settings > User Management >
Authentication Management (U.ADMIN Only)
Operation
panel:
– Settings/Registration > Device Settings > Management Settings > User
Management > Authentication Management > Change Password
(the owning U.NORMAL)
– Settings/Registration > Device Settings > Management Settings > User
Management > Authentication Management > Register/Edit Authentication
User(U.ADMIN Only)
Remote UI: – Settings/Registration > Management Settings > User Management >
Authentication Management (U.ADMIN Only)
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"NetworkAdmin" roles that have been registered as custom roles (administrators) beforehandare not used
because they allow some administrative privileges.
In this configuration, the following two types of roles (U. ADMIN, U. NORMAL) are used. The TOE
associates these roles with legitimate users and maintains them during remote UI and operations panel logins.
[FMT_SMR.1]
– U.ADMIN
Role with administrative privileges. Use the "Administrator" role.
– U.NORMAL
A role for which you do not have administrative privileges. Use a custom role created from a base
role "General User".
Role settings can be performed from the remote UI or the operation panel by the following operations.
[FMT_SMR.1]
7.10.2 Device Management Function
– Supported functional requirements:FMT_MTD.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_MOF.1,
FIA_PMG_EXT.1
The TOE can perform the following management functions to enable the security functions to function
effectively. You can do this from the Remote UI or from the operation panel Settings/Registration > Device
Settings. [FMT_SMF.1]
Also, the ability to enable or desable the security function [TLS encryption function] is limited to U.ADMIN.
[FMT_MOF.1]
Management
Function
Item Description
Date/Time setting
Manegement
Function
Overview Date and time information can be set.
You can also set it to sync with the time server.
Procedures Operation panel: Settings/Registration > Device Settings >
Preferences > Timer/Energy Settings > Date/Time Settings
Operation panel: Settings/Registration > Device Settings >
Preferences > Network > TCP/IP Settings > SNTP Settings
Remote UI: Settings/Registration > Preferences > Timer/Energy
Settings > Date/Time Settings
Remote UI: Settings/Registration > Preferences > Network
Settings > SNTP Settings
IPSec settings
Manegement
Function
Overview Manage the Security Policy Database (SPD) that defines IPSec
connections. The SPD defines the other party's conditions to
which the conditions are applied, the negotiation and encryption
methods, and whether the settings are enabled or disabled.
The IKE configuration in the SPD allows pre-shared key
enrollment and certificate selection as authentication methods. In
the authentication/encryption algorithm setting, SHA1 and SHA2
Operation
panel:
– Settings/Registration > Device Settings > Management Settings > User
Management > Authentication Management > Register/Edit Authentication
User(U.ADMIN Only)
Remote UI: – Settings/Registration > Management Settings > User Management >
Authentication Management (U.ADMIN Only)
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(SHA 256, SHA 384) can be selected as the authentication hash,
AES-CBC can be set as the encryption method, and the DH group
can be selected. You can also configure the lifetime of IKE SAs.
In the IPSec communication configuration in the SPD, ESP
(SHA1, AES-CBC) can be specified as the IPSec SA lifetime
specification and the authentication/encryption algorithm
specification.
Procedures Operation panel: Settings/Registration > Device Settings >
Preferences > Network > TCP/IP Settings > IPSec Settings
Remote UI: Settings/Registration > Preferences > Network
Settings > IPSec Settings
Remote UI: Settings/Registration > Preferences > Network
Settings > IPSec Policy List
TLS settings
Manegement
Function
Overview The TLS cipher feature is defined to start or stop working.
It is also possible to select an encryption key and a certificate to
be used for TLS encryption communication. This selection
determines the digital signature algorithm and key length to use
when establishing a TLS session.
Procedures Operation panel: Settings/Registration > Device Settings >
Management Settings > License/Other > Remote UI
Operation panel: Settings/Registration > Device Settings >
Preferences > Network > TCP/IP Settings > TLS Settings
Remote UI: Settings/Registration > Management Settings >
License/Other > Remote UI
Remote UI: Settings/Registration > Preferences > Network
Settings > TLS Settings
Auto Reset Time
setting
Manegement
Function
Overview The administrator can set the respective automatic logout times
according to the Auto Reset time when logging in from the
operation panel and the session setting when logging in from the
remote UI.
- Auto Reset Time: 10 seconds to 9 minutes (default 2 minutes)
- Session settings: 15 to 150 minutes (default 15 minutes)
Procedures Operation panel: Settings/Registration > Device Settings >
Preferences > Timer/Energy Settings > Auto Reset Time
Operation panel: Settings/Registration > Device Settings >
Preferences > Timer/Energy Settings > Restrict Auto Reset Time
Remote UI: Settings/Registration > Preferences > Timer/Energy
Settings > Power Save Settings > Auto Reset Time
Remote UI: Settings/Registration > Preferences > Timer/Energy
Settings > Power Save Settings > Restrict Auto Reset Time
Remote UI: Settings/Registration > Preferences > Timer/Energy
Settings > Network Settings
Lockout policy
settings
Manegement
Function
Overview The lockout tolerance and lockout time can be set.
- Lockout tolerance: 1 to 10 (The default setting is 3 times or
less.)
- Lockout time: 1 to 60 minutes (The default setting is 3 minutes
or more.)
Procedures Operation panel: Settings/Registration > Device Settings >
Management Settings > Security Settings >
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Authentication/Password Settings > Authentication Function
Settings
Remote UI: Settings/Registration > Management Settings >
Security Settings > Authentication/Password Settings >
Authentication Function Settings
Password policy
settings
Manegement
Function
Overview To require the user to set a robust password, the following
functions are provided to ensure the quality of the password.
- Ability to set a minimum password length of 15 to 32 characters
- Available Characters
uppercase, lowercase, numeric, and special characters ("!" , "@" ,
"#" , "$" , "%" , "^" , "&" , "*" , "(" , ")" , "(space)" , """ , "'" ,
"+" , "," , "-" , "/" , ":" , ";" , "<" , "=" , ">" , "?", "[", "¥", "]", "_",
"`", "{", "|", "}", "~").
Procedures Operation panel: Settings/Registration > Device Settings >
Management Settings > Security Settings >
Authentication/Password Settings > Password Settings
Remote UI: Settings/Registration > Management Settings >
Security Settings > Authentication/Password Settings > Password
Settings
Audit log
Manegement
Function
Overview Can retrieve internally stored audit logs
You can configure the destination settings for sending audit logs
to the audit log server.
Procedures Remote UI: Settings/Registration > Management Settings >
Device Management > Export/Clear Audit Log
Trusted Update
Manegement
Function
Overview Specify the firmware to update
Procedures Remote UI: Settings/Registration > Management Settings >
License/Other > Register/Update Software > Manual Update
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8. References
[Rambus 2012]
Analysis of Intel's Ivy Bridge Digital Random Number Generator, Cryptography Research a division of Rambus,
2012.
https://www.rambus.com/intel-ivy-bridge-random-number-generator/
Fin