TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
Head Office:
Westervoortsedijk 73
NL-6827 AV Arnhem
P.O. Box 2220
NL-6802 CE Arnhem
The Netherlands
Location Leek:
Eiberkamp 10
NL-9351 VT Leek
P.O. Box 37
NL-9350 AA Leek
The Netherlands
info@nl.tuv.com
www.tuv.com/nl
Tel. +31 (0)88 888 7 888
Fax +31 (0)88 888 7 879
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. is a
registered company at the
Netherlands Chamber of Commerce
(KVK), under number 27288788.
VAT number: NL815820380B01
IBAN: NL61DEUT0265155096
Version
2022-01
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Certification Report
NXP JCOP 4.x on P73N2M0B0.2C2/2C6 Secure Element
Sponsor and developer: NXP Semiconductors NV
High Tech Campus 60
5656 AG
Eindhoven
The Netherlands
Evaluation facility: SGS Brightsight B.V.
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-156530-CR4
Report version: 1
Project number: 156530_4
Author(s): Andy Brown
Date: 02 December 2022
Number of pages: 14
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 7
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 7
2.2 Security Policy 7
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 8
2.3.1 Assumptions 8
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 8
2.4 Architectural Information 8
2.5 Documentation 9
2.6 IT Product Testing 10
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 10
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 10
2.6.3 Test configuration 11
2.6.4 Test results 11
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 11
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 11
2.9 Evaluation Results 12
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 12
3 Security Target 13
4 Definitions 13
5 Bibliography 14
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
The presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the NXP
JCOP 4.x on P73N2M0B0.2C2/2C6 Secure Element. The developer of the NXP JCOP 4.x on
P73N2M0B0.2C2/2C6 Secure Element is NXP Semiconductors NV located in Eindhoven, The
Netherlands and they also act as the sponsor of the evaluation. A Certification Report is intended to
assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product
for their particular requirements.
The TOE is a Java Card with GP functionality. It can be used to load, install, instantiate and execute
off-card verified Java Card applets.
The TOE is a composite TOE, consisting of a Java Card smart card operating system and an
underlying platform, which is a secure micro controller. The TOE provides Java Card 3.0.4 and
preparation for Java Card 3.0.5 functionality with post-issuance applet loading, card content
management and secure channel features as specified in Global Platform 2.2.1.
It includes also NXP Proprietary Functionality: Config Applet, OS Update Component, Applet
Migration, Restricted Mode and Error Detection Code (EDC) API.
Cryptographic functionality includes 3DES, AES, RSA and RSA CRT; SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-512 hash algorithms, HMAC, ECC over GF(p). Furthermore, the TOE provides random
number generation according to class DRG.4 of AIS 20.
Note that proprietary applications have been included in the TOE, but as there are no security claims
on these applications in this certificate, these applications have not been assessed, only the self-
protection of the TSF.
The TOE was evaluated initially by SGS Brightsight B.V located in Delft, The Netherlands and was
certified on 01 April 2019. A re-evaluation also took place by SGS Brightsight B.V. and was completed
on 27 January 2020 with the approval of the ETR. A second re-evaluation also took place by SGS
Brightsight B.V. and was completed on 24-09-2020 with the approval of the ETR. This third re-
evaluation of the TOE has also been conducted by SGS Brightsight B.V. and was completed on 02
December 2022 with the approval of the ETR. The re-certification procedure has been conducted in
accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security
[NSCIB].
The second issue of the Certification Report was a result of a “recertification with major changes”. The
major changes were the addition of two variants, JCOP 4.5 and JCOP 4.6, with a renaming of the
TOE to “JCOP 4.x on P73N2M0B0.2C2/2C6 Series” and recertification of the underlying hardware.
The security evaluation re-used the evaluation results of previously performed evaluations. A full, up to
date vulnerability analysis was made, as well as renewed testing.
The third issue of the Certification Report was a result of a “recertification with major changes”.
The major changes were the addition of variant JCOP 4.8 and a renaming of the TOE to “JCOP 4.x on
P73N2M0B0.2C2/2C6 Secure Element".
The security evaluation re-used the evaluation results of previously performed evaluations. A full, up to
date vulnerability analysis was made, as well as renewed testing.
This fourth issue of the Certification Report is a result of a “recertification with major changes”.
The major changes are the claim of conformance to Java Card Protection Profile – Open
Configuration Protection Profile version 3.1, [JC PP] and addition of variant JCOP 4.10 with
associated guidance.
Additionally, some development activities have been relocated from one site to a different, already-
evaluated site.
The security evaluation reused the evaluation results of previously performed evaluations. This
included the use of a site reuse report to cover some development activities that have been relocated
from a site that was used during the previous certification activities.
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A full, up-to-date vulnerability analysis has been made, as well as renewed testing.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the NXP JCOP 4.x on P73N2M0B0.2C2/2C6
Secure Element, the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at
which the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the NXP JCOP 4.x
on P73N2M0B0.2C2/2C6 Secure Element are advised to verify that their own environment is
consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and
recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR]
1
for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL5 Include the following, if applicable: augmented (EAL5+)
assurance requirements for the evaluated security functionality. This assurance level is augmented
with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security measures), ASE_TSS.2 (“TOE summary specification with
architectural design summary”), ALC_FLR.1 (Basic flaw remediation) and AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced
methodical vulnerability analysis).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets
all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will
be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the
specific version of the product as evaluated.
1
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the NXP JCOP 4.x on P73N2M0B0.2C2/2C6
Secure Element from NXP Semiconductors NV located in Eindhoven, The Netherlands.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery item
type
Identifier
Version
Hardware
(Part of P73
certificates)
NXP High-Performance secure controller
“P73N2M0B0.202”
B.02
Software /
Firmware
(Part of SN73
certificates)
Factory OS 1.4.4
Boot OS 1.2.3 PL2 v8
Flash Driver Support 1.5.2
“P73N2M0B0.2C2” Service Software 1.9.14
“P73N2M0B0.2C2” Crypto Library 1.0.8
“P732N2M0B0.2C6” Service Software 1.9.18
“P732N2M0B0.2C6” Crypto Library 1.0.8
Software
“JCOP 4.2 R1.10.0” OS, Native applications and OS Update
Component
JCOP 4.2 R1.10.0
“JCOP 4.5 R1.07.0”
OS, Native applications and OS Update
JCOP 4.5 R1.07.0
Configuration “JCOP 4.6 R1.04.0”
OS, Native applications and OS Update
JCOP 4.6 R1.04.0
Configuration “JCOP 4.8 R1.01.0”
OS, Native applications and OS Update
JCOP 4.8 R1.01.0
Configuration “JCOP 4.10 R1.05.0”
OS, Native applications and OS Update
JCOP 4.10 R1.05.0
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the NXP JCOP 4.x on
P73N2M0B0.2C2/2C6 Secure Element. For details, see section 2.5 “Documentation” of this report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle refer to the [ST], chapter 1.3.2.
2.2 Security Policy
This TOE is a composite TOE, consisting of a Java Card smart card operating system, an OS updater,
an applet migration feature, a restricted mode and an underlying platform, which is composed of a
library which provides cryptographic functions and a secure micro controller. The TOE provides Java
Card 3.0.4 functionality with post-issuance applet loading, card content management and secure
channel features as specified in Global Platform 2.2.1 including SCP03. It includes also NXP
proprietary functionalities:
 Config Applet: JCOP OS includes a Config Applet that can be used for configuration of the
TOE.
 OS Update Component: Proprietary functionality that can update JCOP OS or UpdaterOS.
 Applet Migration: Keep User Data, Key Data or PIN Data after updating an applet.
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Restricted Mode: In Restricted Mode only very limited functionality of the TOE is available such as,
e.g.: reading logging information or resetting the Attack Counter
 Error Detection Code (EDC) API.
Cryptographic functionality includes 3DES, AES, RSA and RSA CRT; SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-512 hash algorithms, HMAC, ECC over GF(p). Furthermore, the TOE provides random
number generation according to class DRG.4 of AIS 20.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 5.2 of the [ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
2.4 Architectural Information
The logical architecture, originating from the Security Target [ST], of the TOE can be depicted as
follows:
Logical architecture of the TOE
The TOE has the following features:
 Cryptographic algorithms and functionality:
o 3DES for en-/decryption (CBC and ECB) and MAC generation and verification (2-key
3DES, 3-key 3DES, Retail-MAC, CMAC and CBC-MAC).
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o AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) for en-/decryption (GCM, CCM, CBC and ECB)
and MAC generation and verification (CMAC, CBC-MAC).
o RSA and RSA CRT for en-/decryption and signature generation and verification.
o RSA and RSA CRT key generation.
o SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 hash algorithm.
o Secure SHA-1, Secure SHA-224, Secure SHA-256, Secure SHA-384, Secure SHA-
512 hash algorithm.
o HMAC
o ECC over GF(p) for signature generation and verification (ECDSA).
o ECC over GF(p) key generation for key agreement.
o Random number generation according to class DRG.3 of AIS 20
 Java Card 3.0.4 and preparation for Java Card 3.0.5 functionality.
 GlobalPlatform 2.2.1 functionality.
 NXP Proprietary Functionality:
o Config Applet: JCOP OS includes a Config Applet used for configuration of the TOE.
o OS Update Component: Proprietary functionality that can update JCOP OS or
UpdaterOS.
o Applet Migration: Keep User Data, Key Data or PIN Data after updating an applet.
o Restricted Mode: In Restricted Mode only very limited functionality of the TOE is
available such as, e.g.: reading logging information or resetting the Attack Counter.
o Error Detection Code (EDC) API.
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
JCOP 4 PN8xy Common Criteria Requirements for NXP PN8xy Products Rev 1.1
JCOP 4.2 R1.10.0 specific documents
JCOP 4.2 R1.10.0 (JCOP 4.2 7.2.10) User Guidance Manual Rev 1.34
JCOP 4.2 R1.10.0 (JCOP 4.2 7.2.10) User Guidance Manual Addendum Rev 1.23
JCOP 4..2 R1.10.0 (JCOP 4.2 7.2.10) Anomaly Sheet Rev 1.8
JCOP 4.5 R1.07.0 specific documents
JCOP 4.5 R1.07.0 (JCOP 4.5 9.2.07) User Guidance Manual Rev 3.13
JCOP 4.5 R1.07.0 (JCOP 4.5 9.2.07) User Guidance Addendum Rev 3.8
JCOP 4.5 R1.10.0 (JCOP 4.5 9.2.07) Anomaly Sheet Rev 3.10
JCOP 4.6 R1.04.0 specific documents
JCOP 4.6 R1.04.0 (JCOP 4.6 11.2.04) User Guidance Manual Rev 5.9
JCOP 4.6 R1.04.0 (JCOP 4.6 11.2.04) User Guidance Manual Addendum Rev 5.5
JCOP 4.6 R1.04.0 (JCOP 4.6 11.2.04) Anomaly Sheet Rev 5.6
JCOP 4.8 R1.01.0 specific documents
JCOP 4.8 R1.01.0 (JCOP 4.8 13.2.01) User Guidance Manual Rev 7.4
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JCOP 4.8 R1.01.0 (JCOP 4.8 13.2.01) User Guidance Manual Addendum Rev 7.2
JCOP 4.8 R1.01.0 (JCOP 4.8 13.2.01) Anomaly Sheet Rev 7.2
JCOP 4.10 R1.05.0 specific documents
JCOP 4.10 R1.05.0 (JCOP 4.10 17.2.05) User Guidance Manual Rev 10.6
JCOP 4.10 R1.05.0 (JCOP 4.10 17.2.05) User Guidance Manual
Addendum
Rev 10.5
JCOP 4.10 R1.05.0 (JCOP 4.10 17.2.05) Anomaly Sheet Rev 10.5
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer used a set of test suites (industry standard and proprietary ones) and tools to test the
TOE as well as an emulator, PC Platform and FPGA tool as some tests could only be performed in
such environment. The identification was checked based on the SVN number. The developer uses a
distributed test environment to allow usage of a vast amount of simultaneously driven testing
equipment.
The developer has performed extensive testing on FSP, subsystem, module and module interface
level.
Code coverage analysis is used by NXP to verify overall test completeness. The evaluator used an
agreed approach for evaluating ATE based on code coverage analysis. The evaluator also used an
acceptable alternative approach (as described in the application notes, Section 14.2.2 in [CEM]) and
used analysis of the implementation representation (i.e. inspection of source code) to validate the
rationales provided by the developer.
The developer has performed extensive testing on functional specification, subsystem and SFR-
enforcing module level. All parameter choices have been addressed at least once. All boundary cases
identified have been tested explicitly, and additionally the near-boundary conditions have been
covered probabilistically. The testing was largely automated using industry standard and proprietary
test suites. Test scripts were extensively used to verify that the functions return the expected values.
The underlying hardware and crypto-library test results are extendable to composite evaluations, as
the underlying platform is operated according to its guidance and the composite evaluation
requirements are met.
For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer has provided samples and a test
environment. In the baseline evaluation, the evaluators reproduced a selection of the developer tests,
as well as a small number of test cases designed by the evaluator.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
The methodical analysis performed was conducted along the following steps:
 When evaluating the evidence in the classes ASE, ADV and AGD potential vulnerabilities
were identified from generating questions to the type of TOE and the specified behaviour.
 For ADV_IMP a thorough implementation representation review was performed on the TOE.
During this attack oriented analysis, the protection of the TOE was analysed using the
knowledge gained from all previous evaluation classes. This resulted in the identification of
additional potential vulnerabilities. This analysis was performed taking into account the attack
methods in [JIL-AM] and attack potential in [JIL-AP]. An important source for assurance in this
step is the technical report [HW-ETRfC] of the underlying platform.
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 All potential vulnerabilities were analysed using the knowledge gained from all evaluation
classes and information from the public domain. A judgment was made on how to assure that
these potential vulnerabilities are not exploitable by using [JIL-AP]. For most of the potential
vulnerabilities a penetration test was defined. Several potential vulnerabilities were found to be
not exploitable due to an impractical attack path.
In the initial re-certification, 4 complementary tests were performed against a test effort of 6 weeks. In
the second re-certification 4 perturbation tests, 1 side channel test and 1 logical test were performed
with a test effort of 8 weeks. In this third re-certification the total test effort expended by the evaluators
was 10 weeks. During that test campaign, 43% of the total time was spent on Perturbation attacks and
57% on logical tests.
See details in [ETRfC].
2.6.3 Test configuration
During this re-certification with major change, samples were used that provided assurance for all four
configurations, i.e. “JCOP 4.2 R1.10.0”, “JCOP 4.5 R1.07.0”, “JCOP 4.6 R1.04.0” and “JCOP 4.8
R1.01.0”, “JCOP 4.10 R1.05.0. Please note that for some tests, intermediate and earlier versions were
used. The used intermediate and earlier versions provide assurance for the TOE configurations as the
code base and security concepts are shared. The following intermediate versions were used: “JCOP
4.2 R2.11.0”, “JCOP 4.9 R2.03.0”, “JCOP 4.6 R2.02.0” and “JCOP 4.5 R1.05.0”.
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e. from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account. The TOE supports a wide
range of key sizes (see [ST]), including those with a sufficient algorithmic security level to exceed 100
bits as required for high attack potential (AVA_VAN.5).
The strength of the implementation of the cryptographic functionality has been assessed in the
evaluation, as part of the AVA_VAN activities. These activities revealed that for some cryptographic
functionality the security level could be reduced. As the remaining security level still exceeds 80 bits,
this is considered sufficient. So no exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent
penetration tests.
For composite evaluations, please consult the [ETRfC] for details.
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
This is a re-certification. Documentary evaluation results of the earlier version of the TOE have been
reused, but vulnerability analysis and penetration testing has been renewed.
Sites involved in the development and production of the hardware platform were reused by
composition.
There has been extensive reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the development and
production of the software component of the TOE, by use of 7 Site Technical Audit Reports.
No sites have been visited as part of this evaluation.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number NXP JCOP 4.x on
P73N2M0B0.2C2/2C6 Secure Element.
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The TOE can be identified using the Platform Identifier, tag DF20, as explained in Section 1.2 of the
respective “User Guidance Manual” listed in section 2.5 of this Certification Report.
The term “Platform” is being used for the entire TOE. This means that the DF20 tag as returned shall
have the following value in ASCII format:
JCOP 4.x revision Identifier
JCOP 4.2 R1.10.0 J5Q2M00148750000
JCOP 4.5 R1.07.0 J5Q2M001C1A10000
JCOP 4.6 R1.04.0 J5Q2M002242B0000
JCOP 4.8 R1.01.0 J5Q2M0027B840000
JCOP 4.10 R1.05.0 J5Q2M00386040000
2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents, and Site Technical Audit Report(s) for the site(s)
[STAR]
2
. To support composite evaluations according to [COMP] a derived document [ETRfC] was
provided and approved. This document provides details of the TOE evaluation that must be
considered when this TOE is used as platform in a composite evaluation.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the NXP JCOP 4.x on
P73N2M0B0.2C2/2C6 Secure Element, to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant, and to
meet the requirements of EAL 5 augmented with AVA_VAN.5, ASE_TSS.2, ALC_DVS.2 and
ALC_FLR.1. This implies that the product satisfies the security requirements specified in Security
Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ‘demonstrable’ conformance to the Protection Profile [PP].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the
countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the
software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations
for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant
details concerning the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: none.
Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength to satisfy the AVA_VAN.5
“high attack potential”. To be protected against attackers with a "high attack potential", appropriate
cryptographic algorithms with sufficiently large cryptographic key sizes shall be used (references can
be found in national and international documents and standards).
2
The Site Technical Audit Report contains information necessary to an evaluation lab and
certification body for the reuse of the site audit report in a TOE evaluation.
Page: 13/14 of report number: NSCIB-CC-156530-CR4, dated 02 December 2022
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
3 Security Target
The NXP JCOP4.x on P73N2M0B0.2C2/2C6 Secure Element Security Target, Rev. 4.2, 28
September 2022 [ST] is included here by reference.
Please note that, to satisfy the need for publication, a public version [ST-lite] has been created and
verified according to [ST-SAN].
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
ACL Access Control List
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC Cipher Block Chaining (a block cipher mode of operation)
CBC-MAC Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code
DES Data Encryption Standard
DFA Differential Fault Analysis
ECB Electronic Code Book (a block cipher mode of operation)
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EMA Electromagnetic Analysis
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
MAC Message Authentication Code
NSCIB Netherlands scheme for certification in the area of IT security
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PP Protection Profile
RNG Random Number Generator
RMI Remote Method Invocation
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SPA/DPA Simple/Differential Power Analysis
TOE Target of Evaluation
TRNG True Random Number Generator
Page: 14/14 of report number: NSCIB-CC-156530-CR4, dated 02 December 2022
®
TÜV,
TUEV
and
TUV
are
registered
trademarks.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and
III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report “NXP JCOP 4.x on P73N2M0B0.2C2/2C6 Secure
Element” – EAL5+, 22-RPT-1301, Version 2.0, 29 November 2022
[ETRfC] Evaluation Technical Report for Composition “JCOP 4.x on
P73N2M0B0.2C2/2C6 Secure Element” – EAL5+, 22-RPT-1300, Version 2.0, 29
November 2022
[HW-CERT] Certificate for P73N2M0B0.202, ANSSI-CC-2018/52-S03, 14 January 2022
[HW-FIRM] Certificate for P73N2M0B0.2C2, ANSSI-CC-2019/62-S02, 14 January 2022
[HW-ETRfC] Surveillance Technical report Lite for composition P73_P73-
CL_P73A_P73B_P73C6_STR_LITE_V2.0, 7 December 2021, version 2.0
[HW-STLITE] Security Target Lite, P73N2M0B0.2C2/2C6, rev 3.3, 22 August 2019
[JIL-AAPS] JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.1, June 2020
[JC PP] Java Card System – Open Configuration Protection Profile Version 3.1, April
2020, registered under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0099-V2-2020, 06 May 2020
[JIL-AM] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.4, January 2020
(sensitive with controlled distribution)
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.5,
28 March 2019
[ST] NXP JCOP4.x on P73N2M0B0.2C2/2C6 Secure Element Security Target, Rev.
4.2, 28 September 2022
[ST-lite] NXP JCOP4.x on P73N2M0B0.2C2/2C6 Secure Element Security Target Lite,
Rev 4.2, 28 September 2022
[ST-SAN] ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-004, April
2006
(This is the end of this report.)