KECS-CR-18-36
INISAFE Nexess V4
Certification Report
Certification No.: KECS-CISS-0885-2018
2018. 8. 20.
IT Security Certification Center
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History of Creation and Revision
No. Date
Revised
Pages
Description
00 2018.08.20. -
Certification report for INISAFE Nexess V4
- First documentation
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This document is the certification report for INISAFE Nexess V4 of
INITECH.
The Certification Body
IT Security Certification Center
The Evaluation Facility
Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA)
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Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary.............................................................................................5
2. Identification.........................................................................................................7
3. Security Policy .....................................................................................................9
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope............................................................9
5. Architectural Information ..................................................................................10
6. Documentation...................................................................................................10
7. TOE Testing........................................................................................................ 11
8. Evaluated Configuration.................................................................................... 11
9. Results of the Evaluation ..................................................................................12
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)............................................................12
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC) ......................................................12
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD).................................................13
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV) ..............................................................13
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE).............................................................................13
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)..............................................................14
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary ...................................................................14
10. Recommendations.............................................................................................15
11. Security Target ...................................................................................................16
12. Acronyms and Glossary....................................................................................16
13. Bibliography.......................................................................................................17
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1. Executive Summary
This report describes the certification result drawn by the certification body on the
results of the evaluation of INISAFE Nexess V4 of INITECH with reference to the
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (“CC” hereinafter) [1].
It describes the evaluation result and its soundness and conformity.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Single Sign-On (SSO) software to be used to enable
the user to access various business systems and use the service through a single user
login without additional login activities. The TOE is comprised of software components
operating as Agent - SSO server - Client. The SSO server is comprised of Nexess
Policy Server that takes charge of authentication policies, Nexess Login Server that
issues and manages authentication tokens, and Nexess AdminTool that takes charge
of management/monitoring. It also includes Nexess Client that stores and destroys
authentication key/cryptographic key, and Nexess Agent that verifies authentication
tokens. The TOE uses cryptographic modules validated under the Korea Cryptographic
Module Validation Program (KCMVP).
The evaluation of the TOE has been carried out by Telecommunications Technology
Association (TTA) and completed on July 13, 2018. This report grounds on the
evaluation technical report (ETR) TTA had submitted [5] and the Security Target (ST)
[6][7].
The ST claims strict conformance to the Korean National Protection Profile for Single
Sign On V1.0 [9]. All Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) in the ST are based
only upon assurance component in CC Part 3, and the TOE satisfies the SARs of the
PP [9]. Therefore the ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 3 conformant. The Security
Functional Requirements (SFRs) are based upon both functional components in CC
Part 2 and newly defined components in the Extended Component Definition chapter of
the ST, and the TOE satisfies the SFRs in the ST. Therefore the ST and the resulting
TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
[Figure 1] shows the operational environment of the TOE.
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[Figure 1] Operational environment of the TOE
[Table 1] shows minimum hardware and software requirements necessary for
installation and operation of the TOE.
Category Contents
SSO
Server
CPU Intel/DualCore 2.0GHz or higher
RAM 8GB or higher
HDD 50GB or higher space for installation of SSO Server
NIC 10/100/1000 X 1Port or higher
OS LINUX - CentOS 7.2 (Kernel 2.6.4) 64bit
Windows Server 2012 R2 Standard 64bit
Required S/W Java2 Runtime v1.7.0_80
Apache Tomcat 7.0.88
Oracle 12.1.0.2
Nexess
Agent
CPU Intel/DualCore 2.0GHz or higher
RAM 8GB or higher
HDD 50GB or higher space for installation of Nexess Agent
NIC 10/100/1000 X 1Port or higher
OS LINUX - CentOS 7.2 (Kernel 2.6.4) 64bit
Windows Server 2012 R2 Standard 64bit
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Required S/W Java2 Runtime v1.7.0_80
Apache Tomcat 7.0.88
Nexess
Client
CPU Intel/DualCore 2.0GHz or higher
RAM 8GB or higher
HDD 50GB or higher space for installation of Nexess Client
NIC 10/100/1000 X 1Port or higher
OS Windows 7 Home SP1 32bit
Required S/W Microsoft Internet Explorer 11
[Table 1] Hardware and software requirements for the TOE
[Table 2] shows minimum requirements necessary for the administrator’s PC to access
Nexess AdminTool.
Category Contents
CPU Intel/DualCore 2.0GHz or higher
RAM 8GB or higher
HDD 50GB or higher
NIC 10/100/1000 X 1Port or higher
OS Windows 7 Home SP1 64bit
Required S/W Internet Explorer 11
[Table 2] The minimum requirements for the administrator’s PC
Certification Validity: The certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the
government of Republic of Korea or by any other organization that recognizes or gives
effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the government of
Republic of Korea or by any other organization recognizes or gives effect to the
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification
The TOE is software libraries consisting of the following software components and
related guidance documents.
TOE INISAFE Nexess V4
Version V4.2.0.13
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TOE
Components
SSO Server Nexess Policy Server V4.2.0.13
Nexess Login Server V4.2.0.13
Nexess AdminTool V4.2.0.13
Nexess Agent Nexess Agent V4.2.0.13
Nexess Client Nexess Client V4.2.0.13
Guidance
Document
CCP.C_NX42_ Preparative Procedures (PRE)_V1.4.pdf
CCP.C_NX42_Operational Guidance(OPE)_V1.6.pdf
[Table 3] TOE identification
Note that the TOE is delivered contained in a CD-ROM.
[Table 4] summarizes additional information for scheme, developer, sponsor, evaluation
facility, certification body, etc..
Scheme Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security
(August 24, 2017)
Korea Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT Security
(September 12, 2017)
Common Criteria Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001 ~ CCMB-2017-04-
003, April 2017
Protection Profile Korean National Protection Profile for Single Sign On V1.0,
KECS-PP-0822-2017, August 18, 2017
Developer INITECH
Sponsor INITECH
Evaluation
Facility
Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA)
Completion Date
of Evaluation
July 13, 2018
Certification Body IT Security Certification Center
[Table 4] Additional identification information
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3. Security Policy
The ST [6][7] for the TOE claims strict conformance to the National Protection Profile
for Single Sign On V1.0 [9], and complies security policies defined in the PP [9] by
security requirements. Thus the TOE provides security features defined in the PP [9] as
follows:
 Security audit: The TOE generates audit records of security relevant events
including the start-up/shutdown of the audit functions, integrity violation and
self-test failures, and stores them in the DBMS.
 Cryptographic support: The TOE performs cryptographic operation such as
encryption/decryption and hash, and cryptographic key management such as
key generation/distribution/destruction using cryptographic modules (NISAFE
Crypto for Java v4.1, INISAFE Crypto for C v5.2.0) validated under the KCMVP.
 Identification and authentication: The TOE identifies and authenticates the
administrators and end users using ID/password, mutually authenticate TOE
components when they communicate each other, and authenticates end-users
based on the authentication token after initial identification and authentication
using ID/password.
 Security management: Security management of the TOE is restricted to only
the authorized administrator who can access the management interface
provided by TOE.
 Protection of the TSF: The TOE provides secure communications amongst
TOE components to protect confidentiality and integrity of the transmitted data
between them. The TOE also protects TSF data against unauthorized
exposure and modification through encryption.
 TOE access: The TOE manages the authorized administrator’s and end user’s
access to itself by terminating interactive sessions after defined time interval of
their inactivity.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
There is no explicit Security Problem Definition chapter, therefore no Assumptions
section, in the low assurance ST. Some security aspects of the operational
environment are added to those of the PP [9] in which the TOE will be used or is
intended to be used (For the detailed and precise definition of the security objectives of
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the operational environment, refer to the ST [6][7], chapter 3.):
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is software consisting of the following components:
 SSO Server (Nexess Policy Server, Nexess Login Server, Nexess AdminTool),
 Nexess Agent, and
 Nexess Client.
[Figure 2] Architectural Information of the TOE
6. Documentation
The following documentations are evaluated and provided with the TOE by the
developer to the customer.
Identifier Release Date
CCP.C_NX42_ Preparative Procedures (PRE)_V1.4 V1.4 July 5, 2018
CCP.C_NX42_Operational Guidance(OPE)_V1.6 V1.6 July 10, 2018
[Table 5] Documentation
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7. TOE Testing
The developer took a testing approach based on the security services provided by
each TOE components based on the operational environment of the TOE. Each test
case includes the following information:
 Test no. and conductor: Identifier of each test case and its conductor
 Test Purpose: Includes the security functions and modules to be tested
 Test Configuration: Details about the test configuration
 Test Procedure detail: Detailed procedures for testing each security function
 Expected result: Result expected from testing
 Actual result: Result obtained by performing testing
 Test result compared to the expected result: Comparison between the
expected and actual result
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests according to the
assurance component ATE_FUN.1.
The evaluator installed and prepared the TOE in accordance to the preparative
procedures, and conducted independent testing based upon test cases devised by the
evaluator. The TOE and test configuration are identical to the developer’s tests.
Also, the evaluator conducted vulnerability analysis and penetration testing based upon
test cases devised by the evaluator resulting from the independent search for potential
vulnerabilities.
The evaluator’s testing effort, the testing approach, configuration, depth, and results
are summarized in the ETR [5].
8. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is INISAFE Nexess V4 (version number V4.2.0.13). See table 3 for detailed
information on the TOE components.
The TOE is installed from the CD-ROM distributed by INITECH. After installing the TOE,
the customer can check the TOE version by command to view each TOE component
version and executable file attribute. And the guidance documents listed in this report
chapter 5, [Table 5] were evaluated with the TOE.
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9. Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation facility provided the evaluation result in the ETR [5] which references
Single Evaluation Reports for each assurance requirement and Observation Reports.
The evaluation result was based on the CC [1] and CEM [2].
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict PASS is assigned to all assurance
components.
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)
The ST Introduction correctly identifies the ST and the TOE, and describes the TOE in
a narrative way at three levels of abstraction (TOE reference, TOE overview and TOE
description), and these three descriptions are consistent with each other. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_INT.1.
The Conformance Claim properly describes how the ST and the TOE conform to the
CC and how the ST conforms to packages. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
ASE_CCL.1.
The Security Objectives for the operational environment are clearly defined. Therefore
the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_OBJ.1.
The Extended Components Definition has been clearly and unambiguously defined,
and it is necessary. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_ECD.1.
The Security Requirements is defined clearly and unambiguously, and it is internally
consistent. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_REQ.1.
The TOE Summary Specification addresses all SFRs, and it is consistent with other
narrative descriptions of the TOE. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
ASE_TSS.1.
Thus, the ST is sound and internally consistent, and suitable to be used as the basis
for the TOE evaluation.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ASE.
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC)
The developer has uniquely identified the TOE. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned
to ALC_CMC.1.
The configuration list includes the TOE and the evaluation evidence required by the
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SARs in the ST. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_CMS.1.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ALC.
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD)
The procedures and steps for the secure preparation of the TOE have been
documented and result in a secure configuration. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to AGD_PRE.1.
The operational user guidance describes for each user role the security functionality
and interfaces provided by the TSF, provides instructions and guidelines for the secure
use of the TOE, addresses secure procedures for all modes of operation, facilitates
prevention and detection of insecure TOE states, or it is misleading or unreasonable.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to AGD_OPE.1.
Thus, the guidance documents are adequately describing the user can handle the TOE
in a secure manner. The guidance documents take into account the various types of
users (e.g. those who accept, install, administrate or operate the TOE) whose incorrect
actions could adversely affect the security of the TOE or of their own data.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AGD.
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV)
The developer has provided a high-level description of at least the SFR-enforcing and
SFR-supporting TSFIs, in terms of descriptions of their parameters. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_FSP.1.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ADV.
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE)
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests in the test documentation.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_FUN.1.
By independently testing a subset of the TSF, the evaluator confirmed that the TOE
behaves as specified in the functional specification and guidance documentation.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_IND.1.
Thus, the TOE behaves as described in the ST and as specified in the evaluation
evidence (described in the ADV class).
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The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ATE.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)
By penetration testing, the evaluator confirmed that there are no exploitable
vulnerabilities by attackers possessing basic attack potential in the operational
environment of the TOE. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to AVA_VAN.1.
Thus, potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and
anticipated operation of the TOE, don’t allow attackers possessing basic attack
potential to violate the SFRs.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AVA.
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ASE ASE_INT.1 ASE_INT.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ASE_INT.1.2E PASS
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_CCL.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_OBJ.1 ASE_OBJ.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1 ASE_ECD.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1.2E PASS
ASE_REQ.1 ASE_REQ.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1 ASE_TSS.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1.2E PASS
ALC ALC_CMC.1 ALC_CMC.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ALC_CMS.1 ALC_CMS.1.1E PASS PASS
AGD AGD_PRE.1 AGD_PRE.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
AGD_PRE.1.2E PASS PASS
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1.1E PASS PASS
ADV ADV_FSP.2 ADV_FSP.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ADV_FSP.1.2E PASS
ATE ATE_FUN.1 ATE_FUN.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ATE_IND.1 ATE_IND.1.1E PASS PASS
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ATE_IND.1.2E PASS
AVA AVA_VAN.1 AVA_VAN.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
AVA_VAN.1.2E PASS
AVA_VAN.1.3E PASS
[Table 6] Evaluation Result Summary
10. Recommendations
The TOE security functionality can be ensured only in the evaluated TOE operational
environment with the evaluated TOE configuration, thus the TOE shall be operated by
complying with the followings:
 The TOE shall be located in a physically secure environment to which only the
authorized administrator is allowed to access and the protective facilities are
provided.
 When the internal network environment changes due to the change in network
configuration, increase/decrease of host and increase/decrease of service, etc.,
the changed environment and security policies must be immediately reflected
to the TOE operational policies in order to maintain the same level of security
as before.
 When operating the product, the administrator's password should be changed
periodically to keep its security.
 The authorized administrator of the TOE shall ensure the reliability and security
of the operating system by enhancing against the latest vulnerabilities of the
operating system in which the TOE is installed and operated.
 The developer who uses the TOE to interoperate with the user identification
and authentication function in the operational environment of the business
system shall ensure that the security features of the TOE are securely applied
in accordance with the requirements of the guidance documents provided with
the TOE.
 The authorized administrator shall periodically checks a spare space of audit
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data storage in case of the audit data loss, and carries out the audit data
backup (external log server or separate storage device, etc.) to prevent audit
data loss.
 After installing the product, the administrator must register the administrator's
e-mail address in the product so that warning e-mail can be normally sent out
in the event of a potential security violation, and confirm that the e-mail
address is registered correctly so that the function operates.
11. Security Target
INISAFE Nexess V4 Security Target V1.13 [6] is included in this report for reference.
For the purpose of publication, it is provided as sanitized version [7] according to the
CCRA supporting document ST sanitizing for publication [8].
12. Acronyms and Glossary
CC Common Criteria
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSFI TSF Interface
Authentication token Authentication data that authorized end-users use to
access the business system
Business System An application server that authorized end-users access
through ‘SSO’
Self-test Pre-operational or conditional test executed by the
cryptographic module
Wrapper Interfaces for interconnection between the TOE and
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various types of business systems or authentication
systems
13. Bibliography
The certification body has used following documents to produce this report.
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001 ~ CCMB-2017-04-003, April 2017
Part 1: Introduction and general model
Part 2: Security functional components
Part 3: Security assurance components
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version
3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004, April 2017
[3] Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security (August 24, 2017)
[4] Korea Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT Security (September 12,
2017)
[5] TTA-CCE-17-012 INISAFE Nexess V4 Evaluation Technical Report V1.5, August
16, 2018
[6] INISAFE Nexess V4 Security Target V1.13, August 13, 2018 (Confidential
Version)
[7] INISAFE Nexess V4 Security Target(ST Lite) V1.13, August 13, 2018 (Sanatized
Version)
[8] ST sanitizing for publication, CCDB-2006-04-004, April 2006
[9] Korean National Protection Profile for Single Sign On V1.0 (KECS-PP-0822-
2017, August 18, 2017)