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All printed copies and duplicate soft copies are considered un-Controlled copies and
the original on-line version should be referred to for latest version.
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1
Cisco Jabber 15.2
Security Target
Version: 0.5
Date: June 23, 2026
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Table of Contents
1 Security Target Introduction.............................................................................................................................................................................7
1.1 ST and TOE Reference .....................................................................................................................................................................................7
1.2 TOE Overview ..................................................................................................................................................................................................7
1.3 TOE Product Type............................................................................................................................................................................................8
1.3.1 Required non-TOE Hardware/Software/Firmware..................................................................................................................................8
1.4 TOE Description...............................................................................................................................................................................................8
1.5 TOE Evaluated Configuration...........................................................................................................................................................................9
1.6 Physical Scope of the TOE................................................................................................................................................................................9
1.7 Logical Scope of the TOE .................................................................................................................................................................................9
1.7.1 Communication................................................................................................................................................................................10
1.7.2 Cryptographic Support...........................................................................................................................................................................10
1.7.3 User Data protection .............................................................................................................................................................................10
1.7.4 Identification and Authentication..........................................................................................................................................................10
1.7.5 Security Management............................................................................................................................................................................10
1.7.6 Protection of the TSF .............................................................................................................................................................................10
1.7.7 Trusted Channels...................................................................................................................................................................................10
1.8 Excluded Functionality...................................................................................................................................................................................11
2 Conformance Claims.......................................................................................................................................................................................12
2.1 Common Criteria Conformance Claim...........................................................................................................................................................12
2.2 Protection Profile Configuration and Functional Package Conformance Claims ...........................................................................................12
3 Security Problem Definition............................................................................................................................................................................16
3.1 Assumptions ..................................................................................................................................................................................................16
3.2 Threats...........................................................................................................................................................................................................16
3.3 Organizational Security Policies.....................................................................................................................................................................17
4 Security Objectives .........................................................................................................................................................................................18
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE.....................................................................................................................................................................18
4.2 Security Objectives for the Environment.......................................................................................................................................................20
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale........................................................................................................................................................................20
5 Security Requirements ...................................................................................................................................................................................23
5.1 Conventions...................................................................................................................................................................................................23
5.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements .........................................................................................................................................................23
5.2.1 Class: Communications (FCO) ...............................................................................................................................................................25
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5.2.1.1 FCO_VOC_EXT.1 – Fixed-Rate Vocoder...........................................................................................................................................25
5.2.2 Class: Cryptographic Support (FCS).......................................................................................................................................................25
5.3.2.1 FCS_CKM_EXT.1 – Cryptographic Key Generation Services ............................................................................................................25
5.3.2.2 FCS_CKM.1/AK – Cryptographic Asymmetric Key Generation........................................................................................................26
5.3.2.3 FCS_CKM.2 – Cryptographic Key Establishment .............................................................................................................................26
5.3.2.4 FCS_COP.1/SKC – Cryptographic Operation – Encryption/Decryption............................................................................................26
5.3.2.5 FCS_COP.1/Hash – Cryptographic Operation – Hashing .................................................................................................................26
5.3.2.6 FCS_COP.1/Sig – Cryptographic Operation – Signing......................................................................................................................27
5.3.2.7 FCS_COP.1/KeyHash – Cryptographic Operation – Keyed-Hash Message Authentication .............................................................27
5.3.2.8 FCS_COP.1/SRTP – Cryptographic Operation – Encryption/Decryption for SRTP ...........................................................................27
5.3.2.9 FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1/Client – HTTPS Protocol ....................................................................................................................................27
5.3.2.10 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 – Random Bit Generation Services......................................................................................................................27
5.3.2.11 FCS_STO_EXT.1 – Storage of Credentials......................................................................................................................................28
5.3.2.12 FCS_SRTP_EXT.1 – Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol .............................................................................................................28
5.3.2.13 FCS_TLS_EXT.1 – TLS Protocol.......................................................................................................................................................28
5.3.2.14 FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 – TLS Client Protocol ..........................................................................................................................................28
5.3.2.15 FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 – TLS Client Support for Mutual Authentication ................................................................................................28
5.3.2.16 FCS_TLSC_EXT.4 – TLS Client Support for Renegotiation ..............................................................................................................28
5.3.2.17 FCS_TLSC_EXT.5 – TLS Client Support for Supported Groups Extension.......................................................................................29
5.3.3 Class: User Data Protection (FDP).........................................................................................................................................................29
5.3.3.1 FDP_DEC_EXT.1 – Access to Platform Resources............................................................................................................................29
5.3.3.2 FDP_NET_EXT.1 – Network Communications .................................................................................................................................29
5.3.3.3 FDP_DAR_EXT.1 – Encryption Of Sensitive Application Data..........................................................................................................29
5.3.3.4 FDP_IFC.1 – Subset Information Flow Control ................................................................................................................................29
5.3.3.5 FDP_IFF.1 – Simple Security Attributes...........................................................................................................................................29
5.3.4 Class: Identification and Authentication (FIA) ......................................................................................................................................30
5.3.4.1 FIA_X509_EXT.1 – X.509 Certificate Validation...............................................................................................................................30
5.3.4.2 FIA_X509_EXT.2 – X.509 Certificate Authentication .......................................................................................................................30
5.3.5 Class: Security Management (FMT) ......................................................................................................................................................31
5.3.5.1 FMT_MEC_EXT.1 – Supported Configuration Mechanism..............................................................................................................31
5.3.5.2 FMT_CFG_EXT.1 – Secure by Default Configuration.......................................................................................................................31
5.3.5.3 FMT_SMF.1 – Specification of Management Functions..................................................................................................................31
5.3.5.4 FMT_SMF.1/VVoIP – Specification of Management Functions (VVoIP Communications)..............................................................31
5.3.6 Class: Privacy (FPR) ..............................................................................................................................................................................31
5.3.6.1 FPR_ANO_EXT.1 – User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable Information ............................................................31
5.3.7 Class: Protection of the TSF (FPT) .........................................................................................................................................................31
5.3.7.1 FPT_API_EXT.1 – Use of Supported Services and APIs....................................................................................................................31
5.3.7.2 FPT_AEX_EXT.1 – Anti-Exploitation Capabilities .............................................................................................................................31
5.3.7.3 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 – Integrity for Installation and Update .................................................................................................................31
5.3.7.4 FPT_TUD_EXT.2 – Integrity for Installation and Update .................................................................................................................32
5.3.7.5 FPT_LIB_EXT.1 – Use of Third Party Libraries..................................................................................................................................32
5.3.7.6 FPT_IDV_EXT.1 Software Identification and Versions.....................................................................................................................33
5.3.8 Class: TOE Access (FTA).........................................................................................................................................................................33
5.3.8.1 FTA_SSL.3/Media – TSF-Initiated Termination (Media Channel) ....................................................................................................33
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5.3.9 Class: Trusted Path (FTP) ......................................................................................................................................................................34
5.3.9.1 FTP_DIT_EXT.1 – Protection of Data in Transit ...............................................................................................................................34
5.3.9.2 FTP_ITC.1/Control – Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (Signaling Channel)..............................................................................................34
5.3.9.3 FTP_ITC.1/Media – Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (Media Channel)....................................................................................................34
5.4 Security Assurance Requirements.................................................................................................................................................................34
5.4.1 SAR Requirements .................................................................................................................................................................................34
5.4.2 SAR Rationale.........................................................................................................................................................................................35
5.5 Assurance Measures......................................................................................................................................................................................35
6 TOE Summary Specification............................................................................................................................................................................37
6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirement Measures ..........................................................................................................................................37
7 Supplemental TOE Summary Specification Information.................................................................................................................................44
8 Annex A: References.......................................................................................................................................................................................45
9 Annex B: Acronyms.........................................................................................................................................................................................46
10 Annex C: Terminology.....................................................................................................................................................................................48
11 Annex D: Differing SFR Naming Conventions..................................................................................................................................................49
12 Annex E: Obtaining Documentation, Submitting a Service Request, and Contacting Cisco ...........................................................................50
Table of Tables
Table 1. ST and TOE Identification..............................................................................................................................................................................7
Table 2. IT Environment Component..........................................................................................................................................................................8
Table 3. Excluded Functionality and Rationale.........................................................................................................................................................11
Table 4. PP Configuration and Functional Package Conformance Claims ................................................................................................................12
Table 5. NIAP Technical Decisions Applied to This ST...............................................................................................................................................12
Table 6. TOE Assumptions........................................................................................................................................................................................16
Table 7. Threats........................................................................................................................................................................................................17
Table 8. Security Objectives for the TOE ..................................................................................................................................................................18
Table 9. Security Objectives for the Environment....................................................................................................................................................20
Table 10. Security Objectives Rationale ...................................................................................................................................................................21
Table 11. Security Requirement Conventions ..........................................................................................................................................................23
Table 12. Security Functional Requirements............................................................................................................................................................23
Table 13. Third-Party Libraries .................................................................................................................................................................................32
Table 14. SAR Requirements ....................................................................................................................................................................................34
Table 15. Assurance Measures.................................................................................................................................................................................35
Table 16. How TOE SFRs Measures Are Met ............................................................................................................................................................37
Table 17. CAVP Certificates ......................................................................................................................................................................................44
Table 18. References................................................................................................................................................................................................45
Table 19. Acronyms..................................................................................................................................................................................................46
Table 20. Terms........................................................................................................................................................................................................48
Table 21. SFR Naming Map.......................................................................................................................................................................................49
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Table of Figures
Figure 1. TOE in Relation to the IT Environment ........................................................................................................................................................9
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Document Introduction
Prepared By:
Cisco Systems, Inc.
170 West Tasman Dr.
San Jose, CA 95134
This document provides the basis for an evaluation of a specific Target of Evaluation (TOE), Cisco Jabber 15.2. This Security
Target (ST) defines a set of assumptions about the aspects of the environment, a list of threats that the product intends to
counter, a set of security objectives, a set of security requirements, and the IT security functions provided by the TOE that
meet the set of requirements. Administrators of the TOE will be referred to as administrators, Authorized Administrators,
TOE administrators, semi-privileged administrators, privileged administrators, and security administrators in this document.
Revision History
Version Date Change
0.1 October 18, 2024 Initial Version
0.2 June 24, 2025 Lab Comments
0.3 February 11, 2026 Lab Comments
0.4 February 12, 2026 Validator Comments
0.5 June 23, 2026 Validator Comments
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
Cisco and the Cisco logo are trademarks or registered trademarks of Cisco and/or its affiliates in the U.S. and other countries.
To view a list of Cisco trademarks, go to this URL: www.cisco.com/go/trademarks. Third-party trademarks mentioned are the
property of their respective owners. The use of the word partner does not imply a partnership relationship between
Cisco and any other company. (1110R)
© 2026 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.
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1 Security Target Introduction
This Security Target contains the following sections:
■ Security Target Introduction [Section 1]
■ Conformance Claims [Section 2]
■ Security Problem Definition [Section 3]
■ Security Objectives [Section 4]
■ Security Requirements [Section 5]
■ TOE Summary Specification [Section 6]
■ Supplemental TOE Summary Specification Information [Section 7]
■ References
The structure and content of this ST comply with the requirements specified in the Common Criteria (CC), Part 1, Annex A,
and Part 3, Chapter 4.
1.1 ST and TOE Reference
This section provides information needed to identify and control this ST and its TOE.
Table 1. ST and TOE Identification
Name Description
ST Title Cisco Jabber 15.2 Security Target
ST Version 0.5
Publication Date June 23, 2026
Vendor and ST Author Cisco Systems, Inc.
TOE Reference Cisco Jabber 15.2
TOE Software Version Jabber 15.2
Keywords VVoIP Client, Telephony
1.2 TOE Overview
Cisco Jabber provides users within an organization a number of features for collaborative communication:
Integrated Voice and Video Telephony - Securely make, receive, and control phone calls. Users have a variety of call control
options including mute, call transfer, call forwarding, and impromptu conferencing.
Instant Messaging and Presence - View real-time availability of co-workers and securely chat in real time using instant
messaging to save time and reduce phone tag.
Online Web Conferencing – Securely access online web conferencing services to collaborate in real-time.
Voicemail Services – Securely access voicemail and tools for managing messages.
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The Common Criteria evaluation was limited to the Integrated Voice and Video over IP (VVoIP) telephony features of Cisco
Jabber that it secures with SRTP and TLS 1.2. Video, Instant Messaging and Presence, Online Web Conferencing, and Voicemail
Services is not covered by the evaluation. Additionally, call control options other than call placement and call receipt were not
evaluated. Advanced features such as call transfer, call forwarding, and impromptu conferencing make use of SIP TLS 1.2,
which is part of the evaluation.
1.3 TOE Product Type
The TOE is a software application that provides protected channels for interactive communication. Use case 3
(Communication) as described in [App], use case 2 (Software Application) as described in [VVoIP], and use case 3 (Client-Server
Architecture) in [VVoIP] apply to the TOE.
1.3.1 Required non-TOE Hardware/Software/Firmware
The TOE has required environmental components to allow for operation and evaluation. The table below lists required IT
environment components.
Table 2. IT Environment Component
Component Required Usage/Purpose Description for TOE performance
Windows Platform Yes The TOE requires a Windows OS platform.
Enterprise Session Controller Yes The Cisco Unified Communications Manager (CUCM) is the SIP Server that
provides the TOE with call control and management. CUCM also acts as
the configuration server.
Remote VoIP Application Yes This is the peer VoIP Application that the TOE interacts with using Security
Real Time Transport Protocol (SRTP).
Certificate Authority Yes The Certification Authority provides X.509 certificates. The CA also
provides a method to check the certificate revocation status of the CUCM
Server.
1.4 TOE Description
Cisco Jabber allows users of an organization to securely make, receive, and control phone calls through Cisco Unified
Communications Manager (CUCM). Users have a variety of call-control options including mute, call transfer, call forwarding,
and impromptu conferencing. Figure 1 depicts the TOE in relation to the IT environment.
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Figure 1. TOE in Relation to the IT Environment
Note: In the test environment, only one instance of Jabber is considered the TOE (outlined in red above). The TOE is limited
by the Protection Profile regarding what TLS version and ciphers may be claimed. However, the TOE only exchanges SIP
messaging with the ESC (CUCM), and there is nothing requiring other endpoints use TLS 1.2 exclusively, so for non-TOE
endpoints, there is no limitation placed on the TLS version.
1.5 TOE Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration is a single instance of Cisco Jabber operating in FIPS and CC mode. Refer to the Cisco Jabber
15.2 Common Criteria Configuration Guide for instructions on placing Cisco Jabber in FIPS and CC mode.
CUCM, release 12.0 or later, is the ESC (also referred to as the SIP Server) that serves as the call control component for voice
and video. There are configuration settings the CUCM ‘pushes’ to the Cisco Jabber TOE, a form of management permitted in
[VVoIP].
CUCM is required to be configured in the On-Premise deployment mode for softphones. Refer to the Cisco Jabber 15.2
Common Criteria Configuration Guide for specific information regarding configuring CUCM in the On-Premise deployment
mode for softphones.
The specific software evaluated was 15.2.0.
1.6 Physical Scope of the TOE
The TOE is a software-only client application that executes on a Windows 11 platform. For this evaluation, the Windows 11
device was a laptop with an Intel Core i5-1135G7 (Tiger Lake) CPU.
1.7 Logical Scope of the TOE
The TOE is comprised of several security features. Each of the security features consists of several security functionalities, as
identified below.
■ Communication
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■ Cryptographic Support
■ User Data Protection
■ Identification and Authentication
■ Security Management
■ Protection of the TSF
■ Trusted Channels
These features are described in more detail in the subsections below.
1.7.1 Communication
The Cisco Jabber TOE transmits voice media using a constant bitrate (CBR) vocoder.
1.7.2 Cryptographic Support
The Cisco Jabber TOE provides cryptography in support of SIP connections via Security Real-Time Transport Protocol (SRTP)
established using the Session Description Protocol (SDP) and the Security Descriptions for Media Streams (SDES) for SDP. The
TOE also protects communications between itself and the CUCM SIP Server by using a Transport Layer Security (TLS)-protected
signaling channel.
The TOE incorporates a CiscoSSL cryptographic module library (v7.2), and the algorithm implementation has been validated
for CAVP conformance. See Table 17 in Section 7 for certificate references.
1.7.3 User Data protection
The TOE ensures that user data is not transmitted when a call is placed on hold, a call is placed on mute, or when the TOE is
not registered with the SIP server. Additionally, the TOE restricts access to hardware resources and network communications
to only those required.
1.7.4 Identification and Authentication
The TOE performs X.509 certificate authentication of remote components the TOE interacts with for SDES/SRTP and TLS
connections. The Cisco Jabber TOE relies upon the TOE Platform to validate certificates.
1.7.5 Security Management
The TOE is capable of registering with an Enterprise Session Controller (ESC) and specifying the termination period for idle
calls.
1.7.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE leverages services and APIs provided by the platform in order to support anti-exploitation features and installation
of authorized software updates.
1.7.7 Trusted Channels
The TOE’s implementation of SDES-SRTP allows secure voice and video communication between itself and a remote VVoIP
application and secure signaling communication between itself and a remote CUCM SIP Server using TLS.
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1.8 Excluded Functionality
The following functionality is not included in the CC evaluation:
Table 3. Excluded Functionality and Rationale
Function Excluded Rationale
Platforms other than Windows 11 The TOE was only evaluated on a Windows 11 Platform
Non-FIPS 140-2 and non-CC modes of operation FIPS and CC modes of operation must be enabled in order for the TOE to be
operating in its evaluated configuration.
SRTP with NULL cipher SRTP with the NULL cipher does not provide encryption.
Jabber to Jabber calling. Jabber to Jabber calling
provides basic voice and video calling capabilities
between different Cisco Jabber clients without
registering to Cisco Unified Communications
Manager.
This feature is not TSF relevant functionality included in the Protection Pro-
files.
Cisco Instant Message and Presence Service
(Instant Messaging and Presence)
This feature is not TSF relevant functionality included in the Protection Pro-
files.
Cisco Webex Meetings Server (Online Web
Conferencing)
This feature is not TSF relevant functionality included in the Protection Pro-
files.
Cisco Unity Connection (Voicemail) This feature is not TSF relevant functionality included in the Protection Pro-
files.
The functionality listed above is disabled in the TOE evaluated configuration.
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2 Conformance Claims
2.1 Common Criteria Conformance Claim
The TOE and ST are compliant with the Common Criteria (CC) Version 3.1, Revision 5, dated: April 2017. For a listing of
Assurance Requirements claimed see Section 5.4.
The TOE and ST are CC Part 2 extended and CC Part 3 extended conformant.
2.2 Protection Profile Configuration and Functional Package Conformance Claims
The TOE and ST are conformant with the Specifications listed in the table below:
Table 4. PP Configuration and Functional Package Conformance Claims
The following NIAP Technical Decisions (TD) have also been applied to the claims in this document. Each posted TD was
reviewed and considered based on the TOE product type, the PP claims, and the security functional requirements claimed in
this document.
Table 5. NIAP Technical Decisions Applied to This ST
TD
Identifier
TD Name Protection Profiles References Publication
Date
Applicable?
TD0965 Additional Option for
FCS_SRTP_EXT.1 Test
MOD_VVOID_V1.0 FCS_SRTP_EXT.1
MOD_VVOID_V1.0
-SD
12/22/2025 Yes
TD0964 Clarifications to
FMT_MEC_EXT.1
Windows Test
PP_APP_V1.4 FMT_MEC_EXT.1 12/12/2025 Yes
TD0945 Adding FIPS 186-5 in
PP_APP_V1.4
PP_APP_V1.4 FCS_CKM.1.1/AK
FCS_COP.1.1/Sig
08/26/2025 Yes
Specification Version Date Short Name
PP-Configuration for Application Software and Voice/Video
over IP (VVoIP) Endpoints
V1.1 2022-05-31 CFG_APP-
VVOIP_v1.1
The PP-Configuration includes the following components:
• Protection Profile for Application Software V1.4 2021-10-07 PP_APP_v1.4
• PP-Module for Voice and Video over IP (VVoIP) V1.0 2020-10-28 MOD_VVOIP_V1.0
Package Claim:
Functional Package for TLS V1.1 2019-03-01 PKG_TLS_V1.1
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TD
Identifier
TD Name Protection Profiles References Publication
Date
Applicable?
TD0938 Adding Support for
Silence Packets When
Muted
MOD_VVoIP_V1.0 FDP_IFF.1,
MOD_VVoIP_V1.0-
SD
01/07/2026 Yes
TD0931 Clarification when
CTR_DRBG is Selected
for FCS_RBG_EXT.2.2
in PP_APP_V1.4
PP_APP_V1.4 FCS_RBG_EXT.2.2 07/16/2025 No,
FCS_RBG_EXT.2.2
not claimed
TD0914 Addition of
PKG_TLS_V2.0 to
Conformance Claims
PP_APP_V1.4
PP_OS_V4.3
PP_MDF_V3.3
PP_MDM_V4.0
Section 2 11/05/2025 No,
TD is optional and we
are using
PKG_TLS_V1.1
TD0865 Consistency of
Cryptographic Key
Sizes
PP_APP_v1.4 FCS_STO_EXT.1.1,
FCS_CKM.1.1/PBK
DF,
FCS_COP.1.1/SKC,
FCS_CKM.1.1/SK
09/25/2024 Yes
TD0844 Addition of Assurance
Package for Flaw
Remediation V1.0
Conformance Claim
PP_ESM_AC_V2.1
PP_ESM_ICM_V2.1
PP_ESM_PM_V2.1
PP_PSD_V4.0
PP_CA_V2.1
PP_MDM_V4.0
PP_GPCP_V1.0
PP_BASE_VIRTUALIZA
TION_V1.1
PP_APP_v1.4
PP_MDF_V3.3
PP_OS_V4.3
PP_HCD_V1.0
Conformance
Claims
06/28/2024 Yes
TD0834 Aligning MOD_VVOIP
1.0 with NDcPP 3.0E
MOD_VVOIP_V1.0 Section 1.1,
MOD_VVOIP_V1.0
-SD
04/25/2024 No, TOE not
evaluated against
NDcPPv3.0e
TD0823 Update to Microsoft
Windows Exploit
Protection link in
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.3
PP_APP_v1.4 FPT_AEX_EXT.1.3 04/10/2024 Yes
TD0822 Correction to
Windows Manifest File
for FDP_DEC_EXT.1
PP_APP_v1.4 FDP_DEC_EXT.1.1,
FDP_DEC_EXT.1.2
04/10/2024 Yes
TD0815 Addition of
Conditional TSS
Activity for
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.5
PP_APP_v1.4 FPT_AEX_EXT.1.5 02/13/2024 Yes
TD0798 Static Memory
Mapping Exceptions
PP_APP_v1.4 FPT_AEX_EXT.1.1 11/29/2023 Yes
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TD
Identifier
TD Name Protection Profiles References Publication
Date
Applicable?
TD0785 Terminology Change
in MOD_VVoIP: Ex-
tended to Functional
Package
MOD_VVOIP_V1.0 Conformance
Claims,
FTP_DIT_EXT.1.1
10/11/2023 Yes
TD0780 FIA_X509_EXT.1 Test 4
Clarification
PP_APP_v1.4 FIA_X509_EXT.1 08/30/2023 Yes
TD0779 Updated Session Re-
sumption Support in
TLS package V1.1
PKG_TLS_V1.1 FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1 10/02/2023 No, No TLSS Claims
TD0770 TLSS.2 connection
with no client cert
PKG_TLS_V1.1 FCS_TLSS_EXT.2.2 07/20/2023 No, No TLSS Claims
TD0756 Update for platform-
provided full disk en-
cryption
PP_APP_v1.4 FDP_DAR_EXT.1 07/07/2023 Yes
TD0747 Configuration Storage
Option for Android
PP_APP_v1.4 FMT_MEC_EXT.1 09/06/2023 No, TOE Not Evalu-
ated on Android
TD0743 FTP_DIT_EXT.1.1 Se-
lection exclusivity
PP_APP_v1.4 FTP_DIT_EXT.1.1 06/07/2023 Yes
TD0739 PKG_TLS_V1.1 has 2
different publication
dates
PKG_TLS_V1.1 FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.3,
Test 1
05/22/2023 Yes
TD0736 Number of elements
for iterations of
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1
PP_APP_v1.4 FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.
3/Server
05/16/2023 No, No HTTPS Claims
TD0730 Clarification on
Trusted Update
sources for VVoIP Ap-
plications
MOD_VVOIP_V1.0 FPT_TUD_EXT.1,
MOD_VVOIP_V1.0
-SD
04/10/2023 Yes
TD0726 Corrections to (D)TLSS
SFRs in TLS 1.1 FP
PKG_TLS_V1.1 FCS_DTLSS_EXT.1.
4,
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.3
03/17/2023 No, No DTLS or TLSS
Claims
TD0719 ECD for PP APP V1.3
and 1.4
PP_APP_v1.4
PP_APP_v1.3
01/23/2023 Yes
TD0718 Format changes for
MOD_VVoIP_V1.0
MOD_VVOIP_V1.0 FDP_IFF.1.2,
FTP_ITC.1/Control,
FTP_ITC.1.1/Media
01/23/2023 Yes
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TD
Identifier
TD Name Protection Profiles References Publication
Date
Applicable?
TD0717 Format changes for
PP_APP_V1.4
PP_APP_v1.4 FCS_CKM.1,
FCS_CKM.2,
FCS_CKM.1/AK,
FCS_CKM.1/PBKDF
, FCS_COP.1/Hash,
FCS_COP.1/Keyed
Hash,
FCS_COP.1/Sig,
FCS_COP.1/SKC
01/18/2023 Yes
TD0684 VVoIP PP-Module Up-
dated to Allow for App
PP v1.4 as Base PP
MOD_VVOIP_V1.0 Section 1, Section
2,
MOD_VVoIP_v1.0-
sd
11/30/2022 Yes
TD0664 Testing activity for
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.2
PP_APP_v1.4 FPT_TUD_EXT.2.2 08/26/2022 Yes
TD0650 Conformance claim
sections updated to al-
low for
MOD_VPNC_V2.3 and
2.4
MOD_FE_V1.0
MOD_BT_V1.0
MOD_FEEM_V1.0
PP_MDM_V4.0
MOD_MDM_AGENT_
V1.0
PP_APP_v1.4
PP_MDF_V3.2
Section 2 06/17/2022 Yes
TD0628 Addition of Container
Image to Package For-
mat
PP_APP_v1.4 FPT_TUD_EXT.2.1 03/09/2022 Yes
TD0589 Reliable Time for
VVoIP Software TOEs
MOD_VVOIP_V1.0 FPT_STM_EXT.1/V
VoIP
05/14/2021 Yes
TD0513 CA Certificate loading PKG_TLS_V1.1 FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.3 05/26/2020 Yes
TD0499 Testing with pinned
certificates
PKG_TLS_V1.1 FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.2 02/04/2020 Yes
TD0469 Modification of test
activity for
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1 test
4.1
PKG_TLS_V1.1 FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1 11/20/2019 Yes
TD0442 Updated TLS Cipher-
suites for TLS Package
PKG_TLS_V1.1 FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1,
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1,
FCS_DTLSC_EXT.1.
1,
FCS_DTLSS_EXT.1.
1
08/21/2019 Yes
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3 Security Problem Definition
This section identifies the following:
■ Significant assumptions about the TOE’s operational environment
■ IT related threats to the organization countered by the TOE
■ Environmental threats requiring controls to provide sufficient protection
■ Organizational Security Policies for the TOE as appropriate
This document identifies assumptions as A.assumption with “assumption” specifying a unique name. Threats are identified
as T.threat with “threat” specifying a unique name. Organizational Security Policies (OSPs) are identified as P.osp with “osp”
specifying a unique name.
3.1 Assumptions
The specific conditions listed in the following subsections are assumed to exist in the TOE’s environment. These assumptions
include both practical realities in the development of the TOE security requirements and the essential environmental
conditions on the use of the TOE.
Table 6. TOE Assumptions
Assumption Assumption Definition
A.PLATFORM The TOE relies upon a trustworthy computing platform with
a reliable time clock for its execution. This includes the
underlying platform and whatever runtime environment it
provides to the TOE.
A.PROPER_USER The user of the application software is not willfully negligent
or hostile, and uses the software in compliance with the
applied enterprise security policy.
A.PROPER_ADMIN The administrator of the application software is not careless,
willfully negligent or hostile, and administers the software in
compliance with the applied enterprise security policy.
A.UPDATE_SOURCE It is assumed that TOE software/firmware updates will be
made available on either the call control server that the TOE
connects to or a separate file server managed by the
organization.
3.2 Threats
The following table lists the threats addressed by the TOE and the IT Environment. The assumed level of expertise of the
attacker for all the threats identified below is Enhanced-Basic.
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Table 7. Threats
Threat Threat Definition
T.NETWORK_ATTACK An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or
elsewhere on the network infrastructure. Attackers may engage
in communications with the application software or alter
communications between the application software and other
endpoints in order to compromise it.
T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or
elsewhere on the network infrastructure. Attackers may
monitor and gain access to data exchanged between the
application and other endpoints.
T.LOCAL_ATTACK An attacker can act through unprivileged software on the
same computing platform on which the application executes.
Attackers may provide maliciously formatted input to the
application in the form of files or other local
communications.
T.PHYSICAL_ACCESS An attacker may try to access sensitive data at rest.
T.MEDIA_DISCLOSURE An attacker can use the encrypted variable rate vocoder frames
to their advantage to decode transmitted data.
T.UNDETECTED_TRANSMISSION An attacker may cause the TOE to exfiltrate audio or video
media over a remote channel while in a state where the user
has a reasonable expectation that no media is being
transmitted.
3.3 Organizational Security Policies
There are no organizational security policies defined in [App], [VVoIP], or [TLS]
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4 Security Objectives
This section identifies the security objectives of the TOE and the IT Environment. The security objectives identify the
responsibilities of the TOE and the TOE’s IT environment in meeting the security needs.
This document identifies objectives of the TOE as O.objective with “objective” specifying a unique name. Objectives that
apply to the IT environment are designated as OE.objective with “objective” specifying a unique name.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
The following table, Security Objectives for the TOE, identifies the security objectives of the TOE. These security objectives
reflect the stated intent to counter identified threats and/or comply with any security policies identified. An explanation of
the relationship between the objectives and the threats/policies is provided in the rationale section of this document.
Table 8. Security Objectives for the TOE
Environment Security
Objective
IT Environment Security Objective Definition Addressed By
O.INTEGRITY Conformant TOEs ensure the integrity of their
installation and update packages, and also leverage
execution environment-based mitigations. Software
is seldom, if ever, shipped without errors. The ability
to deploy patches and updates to fielded software
with integrity is critical to enterprise network
security. Processor manufacturers, compiler
developers, execution environment vendors, and
operating system vendors have developed execution
environment-based mitigations that increase the
cost to attackers by adding complexity to the task of
compromising systems. Application software can
often take advantage of these mechanisms by using
APIs provided by the runtime environment or by
enabling the mechanism through compiler or linker
options.
FDP_DEC_EXT.1
FMT_CFG_EXT.1,
FPT_AEX_EXT.1,
FPT_TUD_EXT.1,
O.QUALITY To ensure quality of implementation, conformant TOEs
leverage services and APIs provided by the runtime
environment rather than implementing their own
versions of these services and APIs. This is especially
important for cryptographic services and other complex
operations such as file and media parsing. Leveraging
this platform behavior relies upon using only
documented and supported APIs.
FMT_MEC_EXT.1,
FPT_API_EXT.1,
FPT_API_EXT.2,
FPT_LIB_EXT.1,
FPT_TUD_EXT.2,
FCS_CKM.1/KeyGen
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Environment Security
Objective
IT Environment Security Objective Definition Addressed By
O.MANAGEMENT To facilitate management by users and the
enterprise, conformant TOEs provide consistent and
supported interfaces for their security-relevant
configuration and maintenance. This includes the
deployment of applications and application updates
through the use of platform-supported deployment
mechanisms and formats, as well as providing
mechanisms for configuration. This also includes
providing control to the user regarding disclosure of
any PII.
FMT_SMF.1,
FPT_IDV_EXT.1,
FPT_TUD_EXT.1,
FPR_ANO_EXT.1,
FCS_COP.1/Sig
O.PROTECTED_STORAGE To address the issue of loss of confidentiality of user
data in the event of loss of physical control of the
storage medium, conformant TOEs will use data-at-
rest protection. This involves encrypting data and
keys stored by the TOE in order to prevent
unauthorized access to this data. This also includes
unnecessary network communications whose
consequence may be the loss of data.
FDP_DAR_EXT.1,
FCS_STO_EXT.1,
FCS_RBG_EXT.1,
FCS_CKM.1/Password,
FCS_COP.1/SKC,
FCS_COP.1/Hash,
FCS_COP.1/KeyHash
O.PROTECTED_COMMS To address both passive (eavesdropping) and active
(packet modification) network attack threats,
conformant TOEs will use a trusted channel for
sensitive data. Sensitive data includes cryptographic
keys, passwords, and any other data specific to the
application that should not be exposed outside of
the application.
FTP_DIT_EXT.1,
FCS_RBG_EXT.1,
FCS_RBG_EXT.2,
FCS_CKM_EXT.1,
FCS_CKM.2,
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1,
FDP_NET_EXT.1,
FIA_X509_EXT.1
O.ENCRYPTION To prevent data disclosure from decryption,
conformant TOEs will transmit and store sensitive data
using mechanisms that provide adequate protections.
FCS_NTP_EXT.1 (from NDcPP),
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 (refined from NDcPP),
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 (refined from NDcPP),
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev (refined from
NDcPP),
FIA_X509_EXT.2 (refined from NDcPP),
FIA_X509_EXT.3 (refined from
NDcPP),
FTP_ITC.1 (refined from NDcPP),
FTP_DIT_EXT.1 (refined from App PP),
FCO_VOC_EXT.1, FTP_ITC.1/Control,
FTP_ITC.1/Media,
FAU_STG_EXT.1 (optional for
software-only TOEs),
FCS_COP.1/SRTP (selection-based),
FCS_SRTP_EXT.1 (selection-based),
FDP_IFC.1/CallControl (selection-
based),
FDP_IFF.1/CallControl (selection-
based),
FPT_STM_EXT.1/VVoIP (selection-
based),
FCS_TLS_EXT.1.1
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Environment Security
Objective
IT Environment Security Objective Definition Addressed By
O.NO_UNATTENDED_TRANS
MISSION
To prevent undetected transmissions, conformant
TOEs will not transmit unattended voice or video
data when streaming media is not in use.
FDP_IFC.1, FDP_IFF.1,
FTA_SSL.3/Media,
FAU_GEN.1/CS-Admin (optional),
FAU_GEN.1/CS-VVoIP (optional),
FAU_GEN.1/P2P-Admin (selection-
based),
FAU_GEN.1/P2P-VVoIP (selection-
based),
FPT_STM_EXT.1/VVoIP (selection-
based)
O.TOE_ADMINISTRATION To support the enforcement of other security
functionality, a conformant TOE will provide a
management capability that allows for configuration
of the TSF.
FMT_SMF.1/VVoIP
4.2 Security Objectives for the Environment
All of the assumptions stated in Section 3.1 are considered to be security objectives for the environment. The following are
the non-IT security objectives, which, in addition to those assumptions, are to be satisfied without imposing technical
requirements on the TOE. That is, they will not require the implementation of functions in the TOE hardware and/or software.
Thus, they will be satisfied largely through application of procedural or administrative measures.
Table 9. Security Objectives for the Environment
Environment Security Objective IT Environment Security Objective Definition
OE.PLATFORM The TOE relies upon a trustworthy computing platform for its
execution. This includes the underlying operating system and
any discrete execution environment provided to the TOE.
OE.PROPER_USER The user of the application software is not willfully negligent
or hostile, and uses the software within compliance of the
applied enterprise security policy.
OE.PROPER_ADMIN The administrator of the application software is not careless,
willfully negligent or hostile, and administers the software
within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.
OE.UPDATE_SOURCE The operational environment will have TOE
software/firmware made available on either the call control
server that the TOE connects to or a separate file server
managed by the organization.
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale
This section describes how the assumptions, threats, and organizational security policies map to the security objectives.
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Table 10. Security Objectives Rationale
Threats, Assumptions, or OSP Security Objective Rationale
T.NETWORK_ATTACK
An attacker is positioned on a
communications channel or
elsewhere on the network
infrastructure. Attackers may
engage in communications with
the application software or alter
communications between the
application software and other
endpoints in order to
compromise it.
O.PROTECTED_COMMS The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered
by O.PROTECTED_COMMS as this provides for
integrity of transmitted data.
O.INTEGRITY The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered
by O.INTEGRITY as this provides for integrity of
software that is installed onto the system from
the network.
O.MANAGEMENT The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered
by O.MANAGEMENT as this provides for the
ability to configure the application to defend
against network attack.
T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP
An attacker is positioned on a
communications channel or
elsewhere on the network
infrastructure. Attackers may
monitor and gain access to data
exchanged between the
application and other endpoints.
O.PROTECTED_COMMS The threat T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP is
countered by O.PROTECTED_COMMS as this
provides for confidentiality of transmitted
data.
O.QUALITY The objective O.QUALITY ensures use of
mechanisms that provide protection against
network-based attack.
O.MANAGEMENT The threat T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP is
countered by O.MANAGEMENT as this provides
for the ability to configure the application to
protect the confidentiality of its transmitted
data.
T.LOCAL_ATTACK
An attacker can act through
unprivileged software on the
same computing platform on
which the application executes.
Attackers may provide
maliciously formatted input to
the application in the form of
files or other local
communications.
O.QUALITY The objective O.QUALITY protects against the
use of mechanisms that weaken the TOE with
regard to attack by other software on the
platform.
T.PHYSICAL_ACCESS
An attacker may try to access
sensitive data at rest.
O.PROTECTED_STORAGE The objective O.PROTECTED_STORAGE
protects against unauthorized attempts to
access physical storage used by the TOE.
A.PLATFORM OE.PLATFORM The operational environment objective
OE.PLATFORM is realized through
A.PLATFORM.
A.PROPER_USER OE.PROPER_USER The operational environment Objective
OE.PROPER_USER is realized through
A.PROPER_USER.
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Threats, Assumptions, or OSP Security Objective Rationale
A.PROPER_ADMIN OE.PROPER_ADMIN The operational environment Objective
OE.PROPER_ADMIN is realized through
A.PROPER_ADMIN.
T.MEDIA_DISCLOSURE
An attacker can use the encrypted
variable rate vocoder frames to
their advantage to decode
transmitted data.
O.ENCRYPTION The TOE transmits security-relevant data to
environmental IT entities using cryptographic
mechanisms that protect this data from
unauthorized disclosure.
T.UNDETECTED_TRANSMISSION
An attacker may cause the TOE to
exfiltrate audio or video media
over a remote channel while in a
state where the user has a
reasonable expectation that no
media is being transmitted.
O.NO_UNATTENDED_TRANSMISSION The TOE prevents transmission of all
unattended voice or video data when the
streaming media is not in use, thereby
ensuring that data is only transmitted when
affirmatively directed by the user. Auditing
(optional for software only TOE’s) further
assists in detecting transmission of VVOIP data.
O.TOE_ADMINISTRATION The TOE defines management functions for
VVoIP connectivity and optionally allows for
configuration of the idle period for calls to
minimize the risk of active unattended sessions
and configuration of auditing to specify how
transmissions are recorded.
A.UPDATE_SOURCE OE.UPDATE_SOURCE The objective satisfies the assumption by
ensuring that TOE updates are made available
in the intended location.
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5 Security Requirements
This section identifies the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE. The Security Functional Requirements included in
this section are derived from Part 2 of the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Revision 5, dated: April 2017 and all international interpretations.
This section identifies the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE. The Security Functional Requirements in this section
are derived from [APP], [VVoIP], [TLS], and NIAP TDs.
5.1 Conventions
The CC defines operations on Security Functional Requirements: assignments, selections, assignments within selections and
refinements. This document uses the following font conventions to identify the operations defined by the CC:
Table 11. Security Requirement Conventions
Convention Indication
Assignment Indicated with italicized text (e.g., assignment).
Selection Indicated with underlined text; (e.g., selection).
Iteration Indicated by appending the SFR name with a slash and unique identifier suggesting the purpose
of the iteration. (e.g. “FCS_COP.1/Hash”).
Refinement Indicated with bold text and strikethroughs. Refinements are indicated using bold, for additions,
and strike-through, for deletions (e.g., “… all objects …” or “… some big things …”).
Extended Requirements Are identified with “(_EXT)” in of the functional class/name and are those not found in Part 2 of
the CC.
Other Sections of the ST use bolding to highlight text of special interest, such as captions.
Note that iterations in [App] are identified with a number inside parentheses (e.g. "(1)") and iterations in [VVoIP] are
identified by appending the SFR name with a slash and unique identifier suggesting the purpose of the iteration. This ST will
follow the convention defined in [VVoIP] for iteration. For clarity, a mapping between the two formats, for SFRs related to
this ST, has been included in Annex D: Differing SFR Naming Conventions.
5.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements
This section identifies the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE. The TOE Security Functional Requirements that
appear in the following table are described in more detail in the following subsections.
Table 12. Security Functional Requirements
Class Name Component Identification Component Name Drawn From
FCO: Communications FCO_VOC_EXT.1 Fixed-Rate Vocoder [VVoIP]
FCS: Cryptographic support FCS_CKM_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Generation Services [APP]
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Class Name Component Identification Component Name Drawn From
FCS_CKM.1/AK Cryptographic Asymmetric Key
Generation
[APP]
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment [APP]
FCS_COP.1/SKC Cryptographic Operation –
Encryption/Decryption
[APP]
FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation – Hashing [APP]
FCS_COP.1/Sig Cryptographic Operation – Signing [APP]
FCS_COP.1/KeyHash Cryptographic Operation – Keyed–Hash
Message Authentication
[APP]
FCS_COP.1/SRTP Cryptographic Operation –
Encryption/Decryption for SRTP
[VVoIP]
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1/Client HTTPS Protocol [APP]
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services [APP]
FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials [APP]
FCS_SRTP_EXT.1 Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol [VVoIP]
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 TLS Protocol [TLS]
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol [TLS] [VVoIP]
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 TLS Client Support for Mutual
Authentication
[TLS] [VVoIP]
FCS_TLSC_EXT.4 TLS Client Support for Renegotiation [TLS]
FCS_TLSC_EXT.5 TLS Client Support for Supported Groups
Extension
[TLS]
FDP: User Data Protection FDP_DEC_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources [APP]
FDP_NET_EXT.1 Network Communications [APP]
FDP_DAR_EXT.1 Encryption Of Sensitive Application Data [APP]
FDP_IFC.1 Subset Information Flow Control [VVoIP]
FDP_IFF.1 Simple Security Attributes [VVoIP]
FIA: FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation [APP]
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Class Name Component Identification Component Name Drawn From
Identification and
authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication [APP]
FMT: Security management FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Supported Configuration Mechanism [APP]
FMT_CFG_EXT.1 Secure by Default Configuration [APP]
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions [APP]
FMT_SMF.1/VVoIP Specification of Management Functions
(VVoIP Communications)
[VVoIP]
FPR: Privacy FPR_ANO_EXT.1 User Consent for Transmission of
Personally Identifiable Information
[App]
FPT: Protection of the TSF FPT_API_EXT.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs [App]
FPT_AEX_EXT.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities [App]
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Integrity for Installation and Update [App]
FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Integrity for Installation and Update [App]
FPT_LIB_EXT.1 FPT_LIB_EXT.1 Use of Third Party Libraries [App]
FPT_IDV_EXT.1 Software Identification and Versions [App]
FTA: TOE Access FTA_SSL.3/Media Media TSF-Initiated Termination (Media
Channel)
[VVoIP]
FTP: Trusted path/channels FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit [App] [VVoIP]
FTP_ITC.1/Control Control Inter-TSF Trusted Channel
(Signaling Channel)
[VVoIP]
FTP_ITC.1/Media Media Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (Media
Channel)
[VVoIP]
5.2.1 Class: Communications (FCO)
5.2.1.1 FCO_VOC_EXT.1 – Fixed-Rate Vocoder
FCO_VOC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall transmit voice media using a constant bit rate voice vocoder.
5.2.2 Class: Cryptographic Support (FCS)
5.3.2.1 FCS_CKM_EXT.1 – Cryptographic Key Generation Services
FCS_CKM_EXT.1.1 The application shall [implement asymmetric key generation].
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5.3.2.2 FCS_CKM.1/AK – Cryptographic Asymmetric Key Generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/AK The application shall [
• implement functionality
] to generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [
• [RSA schemes] using cryptographic key sizes of [2048-bit or greater] that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Dig-
ital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.3;
• [ECC schemes] using [“NIST curves” P-256 P-384 and [P-256, P-521]] that meet the following: [FIPS PUB 186-4,
“Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.4]
].
5.3.2.3 FCS_CKM.2 – Cryptographic Key Establishment
FCS_CKM.2.1 The application shall [implement functionality] to perform cryptographic key establishment in accordance with
a specified cryptographic key establishment method: [
• [RSA-based key establishment schemes] that meets the following: [NIST Special Publication 800-56B, “Recom-
mendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography”],
• [Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes] that meets the following: [NIST Special Publication 800-56A,
“Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”]
].
Application Note: TLS connections related to CAPF make exclusive use of RSA-based key establishment schemes. The other
evaluated TLS connections exclusively use elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes.
5.3.2.4 FCS_COP.1/SKC – Cryptographic Operation – Encryption/Decryption
FCS_COP.1.1/SKC The application shall perform [encryption/decryption] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algo-
rithm [
• AES-CBC (as defined in NIST SP 800-38A) mode,
• AES-GCM (as defined in NIST SP 800-38D) mode,
] and cryptographic key sizes [128-bit, 256-bit].
5.3.2.5 FCS_COP.1/Hash – Cryptographic Operation – Hashing
FCS_COP.1.1/Hash The application shall perform [cryptographic hashing services] in accordance with a specified crypto-
graphic algorithm [
• SHA-1,
• SHA-256,
• SHA-384
• SHA-512
]
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and message digest sizes [
• 160,
• 256,
• 384
• 512
] bits that meet the following: [FIPS Pub 180-4].
5.3.2.6 FCS_COP.1/Sig – Cryptographic Operation – Signing
FCS_COP.1.1/Sig The application shall perform [cryptographic signature services (generation and verification]) in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm [
• RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4 or
FIPS 186-5, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 4
].
5.3.2.7 FCS_COP.1/KeyHash – Cryptographic Operation – Keyed-Hash Message Authentication
FCS_COP.1.1/KeyHash The application shall perform [keyed-hash message authentication] in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [
• HMAC-SHA-256
• HMAC-SHA-384
• HMAC-SHA-512
] and [
• no other algorithms
] with key sizes [256, 384, 512 used in HMAC] and message digest sizes [256, 384, 512] and [no other size] bits that meet the
following: [FIPS Pub 198-1, ‘The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code and FIPS Pub 180-4 Secure Hash Standard’].
5.3.2.8 FCS_COP.1/SRTP – Cryptographic Operation – Encryption/Decryption for SRTP
FCS_COP.1.1/SRTP The TSF shall perform [encryption/decryption to support SDES-SRTP] in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [AES-CTR (as defined in NIST SP 800-38A), AES-GCM (as defined in NIST SP 800-38D)] and
cryptographic key sizes [128-bit, 256-bit].
5.3.2.9 FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1/Client – HTTPS Protocol
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.1/Client: The application shall implement the HTTPS protocol that complies with RFC 2818.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.2/Client: The application shall implement HTTPS using TLS as defined in the Functional Package for TLS.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.3/Client: The application shall [not establish the application-initiated connection] if the peer certificate is
deemed invalid.
5.3.2.10 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 – Random Bit Generation Services
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The application shall [invoke platform-provided DRBG functionality] for its cryptographic operations.
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5.3.2.11 FCS_STO_EXT.1 – Storage of Credentials
FCS_STO_EXT.1.1 The application shall [invoke the functionality provided by the platform to securely store [private keys,
passwords]].
5.3.2.12 FCS_SRTP_EXT.1 – Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol
FCS_SRTP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol (SRTP) that complies with RFC 3711,
and use Security Descriptions for Media Streams (SDES) in compliance with RFC 4568 to provide key information for the
SRTP connection.
FCS_SRTP_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall implement SDES-SRTP supporting the following ciphersuites [
• AEAD_AES_256_GCM, in accordance with RFC 7714].
FCS_SRTP_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall ensure the SRTP NULL algorithm can be disabled.
FCS_SRTP_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall allow the SRTP ports to be used for SRTP communications to be specified by an Authorized
Administrator.
5.3.2.13 FCS_TLS_EXT.1 – TLS Protocol
FCS_TLS_EXT.1.1 The product shall implement [
• TLS as a client
].
5.3.2.14 FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 – TLS Client Protocol
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1 The product shall implement TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246) and [no earlier TLS versions] as a client that supports the
cipher suites [
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 5246,
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289,
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289,
and also supports functionality for [session renegotiation].
Application Note: TLS connections related to CAPF exclusively use TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA. The other evaluated
TLS connections make use of only the two TLS_ECDHE_RSA cipher suites.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.2 The product shall verify that the presented identifier matches the reference identifier according to RFC
6125.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.3 The product shall not establish a trusted channel if the server certificate is invalid [with no exceptions].
5.3.2.15 FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 – TLS Client Support for Mutual Authentication
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.1 The product shall support mutual authentication using X.509v3 certificates.
5.3.2.16 FCS_TLSC_EXT.4 – TLS Client Support for Renegotiation
FCS_TLSC_EXT.4.1 The product shall support secure renegotiation through use of the “renegotiation_info” TLS extension in
accordance with RFC 5746.
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5.3.2.17 FCS_TLSC_EXT.5 – TLS Client Support for Supported Groups Extension
FCS_TLSC_EXT.5.1 The product shall present the Supported Groups Extension in the Client Hello with the supported groups
[secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1].
5.3.3 Class: User Data Protection (FDP)
5.3.3.1 FDP_DEC_EXT.1 – Access to Platform Resources
FDP_DEC_EXT.1.1 The application shall restrict its access to [
• network connectivity,
• camera,
• microphone,
• USB,
• Bluetooth
].
FDP_DEC_EXT.1.2 The application shall restrict its access to [
• address book,
• calendar,
• [file-system, photo library]
].
5.3.3.2 FDP_NET_EXT.1 – Network Communications
FDP_NET_EXT.1.1 The application shall restrict network communication to [
• user-initiated communication for [Voice/Video calls (SIP over TLS,SRTP)],
• respond to [Voice/Video calls (SIP over TLS,SRTP)]
].
5.3.3.3 FDP_DAR_EXT.1 – Encryption Of Sensitive Application Data
FDP_DAR_EXT.1.1 The application shall [protect sensitive data in accordance with FCS_STO_EXT.1] in non-volatile memory.
5.3.3.4 FDP_IFC.1 – Subset Information Flow Control
FDP_IFC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [media transmission policy] on [voice/video media transmitted by the TOE].
5.3.3.5 FDP_IFF.1 – Simple Security Attributes
FDP_IFF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [media transmission policy] based on the following types of subject and information
security attributes: [TOE hook state, VVoIP call connection status, and VVoIP call control server status].
FDP_IFF.1.2 The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information via a
controlled operation if the following rules hold: [
• The TOE is [registered with a VVoIP call control server],
• A call has been established with a telephony device (VVoIP endpoint),
• The TOE is in the off-hook state,
• The TOE is not in the mute state,
• The TOE is in the mute state and only sending silence packets
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• [The TOE is not in the hold state].
].
FDP_IFF.1.3 The TSF shall enforce [no additional information flow control policy rules].
FDP_IFF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly authorize an information flow based on the following rules: [no additional rules].
FDP_IFF.1.5 The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: [all TCP and UDP ports used by
the TOE are closed when not in active use].
5.3.4 Class: Identification and Authentication (FIA)
5.3.4.1 FIA_X509_EXT.1 – X.509 Certificate Validation
FIA_X509_EXT.1.1 The application shall [invoke platform-provided functionality] to validate certificates in accordance with
the following rules:
• RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation.
• The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate.
• The application shall validate a certificate path by ensuring the presence of the basicConstraints extension, that the
CA flag is set to TRUE for all CA certificates, and that any path constraints are met.
• The application shall validate that any CA certificate includes caSigning purpose in the key usage field.
• The application shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [OCSP as specified in RFC 6960, CRL as
specified in RFC 8603].
• The application shall validate the extendedKeyUsage (EKU) field according to the following rules:
o Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall have the Code Signing
purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the EKU field.
o Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp 2 with OID
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the EKU field.
o S/MIME certificates presented for email encryption and signature shall have the Email Protection purpose (id-
kp 4 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4) in the EKU field.
o OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing purpose (id-kp 9 with OID
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the EKU field.
o Server certificates presented for EST shall have the CMC Registration Authority (RA) purpose (id-kp-cmcRA with
OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.28) in the EKU field.
FIA_X509_EXT.1.2 The application shall treat a certificate as a CA certificate only if the basicConstraints extension is present
and the CA flag is set to TRUE.
5.3.4.2 FIA_X509_EXT.2 – X.509 Certificate Authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.2.1 The application shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for [TLS].
FIA_X509_EXT.2.2 When the application cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate, the
application shall [not accept the certificate].
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5.3.5 Class: Security Management (FMT)
5.3.5.1 FMT_MEC_EXT.1 – Supported Configuration Mechanism
FMT_MEC_EXT.1.1 The application shall [invoke the mechanisms recommended by the platform vendor for storing and
setting configuration options.]
5.3.5.2 FMT_CFG_EXT.1 – Secure by Default Configuration
FMT_CFG_EXT.1.1 The application shall provide only enough functionality to set new credentials when configured with
default credentials or no credentials.
FMT_CFG_EXT.1.2 The application shall be configured by default with file permissions which protect the application binaries
and data files from modification by normal unprivileged users.
5.3.5.3 FMT_SMF.1 – Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions [no management functions].
5.3.5.4 FMT_SMF.1/VVoIP – Specification of Management Functions (VVoIP Communications)
FMT_SMF.1.1/VVoIP The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [
• Ability to [register the TOE to an ESC [manually]];
[
o Ability to configure the termination period for idle calls]].
5.3.6 Class: Privacy (FPR)
5.3.6.1 FPR_ANO_EXT.1 – User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable Information
FPR_ANO_EXT.1.1 The application shall [not transmit PII over a network].
5.3.7 Class: Protection of the TSF (FPT)
5.3.7.1 FPT_API_EXT.1 – Use of Supported Services and APIs
FPT_API_EXT.1.1 The application shall use only documented platform APIs.
5.3.7.2 FPT_AEX_EXT.1 – Anti-Exploitation Capabilities
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.1 The application shall not request to map memory at an explicit address except for [no exceptions].
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.2 The application shall [not allocate any memory region with both write and execute permissions].
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.3 The application shall be compatible with security features provided by the platform vendor.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.4 The application shall not write user-modifiable files to directories that contain executable files unless
explicitly directed by the user to do so.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.5 The application shall be built with stack-based buffer overflow protection enabled.
5.3.7.3 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 – Integrity for Installation and Update
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 The application shall [leverage the platform] to check for updates and patches to the application software.
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FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2 The application shall [provide the ability] to query the current version of the application software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3 The application shall not download, modify, replace or update its own binary code.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.4 The application updates shall be digitally signed such that the application platform can cryptographically
verify them prior to installation.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.5 The application is distributed [as an additional software package to the platform OS].
5.3.7.4 FPT_TUD_EXT.2 – Integrity for Installation and Update
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.1 The application shall be distributed using the [format of the platform-supported package manager].
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.2 The application shall be packaged such that its removal results in the deletion of all traces of the
application, with the exception of configuration settings, output files, and audit/log events.
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.3 The application installation package shall be digitally signed such that its platform can cryptographically
verify them prior to installation.
5.3.7.5 FPT_LIB_EXT.1 – Use of Third Party Libraries
FPT_LIB_EXT.1.1 The application shall be packaged with only [list of third-party libraries in table 13].
Table 13. Third-Party Libraries
Third-Party Libraries
nghttp2 gssapi32 tiny-xml
libxml2 leveldb plantronics software
chromium openvino toolkit icu
krbcc32 kfwlogon ippsp legacy. Intel＼u00ae
integrated performance primitives.
signal processing legacy.
angle ippsc legacy. intel＼u00ae
integrated performance
primitives. speech codecs legacy.
visual-studio-runtime
v8 microsoft＼u00ae windows＼
u00ae operating system
openjpeg
libusb leashw32 kerberos
microsoft edge embedded
browser webview loader
krb5_32 skia
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json-cpp gloox libvpx
opencore-amr plantronics jabber plugin debugging tools for windows＼
u00ae
gstreamer zlib free-type
threading-building-blocks oneapi threading building blocks
(onetbb)
sqlite
websocketpp ots io-warrior-sdk
glib re2 cyrus-sasl
libvorbis pdfium tidy
boringssl libjpeg-turbo direct3d
protobuf open-ldap expat
gsoap libcxx cef
json-c libxslt pcre
jansson sql-cipher xpprof32
blink k5sprt32 boost
libjpeg libphonenumber openssl
curl opus apr
libpng safestring libwebp
glew hunspell rapidxml
speexdsp hunspell dynamic link library comerr32
5.3.7.6 FPT_IDV_EXT.1 Software Identification and Versions
FPT_IDV_EXT.1.1 The application shall be versioned with [[sequence-based versioning control]].
5.3.8 Class: TOE Access (FTA)
5.3.8.1 FTA_SSL.3/Media – TSF-Initiated Termination (Media Channel)
FTA_SSL.3.1/Media The TSF shall terminate voice/video transmission after [inactivity longer than [300 seconds, an
administrator-configurable interval]].
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5.3.9 Class: Trusted Path (FTP)
5.3.9.1 FTP_DIT_EXT.1 – Protection of Data in Transit
FTP_DIT_EXT.1.1 The application shall [
• encrypt all transmitted [sensitive data] with [TLS as a client as defined in the Functional Package for TLS] and
[Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol (SRTP)],
] between itself and another trusted IT product.
5.3.9.2 FTP_ITC.1/Control – Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (Signaling Channel)
FTP_ITC.1.1/Control The TSF shall be capable of using [Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)] to provide a trusted
communication channel between itself and a VVoIP call control server that is logically distinct from other communication
channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from disclosure and
detection of modification of the channel data.
FTP_ITC.1.2/Control The TSF shall permit [the TSF, the VVoIP call control server] to initiate communication via the trusted
channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/Control The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [establishment of call control].
5.3.9.3 FTP_ITC.1/Media – Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (Media Channel)
FTP_ITC.1.1/Media The TSF shall be capable of using [SRTP] to provide a trusted communication channel between itself and
another VVoIP endpoint or other telephony device that is logically distinct from other communication channels and
provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from disclosure and detection of
modification of the channel data.
FTP_ITC.1.2/Media The TSF shall permit [the TSF, another VVoIP endpoint or other telephony device] to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/Media The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [transmission of voice/video media].
5.4 Security Assurance Requirements
5.4.1 SAR Requirements
The TOE assurance requirements for this ST are taken directly from [APP] and [VVoIP] which are derived from [CC_PART3].
The assurance requirements are summarized in the table below.
Table 14. SAR Requirements
Assurance Class Components Description
Security Target (ASE) Conformance claims (ASE_CCL.1)
Extended components definition (ASE_ECD.1)
ST introduction (ASE_INT.1)
Security objectives for the operational environment (ASE_OBJ.1)
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Assurance Class Components Description
Security objectives (ASE_OBJ.2)
Stated security requirements (ASE_REQ.1)
Derived security requirements (ASE_REQ.2)
Security Problem Definition (ASE_SPD.1)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS.1)
Development (ADV) Basic functional specification (ADV_FSP.1)
Guidance documents (AGD) Operational user guidance (AGD_OPE.1)
Preparative procedures (AGD_PRE.1)
Life cycle support (ALC) Labeling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1)
TOE CM coverage (ALC_CMS.1)
Timely Security Updates (ALC_TSU_EXT.1)
Tests (ATE) Independent testing – conformance (ATE_IND.1)
Vulnerability assessment (AVA) Vulnerability survey (AVA_VAN.1)
5.4.2 SAR Rationale
The Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) in this Security Target represent the SARs identified in the [APP], [VVoIP], and
[TLS]. As such, the [APP], [VVoIP], and [TLS] SAR rationale is deemed acceptable since the PP themselves have been
validated.
5.5 Assurance Measures
The TOE satisfies the identified assurance requirements. This section identifies the Assurance Measures applied by Cisco to
satisfy the assurance requirements. The table below lists the details.
Table 15. Assurance Measures
Assurance Component How Requirement Will Be Met
ADV_FSP.1 No additional “functional specification” documentation was provided by Cisco to satisfy the
Evaluation Activities specified in the SD.
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Assurance Component How Requirement Will Be Met
AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1
Guidance must include a description of how the IT personnel verifies that the Operational
Environment can fulfill its role for the security functionality. The documentation should be in an
informal style and readable by the IT personnel. Guidance must be provided for every operational
environment that the product supports as claimed in the ST. This guidance includes:
• instructions to successfully install the TSF in that environment; and
• instructions to manage the security of the TSF as a product and as a component of the
larger operational environment; and
• instructions to provide a protected administrative capability.
Guidance pertaining to particular security functionality must also be provided.
Cisco will provide the guidance documents with the ST.
ALC_CMC.1
ALC_CMS.1
Cisco will identify the TOE such that it can be distinguished from other products or versions from
the Cisco and can be easily specified when being procured by an end user.
ALC_TSU_EXT.1 Cisco will provide a Security Vulnerability Policy.
ATE_IND.1 Cisco will provide the TOE for testing.
AVA_VAN.1 Cisco will provide the TOE for Vulnerability Analysis.
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6 TOE Summary Specification
6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirement Measures
The table below identifies and describes how the Security Functional Requirements identified above are met by the TOE.
Table 16. How TOE SFRs Measures Are Met
TOE SFRs How the SFR is Met
FCO_VOC_EXT.1 The Cisco Jabber TOE transmits voice media using a constant bitrate (CBR) vocoder which ensures
packet length is the same. The constant bitrate voice codecs implemented by the TSF are: G.711A,
G.711u, G.722, G.722.1 and G.729.
• G.711 - The most commonly supported codec, used over the public switched telephone net-
work.
• G.722 - A wideband codec that is always preferred by Cisco Unified Communications Man-
ager over G.711, unless G.722 is disabled. Audio codec often used in video conferences.
• G.722.1 - A low-complexity wideband codec operating at 24 and 32 kb/s. The audio quality
approaches that of G.722 while using at most half the bit rate. As it is optimized for both
speech and music, G.722.1 has slightly lower speech quality than the speech-optimized iSAC
codec.
• G.729 - A Low-bit-rate codec with 8-kb/s compression that is typically used for calls across a
WAN link because they use less bandwidth.
FCS_CKM_EXT.1 The TOE implements asymmetric cryptography in support of TLS
FCS_CKM.1/KeyGen To support TLS, the TOE implements a specified key generation algorithm to generate asymmetric
cryptographic keys in accordance with RSA and ECC schemes that meet FIPS PUB 186-4. The key sizes
are:
• RSA scheme: 2048-bit
• ECC using NIST curve of P-256, P-384, and P-521
FCS_CKM.2 To support TLS the TOE implements the following algorithms to perform key establishment:
• RSA-based key establishment schemes that meet 800-56B
• ECC key establishment schemes that meet SP800-56A
TLS connections related to CAPF make exclusive use of RSA-based key establishment schemes. The
other evaluated TLS connections exclusively use elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes.
FCS_COP.1/SKC The TOE provides symmetric encryption and decryption capabilities using AES as specified in ISO
18033-3 supporting the following modes:
o CBC mode as specified in ISO 10116.
o GCM mode as specified in ISO 19772.
The TOE uses AES in the following protocol:
o TLS: CBC mode with key size of 128 and 256 bits. GCM mode with key sizes of 128 and 256
bits.
FCS_COP.1/Hash The TOE provides cryptographic hashing services using SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 as
specified in FIPS Pub 180-4 “Secure Hash Standard.”
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TOE SFRs How the SFR is Met
SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 are used in TLS to validate server certificates on establishing TLS con-
nections. SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 are used when the TOE generates asymmetric keys for El-
liptic curve-based key establishment. SHA-1 is used with SRTP.
The hashing is used to support trusted updates where the TOE software is digitally signed using RSA
2048-bit key cryptography and SHA256 hashing.
FCS_COP.1/Sig The TOE provides cryptographic signature services using RSA Digital Signature Algorithm with key size
of 2048.
FCS_COP.1/KeyHash The TOE provides keyed-hashing message authentication services using HMAC-SHA-256 (key size –
256 bits, block size 512 bits), and HMAC-SHA-384 (key size – 384 bits, block size 1024 bits), and
HMAC-SHA-512 (key size – 512 bits, block size 1024 bits).
FCS_COP.1/SRTP For the STRP protocol, the TOE implements AES in CTR mode with a key size of 128 bits and GCM
mode with a key size of 128 or 256 bits.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1/Cli-
ent
The TOE implements HTTPS over TLS that complies with RFC2818. HTTPS is used to protect communi-
cations between the TOE and the CUCM server for authentication and configuration purposes.
The HTTPS Client is implemented by the curl library which is bundled in the TOE. The curl library runs
over the CiscoSSL FIPS Object Module (FOM) which is also bundled in the TOE. The curl library initi-
ates a connection to the server on the appropriate port. When the TLS handshake has successfully fin-
ished, the curl library initiates the first HTTP request.
The X.509 certificate presented by the server endpoint is validated before establishing the secure
connection. The TOE will not establish an HTTPS connection when the peer certificate is deemed to
be invalid. See section 5.3.4.1, X.509 Certificate Validation for details about certificate validation.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 The TOE invokes the BCryptGenRandom API on the platform when needed to generate a crypto-
graphic key. This applies to the following SFRs:
FCS_CKM.1/KeyGen – Cryptographic Asymmetric Key Generation
FCS_CKM.2 – Cryptographic Key Establishment
FCS_SRTP_EXT.1 – Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol
FCS_STO_EXT.1 The Cisco Jabber TOE leverages the platform for securely storing persistent credentials. The TOE uses
the Windows Data Protection API (DPAPI) to store User password (secret). The TOE uses Windows
Certificate Manager to store the private key used for X.509 certificate generation and peer authenti-
cation
FCS_SRTP_EXT.1 The TOE implements secure RTP (SRTP) as defined in RFC 3711 to provide encryption and authentica-
tion of audio and video data streams between itself and a VVoIP endpoint. The TOE uses AES encryp-
tion/decryption supporting the following ciphersuites:
• AEAD_AES_256_GCM
For incoming and outgoing calls, SRTP keys are exchanged as defined in section 4 of RFC 4568. The
TOE uses the Session Description Protocol (SDP) within SIP signaling messages as the “inline” parame-
ter within SDP packets. SRTP key exchange is accomplished through the "crypto" attribute (a=crypto)
under the particular media type (m=video or m=audio) within the SDP. The format of the "crypto" at-
tribute is shown below.
a=crypto:<tag> <crypto-suite> <key-params> [<session-params>]
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TOE SFRs How the SFR is Met
The tag field is a decimal number used to uniquely distinguish multiple crypto attributes from each
other. The crypto-suite field contains the cipher and message authentication algorithms for the par-
ticular crypto attribute. The key-params field itself has the format shown below.
key-params = <key-method> ":" <key-info>
The key-method field indicates the method by which keying material is exchanged and ‘inline’ indi-
cates the keying information is contained within the SDP. An example of the use of SDP for SRTP is
shown below:
m=video 16386 RTP/SAVP 112
c=IN IP4 14.50.248.31
a=crypto:1 AEAD_AES_256_GCM
inline:8V0Oj7duRGA1lxd1At5eYSpc8Q1qIR4o0Qq3Sr74ZR5+j3eFmro4CvPDvQQ=
Since keying material is sent within SIP signaling, encryption of the SIP signaling is required to secure
the key exchange. The TOE implements TLS to protect the SRTP key exchange between itself and the
CUCM server. The CUCM SIP Server is responsible for the configuration of the policy regarding which
ciphers are allowed. The TOE cannot override this configuration. The evaluated configuration requires
the administrator of the CUCM SIP Server to configure only ‘secure/encrypted’ calls. By doing so at-
tempts to call using SRTP NULL encryption fail.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 The Cisco Jabber TOE implements TLS 1.2 with the following ciphersuites:
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
TLS connections related to CAPF exclusively use TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA. The other evalu-
ated TLS connections make use of only the two TLS_ECDHE_RSA cipher suites.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.5 The Cisco Jabber TOE implements secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1 elliptic curve extensions in the
supported_groups extension of the Client Hello packet. This is the behavior by default and is not con-
figurable.
FDP_DEC_EXT.1 The Cisco Jabber TOE restricts access to the following network connectivity resources: camera, micro-
phone, USB, and Bluetooth. To function as a VVoIP product, access to network connectivity, the cam-
era, and microphone resources are required.
In addition, the TOE can access Bluetooth or USB hardware resources to control Bluetooth or USB au-
dio devices.
The TOE restricts its access to the following repositories:
o Address book and calendar – Needed to import contacts and for calling VVoIP users.
o File-system - To import contacts, access to the file system is needed.
o Photo Library - Users may import a photo from the photo library to be used on VVoIP calls.
FDP_NET_EXT.1 The Cisco Jabber TOE limits network communication to the following:
o Initiation: Jabber allows initiation of Voice/Video (SIP over TLS/SRTP).
o Jabber responds to: Voice/Video (SIP over TLS and SRTP communication initiated by a re-
mote VoIP application via the ESC).
Port/Protocol usage is listed in the table below:
Port(s) Protocol(s) Description
5061 (TCP) SIP over TLS Secure SIP signaling
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TOE SFRs How the SFR is Met
16384 to 32766 (UDP) SRTP Cisco Unified Communica-
tions Manager media port
range used for audio, video,
and BFCP video desktop
share.
443, 8443, 6972 (TCP) HTTPS HTTPS communications
with CUCM for authentica-
tion and, Jabber configura-
tion download.
3804 (TCP) TLS Cisco Certificate Authority
Proxy Function.
80 (TCP) HTTP UDS Discovery. HTTP con-
nection attempts are redi-
rected to HTTPS.
1024-65535 (TCP) HTTP CRL and OCSP Revocation
checking. TCP ports used
are determined by the in-
formation within the certifi-
cate (AIA and/or CDP).
FDP_DAR_EXT.1 Sensitive data in the TOE is defined as:
• The private key used for X.509 certificate generation and peer authentication
• User password (secret)
Each is protected in accordance with FCS_STO.EXT.1
The Cisco Jabber TOE leverages the platform for securely storing persistent credentials. Specifically,
the TOE uses the Windows Data Protection API (DPAPI) to store User password (secret), and TOE uses
Windows Certificate Manager to store the private key used for X.509 certificate generation and peer
authentication.
FDP_IFC.1 The TOE enforces a media transmission policy that ensures media data is not transmitted unless it is
in a streaming media state as defined in the rules for FDP_IFF.1
FDP_IFF.1 The TOE enforces a media transmission policy that ensures user voice and video data is not transmit-
ted until the following is met:
• The TOE is registered with the ESC
• A call has been established with a telephony device (VVoIP endpoint),
• The TOE is in the off-hook state,
• The TOE is not in the mute state,
• The TOE is not in the hold state
When a call is placed on voice mute (silence), the voice steam is not stopped, but voice data from the
microphone is no longer being sent. Silence or comfort noise packets are sent depending on the con-
figuration settings by CUCM SIP Server. When on mute, the audio component is no longer transmit-
ting a signal.
Hold always results in the existing SRTP streams being stopped and new SRTP streams (with new
keys) being negotiated over SIP/SDP with the Music on Hold service.
FIA_X509_EXT.1 The Cisco Jabber TOE invokes platform functionality to perform the following certificate validation:
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TOE SFRs How the SFR is Met
FIA_X509_EXT.2
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 • Certificate validation and certificate path validation according to RFC 5280.
• The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate.
• All CA certificates must have the basicConstraints extension present and be of type
CA=TRUE.
• The certificate must not be revoked. Revocation is validated via the client device platform
by OCSP and CRL revocation status check.
• The certificate must not be expired.
• The extendedKeyUsage field must be valid based on the following rules:
o Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall have
the Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1
with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp 2
with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o S/MIME certificates presented for email encryption and signature shall have the Email Pro-
tection purpose (id-kp 4 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing purpose (id-kp
9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o Server certificates presented for EST shall have the CMC Registration Authority (RA) pur-
pose (id-kp-cmcRA with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.28) in the extendedKeyUsage field
The Cisco Jabber TOE compares the FQDN of the server it is establishing connectivity with against the
Subject Alternate Name-dnsName attributes in the certificate. If Jabber determines there is a mis-
match, it will not establish the TLS trusted channel. This applies to all TLS connections
Note: If the server certificate does not contain a SAN, the CN of the certificate is used for comparison
purposes instead.
The TOE does not support the use of wildcards within certificates and does not support certificate
pinning.
The TOE relies upon the client device platform to verify the certificate at the point in time when it re-
ceives the server certificate as part of the process of establishing a secure connection to any server. If
the TOE platform is unable to connect to the revocation server for example due to a network error,
the TOE will not allow the certificate to be accepted. This behavior applies to all trusted channels.
To obtain a X.509 certificate, the Cisco Jabber TOE must securely enroll in the Certificate Authority
Proxy Function (CAPF) as instructed in the AGD. CAPF runs on the Cisco Unified Communications Man-
ager and provides the TOE with X.509 certificates. The CAPF process also determines the certificate
the TOE will use to establish a TLS connection. TLS mutual authentication is supported for the SIP con-
nection between the TOE and CUCM Server.
FMT_MEC_EXT.1 The Cisco Jabber TOE reads its configuration stored remotely on the SIP Server.
FMT_CFG_EXT.1 The Cisco Jabber TOE is not installed with any preset default credentials. Users can only access files
that are associated to the installation that user performed.
FMT_SMF.1 There are no security management functions performed by the Cisco Jabber TOE. The TSF automati-
cally operates in a manner that meets the SFRs by default.
FMT_SMF.1/VVoIP The initial configuration of the TOE is in an unregistered state. The TSF provides the ability to register
the TOE to an Enterprise Session Controller (ESC) and to specify the termination period for idle calls.
The registration of the TOE to the ESC is a manual process which can be performed by the TOE once
the Operational Environment is appropriately configured by following the configuration steps identified
in the AGD. See additional detail in FTA_SSL.3/Media for the case of idle call timeout configuration.
FPR_ANO_EXT.1 The Cisco Jabber TOE does not transmit PII.
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TOE SFRs How the SFR is Met
FPT_API_EXT.1 The Cisco Jabber TOE uses the following Windows APIs:
CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicy(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_SSL, pChainContext, &PolicyPara, &PolicySta-
tus)
CertGetCertificateChain(NULL, pCert, NULL, caMemStore, &ChainPara, CERT_CHAIN_REVOCA-
TION_CHECK_CHAIN |
CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CACHE_ONLY, NULL, &pChainContext))
CryptAcquireContext(&hCryptProv, NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_AES, CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT |
CRYPT_MACHINE_KEYSET)
CryptCreateHash(hCryptProv, CALG_SHA1, 0, 0, &hHash)
CryptHashData(hHash, pbContent, cbContent, 0)
CryptGetHashParam(hHash, HP_HASHVAL, bHash, &dwHashLen, 0)
Also see FCS_RBG_EXT.1 which details the use of the BCryptGenRandom windows API.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1 The compiler flag used to enable ASLR when the Cisco Jabber TOE is compiled is
/DYNAMICBASE.
The compiler flag used to enable stack-based buffer overflow protection in the Cisco Jabber TOE is
/GS.
FPT_IDV_EXT.1 The Cisco Jabber TOE uses a sequence-based versioning control system. The application uses the “ma-
jor.minor. maintenance.build” format for versioning control. For example: 15.0.4.56553.
- Major (15 in the example above) designates a release where significant new features are
added.
- Minor (0 in the example above) designates a release where minor new features are added.
- Maintenance Release (4 in the example above).
- Build (56553 in the example above) are typically patches for vulnerabilities or bugs.
FPT_LIB_EXT.1 The Cisco Jabber TOE uses the third-party libraries defined in table 13
FPT_TUD_EXT.1
FPT_TUD_EXT.2
ALC_TSU_EXT.1
The TOE has specific versions that can be queried by a user. A TOE update is not a patch applied to
the existing TOE; it is a new version of the TOE. When TOE updates are made available by Cisco, an
administrator can obtain and install the update. TOE software is digitally signed using RSA 4096-bit
key and SHA256 hash, which is in line with the claims made for FCS_COP.1/Hash and FCS_COP.1/Sig.
The platform performs verification and performs an install/upgrade/update if verification is success-
ful. The authorized source for the digitally signed updates is "Cisco Systems, Inc". In a production en-
vironment, distribution to end users is typically achieved by use of a Mobile Device Management
(MDM) solution. MDM solutions allow Administrators to deploy the TOE software in mass while main-
taining control of software version, mode of operation, and feature selection.
All Cisco communications relating to security issues are handled by the Cisco Product Security Inci-
dent Response Team (PSIRT). Cisco aims to provide fixes in 30 days, but depending on the timing, it
may be greater than 30 days though not more than 60 days for most security issues. Fixes may be de-
layed longer for low-risk security issues. Updates are then made available at Cisco Software Central
at: https://software.cisco.com.
Customers can subscribe to the Cisco Notification Service to receive important information regarding
product updates. Full information is provided in the Cisco Security Vulnerability Policy available at
https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/security_vulnerability_policy.html
Customers may securely report security issues to Cisco Support. For details on engaging Cisco Sup-
port, please reference Annex E: Obtaining Documentation and Submitting a Service Request.
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TOE SFRs How the SFR is Met
FTA_SSL.3/Media The Administrator can specify a remote call disconnect timer parameter in the jabber-config.xml file.
If the "CommonCriteriaEndCallTimeout" parameter is specified, the administrator can set a value
from 1 to 480 minutes. By default, Jabber will automatically terminate the voice/video media trans-
mission to the remote peer if it determines it is no longer receiving SRTP/SDES traffic after 300 sec-
onds (5 minutes) when operating in CC mode.
FTP_DIT_EXT.1 The Cisco Jabber TOE uses TLS and SRTP to encrypt transmitted sensitive data.
FTP_ITC.1/Control
FTP_ITC.1/Media
Each time the TOE initiates or receives a VVoIP call, TLS is used to protect the SIP session manage-
ment communication between itself and the ESC. Communication between the TOE and the remote
VVoIP endpoint is protected with SRTP.
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7 Supplemental TOE Summary Specification Information
The TOE provides cryptography in support of other Jabber security functionality. The Jabber software calls the CiscoSSL FIPS
Object Module (FOM) v7.3a that has been validated in accordance with the specified standards to meet the requirements listed
below and all the algorithms claimed have CAVP certificates.
See table below for CAVP certificates.
Table 17. CAVP Certificates
Platform/CPU SFR Algorithm CAVP Certificate
Number
Windows 11 on Intel Core i5-
1135G7 (Tiger Lake)
FCS_CKM.1/KeyGen RSA
2048 bits
A4446
Windows 11 on Intel Core i5-
1135G7 (Tiger Lake)
FCS_CKM.1/KeyGen ECC
P-256/384/521
A4446
Windows 11 on Intel Core i5-
1135G7 (Tiger Lake)
FCS_CKM.2 RSA
2048 bits
Tested with a known
good implementation
Windows 11 on Intel Core i5-
1135G7 (Tiger Lake)
FCS_CKM.2 CVL-KAS-ECC
P-256/384/521
A4446
Windows 11 on Intel Core i5-
1135G7 (Tiger Lake)
FCS_COP.1/SKC CBC, GCM
128, 256 bits
A4446
Windows 11 on Intel Core i5-
1135G7 (Tiger Lake)
FCS_COP.1/SRTP CTR, GCM
128, 256 bits
A4446
Windows 11 on Intel Core i5-
1135G7 (Tiger Lake)
FCS_COP.1/Hash SHS
SHA-1/256/384/512
A4446
Windows 11 on Intel Core i5-
1135G7 (Tiger Lake)
FCS_COP.1/Sig RSA
2048 bits
A4446
Windows 11 on Intel Core i5-
1135G7 (Tiger Lake)
FCS_COP.1/KeyHash HMAC
SHA-256/384/512
A4446
Note: For brevity purposes, the Operating Environment (OE) on certificate A4446 is listed as “Win 11 on Intel Core i5 (Tiger
Lake)”, however expanding the OE shows the full processor name as “Intel Core i5-1135G7”.
Note: Additionally, the Microsoft Windows Next Generation Cryptographic algorithm implementation, which provides enhanced
support for DRBG, is packaged into a library used by Microsoft and other third-party applications is certified by NIST certificate
A2645. This certification includes Windows 11 with a 11th Gen Intel Core i5-1135G7 processor, consistent with the TOE
evaluated as part of this certification. This NIST certificate is mentioned as the evaluated TOE claims to invoke platform-provided
DRBG functionality.
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8 Annex A: References
The documentation listed below was used to prepare this ST.
Table 18. References
Identifier Description
[CC_PART1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 1: Introduction and general
model, dated April 2017, version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001
[CC_PART2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 2: Security functional
components, dated April 2017, version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-002
[CC_PART3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 3: Security assurance
components, dated April 2017, version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-003
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Evaluation Methodology,
dated April 2017, version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004
[APP] Protection Profile for Application Software, v1.4, October 7, 2021
[VVoIP] PP-Module for Voice and Video over IP (VVoIP), v1.0, October 28, 2020
[TLS] Functional Package for TLS, v1.1, March 1, 2019
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9 Annex B: Acronyms
The following acronyms and terms are common and may be used in this Security Target.
Table 19. Acronyms
Acronym/Term Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standards
API Application Programming Interface
CBR Constant bitrate
CC Common Criteria
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology
CM Configuration Management
CRL Certificate Revocation List
CUCM Cisco Unified Communication Manager
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ESC Enterprise Session Controller
ESP Encapsulating Security Payload
GCM Galois Counter Mode
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code
IP Internet Protocol
IT Information Technology
OCSP Online Certificate Status Protocol
OS Operating System
PP Protection Profile
RFC Request For Comment
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SDES Security Descriptions for Media Streams
SDP Session Description Protocol
SHS Secure Hash Standard
SIP Session Initiation Protocol
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SRTP Security Real-Time Transport Protocol
ST Security Target
TCP Transport Control Protocol
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Function
UCM [Cisco] Unified Communications Manager
UDP User datagram protocol
VoIP Voice over IP
VVoIP Voice and Video over IP
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10 Annex C: Terminology
The following terms are common and may be used in this Security Target.
Table 20. Terms
Term Definition
Authorized
Administrator
Any user which has been assigned to a privilege level that is permitted to perform all TSF-related functions.
Certificate Authority
Proxy Function
(CAPF)
Process by which supported devices can request locally significant certificates by using Cisco Unified
Communications Manager Administration.
CUCM Cisco Unified Communications Manager (CUCM) serves as the software-based call-processing component
of the Cisco Unified Communications family of products. The CUCM extends enterprise telephony features
and functions to packet telephony network devices such as IP phones, media processing devices, voice-
over-IP (VoIP) gateways, and multimedia applications. CUCM is an Enterprise Session Controller.
Certificate Trust List
(CTL)
A file signed by the Cisco Site Administrator Security Token (security token), that contains a list of
certificates for servers that the phone is to trust.
CUCM (Call Manger)
Cluster
A cluster refers to a CUCM Publisher (first CUCM server installed) and any associated Subscribers (CUCM
servers installed after the Publisher and included in the Publishers servers list). For purposes of
redundancy, Cisco recommends deployment of at least a Publisher an one subscriber, however from a
functional standpoint, Jabber clients only register to a single server at a time.
CUCM (Call Manager)
Node
A node refers to a member of a CUCM cluster. The term is used in reference to a publisher or associated
Subscribers.
Enterprise Session
Controller (ESC)
A VVoIP infrastructure device that is used to set up and tear down calls between VVoIP endpoints
Peer Another VVoIP device also in communication with the CUCM that is capable of exchanging media packets
with the TOE as part of an establishes media session.
Session Initiation
Protocol (SIP)
A communications protocol defined by IETF that is used for creating, modifying, and terminating
multimedia sessions with multiple participants.
Secure Real-Time
Transport Protocol
(SRTP)
A protocol that is used to provide multimedia (voice/video) streaming services with added security of
encryption, message authentication and integrity, and replay protection.
SIP Server The SIP Server (in this evaluation it is the Cisco Unified Communications Manager (CUCM) interacts with a
VoIP client (TOE) and provides registrar and proxy capabilities required for call-session management as well
as establishing, processing, and terminating VoIP calls.
User Any entity (human user or external IT entity) outside the TOE that interacts with the TOE.
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11 Annex D: Differing SFR Naming Conventions
Note that iterations in [App] are identified with a number inside parentheses (e.g. "(1)") and iterations in [VVoIP] are identified
by appending the SFR name with a slash and unique identifier suggesting the purpose of the iteration. This table serves to map
on format to another.
Table 21. SFR Naming Map
Component Name Component Identification
(Number) Format
Component Identification
/Test Format
Cryptographic Operation - Encryption/Decryption FCS_COP.1(1) FCS_COP.1/SKC
Cryptographic Operation - Hashing FCS_COP.1(2) FCS_COP.1/Hash
Cryptographic Operation - Signing FCS_COP.1(3) FCS_COP.1/Sig
Cryptographic Operation - Keyed-Hash Message
Authentication
FCS_COP.1(4) FCS_COP.1/KeyHash
SRTP Cryptographic Operation
(Encryption/Decryption for SRTP)
FCS_COP.1(5) FCS_COP.1/SRTP
Cryptographic Asymmetric Key Generation FCS_CKM.1(1) FCS_CKM.1/KeyGen
Password Conditioning FCS_CKM.1(3) FCS_CKM.1/Password
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12 Annex E: Obtaining Documentation, Submitting a Service Request, and
Contacting Cisco
The Cisco Jabber 15.2 Common Criteria Configuration Guide (AGD) should be obtained from the Product Listing on the NIAP site.
For information on obtaining other documentation, submitting a service request, and gathering additional information, see the
monthly What's New in Cisco Product Documentation, which also lists all new and revised Cisco technical documentation at:
With CCO login: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/partner/docs/general/whatsnew/whatsnew.html
Without CCO login: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/whatsnew/whatsnew.html
Subscribe to the What's New in Cisco Product Documentation as a Really Simple Syndication (RSS) feed and set content to be
delivered directly to your desktop using a reader application. The RSS feeds are a free service and Cisco currently supports RSS
version 2.0.
You can access the most current Cisco documentation on the World Wide Web at the following site:
http://www.cisco.com
Cisco has more than 200 offices worldwide. Addresses, phone numbers, and fax numbers are listed on the Cisco website at:
http://www.cisco.com/go/offices
Additionally, Cisco.com serves as a starting point for all technical assistance. Customers and partners can obtain documentation,
troubleshooting tips, and sample configurations from online tools. For Cisco.com registered users, additional troubleshooting
tools are available from the TAC website.
Cisco.com is the foundation of a suite of interactive, networked services that provides immediate, open access to Cisco
information and resources at any time, from anywhere in the world. This highly integrated Internet application is a powerful,
easy-to-use tool for doing business with Cisco.
Cisco.com provides a broad range of features and services to help customers and partners streamline business processes and
improve productivity. Through Cisco.com, you can find information about Cisco and our networking solutions, services, and
programs. In addition, you can resolve technical issues with online technical support, download and test software packages, and
order Cisco learning materials and merchandise. Valuable online skill assessment, training, and certification programs are also
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Customers and partners can self-register on Cisco.com to obtain additional personalized information and services. Registered
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To access Cisco.com, go to the following website:
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