BSI-DSZ-CC-1102-V2-2025
for
IFX_CCI_001Fh, IFX_CCI_002Fh, IFX_CCI_0030h,
IFX_CCI_0033h, IFX_CCI_0035h, IFX_CCI_0036h,
IFX_CCI_0038h in the design steps S11 and M11
with software libraries: HSL v2.62.7626 (optional)
and UMSLC v01.00.0234, with specific IC-
dedicated firmware (BOS and Flash Loader)
from
Infineon Technologies AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.48
BSI-DSZ-CC-1102-V2-2025 (*)
Smartcard Controller
IFX_CCI_001Fh, IFX_CCI_002Fh, IFX_CCI_0030h, IFX_CCI_0033h,
IFX_CCI_0035h, IFX_CCI_0036h, IFX_CCI_0038h in the design steps
S11 and M11 with software libraries: HSL v2.62.7626 (optional) and
UMSLC v01.00.0234, with specific IC-dedicated firmware (BOS and
Flash Loader)
from Infineon Technologies AG
PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile with
Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13 January
2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
valid until: 19 February 2030
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), CEM:2022
extended by Scheme Interpretations, by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), CC:2022. CC and
CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 20 February 2025
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Director-General
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1102-V2-2025
This page is intentionally left blank.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1102-V2-2025 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification.....................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication...................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary...................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy...........................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................14
5. Architectural Information............................................................................................15
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................15
7. IT Product Testing......................................................................................................15
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................16
9. Results of the Evaluation...........................................................................................17
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................22
11. Security Target.........................................................................................................23
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................23
13. Definitions................................................................................................................23
14. Bibliography.............................................................................................................25
C. Excerpts from the Criteria.............................................................................................27
D. Annexes........................................................................................................................ 28
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1102-V2-2025
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs 3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat (Federal
Ministry of the Interior and Community)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), CC:2022 [1] also published as ISO/IEC
15408
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1102-V2-2025 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), CEM:2022 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2 and ALC_FLR components.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1102-V2-2025
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product IFX_CCI_001Fh, IFX_CCI_002Fh, IFX_CCI_0030h, IFX_CCI_0033h,
IFX_CCI_0035h, IFX_CCI_0036h, IFX_CCI_0038h in the design steps S11 and M11 with
software libraries: HSL v2.62.7626 (optional) and UMSLC v01.00.0234, with specific IC-
dedicated firmware (BOS and Flash Loader) has undergone the certification procedure at
BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-1102-2019. Specific results from the
evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-1102-2019 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product IFX_CCI_001Fh, IFX_CCI_002Fh, IFX_CCI_0030h,
IFX_CCI_0033h, IFX_CCI_0035h, IFX_CCI_0036h, IFX_CCI_0038h in the design steps
S11 and M11 with software libraries: HSL v2.62.7626 (optional) and UMSLC v01.00.0234,
with specific IC-dedicated firmware (BOS and Flash Loader) was conducted by TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 17 February 2025. TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)4
recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Infineon Technologies AG.
The product was developed by: Infineon Technologies AG.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
4
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1102-V2-2025 Certification Report
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 20 February
2025 is valid until 19 February 2030. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product IFX_CCI_001Fh, IFX_CCI_002Fh, IFX_CCI_0030h, IFX_CCI_0033h,
IFX_CCI_0035h, IFX_CCI_0036h, IFX_CCI_0038h in the design steps S11 and M11 with
software libraries: HSL v2.62.7626 (optional) and UMSLC v01.00.0234, with specific IC-
dedicated firmware (BOS and Flash Loader) has been included in the BSI list of certified
products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]).
Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer5
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
5
Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1-15
85579 Neubiberg
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1102-V2-2025
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1102-V2-2025 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller)
IFX_CCI_001Fh, IFX_CCI_002Fh, IFX_CCI_0030h, IFX_CCI_0033h, IFX_CCI_0035h,
IFX_CCI_0036h, IFX_CCI_0038h in the design steps S11 and M11 with software libraries:
HSL v2.62.7626 (optional) and UMSLC v01.00.0234, with specific IC-dedicated firmware
(BOS and Flash Loader) as well as User Guidance.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages
Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and
some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF_DPM Device Phase Management
SF_PS Protection against Snooping
SF_PMA Protection against Modifying Attacks
SF_PLA Protection against Logical Attacks
SF_CS Cryptographic Support
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 3.1.2. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [9], chapter 3.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1102-V2-2025
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
IFX_CCI_001Fh, IFX_CCI_002Fh, IFX_CCI_0030h, IFX_CCI_0033h, IFX_CCI_0035h,
IFX_CCI_0036h, IFX_CCI_0038h in the design steps S11 and M11 with software
libraries: HSL v2.62.7626 (optional) and UMSLC v01.00.0234, with specific IC-
dedicated firmware (BOS and Flash Loader)
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW/SW IFX_CCI_001Fh, IFX_CCI_002Fh,
IFX_CCI_0030h, IFX_CCI_0033h,
IFX_CCI_0035h, IFX_CCI_0036h,
IFX_CCI_0038h
S11 and M11
(produced in
Singapore)
Plain wafers in an IC case or in
bare dies.
2 FW Flash Loader v8.07.007 Located at the end of User NVM
for non-blocked derivatives.
3 DOC BOS FW identifier:
80.304.01.0
Stored in IFX ROM region on IC
(BOS Patch Area in IFX region
on NVM).
4 SW HSL library (optional) v2.62.7626 Secure download (object
code) via ishare.
(optional)
5 SW UMSLC library v01.00.0234 Secured download
(PDF) via ishare
6 DOC 32-bit Security Controller – V15,
Hardware Reference Manual
Secured download
(PDF) via ishare
7 DOC SLx1/SLx3 (40 nm) security
controllers, Programmer’s
Reference Manual, SLCx7_DFP
Secured download
(PDF) via ishare
8 DOC 32-bit Security Controller – V15,
Security Guidelines
Secured download
(PDF) via ishare
9 DOC Production and personalization, 32-
bit Arm-based security controller
Secured download
(PDF) via ishare
10 DOC HSL library for SLCx7 in 40nm
(optional)
Secured download of
compiled html help
(chm) file via ishare.
(optional)
11 DOC UMSLC library for SLCx7 in 40nm,
Version 01.00.0234
Secured download of
compiled html help
(chm) file via ishare.
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The individual TOE hardware is uniquely identified by its identification data.
As the TOE is under control of the user software, the TOE manufacturer can only
guarantee the integrity up to the delivery procedure. It is in the responsibility of the
composite product manufacturer to include mechanisms in the implemented software
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1102-V2-2025 Certification Report
(developed by the IC embedded software developer) which allows detection of
modifications after the delivery.
In detail, regarding identification:
The hardware part of the TOE is identified by its Common Criteria Identifiers (CCI)
IFX_CCI_001Fh, IFX_CCI_002Fh, IFX_CCI_0030h, IFX_CCI_0033h, IFX_CCI_0035h,
IFX_CCI_0036h, IFX_CCI_0038h and the design steps S11 and M11. The complete chip
identification data is accessible via the Generic Chip Identification Mode (GCIM). The
Generic Chip Identification Mode (GCIM) can be activated after power-on with a dedicated
signalling sequence and is also accessible by the user software. This GCIM outputs
amongst other identifiers for the platform, chip mode, ROM code, chip type, design step,
fabrication facility, wafer, die position, firmware, temperature range, system frequency and
the CCI. The interpretation of the chip identification data is described in [HRM, 4.6.2].
Additionally, the customer can identify the present configuration by reading the relevant
data in the IFX-Mailbox Area (see [13] section 8.10]).
Several bytes of the GCIM include the Common Criteria Certification Identifier, which can
be used to uniquely identify the certified TOE. These identifiers reflect the name of the
TOE as given in the ST. Note, that these identifiers are used by the developer only for this
TOE and reflect the same underlying basic hardware.
In addition to the hardware part, the TOE consists of firmware parts and software parts:
The firmware part of the TOE is identified also via the GCIM. The versions for the
individual firmware parts can be mapped as well as the hardware.
The UMSLC library and HSL (optional), as separate software parts of the TOE, are
identified by their unique version numbers. The user can identify these versions by
calculating the hash signatures of the provided library files. The mapping of these hash
signatures to the version numbers is provided in [6] and [9] section 9 -10.
“TOE Delivery” is uniquely used to indicate
● after Phase 3 (or before Phase 4) if the TOE is delivered in form of wafers or sawn
wafers (dice) or
● after Phase 4 (or before Phase 5) if the TOE is delivered in form of packaged products.
Therefore three different delivering procedures have to be taken into consideration:
● Delivery of the IC dedicated software components (IC dedicated SW, guidance) from the
TOE manufacturer to the IC embedded software developer.
● Delivery of the IC embedded software (ROM / Flash data, initialisation and pre-
personalization data, Bundle Business package) from the IC embedded software
developer to the TOE manufacturer.
● Delivery of the final TOE from the TOE manufacturer to the composite product
manufacturer. After phase 3 the TOE is delivered in form of wafers or sawn wafers, after
phase 4 in form of modules (with or without inlay antenna).
The TOE is delivered via the logistics sites:
● DHL Singapore,
● KWE Shanghai,
● K&N Großostheim (Distribution Center Europe).
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1102-V2-2025
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The Security Policy of the TOE is to provide basic security functionalities to be used by the
smart card operating system and the smart card application, thus providing an overall
smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will provide a True Random Number
Generator (TRNG).
The optional HSL provides functionality via APIs to the Smartcard Embedded Software,
which contains SOLID FLASH™️ NVM service routines and functionality for tearing-safe
programming of SOLID FLASH™️NVM.
The UMSLC library provides a wrapper around the UMSLC hardware functionality with
some software measures to counter fault attacks.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to
provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of
cryptographic functions performed by the TOE), against physical probing, against
malfunctions, against physical manipulations and against abuse of functionality. Hence the
TOE shall
● maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the TOE,
and
● maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security
functionalities (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the TOE.
Specific details concerning the above-mentioned security policies can be found in Chapter
7 of the Security Target [6] and [9].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
The objective OE.Resp-Appl states that the IC embedded software developer shall treat
user data (especially keys) of the composite product appropriately. The IC embedded
software developer gets sufficient information on how to protect user data adequately in
the security guidelines [14].
The ST includes multiple objectives for the composite product manufacturer.
The objective OE.Process-Sec-IC requires the protection of the TOE, as well as of its
manufacturing and test data up to the delivery to the end-consumer. As described in [6]
and [9] section 1.5.5, the TOE can be delivered to the composite product manufacturer
after phase 3or after phase 4 (as complete modules, plain wafers, bare dies, in any IC
case, or in any type of package). However, the single chips are identical in all cases. This
means that the test mode is deactivated, and the TOE is locked into user mode. Therefore,
it is not necessary to distinguish between these forms of delivery. Since Infineon has no
information about the security requirements of the implemented IC embedded software, it
is not possible to define any concrete security requirements for the environment of the
composite product manufacturer.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1102-V2-2025 Certification Report
The objective OE.TOE_Auth requires that the environment must support the authentication
and verification mechanism and must know the corresponding authentication reference
data. The composite product manufacturer receives sufficient information about the
authentication mechanism in [15] chapter 3.
The objective OE.Lim_Block_Loader requires the composite product manufacturer to
protect the loader against misuse, to limit the capability of the loader and to terminate the
loader irreversibly after the intended usage. The permanent deactivation of the Flash
Loader is described in [15] section 3.6 / 4.5.1.3.
The objective OE.Secure_Delivery is only applicable in case the TOE is ordered with a
(temporarily) deactivated Flash Loader. In this case, the customer is required to implement
mechanisms to prevent attacks during TOE transport as required by the security needs of
the loaded IC Embedded Software. This requirement is provided to the user as part of [15]
chapter 3:
● On delivery, if the application is active, then the application is responsible for transport
protection
As Infineon has no information about the security requirements of the implemented IC
embedded software, it is not possible for the guidance to define any concrete security
requirements for the environment of the IC Embedded Software Developer or Composite
Product Manufacturer.
The objective OE.Flashing_Secured_Env requires the user to perform flashing and
successful TOE authentication using the TOE’s Flash Loader in a secure environment. The
user is made aware of the presence of this security objective for the operational
environment in the user guidance in [PPM, 1.3]. There it is stated that only certain Flash
Loader versions claim compliance to the Loader Package 2 as defined in the PP for
loading in insecure environments. The user should refer to the applicable certificate and
Security Target to identify whether this is the case for the present TOE. The ST of the
current TOE does not contain this package claim.
5. Architectural Information
Detailed information in the TOE architecture is to be found in [6] and [9] sections 1.3 and
1.4.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The developers’ testing effort can be summarised in the way described in the following:
TOE test configuration: The tests are performed with the TOE and a simulator.
Developer’s testing: All TSFs and related security mechanisms, subsystems and modules
are tested in order to assure complete coverage of all SFRs.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1102-V2-2025
Different classes of developer tests are performed to test the TOE in a sufficient manner:
● Simulation Tests,
● Qualification Tests / Software Verification,
● Verification Tests,
● Security Evaluation Tests,
● Production Tests.
The evaluator’s testing effort can be summarized in the way described in the following:
The evaluator's objective regarding this aspect was to test the functionality of the TOE,
and to verify the developer's test results by repeating developer's tests and to add
independent tests.
In the course of the evaluation of the TOE the following classes of tests were carried out:
● Module tests,
● Simulation tests,
● Emulation tests,
● Tests in user mode,
● Tests in test mode,
● Hardware tests.
With these kinds of tests, the entire security functionality of the TOE was tested by the
ITSEF.
The penetration testing was partially performed using the developer’s testing environment,
partially using the test environment of the evaluation body.
All configurations of the TOE being intended to be covered by the current evaluation were
tested.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results; moreover, no attack scenario with the attack potential high was actually
successful.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
Smartcard IC IFX_CCI_001Fh, IFX_CCI_002Fh, IFX_CCI_0030h, IFX_CCI_0033h,
IFX_CCI_0035h, IFX_CCI_0036h, IFX_CCI_0038h S11 and M11 (Singapore).
Hardware configuration:
The hardware of the TOE can be ordered with different SOLID FLASHTM
and RAM sizes
(up to 240 kB SOLID FLASH™️and up to 12 kB RAM). The configuration (as listed in [6]
and [9], Table 3) can be done during the manufacturing process of the TOE according to
the choice of the user.
Firmware configuration:
The firmware of the TOE comprises the BOS (FW identifier provided in Table 4) and the
Flash Loader (version provided in Table 4). The latter can be configured in three different
ways as outlined in the following:
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1102-V2-2025 Certification Report
● Option 1: The user or/and a subcontractor downloads the software into the SOLID
FLASH™ memory. Infineon Technologies does not receive any user software.
• Flash Loader can be activated or reactivated by the user or subcontractor to download
software into the SOLID FLASH™ memory.
● Option 2: The user provides software to download into the SOLID FLASH™ memory to
Infineon Technologies AG. The software is loaded into the SOLID FLASH™ memory
during chip production.
• No Flashloader present.
● Option 3: The user provides software to download into the SOLID FLASH™ memory to
Infineon Technologies AG. The software is loaded into the NVM memory during chip
production.
• Flash Loader is blocked by Infineon but can be activated or reactivated by the user or
subcontractor to download software into the SOLID FLASH™ memory. The user is
required to provide a reactivation procedure as part of the software to Infineon
Technologies AG
An overview about the different Flash Loader options is also given in [6] and [9] (section
1.4.8).
Optional software libraries:
Based on the library selection, the TOE can be delivered with or without the functionality of
the HSL. This is considered in the developer documentation and corresponding notes are
added where required.
If the user decides not to use the HSL, it is not delivered to the user and the accompanying
additional specific security functionality as listed in Table 9 is not provided by the TOE.
Upon deselection of a library, the code implementing the functionality is excluded and thus
this functionality is not available to the user.
Excluding the code of the deselected functionality has no impact on any other security
policy of the TOE; it is exactly equivalent to the situation where the user decides just not to
use this functionality.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 1, Durchführung
der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers, Version 14, 2017-
10-11,
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1102-V2-2025
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 14, Anforderungen
an Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical Report) für Evaluationen nach
CC (Common Criteria), Version 7, 2010-08-03,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 19, Anforderungen
an Aufbau und Inhalt der Zusammenfassung des ETR (Evaluation Technical Report) für
Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria), Version 9, 2014-11-03,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 20,
Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-05-15,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 20 DEV EV,
Developer evidence for the evaluation of a deterministic random number generator,
Version 0.9, 2013-02-28,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 20 EVL-DRNG,
Evaluation Report as part of the Evaluation Technical Report, Part B – ETR-Part
Deterministic Random Number Generator, Template-Version 0.10, 2013-02-28
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 23,
Zusammentragen von Nachweisen der Entwickler, Version 4, 2017-03-15,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 23 CCDB-CDE, CC
Supporting Document Guidance – Collection of Developer Evidence, Version 1.5, 2012-
04, CCDB-2012-04-005
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 23 JIL-CDE,
Collection of Developer Evidence, Version 1.5, 2012-01, Joint Interpretation Library.
● Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 25, Anwendungen der
CC auf integrierte Schaltungen, Version 9, 2017-03-15,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS25_CCDB-HW-
ADV-ARC_App1, CC Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document – Security
Architecture requirements (ADV_ARC) for smart cards and similar devices, Version 2.1,
2014-04, CCDB-2014-04-001,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS25_CCDB-HW-IC-
CC, CC Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document – The Application of CC
to Integrated Circuits, Version 3.0, 2009-03, CCDB-2009-03-002,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS25_JIL-HW-ADV-
ARC_App1, Joint Interpretation Library – Security Architecture requirements
(ADV_ARC) for smart cards and similar devices – Appendix 1, Version 2.0, 2012-01
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS25_JIL-HW-IC-CC,
Joint Interpretation Library – The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits, Version 4.0,
2024-04,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS25_JIL-SecReq-
CodeLoad, Joint Interpretation Library – Security requirements for post-delivery code
loading, Version 1.0, 2016-02, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 26,
Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware Integrierte Schaltungen, Version 10, 2017-07-
03,
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● Auswahl geeigneter Chips für DPA-Messungen, Version 1.1, 2008-12-07, AIS26_BSI-
ADPA-SC,Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik,
● Special Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 1.4, 2011-06-08,
● CC Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document – Requirements to perform
Integrated Circuit Evaluations, Version 1.1, 2013-05, CCDB-2013-05-001
● Joint Interpretation Library – Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards and Similar
Devices, Version 3.2.1, 2024-02, AIS26_JIL-AP-SC,Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik.
● Joint Interpretation Library – Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices,
Version 2.5 (confidential), 2022-05, AIS26_JIL-ATT-SC, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik.
● Joint Interpretation Library – Requirements to perform Integrated Circuit Evaluations,
Version 1.1, 2013-02, AIS26_JIL-IC-EVL,Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik.
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 27, Transition from
ITSEC to CC, Version 5, 2010-08-17, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik.
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 31,
Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-05-15,
● Developer evidence for the evaluation of a physical true random generator, Version 0.8,
2013-02-28, AIS31_DEV-EV,Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
● Evaluation Report as part of the Evaluation Technical Report, Part B – ETR-Part True
Physical and Hybrid Random Number Generator, Template-Version 0.7, 2013-02-28,
AIS31_EVL-PTRNG, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 32, CC-
Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema, Version 7, 2011-06-08,
● Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 34, Evaluation
Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ (CC v2.3 & v3.1) and EAL6 (CC
v3.1), Version 3, 2009-09-03,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 35, Öffentliche
Fassung eines Security Target (ST-lite), Version 2, 2007-11-12,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 36,
Kompositionsevaluierung, Version 5, 2017-03-15,
● CC Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document – Composite product
evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices, Version 1.4, 2015-12, AIS36_CCDB-
COMP, CCDB-2015-12-001,
● CC Supporting Document Guidance – ETR template for composite evaluation of Smart
Cards and similar devices, Version 1.1, 2015-12, AIS36_CCDB-COMP-ETR, CCDB-
2015-12-002,
● Joint Interpretation Library – Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar
devices, Version 1.6, 2024-04, AIS36_JIL-COMP, Joint Interpretation Working Group,
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● CC Supporting Document Guidance – ETR template for composite evaluation of Smart
Cards and similar devices, Version 1.2, 2024-04, AIS36_JIL-COMP-ETR,Joint
Interpretation Working Group,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 37, Terminologie
und Vorbereitung von Smartcard-Evaluierungen, Version 3, 2010-05-17,
● CC Supporting Document Guidance – Smartcard Evaluation, Version 2.0, 2010-02,
AIS37_CCDB-SC-EVALCCDB-2010-03-001,
● Joint Interpretation Library – Guidance for smartcard evaluation, Version 3.0, 2024-04,
AIS37_JIL-SC-EVAL, Joint Interpretation Working Group,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 38, Reuse of
evaluation results, Version 2, 2007-09-28,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 39, Formal
Methods, Version 3, 2008-10-24, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 40, Use of
Interpretation for Security Evaluation and Certification of Digital Tachographs, Version 1,
2005-06-28, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik,
● Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 41, Guidelines for PPs
and STs, Version 2, 2011-01-31,AIS41_PP-ST-2,
● Guidance Document – The PP/ST Guide, Version 2, Revision 0, 2010-08, Bundesamt
für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 46, Informationen
zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und ergänzende Hinweise für die
Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-12-04,
● Guidelines for Evaluating Machine-Learning based Side-Channel Attack Resistances,
Version 2024-01, 2024-02-29, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik,
● Review-Protokoll zum (Krypto-)AVA-KickOff, 2019-08-23, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in
der Informationstechnik,
● Guidelines for Evaluating Side-Channel and Fault Attack Resistance of Elliptic Curve
Implementations, Version 3.0, 2024-02-29, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik,
● Guidelines for Evaluating Side-Channel-Attack Resistance of RSA, DSA and Diffie-
Hellman Key Exchange Implementations, Version 2024-01, 2024-02-29, Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) - AIS 47, Regelungen zu
Site Certification, Version 1.1, 2013-12-04
● Guidance for Site Certification, Version 1.1, 2013-12-04, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik, AIS47 SC-GD,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 48, Anforderungen
an die Prüfung von Sicherheitsetiketten, Version 1.0, 2015-04-30, Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 48, Anforderungen
an die Prüfung von Sicherheitsetiketten, Version 1.0, 2015-04-30, Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik,
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● Joint Interpretation Library – Assurance Continuity - Practical Cases for Smart Cards
and similar devices, Version 1.1, 2024-04, Joint Interpretation Working Group, JIL-
AssCont,
● Joint Interpretation Library – Assurance Continuity - Practical Cases for Smart Cards
and similar devices, Version 1.1, 2024-04, Joint Interpretation Working Group, JIL-
MSSR,
● Joint Interpretation Library – Remaining Strength of Asymmetric Cryptographic
Mechanisms after Partial Key Leakage, Version 1.0 (confidential), 2020-06, Joint
Interpretation Working Group,JIL-SoACM,
● A proposal for: Functionality classes for random number generators, Version 2.0, 2011-
09-18, W. Killmann, W. Schindler, T-Systems GEI GmbH and Bundesamt für Sicherheit
in der Informationstechnik, KS2011
are considered.
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20/31 was used (see [4]).
To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite
evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this
platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on
top.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 5 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-1102-2019, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on the transition from CCv3.1 to
CC:2022, the scope limitation of software libraries, the changes on the security target and
the guidance documentation on HRM[12], PRM[13], SEC[14], PPM[15] and HSL[16] where
also within the scope of the evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation
Packages Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-
2014 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
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9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 120 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The following table gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to
enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from cryptographic point of view. Any
Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 120 Bits' of the
following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 120 Bits (in general context)
only. Note that the column “Security Level” given in table 7 refers to the pure cryptographic
(mathematical) strength only, and does not take into account whatever exploitable
weaknesses induced by side-channel leakage, physical attacks, or implementation flaws of
any kind.
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Security Level
above 120 Bits
Comments
1 Cryptographic
Primitive
Physical True RNG
PTG.2
[AIS31] (proprietary) N/A N/A -
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
Some security measures are partly implemented in this certified TOE, but require
additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by a product layer on
top, e.g. the Embedded Software using the TOE. For this reason the TOE includes
guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains obligations and guidelines for the
developer of the product layer on top on how to securely use this certified TOE and which
measures have to be implemented in order to fulfil the security requirements of the
Security Target of the TOE. In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or
system it must be examined if the required measures have been correctly and effectively
implemented by the product layer on top. Additionally, the evaluation of the composite
product or system must also consider the evaluation results as outlined in the document
"ETR for composite evaluation" [10].
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At the point in time when evaluation and certification results are reused there might be an
update of the document "ETR for composite evaluation" available. Therefore, the certified
products list on the BSI website has to be checked for latest information on
reassessments, recertifications or maintenance result available for the product.
The Security IC Embedded Software Developer receives all necessary recommendations
and hints to develop their software in form of the delivered documentation.
● All security hints described in the delivered documents SEC[14], HRM[12], PRM[15],
HSL_API [16], and UMSLC_API[17] must be considered.
The Composite Product Manufacturer receives all necessary recommendations and hints
to develop their software in form of the delivered documentation.
● All security hints described in PPM[15] must be considered.
In addition the following hint resulting from the evaluation of the ALC evaluation aspect
must be considered:
● The IC Embedded Software Developer can deliver their software either to Infineon to let
them implement it in the TOE (in the Flash memory) or to the Composite Product
Manufacturer to let them download the software into the Flash memory.
● The TOE does not claim conformance to “Package 2: Loader dedicated for usage by
authorized users only” of PP [8], section 7.3.2 and must thus be personalized in a
secure environment
● The delivery procedure from the IC Embedded Software Developer to the Composite
Product Manufacturer is not part of this evaluation. If the flashloader is deactivated a
secure delivery is required.
● The delivery procedure from the TOE manufacturer (IFX) to the composite product
manufacturer is not part of this evaluation. However, for security reasons, a form of
transport protection might be required depending on the order option (see Section 2.1
for details). The applied transport protection mechanisms must be considered during the
composite evaluation considering the security needs of any pre-loaded IC Embedded
Software that is active during delivery.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
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BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
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Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation/CC
ISO-Version:
ISO 15408:2022, Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
- Part 1: Introduction and general model
- Part 2: Security functional components
- Part 3: Security assurance components
- Part 4: Framework for the specification of evaluation methods and activities
- Part 5: Pre-defined packages of security requirements
https://www.iso.org/standard/72891.html
https://www.iso.org/standard/72892.html
https://www.iso.org/standard/72906.html
https://www.iso.org/standard/72913.html
https://www.iso.org/standard/72917.html
CCRA-Version:
CC:2022 R1, Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
- Part 1: Introduction and general model
- Part 2: Security functional components
- Part 3: Security assurance components
- Part 4: Framework for the specification of evaluation methods and activities
- Part 5: Pre-defined packages of security requirement
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Gemeinsame Evaluationsmethodologie für die Prüfung und Bewertung der
Sicherheit von Informationstechnik (Common Methodology for Information
Technology Security Evaluation (CEM), Evaluation Methodology
ISO-Version:
ISO 18045:2022: Information technology Security techniques Methodology for IT
security evaluation
https://www.iso.org/standard/72889.html
CCRA-Version:
CEM:2022 R1, Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE6
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
6
specifically
• see chapter 9.1
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[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1102-V2-2025, Version 2.9, 2025-01-09,
IFX_CCI_001Fh, IFX_CCI_002Fh, IFX_CCI_0030h,IFX_CCI_0033h,
IFX_CCI_0035h, IFX_CCI_0036h,IFX_CCI_0038h S11 and M11 Security Target,
Infineon Technologies AG e (confidential document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1, Date 2025-01-14, Document Title, Lab-
Name, (confidential document)
[8] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13
January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
[9] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1102-V2-2025, Version 2.9, 2025-01-09,
IFX_CCI_001Fh, IFX_CCI_002Fh, IFX_CCI_0030h,IFX_CCI_0033h,
IFX_CCI_0035h, IFX_CCI_0036h,IFX_CCI_0038h S11 and M11 Security Target
Lite, Infineon Technologies AG (sanitised public document)
[10] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 for BSI-DSZ-CC-1102-V2-2025,
Version 1, 2025-01-14, EVALUATION TECHNICAL REPORT FOR COMPOSITE
EVALUATION (ETR_COMP), TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential
document)
[11] Configuration list for the TOE, Version 1.2, 2024-11-11, Configuration Management
Scope (confidential document)
[12] Hardware Reference Manual, Version 4.3, 2020-02-10, 32-bit Security Controller –
V15, Hardware Reference Manual Guidance documentation for the TOE, Infineon
Technologies AG
[13] Programmers Reference Manual, Version 5.8, 2024-05-24, SLx1/SLx3 (40 nm)
security controllers, Programmer’s Reference Manual, SLCx7_DFP, Infineon
Technologies AG
[14] Security Guidelines, Version 1.00-2689, 2020-11-05, 32-bit Security Controller –
V15, Security Guidelines, Infineon Technologies AG
[15] Production and personalization Manual, Version 3.6, 2024-12-16, Production and
personalization, 32-bit Arm-based security controller, Infineon Technologies AG
[16] HSL Library, Version 02.62.7626, 2020-12-17, HSL library for SLCx7 in 40nm
Infineon Technologies AG
[17] UMSLC Library Manual, Version 1.1, 2018-05-23, UMSLC library for SLCx7 in
40nm, Infineon Technologies AG
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria in its CCRA Documents can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC:2022 part 1 chapter
10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC:2022
Part 3 chapter 6.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to
CCRA CC:2022 Part 5.
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC:2022 Part 3
chapter 9
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC:2022 Part 3 chapters 7 to 15
• The table 1 in CC:2022 part 5, Chapter 4.2 summarizes the relationship between
the evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published as the CCRA Version at
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/index.cfm
The CC are published as the ISO/IEC Version at
https://standards.iso.org/ittf/PubliclyAvailableStandards/index.html
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1102-V2-2025
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product IFX_CCI_001Fh, IFX_CCI_002Fh, IFX_CCI_0030h, IFX_CCI_0033h,
IFX_CCI_0035h, IFX_CCI_0036h, IFX_CCI_0038h in the design steps S11 and M11 with
software libraries: HSL v2.62.7626 (optional) and UMSLC v01.00.0234, with specific IC-
dedicated firmware (BOS and Flash Loader) (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been
evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (CEM), CEM:2022 extended by Scheme Interpretations by advice of
the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), CC:2022.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 20 February 2025, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.5,
ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.2)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE.
The relevant delivery sites are as follows:
Site ID Company name and address
DHL Singapore DHL Supply Chain Singapore Pte Ltd., Advanced
Regional Center
Tampines LogisPark
1 Greenwich Drive
Singapore 533865
KWE Shanghai KWE Kintetsu World Express (China) Co., Ltd.
Shanghai Pudong Airport Pilot Free Trade Zone
No. 530 Zheng Ding Road
Shanghai,
P.R. China
K&N Großostheim Kühne & Nagel
Stockstädter Strasse 10
63762 Großostheim
Germany
Tabelle 4: TOE Delivery / Distribution Sites
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
Note: End of report
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