NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
Security Target (ST)
Date: June 1, 2020
Version: 2.6
Prepared By: NetIQ Corporation
Prepared For: NetIQ Corporation
515 Post Oak Blvd
Suite 1200
Houston, Texas 77027
Abstract
This document provides the basis for an evaluation of a specific Target of Evaluation (TOE), Identity
Manager 4.7. This Security Target (ST) defines a set of assumptions about the aspects of the environment,
a list of threats that the product intends to counter, a set of security objectives, a set of security requirements
and the IT security functions provided by the TOE which meet the set of requirements.
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Table of Contents
Table of Contents...................................................................................................................................2
List of Tables.........................................................................................................................................3
List of Figures........................................................................................................................................4
1. Introduction ...........................................................................................................................................5
Security Target Reference:............................................................................................................5
TOE Reference..............................................................................................................................5
Document Organization................................................................................................................5
Document Conventions.................................................................................................................6
Document Terminology................................................................................................................6
TOE Overview..............................................................................................................................7
TOE Description...........................................................................................................................8
Administration Workstation (Console):........................................................................................8
Identity Applications (RBPM)......................................................................................................8
Identity Manager:..........................................................................................................................9
Reporting Server:..........................................................................................................................9
Log Manager:................................................................................................................................9
OneSSO Provider:.........................................................................................................................9
Self Service Password Reset:......................................................................................................10
TOE Delivery:.............................................................................................................................10
TOE Environment.......................................................................................................................10
Virtual Machines.........................................................................................................................10
Hardware and Software Supplied by the IT Environment..........................................................11
Logical Boundary........................................................................................................................11
TOE Security Functional Policies...............................................................................................12
Discretionary Access Control SFP..............................................................................................12
TOE Vendor Documentation / Guidance....................................................................................12
Features / Functionality NOT Included in the TOE....................................................................12
2. Conformance Claims ...........................................................................................................................14
CC Conformance Claim..............................................................................................................14
PP Claim .....................................................................................................................................14
Package Claim ............................................................................................................................14
Conformance Rationale...............................................................................................................14
3. Security Problem Definition................................................................................................................15
Threats.........................................................................................................................................15
Organizational Security Policies.................................................................................................15
Assumptions................................................................................................................................15
4. Security Objectives..............................................................................................................................17
Security Objectives for the TOE.................................................................................................17
Security Objectives for the Operational Environment................................................................17
Security Objectives Rationale.....................................................................................................17
Mapping of Objectives................................................................................................................18
5. Extended Components Definition........................................................................................................20
6. Security Requirements.........................................................................................................................21
Security Functional Requirements..............................................................................................21
Security Audit (FAU) .................................................................................................................21
FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation..........................................................................................21
FAU_SAR.1 Audit Review.........................................................................................................22
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Cryptographic Support................................................................................................................22
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation...............................................................................22
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction..............................................................................22
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation (Encryption / Decryption) ..............................................22
Information Flow Control (FDP) ................................................................................................23
FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control...........................................................................................23
FDP_ACF.1 Security Attribute Based Access Control...............................................................23
Identification and Authentication (FIA) .....................................................................................24
FIA_ATD.1 – User Attribute Definition.....................................................................................24
FIA_UAU.2 User Authentication before Any Action ................................................................24
FIA_UID.2 User Identification before Any Action....................................................................24
Security Management (FMT)......................................................................................................24
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes .......................................................................24
FMT_MSA.2 Secure Security Attributes....................................................................................24
FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialization................................................................................24
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF Data....................................................................................25
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions ..............................................................25
FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles.......................................................................................................25
Protection of the TSF (FPT)........................................................................................................25
FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF Basic TSF Data Consistency .................................................................25
Trusted Path / Channel (FTP) .....................................................................................................26
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel ........................................................................................26
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path............................................................................................................26
Security Assurance Requirements ..............................................................................................26
Security Requirements Rationale................................................................................................26
Security Functional Requirements..............................................................................................26
Dependency Rationale ................................................................................................................27
Sufficiency of Security Requirements ........................................................................................28
Security Assurance Requirements ..............................................................................................30
Security Assurance Requirements Rationale ..............................................................................30
Security Assurance Requirements Evidence...............................................................................31
7. TOE Summary Specification...............................................................................................................33
TOE Security Functions..............................................................................................................33
Security Audit.............................................................................................................................33
Identification and Authentication................................................................................................33
User Data Protection...................................................................................................................33
Security Management .................................................................................................................34
Trusted Path / Channels ..............................................................................................................35
Trusted Channel..........................................................................................................................35
Trusted Path:...............................................................................................................................35
Cryptographic Support................................................................................................................35
List of Tables
Table 1 – ST Organization and Section Descriptions...................................................................................6
Table 2 – Acronyms Used in Security Target...............................................................................................7
Table 3 – CAVP Certificate Numbers ..........................................................................................................9
Table 4 – Virtual Machine Environment Requirements .............................................................................11
Table 5 – IT Environment Component Requirements................................................................................11
Table 6 – Logical Boundary Descriptions ..................................................................................................12
Table 7 – IT Environment Components - Not In TOE ...............................................................................13
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Table 8 – Threats Addressed by the TOE...................................................................................................15
Table 9 – Organizational Security Policies.................................................................................................15
Table 10 – Assumptions..............................................................................................................................16
Table 11 – TOE Security Objectives ..........................................................................................................17
Table 12 – Operational Environment Security Objectives .........................................................................17
Table 13 – Mapping of Assumptions, Threats, Policies and ORSP s to Security Objectives.....................18
Table 14 – Mapping of Threats, Policies, and Assumptions to Objectives ................................................19
Table 15 – TOE Security Functional Requirements ...................................................................................21
Table 16 – Cryptographic Standards...........................................................................................................22
Table 17 – Cryptographic Operations.........................................................................................................23
Table 18 – Management of TSF data..........................................................................................................25
Table 19 – Mapping of TOE Security Functional Requirements and Objectives.......................................27
Table 20 – Mapping of SFR to Dependencies and Rationales....................................................................28
Table 20 – Rationale for TOE SFRs to Objectives.....................................................................................30
Table 22 – Security Assurance Requirements at EAL3..............................................................................30
Table 23 – Security Assurance Rationale and Measures ............................................................................32
Table 24 – Roles and Functions..................................................................................................................34
Table 22 – CAVP........................................................................................................................................36
List of Figures
Figure 1 – TOE Deployment with Subsystems.............................................................................................7
Figure 2 – Sample Download List ..............................................................................................................10
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1. Introduction
This section identifies the Security Target (ST), Target of Evaluation (TOE), Security Target
organization, document conventions, and terminology. It also includes an overview of the
evaluated product.
Security Target Reference:
ST Title NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 Security Target:
ST Revision 2.6
ST Publication Date June 1, 2020
ST Author Michael F. Angelo
TOE Reference
TOE Reference NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
TOE Developer NetIQ Corporation
Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) EAL3+
Note: The file download name is: Identity_Manager_4.7_Linux.iso .
Note: The official name of the product is NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 Advanced Edition. The
released product can be uniquely identified as: NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7.3. The product name
may also be abbreviated as Identity Manager 4.7 AE, Identity Manager, IDM 4.7.3AE or IDM 4.7
or simply IDM . Finally the TOE, if examined for the build number will be identified as NetIQ
Identity Manager 4.7.3.0.317. For the purpose of this document all of the above references are
equivalent, and the document may refer to the product simply as IDM or the TOE.
Document Organization
This Security Target follows the following format:
SECTION TITLE DESCRIPTION
1 Introduction Provides an overview of the TOE and defines the
hardware and software that make up the TOE as well
as the physical and logical boundaries of the TOE
2 Conformance Claims Lists evaluation conformance to Common Criteria
versions, Protection Profiles, or Packages where
applicable
3 Security Problem
Definition
Specifies the threats, assumptions and organizational
security policies that affect the TOE
4 Security Objectives Defines the security objectives for the
TOE/operational environment and provides a
rationale to demonstrate that the security objectives
satisfy the threats
5 Extended
Components
Definition
Describes extended components of the evaluation (if
any)
6 Security
Requirements
Contains the functional and assurance requirements
for this TOE
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SECTION TITLE DESCRIPTION
7 TOE Summary
Specification
Identifies the IT security functions provided by the
TOE and also identifies the assurance measures
targeted to meet the assurance requirements.
Table 1 – ST Organization and Section Descriptions
Document Conventions
The notation, formatting, and conventions used in this Security Target are consistent with those
used in Version 3.1 of the Common Criteria. Selected presentation choices are discussed here
to aid the Security Target reader. The Common Criteria allows several operations to be
performed on functional requirements: The allowable operations defined in Part 2 of the
Common Criteria are refinement, selection, assignment and iteration.
 The refinement operation is used to add detail to a requirement, and thus further
restricts a requirement. Refinement of security requirements is denoted by bold text.
Any text removed is indicated with a strikethrough format (Example: TSF).
 The selection operation is picking one or more items from a list in order to narrow the
scope of a component element. Selections are denoted by italicized text.
 The assignment operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter,
such as the length of a password. An assignment operation is indicated by showing the
value in square brackets, i.e. [assignment_value(s)].
 Iterated functional and assurance requirements are given unique identifiers by
appending to the base requirement identifier from the Common Criteria an iteration
number inside parenthesis, for example, FMT_MTD.1.1 (1) and FMT_MTD.1.1 (2) refer
to separate instances of the FMT_MTD.1 security functional requirement component.
When not embedded in a Security Functional Requirement, italicized text is used for both
official document titles and text meant to be emphasized more than plain text.
Document Terminology
The following table describes the acronyms used in this document:
TERM DEFINITION
CC Common Criteria version 3.1
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
IDM Identity Manager
IDV Identity Vault
IGA Identity Governance and Administration
NMAS NetIQ Modular Authentication Service
NTP Network Time Protocol
ORSP Organizational Security Policy
OSP One SSO Provider
SSO Single Sign On
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SLM Sentinel Log Manager
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TERM DEFINITION
SSPR Self Service Password Reset
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Function
Table 2 – Acronyms Used in Security Target
TOE Overview
The TOE is NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7. NetIQ Identity Manager provides data sharing and
synchronization services which enable applications, directories, and databases to share
information. It links scattered information and enables you to establish policies that govern
automatic updates to designated systems when identity changes occur.
Identity Manager provides the foundation for account provisioning, security, single sign-on,
user self-service, authentication, authorization, automated workflow, and Web services. It
allows you to integrate, manage, and control your distributed identity information so you can
securely deliver the right resources to the right people.
The following diagram shows a typical TOE deployment:
Identity Reporting Module
Operating System
General Purpose Computing
Platform
Reporting Server
Sentinel Log Management
for Identity Governance
and Administration
Operating System
General Purpose Computing
Platform
Log Manager
Identity Manager Engine
Identity Vault
Operating System
General Purpose Computing
Platform
Identity Applications
(RBPM)
Web Browser
Operating System
General Purpose Computing
(GPC) Platform
Identity Application
4
1
2
8
10
= TOE Component
= IT Environment Component
One SSO Provider
(uname / pass, Kerberos,
SAML)
Operating System
General Purpose Computing
Platform
3
5
SSO Provider
Self Service Password
Reset
Web Browser
Operating System
General Purpose Computing
Platform
Self Service Password Reset
11
9
12
7a
Identity Manager
6
B
Administration
Workstation
(Console) 7b
Separate communication paths to Sentinel Log Manager
7a – Identity Vault to Sentinel Log Manager
7b – iManager to Sentinel Log Manager
C
A
iManager
Designer / Analyzer
= TOE Sub Component
OpenSSL
Figure 1 – TOE Deployment with Subsystems1
The TOE provides the following functions: data synchronization, role management,
auditing/reporting, and management.
11
Note the Administration Workstation Console is not included in the evaluation as there is no code that is added to it to make it
explicitly a workstation console. It is included in the document as a component required for access.to the TOE.
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 Data synchronization, including password synchronization, is provided by the base
components of the Identity Manager solution: the Identity Vault, Identity Manager
engine, drivers, Remote Loader, and connected applications
 Role management is provided by the User Application
 Auditing and reporting are provided by the Identity Reporting Module
TOE Description
NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 is a comprehensive identity management suite. It provides an
intelligent identity framework that leverages your existing IT assets and new computing
models like Software as a Service (SaaS) by reducing cost and ensuring compliance across
physical, virtual, and cloud environments. With the NetIQ Identity Manager solution, you can
make sure that your business has the most current user identity information. You can retain
control at the enterprise level by managing, provisioning, and de-provisioning identities within
the firewall and extending to the cloud. Through streamlined user administration and
processes, Identity Manager helps organizations reduce management costs, increase
productivity and security, and comply with government regulations.
The TOE is a software TOE and includes the following functions.
Each function contains the components as follows:
1. Administration Workstation (Console)2
2. Identity Applications (RBPM) 4.7.3.0.1109
 Designer aka Identity Manager Designer 4.7.3.0.20190614
 Analyzer aka Identity Manager Analyzer
3. Identity Manager
 Identity Manager Engine 4.7.3.0.AE
o Identity Vault 9.1.4
o iManager 3.1.4
4. Reporting Server
 Identity Reporting Module 6.5.0. F14508F
5. Log Manager
 Sentinel Log Management for Identity Governance and Administration 8.2.2.0_5415
6. SSO Provider
 One SSO Provider (OSP) 6.3.3.0
7. Self Service Password Reset
 Self Service Password Reset (SSPR) 4.4.0.2 B366 r39762
Administration Workstation (Console):
The Administration Workstation (Console) is used to access the Identity Applications (RBPM),
Identity Manager, and the Reporting Server. Each of these functions is described below.
Identity Applications (RBPM)
The Identity Applications (RBPM) houses the Designer / Analyzer functions. The Identity
Application is a Web application (browser-based) that gives users and business administrators
the ability to perform a variety of identity self-service and roles provisioning tasks, including
managing passwords and identity data, initiating and monitoring provisioning and role
assignment requests, managing the approval process for provisioning requests, and verifying
2
The Administration Workstation (Console) is not part of the TOE, in that there is no code added to it in order to function as the
Console it is required to access features and function of the TOE and is included for completeness.
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attestation reports. It includes the workflow engine that controls the routing of requests
through the appropriate approval process. Designer aka Designer for Identity Manager helps
you design, test, document, and deploy Identity Manager solutions in a network or test
environment. Analyzer aka NetIQ Analyzer for Identity Manager is an identity management
toolset that helps you ensure that internal data quality policies are adhered to by providing
data analysis, data cleansing, data reconciliation, and data monitoring/reporting. Analyzer lets
you analyze, enhance, and control all data stores throughout the enterprise.
Identity Manager:
The Identity Manager houses the Identity Manager Engine (and the Identity Vault which
contains the Identity Applications data) and iManager. The Identity Manager Engine
synchronizes identity data between applications. For example, data synchronized from a
PeopleSoft system to Lotus Notes is first added to the Identity Vault and then sent to the Lotus
Notes system. In addition, the Identity Vault stores information specific to Identity Manager,
such as driver configurations, parameters, and policies.
The following packages are used to provide cryptographic functions, and are not included in
the TOE boundary. NetIQ eDirectory is used for the Identity Vault. eDirectory provides access
to the OpenSSL Cryptographic functionality.
They meet the cryptographic quality requirements as evidenced by the following certificates:
Component CAVP Cert #
AES Certs. #3090 and #3264
HMAC Certs. #1937 and #2063
RSA Certs. #1581 and #1664
Table 3 – CAVP Certificate Numbers
Reporting Server:
The reporting server houses the Identity Reporting Module. The Identity Reporting Module
generates reports that show critical business information about various aspects of your
Identity Manager configuration, including information collected from Identity Vaults and
managed systems such as Active Directory or SAP. The reporting module provides a set of
predefined report definitions you can use to generate reports. In addition, it gives you the
option to import custom reports defined in a third-party tool. The user interface for the
reporting module makes it easy to schedule reports to run at off-peak times to optimize
performance.
The IDM Tools are used to manage the Identity Manager solution. This includes functions to:
 Analyze, enhance, and control all data stores throughout the enterprise
 Design, deploy, and document the TOE
 Manage Identity Manager and receive real-time health and status information
about the Identity Manager system
 Define and maintain which authorizations are associated with which business roles
Log Manager:
The Log Manager, also known as Sentinel Log Manager for Identity Governance and
Administration (SLM for IGA), collects and acknowledges receipt of auditing data from all
aspects of the product.
OneSSO Provider:
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The OneSSO Provider, also known as OSP) is a single interface for access authentication. This
provider can handle user name / password, Kerberos, and SAML tokens.
Self Service Password Reset:
Self Service Password Reset (SSPR) allows users to enroll, update, and reset their passwords
without administrative intervention in the Identity Vault (IDV).
Note: that the components above can be installed on one or multiple distributed systems. Also,
the hardware, operating systems and third-party support software (e.g. DBMS) on each of the
systems are excluded from the TOE boundary.
TOE Delivery:
The TOE software is provided to customers via secure download from the download portal
(https://dl.netiq.com/index.jsp). The software is available as either a gnu zip (.gz), iso
formatted optical disk (.iso). zip (.zip) or dmg (if mac) depending on your destination platform.
Once downloaded, and extracted, the setup files can be executed to perform the installation.
Figure 2 – Sample Download List
TOE Environment
Virtual Machines
The following TOE components can be installed in virtual machines (VM).
 Console / Administration Workstation (Identity Applications)
 Identity Manager
 Reporting Server
 Sentinel Log Manager
 One SSO Provider
 Self Service Password Reset (SSPR)
The hardware and software requirements for the operational environment to support the VM
are listed in the table below:
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Category Console /
Administration
Workstation
(Identity
Applications3)
Identity
Manager
(Identity
Manager
Engine)
Reporting
Server
(Identity
Reporting
Module)
Log
Manager
(SLM for
Identity
Gov &
Adm)
SSO
Provider
(OneSSO
Provider)
Self Service
Password Reset
(SSPR)
Processor 2 CPU cores 2 CPU
cores
2 CPU
cores
4 to 8 CPU
cores
2 CPU
cores
2 CPU cores
Memory 8 GB 8 GB 8 GB 8 to 16 GB 8 GB 8 GB
Table 4 – Virtual Machine Environment Requirements
Hardware and Software Supplied by the IT Environment
The TOE consists of a set of software applications run on one or multiple distributed systems.
The TOE requires the following software components as part of the evaluated configuration:
Component Requirements
Administration Workstation Mozilla Firefox 65
Identity Applications (RBPM)
Designer / Analyzer)
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4
Identity Manager (Identity
Manager Engine)
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4
Reporting Server (Identity
Reporting Module)
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4
Log Manager (Sentinel Log
Management for Identity
Governance and
Administration)
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4
SSO Provider (OneSSO
Provider)
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4
Self Service Password Reset SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4
Table 5 – IT Environment Component Requirements
In addition to the platform requirements mentioned above, the following hardware resources
are needed in order to install and configure Identity Manager on each platform:
 A minimum of 8 GB RAM
 15 GB available disk space to install all the components.
 Additional disk space to configure and populate data. This might vary depending
on your connected systems and number of objects in the Identity Vault.
For server-based components, it is recommended that the platform have a minimum of 2 CPUs
or cores
Logical Boundary
This section outlines the boundaries of the security functionality of the TOE; the logical
boundary of the TOE includes the security functionality described in the following table:
3
The system requirements also apply to the following components that you use with the identity applications: PostgreSQL, Tomcat,
NetIQ One SSO Provider (OSP), and NetIQ Self Service Password Reset.
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TSF DESCRIPTION
Security
Management
The TOE restricts the ability to enable, modify and disable security
policy rules and user roles to an authorized Administrator. The TOE
also provides the functions necessary for effective management of
the TOE security functions. Administrators configure the TOE with
the Management Console via Web-based connection.
Security Audit The TOE supports the provision of log data from each system
component, such as user login/logout and incident/ticket
management actions. It also records security events such as failed
login attempts, etc. Audit trails can be stored for later review and
analysis.
Cryptographic
Support
The TOE utilizes the OpenSSL cryptographic module to provide
support for HTTPS / TLS communications with administrators and
TOE components.
Identification and
Authentication
The TOE enforces individual I&A. Operators must successfully
authenticate using a unique identifier and password prior to
performing any actions on the TOE.
User Data
Protection
The TOE enforces discretionary access rules using an access control
list with user attributes.
Trusted Path /
Channels
The TOE utilizes HTTPS/TLS to provide trusted paths and inter-TSF
trusted channels.
Table 6 – Logical Boundary Descriptions
TOE Security Functional Policies
The TOE supports the following Security Functional Policy:
Discretionary Access Control SFP
The TOE implements an access control SFP named Discretionary Access Control SFP. This SFP
determines and enforces the privileges associated with operator roles. An authorized
administrator can define specific services available to administrators and users via the
Management Console.
TOE Vendor Documentation / Guidance
In addition to the documentation generated for the certification, the TOE includes the following
product and guidance documentation generated by NetIQ:
 Quick Start Guide for Installing NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 February 2018
 NetIQ Identity Manager Setup Guide for Linux February 2018
 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7, Operational User Guidance and Preparative Procedures
Supplement (AGD-IGS), version 0.6, is supplied for those customers that need
guidance on how to set the TOE in the evaluated configuration.
Features / Functionality NOT Included in the TOE
The following supported operating systems and software were not included in the evaluated
configuration:
Functions Requirements
Administration Workstation (Console) Web Browsers
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Functions Requirements
 Internet Explorer 11
 Google Chrome
Identity Applications (Includes Designer /
Analyzer)
RHEL 7.5
Windows Server 2016
Identity Manager (Includes Identity Vault
and, iManager)
RHEL 7.5
Windows Server 2016
Reporting Server
(includes Identity Reporting Module)
RHEL 7.5
Windows Server 2016
Log Manager (includes Sentinel Log
Management for Identity Governance and
Administration)
RHEL 7.5
One SSO Provider (uname / pass, Kerberos,
SAML)
RHEL 7.5
Windows Server 2016
Self Service Password Reset (SSPR) RHEL 7.5
Windows Server 2016
Table 7 – IT Environment Components - Not In TOE
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2. Conformance Claims
CC Conformance Claim
The TOE is Common Criteria Version 3.1 Revision 5 (April 2017) Part 2 conformant and Part 3
conformant.
PP Claim
The TOE does not claim conformance to any registered Protection Profile.
Package Claim
The TOE claims conformance to the EAL3 assurance package defined in Part 3 of the Common
Criteria Version 3.1 Revision 5 (April 2017). The TOE does not claim conformance to any
functional package. The TOE EAL3 assurance package is augmented with ALC_FLR.2
Conformance Rationale
No conformance rationale is necessary for this evaluation since this Security Target does not
claim conformance to a Protection Profile.
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3. Security Problem Definition
In order to clarify the nature of the security problem that the TOE is intended to solve, this
section describes the following:
 Any known or assumed threats to the assets against which specific protection within the TOE or
its environment is required
 Any organizational security policy statements or rules with which the TOE must comply
 Any assumptions about the security aspects of the environment and/or of the manner in which
the TOE is intended to be used.
This chapter identifies assumptions as A.assumption, threats as T.threat and policies as P.policy.
Threats
The following are threats identified for the TOE and the IT System (or operating environment)
the TOE monitors. The TOE itself has threats and the TOE is also responsible for addressing
threats to the environment in which it resides. The assumed level of expertise of the attacker
for all threats is unsophisticated.
The TOE addresses the following threats:
THREAT DESCRIPTION
T.NO_AUTH An unauthorized user may gain access to the TOE and alter the
TOE configuration.
T.NO_PRIV An authorized user of the TOE exceeds his/her assigned
security privileges resulting in unauthorized modification of the
TOE configuration and/or data.
T.USER_ACCESS_DENY An authorized user may be able to change user authentication data
and or user access policies and deny their access to it later.
T.PASSWD_COMPROMISE An unauthorized user may be able to obtain and use user
passwords.
T.PROT_TRANS An unauthorized user may be able to gather information from
communications between components.
Table 8 – Threats Addressed by the TOE
Organizational Security Policies
The TOE meets the following organizational security policies:
ASSUMPTION DESCRIPTION
P.REMOTE_DATA Passwords and account information from network-attached systems
shall be monitored and managed.
Table 9 – Organizational Security Policies
Assumptions
The TOE is assured to provide effective security measures in a co-operative non-hostile
environment only if it is installed, managed, and used correctly. The following specific
conditions are assumed to exist in an environment where the TOE is employed.
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ASSUMPTION DESCRIPTION
A.MANAGE Administrators of the TOE are assumed to be appropriately trained to
undertake the installation, configuration and management of the TOE
in a secure and trusted manner.
A.NOEVIL Administrators of the TOE and users on the local area network are not
careless, willfully negligent, nor hostile, and will follow and abide by the
instructions provided by the TOE documentation
A.LOCATE The processing platforms on which the TOE resides are assumed to be
located within a facility that provides controlled access
A.CONFIG The TOE is configured to receive all passwords and associated data
from network-attached systems.
A.TIMESOURCE The TOE has a trusted source for system time via NTP server
Table 10 – Assumptions
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4. Security Objectives
Security Objectives for the TOE
The IT security objectives for the TOE are addressed below:
OBJECTIVE DESCRIPTION
O.MANAGE_DATA The TOE shall provide a means to manage secrets and data associated
with remote IT systems.
O.MANAGE_POLICY The TOE shall provide a workflow to manage authentication and access
control policies.
O.SEC_ACCESS The TOE shall ensure that only those authorized users and applications
are granted access to security functions and associated data.
O.PASSWD_PROT The TOE shall provide cryptographic mechanisms to protect passwords
via cryptographic processes including the ability to generate and destroy
keys.
O.TRANS_PROT The TOE shall provide mechanisms to protect data that is in transit
between elements within the TOE.
Table 11 – TOE Security Objectives
Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
The security objectives for the operational environment are addressed below:
OBJECTIVE DESCRIPTION
OE.TIME The TOE operating environment shall provide an accurate timestamp
(via reliable NTP server).
OE.ENV_PROTECT The TOE operating environment shall provide mechanisms to isolate the
TOE Security Functions (TSF) and assure that TSF components cannot
be tampered with or bypassed
OE.PERSONNEL Authorized administrators are non-hostile and follow all administrator
guidance and must ensure that the TOE is delivered, installed, managed,
and operated in a manner that maintains the TOE security objectives.
Any operator of the TOE must be trusted not to disclose their
authentication credentials to any individual not authorized for access to
the TOE.
OE.PHYSEC The facility surrounding the processing platform in which the TOE
resides must provide a controlled means of access into the facility
Table 12 – Operational Environment Security Objectives
Security Objectives Rationale
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This section provides the summary that all security objectives are traced back to aspects of the
addressed assumptions, threats, and Organizational Security Policies.
OBJECTIVES THREATS/
ASSUMPTIONS/ POLICIES
O.MANAGE_DATA
O.MANAGE_POLICY
O.SEC_ACCESS
O.PASSWD_PROT
O.TRANS_PROT
OE.TIME
OE.ENV_PROTECT
OE.PERSONNEL
OE.PHYSEC
A.CONFIG   
A.MANAGE 
A.NOEVIL 
A.LOCATE 
A.TIMESOURCE 
T.NO_AUTH 
T.NO_PRIV 
T.USER_ACCESS_DENY 
T.PASSWD_COMPROMISE 
T.PROT_TRANS 
P. REMOTE_DATA 
Table 13 – Mapping of Assumptions, Threats, Policies and ORSP s to Security Objectives
Mapping of Objectives
ASSUMPTION /THREAT/
POLICY
RATIONALE
A.CONFIG This assumption is addressed by
 OE.ENV_PROTECT, which ensures that TSF components
cannot be tampered with or bypassed
 OE.PERSONNEL, which ensures that the TOE is managed
and administered by in a secure manner by a competent
and security aware personnel in accordance with the
administrator documentation. This objective also ensures
that those responsible for the TOE install, manage, and
operate the TOE in a secure manner
 OE.PHYSEC, which ensures that the facility surrounding the
processing platform in which the TOE resides provides a
controlled means of access into the facility
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ASSUMPTION /THREAT/
POLICY
RATIONALE
A.MANAGE This assumption is addressed by
 OE.PERSONNEL, which ensures that the TOE is managed
and administered by in a secure manner by a competent
and security aware personnel in accordance with the
administrator documentation. This objective also ensures
that those responsible for the TOE install, manage, and
operate the TOE in a secure manner
A.NOEVIL This assumption is addressed by OE.PERSONNEL, which ensures
that the TOE is managed and administered by in a secure manner
by a competent and security aware personnel in accordance with
the administrator documentation. This objective also ensures
that those responsible for the TOE install, manage, and operate
the TOE in a secure manner
A.LOCATE This assumption is addressed by OE.PHYSEC which ensures that
the facility surrounding the processing platform in which the
TOE resides provides a controlled means of access into the
facility
A.TIMESOURCE This assumption is addressed by OE.TIME, which ensures the
provision of an accurate time source.
T.NO_AUTH This threat is countered by the following:
 O.SEC_ACCESS, which ensures that the TOE allows access to
the security functions, configuration, and associated data
only by authorized users and applications
T.NO_PRIV This threat is countered by O.SEC_ACCESS, which ensures that
the TOE allows access to the security functions, configuration,
and associated data only by authorized users and applications.
T.PASSWD_COMPROMISE This threat is countered by O.PASSWD_PROT, which ensures
the passwords are not in the clear and cannot be exposed to un
authorized users for use.
T.PROT_TRANS This threat is countered by O.TRANS_PROT, which protects data
that is in transit between elements within the TOE.
P.REMOTE_DATA This organizational security policy is enforced by
 O.MANAGE_DATA, which ensures that the TOE provide a
means to manage secrets and data associated with remote
IT systems.
T.USER_ACCESS_DENY This threat is countered by O.MANAGE_POLICY which ensures
that the TOE provides a workflow to manage authentication and
access control policies.
Table 14 – Mapping of Threats, Policies, and Assumptions to Objectives
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5. Extended Components Definition
This Security Target does include any extended components.
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6. Security Requirements
The security requirements that are levied on the TOE and the IT environment are specified in
this section of the ST.
Security Functional Requirements
The functional security requirements for this Security Target consist of the following
components from Part 2 of the CC, which are summarized in the following table:
CLASS HEADING CLASS_FAMILY DESCRIPTION
Security Audit
FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
FAU_SAR.1 Audit Review
Cryptographic Support FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
User Data Protection
FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control
FDP_ACF.1 Security Attribute Based Access Control
Identification and
Authentication
FIA_ATD.1 User Attribute Definition
FIA_UID.2 User Identification before Any Action
FIA_UAU.2 User Authentication before Any Action
Security Management
FMT_MSA.1 Management of Security Attributes
FMT_MSA.2 Secure Security Attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialization
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF Data
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
Protection of the TSF FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency
Trusted Path / Channels
FTP_ITC.1 Trusted Channel
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path
Table 15 – TOE Security Functional Requirements
Security Audit (FAU)
FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following
auditable events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the [not specified] level of audit; and
c) [User login/logout and;
d) Login failures;]
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FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following
information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if
applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event;
and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event
definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST,
[no other audit relevant information].
FAU_SAR.1 Audit Review
FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide [the Administrator] with the capability to read
[all audit data generated within the TOE] from the audit records.
FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the
user to interpret the information.
Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key
generation algorithm in Table 16] and specified cryptographic key
sizes [cryptographic key sizes in Table 16] that meet the following: [list
of standards in Table 16].
Usage Key Generation Algorithm Key Size (bits), Elliptical Curves Standard
RSA RSA Key Generation 2048 FIPS 186-4
AES Deterministic Random Bit
Generator (DRBG)
128, 256 SP 800-90A
Diffie-Hellman Diffie-Hellman Key
Generation
1024, 2048 FIPS 186-4
Table 16 – Cryptographic Standards
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key destruction method [zeroize] that meets
the following: [FIPS 140-2].
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation (Encryption / Decryption)
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operations in Table 17] in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic
algorithm in Table 17] and cryptographic key sizes [cryptographic key
sizes in Table 17] that meet the following: [list of standards in Table
17].
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Application Note: AES in CBC mode is used for encrypting/decrypting
data in support of TLS.
Operation Algorithm Key Size, Curve or
Digest
Standard
Encryption and
Decryption in support of
TLS
AES (Advanced
Encryption
Standard)
128, 256 FIPS PUB
197
Key agreement in
support TLS
Key Agreement
Schemes (KAS) and
Key Confirmation
P-256, P384, P521 SP800-
56A
Authentication algorithm
in support of TLS
ECDSA (Elliptic
Curve Digital
Signature
Algorithm)
P-256, P384, P521 FIPS 186-4
Secure Hashing in
support of TLS
Secure Hash
Algorithm (SHA)
160 (SHA-1)
256 (SHA-256)
384 (SHA-384)
FIPS PUB
180-4
Message Authentication
in support of TLS
Keyed-Hash
Message
Authentication Code
(HMAC)
160 (HMAC-SHA1) 256
(HMAC-SHA2-256) 384
(HMAC-SHA2-384)
FIPS 198-1
Asymmetric
cryptography in support
of TLS
Rivest, Shamir,
Adleman (RSA)
2048 FIPS 186-4
Table 17 – Cryptographic Operations
Information Flow Control (FDP)
FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control SFP] on [
Subjects: All users
Objects: System reports, component audit logs, TOE configuration,
operator account attributes
Operations: all user actions]
FDP_ACF.1 Security Attribute Based Access Control
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control SFP]to objects
based on the following: [
Subjects: All users
Objects: System reports, component audit logs, TOE configuration,
operator account attributes
Operations: all user actions]
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [if the
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ACL identifies the user or a group of users that contains the user
requesting access for the type of resource that the user is requesting,
and the user (or group of users) has the specific rights required for the
type of operation requested on the object then the user is granted
access].
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based
on the following additional rules: [password restrictions, login
restrictions, time based access controls, ip access controls, intruder
lockout].
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules [ password restrictions, login restrictions,
time based access controls, ip access controls, intruder lockout]
Identification and Authentication (FIA)
FIA_ATD.1 – User Attribute Definition
FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes
belonging to individual users: [User Identity, Authentication Status,
and Privilege Level].
FIA_UAU.2 User Authentication before Any Action
FIA_UAU.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UID.2 User Identification before Any Action
FIA_UID.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Security Management (FMT)
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control SFP] to
restrict the ability to [query, modify, delete] the security attributes
[Accounts, privileges, ACLs] to [Administrator].
FMT_MSA.2 Secure Security Attributes
FMT_MSA.2.1 The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for
[security attributes listed with Discretionary Access Control SFP].
FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialization
FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control SFP] to
provide [restrictive] default values for security attributes that are
used to enforce the SFP.
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FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the [Administrator] to specify alternative initial
values to override the default values when an object or information
is created.
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF Data
FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [control] the [data described in the
table below] to [Administrator]:
DATA CHANGE QUERY MODIFY DELETE CLEAR
Discretionary
Access Control SFP
    
User Account
Attributes
 
Audit Logs 
Date/Time 
Table 18 – Management of TSF data
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management
functions: [
a) Create accounts
b) Modify accounts
c) Define privilege levels Change Default,
Query, Modify, Delete, Clear the attributes
associated with the Discretionary Access
Control SFP
d) Modify the behavior of the Discretionary
Access Control SFP
e) Manage ACLs].
FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles [Administrator, User].
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Protection of the TSF (FPT)
FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF Basic TSF Data Consistency
FPT_TDC.1.1 The TSF shall provide the capability to consistently interpret [secrets
(passwords)] when shared between the TSF and another trusted IT
product.
FPT_TDC.1.2 The TSF shall use [the secret with the newest associated timestamp]
when interpreting the TSF data from another trusted IT product.
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Trusted Path / Channel (FTP)
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and
[another trusted IT product] that is logically distinct from other
communication channels and provides assured identification of its end
points and protection of the channel data from [modification or
disclosure].
FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit [the TSF] to initiate communication via the
trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for
[HTTPS/TLS connections
 for communications labeled 1 – 12 in Figure 1]
Application Note: The TOE supports TLS v1.1 and 1.2 as configured by
the Administrator.
Application Note: Crypto as claimed in FCS_COP_1 is used to support
TLS.
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path
FTP_TRP.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and [local]
users that is logically distinct from other communication paths and
provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the
communicated data from [disclosure].
FTP_TRP.1.2 The TSF shall permit [the TSF] to initiate communication via the
trusted path.
FTP_TRP.1.3 The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for [key requests, and
encryption operations
 for communications labeled A, B, and C in Figure 1]
Security Assurance Requirements
The Security Assurance Requirements for this evaluation are listed in Section 6.3.4 – Security
Assurance Requirements.
Security Requirements Rationale
Security Functional Requirements
The following table provides the correspondence mapping between security objectives and the
requirements that satisfy them.
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OBJECTIVE
SFR
O.MANAGE_DATA
O.MANAGE_POLICY
O.SEC_ACCESS
O.PASSWD_PROT
O.TRANS_PROT
FAU_GEN.1 
FAU_SAR.1 
FCS_CKM.1 
FCS_CKM.4 
FCS_COP.1 
FDP_ACC.1 
FDP_ACF.1 
FIA_ATD.1 
FIA_UID.2 
FIA_UAU.2 
FMT_MSA.1 
FMT_MSA.2 
FMT_MSA.3 
FMT_MTD.1 
FMT_SMF.1 
FMT_SMR.1 
FPT_TDC.1 
FTP_ITC.1 
FTP_TRP.1 
Table 19 – Mapping of TOE Security Functional Requirements and Objectives
Dependency Rationale
This ST satisfies all the security functional requirement dependencies of the Common Criteria.
The table below lists each SFR to which the TOE claims conformance with a dependency and
indicates whether the dependent requirement was included. As the table indicates, all
dependencies have been met.
SFR CLAIM DEPENDENCIES DEPENDENCY MET RATIONALE
FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 YES
Satisfied by the Operational
Environment (OE.TIME)
FAU_SAR.1
FAU_GEN.1
FPT_STM.1
YES
FPT_STM.1 satisfied by the
Operational Environment
(OE.TIME)
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SFR CLAIM DEPENDENCIES DEPENDENCY MET RATIONALE
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.1 or
FCS_COP.1 and
FCS_CKM.4
YES
Satisfied by FCS_COP.1 and
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4 FTP_ITC.1 or
FTP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
YES Satisfied by FCS_CKM.1 for AES
FCS_COP.1 FTP_ITC.1 or
FTP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1 and
FCS_CKM.4
YES Satisfied by FCS_CKM.1 and
FCS_CKM.4
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 YES
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.3
YES
FIA_ATD.1 N/A N/A
FIA_UID.2 N/A N/A
FMT_MSA.1
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
YES
FMT_MSA.2
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1
YES
FMT_MSA.3
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1
YES
FMT_MTD.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
YES
FMT_SMF.1 N/A N/A
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 YES
Although FIA_UID.1 is not
included, FIA_UID.2, which is
hierarchical to FIA_UID.1 is
included. This satisfies this
dependency.
FPT_TDC.1 N/A N/A
FTP_ITC.1 N/A N/A
FTP_TRP.1 N/A N/A
Table 20 – Mapping of SFR to Dependencies and Rationales
Sufficiency of Security Requirements
The following table presents a mapping of the rationale of TOE Security Requirements to
Objectives.
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OBJECTIVE RATIONALE
O.MANAGE_DATA The objective to ensure that the TOE will collect events from security
products and non-security products deployed within a network and
applies analytical processes to derive conclusions about the events is
met by the following security requirements:
 FPT_TDC.1 ensures that the TOE provides consistency between
passwords used on remote IT systems and those
stored/managed within the TOE.
O.MANAGE_POLICY The objective to ensure that the TOE provides a workflow to manage
authentication and access control policies is met by the following
security requirements:
 FAU_GEN.1 and FAU_SAR.1 define the auditing capability for
incidents and administrative access control and requires that
authorized users will have the capability to read and interpret
data stored in the audit logs
 FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1 support the security functions
relevant to the TOE and ensure the definition of an authorized
administrator role
O.SEC_ACCESS This objective ensures that the TOE allows access to the security
functions, configuration, and associated data only by authorized users
and applications.
 FDP_ACC.1 requires that all user actions resulting in the access
to TOE security functions and configuration data are controlled
 FDP_ACF.1 supports FDP_ACC.1 by ensuring that access to TOE
security functions, configuration data, audit logs, and account
attributes is based on the user privilege level and their
allowable actions
 FIA_UID.2 requires the TOE to enforce identification of all users
prior to configuration of the TOE
 FIA_UAU.2 requires the TOE to enforce authentication of all
users prior to configuration of the TOE
 FIA_ATD.1 specifies security attributes for users of the TOE
 FMT_MTD.1 restricts the ability to query, add or modify TSF
data to authorized users.
 FMT_MSA.1 specifies that only privileged administrators can
access the TOE security functions and related configuration
data.
 FMT_MSA.2 specifies that only secure values are accepted for
security attributes listed with access control policies.
 FMT_MSA.3 ensures that the default values of security
attributes are restrictive in nature as to enforce the access
control policy for the TOE
 FTP_ITC.1 specifies that the trusted channel exists for components
HTTPS/TLS.
 FTP_TRP.1 specifies that the trusted path exists for components
HTTPS/TLS.
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OBJECTIVE RATIONALE
O.PASSWD_PROT This objective ensures that the TOE provides cryptographic
mechanisms to generate and destroy keys. This objective is met by:
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM. 4, and FCS_COP.1 which provide the
cryptographic support functions for secure communications within the
TOE and with external IT entities.
O.TRANS_PROT This objective ensures that the TOE protects data in transit between
elements within the TOE. This objective is met by FTP_ITC (which
specifies that the trusted channel exists for components) and FTP_TRP
(which ensures that the trusted path exists for components).
Table 21 – Rationale for TOE SFRs to Objectives
Security Assurance Requirements
The assurance security requirements for this Security Target are taken from Part 3 of the CC.
These assurance requirements compose an Evaluation Assurance Level 3 (EAL3). The assurance
components are summarized in the following table:
CLASS HEADING CLASS_FAMILY DESCRIPTION
ADV: Development
ADV_ARC.1 Security Architecture Description
ADV_FSP.3
Functional Specification with Complete
Summary
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural Design
AGD: Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational User Guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative Procedures
ALC: Lifecycle Support
ALC_CMC.3 Authorization Controls
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery Procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of Security Measures
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw Reporting Procedures
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of Coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: Basic Design
ATE_FUN.1 Functional Testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent Testing - Sample
AVA: Vulnerability
Assessment
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability Analysis
Table 22 – Security Assurance Requirements at EAL3
Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
The ST specifies Evaluation Assurance Level 3. EAL3 was chosen because it is based upon good
commercial development practices with thorough functional testing. EAL3 provides the
developers and users a moderate level of independently assured security in conventional
commercial TOEs. The threat of malicious attacks is not greater than low, the security
environment provides physical protection, and the TOE itself offers a very limited interface,
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offering essentially no opportunity for an attacker to subvert the security policies without
physical access. The product was augmented to comply with ALC_FLR.2 in order to document
and address requirements for remediation and reporting of faults that may be discovered in the
product after release.
Security Assurance Requirements Evidence
This section identifies the measures applied to satisfy CC assurance requirements.
SECURITY ASSURANCE
REQUIREMENT
EVIDENCE TITLE
ADV_ARC.1 Security Architecture
Description
NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
Security Architecture (ADV_ARC)
ADV_FSP.3 Functional Specification
with Complete Summary
NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
Functional Specification (ADV_FSP)
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural Design
NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
Architectural Design (IDM TDS)
AGD_OPE.1 Operational User
Guidance4
NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
Operational User Guidance and Preparative
Procedures Supplement (AGD-IGS)
AGD_PRE.1Preparative Procedures
NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
Operational User Guidance and Preparative
Procedures Supplement (AGD-IGS)
ALC_CMC.3 Authorization Controls
NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
Configuration Management Processes and
Procedures (ALC_CM)
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation
representation CM coverage
NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
Configuration Management Processes and
Procedures (ALC_CM)
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery Procedures
NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
Secure Delivery Processes and Procedures
(ALC_DEL)
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of Security
Measures
NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
Development Security Measures (ALC_DVS)
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-
cycle model
NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
Life Cycle Development Process (ALC_LCD)
ALC_FLR.2: Flaw Remediation
Procedures
NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
Flaw reporting Procedures (ALC_FLR)
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of Coverage
NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
Test Plan and Coverage Analysis (ATE)
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: Basic Design
NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
Test Plan and Coverage Analysis (ATE)
4
Additional documents can be found in Appendix A
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SECURITY ASSURANCE
REQUIREMENT
EVIDENCE TITLE
ATE_FUN.1Functional Testing
NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
Test Plan and Coverage Analysis (ATE)
Table 23 – Security Assurance Rationale and Measures
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7. TOE Summary Specification
This section presents the Security Functions implemented by the TOE.
TOE Security Functions
The security functions performed by the TOE are as follows:
 Security Management
 Security Audit
 Identification and Authentication
 User Data Protection
 Trusted Path / Channels
 Cryptographic Support
Security Audit
The TOE generates the following audit data:
 Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions (instantiated by startup of the TOE)
 User login/logout
 Login failures
The TOE provides the Administrator with the capability to read all audit data generated within
the TOE via the console. The GUI provides a suitable means for an Administrator to interpret the
information from the audit log.
The A.TIMESOURCE is added to the assumptions on operational environment, and OE.TIME is
added to the operational environment security objectives. The time and date provided by the
operational environment are used to form the timestamps. The TOE ensures that the audit trail
data is stamped when recorded with a dependable date and time received from the OE
(operating system). In this manner, accurate time and date is maintained on the TOE.
The Security Audit function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:
 FAU_GEN.1
 FAU_SAR.1
Identification and Authentication
The IDM console application provides user interfaces that administrators may use to manage
TOE functions. The operating system and the database in the TOE Environment are queried to
individually authenticate administrators or users. The TOE maintains authorization information
that determines which TOE functions an authenticated administrators or users (of a given role)
may perform.
The TOE maintains the following list of security attributes belonging to individual users:
 User Identity (i.e., user name)
 Authentication Status (whether the IT Environment validated the username/password)
 Privilege Level (Administrator or User)
The Identification and Authentication function is designed to satisfy the following security
functional requirements:
 FIA_ATD.1
 FIA_UAU.2
 FIA_UID.2
User Data Protection
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The TOE implements a discretionary access control policy to define what roles can access
particular functions of the TOE. All access and actions for system reports, component audit logs,
TOE configuration, operator account attributes (defined in FIA_ATD.1) are protected via access
control list. When a user requests to perform an action on an object, the TOE verifies the role
associated with the user name. Access is granted if the user (or group of users) has the specific
rights required for the type of operation requested on the object.
Identity Manager can enforce password policies on incoming passwords from connected
systems and on passwords set or changed through the User Application password self-service.
If the new password does not comply, you can specify that Identity Manager not accept the
password. This also means that passwords that don't comply with your policies are not
distributed to other connected systems.
In addition, can enforce password policies on connected systems. If the password being
published to the Identity Vault does not comply with rules in a policy, you can specify that
Identity Manager not only does not accept the password for distribution, but actually resets the
noncompliant password on the connected system by using the current Distribution password in
the Identity Vault.
The User Data Protection function is designed to satisfy the following security functional
requirements:
 FDP_ACC.1
 FDP_ACF.1
 FPT_TDC.1
Security Management
The TOE maintains the operator roles described in the following table. The individual roles are
categorized into two main roles: the Administrator and the User.
ROLE MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS
Administrator A user who has rights to configure and manage all aspects of the TOE
User The user’s capabilities can be configured to:
View hierarchical relationships between User objects
View and edit user information (with appropriate rights).
Search for users or resources using advanced search criteria
(which can be saved for later reuse).
Recover forgotten passwords.
Table 24 – Roles and Functions
Only an Administrator can determine the behavior of, disable, enable, and modify the behavior
of the functions that implement the Discretionary Access Control SFP. The TPE ensures only
secure values are accepted for the security attributes listed with Discretionary Access Control
SFP.
The Security Management function is designed to satisfy the following security functional
requirements:
 FMT_MTD.1
 FMT_MSA.1
 FMT_MSA.2
 FMT_MSA.3
 FMT_SMF.1
 FMT_SMR.1
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Trusted Path / Channels
The Trusted Path/Channels function is designed to satisfy the following security functional
requirements:
 FTP_ITC.1 – the TOE supports establishment of trusted channels for communicating
TOE entities using HTTPS.
 FTP_TRP.1 – the TOE provides a trusted path for TOE Users, using HTTPS
Trusted Channel
The TOE provides a trusted channel between the TOE and external web servers.
Trusted channels are implemented using HTTPS. The TOE supports TLS v1.1 and TLS v1.2. The
TOE supports the following TLS cipher suites, as defined in RFC 2246, RFC 4346 and RFC 5246:
 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_ CBC_SHA
 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
Trusted Path:
The TOE provides a trusted path for TOE administrators and TOE users to communicate with
the TOE. The trusted path is implemented using HTTPS. The TOE’s implementation of TLS is
described in the previous section (Trusted Channel).
Cryptographic Support
Cryptographic protection of data in transit between the TOE and remote users, and between
the TOE and external web servers is provided by the OpenSSL FIPS Object Module software
version 2.0.10 (Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) certificate number 1747)
libraries.
The following table identifies the CAVP algorithm certificates.
Operation Algorithm CAVP Certificate
Encryption and Decryption in
support of TLS
AES (Advanced Encryption
Standard)
AES 3264
Key Generation in support of
TLS
DRBG (Deterministic
Random Bit Generation)
DRBG 723
Key agreement in support of
TLS
Key Agreement Schemes
(KAS) and Key Confirmation
CVL 472
Keyed-Hash Message
Authentication in support of
TLS
HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA2-
256, HMAC-SHA2-384
HMAC 2063
Secure Hash in support of TLS SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384 SHS 2702
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Asymmetric cryptography in
support of TLS
RSA RSA 1664
Authentication algorithm in
support of TLS
ECDSA ECDSA 620
Table 25 – CAVP
The Cryptographic Support function is designed to satisfy the following security functional
requirements:
 FCS_CKM.1
 FCS_CKM.4
 FCS_COP.1