National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions Compact Network Storage
4-Slot Hardware Encryption Layer
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-10954-2019
Dated: March 28, 2019
Version: 0.3
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
Curtiss-Wright CNS4 Hardware Encryption Layer
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
John Butterworth
The MITRE Corporation
McLean, VA
James Donndelinger
Luke Florer
Jerry Myers
The Aerospace Corporation
Columbia, MD
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Tammy Compton
John Messiah
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Catonsville, MD
Curtiss-Wright CNS4 Hardware Encryption Layer
iii
Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 1
3 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 3
3.1 TOE Evaluated Configuration ............................................................................ 3
3.2 TOE Architecture................................................................................................ 3
3.3 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................ 3
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 3
4.1 Cryptographic support ........................................................................................ 4
4.2 User data protection ............................................................................................ 4
4.3 Security management.......................................................................................... 4
4.4 Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................... 4
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope ....................................................................... 4
6 Documentation............................................................................................................ 5
7 IT Product Testing ...................................................................................................... 5
7.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................... 5
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................... 6
8 Results of the Evaluation ............................................................................................ 6
8.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)............................................................ 6
8.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV).............................................................. 6
8.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ................................................. 7
8.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC) ..................................... 7
8.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ................. 7
8.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)......................................................... 7
8.7 Summary of Evaluation Results.......................................................................... 8
9 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................... 8
10 Annexes....................................................................................................................... 8
11 Security Target............................................................................................................ 8
12 Glossary ...................................................................................................................... 8
13 Bibliography ............................................................................................................... 9
Curtiss-Wright CNS4 Hardware Encryption Layer
1
1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP)
validation team of the evaluation of Curtiss-Wright Compact Network Storage 4-Slot Hardware
Encryption Layer solution provided by Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions. It presents the
evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report is not
an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government, and no
warranty is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common Criteria
Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Catonsville, MD, United States of America, and was completed in
March 2019. The information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report
(ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer Security Solutions. The evaluation
determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and
meets the assurance requirements of the collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption
- Encryption Engine, Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019 and collaborative
Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption Authorization Acquisition, Version 2.0 + Errata
20190201, February 1, 2019.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Curtiss-Wright Compact Network Storage 4-Slot Hardware
Encryption Layer.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a NIAP
approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT Security
Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5). This Validation Report applies only to the specific version of the
TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the
NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and successive
versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product
satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the Security Target
(ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory’s findings are accurate,
the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Curtiss-Wright Defense
Solutions Compact Network Storage 4-Slot Hardware Encryption Layer
(FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E) Security Target, Version 0.4, March 26, 2019 and analysis
performed by the Validation Team.
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations.
Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories called
Curtiss-Wright CNS4 Hardware Encryption Layer
2
Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common Evaluation Methodology
(CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP)
accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a security
evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon successful
completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Curtiss-Wright Compact Network Storage 4-Slot Hardware Encryption Layer
Protection Profile (Specific models identified in Section 8)
collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Encryption Engine,
Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019 and collaborative Protection
Profile for Full Drive Encryption Authorization Acquisition, Version 2.0 + Errata
20190201, February 1, 2019
ST Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions Compact Network Storage 4-Slot Hardware
Encryption Layer (FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E) Security Target, Version 0.4,
March 26, 2019
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Curtiss-Wright Compact Network Storage 4-Slot
Hardware Encryption Layer, Version 0.3, March 26, 2019
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions
Developer Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Catonsville, MD
CCEVS Validators John Butterworth, The MITRE Corporation
James Donndelinger, The Aerospace Corporation
Luke Florer, The Aerospace Corporation
Jerry Myers, The Aerospace Corporation
Curtiss-Wright CNS4 Hardware Encryption Layer
3
3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the Security
Target.
The Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions Compact Network Storage 4-Slot Hardware Encryption
Layer (hereafter referred to as the TOE) is a rugged Network Attached Storage (NAS) file server
for use in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV), and
Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft. Easily integrated into network centric
systems, the is an easy to use, turnkey, rugged network File Server that houses four Flash Storage
Modules (FSMs) that provides quick off load of data. The FSMs can be easily removed from the
CNS4 and installed into any other providing full, seamless data transfer between one or more
networks in separate locations (e.g. ground => vehicle => ground).
The Curtiss-Wright product supports networking protocols including SSH, CIFS, NFS, FTP,
HTTP, DHCP, SNMP, and iSCSI in addition to its RS-232 console port. The FDEEEcPP20E and
FDEAAcPP20E Protection Profiles did not consider, nor did they include networking protocols as
part of the security functional requirements, and as a result, did not include any requirements for
addressing those protocols. Therefore, as per the FDEEEcPP20E and FDEAAcPP20E, the
protocols have not been examined as part of the required assurance activities and consequently the
evaluation can make no claims about the TOE’s networking protocols.
It is suggested that a customer using the product consider the impact of utilizing remote
administration via SSH across the network (rather than through the console) based upon their
specific use case. The customer should factor into their risk management decision the environment
in which TOE operates (dedicated, segregated, private network versus residing in a DMZ
accessible to the Internet), and the value of data to be protected.
3.1 TOE Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration is the Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions Compact Network Storage
4-Slot device when configured according to the Common Criteria guidance found in the
documentation referenced in Section 6 below.
3.2 TOE Architecture
The TOE provides a hardware Full Drive Encryption solution that can accept a Flash Storage
Module (FSM) which contains a data drive within.
3.3 Physical Boundaries
The TOE’s physical boundary is the physical perimeter of its enclosure. The TOE provides a
ruggedized solution to secure Data at Rest (DAR).
4 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
Curtiss-Wright CNS4 Hardware Encryption Layer
4
1. Cryptographic support
2. User data protection
3. Security management
4. Protection of the TSF
4.1 Cryptographic support
The TOE includes cryptographic functionality for key management, user authentication, and
block-based encryption including: symmetric key generation, encryption/decryption,
cryptographic hashing, keyed-hash message authentication, and password-based key derivation.
These functions are supported with suitable random bit generation, key derivation, salt generation,
initialization vector generation, secure key storage, and key destruction. These primitive
cryptographic functions are used to encrypt Data-At-Rest (including the generation and protection
of keys and key encryption keys) used by the TOE.
4.2 User data protection
The TOE performs Full Drive Encryption on the entire drive (so that no plaintext exists) and does
so without user intervention.
4.3 Security management
The TOE provides each of the required management services to manage the full drive encryption
using a command line interface.
4.4 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements a number of features to protect itself to ensure the reliability and integrity of
its security features. It protects key and key material, and includes functions to perform self-tests
and software/firmware integrity checking so that it might detect when it is failing or may be
corrupt. If any of the self-tests fail, the TOE will not go into an operational mode.
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope
Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
 collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Encryption Engine, Version
2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019 (FDEEEcPP20E)
 collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption Authorization Acquisition,
Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019 (FDEAAcPP20E)
That information has not been reproduced here and the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E should be
consulted if there is interest in that material.
Curtiss-Wright CNS4 Hardware Encryption Layer
5
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other
functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other
functionality provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions
can be drawn about their effectiveness.
Clarification of scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets
the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance activities specified
in the Full Drive Encryption Protection Profiles and performed by the evaluation team).
 This evaluation covers only the specific device models and hardware as identified in this
document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
 This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities that
were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines
an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding
of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
 The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements
specified in the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E and applicable Technical Decisions. Any
additional security related functional capabilities of the TOE were not covered by this
evaluation. In particular, management of the device over the network was not evaluated.
6 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
 CNS4 CSfC Common Airborne Recorder CSfC Encrypted Data StorageUser Guide,
DDOC0108-000-A2
These are the only documents that should be trusted to provided information for administering the
TOE in its evaluated configuration.
7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is derived
from information contained in the Assurance Activity Report (FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E)
for Curtiss-Wright Compact Network Storage 4-Slot Hardware Encryption Layer, Version 0.2,
March 18, 2019 (AAR).
7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
Curtiss-Wright CNS4 Hardware Encryption Layer
6
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according a Common Criteria Certification document
and ran the tests specified in the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E including the tests associated
with optional requirements.
The test configuration and tools used for testing are documented in section 3.4 of the Assurance
Activity Report.
8 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are presented
in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all assurance
activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version
3.1 rev 4 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Compact Network Storage 4-
Slot Hardware Encryption Layer TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the SARs contained in
the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E.
8.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST contains
a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of security
requirements claimed to be met by the Curtiss-Wright Compact Network Storage 4-Slot Hardware
Encryption Layer product that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security
function descriptions that support the requirements.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
8.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the design
documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the security
functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained in the
Security target and Guidance documents. Additionally the evaluator performed the assurance
activities specified in the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E related to the examination of the
information contained in the TSS.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
Curtiss-Wright CNS4 Hardware Encryption Layer
7
8.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the
evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to securely
administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of the
evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
8.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the TOE
was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
8.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of tests
specified by the assurance activities in the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E and recorded the
results in a Test Report, summarized in the AAR.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
8.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes a
public search for vulnerabilities. The public search performed on April 3, 2019 for vulnerabilities
did not uncover any residual vulnerability.
The evaluator searched the National Vulnerability Database
(https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search) and Vulnerability Notes Database
(http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/) with the following search terms: "disk encryption", "drive
encryption", "key destruction", "key sanitization", "Opal management software", "SED
management software", "Password caching", "Key caching", "Curtiss Wright", "CNS4",
"Compact Network Storage", "Compact Network Storage 4-slot", "Curtiss Wright Crypto
Firmware", "NXP (Phillips) ARM7 Processor P/N LPC2368FBD100", "Maxim Integrated
Curtiss-Wright CNS4 Hardware Encryption Layer
8
DS3645, Rev A4", "Microchip ATECC508A", "Enova X-Wall MX-256C version 1.0",
"Microchip 24LC512".
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
8.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in the
ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy of the
claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and correctly
verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
9 Validator Comments/Recommendations
As was noted in the Architectural Information and Clarification of Scope sections of this report,
the devices provide more functionality than was covered by the evaluation. Only the
functionality claimed in the SFR’s in the Security Target was evaluated. All other functionality
provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately and no further conclusions should be
drawn as to their effectiveness, nor can any claims be made relative to their security based upon
this evaluation.
10 Annexes
Not applicable
11 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions Compact Network Storage
4-Slot Hardware Encryption Layer (FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E) Security Target, Version
0.4, March 26, 2019.
12 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given implementation
is correct with respect to the formal model.
Curtiss-Wright CNS4 Hardware Encryption Layer
9
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the Common
Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made are justified; or
the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using the Common
Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent, technically sound
and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or more TOEs that may be
evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an IT
product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation under the
CC.
 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue of a
Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation and for
overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme.
13 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction
and General Model, CCMB-2017-04-001, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security
Functional Components, CCMB-2017-04-002, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security
Assurance Components, CCMB-2017-04-003, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[4] collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Encryption Engine, Version
2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019
[5] collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption Authorization Acquisition,
Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019.
[6] Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions Compact Network Storage 4-Slot Hardware Encryption
Layer (FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E) Security Target, Version 0.4, March 26, 2019
(ST).
[7] Assurance Activity Report (FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E) for Curtiss-Wright Compact
Network Storage 4-Slot Hardware Encryption Layer, Version 0.3, March 26, 2019 (AAR).
[8] Detailed Test Report (FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E) for Curtiss-Wright Compact
Network Storage 4-Slot Hardware Encryption Layer, Version 0.2, March 18, 2019 (DTR).
[9] Evaluation Technical Report for Curtiss-Wright Compact Network Storage 4-Slot
Hardware Encryption Layer, Version 0.2, March 18, 2019 (ETR)
Curtiss-Wright CNS4 Hardware Encryption Layer
1