JISEC-CC-CRP-C0697-01-2021
Certification Report
TOMITA Tatsuo, Chairman
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan
2-28-8 Honkomagome, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo
IT Product (TOE)
Reception Date of Application
(Reception Number)
2020-04-20 (ITC-0747)
Certification Identification JISEC-C0697
Product Name
Fuji Xerox ApeosPort
C7070/C6570/C5570/C4570/C3570/C3070/C2570/
C7070 G/C6570 G/C5570 G/C4570 G/C3570 G/C3070 G
models with Copy, Print, Fax, Scan and Overwrite
Storage
Version and Release Numbers Controller ROM Ver. 1.5.3, Fax ROM Ver. 2.2.1
Product Manufacturer Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd.
Conformance of Functionality PP conformant functionality, CC Part 2 Extended
Protection Profile Conformance
Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices 1.0
dated September 10, 2015
(Certification Identification: JISEC-C0553)
Name of IT Security
Evaluation Facility
Information Technology Security Center,
Evaluation Department
This is to report that the evaluation result for the above TOE has been certified as follows.
2021-1-12
YANO Tatsuro, Technical Manager
IT Security Technology Evaluation Department
IT Security Center
Evaluation Criteria, etc.: This TOE is evaluated in accordance with the following
standards prescribed in the "IT Security Evaluation and
Certification Scheme Document."
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Version 3.1 Release 5
- Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Version 3.1 Release 5
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0697-01-2021
Evaluation Result: Pass
"Fuji Xerox ApeosPort C7070/C6570/C5570/C4570/C3570/C3070/C2570/C7070 G/C6570
G/C5570 G/C4570 G/C3570 G/C3070 G models with Copy, Print, Fax, Scan and
Overwrite Storage, Version Controller ROM Ver. 1.5.3, Fax ROM Ver. 2.2.1" has been
evaluated based on the standards required, in accordance with the provisions of the
"Requirements for IT Security Certification" by Information-technology Promotion
Agency, Japan, and has met the specified assurance requirements.
Notice:
This document is the English translation version of the Certification Report published by
the Certification Body of Japan Information Technology Security Evaluation and
Certification Scheme.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0697-01-2021
Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary............................................................................................................. 1
1.1 Product Overview............................................................................................................. 1
1.1.1 Protection Profile or Assurance Package...................................................................... 1
1.1.2 TOE and Security Functionality ................................................................................... 1
1.1.2.1 Threats and Security Objectives ................................................................................ 2
1.1.2.2 Configuration and Assumptions................................................................................. 2
1.1.3 Disclaimers ..................................................................................................................... 2
1.2 Conduct of Evaluation...................................................................................................... 3
1.3 Certification...................................................................................................................... 3
2. Identification ........................................................................................................................ 4
3. Security Policy...................................................................................................................... 5
3.1 Users.................................................................................................................................. 5
3.2 Assets ................................................................................................................................ 5
3.3 Threats.............................................................................................................................. 6
3.4 Organizational Security Policies..................................................................................... 6
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope............................................................................. 8
4.1 Usage Assumptions .......................................................................................................... 8
4.2 Environmental Assumptions ........................................................................................... 8
4.3 Clarification of Scope ......................................................................................................11
5. Architectural Information ................................................................................................. 12
5.1 TOE Boundary and Components .................................................................................. 12
5.2 IT Environment.............................................................................................................. 13
6. Documentation................................................................................................................... 14
7. Evaluation conducted by Evaluation Facility and Results............................................. 15
7.1 Evaluation Facility......................................................................................................... 15
7.2 Evaluation Approach...................................................................................................... 15
7.3 Overview of Evaluation Activity.................................................................................... 15
7.4 IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................... 16
7.4.1 Developer Testing ......................................................................................................... 16
7.4.2 Evaluator Independent Testing................................................................................... 16
7.4.3 Evaluator Penetration Testing .................................................................................... 18
7.5 Evaluated Configuration ............................................................................................... 21
7.6 Evaluation Results......................................................................................................... 22
7.7 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations ..................................................................... 22
8. Certification........................................................................................................................ 23
8.1 Certification Result........................................................................................................ 23
8.2 Recommendations .......................................................................................................... 23
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0697-01-2021
9. Annexes............................................................................................................................... 24
10. Security Target................................................................................................................... 24
11. Glossary .............................................................................................................................. 25
12. Bibliography ....................................................................................................................... 27
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0697-01-2021
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1. Executive Summary
This Certification Report describes the content of the certification result in relation to IT
Security Evaluation of "Fuji Xerox ApeosPort C7070/C6570/C5570/C4570/C3570/C3070/
C2570/C7070 G/C6570 G/C5570 G/C4570 G/C3570 G/C3070 G models with Copy, Print,
Fax, Scan and Overwrite Storage, Version Controller ROM Ver. 1.5.3, Fax ROM Ver. 2.2.1"
(hereinafter referred to as the "TOE") developed by Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd., and the evaluation
of the TOE was completed on 2020-12-16 by Information Technology Security Center,
Evaluation Department (hereinafter referred to as the "Evaluation Facility"). It is intended
to report to the sponsor, Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd., and provide security information to
procurement entities and consumers who are interested in the TOE.
Readers of this Certification Report are advised to read the Security Target (hereinafter
referred to as the "ST") described in Chapter 10. Especially, details of security functional
requirements, assurance requirements and rationale for sufficiency of these requirements
of the TOE are described in the ST.
This Certification Report assumes procurement entities who purchase the TOE to be
readers. Note that the Certification Report presents the certification result based on
assurance requirements to which the TOE conforms, and does not guarantee an individual
IT product itself.
1.1 Product Overview
An overview of the TOE functions and operational conditions is described below. Refer to
Chapter 2 and subsequent chapters for details.
1.1.1 Protection Profile or Assurance Package
The TOE conforms to the following Protection Profile [14][15] (hereinafter referred to as
the "Conformance PP").
Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices 1.0 dated September 10, 2015
(Certification Identification: JISEC-C0553)
1.1.2 TOE and Security Functionality
The TOE is a multifunction device (hereinafter referred to as "MFD"), which has functions
such as copy, scan, print, fax, and document storage and retrieval.
The TOE provides security functions required by the Conformance PP to prevent the
document data processed by the MFD and the setting data etc. affecting security from
unauthorized disclosure and alteration.
For these security functions, the validity of the design policy and the accuracy of the
implementation were evaluated within the scope of the assurance requirements of the
Conformance PP.
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Threats and assumptions assumed for the TOE are described in the following sections.
1.1.2.1 Threats and Security Objectives
The following threats are assumed for the TOE.
There are threats that user document data and data affecting security functions, which are
assets to be protected by the TOE, may be disclosed or altered by unauthorized operation of
the TOE or unauthorized access to the network to which the TOE is connected.
There are also threats that security functions of the TOE may be compromised by the
failure of the TOE itself or installation of unauthorized software.
The TOE provides security functions required by the Conformance PP such as
identification and authentication, access control, encryption, and digital signature to
counter these threats.
1.1.2.2 Configuration and Assumptions
The TOE is assumed to be operated under the following configuration and assumptions.
The TOE is assumed to be operated in an environment where unauthorized physical access
to the TOE is restricted and connected to a LAN separated from the Internet.
The setting, administration and maintenance of the TOE must be performed in accordance
with the guidance documents by a trusted administrator. Users of the TOE must have been
trained in order to use the TOE securely.
1.1.3 Disclaimers
The following operation is not ensured by this evaluation:
- An environment different from that described in "4.2 Environmental Assumptions"
- TOE with settings different from those described in "7.5 Evaluated Configuration"
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0697-01-2021
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1.2 Conduct of Evaluation
Under the IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme that the Certification Body
operates, the Evaluation Facility conducted IT security evaluation and completed in
2020-12, based on functional requirements and assurance requirements of the TOE
according to the publicized documents "IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme
Document"[1], "Requirements for IT Security Certification"[2], and "Requirements for
Approval of IT Security Evaluation Facility"[3] provided by the Certification Body.
1.3 Certification
The Certification Body verified the Evaluation Technical Report [13] and the Observation
Reports prepared by the Evaluation Facility as well as evaluation documentation, and
confirmed that the TOE evaluation was conducted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure. The Certification Body confirmed that the TOE evaluation had been
appropriately conducted in accordance with the CC ([4][5][6] or [7][8][9]) and the CEM
(either of [10][11]). The Certification Body prepared this Certification Report based on the
Evaluation Technical Report and fully concluded certification activities.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0697-01-2021
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2. Identification
The TOE is identified as follows:
TOE Name: Fuji Xerox ApeosPort
C7070/C6570/C5570/C4570/C3570/C3070/C2570/
C7070 G/C6570 G/C5570 G/C4570 G/C3570 G/C3070 G
models with Copy, Print, Fax, Scan and Overwrite Storage
TOE Version: Controller ROM Ver. 1.5.3, Fax ROM Ver. 2.2.1
Users can verify that a product is the TOE, which is evaluated and certified, by the
following means.
Users confirm the following information displayed on the main unit and the control panel
of the TOE as described in the guidance document.
- Name of Developer: "Fuji Xerox"
- Model name: One of the following:
(For Japan)
ApeosPort C7070/C6570/C5570/C4570/C3570/C3070/C2570
(For other countries)
ApeosPort C7070/C6570/C5570/C4570/C3570/C3070
ApeosPort C7070 G/C6570 G/C5570 G/C4570 G/C3570 G/C3070 G
- Function:
Button for copy, print, fax and scan function is displayed.
Overwrite storage function is displayed.
- Version: Each version of Controller ROM and FAX ROM
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0697-01-2021
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3. Security Policy
The TOE provides the basic functions of the MFD such as copy, scan, print, fax, and
document storage and retrieval. It has the functionality to store the user document data in
the TOE and to communicate with user terminals and various servers via a network.
The TOE provides security functions that satisfy the requirements of the Conformance PP,
to protect the document data processed by the MFD and setting data etc. affecting security.
As the background of the security functions provided by the TOE, user roles, assets, threats,
and organizational security policies assumed for the TOE are described in following Section
3.1 to 3.4. Details of the security functions of the TOE are described in Chapter 5.
3.1 Users
The user roles assumed for the TOE are shown in Table 3-1.
Table 3-1 User Roles
Designation Definition
Normal User A User who has been identified and authenticated
and does not have an administrative role
Administrator A User who has been identified and authenticated
and has an administrative role
Note that "administrator" is called as "system administrator" in the TOE, so the terms
"administrator" and "system administrator" have the same meaning in this report.
3.2 Assets
The assets assumed to be protected by the TOE are shown in Table 3-2, Table 3-3 and Table
3-4. There are two categories of the assets, User Data and TSF Data, as shown in Table 3-2.
Furthermore, User Data is classified as shown in Table 3-3 and TSF Data is as shown in
Table 3-4.
Table 3-2 Assets
Designation Category Definition
D.USER User Data Data created by and for Users that do not affect
the operation of the TSF
D.TSF TSF Data Data created by and for the TOE that might affect
the operation of the TSF
Table 3-3 Assets (User Data)
Designation Type Definition
D.USER.DOC User Document
Data
Information contained in a User's Document, in
electronic or hardcopy form
D.USER.JOB User Job Data Information related to a User's Document or
Document Processing Job
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Table 3-4 Assets (TSF Data)
Designation Type Definition
D.TSF.PROT Protected TSF
Data
TSF Data for which alteration by a User who is
neither the data owner nor in an Administrator
role might affect the security of the TOE, but for
which disclosure is acceptable
D.TSF.CONF Confidential
TSF Data
TSF Data for which either disclosure or alteration
by a User who is neither the data owner nor in an
Administrator role might affect the security of the
TOE
3.3 Threats
The threats assumed for the TOE are shown in Table 3-5.
Table 3-5 Threats
Designation Definition
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS An attacker may access (read, modify, or delete)
User Document Data or change (modify or delete)
User Job Data in the TOE through one of the
TOE's interfaces.
T.TSF_COMPROMISE An attacker may gain Unauthorized Access to TSF
Data in the TOE through one of the TOE's
interfaces.
T.TSF_FAILURE A malfunction of the TSF may cause loss of
security if the TOE is permitted to operate.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_UPDATE An attacker may cause the installation of
unauthorized software on the TOE.
T.NET_COMPROMISE An attacker may access data in transit or
otherwise compromise the security of the TOE by
monitoring or manipulating network
communication.
3.4 Organizational Security Policies
The organizational security policies required for the TOE are shown in Table 3-6.
Table 3-6 Organizational Security Policies
Designation Definition
P.AUTHORIZATION Users must be authorized before performing
Document Processing and administrative
functions.
P.AUDIT Security-relevant activities must be audited and
the log of such actions must be protected and
transmitted to an External IT Entity.
P.COMMS_PROTECTION The TOE must be able to identify itself to other
devices on the LAN.
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P.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION If the TOE stores User Document Data or
Confidential TSF Data on Field-Replaceable
Nonvolatile Storage Devices, it will encrypt such
data on those devices.
P.KEY_MATERIAL Cleartext keys, submasks, random numbers, or
any other values that contribute to the creation of
encryption keys for Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile
Storage of User Document Data or Confidential
TSF Data must be protected from unauthorized
access and must not be stored on that storage
device.
P.FAX_FLOW If the TOE provides a PSTN fax function, it will
ensure separation between the PSTN fax line and
the LAN.
P.IMAGE_OVERWRITE Upon completion or cancellation of a Document
Processing job, the TOE shall overwrite residual
image data from its Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile
Storage Devices.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0697-01-2021
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4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
This chapter describes the assumptions and the operational environment to operate the
TOE as useful information for the assumed readers to determine whether to use the TOE.
4.1 Usage Assumptions
Table 4-1 shows assumptions to operate the TOE. The effective performances of the TOE
security functions are not assured unless these assumptions are satisfied.
Table 4-1 Assumptions
Designation Definition
A.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of
the TOE and the data it stores or processes, is
assumed to be provided by the environment.
A.NETWORK The Operational Environment is assumed to
protect the TOE from direct, public access to its
LAN interface.
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN TOE Administrators are trusted to administer the
TOE according to site security policies.
A.TRAINED_USERS Authorized Users are trained to use the TOE
according to site security policies.
4.2 Environmental Assumptions
Figure 4-1 shows the operational environment assumed for the TOE. The TOE is installed
in a general office and used in an environment connected to the public telephone line and a
LAN which is the internal network of the organization. Users operate the control panel of
the TOE or a client PC (i.e. General User Client or System Administrator Client)
connected to the LAN to use the TOE.
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Figure 4-1 Operational Environment of the TOE
The operational environment of the TOE consists of the following components.
1) General User Client
A general user client is a general-purpose PC for general users. The following software is
required:
- OS: Windows 10
- Web browser: Microsoft Edge
- Printer driver (Provided by Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd.)
For Japan: ART EX Driver (Microsoft WHQL Certified Driver)
For other countries: 64-bit Windows Print Driver (PCL)
2) System Administrator Client
A system administrator client is a general-purpose PC for system administrators. The
following software is required:
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0697-01-2021
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- OS: Windows 10
- Web browser: Microsoft Edge
3) Mail Server
A mail server is used to send user document data from the TOE. The following software
is required:
- Software supporting SMTP protocol with TLS 1.2.
(Postfix version 2.10.1 was used in this evaluation.)
4) Audit Server
An audit server is a server to store audit logs generated by the TOE. The following
software is required:
- OS: Windows 10
- PowerShell script to retrieve audit logs from the TOE (described in the TOE guidance)
- PowerShell Version 5.1 (OS built-in tool)
It should be noted that the reliability of the hardware and the software other than the TOE
shown in this configuration is outside the scope of this evaluation. Those are assumed to be
trustworthy.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0697-01-2021
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4.3 Clarification of Scope
There are the following restrictions on the functions provided by the TOE or ensured by
this evaluation.
1) External authentication server
The products for the TOE have a functionality to authenticate users with an external
authentication server. However, the configuration of this evaluation is restricted so that
an external authentication server cannot be used. Therefore, the use of an external
authentication server is not ensured by this evaluation. (Refer to "7.5 Evaluation
Configuration".)
2) Servers and client PCs
System administrators are responsible for operating servers and client PCs cooperating
with the TOE securely.
3) Audit server operation
An audit server polls the TOE periodically to read out audit logs stored on the TOE. The
TOE sends all the stored audit logs on the polling, regardless of whether they have
already been read out. System administrators are responsible for distinguishing newly
generated audit logs from duplicated data and extracting necessary audit logs.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0697-01-2021
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5. Architectural Information
This chapter explains the scope and the main components of the TOE.
5.1 TOE Boundary and Components
The TOE is the entire MFD with the necessary option.
The functions provided by the TOE consist of basic functions of the MFD and security
functions. Regarding the basic functions of the MFD such as copy, scan, print, fax, and
document storage and retrieval, please refer to Chapter 11. The security functions of the
TOE are described below.
1) Identification and Authentication
This function is a function to identify and authenticate users of the TOE with their IDs
and passwords. This function is applied when the TOE is used as follows:
- When users use the TOE from the control panel of MFD, or Web browser of client PC,
or Printer driver of client PC.
- When an audit server retrieves the audit logs from the TOE. (The ID and password of
System Administrator is used.)
This function has the following functionality to reinforce the identification and
authentication.
- Restriction on the minimum password length.
- Suspending the identification and authentication on continuous unsuccessful
authentication attempts.
- Termination of the session if there is no operation for a certain time after the successful
authentication.
2) Access Control
This function is a function to control the access to the user data when users operate the
basic functions of the MFD on them. The access control is performed based on the owner
information of the user data and on the user's identification information and role.
3) Data Encryption
This function is a function to encrypt the data stored in the TOE and the communication
data. The encryption of the stored data uses AES CBC mode with a 256-bit key. The
encryption of communication data is used in the encryption communication protocol
described in "4) Trusted Communication. "
Encryption keys are generated using a random bit generator with enough entropy that is
difficult to guess.
4) Trusted Communication
This function is a function to protect communication data between the TOE and IT
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0697-01-2021
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devices using encryption communication protocol, TLS 1.2.
5) Security Management
This function is a function to restrict the setting, etc. of the security functions to system
administrators. However, general users can change their passwords.
6) Security Audit
This function is a function to generate audit logs on audit events relevant to the security
functions and enable an audit server and system administrators to retrieve them.
Generated audit logs are stored in the TOE. When the stored logs exceed the storage
capacity, the oldest one is deleted to store a new audit log.
7) Trusted Operation
This function is a function to verify the check sum of the firmware and the correct
operation of the random bit generation at start-up of the TOE, and to verify the digital
signature of new firmware when the firmware is updated.
8) PSTN Fax-Network Separation
This function is a function to separate the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN)
and the LAN. It prevents sending and receiving data from the PSTN to the LAN via the
TOE.
9) Overwrite Storage
This function is a function to overwrite the area of the hard disk drive in the TOE where
user document data are stored when those data are deleted by completion of the basic
function of the TOE or by deletion operation by users.
5.2 IT Environment
The TOE communicates with servers and client PCs via LAN. The function of the TOE
described in "4) Trusted Communication" works in cooperation with those IT devices and
uses the following protocols:
- Client PC (Web browser): HTTP over TLS
- Client PC (Printer driver): IPP over TLS
- Audit Server: HTTP over TLS
- Mail Server: SMTP over TLS
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6. Documentation
The identification of the guidance documents of the TOE is listed in Table 6-1 and Table 6-2.
TOE users are required to fully understand and comply with the following documents in
order to satisfy the assumptions.
Table 6-1 Guidance (For Japan)
Name1 Version
ApeosPort Reference Guide Main Unit
C7070/C6570/C5570/C4570/C3570/C3070/C2570
ME9024J1-1
ApeosPort Reference Guide Operations
C7070/C6570/C5570/C4570/C3570/C3070/C2570
ME9025J1-1
ApeosPort User's Manual
C7070/C6570/C5570/C4570/C3570/C3070/C2570
DE6689J1-2
ApeosPort C7070 ApeosPort C6570 ApeosPort C5570
ApeosPort C4570 ApeosPort C3570 ApeosPort C3070
ApeosPort C2570
Security Function Supplementary Guide
ME8995J1-1_
20201203
Table 6-2 Guidance (For other countries)
Name Version
ApeosPort Reference Guide Main Unit
C7070/C6570/C5570/C4570/C3570/C3070
ME9024E2-1
ApeosPort Reference Guide Operations
C7070/C6570/C5570/C4570/C3570/C3070
ME9025E2-1
ApeosPort User's Manual
C7070/C6570/C5570/C4570/C3570/C3070
DE6690E2-2
ApeosPort C7070 ApeosPort C6570 ApeosPort C5570
ApeosPort C4570 ApeosPort C3570 ApeosPort C3070
Security Function Supplementary Guide
ME8996E2-1
_20201203
1 The guidance name listed in Table 6-1 is the translation of Japanese name.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0697-01-2021
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7. Evaluation conducted by Evaluation Facility and Results
7.1 Evaluation Facility
Information Technology Security Center, Evaluation Department that conducted the
evaluation as the Evaluation Facility is approved under JISEC and is accredited by NITE
(National Institute of Technology and Evaluation), the Accreditation Body, which joins
Mutual Recognition Arrangement of ILAC (International Laboratory Accreditation
Cooperation). It is periodically confirmed that the above Evaluation Facility meets the
requirements on the appropriateness of the management and evaluators for maintaining
the quality of evaluation.
7.2 Evaluation Approach
The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the assurance requirements in the CC
Part 3 required by the Conformance PP using the evaluation methods prescribed in the
CEM and the assurance activities of the Conformance PP.
Details for evaluation activities were reported in the Evaluation Technical Report. The
Evaluation Technical Report explains the summary of the TOE as well as the content of the
evaluation and the verdict for each work unit in the CEM and assurance activity of the
Conformance PP.
7.3 Overview of Evaluation Activity
The history of the evaluation conducted is described in the Evaluation Technical Report as
follows.
The evaluation started in 2020-04 and concluded upon completion of the Evaluation
Technical Report dated 2020-12. The Evaluation Facility received a full set of evaluation
deliverables necessary for evaluation provided by the developer, and examined the evidence
in relation to a series of evaluation conducted. Furthermore, the evaluator conducted the
evaluator testing at the developer site in 2020-06, 2020-07, 2020-11 and 2020-12.
Concerns found in evaluation activities were issued as the Observation Reports and
reported to the developer. Those concerns were reviewed by the developer, and all the
concerns were solved eventually.
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7.4 IT Product Testing
As the verification results of the evidence shown in the evaluation process, the evaluator
performed the evaluator independent testing to ensure that the security functions of the
product are accurately implemented, and the evaluator penetration testing based on
vulnerability assessments.
7.4.1 Developer Testing
The developer testing is not included in the assurance requirements for this evaluation.
7.4.2 Evaluator Independent Testing
The evaluator performed the evaluator independent testing (hereinafter referred to as the
"independent testing") based on the evidence shown in the evaluation process to ensure
that the security functions of the product are accurately implemented. The independent
testing performed by the evaluator is described below.
1) Independent Testing Environment
The environment for the independent testing is based on the operational environment of
the TOE shown in Figure 4-1. The components used in the independent testing
environment are listed in Table 7-1.
Table 7-1 Components for the Independent Testing Enbironment
Components Description
TOE (For Japan)
Fuji Xerox ApeosPort C2570 model with Copy, Print, Fax, Scan
and Overwrite Storage
Version: Controller ROM Ver. 1.5.3, Fax ROM Ver. 2.2.1
(For other countries)
Fuji Xerox ApeosPort C3070 G model with Copy, Print, Fax, Scan
and Overwrite Storage
Version: Controller ROM Ver. 1.5.3, Fax ROM Ver. 2.2.1
Client PC
(General User
Client)
- OS: Microsoft Windows 10, Microsoft Windows 10 Professional
- Web browser: Microsoft Edge ver. 44.18362.449.0
- Printer Driver:
(For Japan) ART EX Driver (Microsoft WHQL certified driver)
(For other countries) 64bit Windows Print Driver (PCL)
Client PC
(System
Administrator
Client)
- OS: Microsoft Windows 10, Microsoft Windows 10 Professional
- Web browser: Microsoft Edge ver. 44.18362.449.0
Mail Server - OS: Cent OS ver. 7.6
- Postfix version 2.10.1
Audit Server - OS: Microsoft Windows 10, Microsoft Windows 10 Professional
- PowerShell Script (described in the guidance)
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There are following differences between the configuration of the independent testing and
the TOE configuration identified in the ST. The evaluator determined that there are no
problems with those differences and that the security functions of the TOE configuration
identified in the ST can be considered properly tested.
(1) Tested models
In the models of the TOE described in Chapter 2 "TOE identification," there are multiple
models due to the following differences:
- Difference in languages for Japan and other countries
- Difference in printing speed
- Difference in the model name (with or without a "G" at the end of the model name)
The evaluator determined that the security functions of all the models of the TOE can be
considered to have been tested by testing the representative two models considering the
above differences, because the security functions of each models are the same.
(2) Using a modified firmware for testing
In the independent testing, a firmware modified for testing was used to verify the
encryption functions instead of the firmware of the TOE. The evaluator determined that
the testing on the modified firmware is valid because its modules of the encryption
functions are the same as that of the TOE, and the modification for testing does not affect
the encryption functions.
(3) Using additional testing tools
In the independent testing, some testing tools were used to confirm and alter the
communication data and to confirm the data written in the hard disk drive. The validity
of those testing tools was confirmed by the evaluator.
2) Summary of the Independent Testing
A summary of the independent testing performed by the evaluator is described below.
a. Viewpoints of the Independent Testing
Viewpoints of the independent testing devised by the evaluator based on the
requirements of the Conformance PP and on the provided evaluation documentation are
as follows.
<Viewpoints of the Independent Testing>
(1) Confirm security functions for each Security Functional Requirement (SFR).
(2) Confirm that the implementation of the cryptographic algorithms is correct.
b. Independent Testing Outline
An outline of the independent testing performed by the evaluator is as follows.
<Independent Testing Approach>
The behavior of the TOE for inputs using the control panel of the TOE, the client PC, the
audit server and the testing tools was confirmed by following means:
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- If the behavior can be confirmed from the external interfaces of the TOE, the external
interfaces of the TOE are used.
- If the behavior cannot be confirmed from the external interfaces of the TOE, the
developer interface of the TOE, the analyzer for the hard disk drive in the TOE and the
firmware for testing are used.
<Content of the Performed Independent Testing>
The evaluator performed the independent testing of 20 items.
Table 7-2 shows contents of the independent testing corresponding to the viewpoints.
Table 7-2 Performed Independent Testing
Viewpoint Outline of the Independent Testing
(1) <Confirmation of security functions>
Confirm that all security functions work as the specification with the test
items created based on the assurance activities of the Conformance PP for
each SFR or the requirements of the SFR.
(2) <Confirmation of implementation of cryptographic algorithms>
Confirm the following cryptographic algorithms are implemented as the
specification using the test program installed in the TOE.
- RSA (key generation, signature generation/verification)
- ECDSA (key generation, signature generation/verification)
- AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256, AES-GCM-128, AES-GCM-256
- SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384
- HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384
- CTR_DRBG (AES)
c. Result
All the independent testing performed by the evaluator was correctly completed, and the
evaluator confirmed the behavior of the TOE. The evaluator confirmed consistencies
between the expected behavior and all the test results.
7.4.3 Evaluator Penetration Testing
The evaluator devised and performed the evaluator penetration testing (hereinafter
referred to as the "penetration testing") on the potentially exploitable vulnerabilities of
concern under the assumed environment of use and attack level from the evidence shown
in the process of the evaluation. The penetration testing performed by the evaluator is
described below.
1) Summary of the Penetration Testing
A summary of the penetration testing performed by the evaluator is as follows.
a. Vulnerability of Concern
The evaluator searched into the provided documentation and the publicly available
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0697-01-2021
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information for the potential vulnerabilities, and then identified the following
vulnerabilities which require the penetration testing.
(1) There is a concern that unintended network ports of the TOE may be open, and
known vulnerabilities may exist in the network services running on the TOE.
(2)There is a concern that known vulnerabilities may exist in the Web interface of the
TOE.
(3)There is a concern that known vulnerabilities may exist in the print processing of
the TOE.
(4)There is a concern that the identification and authentication function may be
bypassed by the malicious input from the control panel of the TOE, printer driver or
Web interface.
(5)There is a concern that USB ports of the TOE may be exploited.
b. Penetration Testing Outline
The evaluator performed the following penetration testing to identify potentially
exploitable vulnerabilities.
<Penetration Testing Environment>
The penetration testing was performed in the same environment as that of the evaluator
independent testing, except for the additional PC with tools for penetration testing. Table
7-3 shows the tools used in the penetration testing.
Table 7-3 Penetration Testing Tools
Name Outline and Purpose of Use
Nmap
Version 7.80
A tool to detect available network service ports.
Nessus
Version 7.1.3
A tool to detect known vulnerabilities at network ports.
OWASP ZAP
Version 2.9.0
A tool to detect known vulnerabilities at Web application.
Fiddler
Version 5.0.20194.41348
The tool is used to refer to and alter the communication data
between Web browser and Web server (TOE).
PRET
Version 0.40
A tool to inspect various vulnerabilities in a printing
processing.
<Content of the Performed Penetration Testing>
Table 7-4 shows contents of the penetration testing corresponding to the vulnerabilities
of concern.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0697-01-2021
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Table 7-4 Outline of the Penetration Testing
Vulnerability Penetration Testing Outline
(1) - Confirm that unexpected network ports of the TOE are not open using
Nmap.
- Confirm that there are no known vulnerabilities in the network
services running on the TOE using Nessus.
(2) - Confirm that there are no known vulnerabilities in the Web interface
of the TOE using OWASP ZAP.
- Confirm that the identification and authentication function and the
access control function cannot be bypassed even if the data from Web
browser to the TOE are altered using Fiddler.
(3) - Confirm that there are no known vulnerabilities in print processing of
the TOE using PRET and exploit codes obtained on the Internet.
(4) - Confirm that unexpected behaviour is not observed even if the
character strings that may cause buffer overflow or unauthrised
processing are input for the user ID or password in the control panel,
printer driver and Web interfaces of the TOE.
(5) - Confirm that the USB port of the TOE cannot be used using the PC for
the penetration tesing and bootable USB flash drive.
c. Result
In the penetration testing performed by the evaluator, the evaluator did not find any
exploitable vulnerabilities that attackers who have the assumed attack potential could
exploit.
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7.5 Evaluated Configuration
The conditions of the TOE configuration, that are prerequisites for this evaluation, are as
described in the guidance documents listed in Chapter 6. In order to use the TOE securely
as ensured by the evaluation, the TOE must be set as described in the guidance documents.
Different settings are not subject to assurance by this evaluation.
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7.6 Evaluation Results
The evaluator had concluded that the TOE satisfies all work units prescribed in the CEM
and all assurance activities in the Conformance PP as per the Evaluation Technical Report.
In the evaluation, the following were confirmed.
- PP Conformance:
Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices 1.0 dated September 10, 2015
Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices - v1.0 Errata #1, June 2017
Guideline for Certification Application with HCD-PP Conformance [16]
- Treatment regarding FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Test
- Treatment regarding FCS_TLS_EXT.1.1 Test
- Security functional requirements: Common Criteria Part 2 Extended
- Security assurance requirements: Common Criteria Part 3 Conformant
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict "PASS" was confirmed for the following assurance
components required by the Conformance PP.
ASE_INT.1, ASE_CCL.1, ASE_SPD.1, ASE_OBJ.1, ASE_ECD.1,
ASE_REQ.1, ASE_TSS.1, ADV_FSP.1, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1,
ALC_CMC.1, ALC_CMS.1, ATE_IND.1, AVA_VAN.1
The result of the evaluation is only applied to those which are composed by the TOE
corresponding to the identification described in the Chapter 2.
7.7 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations
There is no evaluator recommendation to be addressed to procurement entities.
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8. Certification
The Certification Body performed the certification from the following viewpoints based on
the materials submitted by the Evaluation Facility during the evaluation process.
1. Contents pointed out in the Observation Report shall be adequate.
2. Contents pointed out in the Observation Report shall properly be solved.
3. The submitted documentation was sampled, the content was examined, and the related
work units in the CEM and assurance activities of the Conformance PP shall be
evaluated as presented in the Evaluation Technical Report.
4. Rationale of the evaluation verdict by the evaluator presented in the Evaluation
Technical Report shall be adequate.
5. The evaluator's evaluation methodology presented in the Evaluation Technical Report
shall conform to the CEM and the assurance activities of the Conformance PP.
8.1 Certification Result
As a result of verification of the Evaluation Technical Report, Observation Report and
related evaluation documentation submitted by the Evaluation Facility, the Certification
Body determined that the TOE evaluation satisfies the assurance requirements required
by the Conformance PP.
8.2 Recommendations
Procurement entities who are interested in the TOE are advised to refer "4.3 Clarification
of Scope" and "7.5 Evaluated Configuration" to make sure the scope of the evaluation and
the operational requirements of the TOE meet the operational conditions assumed by each
user.
It is necessary that an audit server polls the TOE periodically to read out audit logs from
the TOE. The system administrator for the TOE needs to determine the interval time of
polling based on the consideration of your operational policy for audit logs and your usage
of the TOE. Note that if the polling interval is too short, the audit server might run short of
storage area because the TOE sends all stored audit logs every polling. Also note that if the
polling interval is too long, audit logs might be lost.
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9. Annexes
There is no annex.
10. Security Target
Security Target [12] of the TOE is provided as a separate document from this Certification
Report.
Title: Fuji Xerox ApeosPort
C7070/C6570/C5570/C4570/C3570/C3070/C2570/
C7070 G/C6570 G/C5570 G/C4570 G/C3570 G/C3070 G
models with Copy, Print, Fax, Scan and Overwrite Storage
Security Target
Version: V 1.07
Publication Date: December 3, 2020
Author: Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0697-01-2021
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11. Glossary
The abbreviations relating to the CC used in this report are listed below.
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
PP Protection Profile
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
The abbreviations relating to the TOE used in this report are listed below.
MFD Multi-Function Device
PSTN Public Switched Telephone Network
The abbreviations relating to information technology used in this report are listed below.
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CTR_DRBG Counter (CTR) mode block cipher algorithm DRBG
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
GCM Galois/Counter Mode
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
IPP Internet Printing Protocol
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
TLS Transport Layer Security
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0697-01-2021
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The definitions of terms used in this report are listed below.
Copy Function A function to scan paper documents by operating the
control panel and duplicate them.
Document storage and
retrieval Function
A function to store user document data in the MFD and
retrieve them. Document storage functionality is to store
user document data scanned by "Scan function" or
received by "Fax receive function". Document retrieval
functionality is to print out stored user document data by
operating control panel of the MFD or download them by
operating the Web browser of a user client.
Fax Function
(fax send, fax receive)
A function to send and receive fax data via Public
Switched Telephone Network. Fax send functionality is
to scan paper documents by operating the control panel
and send the scanned user document data using the
standard fax protocol. Fax receive functionality is to
receive user document data using the standard fax
protocol and store them with "Document storage and
retrieval function".
Print Function A function to receive user document data from the printer
driver of a user client, and then print out them by
operating the control panel of the MFD.
Scan Function A function to scan paper documents by operating the
control panel and send the scanned user document data
to a mail server or store them with "Document storage
and retrieval function".
Assurance Activity Evaluation work to be performed by an evaluator in order
to conform to a PP. It is a supplement of the CEM. In the
case of the Conformance PP [14], it is described in the
Conformance PP.
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12. Bibliography
[1] IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme Document, July 2018,
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, CCS-01
[2] Requirements for IT Security Certification, September 2018,
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, CCM-02
[3] Requirements for Approval of IT Security Evaluation Facility, September 2018,
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, CCM-03
[4] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1:
Introduction and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017,
CCMB-2017-04-001
[5] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-002
[6] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-003
[7] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1:
Introduction and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017,
CCMB-2017-04-001, (Japanese Version 1.0, July 2017)
[8] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-002,
(Japanese Version 1.0, July 2017)
[9] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-003,
(Japanese Version 1.0, July 2017)
[10] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Evaluation
methodology, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-004
[11] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Evaluation
methodology, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-004,
(Japanese Version 1.0, July 2017)
[12] Fuji Xerox ApeosPort C7070/C6570/C5570/C4570/C3570/C3070/C2570/C7070 G/
C6570 G/C5570 G/C4570 G/C3570 G/C3070 G models with Copy, Print, Fax, Scan and
Overwrite Storage Security Target, Version V1.07, December 3, 2020, Fuji Xerox Co.,
Ltd.
[13] Fuji Xerox ApeosPort C7070/C6570/C5570/C4570/C3570/C3070/C2570/C7070 G/
C6570 G/C5570 G/C4570 G/C3570 G/C3070 G models with Copy, Print, Fax, Scan and
Overwrite Storage Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.3, December 16, 2020,
Information Technology Security Center, Evaluation Department
[14] Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices 1.0 dated September 10, 2015 (Certification
Identification: JISEC-C0553)
[15] Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices - v1.0 Errata #1, June 2017
[16] Guideline for Certification Application with HCD-PP Conformance, Version 1.8,
November 11, 2020, Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan,
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JISEC-CERT-2020-A18