National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for the
Apple IOS 11 Contacts on iPhone and iPad
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID10915
Dated: 13 September 2018
Version: 1.2
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Patrick Mallett PhD.
Michelle Carlson
The MITRE Corporation
Kenneth Stutterheim
The Aerospace Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Anthony Busciglio
Danielle F Canoles
Rutwij Kulkarni
Acumen Security, LLC
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary ........................................................................................................ 4
2 Identification.................................................................................................................. 5
3 Architectural Information ............................................................................................... 6
4 Security Policy ................................................................................................................ 7
4.1 Cryptographic Support ..............................................................................................................................7
4.2 User Data Protection.................................................................................................................................7
4.3 Identification and Authentication .............................................................................................................7
4.4 Security Management ...............................................................................................................................7
4.5 Privacy ......................................................................................................................................................7
4.6 Protection of the TSF.................................................................................................................................7
4.7 Trusted Path/Channels..............................................................................................................................7
5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope ................................................................ 8
5.1 Assumptions .............................................................................................................................................8
5.2 Threats......................................................................................................................................................8
5.3 Clarification of Scope ................................................................................................................................9
6 Documentation............................................................................................................. 10
7 TOE Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................ 11
7.1 Evaluated Configuration..........................................................................................................................11
8 IT Product Testing......................................................................................................... 13
8.1 Developer Testing ...................................................................................................................................13
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ....................................................................................................13
9 Results of the Evaluation .............................................................................................. 14
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target ..................................................................................................................14
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation ...........................................................................................14
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents.........................................................................................................14
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities...............................................................................................15
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity.........................................................................15
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity ...........................................................................................................15
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results...............................................................................................................16
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations.................................................................... 17
11 Annexes ....................................................................................................................... 18
12 Security Target ............................................................................................................. 19
13 Glossary ....................................................................................................................... 20
14 Bibliography ................................................................................................................. 21
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1 Executive Summary
This Validation Report (VR) is intended to assist the end user of this product and any security
certification Agent for that end user in determining the suitability of this Information Technology (IT)
product for their environment. End users should review the Security Target (ST), which is where specific
security claims are made, in conjunction with this VR, which describes how those security claims were
tested and evaluated and any restrictions on the evaluated configuration. Prospective users should
carefully read the Assumptions and Clarification of Scope in Section 5 and the Validator Comments in
Section 10, where any restrictions on the evaluated configuration are highlighted.
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of the
evaluation of the Apple iOS 11 Contacts on iPhone and iPad Target of Evaluation (TOE). It presents the
evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This VR is not an endorsement of
the TOE by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the TOE is either expressed or
implied. This VR applies only to the specific version and configuration of the product as evaluated and
documented in the ST.
The evaluation was completed by Acumen Security in September 2018. The information in this report is
largely derived from the proprietary Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test report, all
written by Acumen Security as summarized in the Apple IOS 11 Contacts Assurance Activity Report
(AAR). The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3
Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements defined in the Protection Profile for Application
Software, version 1.2, dated, 22 April 2016 [SWAPP].
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a NIAP
approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT Security
Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 4) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
(Version 3.1, Rev. 4), as interpreted by the Assurance Activities contained in the Protection Profile for
Application Software, version 1.2, dated, 22 April 2016 [SWAPP] and all applicable NIAP technical
decisions for the technology. This Validation Report applies only to the specific version of the TOE as
evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common
Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation
technical report are consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes and reviewed the
individual work units documented in the ETR and the Assurance Activities Report. The validation team
found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and
assurance requirements stated in the Security Target. Based on these findings, the validation team
concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the
conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical
report are consistent with the evidence produced.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards effort to
establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations. Under this program, security
evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories called Common Criteria Testing
Laboratories (CCTLs). CCTLs evaluate products against Protection Profile containing Assurance
Activities, which are interpretation of CEM work units specific to the technology described by the
PP.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and consistency
across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a security evaluation
contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product's evaluation. Upon successful completion of the
evaluation, the product is added to NIAP's Product Compliant List.
The target of evaluation is the Apple iOS 11 Contacts on iPhone and iPad and the associated TOE
guidance documentation.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as
evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances
of the product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile(s) to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1 - Identification
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Apple IOS 11 Contacts on iPhone and iPad
Protection Profile Protection Profile for Application Software, version 1.2, dated, 22 April 2016
Security Target Apple iOS 11 Contacts on iPhone and iPad Security Target Version 0.4,
September 2018
Evaluation
Technical Report
VID10915 Assurance Activity Report, version 1.4, September, 2018
CC Version Version 3.1, Revision 4
Conformance Result CC Part 2 Extended and CC Part 3 Extended
Sponsor Apple Inc.
Developer Apple Inc.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Acumen Security, LLC
CCEVS Validators Patrick Mallett, PhD., Michelle Carlson, Kenneth Stutterheim
6
3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the Security
Target.
The TOE is the Apple IOS 11 Contacts on iPhone and iPad application which runs on iPad and iPhone
devices. The product provides access and management of user contact information within the devices.
The TOE is the Contacts application software only. The Apple iOS operating system has been separately
validated (VID 10851). The mobile device operating system and hardware platforms are part of the TOE
environment.
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4 Security Policy
The TOE is comprised of several security features, as identified below.
 Cryptography Support
 User Data Protection
 Identification and Authentication
 Security Management
 Privacy
 Protection of the TSF
 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE provides the security functionality required by [SWAPP].
4.1 Cryptographic Support
The iOS platform provides HTTPS/TLS functionality to securely communicate with trusted entities. The
TOE does not directly perform any cryptographic functions.
4.2 User Data Protection
The TOE requests no hardware or software resources during the use of the application. The TOE requires
network access.
4.3 Identification and Authentication
All validation of X.509 certificates is performed by the iOS platform on which the TOE is running.
4.4 Security Management
The TOE is installed completely pre-configured. No security related configuration is required for
operation.
4.5 Privacy
The TOE will transmit contact information at the request of the user. The TOE provides a notification
when sharing this information.
4.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE platform performs cryptographic self-tests at startup which ensures the TOE ability to properly
operate. The TOE platform also verifies all software updates via digital signature
4.7 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE is a software application. The TOE has the ability to establish protected communications.
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5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope
5.1 Assumptions
The specific conditions listed in the following subsections are assumed to exist in the TOE’s
environment. These assumptions include both practical realities in the development of the TOE security
requirements and the essential environmental conditions on the use of the TOE.
Table 2 - Assumptions
Assumption Assumption Definition
A.PLATFORM The TOE relies upon a trustworthy computing platform for its
execution. This includes the underlying platform and whatever
runtime environment it provides to the TOE.
A.PROPER_USER The user of the application software is not willfully negligent or
hostile, and uses the software in compliance with the applied
enterprise security policy.
A.PROPER_ADMIN The administrator of the application software is not careless,
willfully negligent or hostile, and administers the software within
compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.
5.2 Threats
The following table lists the threats addressed by the TOE and the IT Environment. The assumed level of
expertise of the attacker for all the threats identified below is Enhanced-Basic.
Table 3 - Threats
Threat Threat Definition
T.NETWORK_ATTACK An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or
elsewhere on the network infrastructure. Attackers may engage
in communications with the application software or alter
communications between the application software and other
endpoints in order to compromise it.
T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or
elsewhere on the network infrastructure. Attackers may
monitor and gain access to data exchanged between the
application and other endpoints.
T.LOCAL_ATTACK An attacker can act through unprivileged software on the same
computing platform on which the application executes.
Attackers may provide maliciously formatted input to the
application in the form of files or other local communications.
T.PHYSICAL_ACCESS An attacker may try to access sensitive data at rest.
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5.3 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarifying. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this evaluation.
Note that:
 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets the
security claims made, with a certain level of assurance. The level of assurance for this evaluation
is defined within the Protection Profile for Application Software, version 1.2, dated, 22 April
2016 [SWAPP].
 Consistent with the expectations of the Protection Profile, this evaluation did not specifically
search for, nor seriously attempt to counter, vulnerabilities that were not “obvious” or
vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as
one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical
sophistication and resources.
 The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality specified
in the claimed PP and applicable Technical Decisions. Any additional security related functional
capabilities that may be included in the product were not covered by this evaluation.
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6 Documentation
The following documents were provided by the vendor with the TOE for evaluation:
 Apple iOS 11 Contacts Security Target, Version 0.4, September 2018 [ST]
 Apple iOS 11 Contacts Common Criteria Configuration Guide, Version 1.0, July 2018 [AGD]
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the software must be configured as specified in those
guides. Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available online
was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not to be relied upon when
configuring or operating the software as evaluated. Consumers are encouraged to download the CC
configuration guides directly from the NIAP site to ensure the software is configured as evaluated.
11
7 TOE Evaluated Configuration
7.1 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is a software application running on a mobile device (as listed below). The mobile device
platform provides a host Operating System, controls that limit application behavior, and wireless
connectivity. The TOE is the Contacts application only. The Apple iOS operating system has been
separately validated (VID 10851). The mobile operating system and hardware platforms are part of the
TOE environment. The evaluated version of the TOE is version 11.
The Operating System on which the TOE is running is Apple iOS version 11. This is the same version of
iOS which has undergone Common Criteria evaluation against the Protection Profile for Mobile Device
Fundamentals Version 3.1.
As evaluated, the TOE software runs on the following devices:
Table 4 Hardware Devices
Device Name Model Processor WiFi Bluetooth
iPhone X A1901
A1902
A1865
A11 802.11a/b/g/n/ac
802.11a/b/g/n/ac
802.11a/b/g/n/ac
5.0
iPhone 8 Plus/
iPhone 8
A1864, A1897, A1898, A1899/
A1863, A1905, A1906, A1907
A11 802.11a/b/g/n/ac
802.11a/b/g/n/ac
5.0
iPhone 7 Plus/ iPhone 7 A1661, A1784, A1785, A1786/
A1660, A1778, A1779, A1780
A10 802.11a/b/g/n/ac
802.11a/b/g/n/ac
4.2
4.2
iPhone 6S Plus/ iPhone
6S
A1634, A1687, A1690, A1699/
A1633, A1688, A1691, A1700
A9 802.11a/b/g/n/ac
802.11a/b/g/n/ac
4.2
4.2
iPhone SE A1662
A1723
A1724
A9 802.11a/b/g/n/ac
802.11a/b/g/n/ac
802.11a/b/g/n/ac
4.2
iPhone 6 Plus/ iPhone 6 A1522, A1524, A1593/
A1549, A1586, A1589
A8 802.11a/b/g/n/ac
802.11a/b/g/n/ac
802.11a/b/g/n/ac
4.0
4.0
4.0
iPhone 5s A1453
A1457
A1518
A1528
A1530
A1533
A7 802.11a/b/g/n
802.11a/b/g/n
802.11a/b/g/n
802.11a/b/g/n
802.11a/b/g/n
802.11a/b/g/n
4.0
4.0
4.0
4.0
4.0
4.0
iPad mini 3 A1599
A1600
A1601
A7 802.11a/b/g/n
802.11a/b/g/n
802.11a/b/g/n
4.0
4.0
4.0
iPad mini 4 A1538
A1550
A8 802.11a/b/g/n
802.11a/b/g/n
4.2
4.2
iPad Air 2 A1566
A1567
A8X 802.11a/b/g/n/ac
802.11a/b/g/n/ac
4.2
4.2
iPad (5th gen) A1822
A1823
A9X 802.11a/b/g/n/ac
802.11a/b/g/n/ac
4.2
4.2
iPad Pro 12.9”
(1st Gen)
A1584
A1652
A9X 802.11a/b/g/n/ac
802.11a/b/g/n/ac
4.2
4.2
12
Device Name Model Processor WiFi Bluetooth
iPad Pro 9.7” A1673
A1674
A9X 802.11a/b/g/n/ac
802.11a/b/g/n/ac
4.2
4.2
iPad Pro 12.9” (2nd
Gen)
A1670
A1671
A10X 802.11a/b/g/n/ac
802.11a/b/g/n/ac
4.2
4.2
iPad Pro 10.5” A1701
A1709
A10X 802.11a/b/g/n/ac
802.11a/b/g/n/ac
4.2
4.2
iPad 9.7” A1893
A1954
A10 802.11a/b/g/n/ac 4.2
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8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the evaluation team. It is derived from
information contained in Evaluation Test Report for the Apple IOS 11 Contacts on iPhone and iPad,
which is not publicly available. The Assurance Activities Report provides an overview of testing and the
prescribed assurance activities.
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the Assurance Activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according the vendor-provided guidance documentation and
ran the tests specified in the Protection Profile for Application Software, version 1.2, dated, 22 April
2016 [SWAPP]. The independent testing activity is documented in the publicly available Assurance
Activities Report, which is not duplicated here. Multiple test beds were constructed to exercise
Application Software capabilities and claimed security functionality on a representative sampling of the
mobile devices. The following tooling was used as part of the test activities,
 nmap version 7.70
 Wireshark 2.6.1
 SSH version OpenSSH_7.6p1
 QuickTime Player (for Video Recording) version 10.4 [Platform: MAC]
 Custom Script - "shasumfiles.sh"
8.3 Test Bed Configuration Diagram
Per prior arrangement with NIAP, platform related testing was deferred to the previous evaluation, VID
10851, which used the same version of iOS which had undergone Common Criteria evaluation against
the Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals Version 3.1.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are presented in
detail in the proprietary documents: the Detailed Test Report (DTR) and the Evaluation Technical Report
(ETR) and as summarized in the Apple iOS 11 Contacts Assurance Activity Report, Version 1.4. The
reader of this document can assume that activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version 3.1 rev
4 and CEM version 3.1 rev 4. The evaluation determined the Apple iOS 11 Contacts on iPhone and iPad
to be Part 2 extended, and meets the SARs contained in the PP. Additionally the evaluator performed
the Assurance Activities specified in the SWAPP.
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST contains a
description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of security
requirements claimed to be met by the Apple IOS 11 Contacts on iPhone and iPad that are consistent
with the Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the requirements.
Additionally, the evaluator performed an assessment of the Assurance Activities specified in the
Protection Profile for Application Software, version 1.2, dated, 22 April 2016 [SWAPP].
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team
was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation
The evaluation team assessed the design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding
how the TSF provides the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional
specification contained in the Security Target's TOE Summary Specification. Additionally, the evaluator
performed the Assurance Activities specified in the SWAPP related to the examination of the
information contained in the TOE Summary Specification.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was
justified.
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents
The evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the
operational TOE. Additionally, the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance
in describing how to securely administer the TOE. The guides were assessed during the design and
testing phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete. Additionally, the evaluator performed
the Assurance Activities specified in the SWAPP related to the examination of the information contained
in the operational guidance documents.
15
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by
the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities
The evaluation team found that the TOE was identified. Additionally, the team verified that both the
TOE and its supporting documentation are consistently reference the same version and use the same
nomenclature. The evaluation team also verified that the vendor website identified the TOE version
accurately.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team
was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity
The evaluation team ran the set of tests specified by the Assurance Activities in the SWAPP and
recorded the results in a Test Report, summarized in the Evaluation Technical Report and Assurance
Activities Report.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence was
provided by the evaluation team to show that the evaluation activities addressed the test activities in
the SWAPP, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity
The evaluation team performed a public search for vulnerabilities, performed vulnerability testing and
did not discover any issues with the TOE. The following sources of public vulnerability information were
searched in September 2018:
 http://nvd.nist.gov
 http://www.us-cert.gov
 http://www.securityfocus.com
 http://cve.mitre.org
The search terms used included:
 Apple iOS Contacts
 Apple Framework
 Contacts
 Apple iOS 11
 Apple CoreCrypto Kernel Module
 Apple CoreCrypto Module
16
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation addressed the
vulnerability analysis Assurance Activities in the SWAPP, and that the conclusion reached by the
evaluation team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team's test activities also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team performed the Assurance Activities in the SWAPP, and correctly
verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
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10 Validator Comments & Recommendations
<None>
18
11 Annexes
Not applicable.
19
12 Security Target
Please see the Apple iOS 11 Contacts Security Target, Version 0.4 September 2018 [ST].
20
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility accredited by the
National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the CCEVS
Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given implementation
is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the Common
Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made are justified; or
the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using the Common
Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent, technically sound
and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or more TOEs that may be
evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an IT product,
and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation under the CC.
 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue of a
Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation and for
overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme.
21
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 1: Introduction and
general model, Version 3.1 Revision 4.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 2: Security functional
requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 4.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 3: Security assurance
requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 4.
4. Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 4.
5. Apple iOS 11 Contacts Security Target, Version 0.4, September 2018 [ST]
6. Protection Profile for Application Software, version 1.2, dated 22 April 2016 [SWAPP]
7. Apple iOS 11 Contacts Assurance Activity Report, version 1.4, dated September 2018.
8. Apple iOS 11 Contacts on iPhone and iPad Common Criteria Configuration Guide, version 1.0
dated July 2018
9. Apple iOS 11 Contacts Evaluation Technical Report, version 1.2, dated September 2018.
[Evaluation Sensitive]
10. Apple iOS 11 Contacts on iPhone and iPad Equivalency Analysis, version 1.0, dated July 2018.
[Proprietary Document]
11. Vulnerability Assessment for Apple iOS Contacts Application, version 1.4, September 2018.
[Evaluation Sensitive].
12. [A7] Test Plan for Apple iOS Contacts Application version 1.4, September 2018 [Evaluation
Sensitive].
13. [A8] Test Plan for Apple iOS Contacts Application version 1.4, September 2018 [Evaluation
Sensitive].
14. [A8X] Test Plan for Apple iOS Contacts Application version 1.4, September 2018 [Evaluation
Sensitive].
15. [A9] Test Plan for Apple iOS Contacts Application version 1.4, September 2018 [Evaluation
Sensitive].
16. [A10] Test Plan for Apple iOS Contacts Application version 1.4, September 2018 [Evaluation
Sensitive].
17. [A10X] Test Plan for Apple iOS Contacts Application version 1.4, September 2018 [Evaluation
Sensitive].
18. [A11] Test Plan for Apple iOS Contacts Application version 1.4, September 2018 [Evaluation
Sensitive].