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Common Criteria Certification Report
RICOH IM C2510/C3010/C3510/C4510/C6010
Enhanced Security Firmware, version E-1.00-H
26 March 2026
v1.0
CAN-685-LSS
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Foreword
This certification report is an UNCLASSIFIED publication, issued under the authority of the Chief,
Communications Security Establishment (CSE).
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated
certificate, has been evaluated at an approved testing laboratory established under the Canadian
Centre for Cyber Security (a branch of CSE). This certification report, and its associated certificate,
applies only to the identified version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration. The
evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Canadian Common Criteria
Program, and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This report, and its associated certificate, are not an endorsement of the IT product by Canadian
Centre for Cyber Security, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and
its associated certificate, and no warranty for the IT product by the Canadian Centre for Cyber
Security, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
If your organization has identified a requirement for this certification report based on business needs
and would like more detailed information, please contact:
Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
Contact Centre and Information Services
contact@cyber.gc.ca | 1-833-CYBER-88 (1-833-292-3788)
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Overview
The Canadian Common Criteria Program provides a third-party evaluation service for evaluating the
security of IT products. Evaluations are performed by a commercial Common Criteria Testing
Laboratory (CCTL) under the oversight of the Certification Body, which is managed by the Canadian
Centre for Cyber Security.
A CCTL is a commercial facility that has been approved by the Certification Body to perform Common
Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such approval is accreditation to the requirements
of ISO/IEC 17025, the General Requirements for the Competence of Testing and Calibration
Laboratories.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the Certification Body asserts that the product complies
with the security requirements specified in the associated security target (ST). A security target is a
requirements specification document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities. The
consumer of certified IT products should review the ST, in addition to this certification report, to gain
an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended
environment, the evaluated security functionality, and the testing and analysis conducted by the
CCTL.
The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and ST are posted to the Common Criteria
portal (the official website of the International Common Criteria Program).
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Foreword.......................................................................................................................................................1
Overview .......................................................................................................................................................2
Executive Summary CAN-685-LSS .............................................................................................................4
Identification of Target of Evaluation ........................................................................................................5
Common Criteria Conformance ..............................................................................................................5
TOE Description........................................................................................................................................5
TOE Architecture.......................................................................................................................................6
Security Policy..............................................................................................................................................7
Cryptographic Functionality.....................................................................................................................8
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope ...................................................................................................9
Usage and Environmental Assumptions ................................................................................................9
Clarification of Scope...............................................................................................................................9
Evaluated Configuration............................................................................................................................10
Documentation .......................................................................................................................................10
Evaluation Analysis Activities...................................................................................................................11
Development...........................................................................................................................................11
Guidance Documents.............................................................................................................................11
Life-Cycle Support ..................................................................................................................................11
Testing Activities .......................................................................................................................................12
Assessment of Developer tests ............................................................................................................12
Conduct of Testing.................................................................................................................................12
Independent Testing...............................................................................................................................12
Vulnerability Analysis ................................................................................................................................13
Vulnerability Analysis Results ...............................................................................................................13
Results of the Evaluation ..........................................................................................................................14
Recommendations/Comments.............................................................................................................14
Supporting Content....................................................................................................................................15
List of Abbreviations ..............................................................................................................................15
References ..............................................................................................................................................15
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Executive Summary CAN-685-LSS
RICOH IM C2510/C3010/C3510/C4510/C6010 Enhanced Security Firmware, version E-1.00-H
(hereafter referred to as the Target of Evaluation, or TOE), from Ricoh Company, Ltd. , was the subject
of this Common Criteria evaluation. The results of this evaluation demonstrate that the TOE meets
the following conformance claim: collaborative Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices Version 1.0E
Lightship Security is the CCTL that conducted the evaluation. This evaluation was completed on 26
March 2026 and was conducted in accordance with the rules of the Canadian Common Criteria
Program.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the Security Target, which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the TOE, and the security functional/assurance
requirements. Consumers are advised to verify that their operating environment is consistent with
that specified in the security target, and to consider the comments, observations, and
recommendations in this Certification Report.
The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, as the Certification Body, declares that this evaluation meets
all the conditions of the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the
product is listed on the Certified Products list for the Canadian Common Criteria Program and the
Common Criteria portal (the official website of the International Common Criteria Program).
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Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is identified as follows:
Table 1: TOE Identification
TOE Name and Version RICOH IM C2510/C3010/C3510/C4510/C6010 Enhanced Security
Firmware, version E-1.00-H
Developer Ricoh Company, Ltd.
See the Evaluated Configuration section for more details on the evaluated configuration of the TOE.
Common Criteria Conformance
The evaluation was conducted using the following methodology:
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, for
conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5
The TOE claims the following conformance:
collaborative Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices Version 1.0E
TOE Description
The TOE is a Digital Multi-Function Printer (MFP), which is an IT device that inputs, stores, and
outputs electronic and hardcopy documents.
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TOE Architecture
A diagram of the TOE architecture is as follows:
TOE Architecture
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Security Policy
The TOE implements and enforces policies pertaining to the following security functionality:
 Security Audit
 Cryptographic Support
 User Data Protection
 Identification and Authentication
 Security Management
 Protection of the TSF
 TOE Access
 Trusted Path/Channels
Complete details of the security functional requirements (SFRs) can be found in the Security Target.
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Cryptographic Functionality
The TOE makes use of the following ACVP/CAVP validated cryptographic implementation(s):
Table 2: Cryptographic Implementation(s)
Cryptographic Implementation Certificate Number
OpenSSL, v1.1.1 A3561
Ricoh Cryptographic Module for IPsec 2, v1.00 A3560
Platform Validation Library for JX3, v1.1 A7739
RICOH Cryptographic Library 3, v3.0 A3557
RICOH RSA Module for U-boot, v1.1.0 A5472
RICOH SHA512 Module for U-boot, v1.1.0 A7731
RICOH Cryptographic Library for Linux Kernel, v1.0.0 A5471
NesLib, v6.5 for ST33 A1288
RICOH Cryptographic Library for ima, v1.1 A7738
Libimaevm, v1.1 A7737
AES256CBC, v MB8AL1062MH-GE1 AES 3921
wolfCrypt, v5.2.1 A4308
Additionally, the TOE uses the following CMVP validated entropy source(s):
Table 3: Entropy Source(s)
Entropy Source Certificate Number
STMicro Trusted Platform Module ST33HTPH2X32AHE4, v1.769 E45
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Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
Consumers of the TOE should consider assumptions about usage and environmental settings as
requirements for the product’s installation and its operating environment. This will ensure the proper
and secure operation of the TOE.
Usage and Environmental Assumptions
The following assumptions are made regarding the use and deployment of the TOE:
 Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it stores or processes, is assumed
to be provided by the environment.
 The Operational Environment is assumed to protect the TOE from direct, public access to its LAN interface.
 TOE Administrators are trusted to administer the TOE according to site security policies.
 Authorized Users are trained to use the TOE according to site security policies.
Clarification of Scope
The following features are excluded from the evaluated configuration:
 USB Port. The MFP has a USB Port that is used to directly connect a client computer to the MFP for
printing. This USB port is disabled during initial installation and configuration of the TOE.
 SD Card Slot. The MFP has two SD Card Slots, one for customer engineers and one for users. The SD Card
Slot for customer engineer is used by customer engineers to install components of the MFP; the SD Card
Slot for users is used by users to print documents. Both are disabled when the TOE is operational, a cover
is placed on the SD Card slot for customer engineer so cards cannot be inserted or removed and the card
slot for users is set to disabled during installation.
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Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration for the TOE comprises:
Table 4: Evaluated Configuration
TOE Software/Firmware Enhanced Security Firmware, version E-1.00-H
TOE Hardware  IM C2510G
 IM C3010G
 IM C3510G
 IM C4510G
 IM C6010G
Environmental Support  Syslog Server
 LDAP Server
 NTP Server
 FTP Server
 SMTP Server
 OCSP Responder
Documentation
The following documents are available to the consumer to assist in the configuration and installation
of the TOE:
a) RICOH IM C2010/C2510/C3010/C3510/C4510/C5510/C6010 Series User Guide, D0E37604-
EN 2024/6 (HTML)
b) RICOH IM C2010/C2510/C3010/C3510/C4510/C5510/C6010 Series User Guide Security
Reference, D0E37534-EN 2023/2 (HTML)
c) RICOH Notes for Enhanced Security Firmware Users, D3QV7501, 2026 (HTML)
d) RICOH IM C2510/C3010/C3510/C4510/C6010 Enhanced Security Firmware, version E-1.00-H
Common Criteria Guide, version 1.0 (PDF)
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Evaluation Analysis Activities
The evaluation activities comprised a structured assessment of the TOE. Documentation and
processes related to Development, Guidance Documentation, and Life-Cycle Support were reviewed
and analyzed.
Development
The evaluators analyzed the documentation provided by the vendor; they determined that the design
completely and accurately describes the TOE security functionality (TSF) interfaces and how the TSF
implements the security functional requirements. The evaluators determined that the initialization
process is secure, that the security functions are protected against tamper and bypass, and that
security domains are maintained.
Guidance Documents
The evaluators examined the TOE preparative user guidance and operational user guidance and
determined that it sufficiently and unambiguously describes how to securely transform the TOE into
its evaluated configuration and how to use and administer the product. The evaluators exercised the
preparative and operational guidance and determined that they are complete and sufficiently detailed
to result in a secure configuration.
Life-Cycle Support
An analysis of the TOE configuration management system and associated documentation was
performed. The evaluators found that the TOE configuration items were clearly marked.
The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it described all the
procedures required to maintain the integrity of the TOE during distribution to the consumer.
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Testing Activities
Testing consists of the following three steps: assessing developer tests, performing independent
tests, and performing a vulnerability analysis.
Assessment of Developer tests
The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by examining their
test evidence, and reviewing their test results, as documented in the Evaluation Test Report (ETR).
The correspondence between the tests identified in the developer’s test documentation and the
functional specification was complete.
Conduct of Testing
The TOE was subjected to a comprehensive suite of formally documented, independent functional
and penetration tests. The detailed testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases,
expected results and observed results are documented in a separate proprietary test results
document.
Independent Testing
During this evaluation, the evaluator developed independent functional & penetration tests by
examining design and guidance documentation.
All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability of the
testing procedures and results. The following testing activities were performed:
a. PP Assurance Activities: The evaluator performed the assurance activities listed in the
claimed PP;
b. Cryptographic Implementation Verification: The evaluator verified that the claimed
cryptographic implementations are present in the TOE.
Independent Testing Results
The testing produced the expected results, supporting the conclusion that the TOE correctly
implements the functional requirements specified in the ST and the TOE functional specification.
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Vulnerability Analysis
The evaluators conducted an independent review of all evaluation evidence, public domain
vulnerability databases, and technical community sources. Additionally, the evaluators used
automated vulnerability scanning tools to discover potential network, platform, and application layer
vulnerabilities. Based upon this review, the evaluators formulated flaw hypotheses, which they used in
their vulnerability analysis.
Public domain searches were conducted on 12 March 2026 and included the following search terms:
TOE Name and Version ARM Cortex-A57 WolfCrypt, v5.2.1
WolfSL, v5.7.6 OpenSSL 1.1.1l Web Image Monitor
NesLib v6.5 Libimaevm, v1.1 Intel Atom x5-E3930
Intel Atom x5-E3940 Intel Atom x5-E3950 Intel Celeron N3350
SecureCore SC300 Platform Validation Library for JX3 MB8AL1062MH-GE1
ST33TPHF2XSPI RICOH
Vulnerability searches were conducted using the following sources:
Vendor Security Advisories:
https://www.ricoh.com/products/security/vulnerabilities
https://www.ricoh.com/info/
NIST National Vulnerabilities Database (NVD):
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search
CISA – Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog:
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)
https://www.cve.org/
WolfSSL
https://www.wolfssl.com/docs/security-vulnerabilities/
https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/blob/master/ChangeLog.md
https://www.wolfssl.com/?s=vulnerability
OpenSSL
https://openssl-library.org/news/vulnerabilities-
1.1.1/
Vulnerability Analysis Results
The vulnerability analysis did not uncover any security relevant residual exploitable vulnerabilities in
the intended operating environment.
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Results of the Evaluation
The Information Technology product identified in this certification report, and its associated
certificate, has been evaluated at an approved testing laboratory established under the Canadian
Centre for Cyber Security. This certification report, and its associated certificate, apply only to the
specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration.
The overall verdict for this evaluation is PASS. These results are supported by evidence in the ETR.
Recommendations/Comments
It is recommended that all guidance be followed to configure the TOE in the evaluated configuration.
The TOE is a high-quality multi-function print, copy, fax and scanning device with security features
consistent with the collaborative Protection Profile it claims conformance with. Of particular note, the
evaluator found that RICOH is a highly mature organization operating with integrity in regard to
Common Criteria: they value the process and the results.
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Supporting Content
List of Abbreviations
Term Definition
ACVP Automated Cryptographic Validation Protocol
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CCTL Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSE Communications Security Establishment
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ESV Entropy Source Validation
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
PP Protection Profile
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Function
References
Reference
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5.
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM,
Version 3.1 Revision 5.
Security Target RICOH IM C2510/C3010/C3510/C4510/C6010 Enhanced Security
Firmware, version E-1.00-H, 2026-03-17, v1.0.
Evaluation Technical Report RICOH IM C2510/C3010/C3510/C4510/C6010
Enhanced Security Firmware, version E-1.00-H, 2026-03-26, v1.1.
Assurance Activity Report RICOH IM C2510/C3010/C3510/C4510/C6010 Enhanced
Security Firmware, version E-1.00-H, 2026-03-26, v1.1.