National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Aruba ClearPass Policy Manager 6.11
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-11324-2023
Dated: March 27, 2023
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, Suite 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
Aruba ClearPass Policy Manager 6.11 Validation Report Version 1.0, March 21, 2023
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Swapna Katikaneni
Jerome Myers
Mike Quintos
The Aerospace Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Cody Cummins
Matai Spivey
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 2
3 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 3
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms ................................................................................... 3
3.2 TOE Architecture................................................................................................ 3
3.3 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................ 4
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 4
4.1 Security audit ...................................................................................................... 4
4.2 Communication................................................................................................... 4
4.3 Cryptographic support ........................................................................................ 4
4.4 Identification and authentication......................................................................... 5
4.5 Security management.......................................................................................... 5
4.6 Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................... 5
4.7 TOE access.......................................................................................................... 5
4.8 Trusted path/channels ......................................................................................... 5
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope ....................................................................... 6
6 Documentation............................................................................................................ 7
7 IT Product Testing ...................................................................................................... 7
7.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................... 7
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................... 7
8 Evaluated Configuration ............................................................................................. 8
9 Results of the Evaluation ............................................................................................ 8
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)............................................................ 8
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV).............................................................. 8
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ................................................. 9
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)..................................... 9
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ................. 9
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)......................................................... 9
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results........................................................................ 10
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................. 10
11 Annexes..................................................................................................................... 10
12 Security Target.......................................................................................................... 10
13 Glossary .................................................................................................................... 11
14 Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 11
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Aruba ClearPass Policy Manager 6.11 solution
provided by Aruba, a Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company. It presents the evaluation
results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report is not an
endorsement of the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government, and no
warranty is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, MD, United States of America, and was
completed in March 2023. The information in this report is largely derived from the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer
Security Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part
2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements of the collaborative
Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 23 March 2020 (NDcPP22e) with the
Network Device Collaborative Protection Profile (NDcPP)/Application Software Protection
Profile (App PP) Extended Package (EP) for Authentication Servers, Version 1.0, 07 August
2015 (AUTHSRVEP10).
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Aruba ClearPass Policy Manager 6.11.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5). This Validation Report applies only to the specific
version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the
provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the
conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in
the Security Target (ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing
laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are
correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Aruba ClearPass
Policy Manager 6.11 Security Target, version 1.0, March 21, 2023 and analysis performed
by the Validation Team.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products
List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Aruba ClearPass Policy Manager 6.11
(Specific models identified in Section 8)
Protection Profile collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 23 March
2020 (NDcPP22e) with the Network Device Collaborative Protection Profile
(NDcPP)/Application Software Protection Profile (App PP) Extended Package
(EP) for Authentication Servers, Version 1.0, 07 August 2015 (AUTHSRVEP10)
ST Aruba ClearPass Policy Manager 6.11 Security Target, version 1.0, March 21,
2023
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Aruba ClearPass Policy Manager 6.11, version
1.0, March 21, 2023
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 extended
Sponsor Aruba, a Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company
Developer Aruba, a Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
CCEVS Validators Jerome Myers, Swapna Katikaneni, Mike Quintos
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3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The Aruba ClearPass Policy Manager platform provides role- and device-based network
access control for employees, contractors and guests across any wired, wireless and VPN
infrastructure. ClearPass implements RADIUS services, as well as profiling, onboarding,
guest access, and health checks facilitating centralized management of network access
policies. The authentication services are the focus of this evaluation and other services are
not evaluated.
ClearPass provides user and device authentication based on 802.1X, non-802.1X and web
portal access methods. Multiple authentication protocols like PEAP, EAP-FAST, EAP-TLS,
and EAP-TTLS can be used concurrently to strengthen security in any environment.
Attributes from multiple identity stores such as Microsoft Active Directory, LDAP-
compliant directory, ODBC-compliant SQL database, token servers and internal databases
can be used within a single policy for fine-grained control.
For the purpose of evaluation, ClearPass will be treated as a network infrastructure
authentication server device offering authentication services, CAVP tested cryptographic
functions, security auditing, secure administration, trusted updates, self-tests, and secure
connections to other servers (e.g., to transmit audit records).
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms
Detail regarding the evaluated configuration is provided in Section 8 below.
3.2 TOE Architecture
The ClearPass Policy Manager is available either as a hardware or virtual network appliance
and is designed to support a wide range of network, wireless and security protocols to support
a wide range of clients. However, the evaluation is limited to the hardware network
appliances and the secure communication protocols specifically identified below.
There are seven TOE appliance models designed to support different numbers of client
devices. Each platform differs in CPU performance (e.g., number of cores), available
memory, disk performance and storage capacity, and power consumption/supply.
While ClearPass Policy Manager products can be configured as a collection of devices
operating in a cluster sharing a common security policy, the TOE configuration subject to
this evaluation is limited to a single ClearPass Policy Manager device.
Each ClearPass Policy Manager device is a rack-mountable appliance with Intel Atom or
Xeon CPUs running a version of RHEL 8 to host the applications designed to provide the
network access control capabilities summarized above. ClearPass includes a version of
Hewlett Packard Enterprise OpenSSL Cryptographic Module on Red Hat Enterprise Linux
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that is used to perform cryptographic functions. This module supports the implementations
of IPsec using StrongSwan, TLS/HTTPS using Apache, RadSec using radsecproxy, and SSH
using OpenSSH used to secure the communication channels (for remote administration,
exporting audit events, syncing with an NTP server and communicating with NAS servers).
3.3 Physical Boundaries
The physical boundaries of the TOE consist of ClearPass Policy Manager device running
software version 6.11.
4 Security Policy
This section summarizes the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Security audit
2. Communication
3. Cryptographic support
4. Identification and authentication
5. Security management
6. Protection of the TSF
7. TOE access
8. Trusted path/channels
4.1 Security audit
The TOE is designed to be able to generate logs for a wide range of security relevant events.
The TOE can be configured to store the logs locally so they can be accessed by an
administrator or alternately to send the logs to a designated syslog server.
4.2 Communication
The TOE implements the RADIUS protocol in order to service authentication requests from
associated NAS devices. The TOE requires RADIUS encapsulated EAP Message
Authenticators that conform to RFC 3579 and each Access-Request from a NAS must have
the correct Message Authenticator so that the NAS can be determined to be authentic. In
response, the TOE includes its own identifier, Response Authenticator (conforming to RFC
2865), and the response packet with the requested authentication results.
4.3 Cryptographic support
The TOE includes a version of Hewlett Packard Enterprise OpenSSL Cryptographic Module
on Red Hat Enterprise Linux that provides key management, random bit generation,
encryption/decryption, digital signature and secure hashing and key-hashing features in
support of higher-level cryptographic protocols including IPsec, SSH, and TLS/HTTPS.
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4.4 Identification and authentication
The TOE offers no TSF-mediated functions except display of a login banner until the
administrator is identified and authenticated. The TOE authenticates administrative users
accessing the TOE via the command-line interface (local serial console or SSH) or web
interface (Web UI) in the same manner using its own password-based authentication
mechanism. The TOE also supports public-key based authentication of users through the
SSH-based CLI interface and supports certificate authentication for the Web UI.
The TOE supports certificate authentication for TLS and IPsec and supports pre-shared key
authentication for RADIUS and IPsec connections. The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates and
validates received authentication certificates. OCSP is supported for X509v3 certificate
validation.
4.5 Security management
The TOE provides Command Line (CLI) commands (locally via a serial console or remotely
via SSH) and a Web-based Graphical User Interface (Web GUI) to access the available
functions to manage the TOE security functions. Security management commands are
limited to authorized users (i.e., administrators) only after they have been correctly identified
and authenticated. The security management functions are controlled through the use of
Admin Privileges that can be assigned to TOE users.
4.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements a number of features designed to protect itself to ensure the reliability
and integrity of its security features.
It protects particularly sensitive data such as stored passwords and private cryptographic keys
so that they are not accessible even by an administrator. It also provides its own timing
mechanism to ensure that reliable time information is available (e.g., for audit records).
The TOE includes functions to perform self-tests so that it might detect when it is failing. It
also includes mechanisms so that the TOE itself can be updated while ensuring that the
updates will not introduce malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE.
4.7 TOE access
The TOE can be configured to display an informative banner when an administrator
establishes an interactive session and subsequently will enforce an administrator-defined
inactivity timeout value after which the inactive session (local or remote) will be terminated.
The TOE can also reject authentication requests based on time of day, account status, location
and role mapping.
4.8 Trusted path/channels
The TOE protects interactive communication with administrators using a console and SSHv2
for CLI access and TLS/HTTPS for Web UI access. In each case, both the integrity and
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disclosure protection is ensured via the secure protocol. If the negotiation of a secure session
fails or if the user cannot be authenticated for remote administration, the attempted session
will not be established.
The TOE protects communication with network peers, such as a syslog server or NTP server,
using IPsec connections to prevent unintended disclosure or modification of logs. The TOE
uses either RadSec or IPsec to communicate with associated NAS servers for RADIUS
requests and responses.
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope
Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
• collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 23 March 2020
(NDcPP22e)
• Network Device Collaborative Protection Profile (NDcPP)/Application Software
Protection Profile (App PP) Extended Package (EP) for Authentication Servers,
Version 1.0, 07 August 2015 (AUTHSRVEP10)
That information has not been reproduced here and the NDcPP22e/AUTHSRVEP10 should
be consulted if there is interest in that material.
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
NDcPP22e/AUTHSRVEP10 as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other
functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other
functionality provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further
conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
Clarification of scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications
of this evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance
activities specified in the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices with
the Authentication Servers Extended Package and performed by the evaluation team).
• This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in
this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process. The
evaluated configuration is limited to the platforms and devices identified in section
8.
• Apart from the Admin Guide, additional customer documentation for the specific
Authentication Server models was not included in the scope of the evaluation and
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therefore should not be relied upon when configuring or operating the device as
evaluated.
• This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
• The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the NDcPP22e/AUTHSRVEP10 and applicable Technical
Decisions. Any additional security related functional capabilities of the TOE were
not covered by this evaluation.
6 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
• Common Criteria Configuration Guidance Aruba ClearPass Policy Manager, Version
6.11, March 2023
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available
online was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not to be relied
upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as
specified in the Guidance Documentation listed above. Consumers are encouraged to
download the configuration guides from the NIAP website to ensure the device is
configured as evaluated.
7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the proprietary Detailed Test Report for Aruba
ClearPass Policy Manager 6.11, Version 1.0, March 21, 2023 (DTR), as summarized in the
evaluation Assurance Activity Report (AAR).
7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according to a Common Criteria Certification
document and ran the tests specified in the NDcPP22e/AUTHSRVEP10 including the tests
associated with optional requirements. The AAR, in section 3.4.1 lists the tested devices,
provides a list of test tools, and has diagrams of the test environment. Testing took place
from July 2022 to March 2023 at Gossamer.
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8 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration includes the devices listed in the table below and is dependent
upon the TOE being configured per the Guidance Documentation identified in section 6.
No other versions of the TOE, either earlier or later, were evaluated.
Appliance Model CPU
C1000 Intel Atom C2758 (Rangeley)
C2000 Intel Xeon E3-1240 v5 (Skylake)
C2010 Intel Xeon E-2274G (Coffee Lake)
C2020 Intel Xeon E-2374G (Rocket Lake)
C3000 (legacy only) Intel Xeon E5-2620 v3 (Haswell)
C3010 Intel Xeon Gold 5118 (Skylake)
C1000V ESXi 7.0 on Intel Xeon E-2254ML (Coffee Lake)
TOE Models
9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC
version 3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the ClearPass Policy
Manager TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the SARs contained in the
NDcPP22e/AUTHSRVEP10.
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
of security requirements claimed to be met by the Aruba ClearPass Policy Manager 6.11
products that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function
descriptions that support the requirements.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification
contained in the Security Target and Guidance documents. Additionally, the evaluator
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performed the assurance activities specified in the NDcPP22e/AUTHSRVEP10 related to
the examination of the information contained in the TSS.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,
the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how
to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing
phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the
TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of
tests specified by the assurance activities in the NDcPP22e/AUTHSRVEP10 and recorded
the results in a Test Report, summarized in the AAR.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes
a public search for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities did not uncover any
residual vulnerability.
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The evaluator searched the National Vulnerability Database
(https://web.nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search), Vulnerability Notes Database
(http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/), Rapid7 Vulnerability Database
(https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities), Tipping Point Zero Day Initiative
(http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories ), Exploit / Vulnerability Search Engine
(http://www.exploitsearch.net), SecurITeam Exploit Search (http://www.securiteam.com),
Tenable Network Security (http://nessus.org/plugins/index.php?view=search), Offensive
Security Exploit Database (https://www.exploit-db.com/) on 3/21/2023 with the following
search terms: "Aruba", "HPE Aruba", "Clearpass", "C1000", "C2000", "C2010", "C2020",
"C3000", "C3010", "C1000V", "Atom C2758", "Xeon E3-1240", "Xeon E-2274G", "Xeon
E5-2620", "Xeon Gold 5118", "ESXi 7.0", "Xeon E-2254ML", "StrongSwan", "Apache",
"radsecproxy", "OpenSSH", "OpenSSL".
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy
of the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validation team notes that the functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the
security functional requirements specified in the Security Target. Other functionality
included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. Other functionality
provided by devices in the operational environment, such as the syslog server, need to be
assessed separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
11 Annexes
Not applicable
12 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: Aruba ClearPass Policy Manager 6.11 Security Target,
Version 1.0, March 21, 2023.
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13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[4] collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 23 March 2020
(NDcPP22e)
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[5] Network Device Collaborative Protection Profile (NDcPP)/Application Software
Protection Profile (App PP) Extended Package (EP) for Authentication Servers,
Version 1.0, 07 August 2015 (AUTHSRVEP10).
[6] Aruba ClearPass Policy Manager 6.11 Security Target, Version 1.0, March 21, 2023
(ST).
[7] Assurance Activity Report for Aruba ClearPass Policy Manager 6.11, Version 1,0,
March 21, 2023 (AAR).
[8] Detailed Test Report for Aruba ClearPass Policy Manager 6.11, Version 1.0, March
21, 2023 (DTR).
[9] Evaluation Technical Report for Aruba ClearPass Policy Manager 6.11, Version
1.0, March 21, 2023 (ETR)