Cisco Confidential
National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Cisco ASA 9.20 on Firepower 2100 Series
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11494-2024
Dated: November 14, 2024
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, Suite 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Chris Thorpe
Jenn Dotson
Linda Morrison
Lisa Mitchell
Lori Sarem
Randy Heimann
Sheldon Durrant
The MITRE Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Ryan Hagedorn
Cornelius Haley
Will Micknick
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 2
3 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 3
3.1 TOE Description................................................................................................. 3
3.2 TOE Evaluated Platforms ................................................................................... 3
3.3 TOE Architecture................................................................................................ 3
3.4 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................ 4
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 5
4.1 Security audit ...................................................................................................... 5
4.2 Cryptographic support ........................................................................................ 5
4.3 Full Residual Information protection.................................................................. 5
4.4 Identification and authentication......................................................................... 5
4.5 Security management.......................................................................................... 6
4.6 Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................... 6
4.7 TOE access.......................................................................................................... 6
4.8 Trusted path/channels ......................................................................................... 7
4.9 Filtering............................................................................................................... 7
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope ....................................................................... 8
6 Documentation............................................................................................................ 9
7 IT Product Testing ...................................................................................................... 9
7.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................... 9
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................... 9
8 Evaluated Configuration............................................................................................. 9
9 Results of the Evaluation .......................................................................................... 10
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE).......................................................... 11
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV) ............................................................ 11
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)............................................... 11
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC) ................................... 11
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ............... 12
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)....................................................... 12
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results........................................................................ 12
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations .............................................................. 13
11 Annexes................................................................................................................. 13
12 Security Target...................................................................................................... 13
13 Glossary ................................................................................................................ 13
14 Bibliography ......................................................................................................... 14
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Cisco ASA 9.20 on Firepower 2100 Series
solution provided by Cisco Systems, Inc. It presents the evaluation results, their
justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report (VR) is not an
endorsement of the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government, and no
warranty is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, MD, United States of America, and was
completed in November 2024. The information in this report is largely derived from the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer
Security Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part
2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements of the PP-
Configuration for Network Devices, Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, and Virtual Private
Network Gateways, Version 1.3, 18 August 2023 (CFG_NDcPP-FW-VPNGW_v1.3) which
includes the Base PP: collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e,
23 March 2020 (NDcPP22e) with the PP-Module for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls,
Version 1.4 + Errata 20200625, 25 June 2020 (STFFW14e), and the PP-Module for VPN
Gateways, Version 1.3, 25 August 2023 (VPNGW13).
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances (ASA) 9.20 on
Firepower 2100 Series.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5). This Validation Report applies only to the specific
version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the
provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) and
the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) are
consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in
the Security Target (ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing
laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are
correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Cisco ASA 9.20 on
Firepower 2100 Series Security Target, version 1.0, November 7, 2024 and analysis
performed by the Validation Team.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products
List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile (PP) to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Cisco ASA 9.20 on Firepower 2100 Series
(Specific models identified in Section 8)
Protection Profile PP-Configuration for Network Devices, Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, and
Virtual Private Network Gateways, Version 1.3, 18 August 2023 (CFG_NDcPP-
FW-VPNGW_v1.3) which includes the Base PP: collaborative Protection Profile
for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 23 March 2020 (NDcPP22e) with the PP-
Module for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, Version 1.4 + Errata 20200625, 25
June 2020 (STFFW14e), and the PP-Module for VPN Gateways, Version 1.3, 25
August 2023 (VPNGW13)
ST Cisco ASA 9.20 on Firepower 2100 Series Security Target, version 1.0,
November 7, 2024
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances (ASA) 9.20
on Firepower 2100 Series, November 7, 2024
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor Cisco Systems, Inc.
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Item Identifier
Developer Cisco Systems, Inc.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
CCEVS Validators The MITRE Corporation
3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Cisco Firepower 2100 Series Appliances. The Cisco
Firepower 2100 Series Appliances are purpose-built, firewall platforms with VPN
capabilities.
3.1 TOE Description
The TOE is comprised of both software and hardware. The model is comprised of the
following: FP2110, FP2120, FP2130 and FP2140. The software is comprised of the ASA
software image Release 9.20. The ASA software provides all firewall and VPN
functionality.
The Cisco Firepower Appliances that comprise the TOE have common hardware
characteristics. On the other hand, the differing characteristics affect only non-TSF relevant
functionality (such as throughput, processing speed, number and type of network connections
supported, number of concurrent connections supported, and amount of storage) and
therefore support security equivalency of the ASAs in terms of hardware.
3.2 TOE Evaluated Platforms
Detail regarding the evaluated configuration is provided in Section 8 below.
3.3 TOE Architecture
The TOE consists of one or more physical devices. Each physical device includes the Cisco
ASA software. Each instantiation of the TOE has two or more network interfaces and can
filter IP traffic to and through those interfaces.
If the TOE is to be remotely administered, the management station must connect using
SSHv2. It can also be administered through the ASDM. ASDM is a graphical user interface
(GUI) tool that allows administrators to manage and configure Cisco ASA, the firewall
features associated with them and setting up VPN connections. The ASDM provides an
interface that helps with the setup, management, and monitoring of network security policies,
VPNs, and other features of the Cisco ASA devices. When ASDM is used, a remote
workstation with a TLS-enabled browser must be available. Cisco ASDM is typically
accessed through the web browser by connecting to the ASA device's IP address.
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A syslog server can also be used to store audit records, and the syslog server must support
syslog over TLS or IPsec. The TOE is able to filter connections to/from these external
entities using its IP traffic filtering and can encrypt traffic where necessary using TLS and/or
IPsec.
3.4 Physical Boundaries
The following figure provides a visual depiction of an example TOE deployment. The TOE
boundaries are surrounded by a hashed red line.
Example TOE Deployment
The previous figure includes the following:
• Several examples of TOE Models
• VPN Peer (Operational Environment) or another instance of the TOE
• VPN Peer (Operational Environment) with an IPsec VPN Client
• Management Workstation (Operational Environment) with ASDM and SSH Client
• Remote Authentication Server (Operational Environment)
• Peer CA (Operational Environment)
• Syslog server (Operational Environment)
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4 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Security audit
2. Cryptographic support
3. User data protection
4. Identification and authentication
5. Security management
6. Protection of the TSF
7. TOE access
8. Trusted path/channels
9. Filtering
4.1 Security audit
The TOE provides extensive auditing capabilities. The TOE can audit events related to
cryptographic functionality, identification and authentication, and administrative actions.
The TOE generates an audit record for each auditable event. The administrator configures
auditable events, performs back-up operations, and manages audit data storage. The TOE
provides the administrator with a circular audit trail where the newest audit record will
overwrite the oldest audit record when the local storage space for audit data is full. Audit
logs are backed up over an encrypted channel to an external audit server, if so configured.
4.2 Cryptographic support
The TOE provides cryptography in support of other TOE security functionality. The TOE
provides cryptography in support of secure connections using IPsec and TLS, and remote
administrative management via SSHv2, and TLS/HTTPS. The cryptographic random bit
generators (RBGs) are seeded by an entropy noise source.
4.3 User data protection
The TOE ensures that all information flows from the TOE do not contain residual
information from previous traffic. Packets are padded with zeros. Residual data is never
transmitted from the TOE.
4.4 Identification and authentication
The TOE performs two types of authentication: device-level authentication of the remote
device (VPN peers) and user authentication for the authorized administrator of the TOE.
Device-level authentication allows the TOE to establish a secure channel with a trusted
peer. The secure channel is established only after each device authenticates the other.
Device-level authentication is performed via IKE/IPsec X509v3 certificate-based
authentication or pre-shared key methods.
The TOE provides authentication services for administrative users wishing to connect to
the TOEs secure CLI and GUI administrator interfaces. The TOE requires authorized
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administrators to authenticate prior to being granted access to any of the management
functionality. The TOE can be configured to require a minimum password length of 3-127
characters. The TOE also implements a lockout mechanism if the number of configured
unsuccessful authentication attempts has been exceeded.
The TOE provides administrator authentication against a local user database. Password-
based authentication can be performed on the serial console, SSHv2, and HTTPS
interfaces. The TOE optionally supports use of AAA server including RADIUS and
TACACS+ (part of the IT Environment) for authentication of administrative users
attempting to connect to the TOE.
4.5 Security management
The TOE provides secure administrative services for management of general TOE
configuration and the security functionality provided by the TOE. All TOE administration
occurs either through a secure SSHv2 or TLS/HTTPS session, or via a local console
connection. The TOE provides the ability to securely manage all TOE administrative
users; all identification and authentication; all audit functionality of the TOE; all TOE
cryptographic functionality; the timestamps maintained by the TOE and the information
flow control policies enforced by the TOE including encryption/decryption of information
flows for VPNs. The TOE supports an “authorized administrator” role, which equates to
any account authenticated to an administrative interface (CLI or GUI, but not VPN), and
possessing sufficient privileges to perform security-relevant administrative actions.
When a secure session is initially established, the TOE displays an administrator-
configurable warning banner. This is used to provide any information deemed necessary
by the administrator prior to logging in. After a configurable period of inactivity,
administrative sessions will be terminated, requiring administrators to re-authenticate.
4.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE protects against interference and tampering by untrusted subjects by
implementing identification, authentication, and administrator roles to limit configuration
to authorized administrators. The TOE prevents reading of cryptographic keys and
passwords.
Additionally, the TOE is not a general-purpose operating system and access to the TOE
memory space is restricted to only TOE functions.
The TOE internally maintains the date and time. This date and time are used as the
timestamp that is applied to audit records generated by the TOE. Administrators can
update the TOE’s clock manually. Additionally, the TOE performs testing to verify correct
operation of the appliance itself and that of the cryptographic module. Whenever any
system failures occur within the TOE the TOE will cease operation.
4.7 TOE access
When an administrative session is initially established, the TOE displays an administrator-
configurable warning banner. This is used to provide any information deemed necessary
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by the administrator. After a configurable period of inactivity, administrator and VPN
client sessions will be terminated, requiring re-authentication. The TOE also supports
direct connections from VPN clients and protects against threats related to those client
connections. The TOE disconnects sessions that have been idle too long and can be
configured to deny sessions based on IP, time, and day, and to NAT external IPs of
connecting VPN clients to internal network addresses.
4.8 Trusted path/channels
The TOE supports establishing trusted paths between itself and remote administrators using
SSHv2 for CLI access, and TLS/HTTPS for GUI/ASDM access apart from tunneling the
ASDM and/or SSH connections in IPsec VPN tunnels. The TOE supports use of TLS
and/or IPsec for connections with remote syslog servers. The TOE can use IPsec to
encrypt connections with remote authentication servers (e.g. RADIUS, TACACS+). The
TOE can establish trusted paths of peer-to-peer VPN tunnels using IPsec, and VPN client
tunnels using IPsec or TLS. Note that the VPN client is in the operational environment.
4.9 Filtering
The TOE provides stateful traffic firewall functionality including IP address-based filtering
(for IPv4 and IPv6) to address the issues associated with unauthorized disclosure of
information, inappropriate access to services, misuse of services, disruption or denial of
services, and network-based reconnaissance. Address filtering can be configured to restrict
the flow of network traffic between protected networks and other attached networks based
on source and/or destination IP addresses. Port filtering can be configured to restrict the
flow of network traffic between protected networks and other attached networks based on
the originating (source) and/or receiving (destination) port (service). Stateful packet
inspection is used to aid in the performance of packet flow through the TOE and to ensure
that packets are only forwarded when they’re part of a properly established session. The
TOE supports protocols that can spawn additional sessions in accordance with the protocol
RFCs where a new connection will be implicitly permitted when properly initiated by an
explicitly permitted session. The File Transfer Protocol is an example of such a protocol,
where a data connection is created as needed in response to an explicitly allowed command
connection. System monitoring functionality includes the ability to generate audit
messages for any explicitly defined (permitted or denied) traffic flow. TOE administrators
have the ability to configure permitted and denied traffic flows, including adjusting the
sequence in which flow control rules will be applied, and to apply rules to any network
interface of the TOE.
The TOE also provides packet filtering and secure IPsec tunneling. The tunnels can be
established between two trusted VPN peers as well as between remote VPN clients and the
TOE. More accurately, these tunnels are sets of security associations (SAs). The SAs
define the protocols and algorithms to be applied to sensitive packets and specify the
keying material to be used. SAs are unidirectional and are established per the ESP security
protocol. An authorized administrator can define the traffic that needs to be protected via
IPsec by configuring access lists (permit, deny, log) and applying these access lists to
interfaces using crypto map set.
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5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope
Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
• collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 23 March 2020
(NDcPP22e)
• PP-Module for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, Version 1.4 + Errata 20200625, 25
June 2020 (STFFW14e
• PP-Module for VPN Gateways, Version 1.3, 25 August 2023 (VPNGW13)
That information has not been reproduced here and the NDcPP22e/STFFW14e/VPNGW13
should be consulted if there is interest in that material.
Clarification of scope
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
NDcPP22e/STFFW14e/VPNGW13 as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other
functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other
functionality provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further
conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications
of this evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance
activities specified in the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices with
the Firewalls and VPN Gateways PP-Modules and performed by the evaluation
team).
• This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in
this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
• Apart from the Admin Guide, additional customer documentation for the specific
Firewall, VPN Gateway, Router models was not included in the scope of the
evaluation and therefore should not to be relied upon when configuring or operating
the device as evaluated.
• This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
• The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the NDcPP22e/STFFW14e/VPNGW13 and applicable
Technical Decisions. Any additional security related functional capabilities of the
TOE were not covered by this evaluation.
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6 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
• Cisco ASA 9.20 on Firepower 1000 and 2100 Series Preparative Procedures
& Operational User Guide for the Common Criteria Certified Configuration,
Version 0.5, October 28, 2024
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available
online was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not to be relied
upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as
specified in the Guidance Documentation listed above. Consumers are encouraged to
download the configuration guides from the NIAP website to ensure the device is
configured as evaluated.
7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the evaluation team. It is
derived from information contained in the proprietary Detailed Test Report for Cisco
Adaptive Security Appliances (ASA) 9.20 on Firepower 2100 Series (DTR), as summarized
in the evaluation Assurance Activity Report (AAR).
7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according to a Common Criteria Certification
document and ran the tests specified in the NDcPP22e/STFFW14e/VPNGW13 including the
tests associated with optional requirements. The Independent Testing activity is documented
in the AAR, which is publicly available, and is not duplicated here.
8 TOE Evaluated Configuration
8.1 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration consists of the following models:
TOE Configuration Hardware Configuration Software Version
FP2110
FP2120
FP2130
FP2140
The Cisco ASA on FP2100 provides high-
performance firewall and VPN services.
ASA release 9.20
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8.2 Excluded Functionality
The following functionality is excluded from the evaluation.
Table 2: Excluded Functionality
Excluded Functionality Exclusion Rationale
Telnet for management purposes Telnet passes authentication credentials in clear
text and is disabled by default.
Secure Policy Manager is excluded from the
evaluated configuration
Use of Security Policy Manager is beyond the
scope of this Common Criteria evaluation.
Filtering of non-IP traffic provided by the
EtherType option when configuring information
flow policies is excluded from the evaluated
configuration
Use of non-IP traffic filtering is beyond the scope
of this Common Criteria evaluation.
Smart Call Home. The Smart Call Home feature
provides personalized, e-mail-based and web-
based notification to customers about critical
events involving their individual systems.
Use of Smart Call Home is beyond the scope of
this Common Criteria evaluation.
ASA Cluster functionality is excluded from the
evaluated configuration.
Use of ASA Clustering is beyond the scope of this
Common Criteria evaluation.
These services will be disabled by configuration. The exclusion of this functionality does not
affect compliance to the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices (cpp_nd_v2.2e),
PP-Module for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls (mod_cpp_fw_v1.4e) and PP-Module for Virtual
Private Network (VPN) Gateways (mod_vpngw_v1.3).
9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC
version 3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Cisco Adaptive
Security Appliances (ASA) 9.20 on Firepower 2100 Series TOE to be Part 2 extended, and
to meet the SARs contained in the NDcPP22e/STFFW14e/VPNGW13.
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9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
of security requirements claimed to be met by the Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances (ASA)
9.20 on Firepower 2100 Series products that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and
product security function descriptions that support the requirements.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification
contained in the Security Target and Guidance documents. Additionally, the evaluator
performed the assurance activities specified in the NDcPP22e/STFFW14e/VPNGW13
related to the examination of the information contained in the TSS.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,
the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how
to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing
phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the
TOE was identified.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
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9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of
tests specified by the assurance activities in the NDcPP22e/STFFW14e/VPNGW13 and
recorded the results in a Test Report, summarized in the AAR.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes
a public search for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities did not uncover any
residual vulnerability.
The evaluation team searched the following sources:
• National Vulnerability Database (https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search)
• Vulnerability Notes Database (http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/)
• Rapid7 Vulnerability Database (https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities)
• Tipping Point Zero Day Initiative (http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories )
• cve.org CVE Database (https://www.cve.org/),
• Tenable Network Security (http://nessus.org/plugins/index.php?view=search)
• Offensive Security Exploit Database (https://www.exploit-db.com/)
The searches were performed on September 25, 2024, and October 28, 2024 with the
following search terms: “ASA”, “Intel Xeon D-1526”, “Intel Xeon D-1528”, “Intel Xeon
D-1548”, “Intel Xeon D-1577”, “Octeon III”, “CN7230”, “CN7340”, “CN7350”,
“CN7360”, “Broadwell”, “Cisco Security Crypto”, “FOM”, “TLS”, “SSH”, “IPsec”,
“IKE”, “radius”, “TACACS+”.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy
of the claims in the ST.
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The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE
being configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in the Cisco ASA 9.20 on
Firepower 1000 and 2100 Series Preparative Procedures & Operational User Guide for
the Common Criteria Certified Configuration, Version 0.5, October 28, 2024. As stated in
the Clarification of Scope, the evaluated functionality is scoped exclusively to the security
functional requirements specified in the ST, and the only evaluated functionality was that
which was described by the SFRs claimed in the ST. All other functionality provided by
the TOE needs to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about its
effectiveness.
Consumers employing the TOE must follow the configuration instructions provided in the
Configuration Guidance documentation listed in Section 6 to ensure the evaluated
configuration is established and maintained. It is important to note the excluded
functionality listed in Section 8.2 and follow the configuration instructions to ensure that
this functionality is disabled.
Evaluation activities are strictly bound by the assurance activities described in the
Protection Profile and accompanying Supporting Documents. Consumers and integrators of
this TOE are advised to understand the inherent limitations of these activities and take
additional measures as needed to ensure proper TOE behavior when integrated into an
operational environment.
11 Annexes
Not applicable
12 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: Cisco ASA 9.20 on Firepower 2100 Series Security
Target, Version 1.0, November 7, 2024.
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
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• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[4] collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 23 March 2020
(NDcPP22e).
[5] PP-Module for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, Version 1.4 + Errata 20200625, 25
June 2020 (STFFW14e).
[6] PP-Module for VPN Gateways, Version 1.3, 25 August 2023 (VPNGW13).
[7] Cisco ASA 9.20 on Firepower 2100 Series Security Target, Version 1.0, November
7, 2024 (ST).
[8] Assurance Activity Report for Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances (ASA) 9.20 on
Firepower 2100 Series, Version 0.3, November 7, 2024 (AAR).
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[9] Detailed Test Report for Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances (ASA) 9.20 on
Firepower 2100 Series, Version 0.3, November 7, 2024 (DTR).
[10] Evaluation Technical Report for Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances (ASA) 9.20
on Firepower 2100 Series, Version 0.3, November 7, 2024 (ETR).